519BV$spin 05-12-99 06:48:38 UNITED STATES REPORTS 519 OCT. TERM 1996 AMENDMENTS OF RULES 519BV$titl 05-12-99 06:54:32 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 519 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Beginning of Term October 7, 1996, Through February 26, 1997 Together With Opinion of Individual Justice in Chambers FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1999 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 519BV$ Unit: $UII [06-25-99 12:25:11] PGT: FRT Erratum 516 U. S. 1101, line 7: "63 Ohio St. 3d 1418" should be "63 Ohio St. 3d 1419". ii 519bv$$iii 05-13-99 09:08:02 PGT * frtbx n J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. WALTER DELLINGER, Acting Solicitor General.* WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. *Acting Solicitor General Dellinger was presented to the Court on October 7, 1996. See post, p. v. iii 519BV$$$iv 05-12-99 06:51:43 PGT * frtbx n SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv 519BV$$$$v 05-12-99 06:51:53 PGT * frtbx n PRESENTATION OF THE ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL Supreme Court of the United States MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1996 Present: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. The Chief Justice said: The Court now recognizes the Attorney General, Janet Reno. The Attorney General said: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. I have the honor to present to the Court the Acting Solicitor Gen- eral, Walter Dellinger of North Carolina. The Chief Justice said: Thank you, General Reno. Mr. Solicitor General, the Court welcomes you to the per- formance of the important office that you have assumed, to represent the government of the United States before this Court. We wish you well in your new office. v Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1994 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. The opinion reported on page 1301 et seq. is that written in chambers by an individual Justice. Page Aaron; Brown Group, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Aaron; Brown Shoe Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Aaron v. Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1143 Abandy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Abate v. Walton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Abbott v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 522 Benefit Plan . . . . . . . . 1111 ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Abdallah v. United Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Abdelsayed; Narumanchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Abdullah v. Milonas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Abdullah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Abebe-Jiri; Negewo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Abel; Giffler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Abele Assoc. v. Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Prop. Assess., App. & Rev. 868 Abidekun v. Commissioner of Social Services of New York City 891 Abidekun v. Coombe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Abou-Kassem v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Abraham; Selby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Abraham v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Abrams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,947,1038 Acevedo; Huss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Acevedo Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Achilles Corp. v. Kaepa, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Acker; Jefferson County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Acklen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Acosta; Yawczak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Acosta Coronado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 ACS Construction Co. of Miss.; Parkson Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 vii Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR viii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Acty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Acura of Bellevue v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Adams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Adams v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Adams v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Adams v. Burlington Northern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Adams; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Adams v. Cumberland Farms, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Adams v. Florida Dept. of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Adams; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,940,973,1047,1049 Adams County Detention Facility; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Adelman v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Adelphia Cable; Noel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Adesanya v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1062 Adigwu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Adkins; Mahern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Advanced Communications Corp. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Afaneh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 African Union Meth. Prot. Church and Connection v. Mother Afri- can Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Agostini v. Felton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Agostini; Felton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Agribank, FCB; Goetzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Aguilar v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1023 Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Aguilar Riley Ozmen v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1072 Ahmed v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Ainge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Ajugwo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Akbar-El v. Wise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Akins v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Alabama; Carlton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Alabama; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Alabama; Grayson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Alabama; Land v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Alabama; McConico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Alabama; Peagler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Alabama; Slaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Alabama; Sockwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Alabama; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Alabama; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Alabama Dept. of Ed.; Moody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ix Page Alabama State Bar; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Alabama State Bar; Lindsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Alachua County School Bd.; N. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Alaska v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Alaska; Foutch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Alaska; Mendenhall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Alaska; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Alaska; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1038 Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n; Carlson v. . . . . . . . 1101 Albanese v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Alberto Pelaez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Albertson's, Inc.; Everman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Albino v. Machado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Albright; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Albuquerque v. Church on Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Aldi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Aldrich v. General Public Utilities Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Aldridge v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Aldy; Valmet Oy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Aleman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Alexander v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Alexander; Systems Fuel, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Alexandria Physicians Group, Ltd.; Power v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Ali v. Dugger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Ali v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Ali v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 A. L. L.; Allred v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Allah v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Allard v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Allders International (Ships) Ltd. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Allegheny County; DeSarno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Prop. Assess., App. & Rev.; Abele Assoc. v. 868 Allemnore Community Hospital v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Allen v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Allen v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Allen v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Allen; Rawlins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1102 Allen v. Unison Transformer Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1033,1070 Allgood v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1035 Allphin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Allred v. A. L. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR x TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page All Right, Title and Interest in Real Property and Appurtenances Thereto Known as 143­147 East 23d St., N. Y. v. United States 816 Allstate Ins. Co.; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Almero v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Almodovar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Almonte-Nunez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Alonso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Alston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Alston v. Guillory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Alt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Altamirano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Altimus v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Altman; Ronwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Altschul v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1066 Altschul v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Parole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Altschul v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Alvarado-Delgado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1082 Alvarez-Machain; Sosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Alver v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,891 Alzate-Yepez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Amato v. Richmond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Amayo v. Paul Revere Ins. Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1054,1075,1103 Amen-Ra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 American Airlines, Inc.; Cheek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. FHLMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Freddie Mac . . . . . . . . . . . 812 American Bar Assn.; Rohan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 American Bd. of Plastic Surgery; Soignier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 American Broadcasting Cos. v. BankAtlantic Financial Corp. . . . 867,979 American Civil Liberties Union; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 American Civil Liberties Union of Miss., Inc.; King v. . . . . . . . . . 992 American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 American Diversified Investment Corp.; Sahni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 American Express Co.; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1001 American Express Travel Related Services Co.; Brown v. . 837,896,1049 American Home Products, Inc.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 American Honda Motor Co.; Montag v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 American Institute of Law, Econ. & Comp. Studies v. Cenlar FSB 823 American Legion Post No. 3 v. Separation of Church & State Comm. 1038 American Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Trostel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 American National Red Cross; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 American Nonwovens, Inc.; Moses v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xi Page American Savings Bank, F. A.; Wyshak v. . . . . . . . . . 866,950,1023,1035 American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Mich.; Zimmer v. . . . . . . 910 America Speaks v. America's Talking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 America Speaks v. Cable National Broadcasting Co. . . . . . . . . . . 1058 America's Talking; America Speaks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 America's Talking; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Ameritas Investment Corp. v. Slinkard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Amerson v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Ames v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Ames v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Amiri v. U. S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Amitin v. Maryland Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Amoco Energy Trading Corp. v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Amoco Oil Co.; Schaumburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 AMREP, Inc.; Busch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Anchondo v. Cyprus Minerals Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Anchors v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Anderskow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Anderson v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Anderson v. Dortch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1143 Anderson v. Envirotest Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Anderson v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1023 Anderson v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Anderson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1143 Anderson; Macaluso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Anderson v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,956,1100,1132 Anderson Community School Corp.; K. R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Anderson Studios; Macaluso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Andrade v. Burlingame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Andrade v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Andress v. Cleveland Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Andrews; Sheffield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1071 Andrews; Wills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Andrick v. Pool Energy Services Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Andrzejewski v. California Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. . . . . 1095,1156 Andy Cook's Truck Stop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Angelo Morales; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Angelone v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Angelone; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Angelone; Coe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Angelone; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,884 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Angelone; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Angelone v. Montcalm Publishing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Angino v. Board of Supervisors of Middle Paxton Township . . . . 823 Anheuser-Busch, Inc.; John Labatt Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Anjelica Nurseries, Inc. v. Corado-Ceron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Anthony v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Anton; United States ex rel. Hopper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Antonelli v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Antonio Duque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Antonio Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Antonio Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 A­1 Contractors; Strate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 A. O. Smith Corp.; Klehr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Aparacio-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co.; David v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Aponte-Velazquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Appawoo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Appellate Div., Sup. Ct. of N. Y., First Jud. Dept.; Marinoff v. 998,1143 Archer v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Archuleta v. Farmington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Ard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Ardell v. Stark & Stark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Arena Sports, Inc. v. First American Bank of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Arewa v. Gearinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Argento v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Arias v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Arizona; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Arizona; Arizona Central R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Arizona; Betancourt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Arizona; DePiano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Arizona; Gallegos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Arizona; Greenwalt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Arizona; Hedlund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Arizona; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Arizona; Hyde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Arizona; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Arizona; Kemp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Arizona; Laird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Arizona; McCall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Arizona; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Arizona; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Arizona; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Arizona; Roscoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Arizona; Schurz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xiii Page Arizona; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Arizona; Spears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Arizona; Towery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Arizona; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Arizona Central R. Co. v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Arkansas v. Bradford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Arkansas v. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Ark. . . . . . . . . . . 805,1085 Arkansas; Jessep v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Arkansas; Kemp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Arkansas; Misskelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Arkansas; Nance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Arkansas; Reams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Arkansas; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Arkansas; York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Arkansas State Univ.; Labickas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Arkansas Term Limits v. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1149 Arkoma Production Co. v. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Arline v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Armendariz-Mata v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Armentrout v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Armontrout; Ruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Armstrong; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Armstrong; Calder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Armstrong v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Armstrong Law Offices; Bergmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Army Claims Service; O'Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Arnold v. Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Arnold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1033,1155 Arnold and Baker Farms v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Arocho Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Arroyo Jusino v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1048 Arroyo-Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Arteaga v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Arteaga v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1157 Arthur v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Artuz; Blake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Artuz; Maietta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Artuz; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Arvada; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Asam, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Asam v. Alabama State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Asam v. Disciplinary Bd. of Ala. State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1001 Ash v. Swest, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ashcroft; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Asher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Ashford v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Ashland County; Jaakkola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Ashley v. Huntsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ashton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Askew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Askew v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Associated Univs., Inc.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1106 Associate Tribal Judge v. A­1 Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Association for Telecommunications Servs. v. Iowa Util. Bd. . . . . 978 Atamian v. Chin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Atcheson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. 1003,1089 Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Atkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1145 Atkins v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Atkinson v. Oglesby Plant Laboratories, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Atlanta; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Atlanta City School Dist.; Dowling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Atlantic Science & Technology, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 809 AT&T Corporate Headquarters; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 AT&T Family Fed. Credit Union v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 1148 Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Attorney General; Cisneros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Attorney General; Dee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1001 Attorney General; Lassiter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Attorney General; Plumbers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Attorney General; Tlaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Attorney General; zu Mike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Attorney General of Ala.; Owes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Attorney General of Cal. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,976 Attorney General of Cal.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,976 Attorney General of Colo.; Marin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Attorney General of Fla.; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Attorney General of Fla.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Attorney General of Fla.; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Attorney General of Fla.; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Attorney General of Fla.; Siers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Attorney General of Ga.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Attorney General of Ind.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page Attorney General of La. v. CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. . . . . . 964 Attorney General of La.; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Attorney General of La.; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Attorney General of Miss.; Dupree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Attorney General of Miss. v. Ingebretsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Attorney General of Miss.; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Attorney General of N. M.; Wilson Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Attorney General of N. Y. v. Quill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Attorney General of Ohio; Children's Healthcare Is Legal Duty v. 1149 Attorney General of Okla.; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Attorney General of Pa.; Lutz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Attorney General of Tex.; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Attorney General of Tex.; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Attorney General of Va.; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Attorney General of Wash.; Gravel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Loss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Attorney Regist. & Discip. Comm'n, Sup. Ct. of Ill.; Bell v. . . . . . 905 Aubin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Auburn; O'Neill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Audia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Auer v. Robbins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452,924,946,979 Augustine v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Ault; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Austin; Persimmon Hollow Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Autek Systems Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Auto Glass Employees Fed. Credit Union; Automobile Workers v. 814 Automobile Workers v. Auto Glass Employees Fed. Credit Union 814 Automotive Rentals, Inc.; McAdams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 AutoZone, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Avena v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Awkal v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Ayeboua v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1024 Ayer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Ayers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Azeez v. Duncil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Azhocar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Aziz v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Azubuko v. Board of Trustees, Framingham State College . . . . . 1134 B. v. Alachua County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 B. v. S. L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Baba v. Warren Management Consultants, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1022 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Babbitt; Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Babbitt v. Youpee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 Babineaux v. Klevenhagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Bacchi v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Baez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1137 Baird v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Baker; Flattum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Baker; Goudy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Baker v. Independent Order of Foresters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Baker v. Lusk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Baker; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Baker v. Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Baker v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1023 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1020,1140 Bakery Centre Associates; Orientations Gallery, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 812 Balasubramani v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. . . . 868 Balawajder v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Balboa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Balcazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Baldwin; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Baldwin Hardware Corp.; Klayman & Associates, P. C. v. . . . . . . 949 Baldwinville; Kahre-Richardes Family Foundation, Inc. v. . . . . . . 869 Balint v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Ball v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Ball; Interoceanica Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Ballard v. Albright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Ballard v. Kapila . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Ballard v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Ballew v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Balog v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Balter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Baltimore City Jail; Oriakhi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Bane v. Sprouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 BankAtlantic Financial Corp.; American Broadcasting Cos. v. . . 867,979 Bankers Trust Co.; Blytheville Compress Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Banko v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa. . . . . . . . . . 885 Bank of Baroda; Indu Craft, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Bank of N. Y. v. Continental Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1156 Bank One Columbus, N. A.; O'Brien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Bank One, Indianapolis, N. A.; Frey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Banks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xvii Page Banks v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Banks; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Banks v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Banks v. Witt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Bankston v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. . . . . . . . 891,1001 Banshee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Baptiste v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Baptist Medical Center Princeton; Coughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Barbee v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Barbee v. Philadelphia School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Barber v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Barber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Barberena-Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1023 Barbour; Gossage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Barclays Bank of N. Y.; Heady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Barclays Bank of N. Y.; Heady Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Bardsley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Barfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Barker v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Barkley v. Conner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Barnes v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,857,986,1001,1100 Barnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Baron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Barone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1146 Barone v. Feldmeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Barr, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Barr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Barrera; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Barrett v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1135 Barry v. Burdines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Barry; Little v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Barry v. Pennsylvania Higher Ed. Assistance Agency . . . . . . . . . 834 Barry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Barth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Barth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1023 Bartholic v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1153 Barton v. Landmark Land Co. of Carolina, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Barton v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Barton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Bartron, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Bascue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Basey v. Herklotz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Basich v. Board of Pensions, Evangelical Luth. Church in Am. 810 Basinger v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Basket v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Bast v. Glasberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Bast v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Bastidas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,986 Bates v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Bates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1108 Baticados v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Battle v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Battle; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Baucum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Bauer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1131 Baugher v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Bausch & Lomb, Inc.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1035 Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Bayer; Calder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Bayliner Marine Corp.; Powers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Bayshore National Bank of La Porte v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Bazel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Beagles v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Beals v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Beam; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Bean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Beasley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Beaver v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Beavers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1070 Becerra v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bechtel Energy Corp. v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Beck; Pittsburgh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Becker; Committee of Dental Amalgam Alloy Mfrs. and Distrs. v. 1084 Becker; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Becker v. Southwest Travis County Road Dist. No. 1 . . . . . . . . 933,1024 Beckey v. Cenlar Federal Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Becton, Dickinson & Co.; Dunmeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Bedonie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Began; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Beicker Engineering, Inc.; Kahn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1071 Belanger; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Belcher v. Lesley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Bell v. Attorney Regist. & Discip. Comm'n, Sup. Ct. of Ill. . . . . . 905 Bell v. Hallandale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Bell v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix Page Bell v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Bell v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc.; Cleckner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Jarrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Benet-Melendez; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Benge v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Bennett v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Bennett; Angelone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Bennett v. Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough . . 1108 Bennett; Neuman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Bennett; Pippin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,1022 Bennett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Bennington College Corp.; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Benoit v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Benson v. Communications Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Benson; Fenney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Benson; Phea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Benson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Benson; Wayne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Bentley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1066 Benton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1035 Ben Yahweh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Beretta U. S. A. Corp.; Stiltner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Berge; Galowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Berger; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Bergmann v. Armstrong Law Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bergmann v. Erdmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Bergquist; Wishnatsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1024 Bergstrom v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Berk v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Berkeley Marina Marriott Management; Iqbal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Berkey; Krivonak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1143 Berkley v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1072 Berman; Washington Times Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Bernal-Arroyave v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Berndt v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Bernklau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Bernstein v. National Transportation Safety Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Bernys v. Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Berry; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Berry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Bertagnolli, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Berthelot; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Beshears; Witherspoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Best v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Best v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Betancourt v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Betancourt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Bevere; Helbling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Bevil v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Bexar County Tax Office; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Beyer; Russo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1072 Beyond, Inc.; Paulsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Bibbings; Witherspoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 BIC Corp. v. Carney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 BIC Corp.; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Bickel; Korean Air Lines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Biddulph v. Mortham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bienvenu; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Bierley v. Franz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1036 Bierley v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1102 Bigpond v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1072 Billis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1024 Billman v. Department of Human Services, Franklin County . . . . 1041 Billmyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Billy-Eko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Bi-Lo, Inc.; Craven v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Bindana Investments Co. Ltd. v. Knee Deep Cattle Co. . . . . . . . . 1144 Binderup v. Brooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Bisaccia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Bishop v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Bishop v. State Bar of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Bishop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Bisson; Furrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Black v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Blackiston v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Blackman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Blackmon v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Blackshear; Fischer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Blagg v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Blais v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Blake v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Blake v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi Page Blalock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Blanchard v. Williams, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Bland v. Fessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Blandino v. Lindler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1102 Blandino v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Blank v. Hawkesworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Blentech Corp.; Ruiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Blessing v. Freestone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Blinder v. Hoxworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Blodgett; LaRue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Blue v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio v. Schachner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., Inc.; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Blytheville Compress Co. v. Bankers Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 B&M Farms v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 BMW of North America, Inc.; Sitkoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Board of County Comm'rs of Cleveland County v. Shinault . . . . . 1078 Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of Watervliet v. Russman . . . . . 1106 Board of Immigration Appeals; Everett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Board of Medical Examiners of Ariz.; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Board of Pensions, Evangelical Luth. Church in Am.; Basich v. 810 Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System; Frey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Board of Regents, Univ. of Mich.; Yohn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Board of Selectmen for Canton; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1035 Board of Supervisors of Middle Paxton Township; Angino v. . . . . 823 Board of Trustees, Framingham State College; Azubuko v. . . . . . 1134 Board of Trustees of City Univ. of N. Y.; Soffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Board of Trustees of Univ. of N. H.; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Boateng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Boblett v. Terry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Boccella v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Bock; Unigard Security Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Boerne v. Flores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Boggi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Boggs v. Boggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1039,1089 Bojorquez-Gastelum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Bolden; Morton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Bolden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1119 Bolt v. Ptarmigan Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Boltach v. Dexter Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Bolton v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Bond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Boney v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Bonnette v. Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Division . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Bono v. Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Bonta v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Bonty v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Booker; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Booker v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Boone v. Tompkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Boone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Booth v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Boothby; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Boots v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Borcsik v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Borden, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Borg; MacInnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Borjesson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Borough. See name of borough. Borromeo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Bosse; Rayford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Bossier; Bridges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Bossier Parish School Bd.; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Bossier Parish School Bd.; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Bostic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Bostitch Co.; Lawal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Boston; Gillen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Boston Pointe Corp.; Popejoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Botaba Realty Co.; Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. . . 863 Botello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Botello Cervantes v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Bottoson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Botzheim; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Boulden v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Boulineau v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bounds v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Bovis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Bowden v. Public Building Comm'n of Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Bowden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Bowen v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Bowers v. Saturn General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Bowers; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Bowersox v. Driscoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Bowersox; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Bowersox; Heistand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Bowersox; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxiii Page Bowersox; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1036 Bowersox; Lowe-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Bowersox; Schleeper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Bowersox; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Bowersox; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Bowersox; Zeitvogel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1036 Bowlen; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Bowlin v. Mease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Bowling; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,987 Bowling v. Cates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Bowman v. Bowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,987 Bowman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,881 Bowman v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Bowyer v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Box; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Boyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Boyd v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Boyd; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1024 Boyd v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Boyd v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Boyd v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Boyer; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Boyett v. Tomberlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Boyle v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Boyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Boynton; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Brabson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Bracco Diagnostics Inc.; Generic Pharmaceutical Industry v. . . . . 1101 Bracco Diagnostics Inc. v. Kessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Bracy v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1106 Bradford; Arkansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Bradley v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Bradley v. Meko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Bradshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Brady, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1074 Brady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Brahms-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Brancato v. Grady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Branscum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Branton; Salmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Braswell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Braun v. Lorillard, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Brawner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Bray v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Bray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Breast Implant Tort Claimants Represented by O'Quinn, Keren- sky, McAninch & Laminack v. Dow Corning Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Breeden; Jonathan Woodner Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1149 Bregar v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Bretschneider v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1024 Bretzing v. Harvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Brewer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Brewer v. Puckett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1001 Brewington v. Woodard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Brewster; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bridgeport; Finizie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Bridges v. Bossier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Bridgetown Grill; Lawal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Briggs; Holden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Brighton Management Services v. Philadelphia Tax Review Bd. 966 Brimage v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Brimfield v. Leonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Brimfield; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Brine v. Iowa Bd. of Regents and Univ. of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Brinkley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Brink's Ltd.; South African Airways v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Briscoe v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Brito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Britton; Crawford-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Broad v. Sealaska Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Broadnax v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Brocchini v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Brock v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Brockamp; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Broderick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Brodnicki v. Omaha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Bromley; Michigan Ed. Assn.-NEA v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Bronson v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1067 Brookins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Brooks; Binderup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Brooks v. Boynton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Brooks v. George County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Brooks v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Brooks v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Brooks v. Sheppard Air Force Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Brooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxv Page Brooktrails Community Services Dist. Bd. of Directors; Paland v. 1124 Brosky v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Broussard v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Brousse; Reiman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Broward County; Kuchinskas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Browder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,961,1026,1053,1107 Brown v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. . . . . 837,896,1049 Brown; Arroyo Jusino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1048 Brown; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Brown; Bretschneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1024 Brown v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1085 Brown v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1036 Brown v. First State Bank of Harvard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Brown v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Brown v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Brown; Grimmett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Brown v. Gross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Brown v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Brown; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Brown v. Hampton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Brown; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Brown; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Brown v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,970 Brown v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Brown; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1049 Brown v. Kristianson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Brown; March v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Brown v. Maryland Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene . . . . . . . 882 Brown v. Mendel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Brown v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Brown v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Brown; Philadelphia Tribune Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Brown v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1024 Brown v. Sanford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Brown v. South Carolina Bd. of Comm'rs of Judicial Standards . . 1116 Brown v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Brown v. Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Brown v. Tommie Ray's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Brown; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Brown v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820, 844,875,939,940,1021,1046,1059,1060,1084,1100,1140 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Brown v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Brown v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Brown v. Yount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Browner; Virginia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Brown-Forman Beverage Co., Wine Div.; Viviano Wine Importers v. 1078 Brown-Forman Corp.; Viviano Wine Importers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Brown Group, Inc. v. Aaron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Browning; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Brown-Kimble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Brown & Root Industrial Services, Inc.; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Zehnder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Brown Shoe Co. v. Aaron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Bruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Bruder; Mincieli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Bruen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Brunson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Brunson v. Los Angeles County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Bryan v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Bryan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Bryan Independent School Dist.; Rowinsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Bryant v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Bryant v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Bryant; Indiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Bryant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Brytus; Spang & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Buc-Hanan v. Nishi/Hompa Hongwaji Temple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Buchanan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Buchholzer; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Buchholzer; Reynolds Fisheries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Buchler; Sprosty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Buck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Buckley; Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Buckner v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Buenoano v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Buice's Estate v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. . . . 863 Buker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Bulgier v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Bullen; Kokoska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Bullen; Visiting Nurse Assn. of North Shore, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Bullock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Bulson; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bunnell; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Burdines; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii Page Burford v. Steptoe & Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Burger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Burgess v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of N. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Burgess v. Nitzschke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Burgos v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Burgos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Burke; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Burke v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Burks; Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Burks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Burlingame; Andrade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Burlington Northern R. Co.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Burlington Northern R. Co.; Cobb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Burlington Northern R. Co.; Stiffarm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Burnett v. Bulson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Burnett v. Riggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Burnett v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Burns; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Burns; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Burns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Burrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Burrows; Lazich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Burrows v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Burton v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Burton v. Christopher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Busby, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1053 Busch v. AMREP, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Bush, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,957 Bush v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Bush v. Hesse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Bush v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Buss America, Inc.; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1023 Butler; Cole's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Butler v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1155 Butler Co.; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Butterworth; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Butterworth; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Butterworth; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Butterworth; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Butterworth; Siers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Buzea v. Stanhope Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1102 Byles; Wade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Byrd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page C.; Central Regional School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,979 C. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services . . . . . . . . . 1081 Cable National Broadcasting Co.; America Speaks v. . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Cable National Broadcasting Co.; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Cabrera-Baez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Cabrera-Sosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Caesar's Tahoe, Inc.; Lurie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Caffey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Cain; Bolton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Cain; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Cain; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Cain; Mayeux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Cain; Messick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Cain; Mosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Cain; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Cain; Shilling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Cain; Stallings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Cain; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Cain; Thorne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Cain; Tobias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Cain; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Central La. Electric Co. 808 Cal-Almond, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Calder v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Calder v. Bayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Calderon v. Angelo Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Calderon v. Caswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Calderon; Kukes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Calderon v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Caldwell v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Caldwell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Caldwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 California; Arias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 California; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 California; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 California; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 California; Baugher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 California; Bovis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 California; Brunson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 California; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 California; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 California; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 California; Coronado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxix Page California; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1026,1153 California; Dalis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 California; Davenport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 California; Faruqui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1022 California; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 California; Galloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 California; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 California; Gilliam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 California; Grass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 California; Hallgrimson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 California; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 California; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 California; Hastings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 California; Hennessy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 California; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 California; Hoversten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 California; Jaime Avena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 California; Keem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 California; KGET­TV Channel 17 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 California; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 California; Mark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 California; McHenry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 California; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 California; Memro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 California v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 California; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 California; Ochoa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 California; Osband v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 California; Padilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 California; Ponce-Partida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 California; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 California; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 California; Reyes Miranda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 California; Rosenbalm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 California v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,1071 California; Rutherford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 California; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 California; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 California; Shoemaker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,991,1085 California; Sorton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 California; Sperling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 California; United States ex rel. Devlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 California; Velez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 California; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1045 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page California; Yin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 California; Zdun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 California Bd. of Psychology; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 California Dept. of Social Services; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1036 California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. 316 California Franchise Tax Bd. v. MacFarlane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 California Pacific Medical Center; Copy-Mor, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 California Public Utilities Comm'n; Dotson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 California State Bar; Harney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 California State Humane Society; Hershey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 California Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.; Andrzejewski v. . . . . 1095,1156 Call v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Call; Heard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Callins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Calvert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Camacho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1128 Cambas Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Cambra; Madrid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Camilli v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Camilo Montoya v. Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Campbell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Campbell v. McCarthy Brothers Co./Clark Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Campbell v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Campbell v. Quad City Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Campbell v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Campbell; Sweatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,954 Campbell v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1036 Campbell v. Zolin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Campos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Campos Perez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . 1081 Canadian Consulate v. Holden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Canady; Wronke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Canatella v. Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll, Thompson & Horn . . . . . 853 Cancil v. Florida Dept. of State, Division of Licensing . . . . . . . . . 849 Can Do, Inc., Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans v. Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Cannady v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Cannon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Cannon v. Group Health Service of Okla., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Cantrell; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Cantu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,985 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; Tilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Capital Welding & Fabrication, Inc.; McDermott, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 945 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Cappello; Duncan Aircraft Sales of Fla., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Card v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Cardan v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . 888 Carey v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Cargill; Poly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Cargill Associates; Poly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Cargle v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Caribbean Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Fuels of P. R., Inc. . . . . . . 927 Caribbean Petroleum Corp.; Coastal Fuels of P. R., Inc. v. . . . . . . 927 Carillo v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Carl v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Carlos; Shoemaker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Carlson v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n . . . . . . . 1101 Carlson; Thiry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Carlton v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Carlton; Metcalf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Carmen v. Mayo Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Carmona de la Torre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Carnahan; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,876 Carney; BIC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Caron, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Carpenter v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Carpenter; Denver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Carpenter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Carr v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1023 Carr v. Runyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Carrasquillo; Marcus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll, Thompson & Horn; Canatella v. . . . . . 853 Carroll; Khalil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Carroll v. Local 144 Pension Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1001 Carter v. Bowlen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Carter v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Carter; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Carter v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Carter; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Casanova v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Casler; Cotten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Caspari; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Casper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Cassidy; Connecticut v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Castaneda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Casteel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Castillo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,875,893 Castillo Reyes v. Manuel Solloso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Castro; Gnadt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Castro v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Castro Quintana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Caswell; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Caterino; Futernick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Caterino; Holiday West Mobile Home Park v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Cates; Bowling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Cathcart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1034 Caton-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Cave v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Caves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Cazalet; Flanagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Cazier v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 C&C Produce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 C & D Charter Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Ceballos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1001 Ceccarani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Cecil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Cedar Point Oil Co. v. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter . . . . . . . . 811 Cenlar FSB; Am. Institute of Law, Econ. & Comp. Studies v. . . . 823 Cenlar FSB; Beckey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 CenTra, Inc. v. Garavaglia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Central Cartage v. Central States, S. E. and S. W. Area Pens. Fd. 912 Central Fla. Medical Affiliates, Inc.; Levine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Central Life Assurance Co.; Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. . . . . . . . . 1040 Central La. Electric Co.; Cajun Electric Power Cooperative v. 808 Central Regional School Dist. v. M. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,979 Central States, S. E. and S. W. Area Pens. Fd.; Central Cartage v. 912 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd.; Central Transport v. 811 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd.; Mason & Dixon Lines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Central Transport v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd. 811 Cepak; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Certain Real Property Located at 11869 Westshore Drive, Putnam Township, Livingston County v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Cervantes v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Cesnik; Edgewood Baptist Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Cesnik; New Beginnings Adoption and Counseling Agency v. . . . 1110 Chafin; Peck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Chagrin Falls v. Kruse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page Chakales v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Chalmars v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Chambers v. Halford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Champion; Bigpond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1072 Champion; Fritz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Champion v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Chancellor, Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. Felton . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Chandler v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Chandler v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Chapel Hill; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,1022 Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Ed.; Reinhard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Chapleau; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Chapman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Chapman v. Vander Ark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Chappell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Charles Hayden Goodwill Inn School; Martins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Charles Schwab & Co.; Dahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Charles Taylor Construction Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Charlevoix County; Lochman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Charlotte; McClure v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Chase v. Lockheed Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Chase v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Chase Taxidermy Supply Co. v. Superior Form Builders, Inc. . . . 809 Chater; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Chater; Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Chater; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Chater; Haas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Chater; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,985,1085 Chater; Morvant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Chater; Nestler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Chater; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Chater; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Chater; Roark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Chater; Saelee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Chater; Seeger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Chater; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Chater; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Chaudhary v. O'Neil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1035 Chaudhry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Chavez v. Arvada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Chavez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Cheatham v. Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1072 Cheek v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Cheek v. Horn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Cheren v. Fitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Cherisson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Cherry v. Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Cherry Hills Resort Development Co. v. Cherry Hills Village . . . 825 Cherry Hills Village; Cherry Hills Resort Development Co. v. . . 825 Chesapeake; Jamell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Cheshire v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Chester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Chesterfield County; National Assn. of Home Bldrs. of U. S. v. . . 1056 Chevron Pipe Line Co.; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Chicago; Dick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Chicago v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Chicago; Mann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Chicago; Manning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Chicago; North Avenue Novelties, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Chicago; Retired Chicago Police Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Chicago; Wzorek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env. . . . . . . 1147 Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., Alachua County; Bowling v. 936 Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., Marion County; Waterfield v. 837 Chief Justice, Nevada Supreme Court, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Chief Justice of U. S.; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Tex.; Larry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Childers; Wudtke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Childree; UAP/GA AG Chem., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Montgomery . . . . . 1149 Childs v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1024 Chiles; Kilo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Chin; Atamian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Chinn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,972 Chittum; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Chodos v. Shop Television Network, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Choi; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Christensen v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Christman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Christopher; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Christ the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church; Singleton v. . . 870 Christy; Dodaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page Christy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp.; Teets v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Chronicle Publishing Co.; Lafayette Morehouse Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 809 Chrysler Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Chubb LifeAmerica; Ramsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Chul Choi; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Chuquimarca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Churchill; Vogt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mount Calvary Baptist Church . . . . . . . . 818 Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mount Calvary Baptist Church and School 818 Church of Lord Jesus Christ of Apostolic Faith v. Shelton . . . . . . 869 Church on Rock; Albuquerque v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Ciampi; Hannaford Bros. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Ciba-Geigy Corp.; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Cielto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc.; Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub v. . . . . . 964 CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co.; Younis Bros. & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Cihak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Cimmino; Maceri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Cindy R. v. James R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Circuit Court of Ill., Rock Island County; Dooling v. . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Circuit Court of Va., Norfolk; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Circuit Court of Wis., LaCrosse County; LeFebre v. . . . . . . . . . . 842 Cisneros v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Cisneros-Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Citation Oil & Gas Corp.; Weller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Citibank, N. A.; Al-Harbi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Citicorp Savings of Ill.; Rucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1048 Citizen v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Citizens for a Better Env.; Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. . . . . . 1147 Citizens for a Better Env.; Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Citizens for a Better Env.-Cal.; Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . 1101 Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Bd. v. Kansas Pipeline Partnership . . 1115 City. See name of city. City National Bank; Neuton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1079 City & State Factors, Inc.; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1085 Clagett v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Clardy Mfg. Co. v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc. . . . . . . . 1078 Clark; Koch Fuels, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Clark v. Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1083 Clarke; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Clarke; Key v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1001 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Clarke v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Clarke; Portee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Clarke; Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Clarke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Clark Oil Trading Co.; Haberbush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Class; Jenner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Clay v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1001 Clayton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Claywell v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Cleckner v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Clemons v. Raney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Clenney; Kinsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Cleveland; Bregar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Cleveland Independent School Dist.; Andress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Clifton; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Cline v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Clinton v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Clinton; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Clinton; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Clinton; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Clinton; Tierney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,988 Cloird v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Clontz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pacific R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1090 CNG Transmission Corp.; Stitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Coan v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1023 Coastal Fuels of P. R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp. . . . . . . 927 Coastal Fuels of P. R., Inc.; Caribbean Petroleum Corp. v. . . . . . . 927 Cobb v. Burlington Northern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Cobb v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Cobb County Bd. of Health; Lawal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Cobb County School Bd.; Ellerbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Coble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Coburn v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Cochran v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Cochran v. Norton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Cochran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Coe v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Coffey v. Winske . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Coffman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Coggins/Continental Granite Co.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Cohen; Ebenhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Cohen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1156 Cohen v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page Cole v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Cole v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Coleman v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,884 Coleman v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Coleman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Coleman; Kaye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Coleman v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Coleman v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,942,1045 Coleman, Shaw, Willous Group, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 1002 Coles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Cole's Estate v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Collard & Roe, Inc.; Klein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 College of Charleston; Schley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 College Station; Irving v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Colligan v. Trans World Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Collins v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Collins v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Colon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America; Ramsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Colorado; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Colorado; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Colorado; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Colorado; Saiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Colorado v. Sanchez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Colorado; Varallo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Colorado ex rel. Simpson; Highland Irrigation Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 992 Colston v. Madison Correctional Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Columbia Machine, Inc. v. Schnidrig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Columbus; Reese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Colvin v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Comer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Commissioner; Akins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Commissioner; Boulden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Commissioner; Bryan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Commissioner; Chakales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Commissioner; Doctors Hospital Mgmt. Co., Tax Matters Partner v. 811 Commissioner; Gabel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Commissioner; Karim-Panahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1131,1157 Commissioner; McCall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Commissioner; Orozco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Commissioner; Patch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Commissioner; Qureshi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Commissioner; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Commissioner; Salter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Commissioner; Santangelo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Commissioner; Serot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Commissioner; Tseng v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Commissioner; Verbeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Commissioner; Vest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Social Services of New York City; Abidekun v. 891 Committee of Bar Examiners; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Committee of Dental Amalgam Alloy Mfrs. and Distrs. v. Becker 1084 Commodities Export Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465,925 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n; Schulze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth Edison Co.; Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1056 Commonwealth Edison Co.; Seetharaman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Communications Workers; Benson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Communications Workers; Guerra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Communications Workers; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Compton; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Compton; Subaru of America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1143 Comptroller of Currency; James Madison Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Comptroller of New York City; Osinowo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Concepcion v. Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Concourse Nursing Home v. Perales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Cone v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Conerly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Conference of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church v. Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church . . . . . 1042 Conference of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church v. Scotts African Union Meth. Prot. Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Conforti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Conkle v. Jeong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Conkle v. Laird's Food Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Conkle v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Conlan v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Connecticut; Battle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Connecticut v. Cassidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Connecticut; LaPointe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Connecticut; Marion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Connecticut; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Connecticut; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Connecticut; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Conner; Barkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Connolly v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.; O'Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Consolidation Coal Co.; Schultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Constellation Development Corp. v. Dowden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Construction Products Research, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . 927 Continental Airlines, Inc.; Bank of N. Y. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1156 Continental Ins. Co.; Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa., Inc.; Philadelphia v. . . . . . . . . . 1113 Contreras v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Contreras v. Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Contreras v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Contreras-Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1085 Convenient Loan Co.; Kinnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,987 Convertino v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Cook v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Cook v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1024 Cook v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Cook v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,932,939 Cooke, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Cook's Truck Stop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Cookus v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Coombe; Abidekun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Cooper v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Cooper v. Malone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1001,1062 Cooper v. Missouri Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Cooper v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Cooper v. Tropicana Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Copeland v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Copy-Mor, Inc. v. California Pacific Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Corado-Ceron; Anjelica Nurseries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Corbett; Lutz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Corbin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Cordoba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Cordova-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Cornell v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Cornely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Cornish v. District of Columbia Bd. on Pro. Responsibility . . . . 869,1023 Coronado v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Coronado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Corporacion de Exportaciones Mexicanas USA, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Corporation v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Corr v. Gannett Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Corrales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Correction Management Affiliates, Inc.; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1024 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Corthron v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Coshocton County; McCracken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Costa v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Cotnam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Cotroneo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Cotten v. Casler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Cotten v. General Motors Fisher-Body Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Cotter & Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Cotton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Cotton v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Cotton v. Hilbig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1071 Couch; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Couchot v. Ohio Lottery Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Coughlin v. Baptist Medical Center Princeton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Coughlin v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Coughlin; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Coughlin; Salahuddin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Coulter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 County. See name of county. County Collection Services, Inc.; Quisenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals of Minn.; Noltimier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga Cty.; Robinson v. . . 997,1085 Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Allegheny Cty.; Westbrooks v. . . . 889 Court of Criminal Appeals of Okla.; DuBuc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Cousin v. Office of Thrift Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Cousins v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Cousin-Williams; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Cowan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1155 Cowhig v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1022 Cox; Picklesimer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Cox v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Cox v. Treadway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Coyle v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Crabtree; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Craft; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Craig v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Craig Weight Loss Centres, Inc.; Kisala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Crane v. Boothby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Craven v. Bi-Lo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Crawford v. Bexar County Tax Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Crawford v. Newkirk-Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1138 Crawford-El v. Britton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Crawley v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1143 Creasey v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Credit v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Credit Counseling Centers; Credit Counseling Centers of Am. v. 961 Credit Counseling Centers of Am. v. Credit Counseling Centers 961 Creek; Westhaven Village v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Croatian Roman Catholic Cong., Holy Trinity Church v. Wuerl . . 1114 Crockett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1087 Croft v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Cronin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1053 Cronin; Mitchell-Angel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Crosetto v. Wisconsin State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Cross, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Cross v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1026,1153 Cross v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1153 Crossley v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Crouch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Crouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Crowder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1024 Crowder; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Cruz-Fernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Crystal Evangelical Free Church; Christians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Csoka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 CSX Transportation, Inc.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 CSX Transportation, Inc.; Basinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 CSX Transportation, Inc.; Cochran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Cuch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Cudjo v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Culp v. Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Culver City; Ehrlich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Cumberland Farms, Inc.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Cumming; Nationalist Movement v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cunningham, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Cunningham; Aaron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1143 Cunningham; Hardin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1035 Cupidon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Curd v. Searcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Curiale v. Knowles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Curiale v. Lowery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Curry; WSB Electric, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Curtis; Rosado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Cutler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Cyprus Minerals Co.; Anchondo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 D. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Dahler v. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Dailey v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Daily News of Los Angeles v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . 1090 Dairy Queen; Sawyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Dais v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Dalal v. Kaiser Permanente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Daley; Erwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Daley v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Dalis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust; Bergstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Dallas County; Foreman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1147 Dallas Cowboys Football Club; Poissenot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Dalton; Becerra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Dalton; Greenlaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Dalton; Hy Thi Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1143 Dalton; Sayco Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Dalton; Steward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Dalton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 D'Ambrosio, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1074 Damico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Dammer v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co. v. Superior Form Builders, Inc. 809 Daniel; Ratcliff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Daniels v. Burke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Daniels v. Lassalle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Daniels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1094,1156 Danik, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1144 Darby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1143 Dare County Bd. of Ed.; Sakaria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1071 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page Darien; Villager Pond, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Daugherty v. Sarasota County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Davage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Davenport v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 David v. Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 David v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Davidson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Davis v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Davis v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Davis v. Hanover Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1143 Davis; Kirby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1049 Davis v. Leonardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Davis v. O'Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1143 Davis v. Sacramento County District Attorney's Office . . . . . . . . 996 Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1034,1069,1099,1100 Davis v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Davison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Davon, Inc. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Dawn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Dawson v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Day v. Committee of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Day v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Dayhoff, Inc.; H. J. Heinz Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Dayse v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Dayton; Tinch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Dayton Hudson Department Store Co. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 DCX, Inc. v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Deaconess Hospital, Inc.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Dean v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 DeAnnuntis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Deas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Deases v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 DeBardeleben v. Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund . 926,1088 DeCastro v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 DeCastro v. Pataki Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Deckard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 De. D. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Dee v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1001 Dees v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 DeJesus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page de la Cruz v. New York City Human Resources Administration 805 de la Mora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Delaware; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Delaware; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Delaware; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Delaware; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Delaware; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Delaware; Weeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Delaware County Bd. of Supervisors; MacDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . 872 Delaware River Port Authority; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Delespine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Delia v. Itochu International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Dellenbach v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Delmarle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Del Mundo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Delsante; Fischer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc.; SmileCare Dental Group v. . . . . . 1028 DeLuca; Lord v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Demarey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1023 Demeo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Demint v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Demonick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Dempsey v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1024 Denbicare U. S. A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Denetclaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Denha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Denk; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Dennis; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Dennis; Maryland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Denogean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 DeNoyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Dent v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Denton County Sheriff; Phelps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1023 Denver v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Denver; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1101 Department of Agriculture; Cal-Almond, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Department of Agriculture; Produce Place v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Department of Air Force; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Department of Air Force; McCabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Department of Army; Berkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1072 Department of Army; McQuown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Department of Defense; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Department of Defense; Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1023 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Department of Ed.; Goranowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Department of Ed.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Department of Health and Human Services; Singla v. . . . . . . . 970,1072 Department of Human Services, Franklin County; Billman v. . . . 1041 Department of Interior; McMillan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Department of Interior v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Department of Justice; Armendariz-Mata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Department of Justice; Bulgier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Department of Justice; Garrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Department of Justice; Lawyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Department of Labor; Conlan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Department of Labor; Florida Dept. of Labor and Emp. Sec. v. . . 1109 Department of Labor; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Department of Navy; Beagles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Department of Revenue of Fla. v. Share International, Inc. . . . . . 1056 Department of Social Services of Mich.; Lemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Department of State v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,804,1106 Department of Transportation of Alaska; Ehrlander v. . . . . . . . . 1011 Department of Treasury; Toepeaka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Department of Veterans Affairs; Dayse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Department of Veterans Affairs; Minnifield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Department of Veterans Affairs; Nawachie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Depenbrock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 DePiano v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Depository Trust Co.; Toro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Deramus v. Jackson National Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 DeRewal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Derr v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Derstein; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 DeSarno v. Allegheny County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Desnick v. Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 965 DeTella; Hockenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 DeTella; Snipes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Deutch; Minnich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Devlin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Dexter Township; Boltach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Diaz v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Diaz v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1078 DiCesare v. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Dick v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Dickenson; Kilo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Dickerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Dickeson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Dickey v. McMahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 DiDomenico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Dienstberger v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Dietsch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Diggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Digital Equipment Corp.; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Di Lauro v. Ver Strate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Dillard v. Security Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Harold's Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . 928 Dillingham v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Dillingham Constr., N. A.; California Div. of Labor Stds. Enf. v. . 316 Dinkins v. Hutzel Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Dinwiddie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Director, OWCP; Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248,924 Director, OWCP; Lisa Lee Mines (Terrilynne Coal Co.) v. . . . . . . 1090 Director, OWCP; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. Disciplinary Bd. of Ala. State Bar; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1001 Disney Stores, Inc.; McNemar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third Dist.; Swain v. . . . . . . . . . 851 District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia; Ayeboua v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1024 District of Columbia; De. D. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 District of Columbia; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 District of Columbia; Savage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,988 District of Columbia Bar Assn.; Pels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 District of Columbia Bd. on Pro. Responsibility; Cornish v. . . . 869,1023 District of Columbia Court of Appeals; Stanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Dept.; Hope v. . . . . . . . 853 Divetta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Dix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Dixon v. Dixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Dixon v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Dixon v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Doan v. Seagate Technology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Dobson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Doc's Food Stores, Inc.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Doctor's Associates, Inc.; Weible v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Doctors Hospital Mgmt. Co., Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner 811 Dodaro v. Christy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Dodson v. Hillcrest Securities Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Doe v. Grievance Adm'r, Mich. Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . 946 Doe v. Lockwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Doe; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Doe v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,976 Doe; Lungren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,976 Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Doe; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425,804,947 Doe; Siegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1024 Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Dolfi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Dolihite v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Domingues v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Dominguez-Alvarado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Domino v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Donato; Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School Dist. v. . . . . . . . 1150 Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Fuchs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Donnellon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Donovan; Arkansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Donovan; Arkansas Term Limits v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1149 Donovan; Priest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Donovan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Dooley v. International Safety Instruments, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Dooling v. Circuit Court of Ill., Rock Island County . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Doran v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Dormire; Vaughan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Dorrough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Dorsett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Dorsey; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Dorsey; Earnest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Dorsey; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Dorsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Dortch; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1143 Dortch v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Dortch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Dortch v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Dorval v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Dotson v. California Public Utilities Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Dotson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Douglas v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Dover; Windley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd.; Galaxy Manor v. . . . . . . . . . 911 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd.; Rivkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Dow Corning Corp.; Breast Implant Tort Claimants Represented by O'Quinn, Kerensky, McAninch & Laminack v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Dow Corning Corp.; Official Committee of Tort Claimants v. . . . . 1071 Dowden; Constellation Development Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Dowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Dowling v. Atlanta City School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Downey; Quintanilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Downhour v. Somani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Downs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Doyle v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Doyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Draghi v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Drennon v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Driscoll; Bowersox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Drobny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Drug Enforcement Administration; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Drummond v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 D'Souza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Duarte v. U. S. Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Dubin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1102 Du Bois, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1145 Dubois v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 DuBuc v. Court of Criminal Appeals of Okla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Duchene v. Plunkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Duckett v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Duckworth; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Duckworth; Glass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Dudleson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Duff v. Governor of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1111 Dugger; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Dumbrique v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Dunbar v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Duncan Aircraft Sales of Fla., Inc. v. Cappello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Duncil; Azeez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Duncil; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Dunlap v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Dunlap v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Dunmeyer v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465,925 Dunn v. Denk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Dunworth v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Duplessis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Schuver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Dupree v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Duque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819,893 Durham v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Durkin v. Major League Baseball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Dusenbery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Dutcher v. Moreo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Dutton v. O'Guinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Dutton; O'Guinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Dworzanski v. Dworzanski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1085 Dyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Eads v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Early v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Earnest v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Eastland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 East Palo Alto v. Hazzard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Ebb v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Ebbert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1145 Ebenhart v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 ECC International Corp.; Rehman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,993,1029 Edgar; Schueller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Edgar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Edgars; Swoyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Edgewater Sun Spot, Inc. v. Pennington & Haben, P. A. . . . . . . . 931 Edgewood Baptist Church v. Cesnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Edgin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Edmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1027 Edmonds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Edmondson; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Edwards v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Edwards v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Edward Valves, Inc.; Wake County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Egbert v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Eguita v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co. . . . . . . . 1056 Ehrlander v. Department of Transportation of Alaska . . . . . . . . . 1011 Ehrlich v. Culver City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Schuver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 800 Reservation, Inc.; Holiday Inns, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Einhorn Yaffee Prescott Architecture & Engineering v. Turpin . 929 Ekwerekwu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Elder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Electrical Workers v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. . . . . . . . . . 809 Electronic Data Systems Corp.; Barbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Electro-Voice, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Eliasen v. Itel Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1085 Elich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Eline v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 El Jabaar v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Elkhart; Starzenski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1055 Ellerbee v. Cobb County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Ellerbee v. Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Elliott; Pargo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Elliott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,869,987,1118 Ellis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1118 Ellison v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Ellisor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 El Paso Community College; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Elramly; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . . . . . . . . 924 Eltayib v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Emery v. Galose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Emery v. Toledo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Emmons v. Lumley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Employment Appeal Bd.; O'Brien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Energy Transportation Corp. v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 England v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Englewood Associates; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Englewood Disposal Co.; Kienzel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Enoch v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Enriquez v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Enriquez-Varela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Envirodyne Industries, Inc.; Ryckman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 EPA; Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Envirotest Technologies, Inc.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 EEOC; Kentucky State Police Dept. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 EEOC v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 EEOC; Sheet Metal Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Equils v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Erath County; Milligan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Erdmann; Bergmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Erickson v. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Erickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Erickson; Weber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Eriksen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Ernst Home Center, Inc.; Glenbrook Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Ernst & Young LLP v. Knapp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page Ertel v. Patriot-News Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Erwin v. Daley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Escobedo-Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Esparza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Espericueta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Espinosa-Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Esposito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Esquire Magazine; McFarlane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Esquivel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Essrick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Estate. See name of estate. Esteban Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Estrada Medrano v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Ethier v. Larson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Evans; Bayshore National Bank of La Porte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Evans; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Evans v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Evans; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Evans; Lennox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Evans v. McBride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Evans; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Evans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,999,1020,1072 Evanston; Moses v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Evansville; Studio Art Theatre of Evansville, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 866 Everard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Everett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1001 Everett v. Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Evergreen v. Stallworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Everhart v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Everman v. Albertson's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Ewain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Eyerly; Mirin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Eyoum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Ezeoke v. Pry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Ezeoke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Fabianich v. Holmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Fadness; Kuntz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors; McWilliams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Fairfax-Falls Church Community Services Bd.; Olson v. . . . . . . . 1099 Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.; Healy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Fairway Foods, Inc. v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Falciso v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Fankell; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fargo; Habiger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Fargo; Veneklase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Farley; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Farley; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Farm Credit Services of Central Ark.; Arkansas v. . . . . . . . . . 805,1085 Farmer; Messler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Farmers Ins. Exchange; United Farmers Agents Assn., Inc. v. . . 1116 Farmington; Archuleta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Farnsworth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Farquhar v. Manhattan Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Farr v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Farrell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Farris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Faruqui v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1022 Fasken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Faulder v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Faulk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Favarolo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 FCC; Advanced Communications Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 FCC v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 FCC; Mobile Telecommunication Technologies Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 823 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Atherton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Coleman, Shaw, Willous Group, Inc. v. 1002 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Gimbel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Greene County Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Hemmerle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1022 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Herring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Sporting Club Acquisitions, Ltd. v. . . 810 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Stattin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Federal Election Comm'n; Albanese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Federal Election Comm'n; Republican National Committee v. . . . 1055 FERC; Amoco Energy Trading Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Federal Express Corp.; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 FHLMC; American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 FHLMC; Mortgage Network, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Federal Ins. Co.; House of Lloyd, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Feher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Feinberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Feinstein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Felder v. Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1035 Feldmeyer; Barone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Feliciano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Felker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Felker v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,989 Fells v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Felton v. Agostini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Felton; Agostini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Felton; Chancellor, Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Felton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Fenney v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Fent v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Fenton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Ferbar Corp. of Cal.; Bay Area Laundry Pens. Trust Fund v. . . . 991 Fergurson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Ferguson; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1036 Ferguson; Daley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Ferguson v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Ferguson v. Duncil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Ferguson v. F. R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Ferguson; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Fernandes v. Rockaway Township Town Council . . . . . . . . . . . 824,1001 Ferreria; Robert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Fessler; Bland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Fetrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Fields v. American Express Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1001 Fields v. Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Fields; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Fields v. Hinkle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Fields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Fierro; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 FileNet Corp.; Saathoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 FilmTec Corp.; Hydranautics v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Finch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Finfrock v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Finizie v. Bridgeport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Fink v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Finneran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Finney v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Finno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Fiore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Firsdon v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 First American Bank of Va.; Arena Sports, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 First Madison Bank, FSB; Simms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1143 First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.; AT&T Family Fed. Credit Union v. 1148 First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.; National Credit Union Admin. v. . . 1148 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page First State Bank of Harvard; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 First Union National Bank of Fla.; Staup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1024 Fischbach & Moore, Inc.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1023 Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . 1056 Fischer v. Blackshear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Fischer v. Delsante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Fischer v. United Capital Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1131 Fisher v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Fisher v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Fitch; Cheren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Fitzhugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Flanagan v. Cazalet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Flatten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Flattum v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1035 Fleming v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1083 Fletcher; Kalina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Fletcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1053,1133 Flores; Boerne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Flores; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Flores v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1088 Flores-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Florida; Archer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Florida; Bottoson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Florida; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Florida; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Florida; Card v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Florida; Dortch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Florida; Durham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Florida; Egbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Florida; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Florida; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Florida; Geralds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Florida; Greater Ministries International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Florida; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Florida; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Florida; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1152 Florida; Larzelere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Florida; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Florida; Ogden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Florida; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Florida; Orme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Florida; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1122 Florida; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Florida v. Soca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Florida; Venson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Florida; Wuornos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,997 Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation; Corpora- cion de Exportaciones Mexicanas USA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Florida Dept. of Community Affairs; Moorman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Florida Dept. of Labor and Emp. Sec. v. Department of Labor . . 1109 Florida Dept. of Revenue v. General Development Corp. . . . . . . . 824 Florida Dept. of State, Division of Licensing; Cancil v. . . . . . . . . 849 Florida Dept. of Veterans Affairs; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs . . . . . . . 1010 Floris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Flour Bluff Independent School Dist.; Katherine M. v. . . . . . . . . . 1111 Floyd; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Floyd v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Floyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Flucas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Flynn v. Kornwolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Foley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Fontao v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Foote, Inc.; Vick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Foote Tire; Vick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Forbes v. Patrissi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Forbey v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Ford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1020 Ford v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Fordham v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Fordice; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Fordice; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1027,1039 Ford Motor Co.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Foreman v. Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1147 Forman v. IBEW Local Union No. 640 Pension Trust Fund . . . . . 1053 Forman; Korean Air Lines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Forrest v. Vasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Fort v. Hailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1102 Fort v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Fortescue v. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1023 Fortini v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Fort Worth; Reedom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Foster v. Giant Food, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Foster v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Foster v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Foster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Foster v. U. S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Foti v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Foundation Industries, Inc.; Service Employees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Fountain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Fountain; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Foutch v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Fowler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Franco; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Frank; Eline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Frank v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Franklin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 834 Franklin; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Franklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Franklin National Bank of Washington; Geter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Franks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Franz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Franz; Bierley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1036 Fraser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Frazer; Gabor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Frazier v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Frazier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Freddie Mac; American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Freddie Mac; Mortgage Network, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Frederick v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Frederick v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Frederick; Henton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Frederick v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Freeman; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Freeman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Freeman; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Freeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Freeman; Wrenn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Freeman v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Freestone; Blessing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Freitas; Tristar Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 French v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Frey v. Bank One, Indianapolis, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Frey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Frias-Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Friedline v. N. H. Dept. of HHS, Office of Child Support . . . . . . . 811 Frieze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Fritz v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Froeman v. Glendening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Froeman v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 F. R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Fry v. UAL Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Frye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Fuchs; R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Fuji Bank, Ltd.; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1094 Fujinaka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Fukutomi v. United States Trustee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Fu Lin v. Goldsboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Fuller v. Board of Selectmen for Canton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1035 Fuller; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Fuller v. Police Dept. of Bossier City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Fully Informed Jury Assn. v. San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Furlong; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Furr; Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Furr v. Seagate Technology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Furrow v. Bisson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Furtick v. Shults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Futernick v. Caterino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Gabel v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Gabor v. Frazer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Gadson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1035 Gaines v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Galan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Galaxy Manor v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd. . . . . . . . . . . 911 Gallant; Plante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Gallardo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Gallego v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Gallegos v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Galloway v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Galloway v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Galose; Emery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Galowski v. Berge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Gammon; Briscoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Gammon; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Gammon; Weekley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Gandara-Granillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Gannett Pacific Corp.; Corr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Ganyo v. Seguin Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Garavaglia; CenTra, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Garcia v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Garcia v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . 840,843,853,858,865,907,986,1068,1133 Garcia-Rivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Gardner v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Gardner v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Garner; Energy Transportation Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Garner v. Pennington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Garner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Garnett v. Sobol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Garrett v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Garrett v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Garrison v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Gartner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P. A.; Rehman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Garwood, McKenna, McKenna & Wolf; Rehman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Gary v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Gary v. Pension Fund, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, #478 938 Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1022 Garza v. Weekley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1048 Garza Cantu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,985 Gaston v. Stone Container Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Gate v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Gates; Hungerschafer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gateward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Gault v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Gaunce, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1072 Gauthier v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Gaydos, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59,1006,1089,1143 Gearinger; Arewa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Geary v. Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Center and Hospital . . . . . 805,982 Geffrard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. 823 Geiser v. Mathew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 General Development Corp.; Florida Dept. of Revenue v. . . . . . . . 824 General Electric Co.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 General Motors Corp.; Dienstberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 General Motors Corp. v. Linden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278,962 General Motors Corp.; Wiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 General Motors Corp., Electro-Motive Division; Watson v. . . . . . . 842 General Motors Fisher-Body Division; Cotten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page General Public Utilities Corp.; Aldrich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 General Secretariat of Org. of American States v. United States 807 General Services Administration; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1024 Generes v. Morrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Assn. v. Bracco Diagnostics Inc. 1101 Genetech, Inc.; Bio-Technology General Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Gentry v. United Parcel Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Geoghegan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 George v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 George v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 George County; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 George Meany Center for Labor Studies; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . 1054 Georgia; Bevil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Georgia; Claywell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Georgia; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Georgia; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Georgia; Jarrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Georgia; Nance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Georgia; Rivas Linares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Georgia; Wellons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles; Lonchar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,989 Georgia Dept. of Corrections; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . 851 Georgoulis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Geralds v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Ger-Dan International Telecom, Inc.; Tassa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 German; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Gerth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Geschke, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1023 Geter v. Franklin National Bank of Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Gianfortuna v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Giant Food, Inc.; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Gibbons v. Higgins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Gibbons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Gibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1157 Gibson v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Gibson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Gibson County; Lucre, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Giffler v. Abel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Gifford v. Maine Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Gilbert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1037 Gilbert v. Homar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Gilbert v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:49] PGT*TCR lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Giles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1018 Gill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1037 Gill v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Gill v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Gill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Gillen v. Boston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Gillette v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Gilliam v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Gilliam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1120 Gilliard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Gillis; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Gilmore; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Gimbel v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Gimmel, Weiman, Savitz & Kronthal, P. A.; Norris v. . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Ginberg v. Tauber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Giraldo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Girard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Giuliani v. Yourman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Givans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Givings v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Glant v. Glant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Glasberg; Bast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Glass v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Glenbrook Co. v. Ernst Home Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Glendening; Froeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Glendening; Strong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Glendora v. Hubbard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Glendora v. Malone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1079 Glendora v. Walsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Glenn; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Glickman; Levitoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Glickman; Western Radio Services Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Glock v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1044,1076 Gloucester City Zoning Bd.; Intervine Outdoor Advertising v. . . . 1090 Glover v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Glover Bottled Gas Corp.; Jaspan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Glucksberg; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1039,1075 Gnadt v. Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Goble, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1053 Godaire v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1017,1022 Godinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Godoy; Hofman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Godshalk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Goff; Mayrant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Goffer v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Goggans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Goins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Goins v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Goldberg v. Metro Dade County Building and Zoning Dept. . . . . . 1098 Golden v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Golden; Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Golden Gate Hotel Assn. v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Goldin; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,946 Goldsboro; Oriental Jade Restaurant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Goldsboro; Tseng Fu Lin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Golia-Paladin v. North Carolina Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Golkin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Gomez; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Gomez; Call v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Gomez v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Gomez v. Fierro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Gomez; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Gomez; Kashannejad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Gomez; Montue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Gomez; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Gomez; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,969 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Gomez; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Gomez Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Gomric, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1146 Gonzaba v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Gonzaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Gonzales; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,962 Gonzales v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Gonzalez v. Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1083 Gonzalez Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Gooden; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Goodman; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Goodman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Musick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Tumlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Goord; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Goord; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Goord; Spaight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Goranowski v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Gordon v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Gordon; Erickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Gordon v. Peoria School Dist. 150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Goris; Nachreiner Boie Art Factory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Goss v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Gossage v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Goudy v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Gough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Gould v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Gould v. Pellella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Goulding v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Government of Virgin Islands; Weatherwax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Governor of Alaska; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Governor of Ark.; Wainwright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Governor of Cal.; Saif'Ullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Governor of Fla.; Kilo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Governor of Ga.; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Governor of Ga.; Clarke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Governor of Ill.; Duff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1111 Governor of Md.; Froeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Governor of Md.; Strong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Governor of Miss.; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Governor of Mo.; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,876 Governor of N. Y.; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Governor of N. C.; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Governor of N. C.; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Governor of N. D.; North Dakota Assn. of Retarded Citizens v. . . 993 Governor of Pa.; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Governor of Pa.; Pievsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Governor of Utah; Penman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Governor of Virgin Islands; Cheatham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1072 Governor of Wash.; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Graber; Mehio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Grable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Grace; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Grady; Brancato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Graham v. Furlong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Graham v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Graham v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Graham v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Graham v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Graham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1136 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Gramley; Bracy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1106 Gramley; Enoch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Gramley; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1022 Granada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1069 Grandison v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1143 Grant; Iverson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1036 Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Grantwood Village v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Grasmick v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Grass v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Gravel v. Gregoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Gravely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Gray, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Gray v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1157 Gray; Netherland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301 Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,931,966,1058 Grayson v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Great American Ins. Cos.; Kissi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Greater Ministries International, Inc. v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States 801 Great Western Bank v. Kapsimalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Green v. Franco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Green v. Phoenix Institute for Research & Ed., Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Green v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,954,955,974,1034 Greenawalt v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Greenawalt v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1103 Greenberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Greene v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Greene v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1023 Greene v. Tucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Greene v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Greene County Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Greenlaw v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Greenspan v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Greenwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Greer v. Kane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Greer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Gregoire; Gravel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Gregory, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Gregory v. Botzheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Gregory v. Flores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Gregory; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Gregory C. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services . . 1081 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Greif v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Greuling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Grey v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Gribetz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Gridley; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Grievance Adm'r, Mich. Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Doe v. . . . . 946 Griffin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Griffin v. Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Griffin; Coughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Griffin v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Griffin; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1022 Griffin; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1049 Griffin; McVicar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Griffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Griffith v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Griffith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Grimes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Grimmett v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Grines, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Grismore v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Groose; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Groose; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Groose; Hosna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Groose; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gross; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Gross; Izadpanah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Grossman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Grossman, P. A. v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Grosz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Group Health Service of Okla., Inc.; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Grumman Technical Services, Inc. v. Ishee's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Grune v. Thoubboron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Grynberg v. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 GTE Vantage Inc.; Illinois High School Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co.; Singleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 G*UB*MK Constructors v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Gudmanson; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1072 Guerra v. Communications Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Guichard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Guilbeau v. W. W. Henry Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Guilette v. Maine Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Guillory; Alston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Gulati v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page Gullett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Gulley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Gunn; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Gunnell v. Littlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1071 Gurs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Gustafson v. Lake Angelus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Gutierrez-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Gutierrez-Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Gutstein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1020 Guzman Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Gwong; Singletary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1142 H. v. K. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Haas v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Haas v. Wyatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Habben v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Haberbush v. Clark Oil Trading Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Habiger v. Fargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hadley v. North Arkansas Community Technical College . . . . . . . 1148 Hafley; Lohman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Hageman v. Leason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1001 Hailey; Fort v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1102 Hain v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hairston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Haley v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Haley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Halford; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Halford; Snow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Hall v. American National Red Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Hall v. Benet-Melendez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Hall v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Hall v. Browning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Hall; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Hall v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hall; Mains v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1069,1139,1151 Hallandale; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Hallgrimson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Hallmark Cards, Inc.; Barber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Hallock, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1087 Hall & Phillips; Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equipment, Inc. v. 1109 Hall & Phillips; United States ex rel. Virani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Halsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Hameed v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Hamer; Movsesian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Hamilton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Hamilton; Bono v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Hamilton; Maxie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Hamilton v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Hamilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1102 Hamilton; Vines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Hamm v. Latessa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Hamm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hammons v. Presto Roofing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Hampshire v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Hampton v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Hampton; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Hampton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Hampton v. University of Md. at Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Hamtramck; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1112 Hanberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Han Chul Choi; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Hancock Electronics Corp. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 929 Hand v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Hanks; Dellenbach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Hanlon; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Hannaford Bros. Co. v. Ciampi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Hannah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Hanover Ins. Co.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1143 Hansberger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Hansen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Hanson v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Hanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Hao Hoang Ho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1038 Hardin v. Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1035 Hardy v. Louisiana Dept. of Social Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Hargett; Harmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Hargett; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Hargett; McFadden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Hargett v. National Westminster Bank, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Hargis v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Harkrider v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Harmon v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Harney v. California State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Harold's Stores, Inc.; Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 928 Harper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1136 Harper v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1023 Harpster v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Harrell v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Harrell; Sunenblick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Harrell; Uptown Records v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Harri v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Harris v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Harris v. Coughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Harris v. Gillis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Harris v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Harris v. Hamtramck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1112 Harris v. Port Huron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Harris v. Rector and Bd. of Visitors of Univ. of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Harris v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Harris v. San Diego County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,863,864,893,1068 Harris v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Harrison v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Harrison; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Harrison v. Digital Equipment Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Harrison v. Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Harrison v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Harrison v. Letsinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Harrison; Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville & Davidson County v. 863 Harrison v. Moya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Harrison; Simms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Harrison v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Harrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1000 Hart; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Hart/Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hartford; Ricketts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Hartley Marine Corp. v. Paige . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Hartsel v. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Harvey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Harvey; Bretzing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Harvey v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Harvey v. Perrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Harvey v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Harvey v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 824 Harvin v. Stephens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hasan v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Hascall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Hasenstab v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Hastings v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Hatch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Hatcher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Hatcher; Enriquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Hatcher; Odoms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Hatney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Hatter; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Haudrich; Howmedica Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Hauert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Haun v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Hawk; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Hawk; DeBardeleben v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Hawkesworth; Blank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Hawkins v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1016 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,974,1156 Hawks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Hawley; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Hawley; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Hayden Goodwill Inn School; Martins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Hayes v. Correction Management Affiliates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1024 Hayes v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Haygood v. Savage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Hayling; Meadows v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Haynes v. Compton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Haynes v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Haynes v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Haynes v. Lemann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Haynes v. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1064 Haynes v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1102 Haynes v. Summerville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Hays; Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1049 Haywood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Hazelett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Hazzard; East Palo Alto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Heady v. Barclays Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Heady Electric Co. v. Barclays Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Healy v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Heard v. Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hebeka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Hedden v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Hedlund v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Hedrick v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Heiden v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Heil v. Lebow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Hein v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Heinz Co. v. Dayhoff, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Heistand v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Heitman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Helbling v. Bevere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Heldon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Helland v. South Bend Community School Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Helman; Saleem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Helton v. Kmart Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Helton; Kmart Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Helton v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Helwig; Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Hemmerle v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1022 Henao v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Henderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1074 Henderson v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Henderson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Henderson v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Hennessy v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Henry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1104 Henry v. Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Henry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Henry Co.; Guilbeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Henson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Henton v. Frederick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Heon v. Vose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Herklotz; Basey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Herloski v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Hermanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Hernandez v. El Paso Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Hernandez v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,860,867,876,893,902 Hernando Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Herrera v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Herrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Herrera-Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Herring v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Herron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hershey v. California State Humane Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Hershey v. Santa Clara Valley Humane Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hervey v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Hervey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Hess v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Hess v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Hesse; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Hession; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Hester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Hetzel v. Prince William County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Hewitt Soap Co.; Fleenor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1035 Hibbard; Loew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Hickey; Sawyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Hickman v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Hickman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,901 Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,985 Higgins v. Dennis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Higgins; Gibbons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Highland Irrigation Co. v. Colorado ex rel. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Hightower v. Vose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Hilbig; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1071 Hildebrand v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Hill; Aldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hill v. City & State Factors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1085 Hill v. Clifton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Hill v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hill v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Hill; Dunlap v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Hill v. Gooden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Hill; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1102 Hill v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Hill v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Hill v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Hill; Spaulding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,853,858,981,1033 Hillcrest Healthcare Corp.; Wilkinson & Monaghan v. . . . . . . . . . 861 Hillcrest Securities Corp.; Dodson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hinchliffe v. Transamerica Financial Consumer Discount Co. . . 818,1022 Hines v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Hines v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Hines v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Hines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,956 Hinh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Hinkle; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 H. J. Heinz Co. v. Dayhoff, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 H. M.; Special School Dist. No. 1 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Ho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hoang v. Mercury Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Hoang Ho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hoare, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Hobbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Hockenberry v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Hodges v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Hodrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Hoechst Celanese Corp.; BP Chemicals Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Hofbauer; Lonchar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Hofbauer; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Hoff v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Hoffmann v. Hoffmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1027 Hoffmeyer; Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Hofman v. Godoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Hofmann v. Pressman Toy Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,977 Hofstetter; Steward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Hogan v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Hogan v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Hogan v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Hogan v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Hoke v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Holden v. Briggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Holden; Canadian Consulate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Holiday West Mobile Home Park v. Caterino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Holland; Poole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Holland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964,1131 Hollar v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1085 Hollar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Hollingsworth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Holloway v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Holman Warfield v. Warfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Holmberg v. Ramsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Holmes; Fabianich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Holmes v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1022 Holt v. J. L. Prescott Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Holt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,866,906 Holtz v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Holtzclaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Holub v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Holy Cross Hospital; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Homar; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Homick v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Honn v. R. J. Steichen & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Honolulu; One World One Family Now v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Hood; Culp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Hood v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Hook, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Hook v. McDade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Hooper v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Hoover v. Suffolk Univ. Law School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Hoover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Hope, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1071 Hope v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Dept. . . . . . . . . 853 Hope; Lake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Hopewell v. KELO-Land News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Hopkins; Nesbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Hopkins; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Hopkins; Victor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Hopper v. Anton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hopper; Waldrop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Horn; Cheek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Horner; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Horodner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Horton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Horton v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Horton v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Hoskins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,907 Hosna v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Houghteling v. Houghteling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Houghteling v. Hutchinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Houlihan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 House of Lloyd, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Houston Lighting & Power Co.; Electrical Workers v. . . . . . . . . . 809 Houston Lighting & Power Co.; Reece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Houston Oilers, Inc.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Hoversten v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Howard v. Chapel Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,1022 Howard v. Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Howard v. Potter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,851,901,980 Howard v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Howard Univ.; Park v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Howell v. Booker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Howell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Howmedica Inc. v. Haudrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Hoxworth; Blinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Hoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Hoyett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Hoyett v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Hsu; Roslyn Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Hubbard v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Hubbard; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Huckabee; Wainwright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Huff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Huffman v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Huffman; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Hughes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Hughes v. Ignacio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Hughes v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Hughes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082,1151 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer . . . . . . . 926,1088 Hughey v. JMS Development Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Humana Hospital-Tacoma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Human Services Plaza Partnership v. Huntington National Bank 931 Humphrey v. Potlatch Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Humphreys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Hundley; Ragland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Hungerschafer v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Hunt v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Hunt v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Hunt; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Hunt; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equipment Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Hunter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,985,1093 Huntington National Bank; Human Services Plaza Partnership v. 931 Huntley v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Huntsville; Ashley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Hupp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Huss v. Acevedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Hussein v. Raban Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1072 Husske v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Huston v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Hutchinson; Houghteling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hutchinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Hutzel Hospital; Dinkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Hyde v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hyde; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1106 Hydramatic Packing Co.; Sea Gull Lighting, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Hyland Hill North Condo. Assn. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. . . 1041 Hy Thi Nguyen v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1143 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Hyung Su Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Ibanez-Farias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 IBEW Local Union No. 640 & Ariz. Ch. NECA Pens. Tr. Fd.; Forman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 IBP, Inc.; Tovar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Ibrahim v. Roach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Idaho; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund; V­1 Oil Co. v. . . . . . . 1009 Ieyoub v. CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Ieyoub; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Ieyoub; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Igbonwa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Ignacio; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Ignacio; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Iguade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Iguwa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Illinois; Aleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Illinois; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Illinois; Ashford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Illinois; Bounds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Illinois; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,970 Illinois; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Illinois; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Illinois; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Illinois; Dortch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Illinois; Fergurson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Illinois; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Illinois; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Illinois; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Illinois; Janes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Illinois; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Illinois; Keene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Illinois; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Illinois; Maciel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Illinois; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Illinois; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Illinois; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Illinois; Munson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Illinois; Oaks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Illinois; Parisi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Illinois; Redd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Illinois; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Illinois; Rupert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Illinois; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Illinois; Shern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Illinois; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Illinois; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Illinois; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Illinois; Wages v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Illinois; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Illinois v. Yarber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Illinois Bd. of Elections; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation; Desnick v. . . . . . . . . . . 965 Illinois High School Assn. v. GTE Vantage Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Illinois Property Tax Appeal Bd.; Cotter & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Campos Perez v. . . . . . . 1081 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Cupidon v. . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . 834 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Iguwa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Kharrat v. . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Mendez-Rosas v. . . . . . . 1061 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Owusu v. . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Qasguargis v. . . . . . . . . 1148 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Samuel v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Scheidemann v. . . . . . . . 803 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Sule v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Yang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang . . . 26,1085 Impola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Indelicato v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Independence Savings Bank; Sam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Independent Charities of America, Inc. v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . 993 Independent Order of Foresters; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Independent School Dist. No. 33 of Creek County; Redding v. . . . 949 Indiana; Blackmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Indiana; Bowyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Indiana v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Indiana; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Indiana; Isaacs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Indiana; Sceifers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications; McClain v. . . . . . . . . . 1027 Indianapolis; Tinsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Induisi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Industrial Comm'n of Ariz.; Camilli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Industrial Comm'n of Ill.; Jarabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248,924 Ingebretsen; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Ingraham; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Inland Container Corp.; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1049 In re. See name of party. Insty*Bit, Inc.; Poly-Tech Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 1003,1089 Internal Revenue Service; Firsdon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Internal Revenue Service; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Internal Revenue Service; Kallevig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Internal Revenue Service; MacKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Internal Revenue Service; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1049 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Cablevision, Inc.; Noel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 International Safety Instruments, Inc.; Dooley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Interoceanica Corp. v. Ball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Intervine Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Gloucester City Zoning Bd. 1090 Investek Financial Corp.; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Iowa; Amerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Iowa; Cheshire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Iowa; LaBayre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Iowa; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Iowa Bd. of Regents and Univ. of Iowa; Brine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Iowa Utilities Bd.; Association for Telecommunications Servs. v. 978 Iowa Utilities Bd.; Federal Communications Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . 978 Ipswich Police Dept.; Plante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Iqbal v. Berkeley Marina Marriott Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Ireland v. Lowe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Irizarry-Sanabria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Irvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Irvin; Vigilante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Irving v. College Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Irving v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Irving v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Irwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Isaacs v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Isern; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Ishee's Estate; Grumman Technical Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 864 Ishikawa v. New York City Dept. of Cultural Affairs . . . . . . . . . . 883 Island v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Israel-Treiber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Itel Corp.; Eliasen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1085 Itochu International, Inc.; Delia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 I. T. O. Corp. of Va.; Pettus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Iverson v. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1036 Ivy v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Ivy v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Ivy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Izadpanah v. Gross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 J.; M. L. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Jaakkola v. Ashland County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Jabe; Covertino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Jabe; Derr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Jabe; Gianfortuna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Jabe; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Jabe; Marbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Jabe; Sadler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Jackson v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Jackson v. Atlanta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Jackson v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Jackson v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,985,1085 Jackson v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Jackson v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Jackson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Jackson v. Kessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1022 Jackson v. Maine Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Jackson; McIntosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Jackson v. Peugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Jackson v. Sowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1143 Jackson v. Tamminga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,986,1018,1070,1134 Jackson National Life Ins. Co.; Deramus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Jackson Stone Co.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Jacob v. AT&T Corporate Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Jacobs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1145 Jacobs; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Jacobs v. Supreme Court of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Jaffer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Jaime Avena v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Jamal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Jamell v. Chesapeake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 James v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 James R.; Cindy R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 James Square Nursing Home, Inc.; Wing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Janes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 January v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Japan Travel Bureau International, Inc.; Baba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Jaques, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Jarabe v. Industrial Comm'n of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Jaramillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Jarrell; Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Jarrett v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 JA­RU v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Jaspan v. Glover Bottled Gas Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Jasper v. Jasper Civil Service Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Jasper Civil Service Bd.; Jasper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Javier Romero, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 J. B. Grossman, P. A. v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 JBL Consumer Products, Inc.; Kotam Electronics, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1110 J. C. Penny Co.; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Jefferson v. Hart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Jefferson v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Jefferson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1019 Jefferson County v. Acker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1102 Jeffries v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1035 Jelinek v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Jellico; Pilot Air Freight Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Jellico Studio of Western Art; Pilot Air Freight Corp. v. . . . . . . . 871 Jemzura v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 953,1036 Jenkin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Jenkins v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Jenkins v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Jenner v. Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Jennings v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Jennings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Jenny Craig Weight Loss Centres, Inc.; Kisala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Jensen v. California Bd. of Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Jensen v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Jensen v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Jensen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Jeong; Conkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Jeong Kyo Lim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equipment, Inc. v. Hall & Phillips 1109 Jessep v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Jessop v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson 823 Jhaveri v. Muro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Jin v. Temple Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1102 J. L. Prescott Co.; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 J. M. Martinac & Co.; Saratoga Fishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1027 JMS Development Corp.; Hughey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Jo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Jobin; McKay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 John Labatt Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 John O. Butler Co.; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1143 Johnson; Abrams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,947,1038 Johnson; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1143 Johnson; Blackiston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Johnson; Borcsik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Johnson; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,881 Johnson; Boyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Johnson; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Johnson; Brookins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Johnson v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1049 Johnson; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Johnson; Callins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Johnson; Carey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Johnson; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1001 Johnson; Dunbar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Johnson; Estrada Medrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Johnson v. Fankell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Johnson; Faulder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Johnson; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Johnson; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Johnson; Godaire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1017,1022 Johnson; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Johnson v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1049 Johnson; Griffith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Johnson; Grismore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Johnson; Harrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Johnson; Harri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Johnson v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1102 Johnson; Hoyett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Johnson; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Johnson; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Johnson; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Johnson v. Justices of Supreme Court of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Johnson; Kemer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Johnson; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Johnson; Lackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Johnson; Laster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Johnson; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1096 Johnson; Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Johnson; Mallard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Johnson v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Johnson; McGhee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Johnson v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Johnson; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1022,1032,1143 Johnson; Montez Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Johnson v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 892 Johnson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Johnson v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Johnson; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Johnson; Reese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Johnson v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Johnson v. Robbinsdale Independent School Dist. 281 . . . . . . . . . 1045 Johnson; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1035 Johnson; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Johnson; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Johnson v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Johnson; Sawyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,837 Johnson v. Sheahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Johnson v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1036 Johnson; Short v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Johnson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Johnson; Small v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Johnson; Smallwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Johnson v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Johnson v. Sparkman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Johnson; Spence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Johnson v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Johnson; Teel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Johnson; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1080 Johnson; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889, 948,989,1000,1017,1035,1046,1048,1083,1130,1140 Johnson; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,947,1038 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Johnson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1072 Johnson v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Johnson; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Johnson; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1085 Johnson; Westley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Johnson; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1065 Johnson; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Johnson; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,996 Johnson v. Zschach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Johnston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1149 Jones v. Associated Univs., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Jones v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Jones v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1035 Jones; Clinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Jones; Coan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1023 Jones v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Jones v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1152 Jones; Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Jones v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Jones; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Jones; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Jones v. Ignacio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Jones; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Jones v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Jones; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Jones v. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Jones v. Maryvale Samaritan Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Jones v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Jones; Montanez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Jones v. Nance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Jones v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Jones v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Jones v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Jones v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Jones; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Jones v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Jones; Seddens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1048 Jones v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Jones v. Texas Commerce Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Jones v. United States . 849,850,941,943,948,956,973,1022,1068,1121,1156 Jones v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Jones; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Jones; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Jones; Yurtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1023 Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Joost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Jordan; Finfrock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Jordan v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Jordan v. Kenton County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Jordan v. Valdez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Jose; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Joseph v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Joseph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Joyner v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Juarez Godinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Juarez-Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., Indian River County; Waterfield v. 837 Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., Orange County; Strickland v. . . . . . 830 Judge, Circuit Court of W. Va., Wayne County; Peck v. . . . . . . . . 1121 Judge, District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fourth Dist.; Messler v. 912 Judge, District Court of Okla., Cleveland County; Turner v. . . . . 1123 Judge, District Court of Tex., Tarrant County; Tobias v. . . . . . . . 952 Judge, 19th Judicial District Court, East Baton Rouge; Daniels v. 1117 Judge, Supreme Court of N. Y., 9th Judicial Dist.; Lazich v. . . . . . 835 Judge, 295th Judicial District Court, Harris County; Burton v. . . 1043 Judge, Vigo County Court v. Indiana Comm'n, Jud. Qualifications 1027 Juri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Jusino v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1048 Justices of Supreme Court of Cal.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Juvenile (JJAC) v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Juvenile Male v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Kaczynski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Kaepa, Inc.; Achilles Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Kagaku Co.; Roboserve, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Kahn v. Beicker Engineering, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1071 Kahre-Richardes Family Foundation, Inc. v. Baldwinsville . . . . . . 869 Kaiser Permanente; Dalal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Kalasho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Kalina v. Fletcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Kallevig v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Kalp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Kalwaytis; Preferred Meal Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Kalyan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Kambitsis v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 907 Kammefa v. Maryland Dept. of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1036 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Kandies v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Kane; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Kansas v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Kansas; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Kansas; Kinnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Kansas; Schlicher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Kansas; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Kansas; Webber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Kansas; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Kansas Pipeline Partnership; Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Bd. v. 1115 Kansas Pipeline Partnership; Williams Natural Gas Co. v. . . . . . . 1092 Kansas Public Employees Ret. System v. Reimer & Koger Assoc. 948 Kapadia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Kapila; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Kapsimalis; Great Western Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1131,1157 Kashannejad v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Kashannejad v. Pickett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Katherine M. v. Flour Bluff Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . 1111 Kato Kagaku Co.; Roboserve, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Kauble v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Kauble v. Union Employee Discretionary Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Kaufman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Kaufman v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Kauger; Skrzypczak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Kay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Kaye v. Coleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Kayne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Sara Lee Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 K. D. H. v. K. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Keane; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Keane; Romer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Keane; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Keane; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Keathley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1104 Keck; Willbanks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Keel v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Keem v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Keene v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Keesee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Kelley v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Kelly; Ames v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Kelly v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Kelly; Herloski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kelly; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Kelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1068,1100 Kelly Foods Corp. v. Martha White Foods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Kelly Foods Corp. v. Windmill Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 KELO-Land News; Hopewell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Golden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Kelsey-Hayes Co.; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Helwig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Kemer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Kemna; Creasey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Kemp v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Kemp v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Kemp; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Kemp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1076 Kendricks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Kennedy v. Goldin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,946 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Kennett Square; Lal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Kenney v. Stark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Kenney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Kent; McQuade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Kenton County Bd. of Ed.; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Kentucky; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Kentucky; Hood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Kentucky; Perdue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Kentucky; Slone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Kentucky Bar Assn.; Waller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Kentucky State Police Dept. v. EEOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Keohane; Rendelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Kercher; Swoyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Kernan; Barker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Kernan; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Kernan; Sutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Kessell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Kessler; Bracco Diagnostics Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Kessler; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1022 Kessler v. Organon, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Kessler; Organon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Ketchum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Kevorkian v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Key v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1001 Key v. Oakland Housing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Keycorp Mortgage, Inc.; Shimp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Keys; Hartsel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Key West; Sciarrino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 KGET­TV Channel 17 v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 KGET­TV Channel 17 v. Superior Court of Cal., Kern County . . 1008 Khalil v. Carroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Khamvongsa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Khan v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Khan; State Oil Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Kharrat v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 KHD Deutz of America Corp. v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Kidd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Kiel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Kienzle v. Englewood Disposal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Kilaab al Ghashiyah (Khan) v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Kiley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Killingsworth v. Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Kilo v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Kilo v. Dickenson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Kimble v. Montgomery County Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Kimble v. Rehnquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Kime v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Kim E. Laube Co. v. Sunbeam Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Kimes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1053 Kinard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Kincheloe; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 King, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 King v. American Civil Liberties Union of Miss., Inc. . . . . . . . . . 992 King; Dolihite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 King; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 King v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 King v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 King v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 King; Modderno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,886,896,907 King County; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Kinnell v. Convenient Loan Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,987 Kinnell v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Kinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Kinser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Kinsey v. Clenney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Kirby v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1049 Kirchgessner v. Wilentz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Kirkland v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kirkland; Schaffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982,1049 Kirkpatrick v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Kisala v. Jenny Craig Weight Loss Centres, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Kissi v. Great American Ins. Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Kissick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Klade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Klady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Klais v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Klayman & Associates, P. C. v. Baldwin Hardware Corp. . . . . . . . 949 Klecan v. New Mexico Right to Choose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Klein; Arkoma Production Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Klein v. Collard & Roe, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Klein; Grynberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Klein; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Klein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Klevenhagen; Babineaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Klinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Klopp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1022 K. M.; K. D. H. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Kmart Corp. v. Helton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Kmart Corp.; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Knapp; Ernst & Young LLP v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Knapp v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Knaub v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Knee Deep Cattle Co.; Bindana Investments Co. Ltd. v. . . . . . . . 1144 Kneeland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Knight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,827,894 Knighton v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Knoll Rig & Equipment Mfg. Co.; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Knowles; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Koch; Tesciuba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1049 Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Kochvi v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Kokoska v. Bullen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Kokoski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Kontakis v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,1001 Korean Air Lines Co. v. Bickel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Korean Air Lines Co. v. Forman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Korean Air Lines Co.; Saavedra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Kornwolf; Flynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Ko Sai-Man v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Kosisky v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Koss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Kotam Electronics, Inc. v. JBL Consumer Products, Inc. . . . . . . . 1110 Koven v. Pacific-Major Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Koynok v. Koynok's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Koynok's Estate; Koynok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 K. R. v. Anderson Community School Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Kramer; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Kramer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Kramer v. Vision Cable of Pinellas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Kramer v. Wichita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Krehnbrink v. Maryland Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Kreutzer v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Kristianson; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Krivonak v. Berkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1143 Krohn; Luhrs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Krueger v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1023 Kruse; Chagrin Falls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Kuban v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Kubinski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Kuchinskas v. Broward County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Kuhlmann; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Kuhns v. Team Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kukes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Kukes v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Kulick v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Kulinski v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,904 Kumar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1023 Kunkes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kuntz v. Fadness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Kupcho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Kupec; McCarthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,879 Kuykendall; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1049 Kwan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Kyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Kyo Lim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Kyricopoulos v. Rollins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 L.; Allred v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Laakko; Maki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Labansat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 LaBarck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Labatt Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 LaBayre v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Labella-Szuba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Labickas v. Arkansas State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Labor and Industry Review Comm'n; Pioterek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Labor Union. See name of trade. LaBrunerie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Lacey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Lackey v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 LaFave v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Lafayette Morehouse Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . 809 Laffond v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Lagoye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Laidlaw Transit, Inc.; Creamer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1143 Laird v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Laird's Food Market; Conkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Lake v. Hope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Lake Angelus; Gustafson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Botaba Realty Co. . . 863 Lakoski v. University of Tex. Medical Branch at Galveston . . . 947,1035 Lal v. Kennett Square . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Lamarr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Lambrix v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1005 Lancaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Land v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Land v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Landels, Ripley & Diamond; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Landmark Land Co. of Carolina, Inc.; Barton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Landry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Lane v. Landels, Ripley & Diamond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Lane v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Lane v. Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Lane; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lang v. Furr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Lang v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Langford v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Langston v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Lanier; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Lapierre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 LaPointe v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 LaRene, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Larry v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Larry v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Larson; Ethier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Lartey-Trapman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 LaRue v. Blodgett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 LaRue v. Rolfs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Larzelere v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Lasiter v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Lassalle; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Lassiter v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Laster v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Laszczynski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Latessa; Hamm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Lattanzio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Laube v. Sunbeam Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Laube Co. v. Sunbeam Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Laufman v. Mayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1071 Lavigne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Lawal v. Bridgetown Grill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Lawal v. Cobb County Bd. of Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Lawal v. Stanley Bostitch Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Bennett v. 1108 Law Practice of J. B. Grossman, P. A. v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Lawrence v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1036 Lawrence v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Lawrence v. Melissa Holdings, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Lawrence v. Secretary of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1037 Lawson v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Lawson v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Lawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1058 Lawton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Lawyer v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Layeni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Lazenby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1027 Lazich v. Burrows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Lazore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Leaf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Leaphart v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Leason; Hageman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Leaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1027 Leavitt; Penman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lebedeva; Soto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Lebow; Heil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 LeCureux; Langford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 LeDuc v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Lee v. Berthelot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Lee v. Fuji Bank, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1094 Lee v. Goodman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Lee v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Lee v. Lenhardt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Lee v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Lee v. Nuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lee; Omoike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,909,948,998,1022,1117,1139,1141 LeFebre v. Circuit Court of Wis., LaCrosse County . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.; Depart- ment of State v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,804,1106 Legal Services Corp.; Wilkinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Lehman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Leigh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Leinenbach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Lekhovitser v. Lekhovitser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,912 Lemann; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Le May v. Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . 803 LeMay; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Lemons v. Department of Social Services of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Lenhardt; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Lennartz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Lennon v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Lennox v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Lensing; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Leon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Leonard v. Brimfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Leonard; Brimfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Leonard v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Leonard; McMeans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Leonard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1027 Leonardo; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Lerebours v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Lermer Corp.; Lermer Germany GmbH v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Lesley; Belcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Letica Corp.; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Letsinger; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Levin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Levin v. Maya Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Center and Hospital; Geary v. . . . . 805,982 Levine v. Central Fla. Medical Affiliates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Levine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Levinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Levitoff v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Levy; Merchant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Lewis; Brock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Lewis; Caterpillar Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Lewis; Cookus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Lewis v. Hanlon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Lewis v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1096 Lewis; Montville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Lewis; Olguini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Lewis; Spivey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1000 Lewis; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1071 Lewis Lang v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Lewis Truck Parts & Equipment, Inc. v. Hall & Phillips . . . . . . . 1109 Lexie v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Leyva Osuna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Liberty Bank & Trust Co.; Crossley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Light v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lightner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Lim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Lin v. Goldsboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Lin v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Linahan; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Linares v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Lincoln; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Lincoln Loan Co. v. Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Lindemann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Linden; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Lindh v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Lindler; Blandino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1102 Lindley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,1049 Lindsey v. Alabama State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Lindsey v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1072 Lipofsky v. New York State Ins. Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Lipton v. Swest, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Liquidation Estate, De Laurentiis Enter. Group v. Technicolor . . 1007 Lisa Lee Mines (Terrilynne Coal Co.) v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . 1090 Little v. Barry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Littlefield; Gunnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1071 Litzenberg v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1143 Living Springs Retreat v. Putnam County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Livingston Union School Dist.; Takahashi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Lloyd v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Local 144 Pension Fund; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1001 Lochman v. Charlevoix County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Lockerby v. Pima County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Lockheed Corp.; Chase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Lockmiller v. Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County . . . . 929,1035 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lockwood; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Lo Duca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Loew v. Hibbard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Loewe v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Logan v. Beam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Logan v. Bennington College Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Logan v. German . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Logan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Lohman v. Hafley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Lomayaoma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Lonchar, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Lonchar v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,989 Lonchar v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Lonchar v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Long v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Long v. Sparkman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,842,987 Long v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,898 Long Island Jewish Medical Center v. Schonholz . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Longshore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Looker; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1049 Loomer v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Lopes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Lopez v. Monterey County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Lopez v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Lopez v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,879,883,938,1138 Lopez Camacho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Lopez Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Lopreato v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Loral Corp.; Swiftships, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Lord v. DeLuca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Lorillard, Inc.; Braun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Lory v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Los Angeles; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1143 Los Angeles; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Los Angeles County; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Los Angeles County; Hickman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Los Angeles County; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Los Angeles County; Maxie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Los Angeles County; Tapar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services; Stone v. 936 Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services; Gregory C. v. 1081 Los Angeles County Superior Court; Brunson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Loss v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Loss v. Michigan Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Louis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Louisiana; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1023 Louisiana; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Louisiana; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Louisiana; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Louisiana; Lennon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Louisiana; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Louisiana; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Louisiana; Omoike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Louisiana; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Louisiana; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Louisiana; Poullard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Louisiana; Quatrevingt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Louisiana; Ranger Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Louisiana; Sepulvado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Louisiana; Tart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Louisiana; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1023 Louisiana Dept. of Social Service; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development; Oswald v. . . 1008 Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub v. CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. . . . . . 964 Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus v. Hays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1049 Louisiana-Pacific Corp.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982,1072 Louisiana Tech Univ.; Pitre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Love; Hildebrand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Love; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Love; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Love v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Love; Yount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Lovett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Low Country Media, Inc.; Mosley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Lowe v. Cantrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Lowe v. Craft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Lowe v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Lowe v. Holy Cross Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Lowe; Ireland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Lowe v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,954 Lowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,826 Lowe; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Lowe-Bey v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Lowery v. Redd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lowery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Lowery v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Lowrey; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Loyal American Life Ins. Co. v. Mattiace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 LTV Aerospace & Defense Co.; Dailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Lu v. Turk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Lubin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Lucas v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Lucas v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Lucas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1002 Lucero; Olguin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Luckette v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Lucre, Inc. v. Gibson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Ludmer; Nernberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Ludwig; James Madison Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Luecke; Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Lugo v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Luhrs v. Krohn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Luis v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Lumley; Emmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Luna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Luna v. Walton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Lundis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Lundy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Lundy Packing Co.; Faircloth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Lungren v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,976 Lungren; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,976 Luongo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Lurie v. Caesar's Tahoe, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Lusk; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Lusk v. Pope County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Lussier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Lusty v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Luther Memorial Church; Olson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Lutz v. Corbett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Lutz; Palaimo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Luzik v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Lykus v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Lyman; Resetar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Lynce v. Mathis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433 Lynch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Lynman; Resetar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Lynn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1104 Lynn; McCabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Lyon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Lyons v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv Page Lyons v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Ly Trinh Hinh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 M. v. Flour Bluff Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 M.; K. D. H. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 M.; Special School Dist. No. 1 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Maass; Cornell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Maass; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Macalino v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Macaluso v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Macaluso v. Anderson Studios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 MacDonald v. Delaware County Bd. of Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Maceri v. Cimmino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 MacFarlane; California Franchise Tax Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Machado; Albino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Macias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Macias-Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Maciel v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 MacInnes v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Mack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,979 Mack v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 MacKenzie v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Madden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Maddox v. Odom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Maddox v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Madigan; Wronke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1143 Madison Correctional Institution; Colston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Madrid v. Cambra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Magnotti v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Magoon v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Mahapatra v. Mahapatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Mahern v. Adkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Mahoney; Sorensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Maietta v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Mail-Well Envelope Co.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Maine; Huntley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Maine Dept. of Corrections; Gifford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Maine Dept. of Human Services; Guilette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Maine Dept. of Human Services; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Maine Real Estate Comm'n; St. Hilaire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1023 Maine Workers' Compensation Bd.; Valliere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Mains v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Major League Baseball; Durkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Maki v. Laakko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Makowski; Welky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Mallard v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Mallory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Malone; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1001,1062 Malone; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1079 Maloney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Mammah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Mancuso; New York State Thruway Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Mandarino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Mandrgoc v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Manhattan Beach; Farquhar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith; Can Do, Inc., Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Sucessor Plans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Manilla; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Mann v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Manning v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Manning v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Manning v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Manning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Mantz v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Manuel Solloso; Castillo Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Maples v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Marable v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1022 Marbled Murrelet; Pacific Lumber Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Marbury v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 March v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Marcum v. McAninch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Marcus v. Carrasquillo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Marek v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Margiotti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Marin v. Norton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc.; Clardy Mfg. Co. v. . . . . . . . 1078 Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Marin-Montoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Marino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Marinoff v. Appellate Div., Sup. Ct. of N. Y., First Jud. Dept. 998,1143 Marion v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Marjani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Mark v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Mark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1035 Markoff v. Markoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Marks v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Marks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,880 Marsh v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii Page Marshall; Fink v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Marshall v. Kemp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Marshall; Rhinehart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Marshall; Torres Serrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Marshall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1117 Martel v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1024 Martha White Foods; Kelly Foods Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Martin v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Martin; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Martin; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Martin; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Martin v. Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Martin; Schlicher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Martin v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1067 Martin v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Martin v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Martinac & Co.; Saratoga Fishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1027 Martinez v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Martinez v. Letica Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Martinez v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,907,1078,1133,1154 Martinez v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Martinez-Cortez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Martinez-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Martini v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Martins v. Charles Hayden Goodwill Inn School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Marut; Russo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Marx v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Maryland; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Maryland; Colvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Maryland v. Dennis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Maryland; Ebb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Maryland; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Maryland; Froeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Maryland; Grandison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1143 Maryland; Litzenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1143 Maryland; Mathews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Maryland; Oken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Maryland; Pettit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Maryland v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408,804 Maryland Dept. of Agriculture; Kammefa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1036 Maryland Dept. of Ed.; Krehnbrink v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR xcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Maryland Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene; Brown v. . . . . . . 882 Maryland Dept. of Social Services; Amitin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Maryvale Samaritan Hospital; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Maskell; Roe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Mason v. Norwest Bank S. D., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Mason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Masotto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Massachusetts; Dempsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1024 Massachusetts; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Massachusetts; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Massachusetts; Kirkpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Massachusetts; Laffond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Massachusetts; LeDuc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Massachusetts; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Massachusetts; Lykus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Massachusetts; Phachansiri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Massachusetts; Trapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Massachusetts; Waterman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Massachusetts; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Massachusetts Bar Counsel; Fordham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Massengale v. Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1102 Massey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1127 Mathew; Geiser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Mathews v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Mathieu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Mathis; Lynce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433 Matta-Ballesteros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Matta-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Matthews v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Matthews v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Matthews v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,941,973,986 Mattiace; Loyal American Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Matyastik v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815,1072 Mauri v. Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Maxberry v. Paramount Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Maxie v. Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Maxie v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 May v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 May v. Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Maya Construction; Levin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcix Page Mayer; Laufman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1071 Mayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Mayeux v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mayo v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Mayo Foundation; Carmen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Mayor of District of Columbia; Little v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Mayor of Elyria; Harsel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Mayor of New York City v. Yourman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Mayor of San Benito; Garza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1048 Mayrant v. Goff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Maza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Mazurkiewicz; Dais v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Mazurkiewicz; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1023 Mazzei, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Mazzell v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 M. C.; Central Regional School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,979 McAdams v. Automotive Rentals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 McAdams v. MNC Credit Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 McAlister v. Wheat Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 McAllister v. Telxon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 McAllister v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 McAninch; Marcum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 McBride v. Circuit Court of Va., Norfolk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 McBride; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 McBride v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 McCabe v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 McCabe v. Lynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 McCall v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 McCall v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 McCarthy v. Kupec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,879 McCarthy v. Recordex Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 McCarthy v. Teta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 McCarthy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,991,1101 McCarthy Brothers Co./Clark Bridge; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . 950 McCarty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1117 McCaughtry; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 McCaughtry; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 McCausland; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 McClain v. Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications . . . . . . . . . 1027 McClendon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 McCloud; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 McClure v. Charlotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 McConaghy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 McConico v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR c TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McCoskey v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 McCoy v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1099 McCracken v. Coshocton County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 McCrady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 McCree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 McCullough v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1049 McCullough v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div. 832 McDade; Hook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 McDaniel v. Berger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 McDaniel; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 McDaniel; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 McDaniels, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1053 McDermott, Inc. v. Capital Welding & Fabrication, Inc. . . . . . . . . 945 McDonald, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 McDonald v. George Meany Center for Labor Studies . . . . . . . . . 1054 McDonald v. Inland Container Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1049 McDonald v. King County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 McDonald v. Saxton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 McDonald v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 McDonnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 McDonnell Douglas Corp.; Roland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 McDuff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1071 McFadden v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 McFarland; South Division Credit Union v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 McFarland v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 McGee v. Ieyoub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 McGee v. Ingraham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 McGeeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 McGhee v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 McGhee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 McGill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 McGill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 McGinnis; Doran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 McGinnis; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 McGinnis; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 McGinnis, Inc. v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 McGinnis, Inc.; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 McGlory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 McGowan v. Metropolitan Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 McGrier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 McHenry v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 McHenry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ci Page McIntosh v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 McIntosh v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 McIntyre v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 McIntyre; Nesson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 MCI Telecommunications Corp.; Teleconcepts, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 815 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United Arab Emirates . . . . . . 1007 McKay v. Jobin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 McKenzie v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 McKinney v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 McKinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 McKinney v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 McKinnion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 McKnight; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002,1076 McKnight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 McKoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 McLaughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 McLennan Community College; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 McLeod v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 McMahan; Dickey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 McMahon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 McManus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 McMasters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 McMeans v. Leonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 McMillan v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 McMillian v. Monroe County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1089 McMillian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 McNabb v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 McNeil; Hein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 McNeil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 McNeill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 McQuade v. Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 McQueen v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 McQuilkin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 McQuown v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 McShane v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 McVea; Umar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 McVicar v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 McWee v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Meacham; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Meacham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Meadows v. Hayling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Meadows v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Meany Center for Labor Studies; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Mease; Bowlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Medico v. Sobolevitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Medina v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Medina v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Medina-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Medlock v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Medrano v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Medtronic, Inc.; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Meeker; Overmyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Meeks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Meggs; Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1010 Megrave v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Mehio v. Graber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Meinhardt; Unisys Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Mejia-Uribe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Mejorado-Soto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Mekler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1087 Meko; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Melegrito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Melendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Melhorn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Melissa Holdings, Inc.; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Meloy; Montgomery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Melton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Melvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Memro v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Mendel; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Mendenhall v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Mendez-Rosas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . 1061 Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.; Dammer v. . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Mercer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Merchant v. Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Merchant Bank; Swoyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Mercury Ins. Co.; Hoang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Mercy Catholic Medical Center; Adelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Meredith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Monclova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1049 Merrett v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Balasubramani v. . . 868 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ciii Page Merritt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Meservy v. Meservy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1036 Meshell v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Messerschmidt v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Messick v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Messler v. Farmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Mestman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Metcalf v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Metler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Metro Dade County Building and Zoning Dept.; Goldberg v. . . . . 1098 Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Metropolitan Dade County; McGowan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc.; EEOC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc.; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville & Davidson County v. Harrison 863 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Robertson-Ceco Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1002,1089 Metropolitan Transit Authority; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Mett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Metzer; Starr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Mew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Meyer; Dahler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Meza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Michael v. Zervakos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Michelin Aircraft Tire; Newport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1024 Michelin Tire Corp.; Newport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1024 Michigan v. Barrera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Michigan; Burgos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Michigan; Champion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Michigan; Doyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Michigan; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Michigan; Kaufman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Michigan; Kevorkian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Michigan; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Michigan; Kulick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Michigan; LaFave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Michigan; Marable v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1022 Michigan; McIntosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Michigan; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Michigan; Redge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Michigan; Szenay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Michigan; Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Michigan Attorney Discipline Bd.; Mouradian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Manning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources; Pure Waters, Inc. v. . . . . . 864 Michigan Dept. of Treasury; Zantop International Airlines, Inc. v. 1118 Michigan Ed. Assn.-NEA v. Bromley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Michigan Parole Bd.; Loss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n; North Michigan Land & Oil Corp. v. 1007 Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp.; Hopewell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Middleton v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,988 Mihaly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Milam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Miller v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Miller; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Miller; Clarke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Miller v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Miller v. Delaware River Port Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Miller v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Miller; Douglas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Miller v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Miller; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Miller v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Miller; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Miller v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Miller; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Miller v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Miller; Turentine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,906,943,994 Miller; Zavesky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Milligan v. Erath County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Mills, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Mills v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Mills; Ellerbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Mills v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Mills v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Mills; Massengale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1102 Mills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,990 Milner v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Milonas; Abdullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Miltland Raleigh-Durham; Mudie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Minarik v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Mincey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Mincieli v. Bruder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cv Page Minetti v. Port of Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Minneapolis; Paisley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Minnesota; Fairway Foods, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Minnesota; Independent Charities of America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 993 Minnesota; Noltimier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Minnesota; Souvannarath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Minnesota; Ubel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Minnesota; Vanderbeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Minnesota Dept. of Agriculture; Mmubango v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Minnich v. Deutch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Minniecheske, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Minnifield v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Minor v. Prudential Securities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Miranda v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Miranda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Mirin v. Eyerly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Mississippi; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Mississippi; Blue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Mississippi; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Mississippi; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Mississippi; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Mississippi; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Mississippi; Whitworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Misskelley v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Missouri; Armentrout v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Missouri; Copeland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Missouri; Dees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Missouri; Gary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Missouri; Kreutzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Missouri; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Missouri; Manning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Missouri; Mayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Missouri; Nunley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Missouri; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Missouri; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Missouri; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Missouri; Tokar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Missouri; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Missouri; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Missouri Pacific R. Co.; Grantwood Village v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Missouri Parole Bd.; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Mitchell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Mitchell; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Mitchell; Chalmars v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mitchell; Ellison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Mitchell v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1022,1032,1143 Mitchell v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Mitchell; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Mitchell v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Mitchell v. Simonet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,874,956,1083,1135 Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Mittleman v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Mizani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Mizell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Mmubango v. Minnesota Dept. of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 MNC Credit Corp.; McAdams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Moates v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Moats v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Mobile Telecommunication Technologies Corp. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . 823 Modderno v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Moghal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Mohr v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Monaco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Monclova v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Moncrief v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Mongelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Monroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Monroe v. U. S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Monroe County; McMillian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1089 Montag v. American Honda Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Montalvo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Montana; Ahmed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Montana; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Montana v. Fuller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Montanez v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Montanye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Montcalm Publishing Corp.; Angelone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Monterey County; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Montez Garcia v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Montgomery; Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. . . . . 1149 Montgomery; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1023 Montgomery v. Meloy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Montgomery v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Montgomery County Police Dept.; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Montoya v. Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cvii Page Montoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1133 Montue v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Montville v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Moody v. Alabama Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Moody v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Moore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Moore v. Brewster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Moore; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Moore; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Moore; Dupree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Moore v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Moore v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Moore v. Ingebretsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Moore v. Jacobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Moore v. Kuhlmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Moore; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Moore; Lindsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1072 Moore; Mazzell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Moore; Merrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Moore; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,988 Moore v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Moore v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources . . . . . . 815 Moore v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Moore; Truesdale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,842,904,1100,1154 Moore; Valder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Moorehead v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Moorman v. Florida Dept. of Community Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Mora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Morales; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Morales; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Morales; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Moran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1060,1068,1078,1137 Moreno Valley Unified High School Dist.; Weiss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Moreo; Dutcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Morera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Moretti, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,926,1089 Morgan v. Nevada Bd. of Prison Comm'rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Morgan; Rayford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Morgan v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Morgart v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa. . . . . . . . . 936 Morrell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1074 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Morrell; Generes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Morris; Barton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Morris; Grey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,883,904 Morrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,944,1047,1130,1154 Morrison; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Morstein; Shaw Agency v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Mortgage Creditcorp., Inc.; Pipkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. . 812 Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Freddie Mac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Mortham; Biddulph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Morton v. Bolden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Morton; Coburn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Morton; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Morton; Kontakis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,1001 Morvant v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Mosby v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Moschgat v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa. . . . . . . . 1017 Moseley v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Moseley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1036 Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Moses v. Evanston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Moses v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Moskovits v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Moskowitz; Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Mosley v. Low Country Media, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Moss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church; African Union Meth. Prot. Church and Connection v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church; Confer- ence of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church v. . . . 1042 Mountaineer Gas Co.; Oil Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Mount Calvary Baptist Church; Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . 818 Mount Calvary Baptist Church and School; Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. 818 Mouradian v. Michigan Attorney Discipline Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Movsesian v. Hamer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Moya; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Moya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Mua v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Mudie v. Miltland Raleigh-Durham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Mueller; Wisconsin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Muhammad, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Muhammad v. Nuchia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Muhummad v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cix Page Mujahid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Multnomah County v. Pierce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Muniz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Munoz-Mosquera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Munson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Muracciole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Muraski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Muraski v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Murdock; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Murillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Muro; Jhaveri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Murphy; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Murphy; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1153 Murphy v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Murphy; Lindh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Murphy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Murray, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Murray v. America's Talking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Murray v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Murray; Blake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Murray v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Murray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Murrell v. University of S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1071 Muse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Musick v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Myers v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Myers; Hollar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1085 Myers; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Nachreiner Boie Art Factory v. Goris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Nagi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Nagle; Ragan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Nagy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1143 Nahodil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Nance v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Nance v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Nance; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Narducci v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Narlock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Narumanchi v. Abdelsayed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Nash v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Thompson v. . . . 864 National Assn. of Home Bldrs. of U. S. v. Chesterfield County . . . 1056 National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . 892 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page National Casualty Ins. Co.; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 National Corp. of Housing Partnerships; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . 859,1023 National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. . . 1148 Nationalist Movement v. Cumming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 NLRB; AutoZone, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 NLRB; Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 NLRB; Borden, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 NLRB; C & D Charter Power Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 NLRB; Daily News of Los Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 NLRB; Dayton Hudson Department Store Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 NLRB; Electro-Voice, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 NLRB; Greenspan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 NLRB; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 NLRB; Teamsters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 National Railroad Passenger Corp.; Hedden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 National Super Markets, Inc. v. Varner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 National Super Markets, Inc.; Varner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 National Transportation Safety Bd.; Bernstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 National Transportation Safety Bd.; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 National Westminster Bank, USA; Hargett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 NationsBanc Mortgage Corp.; Cazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 NationsBank; Shumate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1035 Navarrette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Nawachie v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 N. B. v. Alachua County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Neadle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Neal v. Regan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1114,1115 Nebraska v. Reeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Nebraska v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Nebraska v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Nedell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1146 Neely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Negewo v. Abebe-Jiri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Nelkin; Panzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Nelson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Nelson v. J. C. Penney Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Nelson v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Nelson v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Nelson v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,939,972,1093 Nennig; Oney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1048 Nernberg v. Ludmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Nero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxi Page Nesbitt v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Ness; Ramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Nesson v. McIntyre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Nestler v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Netherland; Beaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Netherland; Dubois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Netherland v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301 Netherland; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1157 Netherland; Hoke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Netherland; Langston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Netherland; O'Dell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1050 Netherland; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Netherland; Stout v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Netherland; Tuggle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1024 Netherland; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Netherland; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Neuman v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Neumann v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Neuton v. City National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1079 Nevada; Blandino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Nevada; Bonta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Bonty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Dickeson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Nevada; Domingues v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Nevada; Dortch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Nevada; Everhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Nevada; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Gauthier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Gould v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Nevada; Grasmick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Harpster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Homick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Nevada; Jessop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Nevada; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Land v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Macalino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Nevada; Mohr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Nevada; Moncrief v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Nevada; Reberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Nevada; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Nevada; Sierra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Nevada; Staude v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Nevada; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Nevada; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Nevada; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Nevada Bd. of Prison Comm'rs; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Nevada County; Troutwine Family Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Neville v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 New Beginnings Adoption and Counseling Agency v. Cesnik . . . . 1110 New Hampshire; Forbey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 New Hampshire; Kochvi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 New Hampshire; Martel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1024 New Hampshire; Nowaczyk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 New Hampshire; Seymour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 New Hampshire; Veale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 New Hampshire Dept. of HHS, Office of Child Support; Friedline v. 811 New Jersey; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 New Jersey; Martini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 New Jersey; Roach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 New Jersey; Tafuto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 New Jersey v. Womack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Newkirk-Stewart; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 New Mexico; Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1023 New Mexico; Aguilar Riley Ozmen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1072 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,979 New Mexico Dept. of Corrections; Herrera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 New Mexico Right to Choose; Klecan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Newport v. Michelin Aircraft Tire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1024 Newport v. Michelin Tire Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1024 Newton; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 New Valley Corp. v. New Valley Corp. Senior Executive Benefit Plan Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 New Valley Corp. Senior Executive Benefit Plan Participants; New Valley Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 New York; Baptiste v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 New York; Berk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 New York; Butler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 New York; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 New York; Draghi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 New York; Hameed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 New York; Jelinek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 New York; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 New York; McShane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 New York; Santos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxiii Page New York; Strobridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1022 New York; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 New York; Waugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 New York; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 New York; Welz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 New York; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 New York; York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 New York; Zientek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 New York City; Hasenstab v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 New York City; JA­RU v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 New York City; Skeet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 New York City Dept. of Cultural Affairs; Ishikawa v. . . . . . . . . . 883 New York City Human Resources Administration; de la Cruz v. 805 New York Daily News; Reape v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1156 New York State Bd. of Law Examiners; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 New York State Electric & Gas Corp.; Jemzura v. . . . . . . . . . . 953,1036 New York State Ins. Fund; Lipofsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 New York State Thruway Authority v. Mancuso . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Nguyen v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1143 Nguyen v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1023 Nguyen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Nicholas v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1027 Nicholson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Nickelson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Nierengarten v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Services . . 932 Nishi/Hompa Hongwaji Temple; Buc-Hanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Nitzschke; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Nobile v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Noble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Noel v. Adelphia Cable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Noel v. International Cablevision, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Noltimier v. Court of Appeals of Minn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Noltimier v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Norand Corp.; EMC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Nordahl v. Studer Revox America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Nordberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Nordquest v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Chittum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Norgaard; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Norman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Norris; Cloird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Norris v. Gimmel, Weiman, Savitz & Kronthal, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Norris; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Norris; Huffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Norris; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1049 Norris; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Norris; Pitts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Norris; Ruiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1073 Norris; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Norris; Wainwright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1073 North, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 North Alamo Water Supply Corp.; San Juan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 North Arkansas Community Technical College; Hadley v. . . . . . . 1148 North Avenue Novelties, Inc. v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 North Bergen; Tonnelle Ave. Books & Video, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1115 North Carolina; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 North Carolina; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 North Carolina; Best v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 North Carolina; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 North Carolina; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 North Carolina; Buckner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 North Carolina; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 North Carolina; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 North Carolina; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 North Carolina; DeCastro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 North Carolina; Floyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 North Carolina; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 North Carolina; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 North Carolina; Kandies v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 North Carolina; Keel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 North Carolina; Kirkland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 North Carolina; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 North Carolina; Lyons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 North Carolina; Moseley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 North Carolina; Penland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 North Carolina; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 North Carolina; Rowsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 North Carolina; Sessoms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 North Carolina; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 North Carolina; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 North Carolina; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 North Carolina; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1156 North Carolina; Womble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 North Carolina Bar; Golia-Paladin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 North Carolina Dept. of Corrections; Cousins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 North Dakota Assn. of Retarded Citizens v. Schafer . . . . . . . . . . 993 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxv Page Northern States Power Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 North Michigan Land & Oil Corp. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1007 Northrop Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Norton; Cochran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Norton; Marin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Norwest Bank S. D., N. A.; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Norwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Nouraie v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1022 Novak v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Nowaczyk v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Nuchia; Muhammad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Nugent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,941 Nunez-Elizarraraz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Nunley v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Nuth; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Nwobi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Nynex Corp.; Pocchia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund; De Buono v. . 926,1088 Oakland Housing Authority; Key v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Oaks v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 O'Brien v. Bank One Columbus, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 O'Brien; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1143 O'Brien v. Employment Appeal Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 O'Brien v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 O'Brien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1036,1068 Ocean City; Storer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Ochoa v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 O'Connell & Associates; Stover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 O'Connor v. Army Claims Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Division; Bonnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . 822 O'Dell v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1050 Odom; Maddox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Odoms v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 OEC Medical Systems, Inc.; Toshiba America Medical Systems v. 808 Office Employees v. Pope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of Uniformed Serv- ices; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Office of Personnel Management; Almero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Office of Personnel Management; Alver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,891 Office of Personnel Management; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Office of Personnel Management; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Office of Personnel Management; Dunworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Office of Personnel Management; Eguita v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Office of Personnel Management; Falciso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Office of Personnel Management; Fredeluces v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Office of Personnel Management; Medlock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Office of Personnel Management; Mittleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Office of Personnel Management; Royster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Office of Personnel Management; Sobocinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Office of Personnel Management; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Office of Thrift Supervision; Cousin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Official Committee of Tort Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. . . . . 1071 Offiong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Ogbeide v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Ogbomon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1051,1073 Ogden v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 O'Gilvie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Oglebay Norton Co.; Scypta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Oglesby Plant Laboratories, Inc.; Atkinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Oguguo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 O'Guinn v. Dutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 O'Guinn; Dutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 O'Hagan; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Ohio; Allard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Ohio; Awkal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Ohio; Ballew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Ohio; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Ohio; Benge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Ohio; Childs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1024 Ohio; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Ohio; Haley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Ohio; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1016 Ohio; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Ohio; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Ohio; Loomer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Ohio; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Ohio; Nichelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Ohio; Otte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Ohio; Rojas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Ohio v. Robinette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Ohio; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Ohio; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Ohio; Wogenstahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Ohio Adult Parole Authority; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation; Salyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Ohio Lottery Comm'n; Couchot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Ohio Medical Bd.; Vaughn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,965 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxvii Page Oil Workers v. Mountaineer Gas Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Oiness v. Walgreen Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Oken v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Oklahoma; Anthony v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Oklahoma; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Oklahoma; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Oklahoma; Cargle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Oklahoma; Cudjo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Oklahoma; Duckett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Oklahoma; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Oklahoma; Givings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Oklahoma; Hain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Oklahoma; Hedrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Oklahoma; Jeffries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1035 Oklahoma; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Oklahoma; Knighton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Oklahoma; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,954 Oklahoma; Lusty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Oklahoma; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Oklahoma; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Oklahoma; Pennington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Oklahoma; Quate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Oklahoma; Richie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Oklahoma; Romano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Oklahoma; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Oklahoma; Smallwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Oklahoma; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Oklahoma; Stadler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1064 Oklahoma; Storey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Oklahoma; Trim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Oklahoma; Vann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Oklahoma; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Oklahoma; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services; Vann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Burks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Okorie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Okparaocha v. Taco Bell Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Olachea-Jimenes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Olano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Old Chief v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Oldsmar; Rood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Olguin v. Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Olguini v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Oliver v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1023 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Oliver v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Olivo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Olk Long; Rhode v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Olsen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Olsen v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Olson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Olson v. Fairfax-Falls Church Community Services Bd. . . . . . . . . 1099 Olson v. Luther Memorial Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Olson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Omaha; Brodnicki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Omnitrition International, Inc. v. Webster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Omoike v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Omoike v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Onaghise v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 O'Neil; Chaudhary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1035 O'Neil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 O'Neill v. Auburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 One World One Family Now v. Honolulu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Oney v. Nennig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1048 Onitiri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Option Care, Inc.; Rennick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Ordonoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Oregon; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Oregon; Blagg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Oregon; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Oregon; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Oregon; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Oregon; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; Whaley v. . . . 898 Oregon Natural Desert Assn.; Bibles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Orellana-Osorio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Organon, Inc. v. Kessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Organon, Inc.; Kessler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Oriakhi v. Baltimore City Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Oriakhi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Oriental Jade Restaurant v. Goldsboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Orientations Gallery, Inc. v. Bakery Centre Associates . . . . . . . . 812 Orlando Rivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Orme v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Ornelas-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 O'Rourke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Orozco v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxix Page Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,900,1078 Osayande v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Osband v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Osborne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Osinowo v. Comptroller of New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Osorio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 O'Steen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Osuna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Oswald v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development . . 1008 Otte v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Overmyer v. Meeker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Overstreet; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Owens v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Owens v. Presbyterian Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1143 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Owens v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Owes v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Owusu v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Oxford House-C. v. St. Louis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Oxfort v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Oy v. Aldy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Ozmen v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1072 Ozuna Galan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Pacific-CSC Work Furlough; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Pacific Gas & Electric Co.; Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1056 Pacific Lumber Co. v. Marbled Murrelet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Pacific-Major Construction Co.; Koven v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Packer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1099 Padilla v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Padilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Pagan v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Page; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Page; Neumann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Page v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Page v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Paige; Hartley Marine Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Painters; Tsimbidaros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Paisley v. Minneapolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Palacios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Palaimo v. Lutz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Paland v. Brooktrails Community Services Dist. Bd. of Directors 1124 Pallett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1107 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Palma; Verex Assurance, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Palmieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Panthong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Panton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Panzer v. Nelkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Papai; Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1038 Paramount Communications; Maxberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Paramus Bd. of Ed.; Charlton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers International, Inc. . . 822 Pararas-Carayannis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1012 Parenteau, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1036 Pargo v. Elliott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Parham v. PepsiCo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1102 Paries v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Parisi v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Park v. Howard Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Parke; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Parker v. Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Parker; Crawley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Parker v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs . . 812 Parker; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Parker v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Parker v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Parker; Pazol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1068,1134 Parker; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Parker v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Park Place Apartments; Struve v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Parks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Parkson Corp. v. ACS Construction Co. of Miss. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Parrado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Parrish, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Parrish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc.; United States ex rel. Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Partee v. Pastrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1102 Pasadena City College; Waszak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Passman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Pastrick; Partee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1102 Pataki; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Pataki Administration; DeCastro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Patapsco & Back Rivers R. Co.; Mandrgoc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Patch v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxi Page Patch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Patel v. Scotland Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Patel v. Singer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Patrick v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Patriot-News Co.; Ertel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Patrissi; Forbes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Patterson v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Patterson; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1064 Patterson v. Lincoln . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Patterson v. P. H. P. Healthcare Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Patterson v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Patterson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 868 Paul Revere Ins. Group.; Amayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Paulsen v. Beyond, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Pavlico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Payne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Payne v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Payne v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Payton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Pazol v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Peagler v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Pearson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1060 Peat Marwick Main & Co.; Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC v. . . . . 869 Peavy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Peck v. Chafin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pelaez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Pellella; Gould v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Pels v. District of Columbia Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Penland v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Penman v. Leavitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Pennington; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Pennington v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Pennington & Haben, P. A.; Edgewarter Sun Spot, Inc. v. . . . . . . 931 Pennsylvania; Balog v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Pennsylvania; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Pennsylvania; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Pennsylvania; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Pennsylvania; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Pennsylvania; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Pennsylvania; Kosisky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Pennsylvania; McGill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Pennsylvania; Minarik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Pennsylvania; Narducci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pennsylvania; Rapid Return, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pennsylvania v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Pennsylvania; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Pennsylvania; Rubio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Pennsylvania; Saranchak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Pennsylvania; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Pennsylvania; Speight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Pennsylvania; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Pennsylvania; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Pennsylvania; Van Doren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Pennsylvania; Veneri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Pennsylvania; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Pennsylvania; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources; Moore v. . . . . . 815 Pennsylvania Higher Ed. Assistance Agency; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . 834 Pennsylvania Nurses Assn. v. Pennsylvania State Ed. Assn. . . . . 1110 Pennsylvania State Ed. Assn.; Pennsylvania Nurses Assn. v. . . . . 1110 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.; Kauble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Pension Fund, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, #478; Gary v. 938 Peoria School Dist. 150; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 PepsiCo, Inc.; Parham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1102 Perales; Concourse Nursing Home v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Perdue v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Perez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1135,1147 Perez; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Perkins v. Derstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Perkins v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Perkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1059,1136 Perrill; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Perrill; Small v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Perry; Altimus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Perry; DCX, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Perry v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Perry; Thomasson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Perry; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Perry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Perry; Waller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Perryman v. Prado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Persimmon Hollow Co. v. Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Petaway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Peters v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Peters; Wittmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Peterson v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxiii Page Peterson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1122 Peterson; Leaphart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Peterson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Peterson; Stjernholm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Peterson; Tierney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1072 Peterson v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Peth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Petrie; Scambos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Pettit v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Pettus v. I. T. O. Corp. of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Peugh; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 PFS Corp. v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Phachansiri v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Phea v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Phelps v. Denton County Sheriff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1023 Philadelphia v. Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa., Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1113 Philadelphia; Lory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Philadelphia; Regalbuto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Philadelphia School Dist.; Barbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Philadelphia Tax Review Bd.; Brighton Management Services v. 966 Philadelphia Tribune Co. v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Phillips; Larry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,906 Phoenix; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Phoenix; Sabelko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Phoenix Institute for Research & Ed., Ltd.; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . 1028 P. H. P. Healthcare Corp.; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Pickett; Kashannejad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Pickett v. Warr Acres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Picklesimer v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Picone v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Pierce v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Pierce v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Pierce; Multnomah County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Pierce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Pierson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Pievsky v. Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Pigott v. United Homes for Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Pike v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Pilot Air Freight Corp. v. Jellico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Pilot Air Freight Corp. v. Jellico Studio of Western Art . . . . . . . 871 Pima County; Lockerby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Pineda Duque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pineda-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Pioterek v. Labor and Industry Review Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Pipefitters Local Union No. 522 Benefit Plan; Abbott v. . . . . . . . . 1111 Pipes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Pipkin v. Mortgage Creditcorp., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Pipola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Pippin v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,1022 Piscataway Township Bd. of Ed. v. Taxman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Pitt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Pitts v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Pitts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Pittsburgh v. Beck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Pizzo v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1102 Pizzo v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Plain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School Dist. v. Donato . . . . . . . . 1150 Plante v. Gallant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Plante v. Ipswich Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Plassman v. Wauseon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Plescher v. Wille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Pless v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Pletz v. Thoeny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Plumbers v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Plunkett; Duchene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Plust, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Pocchia v. Nynex Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Poe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Pohlman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Poindexter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Poissenot v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Polak-Rudich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Polanco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Police Dept. of Bossier City; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Polischuk, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1074 Polite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Pollack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Poly v. Cargill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Poly v. Cargill Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Poly-Tech Industries, Inc. v. Insty*Bit, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Ponce-Partida v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Poodry; Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Poole v. Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Pool Energy Services Co.; Andrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxv Page Pope v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pope v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Pope v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Pope; Office Employees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Pope v. Pope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Pope County; Lusk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Popejoy v. Boston Pointe Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Poritz; Probation Association of N. J. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Portanova; Seniw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Portee v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Port Huron; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Portillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Portland; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Portland; Lincoln Loan Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Portland; Mauri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Port of Seattle; Minetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Postmaster General; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1023 Postmaster General; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Postmaster General; Gate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Postmaster General; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Postmaster General; Kulinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,904 Postmaster General; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Postmaster General; Page v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Postmaster General; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Potlatch Corp.; Humphrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Potter; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Poullard v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Powell v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Power v. Alexandria Physicians Group, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Power Computing Co.; Sapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Powers v. Bayliner Marine Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Prado; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Prado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Prechtl v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Preferred Meal Systems, Inc. v. Kalwaytis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Presbyterian Hospital; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1143 Prescott Co.; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, 41st Judicial Dist., Juni- ata and Perry Counties, Orphan's Court Division; Vencil v. . . . 862 President of U. S.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 President of U. S.; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 President of U. S.; Tierney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,988 Pressman Toy Corp.; Hofmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,977 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Preston v. Berry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Presto Roofing Co.; Hammons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Previtte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Price, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1076 Price; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Price v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Price; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Price v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Price; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Price v. S­B Power Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Price v. Skil Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1078,1082 Pridgett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Priest v. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Prince v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Prince v. Unsecured Creditors Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Prince William County; Hetzel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Principal Financial Group, Inc.; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Principato, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1146 Pringle v. Wolfe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Printz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Pritchett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Probate Judge for Jasper County v. South Carolina Bd. of Comm'rs of Judicial Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Probation Association of N. J. v. Poritz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y.; Schenck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Proctor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Produce Place v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Protopappas v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Prudential Securities, Inc.; Minor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pruitt v. National Casualty Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Prunty; Adesanya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1062 Prunty; Luis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Prunty; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Prunty; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Pry; Ezeoke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Ptarmigan Co.; Bolt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Public Building Comm'n of Chicago; Bowden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Puckett; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1001 Puckett; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Puerto Rico; Concepcion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Puerto Rico; Velez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1157 Pugh v. Huffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Pulgaron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxvii Page Pulitzer Publishing Co.; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Pullen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1066 Punchard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Pure Waters, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources . . . . . . 864 Purity Supreme, Inc.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Purta; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Pusl v. Pusl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Putnam County; Living Springs Retreat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Putra; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Pyatt; Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Qasguargis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 1148 Quad City Times; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Quasha; Zucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Quate v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Quatrevingt v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Quesada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Quigley; Vencil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Quijano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Quill; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Quill; Vacco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Quintana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Quintanilla v. Downey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Quintero-Barraza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Quisenberry v. County Collection Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Qureshi v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 R. v. Anderson Community School Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 R.; Cindy R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 R. v. James R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Raban Supply Co.; Hussein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1072 Rachal v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1043 Rafael v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Raffield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Ragan v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Ragland v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Ragland v. SMS Financial, L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Rahman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Rainier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Rambo; Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1002,1089 Rambo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Ramer v. Ness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Ramirez v. Belanger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,883,974,1012 Ramirez v. Wichita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Ramirez-Ferrer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ramirez-Valdez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Ramiro Muniz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,956 Ramos-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Ramsey v. Chubb LifeAmerica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Ramsey v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Ramsey; Holmberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Randall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Randell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Randy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Raney; Clemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Raney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069,1157 Ranger Ins. Co. v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Ransom v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Ranum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Rapid Return, Inc. v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Rash; Associates Commercial Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1106 Rashid v. Society Hill Savings and Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Rashid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1099 Ratcliff, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1001 Ratcliff v. Daniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Ratelle; Protopappas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Rawlins v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1102 Rawls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Ray v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Ray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Ray v. Willett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Rayford v. Bosse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Rayford v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, Inc.; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . 925 Reams v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Reape v. New York Daily News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1156 Reberger v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Rebolledo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Recession Hearing Official; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Recordex Services, Inc.; McCarthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Rector and Bd. of Visitors of Univ. of Va.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Redd v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Redd; Lowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Redding v. Independent School Dist. No. 33 of Creek County . . . 949 Redge v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Reed v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Reed v. Chevron Pipe Line Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxix Page Reed; Rochester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Reed v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Reed; Swoyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Reeder; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Reedom v. Fort Worth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Rees v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Reese v. Columbus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Reese v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Reeves v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Regalbuto v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Regan; Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Regas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425,804,947 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Regional Transportation Dist.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1102 Register v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Rehman v. ECC International Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,993,1029 Rehman v. Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Rehman v. Garwood, McKenna, McKenna & Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Rehnquist; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Reich; Acura of Bellevue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Reich; Bechtel Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Reich; G*UB*MK Constructors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Reich; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Reich; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Reich; Stangl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Reid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133,1140 Reilley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Reiman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Reiman v. Brousse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Reiman v. Wagstaff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Reimer & Koger Assoc.; Kansas Public Employees Ret. System v. 948 Reinbold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Reinhard v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Rendelman v. Keohane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Rennick v. Option Care, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Reno; Cisneros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Reno; Dee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1001 Reno; Lassiter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Reno; Plumbers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Reno; Tlaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Reno; zu Mike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Renteria-Caicedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . 1055 Resetar v. Lyman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1072 Resnik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Restrepo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Retired Chicago Police Assn. v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Reveles-Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Revell; Wess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Revere Ins. Group.; Amayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Rexene Corp.; Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Reyes v. Manuel Solloso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Reyes v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Reyes v. Standard Mortgage Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Reyes Miranda v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Reynolds v. Buchholzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Reynolds; Lewis Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Reynolds v. Tele-Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1001 Reynolds Fisheries v. Buchholzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Allgood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1035 Rezaabady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Rhinehart v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Rhines v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Rhoades; Shores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Rhode v. Olk Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Rhode Island; Warwick Mall Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Rhoton v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Riascos-Suarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Riazco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Rice v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Richards v. General Services Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1024 Richards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1093 Richards v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1106 Richardson; Akins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Richardson; Bryan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Richardson v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Richardson v. McKnight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002,1076 Richardson v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Richardson v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Richardson; Patch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Richardson v. Quill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Richardson; Salter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxi Page Richardson; Santangelo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Richardson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,954,1030 Richardson v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Richie v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Richmond; Amato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Rickett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Ricketts v. Hartford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Riddick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1126 Ridge; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Ridge; Pievsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Ries, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Riggle; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Riley; Corthron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Riley; Messerschmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Riley v. Murdock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Riley v. Newton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Riley; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Riley Ozmen v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1072 Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Rivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Rivas Linares v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Rivera v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1018,1020 Rivera-Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Rivers v. Federal Express Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Rivers v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc.; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Rivkin v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Rizzi v. Underwater Construction Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Allgood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1035 R. J. Steichen & Co.; Honn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Roa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Roach; Ibrahim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Roach v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Roach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Roach v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Roark v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Robbins; Auer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452,924,946,979 Robbinsdale Independent School Dist. 281; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . 1045 Roberson v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Roberson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Robert v. Ferreira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Roberts v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Roberts; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Roberts; Marks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Roberts; Meshell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Roberts; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Roberts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1019,1136 Robertson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Robertson-Ceco Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Robertson-Ceco Corp.; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Robinette; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Robinson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Robinson v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga Cty. . . 997,1085 Robinson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1035 Robinson; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Robinson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Robinson v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,943,1070 Robinson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Robles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kagaku Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Rocha; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Rocha; Lugo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Rochester v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Rockaway Township Town Council; Fernandes v. . . . . . . . . . . . 824,1001 Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn.; Cherry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Rocky Mountain Conf. of United Methodist Church v. Winkler . . 1093 Rodgers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Rodrigo Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Rodriguez; Drennon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Rodriguez v. Edmondson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Rodriguez v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Rodriguez v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,856,860,1019,1034,1138 Rodriguez Macias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Rodriquez v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Roe; Augustine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Roe; Galloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Roe; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Roe v. Maskell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Roe; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Rogers; Cline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Rogers v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Rogers; Loewe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Rogers v. Overstreet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Rogers v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816,1024 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxiii Page Rogers; Sherrills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Rogers; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1069,1134 Rogers v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Rohan v. American Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Rojas v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Roland v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Rolfs; LaRue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Rollins; Kyricopoulos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Romano v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Romas-Miranda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Romer v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Romero, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Romero v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Ronwin v. Altman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Rood v. Oldsmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Roquemore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Rosado v. Curtis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Rosch v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Roscoe v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Rose v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Roseboro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Rosemeyer; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Rosen v. Board of Medical Examiners of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Rosenbalm v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Roslyn Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Hsu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Ross v. Communication Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Ross v. Ieyoub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Roston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Roswell Lincoln Mercury, Inc.; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Rota v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Rothberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Rothenberg v. Ruzicka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Rotibi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Roulette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Rowan; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Rowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Rowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Rowland; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rowsey v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Roy; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,1071 Roy; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Royal v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Royster v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Fuchs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Rubalcaba; Valles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rubin; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1024 Rubin; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Rubio v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Rucker v. Citicorp Savings of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1048 Rudd, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Rude v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1156 Ruff v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Ruff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Ruffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Ruiz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Ruiz v. Blentech Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Ruiz v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1073 Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1155 Runnels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Runyan; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Runyon; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1023 Runyon; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Runyon; Gate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Runyon; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Runyon; Kulinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,904 Runyon; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Runyon; Page v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Runyon; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Rupe; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Rupert v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Rush Health Systems, Inc.; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Rushing v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Russell; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Russell v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Russell v. Strongsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Russell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,975,1070,1154 Russman; Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of Watervliet v. . . . . 1106 Russo v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1072 Russo v. Marut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Russo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Rust v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Rutherford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxv Page Ruthers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Rux v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Ruzicka; Rothenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Ryan; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Ryan; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Ryckman v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Rye Neck School Dist.; Immediato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Saathoff v. FileNet Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Saathoff v. Whelan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Sabelko v. Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Sacramento County District Attorney's Office; Davis v. . . . . . . . . 996 Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept.; Megrave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Sadler v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Saelee v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Inc.; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Sage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Sahni v. American Diversified Investment Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Saif'Ullah v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Sai-Man v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 St. David's Episcopal Church; Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. v. . . 1090 St. Hilaire v. Maine Real Estate Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1023 St. Louis; Oxford House-C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 St. Louis v. Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 912 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.; Hyland Hill North Condo. Assn. v. 1041 Saiz v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Sakaria v. Dare County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1071 Salahuddin v. Coughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Salazar v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Salazar Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Saleem v. Helman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Salemo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982,999 Salinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Salinas v. University of Texas-Pan American . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Sallee v. Sherakas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Sallee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Sallee v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Salmon v. Branton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Salomon Forex, Inc.; Tauber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Salter v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Salyer v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Sam v. Independence Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Sammi Corp.; Metro Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Samples v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Samson Resources Co.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Samuel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Sanchez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Sanchez; Colorado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Sanchez v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Sanchez v. Santa Cruz County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1100 Sanchez v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Sanders v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Sanders v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Sanders v. Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 925 Sanders; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Sanders v. Venture Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Sanders v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 San Diego County; Fully Informed Jury Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 San Diego County Dept. of Social Services; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Sandles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Sandoval v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Sandvoss, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Sanford; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 San Francisco; Golden Gate Hotel Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 San Gorgonio Farms, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 San Juan v. North Alamo Water Supply Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 San Mateo County; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 San Pedro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Santa Clara Valley Humane Society; Hershey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Santa Cruz County; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Santa Cruz County; Sorkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. v. Moskowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Santana-Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Santangelo v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Santiago-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Santobello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Santos v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Sapp v. Power Computing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Sara Lee Corp.; Kayser-Roth Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Saranchak v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Sarasota County; Daugherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1027 Sather Trucking Corp.; Slathar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Saturn General Motors Corp.; Bowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Saunders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxvii Page Savage v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,988 Savage; Haygood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Sawyer v. Dairy Queen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Sawyer v. Hickey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Sawyer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,837 Saxton; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Sayco Ltd. v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 S­B Power Tool; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Scambos v. Petrie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Sceifers v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Schachner; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Schacht; American Deposit Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Schafer; North Dakota Assn. of Retarded Citizens v. . . . . . . . . . . 993 Schaffer v. Kirkland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982,1049 Schall v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,1048 Schapiro v. Schapiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1023 Schaumburg v. Amoco Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Scheidemann v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . 803 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Schiffer v. Tarrytown Boat Club, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1023 Schimenti, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Schledwitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Schleeper v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Schley v. College of Charleston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Schlicher v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Schlicher v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Schmalbeck; Zielinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Schmidt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Schneider v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Schneider; Cheatham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1072 Schneider v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Schneider v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Pyatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Schnidrig; Columbia Machine, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Luecke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Schoenbohm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Schonholz; Long Island Jewish Medical Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Schoor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Schriro; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Schriro; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Schueller v. Edgar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Schulte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Schulte Roth & Zabel v. Southmark Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Schultz v. Consolidation Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Schultz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Schulz v. Vernon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Schulze v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Schumer; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Schumer v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Schurz v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Schuver v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Schwab & Co.; Dahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Schwartz v. Doc's Food Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Schwarz v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc.; Kambitsis v. . . . . . . . . . . 907 Scianna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Sciarrino v. Key West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Scotland County Bd. of Ed.; Viswanathan v. . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1030,1143 Scotland Memorial Hospital; Patel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Scott, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Scott; Balawajder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Scott; Boney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Scott; Christensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Scott; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Scott; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Scott v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Scott v. Manilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Scott v. Recession Hearing Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Scott; Samples v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Scott v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1049 Scott v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1155 Scott; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. . . . . 869 Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church; Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church v. . . 1058 Scovish; Upjohn Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Scurlock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Scypta v. Oglebay Norton Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Seagate Technology, Inc.; Doan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Seagate Technology, Inc.; Furr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Seagrave, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Seagrave v. Spindler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Sea Gull Lighting, Inc. v. Hydramatic Packing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Sealaska Corp.; Broad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Searcy; Curd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; DeJesus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Gerth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxix Page Secretary of Agriculture; Levitoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Secretary of Agriculture; Western Radio Services Co. v. . . . . . . . 822 Secretary of Air Force; Coyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Secretary of Army; Askew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Secretary of Army; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Secretary of Army; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Secretary of Army; Cowhig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1022 Secretary of Army; Drummond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Secretary of Army; Goffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Secretary of Army; Nouraie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1022 Secretary of Army; Uithoven v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Secretary of Defense; Altimus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Secretary of Defense; DCX, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Secretary of Defense; Thomasson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Secretary of Defense; Waller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Secretary of Ed.; Messerschmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Secretary of Ed.; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Secretary of HHS; Davon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Secretary of HHS; Hervey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Secretary of HHS; Le May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Secretary of HHS; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Secretary of HHS; Schumer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Secretary of HHS; Templeton Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Secretary of HHS; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Secretary of Interior; Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Secretary of Interior v. Youpee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 Secretary of Labor; Acura of Bellevue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Secretary of Labor; Bechtel Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Secretary of Labor; G*UB*MK Constructors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Secretary of Labor; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Secretary of Labor; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Secretary of Labor; Stangl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Secretary of Navy; Becerra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Secretary of Navy; Greenlaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Secretary of Navy; Hy Thi Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1143 Secretary of Navy; Sayco Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Secretary of Navy; Steward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Secretary of State of Ark. v. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Secretary of State of Fla.; Biddulph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Secretary of Transportation of Kan.; Thiry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Secretary of Treasury; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1024 Secretary of Treasury; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1037 Secretary of Treasury; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Arroyo Jusino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1048 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; March v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 SEC; Law Practice of J. B. Grossman, P. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 SEC; Sprecher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Security Pacific Corp.; Dillard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Seddens v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1048 Seeger v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Seetharaman v. Commonwealth Edison Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Segines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Segler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Seguin Independent School Dist.; Ganyo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Segura-Del Real v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Selby v. Abraham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Seniw v. Portanova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Senkowski; Bacchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Senkowski; Dean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Senkowski; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Separation of Church and State Committee; Am. Legion Post No. 3 v. 1038 Sepe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Sepulvado v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Serito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Serot v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Serrano v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Serrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Sertich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1113 Service Employees v. Foundation Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Service Lloyds Ins. Co.; Gallego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Sessions; Owes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Sessoms v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Sewell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1018 Seymour v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 SGS Importers International, Inc.; Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. . . 822 Shabazz v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Shabazz v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Shalala; Davon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Shalala; Hervey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Shalala; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Shalala; Schumer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Shalala; Templeton Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Shalala; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Shanahan; Zuill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Shanks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Shannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxli Page Share International, Inc.; Department of Revenue of Fla. v. . . . . 1056 Sharp v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Sharp v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Sharrieff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Shaw v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Shaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Shaw Agency v. Morstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Sheahan; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Sheehy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Sheet Metal Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n 945 Sheet Metal Workers; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Sheffield v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Shell Oil Co.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Shelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Shelton; Church of Lord Jesus Christ of Apostolic Faith v. . . . . . 869 Shelton v. Gudmanson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1072 Shelton v. Lensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Shelton v. Looker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1049 Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Sheppard Air Force Base; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Sherakas; Sallee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Sherbondy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Sherman; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Sherman v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Shern v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Sherrills, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Sherrills v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Sherwood Medical Co.; Words v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Shilling v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Shillinger; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Shillinger; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1036 Shimp v. Keycorp Mortgage, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Shinault; Board of County Comm'rs of Cleveland County v. . . . . . 1078 Shoemaker v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,991,1085 Shoemaker v. Carlos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Shoffeitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Shong-Ching Tong v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Shoobs v. Zaveletta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Shop Television Network, Inc.; Chodos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Shores v. Rhoades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Shores v. Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Short v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Shown v. Spears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Shrestha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Shrock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Shults; Furtick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Shumate v. NationsBank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1035 Siegel v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1024 Sierra v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Sierra Club; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter; Cedar Point Oil Co. v. . . . . . . . . 811 Siers v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Sikes; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Silva-Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Silver, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1026 Silvers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Simmons v. Bienvenu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Simmons v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Simmons v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,932,1020 Simmons v. Vacaville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Simmons v. Wetherall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Simms v. First Madison Bank, FSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1143 Simms v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Simms v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Simon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Simon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Simonet; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Simpson v. Cepak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Simpson; Fortescue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1023 Simpson v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Simpson v. Hession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Simpson; Highland Irrigation Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Simpson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Simpson v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Simpson v. Rowan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Simpson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1019 Sims v. Ault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Sims v. Brown & Root Industrial Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Sims v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Sims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1017 Singer; Patel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Singer; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Singla v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . 970,1072 Singletary; Andrade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Singletary; Buenoano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Singletary; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxliii Page Singletary; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Singletary; Castro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Singletary; Cave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Singletary; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Singletary; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Singletary; Gadson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1035 Singletary; Glock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1044,1076 Singletary; Goss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Singletary v. Gwong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1142 Singletary; Irving v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Singletary; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Singletary; Knapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Singletary; Lambrix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1005 Singletary; Magnotti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Singletary; Marek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Singletary; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Singletary; Nicholson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Singletary; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Singletary; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Singletary; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Singletary; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1049 Singletary; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Singletary; VanDerBerg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Singletary; Vickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Singletary; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1031,1143 Singleton v. Christ the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church . . . 870 Singleton v. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Singleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Sinicropi; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Sinisterra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Sirois v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, Lake Traverse Res. v. United States 1011 Sitkoff v. BMW of North America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Skeen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Skeet v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Skil Corp.; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Skott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Skrzypczak v. Kauger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Slappy v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Slappy v. Vanmeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1102 Slater v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,909 Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Slaton v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Slinkard; Ameritas Investment Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page S. L. J.; M. L. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Sloan v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Slone v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Sluder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Small v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Small v. Perrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Smallwood v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Smallwood v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc. . . . . . . 1028 Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,948,988,1035 Smith v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Smith v. Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Smith v. Becker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Smith v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Smith v. Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1101 Smith v. Englewood Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Smith v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,969 Smith v. Grace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Smith; Holtz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Smith; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Smith v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Smith v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Smith; Kilaab al Ghashiyah (Khan) v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Smith v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982,1072 Smith v. Mail-Well Envelope Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Smith v. National Corp. of Housing Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1023 Smith v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of Uni- formed Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Smith v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Smith v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Smith v. Puckett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Smith v. Regional Transportation Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1102 Smith v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Smith v. Sheet Metal Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Smith; Sherman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Smith v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Smith; Stavrakas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Smith v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848, 856,867,880,938,943,999,1018,1020,1070,1082,1119,1133,1137, 1141 Smith v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlv Page Smith; Wambaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Smith v. Warnick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Smith; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Smith Barney Shearson; J. Geils Band Employee Ben. Plan v. 823 Smith Corp.; Klehr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 SmithKline Beecham Corp.; Lynnbrook Farms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Smotkin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1146 SMS Financial, L. L. C.; Ragland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Snipes v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Snow v. Halford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Snyder; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Snyder v. Viani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Sobocinski v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Sobol; Garnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Sobolevitch; Medico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Soca; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Society Hill Savings and Loan Assn.; Rashid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Sockwell v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Soffer v. Board of Trustees of City Univ. of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Soignier v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Sokolow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Solano Camacho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Solis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Solloso; Castillo Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Somani; Downhour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Sonoma County Water Agency; United States ex rel. Hagood v. . . 865,1001 Sorbet v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1102 Sorensen v. Mahoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Sorenson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Sorkin v. Santa Cruz County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Sorton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Sotelo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Soto v. Lebedeva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 South African Airways v. Brink's Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 South Bend Community School Corp; Helland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 South Carolina; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 South Carolina; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1102 South Carolina; McWee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 South Carolina; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 South Carolina; Patrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 South Carolina; Register v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 South Carolina; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 South Carolina; Slappy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page South Carolina; Von Dohlen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 South Carolina; Whipple v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 South Carolina; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,969 South Carolina; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 South Carolina Bd. of Comm'rs of Judicial Standards; Brown v. . . 1116 South Dakota; Chance Management, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 South Dakota; Department of Interior v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 South Dakota; Rhines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 South Division Credit Union v. McFarland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.; Bankston v. . . . . . . . 891,1001 Southern Pacific Transportation Co.; Ruiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Southmark Corp.; Schulte Roth & Zabel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.; Fent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Southwest Travis County Road Dist. No. 1; Becker v. . . . . . . . 933,1024 Souvannarath v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Sowa; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1143 Spaight v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Spang & Co. v. Brytus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Spann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Sparkman; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Sparkman; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,842,987 Sparks v. Stutler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Sparks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Spaulding v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Assurance Co. . . . . . . . . 1040 Spears v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Spears; Shown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Special School Dist. No. 1 v. H. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Speight v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Speight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Spence v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Spencer v. LeMay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Spencer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1066 Spencer v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Sperling v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Spiegel v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1143 Spindler; Seagrave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Spires v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Spiva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Spivey v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Sporting Club Acquisitions, Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . 810 Spradling; Tulsa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Spratt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlvii Page Sprecher v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Spring v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Spring Meadows Apt. Complex Ltd. Partnership v. Stallings . . . 824 Sprosty v. Buchler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Sprouse; Bane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Spurgetis v. U. S. Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Square Nursing Home, Inc.; Wing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Sriyuth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Stabile v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Stadler v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1064 Stainer; Milner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Stallings v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Stallings; Spring Meadows Apt. Complex Ltd. Partnership v. . . . 824 Stallworth; Evergreen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Stambaugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Standard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Standard Mortgage Co.; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Stanewich's Estate; Van Ort v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Stangl v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Stanhope Hotel; Buzea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1102 Stanley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Stanley Bostitch Co.; Lawal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Stanton v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Stanton v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Staples v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Stark; Kenney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Stark & Stark; Ardell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Starr v. Metzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Starzenski v. Elkhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1055 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Light v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 State Bar of Cal.; Wolfgram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 State Bar of Ga.; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Finney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Spiegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1143 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.; Lexie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 State Oil Co. v. Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Stattin v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Staude v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Staula v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Staup v. First Union National Bank of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1024 Stavrakas v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Stearman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cxlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stedman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Steele v. California Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1036 Steele v. Han Chul Choi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Steele v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1143 Steffen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Steichen & Co.; Honn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Stepanik; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Stepanik; Hand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Stepanik; Hanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Stepanik; Pagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Stephans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Stephen v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Stephen v. Rowland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Stephens; Harvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Stepp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Steptoe & Johnson; Burford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Stevens v. McGinnis, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Stevens; McGinnis, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Stevens v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Stevens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Steward v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Steward v. Hofstetter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Stewart; Bartholic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1153 Stewart v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1022 Stewart; Greenawalt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1103 Stewart; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Stewart; KHD Deutz of America Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Stewart; Martinez-Villareal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Stewart v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Stiffarm v. Burlington Northern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Stiles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1089 Stiltner v. Beretta U. S. A. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Stinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Stitt v. CNG Transmission Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Stjernholm v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Stock; Camilo Montoya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Stock; Felder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1035 Stock; Killingsworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Stock; Shores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Stoianoff v. TRW, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1156 Stokes v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Stoller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlix Page Stone v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Stone v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Servs. 936 Stone Co.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Stone Container Corp.; Gaston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Stonehill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Storer v. Ocean City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Storey v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Story; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Story v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Stout v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Stover v. O'Connell & Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Stowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Strate v. A­1 Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Straub v. Zollar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Streetsboro; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Strickland v. Gridley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Strickland v. Linahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Strickland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Strickland v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Stringfellow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Strobridge v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1022 Stroman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Strong v. Glendening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Strongsville; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Strother v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Strothers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Struve v. Park Place Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Stuart; DiCesare v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Studer Revox America, Inc.; Nordahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Studio Art Theatre of Evansville, Inc. v. Evansville . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Stulz v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Stupak-Thrall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Sturgis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Stutler; Sparks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Styles v. VanZandt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Suarez Corp. Industries v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Suarez-Riascos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Subaru of America, Inc. v. Compton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1143 Suehl v. Suehl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1022 Suffolk Univ. Law School; Hoover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Sule v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Su Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sullivan v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Sullivan; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Summers v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Summerville; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Sumrall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada . . . . . . . 822 Sunbeam Corp.; Kime E. Laube Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Sunbeam Corp.; Laube v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.; Oncale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Sunenblick v. Harrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada; SunAmerica Corp. v. . . . . . . . 822 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Cal., Kern County; KGET­TV Channel 17 v. 1008 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Cardan v. . . . . . . . . 888 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . 1153 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Lin v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Tassa v. . . . . . . . . . 1113 Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County; Lockmiller v. . . . . 929,1035 Superior Form Builders; Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co. v. 809 Supreme Court of Ill.; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Supreme Court of Tex.; Wightman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Sutton v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Swaim, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Swain v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third Dist. . . . . . . . . . 851 Sweatt v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Sweed v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Sweeney v. National Transportation Safety Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Swest, Inc.; Ash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Swest, Inc.; Lipton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Swift v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division 806 Swift v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Swiftships, Inc. v. Loral Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Swigert; Waterfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Swisher v. Texas State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Swoyer v. Edgars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Swoyer v. Kercher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Swoyer v. Merchant Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Swoyer v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Systems Fuel, Inc. v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Syverson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Szenay v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Szymanski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cli Page Taco Bell Corp.; Okparaocha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Taffer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1146 Tafuto v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; Suitum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1088 Taite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Takacs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Takahashi v. Livingston Union School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Talamantes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Tamayo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Tamayo Baron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Tamminga; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Tansy; Gillette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Tansy; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Taos Municipal Schools; Trujillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Tapar v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Tarrytown Boat Club, Inc.; Schiffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1023 Tart v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 Tassa v. Ger-Dan International Telecom, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Tassa v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Tate v. Glenn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Tauber; Ginberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Tauber v. Salomon Forex, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Tavares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1139 Tax Comm'r of Ohio; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278,962 Tax Comm'r of W. Va.; Hartley Marine Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Taxman; Piscataway Township Bd. of Ed. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Taylor v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Taylor v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1023 Taylor v. McLennan Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Taylor v. Meacham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Taylor v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Taylor v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Taylor v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,901,1000,1093,1141 Taylor Construction Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Tchoder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Teague v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Team Bank; Kuhns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Technicolor, Inc.; Liquidation Estate of De Laurentiis Entertain- ment Group v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Teel v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR clii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Tele-Communications, Inc.; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1001 Teleconcepts, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 815 Tellier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Telxon Corp.; McAllister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Temple v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,883 Templeton Coal Co. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Temple Univ.; Yuan Jin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1102 Tennessee; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Tennessee; Cone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Tennessee; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Tennessee; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Tennessee; Joyner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Tennessee; Vincent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Tennessee; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Tennessee Bd. of Regents; Huston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Terrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Terrilynne Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Terry; Boblett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Tesciuba v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1049 Teta; McCarthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Texas; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1066 Texas; Booth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Texas; Brimage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Texas; Brosky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Texas; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Texas; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Texas; Cannady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Texas; Carillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Texas; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Texas; Citizen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Texas; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Texas; Dillingham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Texas; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Texas; Gaines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Texas; Gonzaba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Texas; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Texas; Heiden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Texas; January v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Texas; Lawton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Texas; Luckette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Texas; Mantz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Texas; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Texas; Matyastik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815,1072 Texas; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cliii Page Texas; McCoskey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Texas; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Texas; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,979 Texas; O'Brien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Texas; Picone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Texas; Rachal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1043 Texas; Ransom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Texas; Rees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Texas v. Sierra Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Texas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Texas; Summers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Texas; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice; Sweed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Texas Bd. of Pardons and Parole; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Texas Commerce Bank; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div.; McCullough v. 832 Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div.; Swift v. . . . . . 806 Texas State Bar; Swisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n; St. Louis v. . . . . . . . . . . 912 Thigpen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Thimm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Thi Nguyen v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1143 Thiry v. Carlson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Thoeny; Pletz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Thomas v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Thomas v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Thomas v. American Home Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Thomas; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Thomas v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Thomas v. Deaconess Hospital, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Thomas v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Thomas v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles . . . . . . . . . . 851 Thomas; Lasiter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Thomas; Muraski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Thomas v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Thomas v. Sanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,975,985,986,1045 Thomasson v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Thompsen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Thompson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Thompson v. BIC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Thompson; Costa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR cliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Thompson v. Crabtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Thompson; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Thompson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1080 Thompson v. Kramer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Thompson; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Thompson v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration . . . 864 Thompson; Romero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Thompson v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1044 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,967 Thompson v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Thorne v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Thornton v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Thoubborn; Grune v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Throckmorton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Throgmorton; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Throneburg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Thurman; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Thurman; Cobb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Tiday v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Tidik v. Tidik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Tidwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Tierney v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,988 Tierney v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1072 Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Tinch v. Dayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Tinsley v. Indianapolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Tirico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Tisor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Tlaga v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Tobias v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Tobias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Tobias v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Todd v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Toepeaka v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Toerper v. Trotter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Tokar v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Tokarevich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Toledo; Emery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Toler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Tomasin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Tomberlin; Boyett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Tommie Ray's; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Tompkins; Boone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians v. Poodry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clv Page Tong v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Tonnelle Ave. Books & Video, Inc. v. North Bergen . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Toombs; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Toro v. Depository Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Torres v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Torres Serrano v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Toshiba America Medical Systems, Inc. v. OEC Medical Systems 808 Tovar v. IBP, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Towery v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Town. See name of town. Town Justice of Walworth; Pringle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Townsend v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Toys "R" Us, Inc.; Denbicare U. S. A., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Tracy; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278,962 Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div., State Lands and Forestry 1142 Transamerica Financial Consumer Discount Co.; Hinchliffe v. . . 818,1022 Trans World Airlines; Colligan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Trans World Airlines, Inc.; Dean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Sinicropi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Trapp v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Trautman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Travis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Traylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Treadway; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Treiber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Trident Seafoods Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Trim v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Trinh Hinh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Trinidad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Tripati, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Tripati v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Tristar Corp. v. Freitas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Tropicana Products; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Trostel; American Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Trotter; Toerper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Troutwine Family Trust v. Nevada County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Truck Drivers v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Truesdale v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Trujillo v. Taos Municipal Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 TRW, Inc.; Stoianoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1156 Tseng v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Tseng Fu Lin v. Goldsboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Tsimbidaros v. Painters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR clvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Tsosie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Tucker v. Coggins/Continental Granite Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Tucker v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Tucker; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Tucker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Tucker Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Tuggle v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1024 Tulsa v. Spradling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Turentine v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Turk; Lu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Turner v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Turner v. Couch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Turner; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Turner v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Turner v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1049 Turner v. Investek Financial Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Turner v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Turner v. Kuykendall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1049 Turner; Magoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1049 Turner v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Turner; PFS Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Turner; Shong-Ching Tong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1084 Turpin; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Turpin; Einhorn Yaffee Prescott Architecture & Engineering v. 929 Turpin; Felker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,989 Turpin; Lonchar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Tyler v. Ashcroft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Tyler v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Tyler v. Carnahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,876 Tynes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 UAL Corp.; Fry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 UAP/GA AG Chem., Inc. v. Childree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Ubel v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Udall; Wilson Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Uithoven v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Ulczycki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Umar v. McVea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Under Seal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Underwater Construction Corp.; Rizzi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Underwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100,1130 Unigard Security Ins. Co. v. Bock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clvii Page Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Employee Discretionary Trust; Kauble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Citizens for a Better Environment-Cal. . . 1101 Union Pacific R. Co.; CMC Heartland Partners v. . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1090 Union Underwear Co. v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Unison Transformer Services, Inc.; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Unisys Corp. v. Meinhardt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Arab Emirates; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. . . . . . . 1007 United Capital Corp.; Fischer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1131 United Farmers Agents Assn., Inc., v. Farmers Ins. Exchange . . 1116 United Homes for Children; Pigott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 United Parcel Service, Inc.; Gentry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 United Savings Bank; Abdallah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Bureau of Prisons; Duarte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 U. S. Court of Appeals; Bast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 U. S. Court of Appeals; Conkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 U. S. District Court; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1157 U. S. District Court; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1036 U. S. District Court; Foti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 U. S. District Court; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1023 U. S. District Court; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 U. S. District Court; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1072 U. S. District Court; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 U. S. District Court; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 U. S. District Court; Montgomery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 U. S. District Court; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 U. S. District Court; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 U. S. District Court; Wagner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 U. S. District Court; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 U. S. District Court; Zakiya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 U. S. District Court; Zulu X v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 U. S. District Judge; Fischer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 U. S. District Judge v. Governor of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1111 U. S. District Judge; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 U. S. District Judge; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 U. S. District Judge; Hook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 U. S. District Judge; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 U. S. District Judge; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co.; Buice's Estate v. . . . 863 U. S. Judiciary; Spurgetis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1035 U. S. Marshals Service; Amiri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 U. S. Marshals Service; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:50] PGT*TCR clviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page U. S. Marshals Service; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Rosch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Sallee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Stulz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 U. S. Postal Service; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 U. S. Postal Service; Hasan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 U. S. Postal Service; Schall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,1048 U. S. Postal Service; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 United States Trustee; Fukutomi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 University of Cal.; Voytek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 University of Md. at Baltimore; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 University of S. C.; Murrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1071 University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston; Lakoski v. . . 947,1035 University of Texas-Pan American; Salinas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Unsecured Creditors Committee; Prince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Upjohn Co. v. Scovish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Uptown Records v. Harrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Ureta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Uribe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Urichich v. Youngstown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1101 USAir, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Utah; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Utah; Whiting v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1001 Utah Div., State Lands and Forestry; Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. 1142 Vacaville; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Vacco v. Quill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Valder v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Valdes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Valdez; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Valdez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1136 Valdez-Anguiano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Valencia, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Valencia Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Valenzuela Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Valles v. Rubalcaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Valliere v. Maine Workers' Compensation Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Valmet Oy v. Aldy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Vander Ark; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Vanderbeck v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 VanDerBerg v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Van Doren v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Van Hoorelbeke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1072 Vanmeter; Slappy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1102 Vann v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clix Page Vann v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Vann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Van Ort v. Stanewich's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Van Poyck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 VanZandt; Styles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Varallo v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Vargas v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Vargas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Varner; National Super Markets, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Vasquez; Forrest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Vaughan v. Dormire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Vaughn; Allah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Vaughn; Larry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Vaughn v. Ohio Medical Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,965 Vaughn; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Vaughters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Veale v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Vebeliunas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Vega v. Rexene Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Vega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Vega-Fleites v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Velez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Velez v. Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1157 Venable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1027 Vencil v. Quigley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Veneklase v. Fargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Veneri v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Venson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Venture Stores, Inc.; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Verbeck v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Verex Assurance, Inc. v. Palma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Vermont; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Vernon; Schulz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Ver Strate; Di Lauro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Vest v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Vey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,962 Vey v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Viani; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Vick v. Foote, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Vick v. Foote Tire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Vickson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Victor v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR clx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Vigilante v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Village. See name of village. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Darien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Villaloz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Vincent v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Vines v. Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Virani v. Hall & Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Virginia; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Virginia v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Virginia; Clagett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Virginia; Goins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Virginia; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Virginia; Husske v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Virginia; Lowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Virginia; Luzik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Virginia; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Virginia; Muhammad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Virginia; Novak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Virginia; Rhoton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Virginia; Roach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Virginia; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Virginia; Royal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Virginia; Rushing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Virginia; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Virginia; Stanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Virginia; Wanzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Virginia; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Virginia; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1085 Virginia Dept. of Corrections; Wagner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Virgin Islands; Weatherwax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Visintine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Vision Cable of Pinellas, Inc.; Kramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Visiting Nurse Assn. of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Viswanathan v. Scotland County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1030,1143 Vivas-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Viviano Wine Importers, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Beverage Co. . . . 1078 Viviano Wine Importers, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp. . . . . . . . . . 1078 Vocelle; Waterfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Vogt v. Churchill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Voigt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Von Dohlen v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 V­1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund . . . . . . . 1009 Vose; Heon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxi Page Vose; Hightower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Voss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1033 Voytek v. University of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Vrba v. Wakatsuki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Wabash Valley Power Assn., Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Wacker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Wade, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Wade v. Byles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Wadley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Wages v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Wagner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Wagner v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Wagner v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Wagstaff; Reiman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Wainwright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Wainwright v. Huckabee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Wainwright v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1073 Waite v. Hippe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Wakatsuki; Vrba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Wake County v. Edward Valves, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Waldrop, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Waldrop v. Hopper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Walgreen Co.; Oiness v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Walkenbach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Walker; Bronson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1067 Walker; Maddox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Walker v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Walker; Moates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Walker v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Walker v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Walker v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Walker v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,944,1046,1138,1139 Walker v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Walker v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Wall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Wallace v. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Wallace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,977 Waller v. Kentucky Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Waller v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Walls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Walsh; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Walters v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Walters; Bierley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1102 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR clxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Walters v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Walters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Walton; Abate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Walton; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Walton v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Walton v. Throgmorton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Walton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Wambaugh v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Wanambisi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Wanzer v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Ward; Booker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Ward v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Ward v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Ward v. Streetsboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1019 Warden. See name of warden. Warfield; Holman Warfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Warnick; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Warr Acres; Pickett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1022 Warren v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Warren Management Consultants, Inc.; Baba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1022 Warwick Mall Trust v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Washington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Washington; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Washington v. Glucksberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1039,1075 Washington; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Washington; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Washington v. Singer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Washington; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.; Hancock Electronics Corp. v. 929 Washington Post; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Washington Times Corp. v. Berman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Waszak v. Pasadena City College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Waterfield v. Swigert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Waterfield v. Vocelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Waterman v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Waters; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Waters; Hargis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Waters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,905 Waters; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Watkins v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxiii Page Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,938,1000 Watson v. General Motors Corp., Electro-Motive Division . . . . . . 842 Watson v. Isern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Watts; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148,1144 Waugh v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Wauseon; Plassman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Wayne v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Weatherwax v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Weaver v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Weaver v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Weaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100,1132 Weaver v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Webb v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Webb v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Webb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1156 Webber v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Weber v. Erickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Webster; Omnitrition International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Weekley v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Weekley; Garza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1048 Weeks v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Weible v. Doctor's Associates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Weisman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Weiss v. Moreno Valley Unified High School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Weiss v. Weiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Weiters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Welky v. Makowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Wellington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Wellons v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Wells v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Wells v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Wells v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Wells; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482 Wells v. Zent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Welz v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Wesley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Wesley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1085 Wesley v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Wesley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082,1132 Wess v. Revell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 West; Askew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 West; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR clxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page West; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 West; Cowhig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1022 West; Drummond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 West; Goffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 West; Nouraie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1022 West; Uithoven v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. v. St. David's Episcopal Church . . 1090 Westbrooks v. Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Allegheny County 889 Westcott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Western Radio Services Co. v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Westhaven Village v. Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Westley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 West Virginia; McKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 West Virginia; Suarez Corp. Industries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 West Virginia; Woody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Wetherall; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Wexler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Weyerhaeuser Co.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Whaley v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision . . . 898 Wheat Ridge; McAlister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Wheeler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,905,1128 Whelan; Saathoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Whipple v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Whitaker v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 White v. Adams County Detention Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 White; Baticados v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 White; Botello Cervantes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 White; Carl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 White; Domino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 White; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 White v. Gregory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 White v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1065 White; McNabb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 White; Moats v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 White v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 White v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 White; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 White; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 White v. Rush Health Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 White; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 White; Strother v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 White; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxv Page White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1011,1070 White v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 White Foods; Kelly Foods Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Whitehead, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Whitehead v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Whitehead v. Washington Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Whitfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Whiting v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1001 Whitney v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Whitworth v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Wichita; Kramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Wichita; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Widnall; Coyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Wightman v. Supreme Court of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Wild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Wilentz; Kirchgessner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Wiley v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Wilkerson v. Norgaard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Wilkerson v. Roswell Lincoln Mercury, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Wilkerson v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Wilkinson v. Legal Services Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Wilkinson & Monaghan v. Hillcrest Healthcare Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 861 Willbanks v. Keck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Wille; Plescher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Willett; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,962,1023 Williams v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1045 Williams v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Williams; Connolly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Williams v. Cousin-Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Williams v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Williams v. Fountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Williams v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Williams v. Horner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Williams v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Williams v. Jackson Stone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Williams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Williams v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Williams v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Williams v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1071 Williams v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Williams; Lyons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Williams v. McCausland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR clxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Williams v. Metropolitan Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Williams v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Williams v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Williams v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Williams v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Williams v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1156 Williams v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Williams v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Williams v. Parke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Williams; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Williams v. San Gorgonio Farms, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Williams v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1031,1143 Williams v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,969 Williams v. Toombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869, 887,900,902,940,967,1029,1068,1119,1130,1131,1133,1135 Williams v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1085 Williams v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Williams; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Williams v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Williams-Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Williams, Inc.; Blanchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Pipeline Partnership . . . . . . 1092 Williamson v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Williamson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Willis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1034,1120 Willmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Wills v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Wills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Wilmoth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Wilshire Terrace Corp.; Pierson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Wilson v. Began . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Wilson v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Wilson; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Wilson; Hoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Wilson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Wilson v. Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Wilson; Maryland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408,804 Wilson v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Wilson v. McCloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Wilson v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Wilson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Wilson v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Wilson v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxvii Page Wilson v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Wilson; Saif'Ullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Wilson; Truck Drivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Wilson; Union Underwear Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,943,998,1011,1107,1140 Wilson Corp. v. Udall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Wimberly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Windley v. Dover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Windmill Corp.; Kelly Foods Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Windsor; Amchem Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1054,1075,1103 Wing; Bernys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Wing v. James Square Nursing Home, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Winkler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Winkler; Rocky Mountain Conf. of United Methodist Church v. . . 1093 Winkler GMBH & Co. KG; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Winnicki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Winske; Coffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Winslow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Wisconsin; Berndt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Wisconsin; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Wisconsin; Marsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Wisconsin; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Wisconsin v. Mueller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Wisconsin; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Wisconsin; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1106 Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Pro. Responsibility; Harvey v. . . . . . 824 Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Services; Nierengarten v. 932 Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Wisconsin State Bar; Crosetto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Wise; Akbar-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Wishnatsky v. Bergquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1024 Witchell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Witherspoon v. Beshears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Witherspoon v. Bibbings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Withrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Witkowski; Prechtl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Witkowski; Stanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Witt; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Witte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Wittman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Wittmer v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Wofford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Wogenstahl v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Wolf v. Buss America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1023 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR clxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wolfe; Pringle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Wolfe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Wolfgram v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Womack; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Womack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Womble v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Wood; Dent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Wood v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Wood; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Wood; Rice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Wood; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Wood; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Wood v. Rupe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Wood v. San Mateo County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Woodall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Woodard; Brewington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Woodard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Woodfolk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Woodner Co. v. Breeden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1149 Woodrup v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Woods; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Woods v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,996 Woods; Krueger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1023 Woodson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Woody v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Wooten v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Word v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Words v. Sherwood Medical Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Sorbet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1102 Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa.; Banko v. . . . . . . . . . 885 Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa.; Morgart v. . . . . . . . 936 Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa.; Moschgat v. . . . . . . 1017 Wrenn v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Wright v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Wright; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1084,1135 Wright; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Wronke v. Canady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Wronke v. Madigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1143 WSB Electric, Inc. v. Curry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Wudtke v. Childers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Wuerl; Croatian Roman Catholic Cong., Holy Trinity Church v. 1114 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxix Page Wuornos v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,997 Wutthidetgrainggrai v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 W. W. Henry Co.; Guilbeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Wyatt; Haas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Wyatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Wynne v. Wynne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Wyoming; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Wyoming; Rissler & McMurry Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Wyoming; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Wyshak v. American Savings Bank, F. A. . . . . . . . . . . 866,950,1023,1035 Wzorek v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Yahweh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Yang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Yang; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,1085 Yarber; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Yawczak v. Acosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Yepez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Yett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Yil Jo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Yin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Yohn v. Board of Regents, Univ. of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 York v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 York v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Young, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Young; Abraham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Young; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Young; El Jabaar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Young v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1027,1039 Young; Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Young v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Young v. Lowe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Young v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Young; Tobias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,855,1135 YoungBear, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Young & Rubicam Inc.; Abrahams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Youngstown; Urichich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1101 Young Yil Jo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Yount v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Youpee; Babbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 Yourman; Guiliani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Ysassi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Yuan Jin v. Temple Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1102 Job: 519REP Unit: $U12 [05-13-99 15:06:51] PGT*TCR clxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Yueh-Shaio Yang; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . 26,1085 Yulee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Yurtis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1023 Yusuff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Zakiya v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Zant; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Zantop International Airlines, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury 1118 Zaveletta; Shoobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Zavesky v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Zayid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Zdun v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Zehnder; Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Zeitvogel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Zeitvogel v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1036 Zellmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Zent; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Zervakos; Michael v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Zielinski v. Schmalbeck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Zientek v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Zimmer v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Mich. . . . . . . 910 Zolin; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Zollar; Straub v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Zschach; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Zucco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Zucker v. Quasha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Zuckerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Zuill v. Shanahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Zulu X v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 zu Mike v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Zuniga Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 519us1$$1Z 04-30-98 13:30:30 PAGES OPINPGT CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, et al. v. LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 95­1521. Argued October 15, 1996-Decided October 21, 1996 45 F. 3d 469 and 74 F. 3d 1308, vacated and remanded. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Michael Jay Singer, and Robert M. Loeb. Daniel Wolf argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were William R. Stein and Robert B. Jobe. Per Curiam. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of § 633 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Ap- propriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104­208, 110 Stat. 3009­701). 1 519US1$$2Z 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus CALIFORNIA et al. v. ROY on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­2025. Decided November 4, 1996 A California court convicted respondent Roy of robbery and first-degree murder. The State contended that Roy, coming to the aid of a confeder- ate who was committing the robbery, helped with the murder. The jury was instructed that it could convict if, inter alia, Roy, with knowledge of the confederate's unlawful purpose, had helped the confederate. The State Supreme Court later held an identical instruction erroneous be- cause it did not require the jury to find that a defendant had the knowl- edge and intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the confederate's crime. Despite this error, the State Court of Appeal affirmed Roy's conviction, finding that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24. The Federal District Court considering Roy's habeas claim also found the error harmless, reasoning that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate's purpose and helped him but also did not intend to help him. In reversing, the en banc Ninth Circuit applied a special harmless-error standard, which it believed combined aspects of the decisions in Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263 (per curiam), and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432, and held that the omission of the instruction's intent part is harmless only if a review of the assistance and knowledge facts found by the jury establish that the jury necessar- ily found the omitted intent element. Held: As a federal court reviewing a state-court determination in a ha- beas corpus proceeding, the Ninth Circuit should have applied the harmless-error standard first enunciated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, namely, whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The Ninth Circuit drew its standard from a discussion in Carella's concurring opinion about the proper way to determine whether an error in respect to the use of a legal presumption was harmless. Subsequent to Carella, how- ever, this Court held in Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U. S. 619, and O'Neal, supra, that a federal court reviewing a habeas proceeding ordinarily should apply the Kotteakos standard. That standard applies to habeas review of trial errors, including errors in respect to which the Constitu- tion requires state courts to apply a stricter, Chapman-type harmless- error standard when reviewing a conviction directly. The sort of error 519US1$$2Z 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 2 (1996) 3 Per Curiam at issue in Carella is a trial error subject to harmless-error analysis. The error at issue here-a misdescription of an element of the crime- is an error of omission, not an error of the structural sort that defies harmless-error analysis. Certiorari granted; 81 F. 3d 863, vacated and remanded. Per Curiam. A California court convicted respondent Kenneth Roy of the robbery and first-degree murder of Archie Mannix. The State's theory, insofar as is relevant here, was that Roy, com- ing to the aid of a confederate who was trying to rob Mannix, helped the confederate kill Mannix. The trial judge gave the jury an instruction that permitted it to convict Roy of first-degree murder as long as it concluded that (among other things) Roy, "with knowledge of" the confederate's "unlawful purpose" (robbery), had helped the confederate, i. e., had "aid[ed]," "promote[d]," "encourage[d]," or "instigate[d]" by "act or advice . . . the commission of" the confederate's crime. The California Supreme Court later held in People v. Bee- man, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561, 674 P. 2d 1318, 1326 (1984), that an identical instruction was erroneous because of what it did not say, namely, that state law also required the jury to find that Roy had the "knowledge [and] intent or purpose of com- mitting, encouraging, or facilitating" the confederate's crime. Id., at 561, 674 P. 2d, at 1326 (emphasis added). Despite this error, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Roy's con- viction because it found the error "harmless beyond a rea- sonable doubt." See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). The California Supreme Court denied postconvic- tion relief. Subsequently Roy, pointing to the same instructional error, asked a Federal District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court denied the request because, in its view, the error was harmless. Indeed, the District Court wrote that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate's purpose and helped him but also found that Roy did not intend to help him. A divided 519US1$$2q 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT 4 CALIFORNIA v. ROY Per Curiam Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. Roy v. Gomez, 55 F. 3d 1483 (1995). The Ninth Circuit later heard the case en banc and re- versed the District Court. It held that the instructional error was not harmless. 81 F. 3d 863 (1996). In doing so, the majority applied a special "harmless error" standard, which it believed combined aspects of our decisions in Ca- rella v. California, 491 U. S. 263 (1989) (per curiam), and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432 (1995). The Ninth Cir- cuit described the standard as follows: "[T]he omission is harmless only if review of the facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted element." 81 F. 3d, at 867 (emphasis in original). As we understand that statement in context, it meant: "[T]he omission [of the `intent' part of the instruction] is harmless only if review of the facts found by the jury [namely, assistance and knowledge] establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted element [namely, `in- tent']." Ibid. The State of California, seeking certiorari, argues that this definition of "harmless error" is far too strict and that this Court's decisions require application of a significantly less strict "harmless error" standard in cases on collateral review. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993); O'Neal, supra. We believe that the State, and the dissenting judges in the Ninth Circuit, are correct about the proper standard. The Ninth Circuit majority drew its special standard primarily from a concurring opinion in Carella, supra, a case that dealt with legal presumptions. The concurrence in that case set out the views of several Justices about the proper way to determine whether an error in respect to the use of a pre- sumption was "harmless." Subsequent to Carella, however, this Court held that a federal court reviewing a state-court 519US1$$2q 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 2 (1996) 5 Per Curiam determination in a habeas corpus proceeding ordinarily should apply the "harmless error" standard that the Court had previously enunciated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750 (1946), namely, "whether the error `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Brecht, supra, at 637 (citing Kotteakos, supra, at 776). The Court recognized that the Kotteakos standard did not apply to " `structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by "harmless-error" standards,' " 507 U. S., at 629, but held that the Kotteakos standard did apply to habeas review of what the Court called "trial errors," including errors in respect to which the Con- stitution requires state courts to apply a stricter, Chapman- type standard of "harmless error" when they review a con- viction directly. 507 U. S., at 638. In O'Neal, supra, this Court added that where a judge, in a habeas proceeding, applying this standard of harmless error, "is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error," the habeas "petitioner must win." Id., at 437. The case before us is a case for application of the "harm- less error" standard as enunciated in Brecht and O'Neal. This Court has written that "constitutional error" of the sort at issue in Carella is a "trial error," not a "structural error," and that it is subject to "harmless error" analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 306­307 (1991). The state courts in this case applied harmless-error analysis of the strict variety, and they found the error "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman, supra, at 24. The specific error at issue here-an error in the instruction that defined the crime-is, as the Ninth Circuit itself recognized, as easily characterized as a "misdescription of an element" of the crime, as it is characterized as an error of "omission." 81 F. 3d, at 867, n. 4. No one claims that the error at issue here is of the "structural" sort that " `def[ies] analysis by "harmless error" standards.' " Brecht, supra, at 629. The analysis advanced by the Ninth Circuit, while certainly con- 519US1$$2q 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT 6 CALIFORNIA v. ROY Scalia, J., concurring sistent with the concurring opinion in Carella, does not, in our view, overcome the holding of Brecht, followed in O'Neal, that for reasons related to the special function of habeas courts, those courts must review such error (error that may require strict review of the Chapman-type on direct appeal) under the Kotteakos standard. Thus, we are convinced that the "harmless error" standards enunciated in Brecht and O'Neal should apply to the "trial error" before us as enun- ciated in those opinions and without the Ninth Circuit's modification. For these reasons, we grant respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the Ninth Circuit's determination, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins as to Part I, concurring. I I agree with what the Court decides in its per curiam opinion: that the Brecht-O'Neal standard for reversal of the conviction ("grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error"), see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993), and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432 (1995), rather than the more stringent Chapman standard (inability to find the error "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"), see Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), applies to the error in this case when it is presented, not on direct appeal, but as grounds for habeas corpus relief. The Ninth Circuit did not apply that more deferential standard, and I therefore concur in the remand. I do not understand the opinion, however, to address the question of what constitutes the harmlessness to which this more deferential standard is applied-and on that point the Ninth Circuit was quite correct. As we held in Sullivan 519US1$$2q 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 2 (1996) 7 Scalia, J., concurring v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275 (1993), a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury verdict that he is guilty of the crime, and absent such a verdict the conviction must be reversed, "no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be." Id., at 279. A jury verdict that he is guilty of the crime means, of course, a verdict that he is guilty of each necessary element of the crime. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 522­523 (1995). Formally, at least, such a verdict did not exist here: The jury was never asked to determine that Roy had the "intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating" his confederate's crime. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561, 674 P. 2d 1318, 1326 (1984). The absence of a formal verdict on this point cannot be rendered harmless by the fact that, given the evidence, no reasonable jury would have found otherwise. To allow the error to be cured in that fashion would be to dispense with trial by jury. "The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Sulli- van, supra, at 280. The error in the present case can be harmless only if the jury verdict on other points effectively embraces this one or if it is impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict did find without finding this point as well. See Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). I concur in the remand so that the Ninth Circuit may determine whether there is "grave doubt" that this is so, rather than (what it did) deter- mine whether it is impossible to "be certain" that this is so, 81 F. 3d 863, 867 (1996). Elsewhere in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit purported to be applying the O'Neal standard, stat- ing that "[w]hen the reviewing court is unable to conclude the jury necessarily found an element that was omitted from the instructions," it "can only be `in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error,' " 81 F. 3d, at 868 (quoting O'Neal 519US1$$2q 06-02-99 14:00:38 PAGES OPINPGT 8 CALIFORNIA v. ROY Scalia, J., concurring v. McAninch, supra, at 437). That seems to me to impart to the determination a black-and-white character which it does not possess, any more than other determinations pos- sess it. It can be "the better view," but far from "certain," that, given the facts in the record, no juror could find x with- out also finding y. What O'Neal means is that, when the point is arguable, the State's determination of harmless error must be sustained. II One final point: I write as I have written only because the Court has rejected the traditional view of habeas corpus relief as discretionary. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But for that precedent, I would be content to grant federal habeas relief for this sort of state-court error only when there has been no opportunity to litigate it before, or when there is substantial doubt, on the facts, whether the defendant was guilty. See ibid. 519US1$$3Z 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 9 Syllabus LOPEZ et al. v. MONTEREY COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al. appeal from the united states district court for the northern district of california No. 95­1201. Argued October 8, 1996-Decided November 6, 1996 As a jurisdiction covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, appellee Monterey County (hereinafter County) must obtain federal preclear- ance-either from the Attorney General of the United States or from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia-of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. On that date, the County had nine separate and independent inferior court districts, the judges of which were elected exclusively by their respec- tive districts' voters. Between 1972 and 1983, the County adopted six ordinances, which ultimately merged all the districts into a single, countywide municipal court served by judges whom County residents elected at large. This consolidation took place against a backdrop of California laws, some of which governed courts generally and others of which applied to the County's courts specifically. In 1991, appellants, Hispanic voters residing in the County, sued in the District Court, alleg- ing that the County had violated § 5 by failing to obtain federal preclear- ance of the consolidation ordinances. The three-judge District Court ordered the County to obtain federal preclearance of the challenged or- dinances. But the County did not submit the ordinances to the appro- priate federal authorities. Instead, the County began to work with ap- pellants to develop a new judicial election plan that they believed would be less retrogressive than the at-large, countywide election scheme. The State of California, as intervenor, opposed the parties' proposed plans. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan. In es- sence, four years after the filing of the complaint, the District Court ordered the County to hold elections under the very same scheme that appellants had originally challenged under § 5 as unprecleared. Held:1. This Court leaves to the District Court to resolve on remand appel- lee State's threshold contentions that, although the County perhaps should have submitted the consolidation ordinances for federal preclear- ance before implementing them, intervening changes in California law have transformed the County's judicial election scheme into a state plan, for which § 5 preclearance is not needed; that appellants' suit was barred 519US1$$3Z 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 10 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Syllabus by laches; that it is constitutionally improper to designate the County a covered jurisdiction under § 5; and that the consolidation ordinances did not alter a voting "standard, practice, or procedure" subject to § 5 pre- clearance. Pp. 19­20. 2. The District Court's order that the County conduct elections under its unprecleared, at-large judicial election plan conflicts with Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. 646, 652­653, in which the Court held, among other things, that a voting change subject to § 5 is unenforceable unless pre- cleared and that § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting implementation of an unprecleared change. Thus, an injunction is re- quired where, as here, a district court must decide whether to allow illegal elections to go forward. Id., at 654. There is no "extreme cir- cumstance" here that might justify allowing the 1996 elections to pro- ceed, cf. id., at 654­655, and the District Court has not independently crafted a remedial electoral plan such as might render the preclearance requirements inapplicable, see McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 148­ 150. Nor is the preclearance process' basic nature changed by the com- plicating factors that a simple injunction could leave the County without a judicial election system because a return to the 1968 plan appears impractical, and that the parties seem unable to fashion a plan that does not contravene California law. Congress gave exclusive authority to pass on an election change's discriminatory effect or purpose to the fed- eral authorities designated in § 5. See id., at 151. On a complaint al- leging failure to preclear election changes under § 5, a three-judge dis- trict court may determine only whether § 5 covers a contested change, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and if the require- ments were not satisfied, what temporary remedy, if any, is appropriate. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 129, n. 3. The goal of a three-judge district court facing a § 5 challenge must be to ensure that the covered jurisdiction submits its election plan to the appropriate federal authorities for preclearance as expeditiously as possible. Here, by protracting this litigation in order to obtain a plan that complied both with § 5 and with state law, the District Court interposed itself into the § 5 approval process in a way that the statute does not contem- plate. Cf., e. g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U. S. 37, 42­43 (per curiam). Pp. 20­25. Reversed and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Joaquin G. Avila argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert Rubin, Anthony Chavez, Antonia Herna´ndez, and Richard M. Pearl. 519US1$$3Z 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 11 Opinion of the Court Alan Jenkins argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Steven H. Rosen- baum, and Eileen Penner. Daniel G. Stone, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for state appellees were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney Gen- eral, Floyd D. Shimomura, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, and Linda A. Cabatic, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents a challenge to an order by a three- judge District Court for the Northern District of California that authorized Monterey County to conduct judicial elec- tions under an election plan that has not received federal approval pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. I The State of California has 58 counties, one of which is Monterey County (hereinafter County). In 1971, the Attor- ney General designated the County a covered jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(b). 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971); see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1995). As a result, the County became subject to the federal preclearance requirements set forth in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. *Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Paul C. Saunders, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, Samuel L. Walters, Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Steven R. Shapiro, Elaine R. Jones, Norman J. Chachkin, and Jacqueline A. Berrien filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Sharon L. Browne and Deborah J. La Fetra filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Barbara McDowell and Elwood G. Lui filed a brief for the California Judges Association as amicus curiae. 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 12 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court Section 5 governs changes in voting procedures, with the purpose of preventing jurisdictions covered by its require- ments from enacting or seeking to administer voting changes that have a discriminatory purpose or effect. As a jurisdic- tion covered by § 5, Monterey County must obtain federal preclearance-either administrative or judicial-of any vot- ing practice different from the practices in effect on Novem- ber 1, 1968. To obtain administrative preclearance of a changed voting practice, a covered jurisdiction submits the enactment to the Attorney General of the United States. If the Attorney General does not formally object to the new procedure within 60 days of submission, the jurisdiction may enforce the legislation. A covered jurisdiction may also obtain judicial preclearance-either directly or after the Attorney General has objected to the voting change-by securing in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a declaratory judgment that the new practice "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . . ." Ibid. On November 1, 1968, the County had nine inferior court districts. Two of these districts were municipal court dis- tricts, each served by two judges, and the other seven were justice court districts, each served by a single judge. Both municipal and justice courts were trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal courts served districts with popula- tions exceeding 40,000, and justice courts served those dis- tricts with smaller populations. The justice courts differed from the municipal courts in other respects. They were not courts of record and were served by judges who often worked part time and did not have to be members of the bar. Comment, Trial Court Consolidation in California, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1081, 1086 (1974). (On January 1, 1990, however, a state constitutional amendment specified that all courts, including justice courts, were courts of record. Cal. Const., 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 13 Opinion of the Court Art. VI, § 1 (1988). A few years later, California voters eliminated justice courts altogether. Art. VI, §§ 1, 5(b).) Each of the municipal and justice courts operated sep- arately and independently. Judges for each court were elected at large by the voters of their respective districts, and they served only the judicial district in which they were elected. The municipal and justice court districts varied widely in population and judicial workloads. For example, a 1972 survey showed that the Monterey-Carmel Municipal Court District had a population of 106,700, with more than enough work for two full-time judges. By contrast, the San Ardo Justice Court District had a population of 3,500, with a caseload that required less than a quarter of one judge's time. Between 1972 and 1983, the County adopted six or- dinances, which ultimately merged the seven justice court districts and the two municipal court districts into a single, countywide municipal court, served by nine judges whom County residents elected at large. (At present, 10 judges serve on the municipal court.) Each judge was elected to serve for a term of six years. Judicial elections were con- ducted under various interim schemes in 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1982. Additionally, the County conducted at-large, countywide judicial elections in 1986, 1988, and 1990. The County's reorganization of its inferior court system took place against a backdrop of state laws governing the general administration and organization of state courts. State law authorizes a county board of supervisors, "[a]s pub- lic convenience requires, . . . [to] divide the county into judi- cial districts for the purpose of electing judges . . . ." Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976). The board also "may change district boundaries and create other districts." Ibid.; see also Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 25200 (West 1988) ("The board of supervisors may divide the county into elec- tion . . . and other districts required by law, change their boundaries, and create other districts, as convenience re- 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 14 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court quires"). A county's judicial election scheme must comply with several state constitutional and statutory requirements. Municipal court districts must include at least 40,000 resi- dents, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 5(a); cities may not be split into more than one judicial district, ibid.; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976); municipal court judges must be resi- dents of the judicial district to which they are elected or appointed, § 71140; and, according to the State, judges' juris- dictional and electoral bases must be coextensive, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 16(b); Koski v. James, 47 Cal. App. 3d 349, 354, 120 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1975). In addition to these generally applicable laws, the state legislature has enacted various pieces of legislation directed at the judicial systems of particular California counties, in- cluding laws aimed specifically at Monterey County's judicial system. Cal. Govt. Code Ann., Tit. 8, ch. 10 (West 1993). Some of these laws have reflected changes in the County's judicial districts resulting from the consolidation process.* The State has also enacted legislation dealing with the ad- ministration of the County's judicial system, such as appoint- *See, e. g., 1953 Cal. Stats., ch. 206, § 2 ("This article applies to the mu- nicipal court established in a district embracing the Cities of Carmel and Monterey"); 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 966, § 2 ("This article applies only to mu- nicipal courts established in . . . [a] district embracing the Cities of Monte- rey, Carmel, Seaside, Sand City, and Del Rey Oaks designated as the Monterey-Carmel Judicial District; [and a] district embracing the City of Salinas designated as the Salinas Judicial District"); 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 995, § 1 ("This article applies to all of the municipal courts established in the County of Monterey, which are in judicial districts entitled as follows: the Monterey Peninsula Judicial District, the Salinas Judicial District, and the North Monterey County Judicial District"); 1979 Cal. Stats., ch. 694, § 2 ("There is in the County of Monterey, on and after the effective date of this section, a single municipal court district which embraces the former Salinas Judicial District, Monterey Peninsula Judicial District and North Monterey County Judicial District"); 1989 Cal. Stats., ch. 608, § 1 (codified at Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 73560 (West 1993)) ("This article applies to the Monterey County Municipal Court District, which encompasses the entire County of Monterey"). 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 15 Opinion of the Court ment and compensation of court personnel. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 73564­73569 (West 1993). Although it was subject to § 5 preclearance requirements, the County did not submit any of the consolidation ordi- nances for federal preclearance under § 5. The State, how- ever, in 1983 submitted for administrative preclearance a state law, 1983 Cal. Stats., ch. 1249, that mentioned Monterey County's prospective consolidation of the last two justice court districts with the remaining municipal court district. The Department of Justice requested additional information concerning this aspect of the state legislation. In its re- sponse, the State included the last of the County's six consoli- dation ordinances, which was adopted in 1983. The Attor- ney General interposed no objection to the 1983 state law. The State's submission may well have served to preclear the 1983 county ordinance. See 28 CFR § 51.14(2) (1981); 28 CFR § 51.15(a) (1987). The United States points out, how- ever, that the 1983 submission to the Department of Justice did not identify or describe any of the County's previous con- solidation ordinances. The State does not contest this point. Thus, under our precedent, these previous consolidation ordi- nances do not appear to have received federal preclearance approval. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. 646, 657­658 (1991); McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 249 (1984). On September 6, 1991, appellants, five Hispanic voters re- siding in the County, sued the County in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleg- ing that the County had violated § 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of the six judicial district consolidation ordinances it had adopted between 1972 and 1983. They raised no claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act or consti- tutional challenge. A three-judge District Court was con- vened. On March 31, 1993, the District Court ruled that the challenged ordinances were election changes subject to § 5 and consequently unenforceable without federal preclear- ance. The District Court directed the County to submit the 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 16 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court ordinances to federal officials for preclearance. It also de- nied the County's motion to join the State as an indispensa- ble party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), find- ing that the State had no legally protected interest in the outcome of the action. In August 1993, the County filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking judicial preclearance of the challenged ordinances. Appellants intervened. But before that court made any findings, the County voluntarily dismissed its ac- tion, without prejudice. The County and appellants subse- quently stipulated that the County was " `unable to establish that the [consolidation ordinances] adopted by the County between 1968 and 1983 did not have the effect of denying the right to vote to Latinos in Monterey County due to the retrogressive effect several of these ordinances had on La- tino voting strength . . . .' " 871 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N. D. Cal. 1994). The parties thereupon returned to the three- judge District Court, and several years of litigation ensued. In essence, the County and appellants ceased to litigate the case as adversaries. Instead, they embarked on a joint attempt, opposed by the State and others as intervenors, to persuade the District Court to order a judicial election plan they viewed as less retrogressive than an at-large, county- wide election scheme. In late 1993 and early 1994, the County and appellants jointly proposed two plans to the Dis- trict Court. Each plan divided the County into different election areas, with judges from each area to serve on the countywide municipal court. The State objected to these schemes on the ground that they contravened California law, including the constitutional requirements that a judge's ju- risdictional and electoral bases be coextensive, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 16(b), and that cities not be split into more than one judicial district, Art. VI, § 5(a). Appellants and the County acknowledged these conflicts, but asked the District 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 17 Opinion of the Court Court to suspend operation of these state constitutional pro- visions in the County. For some time, the District Court was reluctant to imple- ment either of the proposed plans, ruling that it was "not satisfied that a plan necessarily ha[s] to conflict with [Article VI, § 16(b) in order to meet the requirements of] the Voting Rights Act." 871 F. Supp., at 1256. Finally, the County and appellants filed with the District Court a stipulation that the County could not " `devise or prepare any plan for the election of municipal court judges in Monterey County that [did] not conflict with at least one state law and still com- pl[ied] with the Voting Rights Act.' " Id., at 1257. The par- ties supported the stipulation with information on County demographics, the presence of politically cohesive Hispanic communities and Anglo bloc voting, and a legacy of discrimi- nation that had affected Hispanic citizens' right to vote. They also set forth a number of potential election plans that they believed complied with § 5, all of which violated some aspect of state law. In June 1994, the District Court decided to give appellants, the County, the State, and the United States, which had at this point weighed in as amicus curiae, another chance to develop a workable solution. It enjoined the upcoming 1994 elections. It directed the County to attempt to obtain changes in state law that would permit the implementation of a judicial election plan that complied with § 5 require- ments. It asked the State to assist the County in creat- ing an acceptable judicial election plan. Nevertheless, in late 1994, the parties were back in court, still without a satis- factory plan. The County had sought amendments to the State Constitution and statutes, but was unsuccessful. In a December 20, 1994, order, the District Court con- cluded that it had to devise a remedy that would permit judicial elections to take place, pending implementation of a permanent, federally precleared voting plan. Otherwise, voters would be deprived of their right to elect judges. The 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 18 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court District Court recognized that neither appellants nor the County thought feasible a return to the election scheme in effect on November 1, 1968. Instead, it decided to adopt one of the plans the County and appellants previously had proposed. Under this scheme, the County was divided into four election districts. Voters in three of the districts, in which Hispanics constituted a majority, would each elect one judge. Voters in the fourth district would elect the other seven judges. Judges elected under the plan would serve for 18-month terms, until January 1997. All 10 judges would serve on the countywide municipal court. The Dis- trict Court acknowledged that the interim plan was incon- sistent with state law, but reasoned that the intrusion on state interests was minimal. The County submitted the in- terim plan to the Attorney General for preclearance, and it was precleared on March 6, 1995. In a special election con- ducted on June 6, 1995, seven judges were elected. (Appar- ently, terms of three of the judges holding seats in the seven-member election district had not expired by June 1995.) Shortly after the June 1995 special election, this Court is- sued its decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), which prompted the three-judge District Court to reconsider the soundness of its interim election plan. Miller, ruled the District Court, cast "substantial doubt" on the constitu- tionality of its previous order, "as that plan used race as a significant factor in dividing the County into election areas." App. 167. Without ruling that the interim plan was in fact unconstitutional, the District Court decided to change course. It denied the County's request to extend the terms of judges elected in the 1995 special election, con- cerned that such an extension would be "inappropriate" in light of the possible constitutional infirmity of the interim plan. A return to the judicial election system in existence before the adoption of the consolidation ordinances was not "legal, feasible or desired." Ibid. In the District Court's 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 19 Opinion of the Court view, its only option was to order the County to conduct an at-large, countywide judicial election in March 1996, while enjoining future elections pending preclearance of a perma- nent plan. Judges elected in 1996 would serve for the usual 6-year terms. The District Court also joined the State as an indispensable party, based on the State's argument that the County was doing nothing more than administering a state statute that required countywide elections, rather than administering its own county ordinance. Thus, in essence, four years after the filing of the complaint in this case, the District Court ordered the County to hold elections under the very same scheme that appellants originally challenged under § 5 as unprecleared. On January 22, 1996, appellants filed an emergency appli- cation in this Court to enjoin the 1996 elections pending ap- peal. We granted the application on February 1, 516 U. S. 1104 (1996), and noted probable jurisdiction on April 1, 517 U. S. 1118 (1996). II A Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies whenever a cov- ered jurisdiction "enact[s] or seek[s] to administer any . . . standard, practice, or procedure" different from that in force on the date of § 5 coverage. As a threshold matter, the State contends that, although the County perhaps should have sub- mitted the consolidation ordinances to federal authorities be- fore implementing them, intervening changes in California law have transformed the County's judicial election scheme into a state plan. Therefore, asserts the State, the County is not administering County consolidation ordinances in con- ducting municipal court elections, but is merely implement- ing California law, for which § 5 preclearance is not needed. The District Court was "not persuaded" by this argument, but ruled that the State could continue to seek to show that the County was merely administering California law. See 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 20 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976); see also Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 25200 (West 1988). We leave this issue about the scope of § 5 to the District Court to resolve on remand. The State raises other threshold issues that the District Court did not have the opportunity to address. The State contends that appellants' suit was barred by laches; that it is constitutionally improper to designate the County a covered jurisdiction under § 5; and that the consolidation ordinances did not alter a voting "standard, practice, or procedure" sub- ject to § 5 preclearance. We express no view on these claims, leaving it to the District Court to decide them in the first instance. B A jurisdiction subject to § 5's requirements must obtain either judicial or administrative preclearance before imple- menting a voting change. No new voting practice is enforceable unless the covered jurisdiction has succeeded in obtaining preclearance. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S., at 652­653; McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 137 (1981); Con- nor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975) (per curiam). If a vot- ing change subject to § 5 has not been precleared, § 5 plain- tiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting implementation of the change. Clark v. Roemer, supra, at 652­653 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 572 (1969)). The District Court's order that the County conduct elections under the unprecleared, at-large judicial election plan con- flicts with these principles and with our decision in Clark v. Roemer, supra. Clark concerned the propriety of a three-judge District Court's refusal to enjoin elections under an unprecleared Louisiana judicial election plan. There, Louisiana had not submitted for preclearance a number of statutory and consti- tutional voting changes relating to elections of state judges, many of which were adopted in the late 1960's and 1970's. Id., at 649. The District Court nonetheless permitted elec- tions to go forward, with the winners allowed to take office 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 21 Opinion of the Court if Louisiana filed a judicial preclearance action within 90 days. Id., at 651. We held that the District Court erred in authorizing these elections in the absence of preclearance, pointing out that although Louisiana had been aware for at least three years that the judgeships were not precleared, it had still failed to file for judicial preclearance. Id., at 655. We acknowledged in Clark that earlier decisions such as Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), and Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190 (1978) (per curiam), held that where a covered jurisdiction had already conducted elections under an unprecleared plan, it might be appropriate for the district court to afford local officials an opportunity to seek federal approval before ordering a new election. 500 U. S., at 654. But those cases raised an issue different from the one in Clark. In Perkins and Berry, the District Courts con- fronted the question whether to set aside illegal elections that had already taken place. By contrast, the District Court in Clark had to decide whether to allow illegal elec- tions to go forward in the first place. In this situation, "§ 5's prohibition against implementation of unprecleared changes required the District Court to enjoin the election." 500 U. S., at 654. The District Court faced fundamentally the same problem here as in Clark. The County did not preclear the ordi- nances as required by § 5. For several years, the County had been on notice that its electoral changes were subject to § 5's preclearance requirements, yet it never obtained judicial or administrative preclearance of the consolidation ordinances. In Clark, we left open the question whether a district court may ever deny a § 5 plaintiff's motion for an injunction and allow a covered jurisdiction to conduct an election under an unprecleared voting plan. We suggested that "[a]n extreme circumstance might be present if a seat's unprecleared status is not drawn to the attention of the [cov- ered jurisdiction] until the eve of the election and there are equitable principles that justify allowing the election to pro- 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 22 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court ceed." Id., at 654­655. We found no such exigency to exist in Clark, and we find none here. The State contends that there is a difference between a district court's failing to enjoin an unprecleared election scheme-the situation in Clark-and its ordering, pursu- ant to its equitable remedial authority, an election under an unprecleared plan. Regardless whether this distinction is meaningful, it does not advance the argument that the Coun- ty's judicial elections may be held without § 5 preclearance. We have recognized, at least in cases raising claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, that § 5 preclearance require- ments may not apply where a district court independently crafts a remedial electoral plan. McDaniel v. Sanchez, supra, 148­150 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94­295, pp. 18­19 (1975)). But where a court adopts a proposal "reflecting the policy choices . . . of the people [in a covered jurisdiction] . . . the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act is appli- cable." 452 U. S., at 153. The at-large, countywide system under which the District Court ordered the County to con- duct elections undoubtedly "reflect[ed] the policy choices" of the County; it was the same system that the County had adopted in the first place. It was, therefore, error for the District Court to order elections under that system be- fore it had been precleared by either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. We appreciate the predicament that the District Court faced. The County did not submit the consolidation ordi- nances for preclearance when they were adopted many years ago, and the District Court concluded that changes have oc- curred in the intervening years that make unrealistic a re- turn to the judicial election plan of 1968, now nearly 30 years old. Since there may be no practical way to go back to the 1968 plan, simply enjoining the elections would leave the County without a judicial election system. The County and appellants seem unable to fashion an election plan that does 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 23 Opinion of the Court not contravene the California Constitution, and the State has vigorously opposed each of the parties' proposals as violative of state law. These complications do not, however, change the basic na- ture of the § 5 preclearance process. Congress designed the preclearance procedure "to forestall the danger that local de- cisions to modify voting practices will impair minority access to the electoral process." McDaniel, 452 U. S., at 149 (foot- note omitted). Congress chose to accomplish this purpose by giving exclusive authority to pass on the discriminatory effect or purpose of an election change to the Attorney Gen- eral and to the District Court for the District of Columbia. As we explained in McDaniel, "[b]ecause a large number of voting changes must necessarily undergo the preclearance process, centralized review enhances the likelihood that re- curring problems will be resolved in a consistent and expedi- tious way." Id., at 151 (footnote omitted). Once a covered jurisdiction has complied with these preclearance require- ments, § 5 provides no further remedy. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 549­550. This congressional choice in favor of specialized review necessarily constrains the role of the three-judge district court. On a complaint alleging failure to preclear election changes under § 5, that court lacks authority to consider the discriminatory purpose or nature of the changes. Perkins v. Matthews, supra, at 385 ("What is foreclosed to such dis- trict court is what Congress expressly reserved for consider- ation by the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General-the determination whether a covered change does or does not have the purpose or effect `of deny- ing or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color' "). The three-judge district court may determine only whether § 5 covers a contested change, whether § 5's ap- proval requirements were satisfied, and if the requirements were not satisfied, what temporary remedy, if any, is appro- priate. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT 24 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY Opinion of the Court 129, n. 3 (1983); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren Cty., 429 U. S. 642, 645­647 (1977) (per curiam); Per- kins, supra, at 385; Allen, supra, at 558­559. The goal of a three-judge district court facing a § 5 challenge must be to ensure that the covered jurisdiction submits its election plan to the appropriate federal authorities for preclearance as ex- peditiously as possible. In this case, nearly five years after appellants brought their challenge, neither the Attorney General nor the District Court for the District of Columbia has yet made any findings regarding the retrogressive effect-or lack thereof-of the consolidation ordinances adopted between 1972 and 1983. The County dismissed its declaratory judg- ment action before the District Court for the District of Co- lumbia made any findings, and it has never submitted the consolidation ordinances to the Attorney General for review. Although the District Court initially ordered the County to obtain preclearance of the ordinances, when the County failed to follow through, the District Court did not enforce its order. The District Court itself holds some responsibility for pro- tracting this litigation. Because of its concern that the judi- cial election plans proposed by the County and appellants unnecessarily conflicted with California law, the District Court several times ordered the parties to submit to it an election plan that complied both with § 5's substantive re- quirements and with state law, before the County submitted the plan to federal officials. In so doing, it interposed itself into the § 5 approval process in a way that the statute does not contemplate. Cf. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U. S. 37, 42­43 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren Cty., supra, at 645­647; Perkins, 400 U. S., at 385. In their briefs, both parties raise detailed arguments regard- ing the effect of the consolidation ordinances on the County's minority voters, but § 5 requires either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia to resolve 519US1$$3J 06-02-99 14:25:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 9 (1996) 25 Opinion of the Court in the first instance whether the consolidated municipal court system is retrogressive compared to the system existing in 1968. The County has not discharged its obligation to submit its voting changes to either of the forums designated by Con- gress. The requirement of federal scrutiny should be satis- fied without further delay. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S., at 192. The State appears willing to assist the County in pursuing the issue before either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia, and its effort will doubtless be of assistance. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 519US1$$4Z 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. YUEH-SHAIO YANG certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­938. Argued October 15, 1996-Decided November 13, 1996 Respondent and his wife, former Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain citizenship for respondent. While respondent's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported as excludable at the time of entry. He conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(H). In affirming the Immigra- tion Judge's denial of this request, the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that respondent was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but de- nied it as a matter of discretion. In vacating and remanding for further proceedings, the Ninth Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion by considering as adverse factors, first, respondent's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, second, his fraudulent naturalization appli- cation. The court reasoned that his acts in the former regard were "inextricably intertwined" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an "extension" of that initial fraud. Held: In deciding whether to grant a waiver under § 1251(a)(1)(H), the Attorney General (or her delegate, the INS) may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection with his entry into the United States. The relevant statutory language establishes certain prerequisites to eligibility for a waiver, but imposes no limitations on the factors that the INS may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief. Cf., e. g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 354. Although it is the INS's settled policy to disregard entry fraud, no matter how egregious, in making the waiver determina- tion, that policy is the INS's own invention and is not required by the statutory text. Moreover, the INS has not abused its discretion by arbitrarily disregarding its policy here; it has merely taken a narrow view of what constitutes "entry fraud." It is assuredly rational, and therefore lawful, to distinguish aliens such as respondent who engage in a pattern of immigration fraud from aliens who commit a single, isolated act of misrepresentation. Pp. 29­32. 58 F. 3d 452, reversed. 519US1$$4Z 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 26 (1996) 27 Opinion of the Court Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solic- itor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, and Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler. Howard Hom argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert L. Reeves, Franklin W. Nelson, and Bill Ong Hing.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Attorney General, when deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under the applicable provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 95 Stat. 1616, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(H), may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection with his entry into the United States. Respondent Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, Hai-Hsia Yang, were born and married in the People's Republic of China, and subsequently moved to Taiwan. In order to gain entry to the United States, they executed the following scheme: After divorcing respondent in Taiwan, Hai-Hsia traveled to the United States in 1978 and, using $60,000 provided by respondent, obtained a fraudulent birth certificate and pass- port in the name of Mary Wong, a United States citizen. Respondent then remarried Hai-Hsia in Taiwan under her false identity and fraudulently obtained an immigrant visa to enter the United States as the spouse of a United States citizen. In 1982, four years after his fraudulent entry, re- spondent submitted an application for naturalization, which fraudulently stated that his wife "Mary" was a United States citizen by birth and that respondent had been lawfully ad- *Daniel J. Popeo and David A. Price filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Sandra E. Kupelian filed a brief for the American Immigration Law- yers Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 519US1$$4K 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT 28 INS v. YUEH-SHAIO YANG Opinion of the Court mitted for permanent residence. In 1985, while respond- ent's naturalization application was still pending, respondent and his wife obtained another divorce in order to permit her to obtain a visa under her true name (as the relative of a daughter who had obtained United States citizenship). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ulti- mately learned of respondent's unlawful entry, and in 1992 issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported. The INS maintained that respondent was de- portable under 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(A), because he was ex- cludable from the United States at the time of entry under the former 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(14), (19), and (20) (1988 ed.). Respondent conceded that he was deportable and filed a re- quest for a waiver of deportation under § 1251(a)(1)(H). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge's denial of this request. The Board concluded that respondent was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. Although the Board did not consider respondent's fraudulent entry in 1978 as itself an adverse factor, it did consider, among other things, respond- ent's "acts of immigration fraud before and after his 1978 entry into the United States," App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a, including his first sham divorce to facilitate his wife's unlaw- ful entry, his 1982 application for naturalization, and his sec- ond sham divorce to assist his wife in obtaining an immigrant visa under her real name. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted re- spondent's petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Yang v. INS, 58 F. 3d 452 (1995). The Ninth Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion by considering as an adverse fac- tor respondent's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry, because those acts were "inextricably intertwined with Mr. Yang's own efforts to secure entry into the country and must be considered part of the initial fraud." Id., at 453. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Board improperly 519US1$$4K 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 26 (1996) 29 Opinion of the Court considered respondent's fraudulent application for natural- ization as an adverse factor because that application "must be considered an extension of the initial fraud." Ibid. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1110 (1996).1 Section 1251(a)(1)(H) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "The provisions of this paragraph relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens described in section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) of this title [who have obtained a visa, documentation, entry or INA benefit by fraud or misrepresentation] . . . may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any alien . . . who- "(i) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; and "(ii) was in possession of an immigrant visa or equiv- alent document and was otherwise admissible to the United States at the time of such entry except for those grounds of inadmissibility specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title [relating to possession of valid labor certifications, immigrant visas and entry documents] which were a direct result of that fraud or misrepresentation." 2 1 Our jurisdiction over this matter is not in question. See 5 U. S. C. § 702. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), Div. C., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104­208, 110 Stat. 3009, provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is speci- fied under [Title 8 U. S. C.] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . ." IIRA § 306(a). That provision does not take effect, however, until April 1, 1997. See IIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a) (as amended by Pub. L. 104­ 302, § 2, 110 Stat. 3656). 2 The last clause of the quoted provision is less than artfully drawn, since the phrase "that fraud or misrepresentation" has no apparent antecedent. The antecedent was unmistakable in the prior version of the provision, 519US1$$4K 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT 30 INS v. YUEH-SHAIO YANG Opinion of the Court The meaning of this language is clear. While it establishes certain prerequisites to eligibility for a waiver of depor- tation, it imposes no limitations on the factors that the At- torney General (or her delegate, the INS, see 8 CFR § 2.1 (1996)) may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief. We have described the Attorney General's suspension of deportation under a re- lated and similarly phrased provision of the INA as " `an act of grace' " which is accorded pursuant to her "unfettered dis- cretion," Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 354 (1956) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492 (1935)), and have quoted approv- ingly Judge Learned Hand's likening of that provision to " `a judge's power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President's to pardon a convict,' " 351 U. S., at 354, n. 16 (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489, 491 (CA2 1950)). Respondent contends, however, that the portion of § 1251(a)(1)(H)(ii) requiring the alien to be "otherwise admis- sible"-that is, not excludable on some ground other than the entry fraud-precludes the Attorney General from consider- ing the alien's fraudulent entry at all. The text will not bear such a reading. Unlike the prior version of the waiver-of- deportation statute at issue in INS v. Errico, 385 U. S. 214 (1966), under which the Attorney General had no discretion to deny a waiver if the statutory requirements were met, satisfaction of the requirements under § 1251(a)(1)(H), includ- which, in its prologue, authorized waiver of deportation "on the ground that [the aliens] were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States, by fraud or misrepresentation." 8 U. S. C. § 1251(f) (1988 ed.). In the prologue of the current provision, that explicit (but lengthy) reference to fraud or misrepresentation has been replaced by citation of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which uses almost the same language to define a class of excludable aliens. We think it if not obvious, then at least inevitable, that the phrase "that fraud or misrepresentation" refers to the fraud or misrepresentation for which waiver is sought, alluded to, through citation of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), in the prologue. 519US1$$4K 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 26 (1996) 31 Opinion of the Court ing the requirement that the alien have been "otherwise ad- missible," establishes only the alien's eligibility for the waiver. Such eligibility in no way limits the considerations that may guide the Attorney General in exercising her dis- cretion to determine who, among those eligible, will be ac- corded grace. It could be argued that if the Attorney Gen- eral determined that any entry fraud or misrepresentation, no matter how minor and no matter what the attendant cir- cumstances, would cause her to withhold waiver, she would not be exercising the conferred discretion at all, but would be making a nullity of the statute. But that is a far cry from respondent's argument that all entry fraud must be excused, which is untenable. Respondent asserts (and the United States acknowledges) that it is the settled policy of the INS to disregard entry fraud or misrepresentation, no matter how egregious, in making the waiver determination. See Delmundo v. INS, 43 F. 3d 436, 440 (CA9 1994). This is such a generous dispo- sition that it may suggest a belief on the part of the agency that the statute requires it; and such a belief is also sug- gested by the INS's frequent concessions in litigation that the underlying fraud for which the alien is deportable "should not be considered as an adverse factor in the balanc- ing equation," Liwanag v. INS, 872 F. 2d 685, 687 (CA5 1989); see also Braun v. INS, 992 F. 2d 1016, 1020 (CA9 1993); Start v. INS, 803 F. 2d 539, 542 (CA9 1986), withdrawn, 862 F. 2d 787 (1988). (Such concessions were facilitated, no doubt, by the Ninth Circuit's frequent intimations that the statute for- bade consideration of the initial fraud. See Hernandez- Robledo v. INS, 777 F. 2d 536, 541 (1985); see also Braun, supra, at 1020; Delmundo, supra, at 441.) Before us, how- ever, the United States disclaims such a position-and even if that were the agency's view we could not permit it to over- come the unmistakable text of the law. See MCI Telecom- munications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 229­230 (1994). But that does not render the 519US1$$4K 06-02-99 14:28:19 PAGES OPINPGT 32 INS v. YUEH-SHAIO YANG Opinion of the Court INS's practice irrelevant. Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows-by rule or by settled course of adjudication-a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irratio- nal departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be over- turned as "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The INS has not, however, disregarded its general policy here; it has merely taken a narrow view of what constitutes "entry fraud" under that policy, excluding events removed in time and circumstance from respondent's entry: his preentry and postentry sham divorces, and the fraud in his 1982 application for naturalization. The "entry fraud" exception being, under the current statute, a rule of the INS's own invention, the INS is entitled, within reason, to define that exception as it pleases. The Ninth Circuit held that the acts of fraud counted against respondent can be described as "inextricably intertwined" with, or an "ex- tension" of, the fraudulent entry itself because they were essential to its ultimate success or concealment. Perhaps so, but it is up to the Attorney General whether she will adopt an "inextricably intertwined" or "essential extension" augmentation of her "entry fraud" exception. It is as- suredly rational, and therefore lawful, for her to distinguish aliens such as respondent who engage in a pattern of immi- gration fraud from aliens who commit a single, isolated act of misrepresentation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. 519US1$$5Z 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 33 Syllabus OHIO v. ROBINETTE certiorari to the supreme court of ohio No. 95­891. Argued October 8, 1996-Decided November 18, 1996 After an Ohio deputy sheriff stopped respondent Robinette for speeding, gave him a verbal warning, and returned his driver's license, the deputy asked whether he was carrying illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered "no" and consented to a search of the car, which revealed a small amount of marijuana and a pill. He was arrested and later charged with knowing possession of a con- trolled substance when the pill turned out to be methylenedioxy- methamphetamine. Following denial of his pretrial suppression mo- tion, he was found guilty, but the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the search resulted from an unlawful detention. The State Supreme Court affirmed, establishing as a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances the requirement that an officer clearly state when a citizen validly detained for a traffic offense is "legally free to go." Held:1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Ohio Supreme Court's decision. The contention that jurisdiction is lacking because the Ohio decision rested in part upon the State Constitution is rejected under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040­1041. Although the opinion below mentions the Ohio Constitution in passing, it clearly relies on federal law, discussing and citing federal cases almost exclusively. It is not dispositive that those citations appear only in the opinion and not in the official syllabus. Under Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 566, it is permissible to turn to an Ohio opinion's body when the syllabus speaks only in general terms of "the federal and Ohio Constitutions." Nor is the Court's jurisdiction defeated by the addi- tional holding below that continuing detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation constitutes an illegal seizure when the officer's motiva- tion for continuing is not related to the purpose of the original, constitu- tional stop and there are no articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity. Under Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813, the officer's subjective intentions do not make continued detention illegal, so long as the detention is justified by the circum- stances viewed objectively. Pp. 36­39. 2. The Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to search 519US1$$5Z 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT 34 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Syllabus will be recognized as voluntary. The Amendment's touchstone is rea- sonableness, which is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. In applying this test, the Court has con- sistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact- specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. Indeed, in rejecting a per se rule very similar to one adopted below, this Court has held that the voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact to be deter- mined from all the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 248­249. The Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding other- wise. It would be unrealistic to require the police to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary. Cf. id., at 231. Pp. 39­40. 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695, reversed and remanded. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 40. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 45. Carley J. Ingram argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Paul A. Engel- mayer, and Joseph C. Wyderko. James D. Ruppert argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ala- bama et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Ma- zurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa 519US1$$5H 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 35 Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. We hold that it does not. This case arose on a stretch of Interstate 70 north of Day- ton, Ohio, where the posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour because of construction. Respondent Robert D. Robi- nette was clocked at 69 miles per hour as he drove his car along this stretch of road, and was stopped by Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office. New- some asked for and was handed Robinette's driver's license, and he ran a computer check which indicated that Robinette had no previous violations. Newsome then asked Robinette to step out of his car, turned on his mounted video camera, issued a verbal warning to Robinette, and returned his license. At this point, Newsome asked, "One question before you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Bennett of South Dakota, Charles W. Bursen of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Bernard J. Farber. Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Jeffrey M. Gamso filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for the National Association of Crimi- nal Defense Lawyers by Sheryl Gordon McCloud; and for the Ohio Asso- ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers by W. Andrew Hasselbach. 519US1$$5H 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT 36 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Opinion of the Court car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" App. to Brief for Respondent 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Robinette answered "no" to these questions, after which Deputy Newsome asked if he could search the car. Robinette consented. In the car, Deputy Newsome discov- ered a small amount of marijuana and, in a film container, a pill which was later determined to be methylenedioxymeth- amphetamine (MDMA). Robinette was then arrested and charged with knowing possession of a controlled substance, MDMA, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.11(A) (1993). Before trial, Robinette unsuccessfully sought to suppress this evidence. He then pleaded "no contest," and was found guilty. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, rul- ing that the search resulted from an unlawful detention. The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a divided vote, affirmed. 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695 (1995). In its opinion, that court established a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances: "The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Consti- tutions, to be secure in one's person and property re- quires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase `At this time you legally are free to go' or by words of similar import." Id., at 650­651, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696. We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1157 (1996), to review this per se rule, and we now reverse. We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the Ohio Supreme Court's decision. Respondent contends that we lack such jurisdiction because the Ohio decision rested upon the Ohio Constitution, in addition to the 519US1$$5H 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 37 Opinion of the Court Federal Constitution. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), when "a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so." * Id., at 1040­1041. Although the opinion below mentions Art. I, § 14, of the Ohio Constitution in passing (a section which reads identically to the Fourth Amendment), the opinion clearly relies on federal law nevertheless. Indeed, the only cases it discusses or even cites are federal cases, except for one state case which itself applies the Federal Constitution. Our jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that these cita- tions appear in the body of the opinion, while, under Ohio law, "[the] Supreme Court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of its cases." See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U. S. 257, 259 (1976). When the syllabus, as here, speaks only in general terms of "the federal and Ohio Constitutions," it is permissible for us to turn to the body of the opinion to dis- cern the grounds for decision. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 566 (1977). Respondent Robinette also contends that we may not reach the question presented in the petition because the Supreme Court of Ohio also held, as set out in the syllabus paragraph (1): "When the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some *Respondent and his amici ask us to take this opportunity to depart from Michigan v. Long. We are no more persuaded by this argument now than we were two Terms ago, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995), and we again reaffirm the Long presumption. 519US1$$5H 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT 38 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Opinion of the Court separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696. In reliance on this ground, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that when Newsome returned to Robinette's car and asked him to get out of the car, after he had determined in his own mind not to give Robinette a ticket, the detention then became unlawful. Respondent failed to make any such argument in his brief in opposition to certiorari. See this Court's Rule 15.2. We believe the issue as to the continuing legality of the detention is a "predicate to an intelligent resolution" of the question presented, and therefore "fairly included therein." This Court's Rule 14.1(a); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258­ 259, n. 5 (1980). The parties have briefed this issue, and we proceed to decide it. We think that under our recent decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996) (decided after the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the present case), the sub- jective intentions of the officer did not make the continued detention of respondent illegal under the Fourth Amend- ment. As we made clear in Whren, " `the fact that [an] offi- cer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.' . . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable- cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id., at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978)). And there is no question that, in light of the admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy Newsome was ob- jectively justified in asking Robinette to get out of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 111, n. 6 (1977) ("We hold . . . that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out 519US1$$5H 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 39 Opinion of the Court of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures"). We now turn to the merits of the question presented. We have long held that the "touchstone of the Fourth Amend- ment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248, 250 (1991). Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objec- tive terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), we expressly disavowed any "litmus- paper test" or single "sentence or . . . paragraph . . . rule," in recognition of the "endless variations in the facts and circumstances" implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 506. Then, in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 (1988), when both parties urged "bright-line rule[s] applicable to all investigatory pursuits," we rejected both proposed rules as contrary to our "traditional contextual approach." Id., at 572­573. And again, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), when the Florida Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a sei- zure, we reversed, reiterating that the proper inquiry neces- sitates a consideration of "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter." Id., at 439. We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search. In Schneckloth v. Busta- monte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), it was argued that such a consent could not be valid unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request. We rejected this argument: "While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent." Id., at 227. And just as it "would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed require- ments of an effective warning," id., at 231, so too would it be 519US1$$5H 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT 40 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detain- ees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary. The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and "[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circum- stances," id., at 248­249. The Supreme Court of Ohio hav- ing held otherwise, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment. Robert Robinette's traffic stop for a speeding violation on an interstate highway in Ohio served as prelude to a search of his automobile for illegal drugs. Robinette's experience was not uncommon in Ohio. As the Ohio Supreme Court related, the sheriff's deputy who detained Robinette for speeding and then asked Robinette for permission to search his vehicle "was on drug interdiction patrol at the time." 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 651, 653 N. E. 2d 695, 696 (1995). The dep- uty testified in Robinette's case that he routinely requested permission to search automobiles he stopped for traffic violations. Ibid. According to the deputy's testimony in another prosecution, he requested consent to search in 786 traffic stops in 1992, the year of Robinette's arrest. State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App. 3d 586, 594, n. 3, 639 N. E. 2d 498, 503, n. 3, dism'd, 69 Ohio St. 3d 1488, 635 N. E. 2d 43 (1994). From their unique vantage point, Ohio's courts observed that traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to contraband searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal activity. One Ohio appellate court noted: "[H]undreds, and perhaps thousands of Ohio citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels and asked to relinquish to uniformed police officers their 519US1$$5P 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 41 Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment right to privacy in their automobiles and luggage, sometimes for no better reason than to provide an officer the opportu- nity to `practice' his drug interdiction technique." 93 Ohio App. 3d, at 594, 639 N. E. 2d, at 503 (footnote omitted). Against this background, the Ohio Supreme Court deter- mined, and announced in Robinette's case, that the federal and state constitutional rights of Ohio citizens to be secure in their persons and property called for the protection of a clear-cut instruction to the State's police officers: An officer wishing to engage in consensual interrogation of a motorist at the conclusion of a traffic stop must first tell the motorist that he or she is free to go. The Ohio Supreme Court de- scribed the need for its first-tell-then-ask rule this way: "The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred. . . . . . . . . "Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to inter- rogate them. The police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.. . . . . "While the legality of consensual encounters between police and citizens should be preserved, we do not be- lieve that this legality should be used by police officers to turn a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity. The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution exist to protect citizens against such an unreasonable interference with their liberty." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 654­655, 653 N. E. 2d, at 698­699. 519US1$$5P 06-02-99 14:40:30 PAGES OPINPGT 42 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment Today's opinion reversing the decision of the Ohio Su- preme Court does not pass judgment on the wisdom of the first-tell-then-ask rule. This Court's opinion simply clarifies that the Ohio Supreme Court's instruction to police officers in Ohio is not, under this Court's controlling jurisprudence, the command of the Federal Constitution. See ante, at 39­ 40. The Ohio Supreme Court invoked both the Federal Con- stitution and the Ohio Constitution without clearly indicating whether state law, standing alone, independently justified the court's rule. The ambiguity in the Ohio Supreme Court's decision renders this Court's exercise of jurisdiction proper under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040­1042 (1983), and this Court's decision on the merits is consistent with the Court's "totality of the circumstances" Fourth Amendment precedents, see ante, at 39. I therefore concur in the Court's judgment. I write separately, however, because it seems to me im- probable that the Ohio Supreme Court understood its first- tell-then-ask rule to be the Federal Constitution's mandate for the Nation as a whole. "[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal con- stitutional standards." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 (1975).* But ordinarily, when a state high court grounds a rule of criminal procedure in the Federal Constitution, the *Formerly, the Ohio Supreme Court was "reluctant to use the Ohio Con- stitution to extend greater protection to the rights and civil liberties of Ohio citizens" and had usually not taken advantage of opportunities to "us[e] the Ohio Constitution as an independent source of constitutional rights." Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 42, n. 8, 616 N. E. 2d 163, 168, n. 8 (1993). Recently, however, the state high court declared: "The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. . . . As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups." Id., at 35, 616 N. E. 2d, at 164 (syllabus). 519US1$$5P 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 43 Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment court thereby signals its view that the Nation's Constitution would require the rule in all 50 States. Given this Court's decisions in consent-to-search cases such as Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), however, I suspect that the Ohio Supreme Court may not have homed in on the implication ordinarily to be drawn from a state court's reliance on the Federal Con- stitution. In other words, I question whether the Ohio court thought of the strict rule it announced as a rule for the governance of police conduct not only in Miami County, Ohio, but also in Miami, Florida. The first-tell-then-ask rule seems to be a prophylactic measure not so much extracted from the text of any consti- tutional provision as crafted by the Ohio Supreme Court to reduce the number of violations of textually guaranteed rights. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a similarly motivated rule as a minimal national requirement without suggesting that the text of the Federal Constitution required the precise measures the Court's opinion set forth. See id., at 467 ("[T]he Constitu- tion [does not] necessarily requir[e] adherence to any particu- lar solution" to the problems associated with custodial inter- rogations.); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."). Although all parts of the United States fall within this Court's domain, the Ohio Supreme Court is not similarly situated. That court can declare prophylactic rules governing the conduct of officials in Ohio, but it cannot command the police forces of sister States. The very ease with which the Court today disposes of the federal leg of the Ohio Supreme Court's deci- sion strengthens my impression that the Ohio Supreme Court saw its rule as a measure made for Ohio, designed to reinforce in that State the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. 519US1$$5P 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT 44 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment The Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus and opinion, however, were ambiguous. Under Long, the existence of ambiguity regarding the federal- or state-law basis of a state-court decision will trigger this Court's jurisdiction. Long governs even when, all things considered, the more plausible reading of the state court's decision may be that the state court did not regard the Federal Constitution alone as a sufficient basis for its ruling. Compare Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 7­9 (1995), with id., at 31­33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It is incumbent on a state court, therefore, when it deter- mines that its State's laws call for protection more complete than the Federal Constitution demands, to be clear about its ultimate reliance on state law. Similarly, a state court announcing a new legal rule arguably derived from both federal and state law can definitively render state law an adequate and independent ground for its decision by a simple declaration to that effect. A recent Montana Su- preme Court opinion on the scope of an individual's privilege against self-incrimination includes such a declaration: "While we have devoted considerable time to a lengthy discussion of the application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is to be noted that this holding is also based separately and independently on [the defendant's] right to remain silent pursuant to Arti- cle II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution." State v. Fuller, 276 Mont. 155, 167, 915 P. 2d 809, 816, cert. denied, post, p. 930. An explanation of this order meets the Court's instruction in Long that "[i]f the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, [this Court] will not undertake to review the decision." 463 U. S., at 1041. On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court may choose to clarify that its instructions to law enforcement officers in Ohio find 519US1$$5P 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 45 Stevens, J., dissenting adequate and independent support in state law, and that in issuing these instructions, the court endeavored to state dis- positively only the law applicable in Ohio. See Evans, 514 U. S., at 30­34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). To avoid misun- derstanding, the Ohio Supreme Court must itself speak with the clarity it sought to require of its State's police officers. The efficacy of its endeavor to safeguard the liberties of Ohi- oans without disarming the State's police can then be tested in the precise way Our Federalism was designed to work. See, e. g., Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1, 11­18 (1995); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 392­396 (1980). Justice Stevens, dissenting. The Court's holding today is narrow: The Federal Consti- tution does not require that a lawfully seized person be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. I agree with that holding. Given the Court's reading of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, I also agree that it is appropriate for the Court to limit its review to answering the sole question presented in the State's certiorari petition.1 As I read the state-court opinion, however, the prophylactic rule an- nounced in the second syllabus was intended as a guide to the decision of future cases rather than an explanation of the decision in this case. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio because it correctly held that respondent's consent to the search of his vehicle was the product of an unlawful detention. Moreover, it is important 1 "Whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires police officers to inform motorists, lawfully stopped for traffic violations, that the legal detention has concluded before any subsequent interrogation or search will be found to be consensual?" Pet. for Cert. i. 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT 46 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Stevens, J., dissenting to emphasize that nothing in the Federal Constitution-or in this Court's opinion-prevents a State from requiring its law enforcement officers to give detained motorists the advice mandated by the Ohio court. I The relevant facts are undisputed.2 Officer Newsome stopped respondent because he was speeding. Neither at the time of the stop nor at any later time prior to the search of respondent's vehicle did the officer have any basis for be- lieving that there were drugs in the car. After ordering respondent to get out of his car, issuing a warning, and re- turning his driver's license, Newsome took no further action related to the speeding violation. He did, however, state: "One question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" Thereafter, he obtained re- spondent's consent to search the car. These facts give rise to two questions of law: whether re- spondent was still being detained when the "one question" was asked, and, if so, whether that detention was unlawful. In my opinion the Ohio Appellate Court and the Ohio Supreme Court correctly answered both of those questions. The Ohio Supreme Court correctly relied upon United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980),3 which stated that "a person has been `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . if, in view of all of the circumstances sur- rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have be- lieved that he was not free to leave." Id., at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567, 573 (1988) (noting that "[t]he Court has since embraced this test"). See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 435­436 (1991) (applying variant of this approach). The Ohio Court 2 This is in part because crucial portions of the exchange were video- taped; this recording is a part of the record. 3 See 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 654, 653 N. E. 2d 695, 698 (1995). 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 47 Stevens, J., dissenting of Appeals applied a similar analysis. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 17­18. Several circumstances support the Ohio courts' conclusion that a reasonable motorist in respondent's shoes would have believed that he had an obligation to answer the "one ques- tion" and that he could not simply walk away from the offi- cer, get back in his car, and drive away. The question itself sought an answer "before you get gone." In addition, the facts that respondent had been detained, had received no ad- vice that he was free to leave, and was then standing in front of a television camera in response to an official command are all inconsistent with an assumption that he could reasonably believe that he had no duty to respond. The Ohio Supreme Court was surely correct in stating: "Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 655, 653 N. E. 2d, at 698.4 Moreover, as an objective matter it is fair to presume that most drivers who have been stopped for speeding are in a hurry to get to their destinations; such drivers have no inter- est in prolonging the delay occasioned by the stop just to engage in idle conversation with an officer, much less to allow 4 A learned commentator has expressed agreement on this point. See 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), p. 112 (3d ed. 1996 and Supp. 1997) ("Given the fact that [defendant] quite clearly had been seized when his car was pulled over, the return of the credentials hardly manifests a change in status when it was immediately followed by interrogation con- cerning other criminal activity"); see also ibid. (approving of Ohio Su- preme Court's analysis in this case). We have indicated as much our- selves in the past. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 436 (1984) ("Certainly few motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so"). 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT 48 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Stevens, J., dissenting a potentially lengthy search.5 I also assume that motor- ists-even those who are not carrying contraband-have an interest in preserving the privacy of their vehicles and pos- sessions from the prying eyes of a curious stranger. The fact that this particular officer successfully used a similar method of obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times in one year, State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App. 3d 586, 591­ 592, 639 N. E. 2d 498, 502, dism'd, 69 Ohio St. 3d 1488, 635 N. E. 2d 43 (1994), indicates that motorists generally respond in a manner that is contrary to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender that interest can- not satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so. The Ohio Supreme Court was therefore entirely correct to presume in the first syllabus preceding its opinion that a "continued detention" was at issue here. 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696.6 The Ohio Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion. In response to the State's con- 5 Though this search does not appear to have been particularly intrusive, that may not always be so. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 28­29. Indeed, our holding in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248 (1991), allowing police to open closed containers in the con- text of an automobile consent search where the "consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container," id., at 252, ensures that many motorists will wind up "consenting" to a far broader search than they might have imagined. See id., at 254­255 ("only objection that the police could have to" a rule requiring police to seek consent to search containers as well as the automobile itself "is that it would prevent them from exploiting the ignorance of a citizen who simply did not anticipate that his consent to search the car would be understood to authorize the police to rummage through his packages") (Marshall, J., dissenting). 6 It is ordinarily the syllabus that precedes an Ohio Supreme Court opin- ion, rather than the opinion itself, that states the law of the case. Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 24, 231 N. E. 2d 64, 68 (1967); see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 86, n. 8 (1984); Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U. S. 257, 259 (1976). 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 49 Stevens, J., dissenting tention that Robinette "was free to go" at the time consent was sought, that court held-after reviewing the record- that "a reasonable person in Robinette's position would not believe that the investigative stop had been concluded, and that he or she was free to go, so long as the police officer was continuing to ask investigative questions." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17­18. As I read the Ohio opinions, these determi- nations were independent of the bright-line rule criticized by the majority.7 I see no reason to disturb them. In the first syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court also an- swered the question whether the officer's continued deten- tion of respondent was lawful or unlawful. See ante, at 37­ 38. Although there is a possible ambiguity in the use of the word "motivation" in the Ohio Supreme Court's explanation of why the traffic officer's continued detention of respondent was an illegal seizure, the first syllabus otherwise was a cor- rect statement of the relevant federal rule as well as the relevant Ohio rule. As this Court points out in its opinion, as a matter of federal law the subjective motivation of the officer does not determine the legality of a detention. Be- cause I assume that the learned judges sitting on the Ohio Supreme Court were well aware of this proposition, we should construe the syllabus generously by replacing the ambiguous term "motivation behind" with the term "justifi- cation for" in order to make the syllabus unambiguously state the correct rule of federal law. So amended, the con- trolling proposition of federal law reads: "When the [justification for] a police officer's continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is 7 Indeed, the first paragraph of the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion clearly indicates that the bright-line rule was meant to apply only in future cases. The Ohio Supreme Court first explained: "We find that the search was invalid since it was the product of an unlawful seizure." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 652, 653 N. E. 2d, at 697. Only then did the court proceed to point out that it would "also use this case to establish a bright-line test . . . ." Ibid. 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT 50 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Stevens, J., dissenting not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696. Notwithstanding that the subjective motivation for the officer's decision to stop respondent related to drug inter- diction, the legality of the stop depended entirely on the fact that respondent was speeding. Of course, "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 810 (1996). As noted above, however, by the time Robi- nette was asked for consent to search his automobile, the lawful traffic stop had come to an end; Robinette had been given his warning, and the speeding violation provided no further justification for detention. The continued detention was therefore only justifiable, if at all, on some other grounds.8 At no time prior to the search of respondent's vehicle did any articulable facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion of some separate illegal activity that would justify further detention. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881­ 882 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968). As an objec- tive matter, it inexorably follows that when the officer had completed his task of either arresting or reprimanding the driver of the speeding car, his continued detention of that 8 Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is nec- essary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"); United States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975) ("stop and inquiry must be `reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation' " (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 (1968)). 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 51 Stevens, J., dissenting person constituted an illegal seizure. This holding by the Ohio Supreme Court is entirely consistent with federal law.9 The proper disposition follows as an application of well- settled law. We held in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), that a consent obtained during an illegal detention is ordinarily ineffective to justify an otherwise invalid search.10 See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 433­434 (noting that if consent was given during the course of an unlawful seizure, the results of the search "must be suppressed as tainted fruit"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 218­219 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 601­602 (1975). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). Because Robi- nette's consent to the search was the product of an unlawful detention, "the consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search." Royer, 460 U. S., at 507­ 508 (plurality opinion). I would therefore affirm the judg- ment below. II A point correctly raised by Justice Ginsburg merits em- phasis. The Court's opinion today does not address either the wisdom of the rule announced in the second syllabus pre- 9 Since "this Court reviews judgments, not opinions," Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that Robinette's continued seizure was illegal on these grounds provides a sufficient basis for affirming its judgment. 10 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice White explained that "statements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal deten- tion and not the result of an independent act of free will." 460 U. S., at 501. The defendant in Royer had been "illegally detained when he con- sented to the search." Id., at 507. As a result, the plurality agreed that "the consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search." Id., at 507­508. Concurring in the result, Justice Brennan agreed with this much of the plurality's decision, diverging on other grounds. See id., at 509. Justice Brennan's agreement on that narrow principle represents the holding of the Court. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT 52 OHIO v. ROBINETTE Stevens, J., dissenting ceding the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion or the validity of that rule as a matter of Ohio law. Nevertheless the risk that the narrowness of the Court's holding may not be fully understood prompts these additional words. There is no rule of federal law that precludes Ohio from requiring its police officers to give its citizens warnings that will help them to understand whether a valid traffic stop has come to an end, and will help judges to decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances at issue in any given case.11 Nor, as I have previously observed, is there anything "in the Federal Con- stitution that prohibits a State from giving lawmaking power to its courts." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 479, and n. 3 (1981) (dissenting opinion). Thus, as far as we are concerned, whether Ohio acts through one branch of its government or another, it has the same power to enforce a warning rule as other States that may adopt such rules by executive action.12 11 Indeed, we indicated in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 437 (1991), that the fact a defendant had been explicitly advised that he could refuse to give consent was relevant to the question whether he was seized at the time consent was sought. And, in other cases, we have stressed the importance of similar advice as a circumstance supporting the conclusion that a consent to search was voluntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 227 (1973); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 558­ 559 (1980). Cf. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U. S. 1, 9 (1982) (consent to search was voluntary where defendant "consented, in writing, . . . after being advised that his consent must be voluntary and that he had an abso- lute right to refuse consent"). 12 As we are informed by a brief amicus curiae filed by Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.: "Such a warning may be good police practice, and indeed amicus knows that many law enforcement agencies among our constituents have routinely incorporated a warning into their Fourth Amendment consent forms that they use in the field, but it is pre- cisely that-a practice and not a constitutional imperative. An officer who includes such a warning in his request for consent undoubtedly pre- sents a stronger case for a finding of voluntariness in a suppression hear- ing, and we would not suggest that such agencies and officers do other- 519US1$$5I 06-02-99 14:40:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 33 (1996) 53 Stevens, J., dissenting Moreover, while I recognize that warning rules provide benefits to the law enforcement profession and the courts, as well as to the public, I agree that it is not our function to pass judgment on the wisdom of such rules. Accordingly, while I have concluded that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio should be affirmed, and thus dissent from this Court's disposition of the case, I am in full accord with its conclusion that the Federal Constitution neither mandates nor prohibits the warnings prescribed by the Ohio Court. Whether such a practice should be followed in Ohio is a mat- ter for Ohio lawmakers to decide. wise. We know, too, that instructors in many police training programs of leading universities and management institutes routinely recommend such warnings as a sound practice, likely to bolster the voluntariness of a con- sent to search. [We ourselves] conduc[t] law enforcement training pro- grams at the national level and many of our own speakers have made this very point." Brief for Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 7. 519US1$$6Z 06-02-99 14:45:20 PAGES OPINPGT 54 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Per Curiam UNITED STATES et al. v. JOSE, trustee of JOSE BUSINESS TRUST et al. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­2082. Decided December 2, 1996 In a proceeding to enforce two Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sum- monses issued to respondent, petitioners, the United States and an IRS agent, represented that the documents sought were for a civil investiga- tion. The Magistrate found the summonses valid and enforceable for the purpose stated. As the Magistrate recommended, the District Court ordered enforcement of the summonses, but required the IRS to give respondent five days' notice before transferring summoned infor- mation from its Examination Division to any other IRS office. Chal- lenging the District Court's authority to impose such a restriction, the IRS appealed. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as not ripe be- cause the record did not indicate that the Examination Division had attempted to disclose the documents to any other IRS division; there- fore the five-day notice requirement had not been triggered. Held: The District Court issued a final, appealable order. Its decision dispositively granted in part and denied in part the remedy requested. The IRS prevailed to the extent that the District Court enforced the summonses, but did not prevail to the extent that the District Court imposed the five-day notice condition. With that disposition, the Dis- trict Court completed its adjudication. This Court has expressly held that IRS summons enforcement orders are subject to appellate review. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 15. Finality, not ripeness, is the doctrine governing appeals from district court to circuit court. The Ninth Circuit cited, and this Court has found, no authority supporting the Ninth Circuit's cryptic declaration that the conditional enforcement order was not ripe for appeal. The Court ex- presses no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute, but notes that the matter implicates an intercircuit conflict. Certiorari granted; 71 F. 3d 1484, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. Petitioners, the United States of America and Leslie M. Nishimura, Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service), commenced a proceeding to enforce two 519US1$$6p 06-02-99 14:45:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 54 (1996) 55 Per Curiam IRS summonses issued to Laddie F. Jose, as trustee for the Jose Business Trust and Jose Family Trust. The Service represented to the Magistrate that the documents sought "are for the purpose of a civil investigation." App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. The Magistrate found the summonses valid and enforceable for the purpose stated. He did not address the question whether the summons enforcement require- ments "would be satisfied in the event petitioners decide to pursue a criminal tax investigation." Ibid. That question was not before him in view of the sole purpose-civil investi- gation-specified by the IRS. Ibid. The Magistrate recommended that the District Court (1) enforce petitioners' summonses, and (2) require the IRS to give respondent five days' notice prior to any circulation or transfer of the summoned documents to any division of the IRS other than the Examination Division. Id., at 20a­21a. Before the District Court, neither party objected to the finding that the alleged civil investigation was a legitimate purpose and that the summonses are valid and should be enforced. Id., at 16a. The single issue in controversy was "whether [the court] may restrict enforcement of petitioners' summonses by requiring the IRS to notify respondent five days in advance before circulating, transferring, or copying the summon[ed] documents to any other division of the IRS, including its [C]riminal Investigation Division." Id., at 15a. The District Court determined that the restriction was law- ful and proper and entered a final order to that effect. Id., at 19a. The Service appealed, asserting that the District Court lacked authority to impose the restriction. The Ninth Cir- cuit correctly recognized that it had jurisdiction "pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291," which authorizes appeals from "final decisions." It nonetheless dismissed the appeal "as not ripe." 71 F. 3d 1484, 1485 (1995). The majority stated: "The record indicates that the IRS represented to the district court that the documents requested of Jose were 519US1$$6p 06-02-99 14:45:20 PAGES OPINPGT 56 UNITED STATES v. JOSE Per Curiam for civil tax examination purposes only, not for a crimi- nal investigation. The record does not indicate that the Examination Division has attempted to disclose the doc- uments to any other IRS division, thereby triggering the five-day notice requirement. Thus, any detrimental impact the district court's order may have on the IRS's investigation is, at this time, purely speculative. Ac- cordingly, the IRS's appeal is not ripe for review." Ibid. The dissenting judge concluded that the case was "ready and ripe" for decision, id., at 1486, and stated at some length her reasons for believing that the restriction approved by the District Court was unwarranted. The United States and Revenue Agent Nishimura petitioned for certiorari. We called for a response from trustee Jose, but he filed no brief in opposition. We now reverse. We express no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. The matter, indeed, is one that implicates an inter- circuit conflict.* We think it clear, however, that the Dis- trict Court's final order is indeed final. It is a decision dis- positively granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested. The IRS prevailed to the extent that the Dis- trict Court enforced the summonses. The Service did not *Compare United States v. Barrett, 837 F. 2d 1341, 1349­1351 (CA5 1988) (en banc) (per curiam) (District Court lacks authority to place condi- tions on enforcement of IRS summons), cert. denied, 492 U. S. 926 (1989), with United States v. Zolin, 809 F. 2d 1411, 1417 (CA9 1987) (upholding conditions on enforcement of IRS summons), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 491 U. S. 554, 561 (1989), and United States v. Author Servs., Inc., 804 F. 2d 1520, 1525­1526 (CA9 1986) (District Court has "considerable" discretion to set terms of enforcement order); see also Church of Scien- tology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 14­15, n. 7 (1992) (recognizing split). The existing intercircuit conflict concerns judicial limitations on disclosure by the agency seeking summons enforcement to other govern- mental agencies. The instant case involves the related but distinct ques- tion of the District Court's authority to restrict sharing of information within an agency. 519US1$$6p 06-02-99 14:45:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 54 (1996) 57 Per Curiam prevail to the extent that the District Court imposed a condi- tion-an unqualified requirement that the IRS provide five days' notice to the trustee before transferring summoned in- formation from its Examination Division to any other IRS office. With that disposition, the District Court completed its adjudication. "[W]e have expressly held that IRS sum- mons enforcement orders are subject to appellate review." Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 15 (1992) (citing Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, 449 (1964)). We adhere to that view, and note that appellate ju- risdiction over final decisions does not turn on which side prevailed in the District Court. Finality, not ripeness, is the doctrine governing appeals from district court to court of appeals. In this case, to gain access to appeal from the District Court's final decision to the extent that it disfavored the Service, the IRS is not obli- gated, first, to defy the District Court's order. Nor is the IRS required to provide notice of its intention to transfer documents internally, for this is the very condition the IRS seeks to attack on appeal. The Court of Appeals cited no authority supporting its cryptic declaration that the conditional enforcement order was not ripe for appeal. We have found none. Indeed, prior to this case, the Ninth Circuit itself had twice upheld similar conditional enforcement orders. See United States v. Zolin, 809 F. 2d 1411, 1417 (CA9 1987); United States v. Author Servs., Inc., 804 F. 2d 1520, 1525­1526 (CA9 1986). In neither case did the Court of Appeals avoid the merits by interjecting the doctrine of ripeness. Aggrieved by the conditional enforcement upheld in Zolin, the United States petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the writ, 488 U. S. 907 (1988), and affirmed the Ninth Cir- cuit's ruling by an equally divided Court, 491 U. S. 554, 561 (1989). We hardly would have done so had we considered the matter unfit for review. 519US1$$6p 06-02-99 14:45:20 PAGES OPINPGT 58 UNITED STATES v. JOSE Per Curiam For the reasons stated, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment dismissing the appeal, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 519us1$$7Z 04-04-98 15:09:23 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 59 Per Curiam IN RE GAYDOS on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 96­5831. Decided December 2, 1996 Petitioner seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus. She has been denied leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis 10 times and has filed at least 8 other petitions. Held: Petitioner's requests are denied. For the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (per cu- riam), the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for cer- tiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she pays the required docketing fee and submits her petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Maria L. Gaydos seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering (1) the Clerk of the District Court for the District of New Jersey to file her Freedom of Informa- tion Act (FOIA) lawsuit challenging this Court's orders in 10 previous cases in which Gaydos was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court's Rule 39.8; * (2) the dis- qualification of William T. Walsh, Clerk of the District Court, and William K. Suter, Clerk of this Court; and (3) the issu- ance of summons under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In the alternative, she asks this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction over her FOIA suit because her complaint con- cerns this Court's orders. We deny petitioner's requests. Petitioner is allowed until December 23, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance *Rule 39.8 provides: "If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ . . . is frivo- lous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis." 519us1$$7h 04-04-98 15:09:23 PAGES OPINPGT 60 IN RE GAYDOS Stevens, J., dissenting with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee re- quired by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. Petitioner has a history of frivolous, repetitive filings. She has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis 10 times, and she has filed at least 8 other petitions. This most recent petition is nearly incomprehensible, and alludes to, among other things, fraud by the staff of this Court and im- pending impeachment proceedings against Clerks Walsh and Suter in the House of Representatives. We also note that the relief she purports to seek has already been granted: The District Court docketed petitioner's FOIA complaint as Case No. 96­CV­42435 on September 9, 1996, and promptly dis- missed it "in its entirety" the following week. We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Because petitioner has limited her abuse of our processes to noncrimi- nal cases, we limit our sanction accordingly. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent. 519US1$$8Z 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 61 Syllabus CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 95­1263. Argued November 12, 1996-Decided December 10, 1996 Respondent Lewis, a Kentucky resident, commenced this civil action in Kentucky state court after sustaining personal injuries while operating a bulldozer. Asserting state-law claims, Lewis named as defendants both the manufacturer of the bulldozer-petitioner Caterpillar Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois-and the company that serviced the bulldozer-Whayne Supply Company, a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in that State, intervened as a plaintiff, assert- ing subrogation claims against both Caterpillar and Whayne Supply for workers' compensation benefits Liberty Mutual had paid to Lewis on behalf of his employer. Shortly after learning of a settlement agree- ment between Lewis and Whayne Supply, Caterpillar filed a notice of removal in Federal District Court, grounding federal jurisdiction on di- versity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. § 1332. The notice explained that the case was nonremovable at the lawsuit's start: Complete diversity was absent then because plaintiff Lewis and defendant Whayne Supply shared Kentucky citizenship. Caterpillar assumed that the settlement agreement between these two parties would result in Whayne Supply's dismissal from the lawsuit, yielding complete diversity and rendering the case removable. Lewis promptly moved to remand the case to state court, asserting that diversity was defeated by Whayne Supply's contin- uing presence as a defendant due to Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim against it. The District Court denied the motion, erroneously conclud- ing that diversity had become complete. Before trial, however, Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim against Whayne Supply was settled, and that defendant was dismissed as a party. Complete diversity thereafter existed. The case proceeded to trial, jury verdict, and judgment for Caterpillar. The Sixth Circuit vacated the judgment, concluding that, absent complete diversity at the time of removal, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Held: A district court's error in failing to remand a case improperly re- moved is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. Pp. 67­78. 519US1$$8Z 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 62 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Syllabus (a) The general-diversity statute, § 1332(a), authorizes federal court jurisdiction over cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is di- verse from the citizenship of each defendant. See Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U. S. 185, 187. When a plaintiff files a state-court civil action over which the federal district courts would have original juris- diction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or defendants may remove the action to federal court, § 1441(a), provided that no defendant "is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought," § 1441(b). In a case not originally removable from state court, a de- fendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the post- commencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements-e. g., by reason of a nondiverse party's dismissal-may remove the case to federal court within 30 days. § 1446(b). No case, however, may be re- moved based on diversity "more than 1 year after commencement of the action." Ibid. Once a defendant has filed a notice of removal in the federal court, a plaintiff objecting to removal "on the basis of any defect in removal procedure" may, within 30 days, file a motion to remand the case to state court. § 1447(c). This 30-day limit does not apply, how- ever, to jurisdictional defects: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Ibid. Pp. 67­69. (b) American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, and Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U. S. 699, are key cases in point and tend in Caterpillar's favor. Each suggests that the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at time of judgment may shield a judgment against later jurisdictional attack despite an improper removal. Finn, 341 U. S., at 16; Grubbs, 405 U. S., at 700. However, neither decision resolves dispositively a controversy of the kind here at issue, for neither involved a plaintiff who moved promptly, but unsuccessfully, to remand a case improperly removed from state court to federal court, and then challenged on appeal a judgment entered by the federal court. Pp. 70­73. (c) Beyond question, as Lewis acknowledges, diversity became com- plete in this case when Whayne Supply was formally dismissed as a party. Nevertheless, Caterpillar moves too quickly in claiming that elimination of the jurisdictional defect before trial also cured a statu- tory flaw-Caterpillar's failure to meet the § 1441(a) requirement that the case be fit for federal adjudication at the time the removal petition was filed. By timely moving for remand, Lewis did all that was neces- sary to preserve his objection to removal. An order denying a motion to remand, "standing alone," is "obviously . . . not final and [immediately] appealable" as of right, Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U. S. 574, 519US1$$8Z 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 63 Syllabus 578, and a plaintiff is not required to take an interlocutory appeal pursu- ant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) in order to avoid waiving whatever ultimate appeal right he may have. Having preserved his objection, Lewis urges that ultimate satisfaction of the subject-matter jurisdiction re- quirement ought not swallow up antecedent statutory violations. Lewis' arguments in support of this position are hardly meritless, but they run up against an overriding consideration. Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court, with rules of decision supplied by state law under the regime of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, considera- tions of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming. Cf., e. g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 836. This view is in harmony with a main theme of the removal scheme devised by Congress, which calls for expeditious superintendence by district courts. In this case, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the District Court. To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional re- quirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted administration of justice. Pp. 73­77. (d) Lewis' prediction that rejection of his petition will provide state- court defendants with an enormous incentive to attempt unlawful re- movals rests on an assumption this Court does not indulge-that federal district courts generally will not comprehend, or will balk at applying, the removal rules Congress has prescribed. The prediction further- more assumes defendants' readiness to gamble that any jurisdictional defect, for example, the absence of complete diversity, will first escape detection, then disappear prior to judgment. This Court is satisfied that the well-advised defendant will foresee the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal-a swift and nonreviewable remand order, see §§ 1447(c), (d), attended by the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been improperly invoked. Pp. 77­78. Reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael R. Feagley, John E. Muench, Charles Rothfeld, Leslie W. Morris II, James B. Buda, and William F. Maready. 519US1$$8Z 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 64 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court Leonard J. Stayton argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul Alan Levy and Alan B. Morrison.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, commenced in a state court, involves personal injury claims arising under state law. The case was re- moved to a federal court at a time when, the Court of Ap- peals concluded, complete diversity of citizenship did not exist among the parties. Promptly after the removal, the plaintiff moved to remand the case to the state court, but the District Court denied that motion. Before trial of the case, however, all claims involving the nondiverse defendant were settled, and that defendant was dismissed as a party to the action. Complete diversity thereafter existed. The case proceeded to trial, jury verdict, and judgment for the removing defendant. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, concluding that, absent complete diversity at the time of removal, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The question presented is whether the absence of complete diversity at the time of removal is fatal to federal-court adju- dication. We hold that a district court's error in failing to remand a case improperly removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. I Respondent James David Lewis, a resident of Kentucky, filed this lawsuit in Kentucky state court on June 22, 1989, after sustaining injuries while operating a bulldozer. As- serting state-law claims based on defective manufacture, negligent maintenance, failure to warn, and breach of war- *Patrick W. Lee filed a brief for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 65 Opinion of the Court ranty, Lewis named as defendants both the manufacturer of the bulldozer-petitioner Caterpillar Inc., a Delaware corpo- ration with its principal place of business in Illinois-and the company that serviced the bulldozer-Whayne Supply Company, a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky. Several months later, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, the insurance carrier for Lewis' employer, intervened in the lawsuit as a plaintiff. A Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in that State, Liberty Mutual asserted subrogation claims against both Caterpillar and Whayne Supply for workers' compensation benefits Liberty Mutual had paid to Lewis on behalf of his employer. Lewis entered into a settlement agreement with defendant Whayne Supply less than a year after filing his complaint. Shortly after learning of this agreement, Caterpillar filed a notice of removal, on June 21, 1990, in the United States Dis- trict Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Ground- ing federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. § 1332, Caterpillar satisfied with only a day to spare the statutory requirement that a diversity-based removal take place within one year of a lawsuit's commencement, see 28 U. S. C. § 1446(b). Caterpillar's notice of removal ex- plained that the case was nonremovable at the lawsuit's start: Complete diversity was absent then because plaintiff Lewis and defendant Whayne Supply shared Kentucky citi- zenship. App. 31. Proceeding on the understanding that the settlement agreement between these two Kentucky par- ties would result in the dismissal of Whayne Supply from the lawsuit, Caterpillar stated that the settlement rendered the case removable. Id., at 31­32. Lewis objected to the removal and moved to remand the case to state court. Lewis acknowledged that he had settled his own claims against Whayne Supply. But Liberty Mutual had not yet settled its subrogation claim against Whayne Supply, Lewis asserted. Whayne Supply's presence as a de- 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 66 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court fendant in the lawsuit, Lewis urged, defeated diversity of citizenship. Id., at 36. Without addressing this argument, the District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand on Sep- tember 24, 1990, treating as dispositive Lewis' admission that he had settled his own claims against Whayne Supply. Id., at 55. Discovery, begun in state court, continued in the now fed- eral lawsuit, and the parties filed pretrial conference papers beginning in July 1991. In June 1993, plaintiff Liberty Mu- tual and defendant Whayne Supply entered into a settlement of Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim, and the District Court dismissed Whayne Supply from the lawsuit. With Caterpil- lar as the sole defendant adverse to Lewis,1 the case pro- 1 In accord with 28 U. S. C. § 1367 and Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Caterpillar, after removing the case to federal court, impleaded Lewis' employer, Gene Wilson Enterprises, a Kentucky cor- poration, as a third-party defendant. See App. 2. Gene Wilson Enter- prises, so far as the record shows, remained a named third-party defend- ant, adverse solely to third-party plaintiff Caterpillar, through judgment. See Brief for Respondent 5. No dispute ran between Lewis and his employer, and Caterpillar's third-party complaint against Gene Wilson En- terprises had no bearing on the authority of the federal court to adjudicate the diversity claims Lewis asserted against Caterpillar. See, e. g., Wich- ita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Kan., 260 U. S. 48, 54 (1922) (federal jurisdiction once acquired on the ground of complete diver- sity of citizenship is unaffected by the subsequent intervention "of a party whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the original parties"). As elaborated in 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Prac- tice ¶ 14.26, p. 14­116 (2d ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted): "Once federal sub- ject matter jurisdiction is established over the underlying case between [plaintiff] and [defendant], the jurisdictional propriety of each additional claim is to be assessed individually. Thus, assuming that jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship between [plaintiff] and [defendant], the question concerning impleader is whether there is a jurisdictional basis for the claim by [defendant] against [third-party defendant]. The fact that [plaintiff] and [third-party defendant] may be co-citizens is completely ir- relevant. Unless [plaintiff] chooses to amend his complaint to assert a claim against [third-party defendant], [plaintiff] and [third-party defend- 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 67 Opinion of the Court ceeded to a six-day jury trial in November 1993, ending in a unanimous verdict for Caterpillar. The District Court en- tered judgment for Caterpillar on November 23, 1993, and denied Lewis' motion for a new trial on February 1, 1994. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted Lewis' argument that, at the time of removal, Whayne Supply remained a defendant in the case due to Lib- erty Mutual's subrogation claim against it. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because the party lineup, on removal, included Kentucky plaintiff Lewis and Kentucky defendant Whayne Supply, the Court of Appeals observed that diversity was not complete when Caterpillar took the case from state court to federal court. Id., at 8a­9a. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded, the District Court "erred in denying [Lewis'] motion to remand this case to the state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id., at 9a. That error, according to the Court of Appeals, made it necessary to va- cate the District Court's judgment. Ibid.2 Caterpillar petitioned for this Court's review. Caterpillar stressed that the nondiverse defendant, Whayne Supply, had been dismissed from the lawsuit prior to trial. It was there- fore improper, Caterpillar urged, for the Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court's judgment-entered after several years of litigation and a six-day trial-on account of a ju- risdictional defect cured, all agreed, by the time of trial and judgment. Pet. for Cert. 8. We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1133 (1996), and now reverse. II The Constitution provides, in Article III, § 2, that "[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to Con- ant] are simply not adverse, and there need be no basis of jurisdiction between them." 2 Because the Court of Appeals held the District Court lacked jurisdic- tion over the case, it did not reach several other issues Lewis raised on appeal. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a, 9a, n. 3. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 68 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court troversies . . . between Citizens of different States." Com- mencing with the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78, Congress has constantly authorized the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction based on the diverse citizenship of par- ties. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806), this Court construed the original Judiciary Act's diversity provi- sion to require complete diversity of citizenship. Id., at 267. We have adhered to that statutory interpretation ever since. See Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U. S. 185, 187 (1990). The current general-diversity statute, permitting federal district court jurisdiction over suits for more than $50,000 "between . . . citizens of different States," 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a), thus applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.3 When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district courts would have original juris- diction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or defendants may remove the action to federal court, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a), provided that no defendant "is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought," § 1441(b).4 In a 3 This "complete diversity" interpretation of the general-diversity provi- sion is a matter of statutory construction. "Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 531 (1967). 4 In relevant part, 28 U. S. C. § 1441 provides: "(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For pur- poses of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded. "(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic- tion founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 69 Opinion of the Court case not originally removable, a defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the postcommencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements-for exam- ple, by reason of the dismissal of a nondiverse party-may remove the case to federal court within 30 days of receiving such information. § 1446(b). No case, however, may be re- moved from state to federal court based on diversity of citizenship "more than 1 year after commencement of the action." Ibid.5 Once a defendant has filed a notice of removal in the fed- eral district court, a plaintiff objecting to removal "on the basis of any defect in removal procedure" may, within 30 days, file a motion asking the district court to remand the case to state court. § 1447(c). This 30-day limit does not apply, however, to jurisdictional defects: "If at any time be- fore final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Ibid.6 served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 5 In full, 28 U. S. C. § 1446(b) provides: "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. "If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action." 6 In relevant part, 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c) provides: "A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 70 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court III We note, initially, two "givens" in this case as we have accepted it for review. First, the District Court, in its deci- sion denying Lewis' timely motion to remand, incorrectly treated Whayne Supply, the nondiverse defendant, as effec- tively dropped from the case prior to removal. See App. 55. Second, the Sixth Circuit correctly determined that the complete diversity requirement was not satisfied at the time of removal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a­9a.7 We accordingly home in on this question: Does the District Court's initial misjudgment still burden and run with the case, or is it over- come by the eventual dismissal of the nondiverse defendant? Petitioner Caterpillar relies heavily on our decisions in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6 (1951), and Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U. S. 699 (1972), urging that these decisions "long ago settled the proposition that remand to the state court is unnecessary even if jurisdiction did not exist at the time of removal, so long as the district court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of judgment." Brief for Petitioner 8­9. Caterpil- lar is right that Finn and Grubbs are key cases in point and tend in Caterpillar's favor. Each suggests that the exist- ence of subject-matter jurisdiction at time of judgment may shield a judgment against later jurisdictional attack. But neither decision resolves dispositively a controversy of the kind we face, for neither involved a plaintiff who moved shall be remanded. . . . The State court may thereupon proceed with such case." 7 Caterpillar's petition for certiorari raised the question whether the subrogation claim asserted by Liberty Mutual, and thus the citizenship of Whayne Supply, should be disregarded for purposes of determining diver- sity of citizenship, in view of the settlement agreed upon between Lewis and Whayne Supply. See Pet. for Cert. i, 18­23. Our order granting review did not encompass that question, see 517 U. S. 1133 (1996), and we express no opinion on it. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 71 Opinion of the Court promptly, but unsuccessfully, to remand a case improperly removed from state court to federal court, and then chal- lenged on appeal a judgment entered by the federal court. In Finn, two defendants removed a case to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 341 U. S., at 7­8. Eventually, final judgment was entered for the plaintiff against one of the removing defendants. Id., at 8. The los- ing defendant urged on appeal, and before this Court, that the judgment could not stand because the requisite diversity jurisdiction, it turned out, existed neither at the time of removal nor at the time of judgment. Agreeing with the defendant, we held that the absence of federal jurisdiction at the time of judgment required the Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court's judgment. Id., at 17­18.8 Finn's holding does not speak to the situation here, where the requirement of complete diversity was satisfied at the time of judgment. But Caterpillar points to well-known dicta in Finn more helpful to its cause. "There are cases," the Court observed, "which uphold judgments in the district courts even though there was no right to removal." Id., at 16.9 "In those cases," the Finn Court explained, "the fed- eral trial court would have had original jurisdiction of the 8 The Court left open in Finn the question whether, on remand to the District Court, "a new judgment [could] be entered on the old verdict without a new trial" if the nondiverse defendant were dismissed from the case. 341 U. S., at 18, n. 18. In the litigation's second round, the District Court allowed the plaintiff to dismiss all claims against the nondiverse defendant. See Finn v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 207 F. 2d 113, 114 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 912 (1954). Thereafter, the District Court granted a new trial, on the assumption that the original judgment could not stand for lack of jurisdiction. See 207 F. 2d, at 114. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the judgment entered after the second trial and ordered the original judgment reinstated. Id., at 117. 9 The Court cited Baggs v. Martin, 179 U. S. 206 (1900), and three lower federal-court cases. Finn, 341 U. S., at 16, n. 14. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 72 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court controversy had it been brought in the federal court in the posture it had at the time of the actual trial of the cause or of the entry of the judgment." Ibid. The discussion in Finn concentrated on cases in which courts held removing defendants estopped from challenging final judgments on the basis of removal errors. See id., at 17. The Finn Court did not address the situation of a plain- tiff such as Lewis, who chose a state court as the forum for his lawsuit, timely objected to removal before the District Court, and then challenged the removal on appeal from an adverse judgment. In Grubbs, a civil action filed in state court was removed to federal court on the petition of the United States, which had been named as a party defendant in a "cross-action" filed by the original defendant. 405 U. S., at 700­701; see 28 U. S. C. § 1444 (authorizing removal of actions brought against the United States, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2410, with respect to property on which the United States has or claims a lien). No party objected to the removal before trial or judgment. See Grubbs, 405 U. S., at 701. The Court of Ap- peals nonetheless held, on its own motion, that the "inter- pleader" of the United States was spurious, and that removal had therefore been improper under 28 U. S. C. § 1444. See Grubbs, 405 U. S., at 702. On this basis, the Court of Ap- peals concluded that the District Court's judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to state court. See ibid. This Court reversed. Id., at 700. We explained: "Longstanding decisions of this Court make clear . . . that where after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters judg- ment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had origi- nal jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court." Id., at 702. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 73 Opinion of the Court We concluded that, "whether or not the case was properly removed, the District Court did have jurisdiction of the par- ties at the time it entered judgment." Id., at 700. "Under such circumstances," we held, "the validity of the removal procedure followed may not be raised for the first time on appeal." Ibid. (emphasis added). Grubbs instructs that an erroneous removal need not cause the destruction of a final judgment, if the requirements of federal subject-matter ju- risdiction are met at the time the judgment is entered. Grubbs, however, dealt with a case removed without objec- tion. The decision is not dispositive of the question whether a plaintiff, who timely objects to removal, may later success- fully challenge an adverse judgment on the ground that the removal did not comply with statutory prescriptions. Beyond question, as Lewis acknowledges, there was in this case complete diversity, and therefore federal subject-matter jurisdiction, at the time of trial and judgment. See Brief for Respondent 18­19 (diversity became complete "when Lib- erty Mutual settled its subrogation claim with Whayne Sup- ply and the latter was formally dismissed from the case"). The case had by then become, essentially, a two-party law- suit: Lewis, a citizen of Kentucky, was the sole plaintiff; Cat- erpillar, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Illinois, was the sole defendant Lewis confronted. Caterpillar maintains that this change cured the threshold statutory misstep, i. e., the removal of a case when diversity was incomplete. Brief for Petitioner 7, 13. Caterpillar moves too quickly over the terrain we must cover. The jurisdictional defect was cured, i. e., complete diversity was established before the trial commenced. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit erred in resting its decision on the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. But a statutory flaw-Caterpillar's failure to meet the § 1441(a) requirement that the case be fit for federal adjudication at the time the removal petition is filed-remained in the unerasable history of the case. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 74 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court And Lewis, by timely moving for remand, did all that was required to preserve his objection to removal. An order de- nying a motion to remand, "standing alone," is "[o]bviously . . . not final and [immediately] appealable" as of right. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U. S. 574, 578 (1954). Nor is a plaintiff required to seek permission to take an in- terlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) 10 in order to avoid waiving whatever ultimate appeal right he may have.11 Indeed, if a party had to invoke § 1292(b) in order to preserve an objection to an interlocutory ruling, litigants would be obliged to seek § 1292(b) certifications constantly. Routine resort to § 1292(b) requests would hardly comport with Congress' design to reserve interlocutory review for " `exceptional' " cases while generally retaining for the fed- eral courts a firm final judgment rule. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 475 (1978) (quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F. 2d 1241, 1248 (CA7), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1041 (1972)). Having preserved his objection to an improper removal, Lewis urges that an "all's well that ends well" approach is inappropriate here. He maintains that ultimate satisfaction of the subject-matter jurisdiction requirement ought not swallow up antecedent statutory violations. The course Caterpillar advocates, Lewis observes, would disfavor dili- gent plaintiffs who timely, but unsuccessfully, move to check improper removals in district court. Further, that course would allow improperly removing defendants to profit from 10 Section 1292(b) provides for interlocutory appeals from otherwise not immediately appealable orders, if conditions specified in the section are met, the district court so certifies, and the court of appeals exercises its discretion to take up the request for review. 11 On brief, Caterpillar argued that "Lewis effectively waived his objec- tion to removal by failing to seek an immediate appeal of the district court's refusal to remand." Brief for Petitioner 13. We reject this waiver argument, though we recognize that it has attracted some support in Court of Appeals opinions. See, e. g., Able v. Upjohn Co., 829 F. 2d 1330, 1333­1334 (CA4 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 963 (1988). 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 75 Opinion of the Court their disregard of Congress' instructions, and their ability to lead district judges into error. Concretely, in this very case, Lewis emphasizes, adherence to the rules Congress prescribed for removal would have kept the case in state court. Only by removing prematurely was Caterpillar able to get to federal court inside the one- year limitation set in § 1446(b).12 Had Caterpillar waited until the case was ripe for removal, i. e., until Whayne Sup- ply was dismissed as a defendant, the one-year limitation would have barred the way,13 and plaintiff's choice of forum would have been preserved.14 These arguments are hardly meritless, but they run up against an overriding consideration. Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court, with rules of decision sup- plied by state law under the regime of Erie R. Co. v. Tomp- kins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming. Our decision in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826 (1989), is instructive in this regard. Newman- Green did not involve removal, but it did involve the federal 12 Congress amended § 1446(b) in 1988 to include the one-year limitation in order to "reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial prog- ress has been made in state court." H. R. Rep. No. 100­889, p. 72 (1988). 13 On appeal, Lewis raised only the absence of diversity. He did not refer to the one-year limitation prior to his brief on the merits in this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 30­31. Under this Court's Rule 15.2, a nonjurisdictional argument not raised in a respondent's brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari "may be deemed waived." Under the facts of this case, however, addressing the implications of § 1446(b)'s one- year limitation is " `predicate to an intelligent resolution' of the question presented." Ohio v. Robinette, ante, at 38 (quoting Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258­259, n. 5 (1980)). We therefore regard the issue as one "fairly included" within the question presented. This Court's Rule 14.1. The parties addressed the issue in their briefs and at oral argument, and we exercise our discretion to decide it. 14 Lewis preferred state court to federal court based on differences he perceived in, inter alia, the state and federal jury systems and rules of evidence. See Brief for Respondent 22­23. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 76 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court courts' diversity jurisdiction and a party defendant whose presence, like Whayne Supply's in this case, blocked com- plete diversity. Newman-Green proceeded to summary judgment with the jurisdictional flaw-the absence of complete diversity-undetected. See id., at 828­829. The Court of Appeals noticed the flaw, invited the parties to ad- dress it, and, en banc, returned the case to the District Court "to determine whether it would be prudent to drop [the ju- risdiction spoiler] from the litigation." Id., at 830. We held that the Court of Appeals itself had authority "to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party," although we recognized that, ordinarily, district courts are better positioned to make such judgments. Id., at 837­838. "[R]equiring dismissal after years of litigation," the Court stressed in Newman-Green, "would impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the par- ties, judges, and other litigants waiting for judicial atten- tion." Id., at 836. The same may be said of the remand to state court Lewis seeks here. Cf. Knop v. McMahan, 872 F. 2d 1132, 1139, n. 16 (CA3 1989) ("To permit a case in which there is complete diversity throughout trial to proceed to judgment and then cancel the effect of that judgment and relegate the parties to a new trial in a state court because of a brief lack of complete diversity at the beginning of the case would be a waste of judicial resources."). Our view is in harmony with a main theme of the removal scheme Congress devised. Congress ordered a procedure calling for expeditious superintendence by district courts. The lawmakers specified a short time, 30 days, for motions to remand for defects in removal procedure, 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c), and district court orders remanding cases to state courts generally are "not reviewable on appeal or other- wise," § 1447(d). Congress did not similarly exclude appel- late review of refusals to remand. But an evident concern that may explain the lack of symmetry relates to the federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. Despite a federal trial court's threshold denial of a motion to remand, if, at the end 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996) 77 Opinion of the Court of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."); Finn, 341 U. S., at 18. In this case, however, no jurisdictional defect lin- gered through judgment in the District Court. To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted administra- tion of justice. Lewis ultimately argues that, if the final judgment against him is allowed to stand, "all of the various procedural re- quirements for removal will become unenforceable"; there- fore, "defendants will have an enormous incentive to attempt wrongful removals." Brief for Respondent 9. In particu- lar, Lewis suggests that defendants will remove prematurely "in the hope that some subsequent developments, such as the eventual dismissal of nondiverse defendants, will permit th[e] case to be kept in federal court." Id., at 21. We do not anticipate the dire consequences Lewis forecasts. The procedural requirements for removal remain enforce- able by the federal trial court judges to whom those require- ments are directly addressed. Lewis' prediction that rejec- tion of his petition will "encourag[e] state court defendants to remove cases improperly," id., at 19, rests on an assump- tion we do not indulge-that district courts generally will not comprehend, or will balk at applying, the rules on re- moval Congress has prescribed. The prediction further- more assumes defendants' readiness to gamble that any jurisdictional defect, for example, the absence of complete diversity, will first escape detection, then disappear prior to judgment. The well-advised defendant, we are satisfied, will foresee the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal- a swift and nonreviewable remand order, see 28 U. S. C. 519US1$$8p 06-02-99 15:06:02 PAGES OPINPGT 78 CATERPILLAR INC. v. LEWIS Opinion of the Court §§ 1447(c), (d), attended by the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been improperly invoked. The odds against any gain from a wrongful removal, in sum, render improbable Lewis' projection of increased resort to the maneuver. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap- peals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 519US1$$9z 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 79 Syllabus O'GILVIE et al., MINORS v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 95­966. Argued October 9, 1996-Decided December 10, 1996* Petitioners, the husband and two children of a woman who died of toxic shock syndrome, received a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages in a tort suit based on Kansas law against the maker of the product that caused decedent's death. They paid fed- eral income tax insofar as the award's proceeds represented punitive damages, but immediately sought a refund. Procedurally speaking, this litigation represents the consolidation of two cases brought in the same Federal District Court: the husband's suit against the Government for a refund, and the Government's suit against the children to recover the refund that the Government had made to the children earlier. The Dis- trict Court found for petitioners under 26 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2), which, as it read in 1988, excluded from "gross income" the "amount of any dam- ages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness." (Em- phasis added.) The court held on the merits that the italicized language includes punitive damages, thereby excluding such damages from gross income. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the exclusionary provision does not cover punitive damages. Held:1. Petitioners' punitive damages were not received "on account of" personal injuries; hence the gross-income-exclusion provision does not apply and the damages are taxable. Pp. 82­90. (a) Although the phrase "on account of" does not unambiguously define itself, several factors prompt this Court to agree with the Gov- ernment when it interprets the exclusionary provision to apply to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries, and not to punitive damages that do not compensate injury, but are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. For one thing, the Government's interpretation gives the phrase "on account of" a meaning consistent with the dictionary definition. More impor- tant, in Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U. S. 323, this Court came close to resolving the statute's ambiguity in the Government's favor when it *Together with No. 95­977, O'Gilvie v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. 519US1$$9z 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 80 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Syllabus said that the statute covers pain and suffering damages, medical ex- penses, and lost wages in an ordinary tort case because they are "de- signed to compensate . . . victims," id., at 332, n. 5, but does not apply to elements of damages that are "punitive in nature," id., at 332. The Government's reading also is more faithful to the statutory provision's history and basic tax-related purpose of excluding compensatory dam- ages that restore a victim's lost, nontaxable "capital." Petitioners sug- gest no very good reason why Congress might have wanted the exclu- sion to have covered these punitive damages, which are not a substitute for any normally untaxed personal (or financial) quality, good, or "asset" and do not compensate for any kind of loss. Pp. 82­87. (b) Petitioners' three arguments to the contrary-that certain words or phrases in the original, or current, version of the statute work in their favor; that the exclusion of punitive damages from gross income may be justified by Congress' desire to be generous to tort victims and to avoid such administrative problems as separating punitive from com- pensatory portions of a global settlement or determining the extent to which a punitive damages award is itself intended to compensate; and that their position is supported by a 1989 statutory amendment that specifically says that the gross income exclusion does not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or sickness-are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the Govern- ment's interpretation. Pp. 87­90. 2. Petitioners' two case-specific procedural arguments-that the Gov- ernment's lawsuit was untimely and that its original notice of appeal was filed a few days late-are rejected. Pp. 90­92. 66 F. 3d 1550, affirmed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 94. Stephen R. McAllister argued the cause for petitioners in No. 95­966. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Hughes, Jack D. Flesher, Gregory L. Franken, and David B. Sutton. Linda D. King argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 95­977. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General 519US1$$9z 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 81 Opinion of the Court Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Kenneth L. Greene, and Kenneth W. Rosenberg. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2), as it read in 1988, excluded from "gross income" the "amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." 26 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2) (emphasis added). The issue before us is whether this provision applies to (and thereby makes nontaxable) punitive damages received by a plaintiff in a tort suit for personal injuries. We conclude that the punitive damages received here were not received "on account of " personal injuries; hence the provision does not apply, and the damages are taxable. I Petitioners in this litigation are the husband and two chil- dren of Betty O'Gilvie, who died in 1983 of toxic shock syn- drome. Her husband, Kelly, brought a tort suit (on his own behalf and that of her estate) based on Kansas law against the maker of the product that caused Betty O'Gilvie's death. Eventually, he and the two children received the net pro- ceeds of a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages. Insofar as the proceeds repre- sented punitive damages, petitioners paid income tax on the proceeds but immediately sought a refund. The litigation before us concerns petitioners' legal entitle- ment to that refund. Procedurally speaking, the litigation represents the consolidation of two cases brought in the same Federal District Court: Kelly's suit against the Govern- ment for a refund, and the Government's suit against the children to recover the refund that the Government had made to the children earlier. 26 U. S. C. § 7405(b) (authoriz- 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 82 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ing suits by the United States to recover refunds erroneously made). The Federal District Court held on the merits that the statutory phrase "damages . . . on account of personal injury or sickness" includes punitive damages, thereby ex- cluding punitive damages from gross income and entitling Kelly to obtain, and the children to keep, their refund. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, reversed the District Court. Along with the Fourth, Ninth, and Fed- eral Circuits, it held that the exclusionary provision does not cover punitive damages. 66 F. 3d 1550 (1995). Because the Sixth Circuit has held the contrary, the Circuits are divided about the proper interpretation of the provision. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. II Petitioners received the punitive damages at issue here "by suit"-indeed "by" an ordinary "suit" for "personal inju- ries." Contrast United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229 (1992) (§ 104(a)(2) exclusion not applicable to backpay awarded under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the claim was not based upon " `tort or tort type rights,' " id., at 233); Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U. S. 323 (1995) (alterna- tive holding) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) claim is similar to Title VII claim in Burke in this respect). These legal circumstances bring those damages within the gross-income-exclusion provision, however, only if petitioners also "received" those damages "on account of" the "personal injuries." And the phrase "on account of" does not unambiguously define itself. On one linguistic interpretation of those words, that of petitioners, they require no more than a "but-for" connection between "any" damages and a lawsuit for personal injuries. They would thereby bring virtually all personal injury law- suit damages within the scope of the provision, since: "but for the personal injury, there would be no lawsuit, and but for the lawsuit, there would be no damages." 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 83 Opinion of the Court On the Government's alternative interpretation, however, those words impose a stronger causal connection, making the provision applicable only to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries. To put the matter more specifically, they would make the section inapplicable to punitive damages, where those damages " `are not compensation for injury [but] [i]nstead . . . are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensi- ble conduct and to deter its future occurrence.' " Elec- trical Workers v. Foust, 442 U. S. 42, 48 (1979), quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974) (footnote omitted). The Government says that such damages were not "received . . . on account of" the personal injuries, but rather were awarded "on account of" a defendant's reprehensible conduct and the jury's need to punish and to deter it. Hence, despite some historical uncertainty about the matter, see Rev. Rul. 75­45, 1975­1 Cum. Bull. 47, revoked by Rev. Rul. 84­108, 1984­2 Cum. Bull. 32, the Government now concludes that these punitive damages fall outside the statute's coverage. We agree with the Government's interpretation of the statute. For one thing, its interpretation gives the phrase "on account of" a meaning consistent with the dictionary definition. See, e. g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 13 (1981) ("for the sake of: by reason of: because of"). More important, in Schleier, supra, we came close to re- solving the statute's ambiguity in the Government's favor. That case did not involve damages received in an ordinary tort suit; it involved liquidated damages and backpay re- ceived in a settlement of a lawsuit charging a violation of the ADEA. Nonetheless, in deciding one of the issues there presented (whether the provision now before us covered ADEA liquidated damages), we contrasted the elements of 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 84 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court an ordinary tort recovery with ADEA liquidated damages. We said that pain and suffering damages, medical expenses, and lost wages in an ordinary tort case are covered by the statute and hence excluded from income "not simply because the taxpayer received a tort settle- ment, but rather because each element . . . satisfies the requirement . . . that the damages were received `on account of personal injuries or sickness.' " Id., at 330. In holding that ADEA liquidated damages are not covered, we said that they are not "designed to compensate ADEA victims," id., at 332, n. 5; instead, they are " `punitive in nature,' " id., at 332, quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 125 (1985). Applying the same reasoning here would lead to the con- clusion that the punitive damages are not covered because they are an element of damages not "designed to compensate . . . victims," Schleier, 515 U. S., at 332; rather they are " `pu- nitive in nature,' " ibid. Although we gave other reasons for our holding in Schleier as well, we explicitly labeled this reason an "independent" ground in support of our decision, id., at 334. We cannot accept petitioners' claim that it was simply a dictum. We also find the Government's reading more faithful to the history of the statutory provision as well as the basic tax-related purpose that the history reveals. That history begins in approximately 1918. At that time, this Court had recently decided several cases based on the principle that a restoration of capital was not income; hence it fell outside the definition of "income" upon which the law imposed a tax. E. g., Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U. S. 179, 187 (1918); Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 335 (1918). The Attorney General then advised the Secretary of the Treasury that proceeds of an accident insurance policy should be treated as nontaxable because they primarily 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 85 Opinion of the Court "substitute . . . capital which is the source of future peri- odical income . . . merely tak[ing] the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident. They are therefore [nontaxable] `capital' as distinguished from `income' receipts." 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 304, 308 (1918). The Treasury Department added that "upon similar principles . . . an amount received by an individual as the result of a suit or compromise for per- sonal injuries sustained by him through accident is not income [that is] taxable. . . ." T. D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918). Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the first predecessor of the provision before us. That provision excluded from income "[a]mounts received, through accident or health insur- ance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compen- sation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066. The provision is similar to the cited materials from the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury in lan- guage and structure, all of which suggests that Congress sought, in enacting the statute, to codify the Treasury's basic approach. A contemporaneous House Report, insofar as rel- evant, confirms this similarity of approach, for it says: "Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for per- sonal injury or sickness, and damages received on ac- count of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 86 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court that such amounts shall not be included in gross in- come." H. R. Rep. No. 767, pp. 9­10 (1918). This history and the approach it reflects suggest there is no strong reason for trying to interpret the statute's lan- guage to reach beyond those damages that, making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, "return the victim's personal or financial capital." We concede that the original provision's language does go beyond what one might expect a purely tax-policy-related "human capital" rationale to justify. That is because the language excludes from taxation not only those damages that aim to substitute for a victim's physical or personal well- being-personal assets that the Government does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not lost them. It also excludes from taxation those damages that substitute, say, for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned them. To that extent, the provision can make the compensated taxpayer better off from a tax perspective than had the personal injury not taken place. But to say this is not to support cutting the statute totally free from its original moorings in victim loss. The statute's failure to separate those compensatory elements of damages (or accident insurance proceeds) one from the other does not change its original focus upon damages that restore a loss, that seek to make a victim whole, with a tax-equality objec- tive providing an important part of, even if not the entirety of, the statute's rationale. All this is to say that the Govern- ment's interpretation of the current provision (the wording of which has not changed significantly from the original) is more consistent than is petitioners' with the statute's origi- nal focus. Finally, we have asked why Congress might have wanted the exclusion to have covered these punitive damages, and we have found no very good answer. Those damages are not a substitute for any normally untaxed personal (or finan- cial) quality, good, or "asset." They do not compensate for 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 87 Opinion of the Court any kind of loss. The statute's language does not require, or strongly suggest, their exclusion from income. And we can find no evidence that congressional generosity or concern for administrative convenience stretched beyond the bounds of an interpretation that would distinguish compensatory from noncompensatory damages. Of course, as we have just said, from the perspective of tax policy one might argue that noncompensatory punitive damages and, for example, compensatory lost wages are much the same thing. That is, in both instances, exclusion from gross income provides the taxpayer with a windfall. This circumstance alone, however, does not argue strongly for an interpretation that covers punitive damages, for cov- erage of compensatory damages has both language and his- tory in its favor to a degree that coverage of noncompen- satory punitive damages does not. Moreover, this policy argument assumes that coverage of lost wages is something of an anomaly; if so, that circumstance would not justify the extension of the anomaly or the creation of another. See Wolfman, Current Issues of Federal Tax Policy, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 543, 549­550 (1994) ("[T]o build upon" what is, from a tax policy perspective, the less easily explained portion "of the otherwise rational exemption for personal injury," simply "does not make sense"). Petitioners make three sorts of arguments to the contrary. First, they emphasize certain words or phrases in the origi- nal, or current, provision that work in their favor. For ex- ample, they stress the word "any" in the phrase "any dam- ages." And they note that in both original and current versions Congress referred to certain amounts of money received (from workmen's compensation, for example) as "amounts received . . . as compensation," while here they refer only to "damages received" without adding the limiting phrase "as compensation." 26 U. S. C. § 104(a); Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066. They add that in the orig- inal version, the words "on account of personal injuries" 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 88 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court might have referred to, and modified, the kind of lawsuit, not the kind of damages. And they find support for this view in the second sentence of the Treasury Regulation first adopted in 1958 which says: "The term `damages received (whether by suit or agree- ment)' means an amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or ac- tion based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prose- cution." 26 CFR § 1.104­1(c) (1996). These arguments, however, show only that one can reason- ably read the statute's language in different ways-the very assumption upon which our analysis rests. They do not overcome our interpretation of the provision in Schleier, nor do they change the provision's history. The help that the Treasury Regulation's second sentence gives the petitioners is offset by its first sentence, which says that the exclusion applies to damages received "on account of personal injuries or sickness," and which we have held sets forth an independ- ent requirement. Schleier, 515 U. S., at 336. See Appen- dix, infra, at 92. Second, petitioners argue that to some extent the purposes that might have led Congress to exclude, say, lost wages from income would also have led Congress to exclude puni- tive damages, for doing so is both generous to victims and avoids such administrative problems as separating punitive from compensatory portions of a global settlement or deter- mining the extent to which a punitive damages award is it- self intended to compensate. Our problem with these arguments is one of degree. Tax generosity presumably has its limits. The administrative problem of distinguishing punitive from compensatory ele- ments is likely to be less serious than, say, distinguishing among the compensatory elements of a settlement (which dif- ficulty might account for the statute's treatment of, say, lost 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 89 Opinion of the Court wages). And, of course, the problem of identifying the ele- ments of an ostensibly punitive award does not exist where, as here, relevant state law makes clear that the damages at issue are not at all compensatory, but entirely punitive. Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 200 Kan. 96, 100, 434 P. 2d 828, 831 (1967) ("[E]xemplary damages are not re- garded as compensatory in any degree"); accord, Smith v. Printup, 254 Kan. 315, 866 P. 2d 985 (1993); Folks v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 243 Kan. 57, 755 P. 2d 1319 (1988); Nord- strom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59, 605 P. 2d 545 (1980). Third, petitioners rely upon a later enacted law. In 1989, Congress amended the law so that it now specifically says the personal injury exclusion from gross income "shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." 26 U. S. C. § 104(a). Why, petitioners ask, would Congress have enacted this amendment removing punitive damages (in nonphysical in- jury cases) unless Congress believed that, in the amend- ment's absence, punitive damages did fall within the provi- sion's coverage? The short answer to this question is that Congress might simply have thought that the then-current law about the pro- vision's treatment of punitive damages-in cases of physical and nonphysical injuries-was unclear, that it wanted to clar- ify the matter in respect to nonphysical injuries, but it wanted to leave the law where it found it in respect to physi- cal injuries. The fact that the law was indeed uncertain at the time supports this view. Compare Rev. Rul. 84­108, 1984­2 Cum. Bull. 32, with, e. g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F. 2d 693 (CA9 1983); Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T. C. 330 (1989), rev'd 914 F. 2d 586 (CA4 1990). The 1989 amendment's legislative history, insofar as rele- vant, offers further support. The amendment grew out of the Senate's refusal to agree to a House bill that would have 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 90 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court made all damages in nonphysical personal injury cases tax- able. The Senate was willing to specify only that the Gov- ernment could tax punitive damages in such cases. Com- pare H. R. Rep. No. 101­247, p. 1355 (1989), with H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101­386, pp. 622­623 (1989). Congress' primary focus, in other words, was upon what to do about nonphysical personal injuries, not upon the provision's coverage of puni- tive damages under pre-existing law. We add that, in any event, the view of a later Congress cannot control the interpretation of an earlier enacted stat- ute. United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304 (1960); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940). But cf. Burke, 504 U. S., at 235, n. 6 (including a passing reference to the 1989 amendment, in dicta, as support for a view somewhat like that of petitioners). (Although neither party has argued that it is relevant, we note in passing that § 1605 of the Small Business Job Protec- tion Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104­188, 110 Stat. 1838, explicitly excepts most punitive damages from the exclusion provided by § 104(a)(2). Because it is of prospective application, the section does not apply here. The Conference Report on the new law says that "[n]o inference is intended" as to the proper interpretation of § 104(a)(2) prior to amendment. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104­737, p. 301 (1996).) The upshot is that we do not find petitioners' arguments sufficiently persuasive. And, for the reasons set out supra, at 83­87, we agree with the Government's interpretation of the statute. III Petitioners have raised two further issues, specific to the procedural posture of this litigation. First, the O'Gilvie children point out that the Government had initially accepted their claim for a refund and wrote those checks on July 6, 1990. The Government later changed its mind and, on July 9, 1992, two years plus three days later, filed suit against them seeking the return of a refund erroneously made. 26 U. S. C. § 7405(b) (authorizing a "civil action brought in the 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 91 Opinion of the Court name of the United States" to recover any "portion of a tax . . . which has been erroneously refunded"). They add that the relevant statute of limitations specifies that recovery of the refund "shall be allowed only if such suit is begun within 2 years after the making of such refund." § 6532(b). The children concede that they received the refund checks on July 9, 1990, and they agree that if the limitation period runs from the date of receipt-if, as the Government argues, that is the date of the "making of" the refund-the Govern- ment's suit was timely. But the children say that the refund was made on, and the limitations period runs from, the date the Government mailed the checks (presumably July 6, 7, or 8), in which case the Government brought this suit one or two or three days too late. In our view, the Government is correct in its claim that its lawsuit was timely. The language of the statute admits of both interpretations. But the law ordinarily provides that an action to recover mistaken payments of money "accrues upon the receipt of payment," New Bedford v. Lloyd Invest- ment Associates, Inc., 363 Mass. 112, 119, 292 N. E. 2d 688, 692 (1973); accord, Sizemore v. E. T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 225 Tenn. 226, 233, 465 S. W. 2d 873, 876 (1971) (" `[T]he time of making the . . . payment . . . was the date of actual receipt' "), unless, as in some States and in some cases, it accrues upon the still later date of the mistake's discovery, see Allen & Lamkin, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against Action to Recover Money Paid By Mistake, 79 A. L. R. 3d 754, 766­769 (1977). We are not aware of any good reason why Congress would have intended a different result where the nature of the claim is so similar to a tradi- tional action for money paid by mistake-an action the roots of which can be found in the old common-law claim of "assumpsit" or "money had and received." New Bedford, supra, at 118, 292 N. E. 2d, at 691­692. The lower courts and commentators have reached a similar conclusion. United States v. Carter, 906 F. 2d 1375 (CA9 1990); Akers v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 65, 67 (MD Tenn. 1981); United 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 92 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Appendix to opinion of the Court States v. Woodmansee, 388 F. Supp. 36, 46 (ND Cal. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 578 F. 2d 1302 (CA9 1978); 14 J. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 54A.69 (1995); Kafka & Cavanagh, Litigation of Federal Civil Tax Contro- versies § 20.03, p. 20­15 (2d ed. 1995). That conclusion is consistent with dicta in an earlier case from this Court, United States v. Wurts, 303 U. S. 414, 417­418 (1938), as well as with this Court's normal practice of construing ambiguous statutes of limitations in Government action in the Govern- ment's favor. E. g., Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U. S. 386, 391 (1984). We concede the children's argument that a "date of mail- ing" interpretation produces marginally greater certainty, for such a rule normally would refer the court to the post- mark to establish the date. But there is no indication that a "date of receipt" rule has proved difficult to administer in ordinary state or common-law actions for money paid errone- ously. The date the check clears, after all, sets an outer bound. Second, Kelly O'Gilvie says that the Court of Appeals should not have considered the Government's original appeal from the District Court's judgment in his favor because, in his view, the Government filed its notice of appeal a few days too late. The Court of Appeals describes the circumstances underlying this case-specific issue in its opinion. We agree with its determination of the matter for the reasons it has there set forth. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Section 104(a), in 1988, read as follows: "Compensation for injuries or sickness "(a) In general.-Except in the case of amounts attrib- utable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 93 Appendix to opinion of the Court section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include- "(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness; "(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as pe- riodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness; "(3) amounts received through accident or health insur- ance for personal injuries or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer); "(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey or the Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable under the provisions of section 808 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980; and "(5) amounts received by an individual as disability in- come attributable to injuries incurred as a direct result of a violent attack which the Secretary of State deter- mines to be a terrorist attack and which occurred while such individual was an employee of the United States engaged in the performance of his official duties outside the United States." 26 U. S. C. § 104 (1988 ed.). In 1989, § 104(a) was amended, adding, among other things, the following language: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." 26 U. S. C. § 104(a). 519US1$$9q 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 94 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting Treasury Regulation § 1.104­1(c) provides: "Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The term `damages received (whether by suit or agree- ment)' means an amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or ac- tion based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prose- cution." 26 CFR § 1.104­1(c) (1996). Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. Section 104(a)(2), as it stood at the time relevant to these cases, provided an exclusion from income for "any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness." 26 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 ed.). The Court is of the view that this phrase, in isolation, is just as susceptible of a meaning that includes only compensatory damages as it is of a broader meaning that includes punitive damages as well. Ante, at 82­83. I do not agree. The Court greatly understates the connection between an award of punitive damages and the per- sonal injury complained of, describing it as nothing more than "but-for" causality, ante, at 82. It seems to me that the personal injury is as proximate a cause of the punitive dam- ages as it is of the compensatory damages; in both cases it is the reason the damages are awarded. That is why punitive damages are called damages. To be sure, punitive damages require intentional, blameworthy conduct, which can be said to be a coequal reason they are awarded. But negligent (or intentional) conduct occupies the same role of coequal causal- ity with regard to compensatory damages. Both types of damages are "received on account of" the personal injury. The nub of the matter, it seems to me, is this: If one were to be asked, by a lawyer from another legal system, "What damages can be received on account of personal injuries in 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 95 Scalia, J., dissenting the United States?" surely the correct answer would be "Compensatory damages and punitive damages-the former to compensate for the inflicting of the personal injuries, and the latter to punish for the inflicting of them." If, as the Court asserts, the phrase "damages received on account of personal injuries" can be used to refer only to the former category, that is only because people sometimes can be im- precise. The notion that Congress carefully and precisely used the phrase "damages received on account of personal injuries" to segregate out compensatory damages seems to me entirely fanciful. That is neither the exact nor the ordi- nary meaning of the phrase, and hence not the one that the statute should be understood to intend. What I think to be the fair meaning of the phrase in isola- tion becomes even clearer when the phrase is considered in its statutory context. The Court proceeds too quickly from its erroneous premise of ambiguity to analysis of the history and policy behind § 104(a)(2). Ante, at 84­87. Ambiguity in isolation, even if it existed, would not end the textual in- quiry. Statutory construction, we have said, is a "holistic endeavor." United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). "A provi- sion that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme." Ibid. Section 104(a)(2) appears immediately after another provi- sion, § 104(a)(1), which parallels § 104(a)(2) in several respects but does not use the critical phrase "on account of": "(a) [G]ross income does not include- "(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness; "(2) the amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness." (Emphasis added.) Although § 104(a)(1) excludes amounts received "as compen- sation for" personal injuries or sickness, while § 104(a)(2) ex- cludes amounts received "on account of" personal injuries or 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 96 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting sickness, the Court reads the two phrases to mean precisely the same thing. That is not sound textual interpretation. "[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court as- sumes different meanings were intended." 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.07 (5th ed. 1992 and Supp. 1996). See, e. g., Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983). This principle of construction has its lim- its, of course: Use of different terminology in differing con- texts might have little significance. But here the contrast- ing phrases appear in adjoining provisions that address precisely the same subject matter and that even have identi- cal grammatical structure. The contrast between the two usages is even more striking in the original statute that enacted them. The Revenue Act of 1918 combined subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of § 104, to- gether with (a)(3) (which provides an exclusion from income for amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness), into a single subsection, which provided: " `Gross income' . . . [d]oes not include . . . : "(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insur- ance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compen- sation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received . . . on account of such injuries or sickness." § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1065­1066 (emphasis added). The contrast between the first exclusion and the second could not be more clear. Had Congress intended the latter provision to cover only damages received "as compensation for" personal injuries or sickness, it could have written "amounts received, through accident or health insurance, under workmen's compensation acts, or in damages, as com- pensation for personal injuries or sickness." Instead, it tacked on an additional phrase "plus the amount of[, etc.]" 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 97 Scalia, J., dissenting with no apparent purpose except to make clear that not only compensatory damages were covered by the exclusion. The Court maintains, however, that the Government's reading of § 104(a)(2) is "more faithful to [its] history." Ante, at 84. The "history" to which the Court refers is not statutory history of the sort just discussed-prior enact- ments approved by earlier Congresses and revised or amended by later ones to produce the current text. Indeed, it is not "history" from within even a small portion of Con- gress, since the House Committee Report the Court cites, standing by itself, is uninformative, saying only that "[u]nder the present law it is doubtful whether . . . damages received on account of [personal] injuries or sickness are required to be included in gross income." H. R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 9­10 (1918). The Court makes this snippet of legislative history relevant by citing as pertinent an ante- cedent Treasury Department decision, which concludes on the basis of recent judicial decisions that amounts received from prosecution or compromise of a personal-injury suit are not taxable because they are a return of capital. Ante, at 85 (citing T. D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918)). One might expect the Court to conclude from this that the Members of Congress (on the unrealistic assumption that they knew about the Executive Branch opinion) meant the statutory language to cover only return of capital, the source of the "doubt" to which the Committee Report referred. But of course the Court cannot draw that logical conclusion, since even if it is applied only to compensatory damages the statute obviously and undeniably covers more than mere re- turn of "human capital," namely, reimbursement for lost in- come, which would be a large proportion (indeed perhaps the majority) of any damages award. The Court concedes this is so, but asserts that this inconsistency is not enough "to support cutting the statute totally free from its original moorings," ante, at 86, by which I assume it means the Treasury Decision, however erroneous it might have been as 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 98 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting to the "capital" nature of compensatory damages. But the Treasury Decision was no more explicitly limited to compen- satory damages than is the statute before us. It exempted from taxation "an amount received by an individual as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries." T. D. 2747, supra, at 457. The Court's entire thesis of taxability rests upon the proposition that this Treasury Decision, which overlooked the obvious fact that "an amount received . . . as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries" al- most always includes compensation for lost future income, did not overlook the obvious fact that such an amount some- times includes "smart money." So, to trace the Court's reasoning: The statute must ex- clude punitive damages because the Committee Report must have had in mind a 1918 Treasury Decision, whose text no more supports exclusion of punitive damages than does the text of the statute itself, but which must have meant to ex- clude punitive damages since it was based on the "return-of- capital" theory, though, inconsistently with that theory, it did not exclude the much more common category of compensa- tion for lost income. Congress supposedly knew all of this, and a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure it out by mis- trusting the inclusive language of the statute, consulting the Committee Report, surmising that the Treasury Decision of 1918 underlay that Report, mistrusting the inclusive lan- guage of the Treasury Decision, and discerning that Treas- ury could have overlooked lost-income compensatories, but could not have overlooked punitives. I think not. The sure and proper guide, it seems to me, is the language of the stat- ute, inclusive by nature and doubly inclusive by contrast with surrounding provisions. The Court poses the question, ante, at 86, "why Congress might have wanted the exclusion [in § 104(a)(2)] to have cov- ered . . . punitive damages." If an answer is needed (and the text being as clear as it is, I think it is not), surely it suffices to surmise that Congress was following the Treasury 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 99 Scalia, J., dissenting Decision, which had inadvertently embraced punitive dam- ages just as it had inadvertently embraced future-income compensatory damages. Or if some reason free of human error must be found, I see nothing wrong with what the Court itself suggests but rejects out of hand: Excluding puni- tive as well as compensatory damages from gross income "avoids such administrative problems as separating punitive from compensatory portions of a global settlement." Ante, at 88. How substantial that particular problem is is sug- gested by the statistics which show that 73 percent of tort cases in state court are disposed of by settlement, and be- tween 92 and 99 percent of tort cases in federal court are disposed of by either settlement or some other means (such as summary judgment) prior to trial. See B. Ostrom & N. Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1994, p. 34 (1996); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, L. Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director 162­164. What is at issue, of course, is not just imposing on the parties the necessity of allocating the settlement between compensatory and punitive damages (with the concomitant suggestion of intentional wrongdoing that any allocation to punitive damages entails), but also im- posing on the Internal Revenue Service the necessity of re- viewing that allocation, since there would always be strong incentive to inflate the tax-free compensatory portion. The Court's only response to the suggestion that this is an ade- quate reason (if one is required) for including punitive dam- ages in the exemption is that "[t]he administrative problem of distinguishing punitive from compensatory elements is likely to be less serious than, say, distinguishing among the compensatory elements of a settlement." Ante, at 88. Per- haps so; and it may also be more simple than splitting the atom; but that in no way refutes the point that it is compli- cated enough to explain the inclusion of punitive damages in an exemption that has already abandoned the purity of a "return-of-capital" rationale. 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT 100 O'GILVIE v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting The remaining argument offered by the Court is that our decision in Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U. S. 323 (1995), came "close to resolving"-in the Government's favor-the question whether § 104(a)(2) permits the exclusion of puni- tive damages. Ante, at 83. I disagree. In Schleier we were faced with the question whether backpay and liqui- dated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employ- ment Act of 1967 (ADEA) were "damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness" for purposes of § 104(a)(2)'s exclusion. As the dissent accurately observed, 515 U. S., at 342 (opinion of O'Connor, J.), "the key to the Court's analysis" was the determination that an ADEA cause of action did not necessarily entail "personal injury or sickness," so that the damages awarded for that cause of ac- tion could hardly be awarded "on account of personal injuries or sickness." See id., at 330. In the case at hand, we said, "respondent's unlawful termination may have caused some psychological or `personal' injury comparable to the intangi- ble pain and suffering caused by an automobile accident," but "it is clear that no part of respondent's recovery of back wages is attributable to that injury." Ibid. The respond- ent countered that at least "the liquidated damages portion of his settlement" could be linked to that psychological in- jury. Id., at 331. And it was in response to that argument that we made the statement which the Court seeks to press into service for today's opinion. ADEA liquidated damages, we said, were punitive in nature, rather than compensatory. Id., at 331­332, and n. 5. The Court recites this statement as though the point of it was that punitive damages could not be received "on account of" personal injuries, whereas in fact the point was quite different: Since the damages were punishment for the con- duct that gave rise to the (non-personal-injury) cause of action, they could not be "linked to" the incidental psycho- logical injury. In the present cases, of course, there is no question that a personal injury occurred and that this per- 519US1$$9k 06-05-99 15:55:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 79 (1996) 101 Scalia, J., dissenting sonal injury is what entitled petitioners to compensatory and punitive damages. We neither decided nor intimated in Schleier whether punitive damages that are indisputably "linked to" personal injuries or sickness are received "on ac- count of" such injuries or sickness. Indeed, it would have been odd for us to resolve that question (or even come "close to resolving" it) without any discussion of the numerous con- siderations of text, history, and policy highlighted by today's opinion. If one were to search our opinions for a dictum bearing upon the present issue, much closer is the statement in United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229 (1992), that a statute confers "tort or tort type rights" (qualifying a plaintiff's re- covery for the § 104(a)(2) exemption) if it entitles the plaintiff to "a jury trial at which `both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages' may be awarded." Id., at 240 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 460 (1975)). But all of this is really by the way. Because the statutory text unambiguously covers punitive damages that are awarded on account of personal injuries, I conclude that peti- tioners were entitled to deduct the amounts at issue here. This makes it unnecessary for me to reach the question, dis- cussed ante, at 90­92, whether the Government's refund ac- tion against the O'Gilvie children was commenced within the 2-year period specified by 26 U. S. C. § 6532(b). I note, how- ever, that the Court's resolution of these cases also does not demand that this issue be addressed, except to the extent of rejecting the proposition that the statutory period begins to run with the mailing of a refund check. So long as that is not the trigger, there is no need to decide whether the proper trigger is receipt of the check or some later event, such as the check's clearance. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court. 519US1$10Z 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 102 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus M. L. B. v. S. L. J., individually and as next friend of the minor children, S. L. J. and M. L. J., et ux. certiorari to the supreme court of mississippi No. 95­853. Argued October 7, 1996-Decided December 16, 1996 In a decree forever terminating petitioner M. L. B.'s parental rights to her two minor children, a Mississippi Chancery Court recited a segment of the governing Mississippi statute and stated, without elaboration, that respondents, the children's natural father and his second wife, had met their burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence." The Chancery Court, however, neither described the evidence nor otherwise revealed precisely why M. L. B. was decreed a stranger to her children. M. L. B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Missis- sippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record prepa- ration fees estimated at $2,352.36. Lacking funds to pay the fees, M. L. B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, under its prece- dent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. Urging that the size of her pocketbook should not be dispositive when "an interest far more precious than any property right" is at stake, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 758­759, M. L. B. contends in this Court that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected par- ent's ability to pay record preparation fees. Held: Just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, see Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 195­196, so Mississippi may not deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court based its parental termination decree. Pp. 110­128. (a) The foundation case in the relevant line of decisions is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, in which the Court struck down an Illinois rule that effectively conditioned thoroughgoing appeals from criminal convic- tions on the defendant's procurement of a transcript of trial proceedings. The Illinois rule challenged in Griffin deprived most defendants lacking the means to pay for a transcript of any access to appellate review. Although the Federal Constitution guarantees no right to appellate re- view, id., at 18 (plurality opinion), once a State affords that right, Griffin held, the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice," id., at 24 (Frank- 519US1$10Z 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 103 Syllabus furter, J., concurring in judgment). The Griffin plurality drew support for its decision from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, id., at 13, 18, while Justice Frankfurter emphasized and explained the decision's equal protection underpinning, id., at 23. Of prime relevance to the question presented by M. L. B., Griffin's principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake, but extends to ap- peals from convictions of petty offenses, involving conduct "quasi crimi- nal" in nature. Mayer, 404 U. S., at 196, 197. In contrast, an indigent defendant's right to counsel at state expense does not extend to nonfel- ony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually imposed. Scott v. Illi- nois, 440 U. S. 367, 373­374. Pp. 110­113. (b) This Court has also recognized a narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees. See, e. g., Boddie v. Con- necticut, 401 U. S. 371, 374 (divorce proceedings). Making clear, how- ever, that a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule, the Court has refused to extend Griffin to the broad array of civil cases. See United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434, 445; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656, 661 (per curiam). But the Court has consistently set apart from the mine run of civil cases those involving state controls or intrusions on family relationships. In that domain, to guard against undue official intrusion, the Court has examined closely and contextually the importance of the governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion. Pp. 113­116. (c) M. L. B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever perma- nently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association "of basic importance in our society" is at stake. Boddie, 401 U. S., at 376. The Court approaches M. L. B.'s petition mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on her and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point: Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18 (appoint- ment of counsel for indigent defendants in parental status termination proceedings is not routinely required by the Constitution, but should be determined on a case-by-case basis), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 ("clear and convincing" proof standard is constitutionally required in parental termination proceedings). Although both Lassiter and San- tosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimously of the view that "the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty inter- ests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," Santosky, 455 U. S., at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and that "[f]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties," id., at 787. Pp. 116­119. 519US1$10Z 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 104 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Syllabus (d) Guided by Lassiter, Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship, the Court agrees with M. L. B. that Mayer points to the disposition proper in this case: Her parental termination appeal must be treated as the Court has treated petty offense appeals, and Mississippi may not withhold the transcript she needs to gain review of the order ending her parental status. The Court's decisions concerning access to judicial processes, commencing with Griffin and running through Mayer, reflect both equal protection and due process concerns. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 608­ 609. In these cases, "[d]ue process and equal protection principles con- verge." Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 665. A "precise rationale" has not been composed, Ross, 417 U. S., at 608, because cases of this order "cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analy- sis," Bearden, 461 U. S., at 666. Nevertheless, "[m]ost decisions in this area," the Court has recognized, "res[t] on an equal protection frame- work," id., at 665, as M. L. B.'s plea heavily does, for due process does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal. Placing this case within the framework established by the Court's past decisions in this area, the Court inspects the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justifi- cation for its exaction, on the other. See id., at 666­667. As in the case of the indigent petty offender charged in Mayer, the stakes for M. L. B. are large. Parental status termination is "irretriev- abl[y] destructi[ve]" of the most fundamental family relationship. San- tosky, 455 U. S., at 753. And the risk of error, Mississippi's experience shows, is considerable. Mississippi has, consistent with Santosky, adopted a "clear and convincing proof" standard for parental status ter- mination cases, but the Chancellor's order in this case simply recites statutory language; it describes no evidence, and otherwise details no reasons for finding M. L. B. "clear[ly] and convincing[ly]" unfit to be a parent. Only a transcript can reveal the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of the evidence to support that stern judgment. Mississippi's countervail- ing interest in offsetting the costs of its court system is unimpressive when measured against the stakes for M. L. B. The record discloses that, in the tightly circumscribed category of parental status termina- tion cases, appeals are few, and not likely to impose an undue burden on the State. Moreover, it would be anomalous to recognize a right to a transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction-though trial counsel may be flatly denied such a defendant-but hold, at the same time, that a transcript need not be prepared for M. L. B.-though were her defense sufficiently complex, state-paid counsel, as Lassiter in- structs, would be designated for her. While the Court does not ques- tion the general rule, stated in Ortwein, 410 U. S., at 660, that fee re- 519US1$10Z 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 105 Syllabus quirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality, the Court's cases solidly establish two exceptions to that rule. The basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be lim- ited to those who can pay for a license. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663. Nor may access to judicial processes in cases criminal or "quasi criminal" in nature, Mayer, 404 U. S., at 196, turn on ability to pay. The Court places decrees forever terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice." Griffin, 351 U. S., at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). Pp. 119­124. (e) Contrary to respondents' contention, cases in which the Court has held that government need not provide funds so that people can exercise even fundamental rights, see, e. g., Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360, 363, n. 2, 370­374, are inapposite here. Complainants in those cases sought state aid to subsidize their privately initiated action or to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances that existed apart from state action. M. L. B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication. Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action. That is the very reason this Court has paired her case with Mayer, not with Ortwein or Kras. Also rejected is respondents' suggestion that Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242, effectively overruled the Grif- fin line of cases in 1976 by rejecting the notion "that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another." That this Court has not so conceived the meaning and effect of Washington v. Davis is demonstrated by Bearden, 461 U. S., at 664­665, in which the Court adhered in 1983 to "Griffin's principle of `equal justice.' " The Court recognized in Griffin that "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in operation," 351 U. S., at 17, n. 11, and explained in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 242, that an Illinois statute it found unconstitutional in that case "in operative effect ex- pose[d] only indigents to the risk of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum." Like the sanction in Williams, the Mississippi prescription here at issue is not merely disproportionate in impact, but wholly contin- gent on one's ability to pay, thereby "visit[ing] different consequences on two categories of persons." Ibid. A failure rigidly to restrict Grif- fin to cases typed "criminal" will not result in the opening of judicial floodgates, as respondents urge. This Court has repeatedly distin- guished parental status termination decrees from mine run civil actions 519US1$10Z 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 106 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court on the basis of the unique deprivation termination decrees work: perma- nent destruction of all legal recognition of the parental relationship. Lassiter and Santosky have not served as precedent in other areas, and the Court is satisfied that the label "civil" should not entice it to leave undisturbed the Mississippi courts' disposition of this case. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 50. Pp. 124­128. (f) Thus, Mississippi may not withhold from M. L. B. "a `record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims." Mayer, 404 U. S., at 198. P. 128. Reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opin- ion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 128. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 129. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, except as to Part II, post, p. 129. Robert B. McDuff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Danny Lampley and Steven R. Shapiro. Rickey T. Moore, Special Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Mike Moore, Attorney General.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. By order of a Mississippi Chancery Court, petitioner M. L. B.'s parental rights to her two minor children were forever terminated. M. L. B. sought to appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi required that she pay in advance record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36. Because M. L. B. lacked funds to pay the fees, her appeal was dismissed. Urging that the size of her pocketbook should not be dis- positive when "an interest far more precious than any prop- erty right" is at stake, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, *Martha Matthews filed a brief for the National Center for Youth Law et al. as amici curiae. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 107 Opinion of the Court 758­759 (1982), M. L. B. tenders this question, which we agreed to hear and decide: May a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees ter- minating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees? We hold that, just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an ap- peal afforded others, see Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 195­196 (1971), so Mississippi may not deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent. I Petitioner M. L. B. and respondent S. L. J. are, respec- tively, the biological mother and father of two children, a boy born in April 1985, and a girl born in February 1987. In June 1992, after a marriage that endured nearly eight years, M. L. B. and S. L. J. were divorced. The children remained in their father's custody, as M. L. B. and S. L. J. had agreed at the time of the divorce. S. L. J. married respondent J. P. J. in September 1992. In November of the following year, S. L. J. and J. P. J. filed suit in Chancery Court in Mississippi, seeking to terminate the parental rights of M. L. B. and to gain court approval for adoption of the children by their stepmother, J. P. J. The complaint alleged that M. L. B. had not maintained reason- able visitation and was in arrears on child support payments. M. L. B. counterclaimed, seeking primary custody of both children and contending that S. L. J. had not permitted her reasonable visitation, despite a provision in the divorce de- cree that he do so. After taking evidence on August 18, November 2, and De- cember 12, 1994, the Chancellor, in a decree filed December 14, 1994, terminated all parental rights of the natural mother, approved the adoption, and ordered that J. P. J., the adopting parent, be shown as the mother of the children on 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 108 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court their birth certificates. Twice reciting a segment of the governing Mississippi statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 93­15­ 103(3)(e) (1994), the Chancellor declared that there had been a "substantial erosion of the relationship between the natural mother, [M. L. B.], and the minor children," which had been caused "at least in part by [M. L. B.'s] serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate with her minor children." App. to Pet. for Cert. 9, 10.1 The Chancellor stated, without elaboration, that the natu- ral father and his second wife had met their burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence." Id., at 10. Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however, or otherwise reveals precisely why M. L. B. was decreed, for- evermore, a stranger to her children. In January 1995, M. L. B. filed a timely appeal and paid the $100 filing fee. The Clerk of the Chancery Court, sev- eral days later, estimated the costs for preparing and trans- mitting the record: $1,900 for the transcript (950 pages at $2 per page); $438 for other documents in the record (219 pages at $2 per page); $4.36 for binders; and $10 for mailing. Id., at 15. Mississippi grants civil litigants a right to appeal, but con- ditions that right on prepayment of costs. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11­51­3, 11­51­29 (Supp. 1996). Relevant portions of a transcript must be ordered, and its preparation costs ad- 1 Mississippi Code Ann. § 93­15­103(3) (1994) sets forth several grounds for termination of parental rights, including, in subsection (3)(e), "when there is [a] substantial erosion of the relationship between the parent and child which was caused at least in part by the parent's serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or communicate, or prolonged imprisonment." M. L. B. notes that, "in repeating the catch-all language of [the statute], the Chancellor said that [she] was guilty of `serious . . . abuse.' " Reply Brief 6, n. 1. "However," M. L. B. adds, "there was no allegation of abuse in the complaint in this case or at any other stage of the proceedings." Ibid. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 109 Opinion of the Court vanced by the appellant, if the appellant "intends to urge on appeal," as M. L. B. did, "that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence." Miss. Rule of App. Proc. 10(b)(2) (1995); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 11­51­29 (Supp. 1996). Unable to pay $2,352.36, M. L. B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi de- nied her application in August 1995. Under its precedent, the court said, "[t]he right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases exists only at the trial level." App. to Pet. for Cert. 3.2 M. L. B. had urged in Chancery Court and in the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and now urges in this Court, that "where the State's judicial processes are invoked to se- cure so severe an alteration of a litigant's fundamental rights-the termination of the parental relationship with one's natural child-basic notions of fairness [and] of equal protection under the law, . . . guaranteed by [the Mississippi and Federal Constitutions], require that a person be afforded the right of appellate review though one is unable to pay the costs of such review in advance." Id., at 18.3 2 In fact, Mississippi, by statute, provides for coverage of transcript fees and other costs for indigents in civil commitment appeals. Miss. Code Ann. § 41­21­83 (Supp. 1996) (record on appeal shall include transcript of commitment hearing); Miss. Code Ann. § 41­21­85 (1972) (all costs of hear- ing or appeal shall be borne by state board of mental health when patient is indigent). 3 On the efficacy of appellate review in parental status termination cases, M. L. B. notes that of the eight reported appellate challenges to Mississippi trial court termination orders from 1980 through May 1996, three were reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court for failure to meet the "clear and convincing" proof standard. Brief for Petitioner 20; see also Reply Brief 6 ("[I]n civil cases generally, the Mississippi Court of Appeals re- versed or vacated nearly 39% of the trial court decisions it reviewed in 1995 and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed or vacated nearly 37%. Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1995 Annual Report, pp. 22, 41."). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 110 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court II Courts have confronted, in diverse settings, the "age-old problem" of "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 16 (1956). Concerning access to appeal in general, and tran- scripts needed to pursue appeals in particular, Griffin is the foundation case. Griffin involved an Illinois rule that effectively condi- tioned thoroughgoing appeals from criminal convictions on the defendant's procurement of a transcript of trial proceed- ings. See id., at 13­14, and nn. 2, 3 (noting, inter alia, that "mandatory record," which an indigent defendant could ob- tain free of charge, did not afford the defendant an opportu- nity to seek review of trial errors). Indigent defendants, other than those sentenced to death, were not excepted from the rule, so in most cases, defendants without means to pay for a transcript had no access to appellate review at all. Al- though the Federal Constitution guarantees no right to ap- pellate review, id., at 18, once a State affords that right, Grif- fin held, the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice," id., at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). The plurality in Griffin recognized "the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt or inno- cence." Id., at 18. "[T]o deny adequate review to the poor," the plurality observed, "means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convic- tions which appellate courts would set aside." Id., at 19. Judging the Illinois rule inconsonant with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Griffin plurality drew support from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id., at 13, 18. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment in Griffin, emphasized and explained the decision's equal protection underpinning: "Of course a State need not equalize economic condi- tions. . . . But when a State deems it wise and just that 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 111 Opinion of the Court convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons, forsooth er- roneously convicted, from securing such a review . . . ." Id., at 23. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 607 (1974) (Griffin and succeeding decisions "stand for the proposition that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons."). Summarizing the Griffin line of decisions regarding an indi- gent defendant's access to appellate review of a conviction,4 we said in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 310 (1966): "This Court has never held that the States are required to estab- lish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Of prime relevance to the question presented by M. L. B.'s petition, Griffin's principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake. The key case is Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971). Mayer involved an indigent defendant convicted on nonfelony charges of violating two city ordinances. Fined $250 for each offense, the defendant petitioned for a transcript to support his appeal. He alleged prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence to convict. The State provided free transcripts for indigent appellants 4 See, e. g., Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458, 458­459 (1969) (per curiam) (transcript needed to perfect appeal must be furnished at state expense to indigent defendant sentenced to 90 days in jail and a $50 fine for drunk driving); Long v. District Court of Iowa, Lee Cty., 385 U. S. 192, 192­194 (1966) (per curiam) (transcript must be furnished at state expense to enable indigent state habeas corpus petitioner to appeal denial of relief); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708, 708­709 (1961) (filing fee to process state habeas corpus application must be waived for indigent pris- oner); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 253, 257­258 (1959) (filing fee for mo- tion for leave to appeal from judgment of intermediate appellate court to State Supreme Court must be waived when defendant is indigent). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 112 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court in felony cases only. We declined to limit Griffin to cases in which the defendant faced incarceration. "The invidious- ness of the discrimination that exists when criminal proce- dures are made available only to those who can pay," the Court said in Mayer, "is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed." 404 U. S., at 197. Petty offenses could entail serious collateral consequences, the Mayer Court noted. Ibid. The Griffin principle, Mayer underscored, "is a flat prohibition," 404 U. S., at 196, against "making access to appellate processes from even [the State's] most inferior courts depend upon the [convicted] defendant's ability to pay," id., at 197. An impecunious party, the Court ruled, whether found guilty of a felony or conduct only "quasi criminal in nature," id., at 196, "cannot be denied a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate] consider- ation of his claims," id., at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted).5 In contrast to the "flat prohibition" of "bolted doors" that the Griffin line of cases securely established, the right to 5 Griffin did not impose an inflexible requirement that a State provide a full trial transcript to an indigent defendant pursuing an appeal. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 20 (1956) (State need not purchase a ste- nographer's transcript in every case where an indigent defendant cannot buy it; State "Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants."). In Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963), we invalidated a state rule that tied an indigent defendant's ability to obtain a transcript at public expense to the trial judge's finding that the defendant's appeal was not frivolous. Id., at 498­500. We emphasized, however, that the Griffin requirement is not rigid. "Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings," we ob- served, "are permissible if they place before the appellate court an equiva- lent report of the events at trial from which the appellant's contentions arise." 372 U. S., at 495. Moreover, we held, an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are "germane to consid- eration of the appeal." Ibid.; see also Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 194 (1971) ("A record of sufficient completeness does not translate auto- matically into a complete verbatim transcript." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 113 Opinion of the Court counsel at state expense, as delineated in our decisions, is less encompassing. A State must provide trial counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony, Gideon v. Wain- wright, 372 U. S. 335, 339 (1963), but that right does not ex- tend to nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actu- ally imposed, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 373­374 (1979). A State's obligation to provide appellate counsel to poor de- fendants faced with incarceration applies to appeals of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357 (1963). In Ross v. Moffitt, however, we held that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause requires a State to provide counsel at state expense to an indigent prisoner pursuing a discretionary appeal in the state system or peti- tioning for review in this Court. 417 U. S., at 610, 612, 616­618. III We have also recognized a narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), we held that the State could not deny a divorce to a married couple based on their inability to pay approximately $60 in court costs. Crucial to our decision in Boddie was the fundamental inter- est at stake. "[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the con- comitant state monopolization of the means for legally dis- solving this relationship," we said, due process "prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages." Id., at 374; see also Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1, 13­17 (1981) (State must pay for blood grouping tests sought by an indigent defendant to enable him to contest a paternity suit). Soon after Boddie, in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), the Court confronted a double-bond requirement im- posed by Oregon law only on tenants seeking to appeal ad- 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 114 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court verse decisions in eviction actions. We referred first to precedent recognizing that, "if a full and fair trial on the merits is provided, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to provide appellate review." Id., at 77. We next stated, however, that "[w]hen an appeal is afforded, . . . it cannot be granted to some liti- gants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause." Ibid. Oregon's double-bond requirement failed equal protection measure- ment, we concluded, because it raised a substantial barrier to appeal for a particular class of litigants-tenants facing eviction-a barrier "faced by no other civil litigant in Ore- gon." Id., at 79. The Court pointed out in Lindsey that the classification there at issue disadvantaged nonindigent as well as indigent appellants, ibid.; the Lindsey decision, therefore, does not guide our inquiry here. The following year, in United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973), the Court clarified that a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule. Kras concerned fees, totaling $50, required to secure a discharge in bankruptcy. Id., at 436. The Court recalled in Kras that "[o]n many occasions we have rec- ognized the fundamental importance . . . under our Consti- tution" of "the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of th[e] [marital] relationship." Id., at 444.6 But bankruptcy discharge entails no "funda- 6 As examples, the Court listed: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to be free from government interference in deciding whether to bear or beget a child is "fundamenta[l]," and may not be burdened based upon marital status); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is [a] `basic civil righ[t],' " and cannot be denied based on a racial classification. (citations omitted)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 485­486 (1965) (marital relationship "is an association that promotes a way of life, . . . a harmony in living, . . . a bilateral loyalty," and the use of contraception within marriage is protected against government intrusion); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) (Be- cause the power to sterilize affects "a basic liberty[,] . . . strict scrutiny of 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 115 Opinion of the Court mental interest," we said. Id., at 445. Although "obtaining [a] desired new start in life [is] important," that interest, the Court explained, "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as the interest in establishing or dissolving a marriage. Ibid.7 Nor is resort to court the sole path to securing debt forgiveness, we stressed; in contrast, termination of a mar- riage, we reiterated, requires access to the State's judicial machinery. Id., at 445­446; see Boddie, 401 U. S., at 376. In Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), the Court adhered to the line drawn in Kras. The appel- lants in Ortwein sought court review of agency determina- tions reducing their welfare benefits. Alleging poverty, they challenged, as applied to them, an Oregon statute re- quiring appellants in civil cases to pay a $25 fee. We sum- marily affirmed the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment re- jecting appellants' challenge. As in Kras, the Court saw no " `fundamental interest . . . gained or lost depending on the availability' of the relief sought by [the complainants]." 410 U. S., at 659 (quoting Kras, 409 U. S., at 445). Absent a fun- damental interest or classification attracting heightened scrutiny, we said, the applicable equal protection standard the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing liberty interest in raising children). See Kras, 409 U. S., at 444. 7 The Court ranked the prescription in Kras with economic and social welfare legislation generally, and cited among examples: Jefferson v. Hack- ney, 406 U. S. 535, 546 (1972) (Texas scheme for allocating limited welfare benefits is a rational legislative "effor[t] to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy."); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971) (federal statute mandating reductions in Social Security benefits to reflect workers' com- pensation payments is social welfare regulation that survives rational- basis review); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 483, 487 (1970) (Mary- land "maximum grant regulation" limiting family welfare benefits is economic, social welfare regulation that is "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination."); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 606, 611 (1960) (The right to receive benefits under the Social Security Act is not "an accrued property right," but Congress may not take away benefits arbitrarily.). See Kras, 409 U. S., at 445­446. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 116 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court "is that of rational justification," a requirement we found sat- isfied by Oregon's need for revenue to offset the expenses of its court system. 410 U. S., at 660. We expressly rejected the Ortwein appellants' argument that a fee waiver was re- quired for all civil appeals simply because the State chose to permit in forma pauperis filings in special classes of civil appeals, including appeals from terminations of parental rights. Id., at 661. In sum, as Ortwein underscored, this Court has not ex- tended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases. But tell- ingly, the Court has consistently set apart from the mine run of cases those involving state controls or intrusions on family relationships. In that domain, to guard against undue offi- cial intrusion, the Court has examined closely and contextu- ally the importance of the governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). IV Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our society," Boddie, 401 U. S., at 376, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. See, for example, Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Okla- homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) (raising children). M. L. B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever per- manently a parent-child bond,8 demands the close consider- 8 Although the termination proceeding in this case was initiated by pri- vate parties as a prelude to an adoption petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M. L. B. resists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-child relationships. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 117 Opinion of the Court ation the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake. We approach M. L. B.'s petition mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on her and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point: Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18 (1981), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (1982). Lassiter concerned the appointment of counsel for indigent persons seeking to defend against the State's termination of their parental status. The Court held that appointed coun- sel was not routinely required to assure a fair adjudication; instead, a case-by-case determination of the need for counsel would suffice, an assessment to be made "in the first instance by the trial court, subject . . . to appellate review." 452 U. S., at 32. For probation-revocation hearings where loss of condi- tional liberty is at issue, the Lassiter Court observed, our precedent is not doctrinaire; due process is provided, we have held, when the decision whether counsel should be appointed is made on a case-by-case basis. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 790 (1973). In criminal prosecutions that do not lead to the defendant's incarceration, however, our precedent recognizes no right to appointed counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S., at 373­374. Parental termina- tion cases, the Lassiter Court concluded, are most appropri- ately ranked with probation-revocation hearings: While the Court declined to recognize an automatic right to appointed counsel, it said that an appointment would be due when war- ranted by the character and difficulty of the case. See Las- siter, 452 U. S., at 31­32.9 Significant to the disposition of M. L. B.'s case, the Las- siter Court considered it "plain . . . that a parent's desire for 9 The Court noted, among other considerations, that petitions to termi- nate parental rights may charge criminal activity and that "[p]arents so accused may need legal counsel to guide them in understanding the prob- lems such petitions may create." Lassiter, 452 U. S., at 27, n. 3. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 118 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court and right to `the companionship, care, custody, and manage- ment of his or her children' is an important interest," one that " `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a power- ful countervailing interest, protection.' " Id., at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972)). The object of the proceeding is "not simply to infringe upon [the parent's] interest," the Court recognized, "but to end it"; thus, a deci- sion against the parent "work[s] a unique kind of depriva- tion." Lassiter, 452 U. S., at 27. For that reason, "[a] par- ent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision . . . is . . . a commanding one." Ibid.; see also id., at 39 (Black- mun, J., dissenting) ("A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no right to visit or communicate with the child . . . ." (footnote omitted)). Santosky held that a "clear and convincing" proof stand- ard is constitutionally required in parental termination pro- ceedings. 455 U. S., at 769­770.10 In so ruling, the Court again emphasized that a termination decree is "final and irrevocable." Id., at 759 (emphasis in original). "Few forms of state action," the Court said, "are both so severe and so irreversible." Ibid.11 As in Lassiter, the Court characterized the parent's interest as "commanding," indeed, 10 Earlier, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 431­432 (1979), the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a "clear and convinc- ing" standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings. 11 In Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U. S. 574 (1987), the Court declined to ex- tend Santosky to paternity proceedings. The Court distinguished the State's imposition of the legal obligations attending a biological relation- ship between parent and child from the State's termination of a fully existing parent-child relationship. See Rivera, 483 U. S., at 579­582. In drawing this distinction, the Court found it enlightening that state legislatures had similarly separated the two proceedings: Most jurisdic- tions applied a "preponderance of the evidence" standard in paternity cases, while 38 jurisdictions, at the time Santosky was decided, required a higher standard of proof in proceedings to terminate parental rights. See Rivera, 483 U. S., at 578­579 (citing Santosky, 455 U. S., at 749­750). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 119 Opinion of the Court "far more precious than any property right." 455 U. S., at 758­759. Although both Lassiter and Santosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimously of the view that "the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 455 U. S., at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It was also the Court's unanimous view that "[f]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties." Id., at 787. V Guided by this Court's precedent on an indigent's access to judicial processes in criminal and civil cases, and on pro- ceedings to terminate parental status, we turn to the classi- fication question this case presents: Does the Fourteenth Amendment require Mississippi to accord M. L. B. access to an appeal-available but for her inability to advance re- quired costs-before she is forever branded unfit for affilia- tion with her children? Respondents urge us to classify M. L. B.'s case with the generality of civil cases, in which indigent persons have no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis. See supra, at 114­116. M. L. B., on the other hand, maintains that the accusatory state action she is trying to fend off 12 is barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence of the loss she faces. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 50, 55 (1967) (resisting "feeble enticement of the `civil' label-of- convenience," and holding that Fifth Amendment's safeguard against self-incrimination applies in juvenile proceedings). See also Santosky, 455 U. S., at 756, 760 (recognizing stig- matic effect of parental status termination decree: "[I]t en- tails a judicial determination that [a parent is] unfit to raise [her] own children."). For the purpose at hand, M. L. B. 12 See supra, at 116, n. 8. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 120 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court asks us to treat her parental termination appeal as we have treated petty offense appeals; she urges us to adhere to the reasoning in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971), see supra, at 111­112, and rule that Mississippi may not withhold the transcript M. L. B. needs to gain review of the order ending her parental status. Guided by Lassiter and San- tosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship, e. g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S., at 651; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S., at 399, we agree that the Mayer decision points to the disposition proper in this case. We observe first that the Court's decisions concerning ac- cess to judicial processes, commencing with Griffin and run- ning through Mayer, reflect both equal protection and due process concerns. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S., at 608­609. As we said in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 665 (1983), in the Court's Griffin-line cases, "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge." The equal protection con- cern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appel- lants based solely on their inability to pay core costs. See Griffin, 351 U. S., at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judg- ment) (cited supra, at 110­111). The due process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered pro- ceedings anterior to adverse state action. See Ross, 417 U. S., at 609. A "precise rationale" has not been composed, id., at 608, because cases of this order "cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis," Bearden, 461 U. S., at 666. Nevertheless, "[m]ost decisions in this area," we have recognized, "res[t] on an equal protection framework," id., at 665, as M. L. B.'s plea heavily does, for, as we earlier observed, see supra, at 110, due process does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal. We place this case within the framework estab- lished by our past decisions in this area. In line with those decisions, we inspect the character and intensity of the indi- vidual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 121 Opinion of the Court justification for its exaction, on the other. See Bearden, 461 U. S., at 666­667. We now focus on Mayer and the considerations linking that decision to M. L. B.'s case. Mayer, described supra, at 111­112, applied Griffin to a petty offender, fined a total of $500, who sought to appeal from the trial court's judgment. See Mayer, 404 U. S., at 190. An "impecunious medical stu- dent," id., at 197, the defendant in Mayer could not pay for a transcript. We held that the State must afford him a record complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims. The defendant in Mayer faced no term of confine- ment, but the conviction, we observed, could affect his pro- fessional prospects and, possibly, even bar him from the prac- tice of medicine. Ibid. The State's pocketbook interest in advance payment for a transcript, we concluded, was unim- pressive when measured against the stakes for the defend- ant. Ibid. Similarly here, the stakes for petitioner M. L. B.-forced dissolution of her parental rights-are large, " `more substan- tial than mere loss of money.' " Santosky, 455 U. S., at 756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 424 (1979)). In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parent- child bond, parental status termination is "irretrievabl[y] de- structi[ve]" of the most fundamental family relationship. Santosky, 455 U. S., at 753. And the risk of error, Mississip- pi's experience shows, is considerable. See supra, at 109, n. 3. Consistent with Santosky, Mississippi has, by statute, adopted a "clear and convincing proof" standard for paren- tal status termination cases. Miss. Code Ann. § 93­15­109 (Supp. 1996). Nevertheless, the Chancellor's termination order in this case simply recites statutory language; it de- scribes no evidence, and otherwise details no reasons for finding M. L. B. "clear[ly] and convincing[ly]" unfit to be a parent. See supra, at 107­108. Only a transcript can re- veal to judicial minds other than the Chancellor's the suffi- 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 122 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court ciency, or insufficiency, of the evidence to support his stern judgment. The countervailing government interest, as in Mayer, is financial. Mississippi urges, as the justification for its ap- peal cost prepayment requirement, the State's legitimate in- terest in offsetting the costs of its court system. Brief for Respondents 4, 8, n. 1, 27­30. But in the tightly circum- scribed category of parental status termination cases, cf. supra, at 118, n. 11, appeals are few, and not likely to impose an undue burden on the State. See Brief for Petitioner 20, 25 (observing that only 16 reported appeals in Mississippi from 1980 until 1996 referred to the State's termination stat- ute, and only 12 of those decisions addressed the merits of the grant or denial of parental rights); cf. Brief for Respond- ents 28 (of 63,765 civil actions filed in Mississippi Chancery Courts in 1995, 194 involved termination of parental rights; of cases decided on appeal in Mississippi in 1995 (including Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases), 492 were first appeals of criminal convictions, 67 involved domestic rela- tions, 16 involved child custody). Mississippi's experience with criminal appeals is noteworthy in this regard. In 1995, the Mississippi Court of Appeals disposed of 298 first appeals from criminal convictions, Sup. Ct. of Miss. Ann. Rep. 42 (1995); of those appeals, only seven were appeals from misde- meanor convictions, ibid., notwithstanding our holding in Mayer requiring in forma pauperis transcript access in petty offense prosecutions.13 13 Many States provide for in forma pauperis appeals, including tran- scripts, in civil cases generally. See, e. g., Alaska Rule App. Proc. 209(a)(3) (1996); Conn. Rule App. Proc. 4017 (1996); D. C. Code Ann. § 15­ 712 (1995); Idaho Code § 31­3220(5) (1996); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 735, § 5/ 5­105.5(b) (Supp. 1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 453.190 (Baldwin 1991); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 5185 (West Supp. 1996); Me. Rule Civ. Proc. 91(f) (1996); Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 7 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.150 (1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25­2306 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 12.015.2 (1995); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 39­3­12 (1991); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1102(b) (McKin- ney 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 21.605(3)(a) (1991); Pa. Rule Jud. Admin. 5000.2(h) (1996); Tex. Rule App. Proc. 53(j)(1) (1996); Vt. Rule App. Proc. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 123 Opinion of the Court In States providing criminal appeals, as we earlier re- counted, an indigent's access to appeal, through a transcript of relevant trial proceedings, is secure under our precedent. See supra, at 110­112. That equal access right holds for petty offenses as well as for felonies. But counsel at state expense, we have held, is a constitutional requirement, even in the first instance, only when the defendant faces time in confinement. See supra, at 113. When deprivation of pa- rental status is at stake, however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is due. See Lassiter, 452 U. S., at 31­32. It would be anomalous to recognize a right to a transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction-though trial counsel may be flatly denied-but hold, at the same time, that a transcript need not be prepared for M. L. B.-though were her defense sufficiently complex, state-paid counsel, as Lassiter instructs, would be designated for her. In aligning M. L. B.'s case and Mayer-parental status termination decrees and criminal convictions that carry no jail time-for appeal access purposes, we do not question the general rule, stated in Ortwein, that fee requirements or- dinarily are examined only for rationality. See supra, at 115­116. The State's need for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the rationality requirement, see Ortwein, 410 U. S., at 660; States are not forced by the Con- stitution to adjust all tolls to account for "disparity in mate- 10(b)(4) (1996); Wash. Rule App. Proc. 15.4(d) (1996); W. Va. Code § 59­2­ 1(a) (Supp. 1996); State ex rel. Girouard v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 454 N. W. 2d 792 (1990). Several States deal discretely with in forma pauperis appeals, including transcripts, in parental status termination cases. See, e. g., In re Appeal in Pima County v. Howard, 112 Ariz. 170, 540 P. 2d 642 (1975); Cal. Family Code Ann. § 7895(c) (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19­3­609 (Supp. 1996); Nix v. Department of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 225 S. E. 2d 306 (1976); In re Chambers, 261 Iowa 31, 152 N. W. 2d 818 (1967); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38­1593 (1986); In re Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N. W. 2d 402 (1968); Mich. Rule P. Ct. 5.974(H)(3) (1996); In re Dotson, 72 N. J. 112, 367 A. 2d 1160 (1976); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N. E. 2d 66 (1980); Ex parte Cauthen, 291 S. C. 465, 354 S. E. 2d 381 (1987). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 124 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court rial circumstances." Griffin, 351 U. S., at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). But our cases solidly establish two exceptions to that gen- eral rule. The basic right to participate in political proc- esses as voters and candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license.14 Nor may access to judicial proc- esses in cases criminal or "quasi criminal in nature," Mayer, 404 U. S., at 196 (citation and internal quotation marks omit- ted), turn on ability to pay. In accord with the substance and sense of our decisions in Lassiter and Santosky, see supra, at 117­120, we place decrees forever terminating pa- rental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice," Griffin, 351 U. S., at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment); see supra, at 110. VI In numerous cases, respondents point out, the Court has held that government "need not provide funds so that people 14 The pathmarking voting and ballot access decisions are Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 664, 666 (1966) (invalidating, as a denial of equal protection, an annual $1.50 poll tax imposed by Virginia on all residents over 21); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 135, 145, 149 (1972) (invalidating Texas scheme under which candidates for local office had to pay fees as high as $8,900 to get on the ballot); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709, 710, 718 (1974) (invalidating California statute requiring pay- ment of a ballot-access fee fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office sought). Notably, the Court in Harper recognized that "a State may exact fees from citizens for many different kinds of licenses." 383 U. S., at 668. For example, the State "can demand from all an equal fee for a driver's li- cense." Ibid. But voting cannot hinge on ability to pay, the Court ex- plained, for it is a " `fundamental political right . . . preservative of all rights.' " Id., at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886)). Bullock rejected as justifications for excluding impecunious per- sons, the State's concern about unwieldy ballots and its interest in financ- ing elections. 405 U. S., at 144­149. Lubin reaffirmed that a State may not require from an indigent candidate "fees he cannot pay." 415 U. S., at 718. 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 125 Opinion of the Court can exercise even fundamental rights." Brief for Respond- ents 12; see, e. g., Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360, 363, n. 2, 370­374 (1988) (rejecting equal protection attack on amendment to Food Stamp Act providing that no house- hold could become eligible for benefits while a household member was on strike); Regan v. Taxation with Representa- tion of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 543­544, 550­551 (1983) (reject- ing nonprofit organization's claims of free speech and equal protection rights to receive tax deductible contributions to support its lobbying activity); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 321­326 (1980) (Medicaid funding need not be provided for women seeking medically necessary abortions). A deci- sion for M. L. B., respondents contend, would dishonor our cases recognizing that the Constitution "generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property in- terests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of So- cial Servs., 489 U. S. 189, 196 (1989). Complainants in the cases on which respondents rely sought state aid to subsidize their privately initiated ac- tion or to alleviate the consequences of differences in eco- nomic circumstances that existed apart from state action. M. L. B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is endeavor- ing to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication. Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared from the State's devastat- ingly adverse action. That is the very reason we have paired her case with Mayer, not with Ortwein or Kras, dis- cussed supra, at 114­116. Respondents also suggest that Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), is instructive because it rejects the notion "that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 126 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Opinion of the Court within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another," id., at 242. "This must be all the more true," respondents urge, "with respect to an allegedly disparate impact on a class [here, the poor] that, unlike race, is not suspect." Brief for Respond- ents 31. Washington v. Davis, however, does not have the sweep- ing effect respondents attribute to it. That case involved a verbal skill test administered to prospective Government employees. "[A] far greater proportion of blacks-four times as many-failed the test than did whites." 426 U. S., at 237. But the successful test takers included members of both races, as did the unsuccessful examinees. Dispropor- tionate impact, standing alone, the Court held, was insuffi- cient to prove unconstitutional racial discrimination. Were it otherwise, a host of laws would be called into question, "a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white." Id., at 248. To comprehend the difference between the case at hand and cases controlled by Washington v. Davis,15 one need look no further than this Court's opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970). Williams held unconstitutional an Illi- nois law under which an indigent offender could be continued in confinement beyond the maximum prison term specified by statute if his indigency prevented him from satisfying the monetary portion of the sentence. The Court described that law as " `nondiscriminatory on its face,' " and recalled that the law found incompatible with the Constitution in Griffin had been so characterized. 399 U. S., at 242 (quoting Grif- fin, 351 U. S., at 17, n. 11); see Griffin, 351 U. S., at 17, n. 11 15 See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 127 Opinion of the Court ("[A] law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly dis- criminatory in its operation."). But the Williams Court went on to explain that "the Illinois statute in operative ef- fect exposes only indigents to the risk of imprisonment be- yond the statutory maximum." 399 U. S., at 242 (emphasis added). Sanctions of the Williams genre, like the Missis- sippi prescription here at issue, are not merely dispropor- tionate in impact. Rather, they are wholly contingent on one's ability to pay, and thus "visi[t] different consequences on two categories of persons," ibid.; they apply to all indi- gents and do not reach anyone outside that class. In sum, under respondents' reading of Washington v. Davis, our overruling of the Griffin line of cases would be two decades overdue. It suffices to point out that this Court has not so conceived the meaning and effect of our 1976 "dis- proportionate impact" precedent. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S., at 664­665 (adhering in 1983 to "Griffin's principle of `equal justice' ").16 Respondents and the dissenters urge that we will open floodgates if we do not rigidly restrict Griffin to cases typed "criminal." See post, at 141­144 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondents 27­28. But we have repeatedly no- ticed what sets parental status termination decrees apart from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic rela- tions matters such as divorce, paternity, and child custody. See supra, at 117­120, and n. 11. To recapitulate, termina- tion decrees "wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation." Las- siter, 452 U. S., at 27. In contrast to matters modifiable at 16 Six of the seven Justices in the majority in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), had two Terms before Davis read our decisions in Griffin and related cases to hold that "[t]he State cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent defendant `entirely cut off from any appeal at all,' by virtue of his indigency, or extend to such indigent defendants merely a `meaningless ritual' while others in better economic circumstances have a `meaningful appeal.' " Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 612 (1974) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist, J.) (citations omitted). 519US1$10p 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 128 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment the parties' will or based on changed circumstances, termina- tion adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State "to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship." Rivera, 483 U. S., at 580. Our Las- siter and Santosky decisions, recognizing that parental ter- mination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action, Santosky, 455 U. S., at 759, have not served as prece- dent in other areas. See supra, at 118, n. 11. We are there- fore satisfied that the label "civil" should not entice us to leave undisturbed the Mississippi courts' disposition of this case. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S., at 50. * * * For the reasons stated, we hold that Mississippi may not withhold from M. L. B. "a `record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims." Mayer, 404 U. S., at 198. Accordingly, we reverse the judg- ment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment. The Court gives a most careful and comprehensive recita- tion of the precedents from Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), through Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971), and beyond, a line of decisions which invokes both equal protec- tion and due process principles. The duality, as the Court notes, stems from Griffin itself, which produced no opinion for the Court and invoked strands of both constitutional doctrines. In my view the cases most on point, and the ones which persuade me we must reverse the judgment now reviewed, are the decisions addressing procedures involving the rights and privileges inherent in family and personal relations. 519US1$10l 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 129 Thomas, J., dissenting These are Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971); Las- siter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18 (1981); and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (1982), all cases resting exclusively upon the Due Process Clause. Here, due process is quite a sufficient basis for our holding. I acknowledge the authorities do not hold that an appeal is required, even in a criminal case; but given the existing appellate structure in Mississippi, the realities of the litiga- tion process, and the fundamental interests at stake in this particular proceeding, the State may not erect a bar in the form of transcript and filing costs beyond this petitioner's means. The Court well describes the fundamental interests the petitioner has in ensuring that the order which termi- nated all her parental ties was based upon a fair assessment of the facts and the law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). With these observations, I concur in the judgment. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting. I join all but Part II of Justice Thomas' dissenting opin- ion. For the reasons stated in that opinion, I would not ex- tend the Griffin-Mayer line of cases to invalidate Missis- sippi's refusal to pay for petitioner's transcript on appeal in this case. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, and with whom The Chief Justice joins except as to Part II, dissenting. Today the majority holds that the Fourteenth Amendment requires Mississippi to afford petitioner a free transcript be- cause her civil case involves a "fundamental" right. The majority seeks to limit the reach of its holding to the type of case we confront here, one involving the termination of pa- rental rights. I do not think, however, that the new-found constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals can be 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 130 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting effectively restricted to this case. The inevitable conse- quence will be greater demands on the States to provide free assistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases involving interests that cannot, based on the test established by the majority, be distinguished from the admittedly impor- tant interest at issue here. The cases on which the majority relies, primarily cases requiring appellate assistance for indi- gent criminal defendants, were questionable when decided, and have, in my view, been undermined since. Even accept- ing those cases, however, I am of the view that the majority takes them too far. I therefore dissent. I Petitioner requests relief under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, though she does not specify how either Clause affords it. The majority accedes to petition- er's request. But, carrying forward the ambiguity in the cases on which it relies, the majority does not specify the source of the relief it grants. Those decisions are said to "reflect both equal protection and due process concerns." Ante, at 120. And, while we are told that "cases of this order `cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeon- hole analysis,' " ibid. (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 666 (1983)), the majority nonetheless acknowledges that " `[m]ost decisions in this area . . . res[t] on an equal protec- tion framework,' " ante, at 120 (quoting Bearden, supra, at 665). It then purports to "place this case within the frame- work established by our past decisions in this area." Ante, at 120. It is not clear to me whether the majority disavows any due process support for its holding. (Despite the murky disclaimer, the majority discusses numerous cases that squarely relied on due process considerations.) I therefore analyze petitioner's claim under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. If neither Clause affords peti- tioner the right to a free, civil-appeal transcript, I assume that no amalgam of the two does. 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 131 Thomas, J., dissenting A We have indicated on several occasions in this century that the interest of parents in maintaining their relationships with their children is "an important interest that `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' " Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stan- ley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972)). Assuming that petitioner's interest may not be impinged without due proc- ess of law, I do not think that the Due Process Clause re- quires the result the majority reaches. Petitioner's largest obstacle to a due process appeal gratis is our oft-affirmed view that due process does not oblige States to provide for any appeal, even from a criminal convic- tion. See, e. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (noting that "a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all" (citation omitted)); McKane v. Dur- ston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894) ("A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was not at com- mon law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review. A citation of authorities upon the point is unnecessary"). To be sure, we have indi- cated, beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, that where an ap- peal is provided, States may be prohibited from erecting bar- riers to those unable to pay. As I described last Term in my concurring opinion in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 368­ 373 (1996), however, I believe that these cases are best un- derstood as grounded in equal protection analysis, and thus make no inroads on our longstanding rule that States that accord due process in a hearing-level tribunal need not pro- vide further review. The majority reaffirms that due process does not require an appeal. Ante, at 110, 120. Indeed, as I noted above, it 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 132 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting is not clear that the majority relies on the Due Process Clause at all. The majority does discuss, however, one case in which the Court stated its holding in terms of due process: Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held violative of due process a Connecticut statute that exacted fees averaging $60 from persons seeking mari- tal dissolution. Citing the importance of the interest in end- ing a marriage, and the State's monopoly over the mecha- nisms to accomplish it, we explained that, "at a minimum" and "absent a countervailing state interest of overriding sig- nificance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id., at 377. Boddie has little to do with this case. It, "of course, was not concerned with post-hearing review." Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656, 659 (1973). Rather, the concern in Boddie was that indigent persons were deprived of "fundamental rights" with no hear- ing whatsoever. Petitioner, in contrast, received not merely a hearing, but in fact enjoyed procedural protections above and beyond what our parental termination cases have re- quired. She received both notice and a hearing before a neutral, legally trained decisionmaker. She was repre- sented by counsel-even though due process does not in every case require the appointment of counsel. See Las- siter, supra, at 24. Through her attorney, petitioner was able to confront the evidence and witnesses against her. And, in accordance with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 769 (1982), the Chancery Court was required to find that petitioner's parental unfitness was proved by clear and con- vincing evidence. Indeed, petitioner points to no hearing- level process to which she was entitled that she did not receive. Given the many procedural protections afforded petitioner, I have little difficulty concluding that "due process has . . . been accorded in the tribunal of first instance." Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U. S. 74, 80 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 133 Thomas, J., dissenting (1930). Due process has never compelled an appeal where, as here, its rigors are satisfied by an adequate hearing. Those cases in which the Court has required States to allevi- ate financial obstacles to process beyond a hearing-though sometimes couched in due process terms-have been based on the equal protection proposition that if the State chooses to provide for appellate review, it " `can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.' " Lewis v. Casey, supra, at 371 (Thomas, J., con- curring) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 17 (plurality opinion)) (footnote omitted). There seems, then, no place in the Due Process Clause-certainly as an original matter, and even as construed by this Court-for the constitutional "right" crafted by the majority today. I turn now to the other possible source: The Equal Protection Clause. B As I stated last Term in Lewis v. Casey, I do not think that the equal protection theory underlying the Griffin line of cases remains viable. See 518 U. S., at 373­378. There, I expressed serious reservations as to the continuing vitality of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817 (1977) (requiring prison authorities to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or legal assistance). As it did in Bounds, the Court today not only adopts the equal protection theory of Griffin v. Illi- nois-which was dubious ab initio and which has been un- dermined since-but extends it. Thus, much of what I said in Lewis v. Casey bears repeating here. In Griffin, the State of Illinois required all criminal appel- lants whose claims on appeal required review of a trial tran- script to obtain it themselves. The plurality thought that this "discriminate[d] against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty," 351 U. S., at 18 (plurality opinion). Justice Harlan, in dissent, perceived a troubling shift in this Court's equal protection jurisprudence. The Court, he noted, did not "dispute either the necessity for a bill of excep- 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 134 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting tions or the reasonableness of the general requirement that the trial transcript, if used in its preparation, be paid for by the appealing party." Id., at 35. But, because requiring each would-be appellant to bear the costs of appeal hit the poor harder, the majority divined "an invidious classification between the `rich' and the `poor.' " Ibid. Disputing this early manifestation of the "disparate impact" theory of equal protection, Justice Harlan argued: "[N]o economic burden attendant upon the exercise of a privilege bears equally upon all, and in other circum- stances the resulting differentiation is not treated as an invidious classification by the State, even though dis- crimination against `indigents' by name would be uncon- stitutional." Ibid. Justice Harlan offered the example of a state university that conditions an education on the payment of tuition. If charg- ing tuition did not create a discriminatory classification, then, Justice Harlan wondered, how did any other reasonable exac- tion by a State for a service it provides? "The resulting classification would be invidious in all cases, and an invidious classification offends equal protection regardless of the seri- ousness of the consequences." Ibid. (emphasis deleted). The issue in Griffin was not whether Illinois had made a reasonable classification, but whether the State acted reason- ably in failing to remove disabilities that existed wholly inde- pendently of state action. To Justice Harlan this was not an inquiry typically posed under the Equal Protection Clause. In Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), Justice Har- lan again confronted what Justice Clark termed the Court's "fetish for indigency," id., at 359 (dissenting opinion). Re- garding a law limiting the appointment of appellate counsel for indigents, Justice Harlan pointed out that "[l]aws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States `an affirmative duty to lift the handi- 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 135 Thomas, J., dissenting caps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.' " Id., at 362 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan's views were accepted by the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), in which "[w]e rejected a disparate impact theory of the Equal Protection Clause altogether." Lewis v. Casey, supra, at 375 (concur- ring opinion). We spurned the claim that "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another." 426 U. S., at 242. Absent proof of discriminatory purpose, official action did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment "solely because it has a racially dis- parate impact." Id., at 239 (emphasis in original). Hear- kening back to Justice Harlan's dissents in Griffin and Doug- las, we recognized that "[a] rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white." 426 U. S., at 248 (footnote omitted). The lesson of Davis is that the Equal Protection Clause shields only against purposeful discrimination: A disparate impact, even upon members of a racial minority, the classifi- cation of which we have been most suspect, does not violate equal protection. The Clause is not a panacea for perceived social or economic inequity; it seeks to "guarante[e] equal laws, not equal results." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 273 (1979). Since Davis, we have regularly required more of an equal protection claimant than a showing that state action has a 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 136 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting harsher effect on him or her than on others. See, e. g., Har- ris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 324, n. 26 (1980) ("The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, and when a facially neutral fed- eral statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, it is incumbent upon the challenger to prove that Congress se- lected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S., at 375 (concurring opinion) (citing cases). Our frequent pronounce- ments that the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by disparate impact have spanned challenges to statutes alleged to affect disproportionately members of one race, Washing- ton v. Davis, supra; members of one sex, Personnel Admin- istrator v. Feeney, supra; and poor persons seeking to exer- cise protected rights, Harris v. McRae, supra; Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 470­471 (1977). The majority attempts to avoid what I regard as the irre- sistible force of the Davis line of cases, but I am unconvinced by the effort. The majority states that persons in cases like those cited above "sought state aid to subsidize their pri- vately initiated action or to alleviate the consequences of dif- ferences in economic circumstances that existed apart from state action." Ante, at 125. Petitioner, in apparent con- trast, "is endeavoring to defend against the State's destruc- tion of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication." Ibid. She, "[l]ike a defendant resisting criminal conviction, . . . seeks to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action." Ibid. But, also like a defendant resisting criminal convic- tion, petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to post-trial process. See ante, at 110, 120. She defended against the "destruction of her family bonds" in the Chancery Court hearing at which she was accorded all the process this Court has required of the States in parental termination cases. She now desires "state aid to subsidize [her] privately initi- 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 137 Thomas, J., dissenting ated" appeal-an appeal that neither petitioner nor the ma- jority claims Mississippi is required to provide-to overturn the determination that resulted from that hearing. I see no principled difference between a facially neutral rule that serves in some cases to prevent persons from availing them- selves of state employment, or a state-funded education, or a state-funded abortion-each of which the State may, but is not required to, provide-and a facially neutral rule that prevents a person from taking an appeal that is available only because the State chooses to provide it. Nor does Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), a case decided six years earlier, operate to limit Washington v. Davis. Williams was yet another manifestation of the "equalizing" notion of equal protection that this Court began to question in Davis. See Williams, supra, at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). To the extent its reasoning survives Davis, I think that Williams is distinguishable. Petitioner Williams was incarcerated beyond the maximum statutory sentence because he was unable to pay the fine imposed as part of his sentence. We found the law that per- mitted prisoners to avoid extrastatutory imprisonment only by paying their fines to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Even though it was " `nondiscriminatory on its face,' " the law "work[ed] an invidious discrimination" as to Williams and all other indigents because they could not afford to pay their fines. 399 U. S., at 242. The majority concludes that the sanctions involved in Williams are analogous to "the Missis- sippi prescription here at issue," in that both do not have merely a disparate impact, "they apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class." Ante, at 127. Even assuming that Williams' imprisonment gave rise to an equal protection violation, however, M. L. B.'s circumstances are not comparable. M. L. B.'s parental rights were termi- nated-the analog to Williams' extended imprisonment-be- cause the Chancery Court found, after a hearing, that she was unfit to remain her children's mother, not because she was indigent. Her indigency only prevented her from tak- 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 138 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting ing advantage of procedures above and beyond those re- quired by the Constitution-in the same way that indigency frequently prevents persons from availing themselves of a variety of state services.1 The Griffin line of cases ascribed to-one might say an- nounced-an equalizing notion of the Equal Protection Clause that would, I think, have startled the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers. In those cases, the Court did not find, nor did it seek, any purposeful discrimination on the part of the state defendants. That their statutes had dispro- portionate effect on poor persons was sufficient for us to find a constitutional violation. In Davis, among other cases, we began to recognize the potential mischief of a disparate im- pact theory writ large, and endeavored to contain it. In this case, I would continue that enterprise. Mississippi's re- quirement of prepaid transcripts in civil appeals seeking to contest the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial is facially neutral; it creates no classification. The transcript rule reasonably obliges would-be appellants to bear the costs of availing themselves of a service that the State chooses, but is not constitutionally required, to provide.2 Any ad- 1 Similarly, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966), struck down a poll tax that directly restricted the exercise of a right found in that case to be fundamental-the right to vote in state elections. The fee that M. L. B. is unable to pay does not prevent the exercise of a funda- mental right directly: The fundamental interest identified by the majority is not the right to a civil appeal, it is rather the right to maintain the parental relationship. 2 Petitioner suggests that Mississippi's $2 per page charge exceeds the actual cost of transcription. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 8. She stops short of asserting that the charge is unreasonable or irrational. While not conclusive, I note that Mississippi's transcript charge falls comforta- bly within the range of charges throughout the Nation. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12­224(B) (1992) ($2.50/page); Idaho Code § 1­1105(2) (1990) ($2/page); Mass. Gen. Laws § 221:88 (1994) ($3/page); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 485.100 (1994) ($1.50/page); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 34­6­20(C) (1996) ($1.65/page); R. I. Gen. Laws § 8­5­5 (Supp. 1995) (family court tran- scripts, $3/page); S. C. App. Ct. Rule 508 ($2/page). 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 139 Thomas, J., dissenting verse impact that the transcript requirement has on any per- son seeking to appeal arises not out of the State's action, but out of factors entirely unrelated to it. II If this case squarely presented the question, I would be inclined to vote to overrule Griffin and its progeny. Even were I convinced that the cases on which the majority today relies ought to be retained, I could not agree with the majori- ty's extension of them. The interest at stake in this case differs in several im- portant respects from that at issue in cases such as Griffin. Petitioner's interest in maintaining a relationship with her children is the subject of a civil, not criminal, action. While certain civil suits may tend at the margin toward criminal cases, and criminal cases may likewise drift toward civil suits, the basic distinction between the two finds root in the Constitution and has largely retained its vitality in our jurisprudence. In dissent in Boddie v. Connecticut, Justice Black stated that "in Griffin the Court studiously and care- fully refrained from saying one word or one sentence sug- gesting that the rule there announced to control rights of criminal defendants would control in the quite different field of civil cases." 401 U. S., at 390. The Constitution provides for a series of protections of the unadorned liberty interest at stake in criminal proceedings. These express protections include the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of grand jury in- dictment, and protection against double jeopardy and self- incrimination; the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of a speedy and public jury trial, of the ability to confront wit- nesses, and of compulsory process and assistance of counsel; and the Eighth Amendment's protections against excessive bail and fines, and against cruel and unusual punishment. This Court has given content to these textual protections, and has identified others contained in the Due Process Clause. These protections are not available to the typical 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 140 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting civil litigant. Even where the interest in a civil suit has been labeled "fundamental," as with the interest in parental termination suits, the protections extended pale by compari- son. A party whose parental rights are subject to termina- tion is entitled to appointed counsel, but only in certain circumstances. See Lassiter, 452 U. S., at 31­32. His or her rights cannot be terminated unless the evidence meets a standard higher than the preponderance standard applied in the typical civil suit, but the standard is still lower than that required before a guilty verdict. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S., at 769­770. That said, it is true enough that civil and criminal cases do not always stand in bold relief to one another. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971), marks a particularly discomfit- ing point along the border between the civil and criminal areas. Based on Griffin, the Court determined there that an indigent defendant had a constitutional right to a free transcript in aid of appealing his conviction for violating city ordinances, which resulted in a $500 fine and no imprison- ment. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979), we concluded that an indigent defendant charged with a crime that was not punishable by imprisonment was not entitled to appointed counsel. And yet, in Lassiter, supra, we held that, in some cases, due process required provision of assistance of counsel before the termination of parental rights. The assertion that civil litigants have no right to the free transcripts that all criminal defendants enjoy is difficult to sustain in the face of our holding that some civil litigants are entitled to the assistance of counsel to which some criminal defendants are not. It is at this unsettled (and unsettling) place that the majority lays the foundation of its holding. See ante, at 120­124. The majority's solution to the "anamol[y]" that a misdemeanant receives a free transcript but no trial counsel, while a parental-rights terminee receives (sometimes) trial counsel, but no transcript, works an extension of Mayer. I 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 141 Thomas, J., dissenting would answer the conundrum differently: Even if the Griffin line were sound, Mayer was an unjustified extension that should be limited to its facts, if not overruled. Unlike in Scott and Lassiter, the Court gave short shrift in Mayer to the distinction, as old as our Constitution, between crimes punishable by imprisonment and crimes punishable merely by fines. See Lassiter, supra, at 26­27; Scott, supra, at 373. Even though specific text-based constitutional pro- tections have been withheld in cases not involving the pros- pect of imprisonment, the Court found the difference of no moment in Mayer. The Court reasoned that "[t]he invidi- ousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal pro- cedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed." 404 U. S., at 197. We reap today what we sowed then. If requiring payment for procedures (e. g., appeals) that are not themselves required is invidious discrimination no matter what sentence results, it is difficult to imagine why it is not invidious discrimination no matter what results and no matter whether the procedures involve a criminal or civil case. See supra, at 135. To me this points up the dif- ficulty underlying the entire Griffin line. Taking the Grif- fin line as a given, however, and in the absence of any obvi- ous limiting principle, I would restrict it to the criminal appeals to which its authors, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 389 (Black, J., dissenting), sought to limit it. The distinction between criminal and civil cases-if blurred at the margins-has persisted throughout the law. The distinction that the majority seeks to draw between the case we confront today and the other civil cases that we will surely face tomorrow is far more ephemeral. If all that is required to trigger the right to a free appellate transcript is that the interest at stake appear to us to be as fundamen- tal as the interest of a convicted misdemeanant, several kinds of civil suits involving interests that seem fundamental 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 142 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting enough leap to mind. Will the Court, for example, now ex- tend the right to a free transcript to an indigent seeking to appeal the outcome of a paternity suit? 3 To those who wish to appeal custody determinations? 4 How about persons against whom divorce decrees are entered? 5 Civil suits that arise out of challenges to zoning ordinances with an impact on families? 6 Why not foreclosure actions-or at least fore- 3 In Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1 (1981), we held that the Due Process Clause required the States to provide a free blood grouping test to an indigent defendant in a paternity action. The Court observed that "[a]part from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a sub- stantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child rela- tionship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them consti- tutional protection. Just as the termination of such bonds demands pro- cedural fairness, so too does their imposition." Id., at 13 (citations omit- ted). Little's description of the interest at stake in a paternity suit seems to place it on par with the interest here. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 58 (1981), recognized as much: "I deem it not a little ironic that the Court on this very day grants, on due process grounds, an indigent putative father's claim for state-paid blood grouping tests in the interest of according him a meaningful opportunity to disprove his paternity, Little v. Streater, [supra,] but in the present case rejects, on due process grounds, an indigent mother's claim for state-paid legal assistance when the State seeks to take her own child away from her in a termination proceeding." (Emphasis deleted.) As the majority indicates, ante, at 118, n. 11, we have distinguished- in my view unpersuasively-between the requirements of due process in paternity suits and in termination suits. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U. S. 574 (1987). Whether we will distinguish between paternity appellants and misdemeanor appellants remains to be seen. 4 See, e. g., Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F. 3d 1011, 1013­1014 (CA8 1996) (fa- ther's "fundamental" "liberty interest in the care, custody and manage- ment of his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree and Nebraska law"). 5 In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), we referred to a divorce as the "adjustment of a fundamental human relationship." Id., at 382­383. 6 See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996) 143 Thomas, J., dissenting closure actions seeking to oust persons from their homes of many years? 7 The majority seeks to provide assurances that its holding will not extend beyond parental termination suits. The holdings of Santosky and Lassiter-both of which involved parental termination-have not, we are told, been applied to other areas of law. Ante, at 128. This is not comforting. Both Santosky and Lassiter are cases that determined the requirements of due process (not equal protection) in the parental rights termination area. As the Court has said countless times, the requirements of due process vary consid- erably with the interest involved and the action to which it is subject. It is little wonder, then, that the specific due process requirements for one sort of action are not readily transferable to others. I have my doubts that today's opin- ion will be so confined. In the first place, it is not clear whether it is an equal protection or a due process opinion. Moreover, the principle on which it appears to rest hardly seems capable of stemming the tide. Petitioner is permitted a free appellate transcript because the interest that under- lies her civil claim compares favorably to the interest of the misdemeanant facing a $500 fine and unknown professional difficulties in Mayer v. Chicago. Under the rule announced today, I do not see how a civil litigant could constitutionally be denied a free transcript in any case that involves an inter- est that is arguably as important as the interest in Mayer (which would appear to include all the types of cases that I mention above, and perhaps many others).8 What is more, it must be remembered that Griffin did not merely invent 7 Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 89­90 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent- ing in part) ("[W]here the right is so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements of due process should be more embracing"). 8 Accordingly, Mississippi will no doubt find little solace in the fact that, as the majority notes, of 63,765 civil actions filed in Mississippi Chancery Court in 1995, 194 were parental termination cases. Ante, at 122. Mis- sissippi pointed out in its brief that of these civil actions, "39,475 were domestic relations cases," "1027 involved custody or visitation, and 6080 were paternity cases." Brief for Respondents 28. 519US1$10n 06-02-99 16:04:08 PAGES OPINPGT 144 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. Thomas, J., dissenting the free transcript right for criminal appellants; it was also the launching pad for the discovery of a host of other rights. See, e. g., Bounds, 430 U. S., at 822 (right to prison law librar- ies or legal assistance); Douglas, 372 U. S., at 356 (right to free appellate counsel). I fear that the growth of Griffin in the criminal area may be mirrored in the civil area. In brushing aside the distinction between criminal and civil cases-the distinction that has constrained Griffin for 40 years-the Court has eliminated the last meaningful limit on the free-floating right to appellate assistance. From Mayer, an unfortunate outlier in the Griffin line, has sprung the M. L. B. line, and I have no confidence that the majority's assurances that the line starts and ends with this case will hold true. III As the majority points out, many States already provide for in forma pauperis civil appeals, with some making spe- cial allowances for parental termination cases. I do not dis- pute the wisdom or charity of these heretofore voluntary allocations of the various States' scarce resources. I agree that, for many-if not most-parents, the termination of their right to raise their children would be an exaction more dear than any other. It seems perfectly reasonable for States to choose to provide extraconstitutional procedures to ensure that any such termination is undertaken with care. I do not agree, however, that a State that has taken the step, not required by the Constitution, of permitting appeals from termination decisions somehow violates the Constitution when it charges reasonable fees of all would-be appellants. I respectfully dissent. 519US1$11Z 06-02-99 16:50:28 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 145 Per Curiam GREENE v. GEORGIA on petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court of georgia No. 96­5369. Decided December 16, 1996 Petitioner was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated as- sault by a Georgia jury and sentenced to death. Over his objection, the trial court excused for cause five jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty. The State Supreme Court affirmed, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, as "controlling authority" for a rule that appellate courts must defer to trial courts' juror bias findings. Held: Witt is not controlling authority as to the standard of review to be applied by state appellate courts reviewing trial courts' jury selection rulings. Witt arose on federal habeas, where deference to state-court findings is mandated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), but that statute does not govern the standard of review of trial court findings by the Georgia Supreme Court. That court mistakenly believed itself bound by Witt's standard. It is free to adopt that standard, but it need not do so. Certiorari granted; 266 Ga. 439, 469 S. E. 2d 129, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. Petitioner was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault by a jury in Taylor County, Georgia, and sentenced to death. At trial, over petitioner's objection, the court excused for cause five jurors who expressed reserva- tions about the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Geor- gia affirmed, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985), as "controlling authority" for a rule that appellate courts must defer to trial courts' findings concerning juror bias. 266 Ga. 439, 440­442, 469 S. E. 2d 129, 134­135 (1996). Wainwright v. Witt, supra, delineated the standard under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for determining when a juror may be excused for cause because of his views on the death penalty: whether these views would " `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " Id., at 424. Addressing petitioner's federal constitutional chal- 519US1$11h 06-02-99 16:50:28 PAGES OPINPGT 146 GREENE v. GEORGIA Per Curiam lenge to the juror disqualifications in this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia correctly recognized that Witt is "the con- trolling authority as to the death-penalty qualification of pro- spective jurors . . . ." 266 Ga., at 440, 469 S. E. 2d, at 134.* Witt also held that, under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), federal courts must accord a presumption of correctness to state courts' findings of juror bias. 469 U. S., at 426­430. The Supreme Court of Georgia said that Witt was also "control- ling authority" on this point, and it therefore ruled that "[t]he conclusion that a prospective juror is disqualified for bias is one that is based upon findings of demeanor and credi- bility which are peculiarly within the trial court's province and such findings are to be given deference by appellate courts. Wainwright v. Witt, [469 U. S.,] at 428." 266 Ga., at 441, 469 S. E. 2d, at 134­135. Witt is not "controlling authority" as to the standard of review to be applied by state appellate courts reviewing trial courts' rulings on jury selection. Witt was a case arising on federal habeas, where deference to state-court findings is mandated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). But this statute does not govern the standard of review of trial court findings by the Supreme Court of Georgia. There is no indication in that court's opinion that it viewed Witt as merely persuasive authority, or that the court intended to borrow or adopt the Witt standard of review for its own purposes. It be- lieved itself bound by Witt's standard of review of trial court findings on jury-selection questions, and in so doing it was mistaken. In a similar case involving a state court's mistaken view that the First Amendment required it to reach a particular result, we said: "We conclude that although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amend- ments do not require it to do so." Zacchini v. Scripps- *We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Supreme Court of Georgia's application of the Witt standard in this case. 519US1$11h 06-02-99 16:50:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 145 (1996) 147 Per Curiam Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 578­579 (1977). Here, too, the Supreme Court of Georgia is free to adopt the rule laid down in Witt for review of trial court findings in jury-selection cases, but it need not do so. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are therefore granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is re- manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 519US1$12Z 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 148 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. WATTS on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1906. Decided January 6, 1997* Respondent Watts was convicted of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, but acquitted of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. Despite this, the District Court found by a preponderance of the evi- dence that Watts possessed guns in connection with the drug offense, and therefore added two points to his base offense level when calculat- ing his sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In a separate case, respondent Putra was convicted of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine on May 8, 1992, but acquit- ted of aiding and abetting such a transaction on May 9. Finding by a preponderance of the evidence that she had been involved in the May 9 transaction, the District Court calculated her Guidelines' base offense level by aggregating the amounts of both sales. In each of these cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the sentencing courts could not consider respondents' conduct underlying the charges of which they had been acquitted. Held: A jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent a sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The Ninth Circuit's contrary holdings conflict with the clear implications of 18 U. S. C. § 3661, the Guidelines, and this Court's double jeopardy deci- sions, particularly Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389. Section 3661 codifies the longstanding principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information, including facts re- lated to charges of which the defendant has been acquitted. Further, this Court has held that consideration of information about a defendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not result in punishment for any offense other than the crime of conviction. Id., at 401. In addi- tion, acquittal merely proves, not that the defendant is innocent, but the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Thus, an acquittal does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof. Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 349. The acquittals below shed no light on *Together with United States v. Putra, also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court. 519US1$12Z 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 149 Per Curiam whether a preponderance of the evidence either established Putra's par- ticipation in the May 9 sale or Watts' use of a firearm in connection with a drug offense. Certiorari granted; 67 F. 3d 790 and 78 F. 3d 1386, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. In these two cases, two panels of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing courts could not consider conduct of the defendants underlying charges of which they had been acquitted. United States v. Watts, 67 F. 3d 790 (CA9 1995) (Watts); United States v. Putra, 78 F. 3d 1386 (CA9 1996) (Putra). Every other Court of Ap- peals has held that a sentencing court may do so, if the Gov- ernment establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.1 The Government filed a single petition for cer- tiorari seeking review of both cases, pursuant to this Court's Rule 12.4, to resolve this split. Because the panels' holdings conflict with the clear implications of 18 U. S. C. § 3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court's decisions, particu- larly Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995), we grant the petition and reverse in both cases. In Watts, police discovered cocaine base in a kitchen cabi- net and two loaded guns and ammunition hidden in a bed- room closet of Watts' house. A jury convicted Watts of pos- sessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 1 United States v. Boney, 977 F. 2d 624, 635­636 (CADC 1992); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F. 2d 13, 16­17 (CA1 1989) (criticized in dicta in United States v. Lanoue, 71 F. 3d 966, 984 (CA1 1995)); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F. 2d 177, 180­182 (CA2), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 844 (1990); United States v. Ryan, 866 F. 2d 604, 608­609 (CA3 1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F. 2d 736, 738­739 (CA4 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F. 2d 747, 748­749 (CA5 1989) (per curiam); United States v. Milton, 27 F. 3d 203, 208­209 (CA6 1994), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1085 (1995); United States v. Fonner, 920 F. 2d 1330, 1332­1333 (CA7 1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F. 2d 1444, 1449­1450 (CA8), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 960 (1990); United States v. Coleman, 947 F. 2d 1424, 1428­1429 (CA10 1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 972 (1992); United States v. Averi, 922 F. 2d 765, 765­766 (CA11 1991) (per curiam). 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 150 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Per Curiam 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1), but acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Despite Watts' acquittal on the firearms count, the District Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense. In calculating Watts' sentence, the court therefore added two points to his base offense level under United States Sentenc- ing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 1995) (USSG). The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, hold- ing that "a sentencing judge may not, `under any standard of proof,' rely on facts of which the defendant was acquitted." 67 F. 3d, at 797 (quoting United States v. Brady, 928 F. 2d 844, 851, and n. 12 (CA9 1991), abrogated on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738 (1994)) (emphasis added in Watts). The Government argued that the District Court could have enhanced Watts' sentence without consid- ering facts "necessarily rejected" by the jury's acquittal on the § 924(c) charge because the sentencing enhancement did not require a connection between the firearm and the predi- cate offense, whereas § 924(c) did. The court rejected this argument, stated that both the enhancement and § 924(c) in- volved such a connection, and held that the District Court had impermissibly "reconsider[ed] facts that the jury neces- sarily rejected by its acquittal of the defendant on another count." 67 F. 3d, at 796. In Putra, authorities had videotaped two transactions in which Putra and a codefendant (a major drug dealer) sold cocaine to a Government informant. The indictment charged Putra with, among other things, one count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine on May 8, 1992; and a second count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on May 9, 1992, both in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. § 2. The jury convicted Putra on the first count but acquitted her on the second. At sentenc- ing, however, the District Court found by a preponderance 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 151 Per Curiam of the evidence that Putra had indeed been involved in the May 9 transaction. The District Court explained that the second sale was relevant conduct under USSG § 1B1.3, and it therefore calculated Putra's base offense level under the Guidelines by aggregating the amounts of both sales. As in Watts, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for resentencing. Reasoning that the jury's verdict of acquittal manifested an "explicit rejection" of Putra's involvement in the May 9 transaction, the Court of Appeals held that "allow- ing an increase in Putra's sentence would be effectively pun- ishing her for an offense for which she has been acquitted." 78 F. 3d, at 1389. The panel explained that it was imposing "a judicial limitation on the facts the district court may con- sider at sentencing, beyond any limitation imposed by the Guidelines." Ibid. Then-Chief Judge Wallace dissented, arguing that the panel's "sweeping language contradicts the Guidelines, our practice prior to enactment of the Guidelines, decisions of other circuits, and recent Supreme Court author- ity." Id., at 1390. We begin our analysis with 18 U. S. C. § 3661, which codi- fies the longstanding principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information. The statute states: "No limitation shall be placed on the information con- cerning the background, character, and conduct of a per- son convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of im- posing an appropriate sentence." We reiterated this principle in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), in which a defendant convicted of murder and sentenced to death challenged the sentencing court's re- liance on information that the defendant had been involved in 30 burglaries of which he had not been convicted. We contrasted the different limitations on presentation of evi- dence at trial and at sentencing: "Highly relevant-if not es- 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 152 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Per Curiam sential-to [the judge's] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concern- ing the defendant's life and characteristics." Id., at 247 (footnote omitted); see Nichols, supra, at 747 (noting that sentencing courts have traditionally and constitutionally "considered a defendant's past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior") (citing Williams, supra); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 573, n. 19 (1996) ("A sentencing judge may even consider past criminal behavior which did not result in a conviction") (cit- ing Williams, supra). Neither the broad language of § 3661 nor our holding in Williams suggests any basis for the courts to invent a blanket prohibition against considering certain types of evidence at sentencing. Indeed, under the pre- Guidelines sentencing regime, it was "well established that a sentencing judge may take into account facts introduced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the de- fendant has been acquitted." United States v. Donelson, 695 F. 2d 583, 590 (CADC 1982) (Scalia, J.). The Guidelines did not alter this aspect of the sentencing court's discretion. " `[V]ery roughly speaking, [relevant con- duct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines' enactment.' " Witte, supra, at 402 (quoting United States v. Wright, 873 F. 2d 437, 441 (CA1 1989) (Breyer, J.)). Section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines reflects the policy set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3661: "In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guide- lines is warranted, the court may consider, without limi- tation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless other- wise prohibited by law. See 18 U. S. C. § 3661." Section 1B1.3, in turn, describes in sweeping language the conduct that a sentencing court may consider in determining 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 153 Per Curiam the applicable guideline range. The commentary to that section states: "Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range." USSG § 1B1.3, comment., backg'd. With respect to certain offenses, such as Putra's drug conviction, USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2) requires the sentencing court to consider "all acts and omis- sions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." Application Note 3 explains that "[a]pplication of this provi- sion does not require the defendant, in fact, to have been convicted of multiple counts." The Note also gives the fol- lowing example: "[W]here the defendant engaged in three drug sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of cocaine, as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, subsection (a)(2) provides that the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is to be used to determine the offense level even if the defendant is convicted of a single count charging only one of the sales." Accordingly, the Guidelines conclude that "[r]elying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of the number of counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is obtained, appears to be the most reasonable approach to writing work- able guidelines for these offenses." USSG § 1B1.3, com- ment., backg'd (emphasis added). Although Justice Stevens' dissent concedes that a dis- trict court may properly consider "evidence adduced in a trial that resulted in an acquittal" when choosing a particular sentence within a guideline range, it argues that the court must close its eyes to acquitted conduct at earlier stages of the sentencing process because the "broadly inclusive lan- guage of § 3661" is incorporated only into § 1B1.4 of the Guidelines. Post, at 162. This argument ignores § 1B1.3 which, as we have noted, directs sentencing courts to con- 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 154 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Per Curiam sider all other related conduct, whether or not it resulted in a conviction. Justice Stevens also contends that because Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission, in 28 U. S. C. § 994(l), to ensure that the Guidelines provide incre- mental punishment for a defendant who is convicted of multi- ple offenses, it could not have meant for the Guidelines to increase a sentence based on offenses of which a defendant has been acquitted. Post, at 168. The statute is not, how- ever, "cast in restrictive or exclusive terms." United States v. Ebbole, 917 F. 2d 1495, 1501 (CA7 1990). Far from limit- ing a sentencing court's power to consider uncharged or ac- quitted conduct, § 994(l) simply ensures that, at a minimum, the Guidelines provide additional penalties when defendants are convicted of multiple offenses. Ibid. If we accepted Justice Stevens' logic, § 994(l) would prohibit a district court from considering acquitted conduct for any sentencing purposes, whether for setting the guidelines range or for choosing a sentence within that range-a novel proposi- tion that Justice Stevens does not defend. Post, at 162. In short, we are convinced that a sentencing court may con- sider conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted. The Court of Appeals' position to the contrary not only conflicts with the implications of the Guidelines, but it also seems to be based on erroneous views of our double jeopardy jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals asserted that, when a sentencing court considers facts underlying a charge on which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, the defendant " `suffer[s] punishment for a criminal charge for which he or she was acquitted.' " Watts, 67 F. 3d, at 797 (quoting Brady, 928 F. 2d, at 851). As we explained in Witte, however, sen- tencing enhancements do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not convicted, but rather increase his sen- tence because of the manner in which he committed the crime of conviction. 515 U. S., at 402­403. In Witte, we held that a sentencing court could, consistent with the Dou- ble Jeopardy Clause, consider uncharged cocaine importation 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 155 Per Curiam in imposing a sentence on marijuana charges that was within the statutory range, without precluding the defendant's sub- sequent prosecution for the cocaine offense. We concluded that "consideration of information about the defendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not result in `pun- ishment' for any offense other than the one of which the de- fendant was convicted." Id., at 401. Rather, the defendant is "punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased punishment . . . ." Id., at 403; see also Nichols, 511 U. S., at 747. The Court of Appeals likewise misunderstood the preclu- sive effect of an acquittal, when it asserted that a jury " `re- ject[s]' " some facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty. Putra, 78 F. 3d, at 1389 (quoting Brady, supra, at 851). The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the signifi- cance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial and sentencing. We have explained that "acquittal on crimi- nal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 361 (1984). As then-Chief Judge Wallace pointed out in his dissent in Putra, it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant not guilty on a cer- tain charge. "[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact. An acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that the government failed to prove an essential element of the offense be- yond a reasonable doubt. Without specific jury find- ings, no one can logically or realistically draw any fac- tual finding inferences . . . ." 78 F. 3d, at 1394. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' assertion in Brady, supra, at 851, the jury cannot be said to have "necessarily rejected" any facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty. 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 156 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Per Curiam For these reasons, "an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof." Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 349 (1990). The Guidelines state that it is "appropriate" that facts relevant to sentencing be proved by a preponder- ance of the evidence, USSG § 6A1.3, comment., and we have held that application of the preponderance standard at sen- tencing generally satisfies due process. McMillan v. Penn- sylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 91­92 (1986); Nichols, supra, at 747­ 748. We acknowledge a divergence of opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence.2 The cases be- 2 See McMillan, 477 U. S., at 88 (upholding use of preponderance stand- ard where there was no allegation that the sentencing enhancement was "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense"); Kinder v. United States, 504 U. S. 946, 948­949 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (acknowledging split); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F. 2d 1084, 1102 (CA3 1990) (holding that clear-and-convincing standard is im- plicit in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b), which requires a sentencing court to "find" certain facts in order to justify certain large upward departures; not reaching the due process issue); United States v. Gigante, 39 F. 3d 42, 48 (CA2 1994), as amended, 94 F. 3d 53, 56 (1996) (not reaching due process issue; "In our view, the preponderance standard is no more than a thresh- old basis for adjustments and departures, and the weight of the evidence, at some point along a continuum of sentence severity, should be considered with regard to both upward adjustments and upward departures. . . . Where a higher standard, appropriate to a substantially enhanced sen- tence range, is not met, the court should depart downwardly"); United States v. Lombard, 72 F. 3d 170, 186­187 (CA1 1995) (authorizing down- ward departure in "an unusual and perhaps a singular case" that may have "exceeded" constitutional limits, where acquitted conduct calling for an "enormous" sentence enhancement "is itself very serious conduct," "where the ultimate sentence is itself enormous, and where the judge is seemingly mandated to impose that sentence"); see also United States v. Townley, 929 F. 2d 365, 369 (CA8 1991) ("At the very least, McMillan allows for the possibility that the preponderance standard the Court approved for gar- den variety sentencing determinations may fail to comport with due proc- 519US1$12J 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 157 Per Curiam fore us today do not present such exceptional circumstances, and we therefore do not address that issue. We therefore hold that a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in both cases be- fore us today. In Putra, the jury simply found that the prosecution had not proved the defendant's complicity in the May 9 sale beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal sheds no light on whether a preponderance of the evidence estab- lished Putra's participation in that transaction. Likewise, in Watts, the jury acquitted the defendant of using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to the drug offense. That verdict does not preclude a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did, in fact, use or carry such a weapon, much less that he simply possessed the weapon in connection with a drug offense. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are re- manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Respondent Putra's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The motion of Morris L. Whitman for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. It is so ordered. ess where, as here, a sentencing enhancement factor becomes `a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense' ") (quoting McMillan, supra, at 88); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F. 2d 654, 656, n. 1 (CA9 1991) (en banc) (suggesting that clear-and-convincing evidence might be required for extraordinary upward adjustments or departures), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 961 (1992); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F. 2d 682, 688 (CADC) (same), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 901 (1992); United States v. Truji- llo, 959 F. 2d 1377, 1382 (CA7) (same), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 897 (1992). But see United States v. Washington, 11 F. 3d 1510, 1516 (CA10 1993) ("At least as concerns making guideline calculations the issue of a higher than a preponderance standard is foreclosed in this circuit"), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1020 (1994). 519US1$12K 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 158 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Breyer, J., concurring Justice Scalia, concurring. I do not agree with the assertion in Justice Breyer's concurrence that there is no obstacle to the Sentencing Com- mission's reversing today's outcome by mandating disregard of the information we today hold it proper to consider. Title 28 U. S. C. § 994(b)(1) requires the Guidelines to be "consist- ent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code." In turn, 18 U. S. C. § 3661 provides that "[n]o limita- tion shall be placed on the information concerning the back- ground, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sen- tence." In my view, neither the Commission nor the courts have authority to decree that information which would oth- erwise justify enhancement of sentence or upward departure from the Guidelines may not be considered for that purpose (or may be considered only after passing some higher stand- ard of probative worth than the Constitution and laws re- quire) if it pertains to acquitted conduct. If the Commission believes that the rules of evidence and proof established by the Constitution and laws are inadequate, it may of course recommend changes to the Congress, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 994(w). Justice Breyer, concurring. I join the Court's per curiam opinion while noting that it poses no obstacle to the Sentencing Commission itself decid- ing whether or not to enhance a sentence on the basis of conduct that a sentencing judge concludes did take place, but in respect to which a jury acquitted the defendant. In telling judges in ordinary cases to consider "all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction," United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1995) (USSG), the Guidelines recognize the fact that before their creation sentencing judges often took account, not only of the precise conduct that made up 519US1$12Q 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 159 Stevens, J., dissenting the offense of conviction, but of certain related conduct as well. And I agree with the Court that the Guidelines, as presently written, do not make an exception for related con- duct that was the basis for a different charge of which a jury acquitted that defendant. To that extent, the Guidelines' policy rests upon the logical possibility that a sentencing judge and a jury, applying different evidentiary standards, could reach different factual conclusions. This truth of logic, however, is not the only pertinent pol- icy consideration. The Commission in the past has con- sidered whether the Guidelines should contain a specific exception to their ordinary "relevant conduct" rules that would instruct the sentencing judge not to base a sentence enhancement upon acquitted conduct. United States Sen- tencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 57 Fed. Reg. 62832 (1992) (proposed USSG § 1B1.3(c)). Given the role that juries and acquittals play in our system, the Commission could decide to revisit this mat- ter in the future. For this reason, I think it important to specify that, as far as today's decision is concerned, the power to accept or reject such a proposal remains in the Commission's hands. Justice Stevens, dissenting. "The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 revolutionized the manner in which district courts sentence persons convicted of federal crimes." Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129, 132 (1991). The goals of rehabilitation and fairness served by individualized sentencing that formerly justified vesting judges with virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion have been replaced by the impersonal interest in uniformity and retribution.1 Strict mandatory rules have dramatically 1 Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247­248 (1949) ("Refor- mation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence"), with 28 U. S. C. § 994(k) (rejecting rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment) and 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2) (stating that punish- 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 160 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Stevens, J., dissenting confined the exercise of judgment based on a totality of the circumstances. "While the products of the Sentencing Com- mission's labors have been given the modest name `Guide- lines,' . . . they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive. A judge who disregards them will be reversed." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). I In 1970, during the era of individualized sentencing, Con- gress enacted the statute now codified as 18 U. S. C. § 3661 to make it clear that otherwise inadmissible evidence could be considered by judges in the exercise of their sentencing discretion. The statute, however, did not tell the judge how to weigh the significance of any of that evidence. The judge was free to rely on any information that might shed light on a decision to grant probation, to impose the statutory maxi- mum, or to determine the precise sentence within those ex- tremes. Wisdom and experience enabled the judge to give appropriate weight to uncorroborated hearsay or to evidence of criminal conduct that had not resulted in a conviction. Even if convinced that a jury had erroneously acquitted a defendant, the judge was not required to ignore the evidence of guilt. At the same time, however, he or she was free to discount the significance of that evidence if mitigating cir- cumstances-perhaps the same facts that persuaded the jury that an acquittal was appropriate-were present. Like a jury in a capital case, the judge could exercise discretion "to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment). Although the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 has cabined the discretion of sentencing judges, the 1970 statute remains on the books. As was true when it was enacted, § 3661 does ment should serve retributive, deterrent, educational, and incapacitative goals). 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 161 Stevens, J., dissenting not speak to questions concerning the relevance or the weight of any item of evidence. That statute is not offended by provisions in the Guidelines that proscribe reliance on evidence of economic hardship, drug or alcohol dependence, or lack of guidance as a youth in making certain sentencing decisions. See Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 93 (1996). Conversely, that statute does not command that any partic- ular weight-or indeed that any weight at all-be given to evidence that a defendant may have committed an offense that the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In short, while the statute that introduces the Court's analysis of these cases, ante, at 151, does support its narrow holding that sentencing courts may sometimes "con- sider conduct of the defendants underlying other charges of which they had been acquitted," ante, at 149, it sheds no light on whether the district judges' application of the Guide- lines in the manner presented in these cases was authorized by Congress, or is allowed by the Constitution. A closer examination of the interaction among § 3661, the other provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, and the Guidelines demonstrates that the role played by § 3661 is of a narrower scope than the Court's opinion suggests. The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted primarily to address Congress' concern that similar offenders convicted of similar offenses were receiving "an unjustifiably wide range of sen- tences." S. Rep. No. 98­225, p. 38 (1983). It therefore cre- ated the Sentencing Commission and directed it to draft Guidelines that would cabin the discretion of all judges- those who were too harsh as well as those who were too lenient. See 28 U. S. C. § 991(b)(1)(B). While the abolition of parole indicates that the new rules were generally in- tended to increase the minimum levels of punishment, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3624(a) and (b), they also confined the judges' authority to impose the maximum sentences authorized by statute. The central mechanism that Congress promulgated to avoid disparate sentencing in typical cases is a require- 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 162 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Stevens, J., dissenting ment that for any sentence of imprisonment in the Guide- lines, "the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months," 28 U. S. C. § 994(b)(2). The determination of which of these narrow ranges a partic- ular sentence should fall into is made by operation of manda- tory rules, but within the particular range, the judge retains broad discretion to set a particular sentence. By their own terms, the Guidelines incorporate the broadly inclusive language of § 3661 only into those por- tions of the sentencing decision in which the judge retains discretion. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1B1.4 (Nov. 1995) (USSG) provides: "In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guide- lines is warranted, the court may consider, without limi- tation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless other- wise prohibited by law. See 18 U. S. C. § 3661." Thus, as in the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime, it is in the area in which the judge exercises discretion that § 3661 authorizes unlimited access to information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant. When the judge is exercising such discretion, I agree that he or she may consider otherwise inadmissible evidence, including evidence adduced in a trial that resulted in an acquittal. But that practice, enshrined in § 3661 and USSG § 1B1.4, sheds little, if any, light on the appropriateness of the Dis- trict Courts' application of USSG § 1B1.3, which defines relevant conduct for the purposes of determining the Guide- lines range within which a sentence can be imposed. II The issue of law raised by the sentencing of Cheryl Putra involved the identification of the offense level that deter- 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 163 Stevens, J., dissenting mined the range within which the judge could exercise dis- cretion. Because she was a first offender with no criminal history, that range was based entirely on the offense or of- fenses for which she was to be punished. She was found guilty of aiding and abetting the intended distribution of one ounce of cocaine on May 8, 1992, but not guilty of participat- ing in a similar transaction involving five ounces of cocaine on May 9, 1992. United States v. Putra, 78 F. 3d 1386, 1387 (CA9 1996). If the guilty verdict provided the only basis for imposing punishment on Ms. Putra, the Guidelines would have required the judge to impose a sentence of no less than 15 months in prison and would have prohibited him from imposing a sentence longer than 21 months. If Putra had been found guilty of also participating in the 5-ounce transaction on May 9, 1992, the Guidelines would have required that both the minimum and the maximum sen- tences be increased; the range would have been between 27 and 33 months. As the District Court applied the Guide- lines, precisely the same range resulted from the acquittal as would have been dictated by a conviction. Notwithstand- ing the absence of sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the alleged offense on May 9 led to the imposition of a sentence six months longer than the maxi- mum permitted for the only crime that provided any basis for punishment.2 2 The circumstances surrounding Vernon Watts' sentencing were some- what different from those involved in Putra's sentencing. Watts was ac- quitted of the crime of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c), but was found guilty of certain drug crimes. United States v. Watts, 67 F. 3d 790, 793 (CA9 1995). The sentencing judge enhanced Watts' base offense level by two points, pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), after concluding that the defendant's "possession" of the firearm in connection with the crime had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 67 F. 3d, at 797­798. Because the "use" of a firearm and its "possession" are not identical, the judge may not have relied on facts necessarily rejected by the jury in concluding that the sentencing en- hancement was appropriate. I nevertheless believe that the enhancement 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 164 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Stevens, J., dissenting In my judgment neither our prior cases nor the text of the statute warrants this perverse result. And the vigor of the debate among judges in the Courts of Appeals on this basic issue belies the ease with which the Court addresses it, with- out hearing oral argument or allowing the parties to fully brief the issues.3 was inappropriate because it was based on conduct that the judge found only by a preponderance of the evidence. Since Watts' base offense level was increased by this evidence, I believe it should have been proved be- yond a reasonable doubt. 3 Although the Court's decision suggests that the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in these cases breaks from settled law in every other Circuit, the opinion ignores the fact that respected jurists all over the country have been critical of the interaction between the Sentencing Guidelines' mechanical approach and the application of a preponderance of the evi- dence standard to so-called relevant conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Silverman, 976 F. 2d 1502, 1519, 1527 (CA6 1992) (Merritt, C. J., dissent- ing); id., at 1533 (Martin, J., dissenting); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F. 2d 369, 389, 396 (CA2 1992) (Newman, C. J., concurring) ("A just system of criminal sentencing cannot fail to distinguish between an allegation of conduct resulting in a conviction and an allegation of conduct resulting in an acquittal"); United States v. Galloway, 976 F. 2d 414, 436 (CA8 1992) (Bright, J., dissenting, joined by Arnold, C. J., Lay, J., and McMillian, J.); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F. 2d 654, 663 (CA9 1991) (Pregerson, J., dissenting, joined by Hug, J.); id., at 664 (Norris, J., dissenting, joined by Hug, J., Pregerson, J., and D. W. Nelson, J.). Cf. United States v. Lanoue, 71 F. 3d 966, 984 (CA1 1995) ("Although it makes no difference in this case, we believe that a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is trampled when he is imprisoned (for any length of time) on the basis of conduct of which a jury has necessarily acquitted him"). See also Martin, The Cornerstone Has No Foundation: Relevant Conduct in Sentencing and the Require- ments of Due Process, 3 Const. L. J. 25, 34­36 (1993); Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional Significance of the "Elements of the Sentence," 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147, 157­158 (1993); Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289 (1992); Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentenc- ing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 208­220 (1991). 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 165 Stevens, J., dissenting III The Court relies principally on three cases-Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986); and Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995)-to justify its outcome. In each instance, the reliance is misplaced. For three reasons, Williams cannot support the result in these cases. First, it dealt with the exercise of the sentenc- ing judge's discretion within the range authorized by law, rather than with rules defining the range within which dis- cretion may be exercised. Second, "[t]he accuracy of the statements made by the judge as to appellant's background and past practices was not challenged by appellant or his counsel, nor was the judge asked to disregard any of them or to afford appellant a chance to refute or discredit any of them by cross-examination or otherwise." 337 U. S., at 244. The precise question here-the burden of proof applicable to sentencing facts-was thus not before the Court in that case. Third, its rationale depended largely on agreement with an individualized sentencing regime that is significantly differ- ent from the Guidelines system. "Williams was decided in the context of a sentencing `system that focuse[d] on subjec- tive assessments of rehabilitative potential. . . .' Saltzburg, [Sentencing Procedures: Where Does Responsibility Lie?, 4 Fed. Sent. Rep. 248, 250 (1992)]." United States v. Wise, 976 F. 2d 393, 409 (CA8 1992) (Arnold, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As this Court has acknowledged, see Burns, 501 U. S., at 132, the Guidelines wrought a dra- matic change in sentencing processes, replacing the very sys- tem that justified Williams with a rigid system in which, "[f]or most defendants in the federal courts, sentencing is what the case is really about." Wise, 976 F. 2d, at 409. Even more than Williams, this Court, like all of the Cir- cuits that have adopted the same approach as the District Courts in these cases, relies primarily on the misguided 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 166 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Stevens, J., dissenting 5-to-4 decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986). For the reasons stated in my dissent in that case, id., at 95­104, I continue to believe that it was incorrectly decided and that its holding should be reconsidered. Even accepting its holding that the Constitution does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish a sentencing factor that increases the minimum sentence without altering the maximum, however, there are at least two reasons why McMillan does not dictate the outcome of these cases. In McMillan, as in these cases, the defendant's minimum sentence was enhanced on the basis of a fact proved by a preponderance of the evidence. But in McMillan, the maxi- mum was unchanged; the sentence actually imposed was within the range that would have been available to the judge even if the enhancing factor had not been proved. In these cases, however, the sentences actually imposed were higher than the Guidelines would have allowed without evidence of the additional offenses. The McMillan opinion pointedly noted that the Pennsylvania statute had not altered "the maximum penalty for the crime committed" and operated "solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Id., at 87­88. Given the Court's acknowledged "inability to lay down any `bright line' test" that would define the limits of its holding, id., at 91, and its apparent assumption that a sentencing factor should not be allowed to serve as a "tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense," id., at 88, see also ante, at 156­157, n. 2, the holding should not be extended to allow a fact proved by only a preponderance to increase the entire range of penalties within which the sentencing judge may lawfully exercise discretion.4 4 I recognize that the shift from one Guideline range to a higher range does not produce a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. It does, however, mandate a sentence that is above the maximum that the judge 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 167 Stevens, J., dissenting Moreover, McMillan addressed only the constitutionality of a statute the meaning of which was perfectly clear. Noth- ing in the text of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 even arguably mandates the result that the District Courts reached in these cases. Indeed, as Justice Breyer points out in his separate concurrence, ante, at 159, the Sentencing Commission unquestionably has the authority to disallow the consideration of acquitted conduct. Similarly, the Commis- sion could have chosen to set the burden of proof for sentenc- ing proceedings at beyond a reasonable doubt without run- ning afoul of the enabling legislation. Given the lack of a contrary command in the statute itself, as well as the com- plete absence of any pre-1984 precedent for establishing the range of a permissible sentence on the basis of a fact proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, the McMillan opin- ion which was announced in 1986 can shed no light on the meaning of the 1984 Act. Nor does the Court's decision in Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995), dictate the answer to the question pre- sented by these cases. I continue to disagree with the con- clusion reached by the Court in Witte, that the Double Jeop- ardy Clause does not prohibit convicting and sentencing an individual for conduct that has been decisive in determining the individual's offense level for a previous conviction. But that is a different issue from the one here. The opinion in Witte, carefully and repeatedly, confined the Court's holding to the double jeopardy context. Id., at 397 (defendant in this case "is punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted"); id., at 399 (dis- puted practice is not "punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause"); id., at 404 (prac- tice "constitutes punishment only for the offense of convic- tion for purposes of the double jeopardy inquiry"). What is would have had the legal authority to impose absent consideration of the "relevant conduct." 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 168 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Stevens, J., dissenting at issue in these cases is not whether a defendant is being twice punished or prosecuted for the same conduct, but whether his or her initial punishment has been imposed pur- suant to rules that are authorized by the statute and consist- ent with the Constitution. IV Putra's case involves "multiple offenses." She was charged with several offenses and received a sentence that was based on the judge's conclusion that she was guilty of each of these multiple offenses even though she had in fact been found guilty of only one offense. It is therefore appro- priate to consider what the Sentencing Reform Act has to say about "multiple offenses." In 28 U. S. C. § 994(l) Congress specifically directed the Commission to ensure that the Guidelines included incre- mental sentences for multiple offenses. That subsection provides: "The Commission shall insure that the Guidelines promulgated . . . reflect- "(1) the appropriateness of imposing an incremental penalty for each offense in a case in which a defendant is convicted of- "(A) multiple offenses committed in the same course of conduct . . . . ; and "(B) multiple offenses committed at different times . . . ." (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to square this explicit statutory command to impose incremental punishment for each of the "multiple of- fenses" of which a defendant "is convicted" with the conclu- sion that Congress intended incremental punishment for each offense of which the defendant has been acquitted.5 5 Courts upholding the Guidelines' relevant conduct provisions and their application in cases such as these have tended to focus their attention exclusively on those provisions in the statute that direct courts and the Commission to consider the "nature and circumstances of the offense" in 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 169 Stevens, J., dissenting The Court, however, appears willing to read the statute's treatment of multiple offenses as though it authorized an in- cremental penalty for each offense for which the defendant was indicted if she is convicted of at least one such offense. The fact that the text of the statute expressly authorizes such incremental punishment "for each offense" only when a "defendant is convicted of . . . multiple offenses" conveys a far different message to thoughtful judges.6 In my opinion the statute should be construed in the light of the traditional requirement that criminal charges must be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That re- quirement has always applied to charges involving multiple offenses as well as a single offense. Whether an allegation of criminal conduct is the sole basis for punishment or merely one of several bases for punishment, we should presume that Congress intended the new sentencing Guidelines that it authorized in 1984 to adhere to longstanding procedural re- quirements enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence. determining an appropriate sentence. 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(1); see also 28 U. S. C. § 994(d). In § 994(d), Congress granted the Sentencing Commis- sion the authority to "consider whether [certain enumerated factors], among others, have any relevance" in establishing Guidelines for offenses. Some courts have concluded that the inclusion of the qualifier "among others" in this provision indicated that Congress intended the Commission to include anything it felt was relevant to the sentencing decision. See, e. g., United States v. Galloway, 976 F. 2d, at 420­421; United States v. Thomas, 932 F. 2d 1085, 1089 (CA5 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Pullock v. United States, 502 U. S. 895, and Samuels v. United States, 502 U. S. 962 (1992). But this provision cannot be read separately from the rest of the statute. The clear congressional directive concerning sentencing for "multiple of- fenses" must be read as an important limit on the "othe[r]" factors that can be considered relevant to determination of an offense level. 6 Some judges have concluded, in large part because of this provision, that the Guidelines' relevant conduct rules are outside the scope of the authority Congress granted to the Commission. See Galloway, 976 F. 2d, at 430­431 (Beam, J., dissenting); United States v. Davern, 970 F. 2d 1490, 1507 (CA6 1992) (Merritt, C. J., dissenting). 519US1$12I 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT 170 UNITED STATES v. WATTS Kennedy, J., dissenting The notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give rise to the same punish- ment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to that jurisprudence. I respectfully dissent. Justice Kennedy, dissenting. A case can be made for summary reversal here, based on such factors as the conflict between the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the rationale of this Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and, to a lesser extent, in Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995); the conflict the Ninth Circuit created, without considering en banc its departure from the rule followed in all other Circuits; and the lack of any clear authority to con- strain the sentencing judge as the Court of Appeals seeks to do. On the other hand, it must be noted the cases raise a ques- tion of recurrent importance in hundreds of sentencing pro- ceedings in the federal criminal system. We have not de- cided a case on this precise issue, for it involves not just prior criminal history but conduct underlying a charge for which the defendant was acquitted. At several points the per cu- riam opinion shows hesitation in confronting the distinction between uncharged conduct and conduct related to a charge for which the defendant was acquitted. The distinction ought to be confronted by a reasoned course of argument, not by shrugging it off. At the least it ought to be said that to increase a sentence based on conduct underlying a charge for which the defend- ant was acquitted does raise concerns about undercutting the verdict of acquittal, concerns noted by Justice Stevens and the other federal judges to whom he refers in his dissent. If there is no clear answer but to acknowledge a theoretical contradiction from which we cannot escape because of over- riding practical considerations, at least we ought to say so. 519US1$12L 06-05-99 15:57:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 148 (1997) 171 Kennedy, J., dissenting Finally, as Justice Stevens further points out, the effect of the Sentencing Reform Act of l984 on this question deserves careful exploration. This is illustrated by the fact that Jus- tices Scalia and Breyer each find it necessary to issue separate opinions setting forth differing views on the role of the Sentencing Commission. For these reasons the cases should have been set for full briefing and consideration on the oral argument calendar. From the Court's failure to do so, I dissent. 519US1$13Z 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 172 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­6556. Argued October 16, 1996-Decided January 7, 1997 After a fracas involving at least one gunshot, petitioner, Old Chief, was charged with, inter alia, violating 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. He offered to stipulate to § 922(g)(1)'s prior-conviction element, arguing that his offer rendered evidence of the name and nature of his prior offense- assault causing serious bodily injury-inadmissible because its "proba- tive value [was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju- dice . . . ," Fed. Rule Evid. 403. The Government refused to join the stipulation, however, insisting on its right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction, and the District Court agreed. At trial, the Government introduced the judgment record for the prior conviction, and a jury convicted Old Chief. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce proba- tive evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer. Held: A district court abuses its discretion under Rule 403 if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede a prior judgment and admits the full judg- ment record over the defendant's objection, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction. Pp. 178­192. (a) Contrary to Old Chief's position, the name of his prior offense as contained in the official record is relevant to the prior-conviction ele- ment. That record made his § 922(g)(1) status "more probable . . . than it [would have been] without the evidence," Fed. Rule Evid. 401; and the availability of alternative proofs, such as his admission, did not affect its evidentiary relevance, see Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 401, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 859. Pp. 178­179. (b) As to a criminal defendant, Rule 403's term "unfair prejudice" speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof specific to the offense charged. Such improper grounds certainly in- clude generalizing from a past bad act that a defendant is by propensity the probable perpetrator of the current crime. Thus, Rule 403 requires that the relative probative value of prior-conviction evidence be bal- 519US1$13Z 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 173 Syllabus anced against its prejudicial risk of misuse. A judge should balance these factors not only for the item in question but also for any actually available substitutes. If an alternative were found to have substan- tially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were sub- stantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk. Pp. 180­185. (c) In dealing with the specific problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and its prior-conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice whenever the official record would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning. Old Chief sensibly worried about the prejudicial effect of his prior offense. His proffered admission also presented the District Court with alternative, relevant, admissible, and seemingly conclusive evidence of the prior conviction. Thus, while the name of the prior offense may have been technically relevant, it addressed no detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would not have been covered by the stipulation or admis- sion. Pp. 185­186. (d) Old Chief's offer supplied evidentiary value at least equivalent to what the Government's own evidence carried. The accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away has virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant's legal status. Here, the most the jury needed to know was that the conviction admitted fell within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from possessing a gun. More obviously, the proof of status went to an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what Old Chief was charged with think- ing and doing to commit the current offense. Since there was no cogni- zable difference between the evidentiary significance of the admission and the official record's legitimately probative component, and since the functions of the competing evidence were distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the conviction record's discounted probative value. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion to admit the conviction record when the defendant's admission was available. Pp. 186­192. 56 F. 3d 75, reversed and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Ken- nedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissent- ing opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 192. 519US1$13Z 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 174 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Daniel Donovan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Anthony R. Gallagher. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assist- ant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Alan Jenkins, and Thomas E. Booth.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Subject to certain limitations, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) pro- hibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction, which the Government can prove by introducing a record of judgment or similar evidence identifying the pre- vious offense. Fearing prejudice if the jury learns the na- ture of the earlier crime, defendants sometimes seek to avoid such an informative disclosure by offering to concede the fact of the prior conviction. The issue here is whether a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns such an offer and ad- mits the full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evi- dence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction.1 We hold that it does. I In 1993, petitioner, Old Chief, was arrested after a fracas involving at least one gunshot. The ensuing federal charges included not only assault with a dangerous weapon and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence but violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). This statute makes it unlawful for anyone "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime pun- ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm . . . ." "[A] *Tova Indritz and Barbara Bergman filed a brief for the National Asso- ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae. 1 The standard of review applicable to the evidentiary rulings of the district court is abuse of discretion. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 54­55 (1984). 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 175 Opinion of the Court crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is defined to exclude "any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, re- straints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices" and "any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and pun- ishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less." § 921(a)(20). The earlier crime charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Before trial, he moved for an order requiring the Government "to refrain from mentioning-by reading the Indictment, during jury selection, in opening statement, or closing argument- and to refrain from offering into evidence or soliciting any testimony from any witness regarding the prior criminal convictions of the Defendant, except to state that the Defend- ant has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprison- ment exceeding one (1) year." App. 6. He said that reveal- ing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm, and he offered to "solve the problem here by stipulating, agreeing and requesting the Court to instruct the jury that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) yea[r]." Id., at 7. He argued that the offer to stipulate to the fact of the prior conviction rendered evidence of the name and nature of the offense inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the danger being that unfair prejudice from that evidence would sub- stantially outweigh its probative value. He also proposed this jury instruction: "The phrase `crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year' generally means a crime which is a felony. The phrase does not include any state of- fense classified by the laws of that state as a misde- 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 176 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court meanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less and certain crimes concerning the reg- ulation of business practices. "[I] hereby instruct you that Defendant JOHNNY LYNN OLD CHIEF has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." Id., at 11.2 2 Proposals for instructing the jury in this case proved to be perilous. We will not discuss Old Chief's proposed instruction beyond saying that, even on his own legal theory, revision would have been required to dispel ambiguity. The jury could not have said whether the instruction that Old Chief had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year meant that, as a matter of law, his conviction fell within the definition of "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," or was instead merely a statement of fact, in which case the jurors could not have determined whether the predicate offense was within one of the statute's categorical exceptions, a "state . . . misdemeanor . . . pun- ishable by a term . . . of two years or less" or a "business" crime. The District Court did not, however, deny Old Chief's motion because of the artless instruction he proposed, but because of the general rule, to be discussed below, that permits the Government to choose its own evidence. While Old Chief's proposed instruction was defective even under the law as he viewed it, the instruction actually given was erroneous even on the Government's view of the law. The District Court charged, "You have also heard evidence that the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony. You may consider that evidence only as it may affect the defend- ant's believability as a witness. You may not consider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is now on trial." App. 31. This instruction invited confusion. First, of course, if the jury had applied it literally there would have been an acquittal for the wrong reason: Old Chief was on trial for, among other offenses, being a felon in possession, and if the jury had not considered the evidence of prior convic- tion it could not have found that he was a felon. Second, the remainder of the instruction referred to an issue that was not in the case. While it is true that prior-offense evidence may in a proper case be admissible for impeachment, even if for no other purpose, Fed. Rule Evid. 609, petitioner did not testify at trial; there was no justification for admitting the evidence for impeachment purposes and consequently no basis for the District Court's suggestion that the jurors could consider the prior conviction as impeachment evidence. The fault for this error lies at least as much with Old Chief as with the District Court, since Old Chief apparently sought 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 177 Opinion of the Court The Assistant United States Attorney refused to join in a stipulation, insisting on his right to prove his case his own way, and the District Court agreed, ruling orally that, "If he doesn't want to stipulate, he doesn't have to." Id., at 15­16. At trial, over renewed objection, the Government introduced the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief's prior conviction. This document disclosed that on December 18, 1988, he "did knowingly and unlawfully assault Rory Dean Fenner, said assault resulting in serious bodily injury," for which Old Chief was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Id., at 18­19. The jury found Old Chief guilty on all counts, and he appealed. The Ninth Circuit addressed the point with brevity: "Regardless of the defendant's offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through introduction of probative evidence. See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F. 3d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Gilman, 684 F. 2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1982)). Under Ninth Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and, thus, it has no place in the FRE 403 balancing process. Breitkreutz, 8 F. 3d at 691­92. . . . . . "Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Old Chief's prior conviction to prove that element of the unlawful possession charge." No. 94­ 30277, 1995 WL 325745, *1 (CA9, May 31, 1995) (unpub- lished), App. 50­51, judgt. order reported at 56 F. 3d 75 (1995). We granted Old Chief's petition for writ of certiorari, 516 U. S. 1110 (1996), because the Courts of Appeals have divided sharply in their treatment of defendants' efforts to exclude evidence of the names and natures of prior offenses in cases like this. Compare, e. g., United States v. Burkhart, 545 some such instruction and withdrew the request only after the court had charged the jury. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 178 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court F. 2d 14, 15 (CA6 1976); United States v. Smith, 520 F. 2d 544, 548 (CA8 1975), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 925 (1976); and United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F. 3d 688, 690­692 (CA9 1993) (each recognizing a right on the part of the Government to refuse an offered stipulation and proceed with its own evi- dence of the prior offense), with United States v. Tavares, 21 F. 3d 1, 3­5 (CA1 1994) (en banc); United States v. Poore, 594 F. 2d 39, 40­43 (CA4 1979); United States v. Wacker, 72 F. 3d 1453, 1472­1473 (CA10 1995); and United States v. Jones, 67 F. 3d 320, 322­325 (CADC 1995) (each holding that the de- fendant's offer to stipulate to or to admit to the prior convic- tion triggers an obligation of the district court to eliminate the name and nature of the underlying offense from the case by one means or another). We now reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. II A As a threshold matter, there is Old Chief's erroneous argu- ment that the name of his prior offense as contained in the record of conviction is irrelevant to the prior-conviction ele- ment, and for that reason inadmissible under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as having "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with- out the evidence." Fed. Rule Evid. 401. To be sure, the fact that Old Chief's prior conviction was for assault result- ing in serious bodily injury rather than, say, for theft was not itself an ultimate fact, as if the statute had specifically required proof of injurious assault. But its demonstration 3 "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Fed. Rule Evid. 402. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 179 Opinion of the Court was a step on one evidentiary route to the ultimate fact, since it served to place Old Chief within a particular subclass of offenders for whom firearms possession is outlawed by § 922(g)(1). A documentary record of the conviction for that named offense was thus relevant evidence in making Old Chief's § 922(g)(1) status more probable than it would have been without the evidence. Nor was its evidentiary relevance under Rule 401 affected by the availability of alternative proofs of the element to which it went, such as an admission by Old Chief that he had been convicted of a crime "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" within the meaning of the statute. The 1972 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 401 make this point directly: "The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. While situations will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a point con- ceded by the opponent, the ruling should be made on the basis of such considerations as waste of time and undue prejudice (see Rule 403), rather than under any general requirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in dispute." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 401, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 859. If, then, relevant evidence is inadmissible in the presence of other evidence related to it, its exclusion must rest not on the ground that the other evidence has rendered it "irrele- vant," but on its character as unfairly prejudicial, cumulative or the like, its relevance notwithstanding.4 4 Viewing evidence of the name of the prior offense as relevant, there is no reason to dwell on the Government's argument that relevance is to be determined with respect to the entire item offered in evidence (here, the entire record of conviction) and not with reference to distinguishable sub- units of that object (here, the name of the offense and the sentence re- ceived). We see no impediment in general to a district court's determina- tion, after objection, that some sections of a document are relevant within 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 180 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court B The principal issue is the scope of a trial judge's discretion under Rule 403, which authorizes exclusion of relevant evi- dence when its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi- dence." Fed. Rule Evid. 403. Old Chief relies on the dan- ger of unfair prejudice.5 1 The term "unfair prejudice," as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground differ- ent from proof specific to the offense charged. See gener- ally 1 J. Weinstein, M. Berger, & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 403[03] (1996) (discussing the meaning of "unfair prejudice" under Rule 403). So, the Committee Notes to Rule 403 explain, " `Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 403, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 860. Such improper grounds certainly include the one that Old Chief points to here: generalizing a defendant's earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as call- the meaning of Rule 401, and others irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 402. 5 Petitioner also suggests that we might find a prosecutor's refusal to accept an adequate stipulation and jury instruction in the narrow context presented by this case to be prosecutorial misconduct. The argument is that, since a prosecutor is charged with the pursuit of just convictions, not victory by fair means or foul, any ethical prosecutor must agree to stipu- late in the situation here. But any ethical obligation will depend on the construction of Rule 403, and we have no reason to anticipate related ethi- cal lapses once the meaning of the Rule is settled. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 181 Opinion of the Court ing for preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily). As then-Judge Breyer put it, "Al- though . . . `propensity evidence' is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged-or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment-creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance." United States v. Moc- cia, 681 F. 2d 61, 63 (CA1 1982). Justice Jackson described how the law has handled this risk: "Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prose- cution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil char- acter to establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a presumption of good character, Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559, but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposi- tion and reputation on the prosecution's case-in-chief. The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be per- suasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because char- acter is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, de- spite its admitted probative value, is the practical expe- rience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice." Mi- chelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 475­476 (1948) (footnotes omitted). Rule of Evidence 404(b) reflects this common-law tradition by addressing propensity reasoning directly: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 182 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b). There is, accordingly, no question that propensity would be an "improper basis" for conviction and that evidence of a prior conviction is sub- ject to analysis under Rule 403 for relative probative value and for prejudicial risk of misuse as propensity evidence. Cf. 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence 780 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter McCormick) (Rule 403 prejudice may occur, for example, when "evidence of convictions for prior, unrelated crimes may lead a juror to think that since the defendant already has a criminal record, an erroneous conviction would not be quite as serious as would otherwise be the case"). As for the analytical method to be used in Rule 403 balanc- ing, two basic possibilities present themselves. An item of evidence might be viewed as an island, with estimates of its own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference points in deciding whether the danger substan- tially outweighs the value and whether the evidence ought to be excluded. Or the question of admissibility might be seen as inviting further comparisons to take account of the full evidentiary context of the case as the court understands it when the ruling must be made.6 This second approach would start out like the first but be ready to go further. On objection, the court would decide whether a particular item of evidence raised a danger of unfair prejudice. If it did, the judge would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but for any actually available substitutes as well. If an alternative 6 It is important that a reviewing court evaluate the trial court's decision from its perspective when it had to rule and not indulge in review by hindsight. See, for example, United States v. O'Shea, 724 F. 2d 1514, 1517 (CA11 1984), where the appellate court approved the trial court's pretrial refusal to impose a stipulation on the Government and exclude the Gov- ernment's corresponding evidence of past convictions because the trial court had found at that stage that the evidence would quite likely come in anyway on other grounds. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 183 Opinion of the Court were found to have substantially the same or greater proba- tive value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judi- cial discretion would discount the value of the item first of- fered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk. As we will explain later on, the judge would have to make these calculations with an appreciation of the offering party's need for evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case, and the mere fact that two pieces of evidence might go to the same point would not, of course, necessarily mean that only one of them might come in. It would only mean that a judge applying Rule 403 could reasonably apply some discount to the probative value of an item of evidence when faced with less risky alternative proof going to the same point. Even under this second approach, as we explain below, a defendant's Rule 403 objection offering to concede a point generally cannot prevail over the Government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt and all the circumstances sur- rounding the offense. See infra, at 186­189.7 The first understanding of the Rule is open to a very tell- ing objection. That reading would leave the party offering evidence with the option to structure a trial in whatever way would produce the maximum unfair prejudice consistent with relevance. He could choose the available alternative carrying the greatest threat of improper influence, despite the availability of less prejudicial but equally probative evi- dence. The worst he would have to fear would be a ruling sustaining a Rule 403 objection, and if that occurred, he could simply fall back to offering substitute evidence. This would be a strange rule. It would be very odd for the law 7 While our discussion has been general because of the general wording of Rule 403, our holding is limited to cases involving proof of felon status. On appellate review of a Rule 403 decision, a defendant must establish abuse of discretion, a standard that is not satisfied by a mere showing of some alternative means of proof that the prosecution in its broad discre- tion chose not to rely upon. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 184 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court of evidence to recognize the danger of unfair prejudice only to confer such a degree of autonomy on the party subject to temptation, and the Rules of Evidence are not so odd. Rather, a reading of the companions to Rule 403, and of the commentaries that went with them to Congress, makes it clear that what counts as the Rule 403 "probative value" of an item of evidence, as distinct from its Rule 401 "rele- vance," may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alterna- tives. The Committee Notes to Rule 401 explicitly say that a party's concession is pertinent to the court's discretion to exclude evidence on the point conceded. Such a concession, according to the Notes, will sometimes "call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove [the] point conceded by the oppo- nent . . . ." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 401, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 859. As already mentioned, the Notes make it clear that such rulings should be made not on the basis of Rule 401 relevance but on "such considerations as waste of time and undue prejudice (see Rule 403) . . . ." Ibid. The Notes to Rule 403 then take up the point by stat- ing that when a court considers "whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice," the "availability of other means of proof may . . . be an appropriate factor." Advisory Com- mittee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 403, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 860. The point gets a reprise in the Notes to Rule 404(b), dealing with admissibility when a given evidentiary item has the dual nature of legitimate evidence of an element and ille- gitimate evidence of character: "No mechanical solution is offered. The determination must be made whether the dan- ger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decision of this kind under 403." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 404, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 861. Thus the notes leave no question that when Rule 403 confers discretion by providing that evidence "may" be excluded, the discretionary judgment may be informed not only by assessing an evidentiary item's 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 185 Opinion of the Court twin tendencies, but by placing the result of that assessment alongside similar assessments of evidentiary alternatives. See 1 McCormick 782, and n. 41 (suggesting that Rule 403's "probative value" signifies the "marginal probative value" of the evidence relative to the other evidence in the case); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5250, pp. 546­547 (1978) ("The probative worth of any par- ticular bit of evidence is obviously affected by the scarcity or abundance of other evidence on the same point"). 2 In dealing with the specific problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and its prior-conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense gen- erally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. That risk will vary from case to case, for the reasons already given, but will be substantial whenever the official record offered by the Government would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning. Where a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious, and Old Chief sensibly worried that the prejudicial effect of his prior assault conviction, sig- nificant enough with respect to the current gun charges alone, would take on added weight from the related assault charge against him.8 8 It is true that a prior offense may be so far removed in time or nature from the current gun charge and any others brought with it that its poten- tial to prejudice the defendant unfairly will be minimal. Some prior of- fenses, in fact, may even have some potential to prejudice the Govern- ment's case unfairly. Thus an extremely old conviction for a relatively minor felony that nevertheless qualifies under the statute might strike many jurors as a foolish basis for convicting an otherwise upstanding member of the community of otherwise legal gun possession. Since the Government could not, of course, compel the defendant to admit formally the existence of the prior conviction, the Government would have to bear the risk of jury nullification, a fact that might properly drive the Govern- ment's charging decision. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 186 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court The District Court was also presented with alternative, relevant, admissible evidence of the prior conviction by Old Chief's offer to stipulate, evidence necessarily subject to the District Court's consideration on the motion to exclude the record offered by the Government. Although Old Chief's formal offer to stipulate was, strictly, to enter a formal agreement with the Government to be given to the jury, even without the Government's acceptance his proposal amounted to an offer to admit that the prior-conviction ele- ment was satisfied, and a defendant's admission is, of course, good evidence. See Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Old Chief's proffered admission would, in fact, have been not merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the element. The statutory language in which the prior- conviction requirement is couched shows no congressional concern with the specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the broad cate- gory of qualifying felonies, and Old Chief clearly meant to admit that his felony did qualify, by stipulating "that the Government has proven one of the essential elements of the offense." App. 7. As a consequence, although the name of the prior offense may have been technically relevant, it ad- dressed no detail in the definition of the prior-conviction ele- ment that would not have been covered by the stipulation or admission. Logic, then, seems to side with Old Chief. 3 There is, however, one more question to be considered be- fore deciding whether Old Chief's offer was to supply eviden- tiary value at least equivalent to what the Government's own evidence carried. In arguing that the stipulation or admis- sion would not have carried equivalent value, the Govern- ment invokes the familiar, standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 187 Opinion of the Court the Government chooses to present it. The authority usu- ally cited for this rule is Parr v. United States, 255 F. 2d 86 (CA5), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 824 (1958), in which the Fifth Circuit explained that the "reason for the rule is to permit a party `to present to the jury a picture of the events relied upon. To substitute for such a picture a naked admission might have the effect to rob the evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight.' " 255 F. 2d, at 88 (quoting Dunning v. Maine Central R. Co., 91 Me. 87, 39 A. 352, 356 (1897)). This is unquestionably true as a general matter. The "fair and legitimate weight" of conventional evidence showing in- dividual thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact that making a case with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive richness. Unlike an ab- stract premise, whose force depends on going precisely to a particular step in a course of reasoning, a piece of evidence may address any number of separate elements, striking hard just because it shows so much at once; the account of a shoot- ing that establishes capacity and causation may tell just as much about the triggerman's motive and intent. Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the will- ingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them. Jury duty is usually unsought and some- times resisted, and it may be as difficult for one juror sud- denly to face the findings that can send another human being to prison, as it is for another to hold out conscientiously for acquittal. When a juror's duty does seem hard, the eviden- tiary account of what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact but to establish its human signifi- 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 188 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court cance, and so to implicate the law's moral underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment. Thus, the prosecu- tion may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete ele- ments of a defendant's legal fault. Cf. United States v. Gil- liam, 994 F. 2d 97, 100­102 (CA2), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 927 (1993). But there is something even more to the prosecution's in- terest in resisting efforts to replace the evidence of its choice with admissions and stipulations, for beyond the power of conventional evidence to support allegations and give life to the moral underpinnings of law's claims, there lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors' ex- pectations about what proper proof should be. Some such demands they bring with them to the courthouse, assuming, for example, that a charge of using a firearm to commit an offense will be proven by introducing a gun in evidence. A prosecutor who fails to produce one, or some good reason for his failure, has something to be concerned about. "If [ju- rors'] expectations are not satisfied, triers of fact may penal- ize the party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against that party." Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1011, 1019 (1978) (footnotes omitted).9 Expectations may also arise in 9 Cf. Green, "The Whole Truth?": How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 699, 703 (1992) ("[E]videntiary rules . . . predicated in large measure on the law's distrust of juries [can] have the unintended, and perhaps ironic, result of encouraging the jury's distrust of lawyers. The rules do so by fostering the perception that lawyers are deliberately withholding evidence" (footnote omitted)). The fact that juries have expectations as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and may well hold the absence of that evidence against the party, is also recognized in the case law of the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 189 Opinion of the Court jurors' minds simply from the experience of a trial itself. The use of witnesses to describe a train of events naturally related can raise the prospect of learning about every ingre- dient of that natural sequence the same way. If suddenly the prosecution presents some occurrence in the series dif- ferently, as by announcing a stipulation or admission, the ef- fect may be like saying, "never mind what's behind the door," and jurors may well wonder what they are being kept from knowing. A party seemingly responsible for cloaking some- thing has reason for apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of proof may prudently demur at a defense re- quest to interrupt the flow of evidence telling the story in the usual way. In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away rests on good sense. A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it. People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstrac- tion may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story's truth can feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than they have heard. A convincing tale can be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative evidence, an as- surance that the missing link is really there is never more than second best. supposes that, despite the venerable history of the privilege against self- incrimination, jurors may not recall that someone accused of crime need not explain the evidence or avow innocence beyond making his plea. See, e. g., Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 340, and n. 10 (1978). The assump- tion that jurors may have contrary expectations and be moved to draw adverse inferences against the party who disappoints them undergirds the rule that a defendant can demand an instruction forbidding the jury to draw such an inference. 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 190 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 4 This recognition that the prosecution with its burden of persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story has, however, virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant's legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him. As in this case, the choice of evidence for such an element is usually not between eventful narrative and abstract proposition, but between propositions of slightly varying abstraction, either a record saying that conviction for some crime occurred at a certain time or a statement admitting the same thing with- out naming the particular offense. The issue of substituting one statement for the other normally arises only when the record of conviction would not be admissible for any purpose beyond proving status, so that excluding it would not de- prive the prosecution of evidence with multiple utility; if, indeed, there were a justification for receiving evidence of the nature of prior acts on some issue other than status (i. e., to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident," Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b)), Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek its admission. Nor can it be argued that the events behind the prior conviction are proper nourishment for the jurors' sense of obligation to vindicate the public interest. The issue is not whether concrete details of the prior crime should come to the jurors' attention but whether the name or general character of that crime is to be disclosed. Congress, however, has made it plain that distinctions among generic felonies do not count for this purpose; the fact of the qualify- ing conviction is alone what matters under the statute. "A defendant falls within the category simply by virtue of past conviction for any [qualifying] crime ranging from possession of short lobsters, see 16 U. S. C. § 3372, to the most aggra- vated murder." Tavares, 21 F. 3d, at 4. The most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defend- 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 191 Opinion of the Court ant falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from possessing a gun, and this point may be made readily in a defendant's admission and under- scored in the court's jury instructions. Finally, the most ob- vious reason that the general presumption that the prosecu- tion may choose its evidence is so remote from application here is that proof of the defendant's status goes to an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to commit the current offense. Proving status without telling exactly why that status was imposed leaves no gap in the story of a defend- ant's subsequent criminality, and its demonstration by stip- ulation or admission neither displaces a chapter from a con- tinuous sequence of conventional evidence nor comes across as an officious substitution, to confuse or offend or provoke reproach. Given these peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by the risk in- herent in the one and wholly absent from the other. In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available.10 What we have said shows why this will be 10 There may be yet other means of proof besides a formal admission on the record that, with a proper objection, will obligate a district court to exclude evidence of the name of the offense. A redacted record of con- viction is the one most frequently mentioned. Any alternative will, of 519US1$13M 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 192 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES O'Connor, J., dissenting the general rule when proof of convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor's choice will generally survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for which he is being tried. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.11 It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. The Court today announces a rule that misapplies Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and upsets, without explanation, longstanding precedent regarding criminal prosecutions. I do not agree that the Government's introduction of evi- dence that reveals the name and basic nature of a defendant's prior felony conviction in a prosecution brought under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) "unfairly" prejudices the defendant within the meaning of Rule 403. Nor do I agree with the Court's newly minted rule that a defendant charged with violating course, require some jury instruction to explain it (just as it will require some discretion when the indictment is read). A redacted judgment in this case, for example, would presumably have revealed to the jury that Old Chief was previously convicted in federal court and sentenced to more than a year's imprisonment, but it would not have shown whether his previous conviction was for one of the business offenses that do not count, under § 921(a)(20). Hence, an instruction, with the defendant's consent, would be necessary to make clear that the redacted judgment was enough to satisfy the status element remaining in the case. The Government might, indeed, propose such a redacted judgment for the trial court to weigh against a defendant's offer to admit, as indeed the Government might do even if the defendant's admission had been received into evidence. 11 In remanding, we imply no opinion on the possibility of harmless error, an issue not passed upon below. 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 193 O'Connor, J., dissenting § 922(g)(1) can force the Government to accept his concession to the prior conviction element of that offense, thereby pre- cluding the Government from offering evidence on this point. I therefore dissent. I Rule 403 provides that a district court may exclude rele- vant evidence if, among other things, "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Certainly, Rule 403 does not permit the court to exclude the Government's evidence simply because it may hurt the de- fendant. As a threshold matter, evidence is excludable only if it is "unfairly" prejudicial, in that it has "an undue tend- ency to suggest decision on an improper basis." Advisory Committee's Note on Fed. Rule Evid. 403, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 860; see, e. g., United States v. Munoz, 36 F. 3d 1229, 1233 (CA1 1994) ("The damage done to the defense is not a basis for exclusion; the question under Rule 403 is `one of "unfair" prejudice-not of prejudice alone' ") (citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Martinez v. United States, 513 U. S. 1179 (1995); Dollar v. Long Mfg., N. C., Inc., 561 F. 2d 613, 618 (CA5 1977) (" `[U]nfair prejudice' as used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party. Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't mate- rial. The prejudice must be `unfair' "), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 996 (1978). The evidence tendered by the Government in this case-the order reflecting petitioner's prior convic- tion and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily in- jury, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1153 and 18 U. S. C. § 113(f) (1988 ed.)-directly proved a necessary element of the § 922(g)(1) offense, that is, that petitioner had committed a crime covered by § 921(a)(20). Perhaps petitioner's case was damaged when the jury discovered that he previously had committed a felony and heard the name of his crime. But I cannot agree with the Court that it was unfairly prejudi- cial for the Government to establish an essential element 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 194 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES O'Connor, J., dissenting of its case against petitioner with direct proof of his prior conviction. The structure of § 922(g)(1) itself shows that Congress en- visioned jurors' learning the name and basic nature of the defendant's prior offense. Congress enacted § 922(g)(1) to prohibit the possession of a firearm by any person convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." Section 922(g)(1) does not merely prohibit the possession of firearms by "felons," nor does it apply to all prior felony convictions. Rather, the statute excludes from § 922(g)(1)'s coverage certain business crimes and state mis- demeanors punishable by imprisonment of two years or less. § 921(a)(20). Within the meaning of § 922(g)(1), then, "a crime" is not an abstract or metaphysical concept. Rather, the Government must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime. In short, under § 922(g)(1), a defendant's prior felony conviction connotes not only that he is a prior felon, but also that he has engaged in specific past criminal conduct. Even more fundamentally, in our system of justice, a per- son is not simply convicted of "a crime" or "a felony." Rather, he is found guilty of a specified offense, almost al- ways because he violated a specific statutory prohibition. For example, in the words of the order that the Government offered to prove petitioner's prior conviction in this case, petitioner "did knowingly and unlawfully assault Rory Dean Fenner, said assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 1153 and 113(f)." App. 18. That a variety of crimes would have satisfied the prior con- viction element of the § 922(g)(1) offense does not detract from the fact that petitioner committed a specific offense. The name and basic nature of petitioner's crime are insepara- ble from the fact of his earlier conviction and were therefore admissible to prove petitioner's guilt. The principle is illustrated by the evidence that was ad- mitted at petitioner's trial to prove the other element of the 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 195 O'Connor, J., dissenting § 922(g)(1) offense-possession of a "firearm." The Gov- ernment submitted evidence showing that petitioner pos- sessed a 9-mm. semiautomatic pistol. Although petitioner's possession of any number of weapons would have satisfied the requirements of § 922(g)(1), obviously the Government was entitled to prove with specific evidence that petitioner possessed the weapon he did. In the same vein, consider a murder case. Surely the Government can submit proof establishing the victim's identity, even though, strictly speaking, the jury has no "need" to know the victim's name, and even though the victim might be a particularly well loved public figure. The same logic should govern proof of the prior conviction element of the § 922(g)(1) offense. That is, the Government ought to be able to prove, with specific evidence, that petitioner committed a crime that came within § 922(g)(1)'s coverage. The Court never explains precisely why it constitutes "un- fair" prejudice for the Government to directly prove an es- sential element of the § 922(g)(1) offense with evidence that reveals the name or basic nature of the defendant's prior conviction. It simply notes that such evidence may lead a jury to conclude that the defendant has a propensity to com- mit crime, thereby raising the odds that the jury would find that he committed the crime with which he is currently charged. With a nod to the part of Rule 404(b) that says "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith," the Court writes: "There is, accordingly, no question that propensity would be an `improper basis' for conviction and that evi- dence of a prior conviction is subject to analysis under Rule 403 for relative probative value and for prejudicial risk of misuse as propensity evidence." Ante, at 182. A few pages later, it leaps to the conclusion that there can be "no question that evidence of the name or nature of the 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 196 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES O'Connor, J., dissenting prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant." Ante, at 185. Yes, to be sure, Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." But Rule 404(b) does not end there. It ex- pressly contemplates the admission of evidence of prior crimes for other purposes, "such as proof of motive, opportu- nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab- sence of mistake or accident." The list is plainly not exhaus- tive, and where, as here, a prior conviction is an element of the charged offense, neither Rule 404(b) nor Rule 403 can bar its admission. The reason is simple: In a prosecution brought under § 922(g)(1), the Government does not submit evidence of a past crime to prove the defendant's bad charac- ter or to "show action in conformity therewith." It tenders the evidence as direct proof of a necessary element of the offense with which it has charged the defendant. To say, as the Court does, that it "unfairly" prejudices the defendant for the Government to establish its § 922(g)(1) case with evi- dence showing that, in fact, the defendant did commit a prior offense misreads the Rules of Evidence and defies common sense. Any incremental harm resulting from proving the name or basic nature of the prior felony can be properly mitigated by limiting jury instructions. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 provides that when evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not another, "the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accord- ingly." Indeed, on petitioner's own motion in this case, the District Court instructed the jury that it was not to " `con- sider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is now on trial.' " Brief for United States 32. The jury is presumed to have followed this cau- tionary instruction, see Shannon v. United States, 512 U. S. 573, 585 (1994), and the instruction offset whatever prejudice 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 197 O'Connor, J., dissenting might have arisen from the introduction of petitioner's prior conviction. II The Court also holds that, if a defendant charged with violating § 922(g)(1) concedes his prior felony conviction, a district court abuses its discretion if it admits evidence of the defendant's prior crime that raises the risk of a ver- dict "tainted by improper considerations." See ante, at 174. Left unexplained is what, exactly, it was about the order introduced by the Government at trial that might cause a jury to decide the case improperly. The order offered into evidence (which the Court nowhere in its opinion sets out) stated, in relevant part: "And the defendant having been convicted on his plea of guilty of the offense charged in Count II of the indict- ment in the above-entitled cause, to-wit: That on or about the 18th day of December 1988, at Browning, in the State and District of Montana, and on and within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, being Indian country, JOHNNY LYNN OLD CHIEF, an Indian person, did knowingly and unlawfully assault Rory Dean Fenner, said assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 1153 and 113(f)." App. 18. The order went on to say that petitioner was sentenced for a term of 60 months' imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release. Why, precisely, does the Court think that this item of evi- dence raises the risk of a verdict "tainted by improper con- siderations"? Is it because the jury might learn that peti- tioner assaulted someone and caused serious bodily injury? If this is what the Court means, would evidence that peti- tioner had committed some other felony be admissible, and if so, what sort of crime might that be? Or does the Court object to the order because it gave a few specifics about the 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 198 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES O'Connor, J., dissenting assault, such as the date, the location, and the victim's name? Or perhaps the Court finds that introducing the order risks a verdict "tainted by improper considerations" simply be- cause the § 922(g)(1) charge was joined with counts charging petitioner with using a firearm in relation to a crime of vio- lence, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c), and with committing an assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1153 and 18 U. S. C. § 113(c) (1988 ed.)? Under the Court's nebulous standard for admission of prior felony evi- dence in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, these are open questions. More troubling still is the Court's retreat from the funda- mental principle that in a criminal prosecution the Govern- ment may prove its case as it sees fit. The Court reasons that, in general, a defendant may not stipulate away an ele- ment of a charged offense because, in the usual case, "the prosecution with its burden of persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story." Ante, at 190. The rule has, however, "virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant's legal status, dependent on some judg- ment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him." Ibid. Thus, concludes the Court, there is no real difference be- tween the "evidentiary significance" of a defendant's conces- sion and that of the Government's proof of the prior felony with the order of conviction. Ante, at 191. Since the Gov- ernment's method of proof was more prejudicial than peti- tioner's admission, it follows that the District Court should not have admitted the order reflecting his conviction when petitioner had conceded that element of the offense. Ibid. On its own terms, the argument does not hold together. A jury is as likely to be puzzled by the "missing chapter" resulting from a defendant's stipulation to his prior felony conviction as it would be by the defendant's conceding any other element of the crime. The jury may wonder why it has not been told the name of the crime, or it may question why the defendant's firearm possession was illegal, given the 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 199 O'Connor, J., dissenting tradition of lawful gun ownership in this country, see Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 610­612 (1994). " `Doubt as to the criminality of [the defendant's] conduct may influ- ence the jury when it considers the possession element.' " United States v. Barker, 1 F. 3d 957, 960 (1993) (quoting United States v. Collamore, 868 F. 2d 24, 28 (CA1 1989)), modified, 20 F. 3d 365 (CA9 1994). Second, the Court misapprehends why "it has never been seriously suggested that [a defendant] can . . . compel the Government to try the case by stipulation." Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 35 (1965). It may well be that the prosecution needs "evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story" in order to prove its case in a way a jury will accept. Ante, at 190. But that is by no means the only or the most important reason that a defendant may not oblige the Gov- ernment to accept his concession to an element of the charged offense. The Constitution requires a criminal con- viction to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime of which he is charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 510 (1995) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 277 (1993)); see also Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 156 (1979) ("[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's re- sponsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt"). "A simple plea of not guilty, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, puts the prosecution to its proof as to all elements of the crime charged . . . ." Mathews v. United States, 485 U. S. 58, 64­65 (1988). Further, a defendant's tactical decision not to con- test an essential element of the crime does not remove the prosecution's burden to prove that element. Estelle v. Mc- Guire, 502 U. S. 62, 69 (1991). At trial, a defendant may thus choose to contest the Government's proof on every ele- ment; or he may concede some elements and contest others; 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT 200 OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES O'Connor, J., dissenting or he may do nothing at all. Whatever his choice, the Gov- ernment still carries the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each element. It follows from these principles that a defendant's stipula- tion to an element of an offense does not remove that element from the jury's consideration. The usual instruction regard- ing stipulations in a criminal case reflects as much: "When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as to the exist- ence of a fact, you may accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved. You are not required to do so, however, since you are the sole judge of the facts." 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff, & K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 12.03, p. 333 (4th ed. 1992). Ob- viously, we are not dealing with a stipulation here. A stipu- lation is an agreement, and no agreement was reached be- tween petitioner and the Government in this case. Does the Court think a different rule applies when the defendant at- tempts to stipulate, over the Government's objection, to an element of the charged offense? If so, that runs counter to the Constitution: The Government must prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361 (1970), and the defendant's strate- gic decision to "agree" that the Government need not prove an element cannot relieve the Government of its burden, see Estelle, supra, at 69­70. Because the Government bears the burden of proof on every element of a charged offense, it must be accorded substantial leeway to submit evidence of its choosing to prove its case. Also overlooked by the Court is the fact that, in "conced- ing" that he has a prior felony conviction, a defendant may be trying to take the issue from the jury altogether by effec- tively entering a partial plea of guilty, something we have never before endorsed. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) does not permit a defendant to waive a jury trial unless the Government consents, and we have upheld the provision as constitutional. Singer, supra, at 37. "The Constitution 519US1$13J 06-02-99 18:45:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 172 (1997) 201 O'Connor, J., dissenting recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of de- termining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a le- gitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair re- sult." 380 U. S., at 36. A defendant who concedes the prior conviction element of the § 922(g)(1) offense may be effec- tively trying to waive his right to a jury trial on that ele- ment. Unless the Government agrees to this waiver, it runs afoul of Rule 23(a) and Singer. III The Court manufactures a new rule that, in a § 922(g)(1) case, a defendant can force the Government to accept his admission to the prior felony conviction element of the of- fense, thereby precluding the Government from offering evi- dence to directly prove a necessary element of its case. I cannot agree that it "unfairly" prejudices a defendant for the Government to prove his prior conviction with evidence that reveals the name or basic nature of his past crime. Like it or not, Congress chose to make a defendant's prior criminal conviction one of the two elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense. Moreover, crimes have names; a defendant is not convicted of some indeterminate, unspecified "crime." Nor do I think that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 can be read to obviate the well accepted principle, grounded in both the Constitution and in our precedent, that the Government may not be forced to accept a defendant's concession to an element of a charged offense as proof of that element. I respectfully dissent. 519us2$14Z 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT 202 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 95­259. Argued November 6, 1996-Decided January 14, 1997* In 1990, petitioner Walters was fired by respondent Metropolitan Educa- tional Enterprises, Inc., soon after she filed an employment discrimina- tion charge against it under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Petitioner Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Metropolitan, alleging that the firing violated Title VII's antiretaliation provision. After Walters intervened, Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not an "employer" covered by Title VII because, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it was not "a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). The par- ties have stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989; that, during most of 1990, it had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; and that, during 1990, there were only nine weeks in which it was actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day. The District Court dismissed the case, relying on Circuit precedent to the effect that employees may be counted for § 2000e(b) purposes only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Held: The ultimate touchstone under § 2000e(b) is whether an em- ployer has employment relationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question. Pp. 205­212. (a) The "payroll method"-which looks to whether the employer has an employment relationship with the employee on the day in question, as is most readily demonstrated by the individual's appearance on the employer's payroll-represents the fair reading of the statutory lan- guage. That method embodies the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of "has [an] employe[e]." While the phrase "for each working *Together with No. 95­779, Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- sion v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., et al., also on certio- rari to the same court. 519us2$14Z 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 202 (1997) 203 Syllabus day" suggests the possibility of a test based on whether an employee is actually at work on a given day, such a test would be impossible to administer and reflects an improbable reading of the statute. The method advocated by Metropolitan, which focuses on whether an em- ployer is compensating the employee on the day in question, is not a plausible reading of the statutory criterion of whether the employer "has" the employee. Pp. 206­208. (b) The payroll approach does not render superfluous the statutory qualification "for each working day." Without this phrase, one would not be sure whether to count part-week employees toward the statutory minimum. Nor is it dispositive that the payroll method produces some strange consequences with regard to Title VII's coverage, since Metro- politan's approach produces unique peculiarities of its own. The latter approach would also turn the coverage determination into an incredibly complex and expensive factual inquiry, whereas, under the payroll method, all one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether he started or ended employment during that year and, if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure. Pp. 208­211. (c) Under the payroll method, Metropolitan was an "employer" for purposes of petitioners' retaliatory-discharge claim. Pp. 211­212. 60 F. 3d 1225, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Constantine John Gekas argued the cause for petitioner in No. 95­259. With him on the briefs was Adrianne S. Harvitt. Deputy Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 95­779. On the briefs were Solic- itor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, As- sistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Beth S. Brinkmann, C. Gregory Stewart, Gwen- dolyn Young Reams, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and C. Gregory Stewart. Patrick J. Falahee, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jona- than P. Hiatt, Marsha S. Berzon, Virginia A. Seitz, and Laurence Gold; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by Lawrence J. 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT 204 WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN ED. ENTERPRISES, INC. Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to any employer who "has fifteen or more employees for each work- ing day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). These cases present the question whether an employer "has" an employee on any working day on which the employer maintains an employ- ment relationship with the employee, or only on working days on which the employee is actually receiving compen- sation from the employer. I Petitioner Darlene Walters was employed by respondent Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., a retail distribu- tor of encyclopedias, dictionaries, and other educational materials. In 1990, she filed a charge with the Equal Em- ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that Metropolitan had discriminated against her on account of her sex in failing to promote her to the position of credit man- ager. Soon after that, Metropolitan fired her. On April 7, 1993, petitioner EEOC filed suit against Metro- politan and its owner, respondent Leonard Bieber (here- inafter collectively Metropolitan), alleging that the firing constituted unlawful retaliation. Walters intervened in the suit. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that the company did not pass the 15-employee threshold for coverage under Title VII. Latto, Herbert J. Hansell, Paul C. Saunders, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, and Teresa A. Ferrante; and for the Women's Legal Defense Fund et al. by Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, and Helen L. Norton. Donald J. McNeil and Mona C. Zeiberg filed a brief for the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Sharon L. Browne filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae. 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 202 (1997) 205 Opinion of the Court The District Court granted Metropolitan's motion to dis- miss, 864 F. Supp. 71 (ND Ill. 1994), relying on Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F. 2d 347, 354 (CA7 1983), which affirmed a District Court's decision to count employees toward the 15-employee threshold only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence. On appeal from the District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Zimmerman. 60 F. 3d 1225 (CA7 1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1171 (1996). II Petitioners' suit rests on Title VII's antiretaliation provi- sion, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­3(a), which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of its employees for filing complaints of discrimination. Metropolitan was sub- ject to Title VII, however, only if, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it met the statutory definition of "employer," to wit: "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." § 2000e(b). Metropolitan's "working days" are Monday through Fri- day, and the "current" and "preceding" calendar years for purposes of the retaliatory-discharge claim are 1990 and 1989. The parties have stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989. During most of 1990, Metropolitan had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; but in only nine weeks of the year was it actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day (including paid leave as compensation). The difference resulted from the fact that Metropolitan had two part-time hourly employees who ordinarily skipped one working day each week.* *Walters (but not the EEOC) alleged that, in addition to violating Title VII's antiretaliation provision, Metropolitan also violated the basic antidis- crimination provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a), by failing to promote her to 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT 206 WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN ED. ENTERPRISES, INC. Opinion of the Court A The parties agree that, on any particular day, all of the individuals with whom an employer has an employment rela- tionship are "employees" of that employer. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(f) (defining "employee" to mean "an individual em- ployed by an employer"). Thus, individuals who are not receiving compensation from their employer on the day in question nonetheless qualify as "employees" on that day for purposes of § 2000e(b)'s definition of "employer." Respond- ents contend, however, and the Seventh Circuit held here, that an employer "has" an employee for a particular working day within the meaning of § 2000e(b) only when he is actually compensating the individual on that day. This position has also been adopted by the Eighth Circuit. See EEOC v. Gar- den & Associates, Ltd., 956 F. 2d 842, 843 (1992). Petitioners contend that the test for when an employer "has" an employee is no different from the test for when an individual is an employee: whether the employer has an employment relationship with the individual on the day in question. This test is generally called the "payroll method," since the employment relationship is most readily demon- strated by the individual's appearance on the employer's pay- roll. The payroll method was approved in dictum by the Fifth Circuit in Dumas v. Mount Vernon, 612 F. 2d 974, 979, n. 7 (1980), and was adopted by the First Circuit in Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F. 2d 633, 634­635 (1983), cert. de- nied, 466 U. S. 904 (1984); see also Vera-Lozano v. Inter- national Broadcasting, 50 F. 3d 67, 69­70 (CA1 1995) (re- credit manager in September 1989. In granting Metropolitan's motion to dismiss, the District Court stated that the relevant years for determining Metropolitan's status as an employer were 1989 and 1990. 864 F. Supp. 71, 72 (ND Ill. 1994). For purposes of Walters' discrimination claim, however, the relevant years were 1988 and 1989. Because Walters did not mention this issue in her petition for certiorari or her brief on the merits, we treat any objection to the District Court's disposition of the matter as waived. 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 202 (1997) 207 Opinion of the Court affirming Thurber). The payroll method has also been adopted by the EEOC under the Age Discrimination in Em- ployment Act of 1967, which defines "employer" in precisely the way Title VII does. See 29 U. S. C. § 630(b); Equal Em- ployment Opportunity Commission Notice No. N­915­052, Policy Guidance: Whether Part-Time Employees Are Em- ployees (Apr. 1990), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a­ 40a (hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance). The Department of Labor has likewise adopted the payroll method under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which defines "em- ployer" as a person who "employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work- weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See 29 U. S. C. § 2611(4)(A)(i); 29 CFR §§ 825.105(b)­(d) (1996). In its administration of Title VII, the EEOC has expressed a preference for the payroll method, see EEOC Policy Guid- ance, but it lacks rulemaking authority over the issue, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­12(a); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257 (1991). We think that the payroll method represents the fair read- ing of the statutory language, which sets as the criterion the number of employees that the employer "has" for each work- ing day. In the absence of an indication to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their "ordinary, con- temporary, common meaning." Pioneer Investment Serv- ices Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380, 388 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omit- ted). In common parlance, an employer "has" an employee if he maintains an employment relationship with that indi- vidual. See 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1198 (1993) (def. 2: defining "have" to mean to "[p]ossess in a certain relationship"); American Heritage Dictionary 828 (3d ed. 1992) (def. 2: defining "have" to mean "to occupy a partic- ular relation to"; giving as an example "had a great many disciples"); Webster's New International Dictionary 1145 (2d ed. 1950) (def. 2: defining "have" to mean "[t]o possess, as 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:01 PAGES OPINPGT 208 WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN ED. ENTERPRISES, INC. Opinion of the Court something which appertains to, is connected with, or affects, one"; giving as an example "to have an ungrateful son"). Metropolitan contends that if one were asked how many employees he had for a given working day, he would give as the answer the number of employees who were actually performing work on that day. That is possibly so. Lan- guage is a subtle enough thing that the phrase "have an em- ployee for a given working day" (as opposed to "have an employee on a given day") may be thought to convey the idea that the employee must actually be working on the day in question. But no one before us urges that interpretation of the language, which would count even salaried employees only on days that they are actually working. Such a disposi- tion is so improbable and so impossible to administer (few employers keep daily attendance records of all their salaried employees) that Congress should be thought to have pre- scribed it only if the language could bear no other meaning. Metropolitan's own proposed test does not focus on the ques- tion, "How many employees did you have at work on a partic- ular working day?" but rather the question, "How many employees were you compensating on that day?" That question, unlike the other one, simply cannot be derived from any possible reading of the text. B The Court of Appeals rejected the straightforward mean- ing of "has fifteen or more employees" in § 2000e(b) because of a different supposed consequence of the added statu- tory qualification "for each working day." In its view, if only the employment relationship were the intended focus, the statute would simply have required the employer to "ha[ve] fifteen or more employees . . . in each of twenty or more calendar weeks," without the further refinement "for each working day" of each of those weeks. This point would have some force (though it would still not produce the Court of Appeals' focus on the number of employees being compen- 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 202 (1997) 209 Opinion of the Court sated on a particular day) if indeed the ordinary meaning of "has fifteen or more employees" rendered "for each working day" superfluous. Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect. United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538­539 (1955). But we do not agree that giving "has fifteen or more employees" its ordi- nary meaning renders "for each working day" superfluous. Without that qualification, it would be unclear whether an employee who departed in the middle of a calendar week would count toward the 15-employee minimum for that week; with the qualification, it is clear that he does not. Similarly, the adjective "working" within the phrase "for each working day" eliminates any ambiguity about whether employees who depart after the end of the workweek, but before the end of the calendar week, count toward the 15-employee min- imum for that week. The Court of Appeals thought that the mere exclusion of part-week employees was an improbable purpose of the phrase. "[I]nstances where employees begin work on Wednesdays or depart on Thursdays," it said, "are unlikely to occur with sufficient frequency to merit inclusion in a fed- eral anti-discrimination statute." 60 F. 3d, at 1228. But it is not a matter of carving out special treatment for this (sup- posedly minuscule) class-as would be the case if, without the phrase "for each working day," part-week employees would unquestionably be counted toward the statutory mini- mum. Without the phrase one would not be sure whether to count them or not, and in at least some cases the matter would have to be litigated. (Does a company have 15 em- ployees "in" a week where, on all except the last workday, it has only 14? "In" a week where it hires a new employee on Saturday, a nonworkday, to begin on the next Monday? "In" a week where, in mid-week, one of 14 employees quits and is replaced by a different 14th employee?) We are decidedly of the view that the "mere" elimination of evident ambiguity is ample-indeed, admirable-justification for the inclusion 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:02 PAGES OPINPGT 210 WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN ED. ENTERPRISES, INC. Opinion of the Court of a statutory phrase; and that purpose alone is enough to "merit" enactment of the phrase at issue here. Moreover, the phenomenon of midweek commencement and termination of employment seems to us not as rare as the Court of Ap- peals believed. For many businesses payday, and hence hiring- and firing-day, is the end of the month rather than the end of the week. Metropolitan itself experienced 10 midweek arrivals or departures from its roughly 15- employee work force during 1990. Brief for Petitioner in No. 95­259, pp. 10­11. Metropolitan points out that the interpretation we adopt produces some strange consequences with regard to the cov- erage of Title VII. For example, an employee who works irregular hours, perhaps only a few days a month, will be counted toward the 15-employee minimum for every week in the month. Metropolitan's approach reduces this problem (though it does not eliminate it entirely): The employee will be counted so long as he works one hour each day of the workweek. On the other hand, Metropolitan's approach pro- duces unique peculiarities of its own: A company that has 15 employees working for it on each day of a 5-day workweek is covered, but if it decides to add Saturday to its workweek with only one less than its full complement of employees, it will become exempt from coverage (despite being in fact a "larger" business). Unsalaried employees who work the same number of hours per week are counted or not counted, depending on how their hours are scheduled. A half-time worker who works only mornings is counted; a half-time worker who works alternate days is not. The fact is that neither interpretation of the coverage provision can cause it to be an entirely accurate measure of the size of a business. In any event, Metropolitan ought to be reluctant to appeal to practical consequences as the basis for deciding the ques- tion before us. The approach it suggests would turn the coverage determination into an incredibly complex and ex- pensive factual inquiry. Applying it in the present cases re- 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 202 (1997) 211 Opinion of the Court quired the parties to spend 10 months poring over Metropoli- tan's payroll registers, timecards, work diaries, and other timekeeping records to determine, for each working day of a 2-year period, how many employees were at work, how many were being paid on salaries, how many were on paid holiday leave, how many were on paid vacation leave, and how many were on paid sick leave. For an employer with 15 employees and a 5-day workweek, the number of daily working histories for the 2-year period is 7,800. The problems with Metropoli- tan's compensation-based approach are magnified when em- ployees are "compensated" on days off in ways less clear cut than holiday, vacation, or sick leave. If, for example, em- ployees accumulate seniority rights or entitlements to holi- day bonuses on their unpaid days off, it would be necessary to determine (or litigate) whether they are "receiving com- pensation" on those days for purposes of the coverage deter- mination. Under the interpretation we adopt, by contrast, all one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether the employee started or ended employment during that year and, if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure. III As we have described, in determining the existence of an employment relationship, petitioners look first and primarily to whether the individual in question appears on the employ- er's payroll. Metropolitan did not challenge this aspect of petitioners' approach; its objection was the more basic one that existence of an employment relationship was not the criterion. For their part, petitioners emphasize that what is ultimately critical under their method is the existence of an employment relationship, not appearance on the payroll; an individual who appears on the payroll but is not an "em- ployee" under traditional principles of agency law, see, e. g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 323­324 (1992), would not count toward the 15-employee minimum. 519us2$14K 04-15-98 09:03:02 PAGES OPINPGT 212 WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN ED. ENTERPRISES, INC. Opinion of the Court We agree with petitioners that the ultimate touchstone under § 2000e(b) is whether an employer has employment re- lationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question. The parties' stipulation concerning the number of weeks in 1990 during which Metropolitan satisfied the 15-employee threshold using the payroll approach does not correspond precisely to the counting method petitioners have advocated here. The stipulation was arrived at by counting the num- ber of employees on the payroll in each week of 1990, without regard to whether these employees were employed on each working day of the week. However, subtracting the nine weeks in which Metropolitan experienced midweek employ- ment changes in 1990 from the 47 weeks of that year in which, according to the parties' stipulation, Metropolitan had employment relationships with 15 or more employees, leaves 38 weeks in which Metropolitan satisfied the 15-employee threshold under the interpretation we adopt. Therefore, Metropolitan was an "employer" within the meaning of § 2000e(b) for purposes of petitioners' retaliatory-discharge claim. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 519us2$15Z 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 213 Syllabus ATHERTON v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver for CITY SAVINGS, F. S. B. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 95­928. Argued November 4, 1996-Decided January 14, 1997 After City Federal Savings Bank, a federally chartered, federally insured savings association, went into receivership, the Resolution Trust Corpo- ration (RTC), which has since been replaced as receiver by respondent Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), brought this action in City Federal's name against several of its officers and directors, claiming that they had acted (or failed to act) in ways that led City Federal to make bad loans, and that these actions (or omissions) were unlawful because they amounted to gross negligence, simple negligence, and breaches of fiduciary duty. The defendants moved to dismiss under 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k), which states, in relevant part: "A director or officer of [a federally insured bank] may be held personally liable for monetary damages in any [RTC-initiated] civil action . . . for gross negligence [or] similar conduct . . . that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) . . . . Nothing in this paragraph shall im- pair or affect any right of the [RTC] under other applicable law." (Em- phasis added.) In dismissing all but the gross negligence claims, the District Court agreed with the defendants that, by authorizing actions for gross negligence or more seriously culpable conduct, the statute intended to forbid actions based upon less seriously culpable conduct, such as simple negligence. Reversing, the Third Circuit interpreted § 1821(k) as simply offering a safeguard against state legislation that had watered down applicable state standards of care-below a gross negligence benchmark. As so interpreted, the statute did not prohibit actions resting upon stricter standard of care rules-whether originat- ing in state law (which the Circuit found applicable to state-chartered banks) or in federal common law (which the Circuit found applicable to federally chartered banks). Noting City Federal's federal charter, the Circuit concluded that the Government could pursue any claims for neg- ligence or breach of fiduciary duty available as a matter of federal com- mon law. Held: State law sets the standard of conduct for officers and directors of federally insured savings institutions as long as the state standard (such as simple negligence) is stricter than that of § 1821(k). The federal 519us2$15Z 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 214 ATHERTON v. FDIC Syllabus statute nonetheless sets a "gross negligence" floor, which applies as a substitute for state standards that are more relaxed. Pp. 217­231. (a) There is no federal common law that would create a general standard of care applicable to this case absent § 1821(k). The federal common-law corporate governance standard enunciated in cases such as Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, applied to federally chartered banks, but does not survive this Court's later decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tomp- kins, 304 U. S. 64, 78. Normally, a federal court may fashion federal common-law rules only upon a specific showing that the use of state law will create a significant conflict with, or threat to, some federal policy or interest. See, e. g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U. S. 79, 87. The basic arguments that the FDIC implicitly or explicitly raises-(1) its invocation of the need for "uniformity" in fiduciary responsibility standards for federally chartered banks; (2) its suggestion that a federal common-law standard must be applied simply because the banks in question are federally chartered; (3) its analogy to the conflict of laws "internal affairs doctrine" to support its contention that courts should look to federal law to find the applicable standard of care; and (4) its reliance on federal Office of Thrift Supervision opinions applying the Briggs standard to federal savings bank directors and officers-do not point to a significant conflict with, or threat to, a federal interest that would be caused by the application of state-law standards of care. The Court notes that here, as in O'Melveny, the FDIC is acting only as a receiver of a failed institution; it is not pursuing the Government's inter- est as a bank insurer-an interest likely present whether the insured institution is state, or federally, chartered. The federal need here is far weaker than was present in the few and restricted instances in which this Court has created a federal common law. Thus, state law (except as modified by § 1821(k)) provides the applicable rules for decision. Pp. 217­226. (b) Section 1821(k)'s "gross negligence" standard provides only a floor; it does not stand in the way of a stricter state-law standard mak- ing directors and officers liable for conduct, such as simple negligence, that is less culpable than gross negligence. For one thing, the statutory saving clause's language, read literally, preserves the applicability of stricter state standards when it says that "[n]othing [here]in . . . shall impair . . . any [RTC] right . . . under other applicable law." (Emphasis added.) For another, § 1821(k)'s background as a whole-its enactment at a time of failing savings associations, large federal payments to in- sured bank depositors, and recent state-law changes designed to limit pre-existing officer and director negligence liability-supports a reading of the statute as an effort to preserve the Government's ability to re- cover federal insurance funds by creating a standard of care floor. The 519us2$15Z 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 215 Opinion of the Court legislative history, insofar as it is relevant, supports this conclusion. The petitioner's argument that § 1821(k) displaces federal common law by applying a uniform "gross negligence" standard for federally char- tered, but not state-chartered, savings banks fails in light of the stat- ute's language and history, this Court's conclusion that federal common law is inapplicable, and the fact that Congress did not separate its con- sideration of the two types of institutions. Pp. 226­231. 57 F. 3d 1231, vacated and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined, except to the extent the opinion relies on legislative history. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 231. Ronald W. Stevens argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gilbert C. Miller and Bruce H. Nielson. Richard P. Bress argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Jack D. Smith, Ann S. DuRoss, and Jerome A. Madden.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) sued several of- ficers and directors of City Federal Savings Bank, claiming that they had violated the legal standard of care they owed that federally chartered, federally insured institution. The case here focuses upon the legal standard for determining whether or not their behavior was improper. It asks where courts should look to find the standard of care to measure the legal propriety of the defendants' conduct-to state law, *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, Richard M. Whiting, and Leonard J. Rubin; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Reuben B. Robertson III, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar; and for Joseph Iaria et al. by Douglas S. Eakeley and Alan S. Naar. 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 216 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court to federal common law, or to a special federal statute (103 Stat. 243, 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k)) that speaks of "gross negligence"? We conclude that state law sets the standard of conduct as long as the state standard (such as simple negligence) is stricter than that of the federal statute. The federal statute nonetheless sets a "gross negligence" floor, which applies as a substitute for state standards that are more relaxed. I In 1989, City Federal Savings Bank (City Federal), a fed- eral savings association, went into receivership. The RTC, as receiver, brought this action in the bank's name against officers and directors. (Throughout this opinion, we use the more colloquial term "bank" to refer to a variety of institu- tions such as "federal savings associations.") The complaint said that the defendants had acted (or failed to act) in ways that led City Federal to make various bad development, construction, and business acquisition loans. It claimed that these actions (or omissions) were unlawful because they amounted to gross negligence, simple negligence, and breaches of fiduciary duty. The defendants moved to dismiss. They pointed to a fed- eral statute, 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k), that says in part that a "director or officer" of a federally insured bank "may be held personally liable for monetary damages" in an RTC-initiated "civil action . . . for gross negligence" or "similar conduct . . . that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) . . . ." (Emphasis added.) They argued that, by authorizing actions for gross negligence or more seriously culpable conduct, the statute intended to forbid actions based upon less seriously culpable conduct, such as conduct that rose only to the level of simple negligence. The District Court agreed and dismissed all but the gross negli- gence claims. 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 217 Opinion of the Court The Third Circuit, providing an interlocutory appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), reversed. It interpreted the federal stat- ute as simply offering a safeguard against state legislation that had watered down applicable state standards of care- below a gross negligence benchmark. As so interpreted, the statute did not prohibit actions resting upon stricter stand- ard of care rules-whether those stricter standard of care rules originated in state law (which the Circuit found ap- plicable in the case of state-chartered banks) or in federal common law (which the Circuit found applicable in the case of federally chartered banks). Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp., 57 F. 3d 1231, 1243­1244, 1245­1249 (1995). Noting that City Federal is a federally chartered savings institution, the Circuit concluded that the RTC was free "to pursue any claims for negligence or breach of fidu- ciary duty available as a matter of federal common law." Id., at 1249. The defendants, pointing to variations in the Circuits' in- terpretations of the "gross negligence" statute, sought cer- tiorari. Compare Resolution Trust Corp. v. Frates, 52 F. 3d 295 (CA10 1995) (§ 1821(k) prohibits federal common-law ac- tions for simple negligence), with Cityfed, supra, at 1246­ 1249 (§ 1821(k) does not prohibit federal common-law actions for simple negligence). And we granted review. II We begin by temporarily setting the federal "gross negli- gence" statute to the side, and by asking whether, were there no such statute, federal common law would provide the applicable legal standard. We recognize, as did the Third Circuit, that this Court did once articulate federal common- law corporate governance standards, applicable to federally chartered banks. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (1891). See also Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7, 15 (1884) (directors must "use ordinary diligence . . . and . . . exercise reasonable 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 218 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court control"); Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U. S. 504 (1919). But the Court found its rules of decision in federal common law long before it held, in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), that "[t]here is no federal general common law." Id., at 78. The Third Circuit, while considering itself bound by Briggs, asked whether relevant federal common-law stand- ards could have survived Erie. We conclude that they did not and that (except as modified in Part III, infra) state law, not federal common law, provides the applicable rules for decision. This Court has recently discussed what one might call "federal common law" in the strictest sense, i. e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated administrative rule, but, rather, to the judicial "creation" of a special federal rule of decision. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Ma- terials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640­643 (1981). The Court has said that "cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified . . . are . . . `few and restricted.' " O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U. S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963)). "Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress," not the federal courts. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966). Nor does the existence of related federal stat- utes automatically show that Congress intended courts to create federal common-law rules, for " `Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states . . . .' " Id., at 68 (quoting H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Fed- eral Courts and the Federal System 435 (1953)). Thus, nor- mally, when courts decide to fashion rules of federal common law, "the guiding principle is that a significant conflict be- tween some federal policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically shown." 384 U. S., at 68. Indeed, such a "conflict" is normally a "precondition." O'Melveny, supra, at 87. See also United States v. Kimbell 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 219 Opinion of the Court Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 728 (1979); Kamen v. Kemper Fi- nancial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 98 (1991). No one doubts the power of Congress to legislate rules for deciding cases like the one before us. Indeed, Congress has enacted related legislation. Certain federal statutes spec- ify, for example, how to form "national banks" (i. e., a feder- ally chartered bank), how to amend the articles of associa- tion, how shareholders are to vote, directors' qualifications, the form of a bank's "organization certificate," minimum cap- ital requirements, and a list of corporate powers. See 12 U. S. C. § 21 et seq. Other federal statutes regulate the ac- tivities of federally chartered savings associations in various ways. E. g., 12 U. S. C. § 1464(b) (various regulations on sav- ings associations, such as interest rate on loans). No one argues, however, that either these statutes, or federal regu- lations validly promulgated pursuant to statute, set forth general corporate governance standards of the sort at issue applicable to a federally chartered savings association such as City Federal. Cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 4866 (1996) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.2000) (discussed infra, at 224) (describing gov- ernance procedures applicable to federally chartered na- tional banks, but not federal savings associations). Conse- quently, we must decide whether the application of state-law standards of care to such banks would conflict with, and thereby significantly threaten, a federal policy or interest. We have examined each of the basic arguments that the respondent implicitly or explicitly raises. In our view, they do not point to a conflict or threat that is significant, and we shall explain why. (The respondent, by the way, is now the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-the FDIC-which has replaced the RTC pursuant to a new federal statute. 12 U. S. C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A).) First, the FDIC invokes the need for "uniformity." Fed- eral common law, it says, will provide uniformity, but "[s]u- perimposing state standards of fiduciary responsibility over standards developed by a federal chartering authority would 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 220 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court . . . `upset the balance' that the federal chartering authority `may strike . . . .' " Brief for Respondent 23 (quoting Kamen, supra, at 103). To invoke the concept of "uniform- ity," however, is not to prove its need. Cf. Kimbell Foods, supra, at 730 (rejecting "generalized pleas for uniformity"); O'Melveny, supra, at 88 (same). For one thing, the number of federally insured banks is about equally divided between federally chartered and state-chartered banks, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora- tion, 1 Statistics on Banking: A Statistical History of the United States Banking Industry, p. B­9 (Aug. 1995) (Table SI­9) (showing that, in 1989, there were 1,595 federally char- tered institutions and 1,492 state-chartered ones); and a fed- eral standard that increases uniformity among the former would increase disparity with the latter. For another, our Nation's banking system has thrived despite disparities in matters of corporate governance. Consider, for example, the divergent state-law governance standards applicable to banks chartered in different States, e. g., Ind. Code § 23­1­35­1(e)(2) (1994) (directors not liable unless conduct constitutes at least "willful misconduct or recklessness"); Iowa Code § 524.605 (1995) (providing ordi- nary negligence standard), as well as the different ways in which lower courts since 1891 have interpreted Briggs' "fed- eral common law" standard. Compare Federal Deposit In- surance Corporation v. Mason, 115 F. 2d 548, 551­552 (CA3 1940) (applying standard similar to simple negligence), with Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (DC 1993) (Briggs did not apply "simple negligence" stand- ard of care). See R. Stevens & B. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 Ann. Review Banking L. 169, 172 (1994) (in part because of "widely varying results, the federal common law standard of care is neither fully developed, nor well settled"). See 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 221 Opinion of the Court also infra, at 223 (citing cases in which state governance law has been applied to national banks). Indeed, the Comptrol- ler of the Currency, acting through regulation, permits considerable disparity in the standard of care applicable to federally chartered banks other than savings banks (which are under the jurisdiction of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 12 U. S. C. §§ 1462a, 1463(a)). See 61 Fed. Reg. 4866 (1996) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.2000) (permitting banks, within broad limits, "to follow the corporate governance pro- cedures of the law of the state in which the main office of the bank is located . . . [or] the Delaware General Corporation Law . . . or the [Model Business Corporation Act]"). Second, the FDIC at times suggests that courts must apply a federal common-law standard of care simply because the banks in question are federally chartered. This argu- ment, with little more, might have seemed a strong one dur- ing most of the first century of our Nation's history, for then state-chartered banks were the norm and federally char- tered banks an exception-and federal banks often encoun- tered hostility and deleterious state laws. See B. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking: A History 4­11 (1990) (trac- ing the origin of the dual banking system to the 1780 Phil- adelphia Bank and discussing proposals of a then-young Alexander Hamilton); B. Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War 41­66 (1957) (describing the controversial, but successful, Federalist pro- posals for the first and second federally chartered Bank of the United States). After President Madison helped to create the second Bank of the United States, for example, many States enacted laws that taxed the federal bank in an effort to weaken it. This Court held those taxes unconstitutional. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819) ("[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy"). See also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824) (federal marshals acted lawfully in seizing funds from a state tax collector who had 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 222 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court hurdled the counter at the Chilicothe Branch of the Bank of the United States and taken $100,000 from the vault). Still, 10 years later President Andrew Jackson effectively killed the bank. His Secretary of the Treasury Roger Taney (later Chief Justice), believing state banks fully able to serve the Nation, took steps to "ushe[r] in the era of expansive state banking." A. Pollard, J. Passaic, K. Ellis, & J. Daly, Banking Law in the United States 16 (1988). See also Bris- coe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257 (1837) (permitting state banks to issue paper money in certain circumstances). During and after the Civil War a federal banking system reemerged. Moved in part by war-related financing needs, Treasury Secretary (later Chief Justice) Salmon P. Chase proposed, and Congress enacted, laws providing for federally chartered banks, Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 43, 12 Stat. 655, and encouraging state banks to obtain federal charters. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (only federally char- tered banks can issue national currency). See also Veazie v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869) (opinion of Chase, C. J.) (upholding constitutionality of federal taxation of state banks). Just before World War I, Congress created the federal reserve system. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251. After that war, it created several federal banking agencies with regula- tory authority over both federal and state banks. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. And in 1933, it provided for the federal chartering of savings banks. Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 62, 48 Stat. 128. This latter history is relevant because in 1870 and thereaf- ter this Court held that federally chartered banks are sub- ject to state law. See National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 361 (1870). In National Bank the Court distin- guished McCulloch by recalling that Maryland's taxes were "used . . . to destroy," and it added that federal banks "are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts are 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 223 Opinion of the Court governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisi- tion and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law inca- pacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional." 9 Wall., at 362. The Court subsequently found numerous state laws applica- ble to federally chartered banks. See, e. g., Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 290 (1896) ("Nothing, of course, in this opinion is intended to deny the operation of general and undiscriminating state laws on the contracts of national banks, so long as such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general objects and purposes of Congressional legisla- tion"); First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 656 (1924) (national banks "are subject to the laws of a State in respect of their affairs unless such laws interfere with the purposes of their creation, tend to impair or destroy their efficiency as federal agencies or conflict with the para- mount law of the United States"); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U. S. 103 (1939) (apply- ing state law to tort claim by depositor against directors of a national bank); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 248 (1944) ("[N]ational banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or im- pose an undue burden on the performance of the banks' func- tions"); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272 (1987) (applying state employment discrimination law to federally chartered savings and loan association). For present purposes, the consequence is the following: To point to a federal charter by itself shows no conflict, threat, or need for "federal common law." It does not answer the critical question. Third, the FDIC refers to a conflict of laws principle called the "internal affairs doctrine"-a doctrine that this Court has described as 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 224 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court "a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a cor- poration's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflict- ing demands." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 645 (1982). States normally look to the State of a business' incorporation for the law that provides the relevant corporate governance general standard of care. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 309 (1971). And by analogy, it has been argued, courts should look to federal law to find the standard of care governing officers and directors of federally chartered banks. See Resolution Trust Corporation v. Chapman, 29 F. 3d 1120, 1123­1124 (CA7 1994). To find a justification for federal common law in this argu- ment, however, is to substitute analogy or formal symmetry for the controlling legal requirement, namely, the existence of a need to create federal common law arising out of a sig- nificant conflict or threat to a federal interest. O'Melveny, 512 U. S., at 85, 87. The internal affairs doctrine shows no such need, for it seeks only to avoid conflict by requiring that there be a single point of legal reference. Nothing in that doctrine suggests that the single source of law must be fed- eral. See Chapman, supra, at 1126­1127 (Posner, C. J., dis- senting). In the absence of a governing federal common law, courts applying the internal affairs doctrine could find (we do not say that they will find) that the State closest analogi- cally to the State of incorporation of an ordinary business is the State in which the federally chartered bank has its main office or maintains its principal place of business. Cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 4866 (1996) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.2000) (fed- erally chartered commercial banks may "follow the corporate governance procedures of the law of the state in which the main office of the bank is located"). So to apply state law, 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 225 Opinion of the Court as we have said, would tend to avoid disparity between fed- erally chartered and state-chartered banks (that might be next door to each other). And, of course, if this approach proved problematic, Congress and federal agencies acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority remain free to provide to the contrary. Fourth, the FDIC points to statutes that provide the OTS, a federal regulatory agency, with authority to fine, or to re- move from office, savings bank officers and directors for cer- tain breaches of fiduciary duty. The FDIC adds that in "the course of such proceedings, the OTS, applying the ordinary- care standard [of Briggs,] . . . has spoken authoritatively respecting the duty of care owed by directors and officers to federal savings associations." Brief for Respondent 23­25 (citations omitted). The FDIC does not claim, however, that these OTS statements, interpreting a pre-existing judge- made federal common-law standard (i. e., that of Briggs) themselves amounted to an agency effort to promulgate a binding regulation pursuant to delegated congressional au- thority. Nor have we found, in our examination of the rele- vant OTS opinions, any convincing evidence of a relevant, significant conflict or threat to a federal interest. Finally, we note that here, as in O'Melveny, the FDIC is acting only as a receiver of a failed institution; it is not pursu- ing the interest of the Federal Government as a bank in- surer-an interest likely present whether the insured insti- tution is state, or federally, chartered. In sum, we can find no significant conflict with, or threat to, a federal interest. The federal need is far weaker than was present in what the Court has called the " `few and re- stricted' instances," Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 313 (1981), in which this Court has created a federal common law. Consider, for example, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938) (controversy be- tween two States regarding apportionment of streamwater); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500 (1988) 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 226 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court (Federal Government contractors and civil liability of federal officials); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947) (relationship between Federal Government and members of its Armed Forces); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593, 597 (1959) ( liability of federal officers in the course of official duty); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 425 (1964) (relationships with other countries). See also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 641 (1981) ("[A]bsent some congressional au- thorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those con- cerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the con- flicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases"). Indeed, the interests in many of the cases where this Court has declined to recognize federal common law appear at least as strong as, if not stronger than, those present here. E. g., Wallis v. Pan American Petro- leum Corp., 384 U. S. 63 (1966) (applying state law to claims for land owned and leased by the Federal Government); Kim- bell Foods, 440 U. S., at 726, 732­738 (applying state law to priority of liens under federal lending programs). We conclude that the federal common-law standards enun- ciated in cases such as Briggs did not survive this Court's later decision in Erie v. Tompkins. There is no federal com- mon law that would create a general standard of care appli- cable to this case. III We now turn to a further question: Does federal statutory law (namely, the federal "gross negligence" statute) supplant any state-law standard of care? The relevant parts of that statute read as follows: "A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 227 Opinion of the Court direction of the Corporation . . . acting as conservator or receiver . . . for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disre- gard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law." 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k) (emphasis added). Lower courts have taken different positions about whether this statute, in stating that directors and officers "may be held personally liable" for conduct that amounts to "gross negligence" or worse, immunizes them from liability for con- duct that is less culpable than gross negligence such as sim- ple negligence. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. McSweeney, 976 F. 2d 532, 537, n. 5 (CA9 1992), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 950 (1993); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Canfield, 967 F. 2d 443, 446, n. 3 (CA10) (en banc), cert. dism'd, 506 U. S. 993 (1992); Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- poration v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244 (Minn. 1991). See also Pet. for Cert. i ("The questions presented for review are: 1. Whether Section 1821(k) supplants `federal common law' and constitutes the exclusive standard of liability in a civil dam- age action brought by the Resolution Trust Corporation . . ."); Brief for American Bankers Association et al. as Amici Curiae 7­8. In our view, the statute's "gross negligence" standard pro- vides only a floor-a guarantee that officers and directors must meet at least a gross negligence standard. It does not stand in the way of a stricter standard that the laws of some States provide. For one thing, the language of the statute contains a sav- ing clause that, read literally, preserves the applicability of stricter state standards. It says "[n]othing in this para- graph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law." 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k) (emphasis 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 228 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court added). The petitioner, in contending that the statute dis- places federal common law, says that "any right" means only a right created elsewhere in the same Act of Congress, for example, by various regulatory enforcement provisions. E. g., § 1818(b) (cease-and-desist provision). But that is not what the Act says nor does its language compel so restrictive a reading. That language, read naturally, suggests an inter- pretation broad enough to save rights provided by other state, or federal, law. For another thing, Congress enacted the statute against a background of failing savings associations, see 135 Cong. Rec. 121 (1989) (statement of Rep. Roth); 135 Cong. Rec. 1760 (1989) (statement of Sen. Graham), large federal payments to insured bank depositors, and recent changes in state law designed to limit pre-existing officer and director negligence liability. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 607.0831 (1993) ("recklessness or an act or omission . . . committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(D) (1994) ("deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or un- dertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation"). The state-law changes would have made it more difficult for the Federal Government to recover, from negligent officers and directors, federal funds spent to rescue failing savings banks and their depositors. And the back- ground as a whole supports a reading of the statute as an effort to preserve the Federal Government's ability to re- cover funds by creating a standard of care floor. The legislative history, insofar as it is relevant, supports this conclusion. Members of Congress repeatedly referred to the harm that liability-relaxing changes in state law had caused the Federal Government, hence the taxpayer, as fed- eral banking agencies tried to recover, from negligent offi- cers and directors, some of the money that federal insurers had to pay to depositors in their failed banks. E. g., 135 Cong. Rec. 7150­7151 (1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle) ("[T]he establishment of a Federal standard of care is based 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 229 Opinion of the Court on the overriding Federal interest in protecting the sound- ness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fund and is very limited in scope. It is not a wholesale preemption of longstanding principles of corporate governance . . ."). To have pre-empted state law with a uniform federal "gross negligence" standard would have cured the problem in some instances (where state law was weaker) but would have ag- gravated it in others (where state law was stronger). In fact, the legislative history says more. The relevant Senate Report addresses the point specifically. It says: "This subsection does not prevent the FDIC from pursu- ing claims under State law or under other applicable Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial institution to be sued (1) for violating a lower standard of care, such as simple negligence." S. Rep. No. 101­19, p. 318 (1989). This Report was not published until two weeks after Con- gress enacted the law. But, as petitioner elsewhere con- cedes, the Report was circulated within Congress several weeks before Congress voted. In fact Senator Riegle, the Banking Committee Chairman, read the statement, on his own behalf and that of Senator Garn, six weeks before Con- gress voted on the law. 135 Cong. Rec. 12374 (1989). Con- trast Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 407 (1987) (refusing to "attach substantial weight" to a Repre- sentative's statement made 10 days after the enactment of the law). The history is not all on one side. The Congressional Rec- ord contains one statement that suggests a competing con- gressional purpose, namely, to protect bank officers and di- rectors from too strict a liability standard. 135 Cong. Rec. 7150 (1989) (statement of Sen. Sanford) (supporting "pro- visions relating to State laws affecting the liability of offi- cers and directors of financial institutions" because "these changes are essential if we are to attract qualified officers 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 230 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of the Court and directors to serve in our financial institutions"). But we have not found other such statements. And that statement is inconsistent with the language of the Senate Report. It suggests an interpretation of the statute largely rejected in the lower courts, namely, that it pre-empts stricter state law as applied to state-chartered, as well as to federally char- tered, institutions. See, e. g., McSweeney, 976 F. 2d, at 540­ 541 (rejecting the interpretation as applied to state- chartered banks); Canfield, 967 F. 2d, at 448­449 (same). The petitioner, in the courts below and as an alternative ground in this Court, made a final complicated argument to explain why 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k) displaces federal common law. He points to the universally conceded fact that the "gross negligence" statute applies to federal, as well as to state, banks. He then assumes, for sake of the argument, that in the absence of the statute, federal common law would determine liability for federal banks. He then asks why Congress would have applied the "gross negligence" statute to federal banks unless it wanted that statute to set an abso- lute standard, not a floor. After all, on the assumption that, without the statute, federal common law would hold federal directors and officers to a standard as strict, or stricter, there would have been no need for the statute unless (as applied to federal banks) it intended to set a universal stand- ard, freeing officers and directors from the potentially less strict standard of the common law, and not what, given the assumptions, would be a totally unnecessary floor. This ar- gument, taken to its logical conclusion, would also suggest that state standards of simple negligence would be displaced by the federal gross negligence statute. One obvious short answer to this ingenious argument lies in the fact that our conclusion in Part II runs contrary to the argument's critical assumption, namely, that federal common law sets the standard of liability applicable to federal banks. State law applies. Without that assumption, the need for a "gross negligence" floor in the case of federally chartered banks is identical to the need in the case of state-chartered 519us2$15Q 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 213 (1997) 231 Opinion of O'Connor, J. banks. In both instances, the floor is needed to limit state efforts to weaken liability standards; in both instances a floor serves that purpose; and the reasons for believing the statute only sets such a floor are equally strong. A more thorough answer lies in the fact that Congress nowhere separated its consideration of federally chartered, from that of state-chartered, banks. Congress did not ask whether one looked to federal common law or to state law to find the liability standard applicable to federally chartered banks. Nor did it try to determine the content of federal common law. One can reconcile congressional silence on the matter with a "gross negligence" statute, the language of which brings all banks (federal- and state-chartered) within its scope, simply by assuming that Congress, when enacting the statute, wanted to leave other law, including the law applicable to federally chartered banks, exactly where Con- gress found it. That, after all, is what the statute says. And the saving clause language taken at face value permits Congress to achieve its basic objective (providing a "gross negligence" floor) without having to unravel the arcane in- tricacies of federal common law. In our view, this under- standing of congressional intent better explains the statute's language and history than the petitioner's interpretation, imputing to Congress an intent to apply a uniform "gross negligence" standard to federally chartered, but not state chartered, institutions. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consist- ent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join all of the Court's opinion, except to the extent that it relies on the notably unhelpful legislative history to 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k). Ante, at 228­230. As the Court cor- 519us2$15J 06-03-99 18:57:34 PAGES OPINPGT 232 ATHERTON v. FDIC Opinion of O'Connor, J. rectly points out, the most natural reading of the saving clause in § 1821(k) covers both state and federal rights. Ante, at 228. With such plain statutory language in hand, there is no reason to rely on legislative history that is, as the majority recognizes, "not all on one side." Ante, at 229. 519us2$16Z 04-11-98 09:14:49 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 233 Per Curiam GRIMMETT, trustee for the BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF SIRAGUSA, et al. v. BROWN et al. certiorari to the united states court of apppeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1723. Argued January 6, 1997-Decided January 14, 1997 Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 506. Richard A. Sauber argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Michael L. Waldman, David B. Smith, Erven T. Nelson, and Randall M. Rumph. Philip A. Lacovara argued the cause for respondents. On the brief for respondents Beckley et al. were Niels L. Pearson, Rex A. Jemison, and Daniel F. Polsenberg. On the brief for respondents Brown et al. were Peter M. Angulo and Don F. Shreve, Jr.* Per Curiam. The writ of certiorari in this case is dismissed as improvi- dently granted. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Executive Committee, MDL No. 1069, et al. by Richard B. McNamara, Gregory A. Holmes, Stephanie A. Bray, Michael M. Baylson, Martin J. Oberman, Alice W. Ballard, Charles Barnhill, Jr., Judson Miner, and Edward R. Garvey; and for the National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys by Kevin P. Roddy, G. Robert Blakey, and Jonathan W. Cuneo. Michael A. Cardozo and Steven C. Krane filed a brief for the National Hockey League as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Andrew L. Frey, Philip A. Lacovara, and Evan M. Tager filed a brief for the American Honda Motor Co. as amicus curiae. 519us2$17Z 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT 234 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. YOUPEE et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1595. Argued December 2, 1996-Decided January 21, 1997 In the late Nineteenth Century, Congress initiated an Indian land program that authorized the allotment of communal Indian property to individual tribal members. This allotment program resulted in the extreme frac- tionation of Indian lands as allottees passed their undivided interests on to multiple heirs through descent or devise. In 1983, Congress adopted the Indian Land Consolidation Act in part to reduce fractionated owner- ship of allotted lands. Section 207 of the Act-the "escheat" provi- sion-prohibited the descent or devise of fractional interests that consti- tuted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and earned less than $100 in the preceding year. Instead of passing to heirs, the interests described in § 207 would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Section 207 made no pro- vision for the payment of compensation to those who held such fractional interests. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, this Court invalidated the original version of § 207 on the ground that it effected a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amend- ment. Id., at 716­718. Considering, first, the economic impact of § 207, the Court observed that the provision's income-generation test might fail to capture the actual economic value of the land. Id., at 714. Weighing most heavily against the constitutionality of § 207, however, was the "extraordinary" character of the Government regulation, id., at 716, which amounted to the virtual abrogation of the rights of descent and devise, id., at 716­717. While Irving was pending in the Court of Appeals, Congress amended § 207. Amended § 207 differs from the original provision in three relevant respects: It looks back five years instead of one to determine the income produced from a small interest, and creates a rebuttable presumption that this income stream will con- tinue; it permits devise of otherwise escheatable interests to persons who already own an interest in the same parcel; and it authorizes tribes to develop their own codes governing the disposition of fractional inter- ests. The will of William Youpee, an enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes, devised to respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted lands on reserva- tions in Montana and North Dakota. Each interest was devised to a 519us2$17Z 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 235 Syllabus single descendant. Youpee's will thus perpetuated existing fraction- ation, but it did not splinter ownership further by bequeathing any sin- gle fractional interest to multiple devisees. In a proceeding to deter- mine claims against and heirs to Youpee's estate, an Administrative Law Judge in the Department of the Interior found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within the compass of amended § 207 and should therefore escheat to the relevant tribal governments. Respond- ents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended § 207, appealed the order to the Board of Indian Appeals. The Board, stating that it did not have jurisdiction to consider respondents' constitutional claim, dis- missed the appeal. Respondents then filed this suit against the Secre- tary of the Interior, alleging that amended § 207 violates the Just Com- pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with respondents and granted their request for declaratory and injunc- tive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: Amended § 207 does not cure the constitutional deficiency this Court identified in the original version of § 207. The Court is guided by Irving in determining whether the amendments to § 207 render the pro- vision constitutional. The United States maintains that the amend- ments moderate the economic impact of the provision and temper the character of the Government's regulation. However, the narrow revi- sions Congress made to § 207, without benefit of this Court's ruling in Irving, do not warrant a disposition different from the one announced and explained in Irving. Amended § 207 permits a five-year window rather than a one-year window to assess the income-generating capacity of a fractional interest, and the United States urges that this alteration substantially mitigates the economic impact of § 207. But amended § 207 still trains on income generated from the land, not on the value of the parcel. Even if the income generated by such parcels may be typed de minimis, the value of the land may not fit that description. 481 U. S., at 714. The United States correctly comprehends that Irving rested primarily on the "extraordinary" character of the governmental regulation: the "virtua[l] abrogation" of the right of descent and devise, id., at 716. The United States contends, however, that Congress cured the fatal infirmity in § 207 when it revised the section to allow transmis- sion of fractional interests to successors who already own an interest in the allotment. But this change does not rehabilitate the measure. Amended § 207 severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property by shrinking drastically the universe of possible successors. And, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the "very limited group [of permissible devisees] is unlikely to contain any lineal descend- ants." 67 F. 3d 194, 199­200. Moreover, amended § 207 continues to 519us2$17Z 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT 236 BABBITT v. YOUPEE Opinion of the Court restrict devise "even in circumstances when the governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the further descent of the property." 481 U. S., at 718. As the United States acknowledges, giving effect to Youpee's directive bequeathing each fractional interest to one heir would not further frac- tionate Indian land holdings. The United States' arguments that amended § 207 satisfies the Constitution's demand because it does not diminish the owner's right to use or enjoy property during his lifetime and does not affect the right to transfer property at death through non- probate means are no more persuasive today than they were in Irving. See id., at 716­718. The third alteration made in amended § 207 also fails to bring the provision outside the reach of this Court's holding in Irving: Tribal codes governing disposition of escheatable interests have apparently not been developed. Pp. 243­245. 67 F. 3d 194, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 246. James A. Feldman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Del- linger, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solici- tor General Kneedler, Anne S. Almy, Robert L. Klarquist, and Andrew C. Mergen. Rene A. Martell argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Daniel L. Minnis and D. Michael Eakin.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we consider for a second time the constitution- ality of an escheat-to-tribe provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA). 96 Stat. 2519, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 2206. Specifically, we address § 207 of the ILCA, as amended in 1984. Congress enacted the original provi- *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Allottees Association and Affiliated Tribes and Bands of the Quinault Reservation et al. by Joel Jasperse and Thomas E. Luebben; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by James S. Burling. 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 237 Opinion of the Court sion in 1983 to ameliorate the extreme fractionation problem attending a century-old allotment policy that yielded mul- tiple ownership of single parcels of Indian land. Pub. L. 97­459, § 207, 96 Stat. 2519. Amended § 207 provides that certain small interests in Indian lands will transfer-or "escheat"-to the tribe upon the death of the owner of the interest. Pub. L. 98­608, 98 Stat. 3173. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704 (1987), this Court held that the original version of § 207 of the ILCA effected a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amend- ment to the United States Constitution. Id., at 716­718. We now hold that amended § 207 does not cure the constitu- tional deficiency this Court identified in the original version of § 207. I In the late Nineteenth Century, Congress initiated an In- dian land program that authorized the division of communal Indian property. Pursuant to this allotment policy, some In- dian land was parcelled out to individual tribal members. Lands not allotted to individual Indians were opened to non- Indians for settlement. See Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. Allotted lands were held in trust by the United States or owned by the allottee subject to restrictions on alienation. On the death of the allottee, the land descended according to the laws of the State or Ter- ritory in which the land was located. 24 Stat. 389. In 1910, Congress also provided that allottees could devise their interests in allotted land. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 2, 36 Stat. 856, codified as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 373. The allotment policy "quickly proved disastrous for the In- dians." Irving, 481 U. S., at 707. The program produced a dramatic decline in the amount of land in Indian hands. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 138 (1982) (herein- after Cohen). And as allottees passed their interests on to multiple heirs, ownership of allotments became increasingly fractionated, with some parcels held by dozens of owners. 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT 238 BABBITT v. YOUPEE Opinion of the Court Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 77 (1984) (hereinafter Lawson). A number of factors augmented the problem: Be- cause Indians often died without wills, many interests passed to multiple heirs, H. R. Rep. No. 97­908, p. 10 (1982); Congress' allotment Acts subjected trust lands to alienation restrictions that impeded holders of small interests from transferring those interests, Lawson 78­79; Indian lands were not subject to state real estate taxes, Cohen 406, which ordinarily serve as a strong disincentive to retaining small fractional interests in land. The fractionation problem pro- liferated with each succeeding generation as multiple heirs took undivided interests in allotments. The administrative difficulties and economic inefficiencies associated with multiple undivided ownership in allotted lands gained official attention as early as 1928. See L. Meriam, Institute for Government Research, The Problem of Indian Administration 40­41 (1928). Governmental ad- ministration of these fractionated interests proved costly, and individual owners of small undivided interests could not make productive use of the land. Congress ended further allotment in 1934. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. But that action left the legacy in place. As most owners had more than one heir, interests in lands already allotted continued to splinter with each generation. In the 1960's, congressional studies re- vealed that approximately half of all allotted trust lands were held in fractionated ownership; for over a quarter of allotted trust lands, individual allotments were held by more than six owners to a parcel. See Irving, 481 U. S., at 708­ 709 (citing Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian Heirship Land Survey, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. x (Comm. Print 1960­1961)). In 1983, Congress adopted the ILCA in part to reduce fractionated ownership of allotted lands. Pub. L. 97­459, tit. 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 239 Opinion of the Court II, 96 Stat. 2517. Section 207 of the ILCA-the "escheat" provision-prohibited the descent or devise of small frac- tional interests in allotments. 96 Stat. 2519.1 Instead of passing to heirs, such fractional interests would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Congress defined the targeted fractional interest as one that both constituted 2 percent or less of the total acre- age in an allotted tract and had earned less than $100 in the preceding year. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of compensation to those who held such interests. In Hodel v. Irving, this Court invalidated § 207 on the ground that it effected a taking of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 481 U. S., at 716­718. The appellees in Irving were, or repre- sented, heirs or devisees of members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. But for § 207, the appellees would have received 41 fractional interests in allotments; under § 207, those interests would escheat to the Tribe. Id., at 709­710. This Court tested the legitimacy of § 207 by considering its economic impact, its effect on investment-backed expectations, and the essential character of the measure. See id., at 713­718; see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978). Turning first to the economic impact of § 207, the Court in Irving observed that the provision's income-generation test might fail to capture the actual eco- nomic value of the land. 481 U. S., at 714. The Court next indicated that § 207 likely did not interfere with investment- backed expectations. Id., at 715. Key to the decision in Irving, however, was the "extraordinary" character of the 1 As originally enacted, § 207 provided: "No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat." 96 Stat. 2519. 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT 240 BABBITT v. YOUPEE Opinion of the Court Government regulation. Id., at 716. As this Court noted, § 207 amounted to the "virtua[l] abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property." Ibid. Such a complete abrogation of the rights of descent and devise could not be upheld. Id., at 716­717. II In 1984, while Irving was still pending in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Congress amended § 207. Pub. L. 96­608, § 1(4), 98 Stat. 3173.2 Amended § 207 differs from the original escheat provision in three relevant re- spects. First, an interest is considered fractional if it both 2 In 1990, Congress enacted minor revisions to § 207 that are not relevant here. Pub. L. 101­644, § 301, 104 Stat. 4666­4667. Amended § 207, codi- fied at 25 U. S. C. § 2206, provides: "(a) Escheat to tribe; rebuttable presumption "No undivided interest held by a member or nonmember Indian in any tract of trust land or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or outside of a reservation and subject to such tribe's jurisdiction shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to the reservation's recognized tribal government, or if outside of a reservation, to the recognized tribal govern- ment possessing jurisdiction over the land if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years from the date of the decedent's death. Where the fractional interest has earned to its owner less than $100 in any one of the five years before the decedent's death, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such interest is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years following the death of the decedent. "(b) Escheatable fractional interest "Nothing in this section shall prohibit the devise of such an escheatable fractional interest to any other owner of an undivided fractional interest in such parcel or tract of trust or restricted land. "(c) Adoption of Indian tribal code "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any Indian tribe may, subject to the approval of the Secretary, adopt its own code of laws to govern the disposition of interests that are escheatable under this section, and such codes or laws shall take precedence over the escheat provisions of subsection (a) of this section, provided, the Secretary shall not approve any code or law that fails to accomplish the purpose of preventing further descent or fractionation of such escheatable interests." 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 241 Opinion of the Court constitutes 2 percent or less of the total acreage of the parcel and "is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years [following the] decedent's death"-as opposed to one year before the decedent's death in the original § 207. 25 U. S. C. § 2206(a). If the interest earned less than $100 in any one of five years prior to the decedent's death, "there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such interest is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years following the death of the decedent." Ibid. Second, in lieu of a total ban on devise and descent of fractional interests, amended § 207 per- mits devise of an otherwise escheatable interest to "any other owner of an undivided fractional interest in such parcel or tract" of land. 25 U. S. C. § 2206(b). Finally, tribes are authorized to override the provisions of amended § 207 through the adoption of their own codes governing the dis- position of fractional interests; these codes are subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U. S. C. § 2206(c). In Irving, "[w]e express[ed] no opinion on the con- stitutionality of § 207 as amended." 481 U. S., at 710, n. 1. Under amended § 207, the interests in this case would escheat to tribal governments. The initiating plaintiffs, respondents here, are the children and potential heirs of William Youpee. An enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation in Montana, William Youpee died testate in October 1990. His will de- vised to respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted trust lands on various reservations in Montana and North Dakota. These inter- ests, as the Ninth Circuit reported, were valued together at $1,239. 67 F. 3d 194, 199 (1995). Each interest was devised to a single descendant. Youpee's will thus perpetuated ex- isting fractionation, but it did not splinter ownership further by bequeathing any single fractional interest to multiple devisees. In 1992, in a proceeding to determine the heirs to, and claims against, William Youpee's estate, an Administrative 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT 242 BABBITT v. YOUPEE Opinion of the Court Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of the Interior found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within the compass of amended § 207 and should therefore escheat to the tribal governments of the Fort Peck, Standing Rock, and Devils Lake Sioux Reservations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a­40a. Respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended § 207, appealed the ALJ's order to the Department of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. The Board, stating that it did not have jurisdiction to consider respondents' con- stitutional claim, dismissed the appeal. Respondents then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, naming the Secretary of the Interior as defendant, and alleging that amended § 207 of the ILCA violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with re- spondents and granted their request for declaratory and in- junctive relief. 857 F. Supp. 760, 766 (1994). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 67 F. 3d 194 (1995). That court carefully inspected the 1984 revisions to § 207. Hewing closely to the reasoning of this Court in Irving, the Ninth Circuit determined that amended § 207 did not cure the deficiencies that rendered the original provision unconstitutional. In particular, the Ninth Circuit observed that amended § 207 "continue[d] to completely abol- ish one of the sticks in the bundle of rights [constituting property] for a class of Indian landowners." 67 F. 3d, at 200. The Ninth Circuit noted that "Congress may pursue other options to achieve consolidation of . . . fractional interests," including Government purchase of the land, condemnation for a public purpose attended by payment of just compensa- tion, or regulation to impede further fractionation. Ibid. But amended § 207 could not stand, the Ninth Circuit con- cluded, for the provision remained "an extraordinary and impermissible regulation of Indian lands and effect[ed] an unconstitutional taking without just compensation." Ibid. 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 243 Opinion of the Court On the petition of the United States, we granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1232 (1996), and now affirm. III In determining whether the 1984 amendments to § 207 ren- der the provision constitutional, we are guided by Irving.3 The United States maintains that the amendments, though enacted three years prior to the Irving decision, effectively anticipated the concerns expressed in the Court's opinion. As already noted, amended § 207 differs from the original in three relevant respects: It looks back five years instead of one to determine the income produced from a small interest, and creates a rebuttable presumption that this income stream will continue; it permits devise of otherwise escheat- able interests to persons who already own an interest in the same parcel; and it authorizes tribes to develop their own codes governing the disposition of fractional interests. These modifications, according to the United States, rescue amended § 207 from the fate of its predecessor. The Gov- ernment maintains that the revisions moderate the economic impact of the provision and temper the character of the Gov- ernment's regulation; the latter factor weighed most heavily against the constitutionality of the original version of § 207. The narrow revisions Congress made to § 207, without ben- efit of our ruling in Irving, do not warrant a disposition dif- ferent from the one this Court announced and explained in Irving. Amended § 207 permits a five-year window rather than a one-year window to assess the income-generating ca- pacity of the interest. As the Ninth Circuit observed, how- ever, argument that this change substantially mitigates the economic impact of § 207 "misses the point." 67 F. 3d, at 3 In Irving we relied on Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). Because we find Irving dispositive, we do not reach respondents' argument that amended § 207 effects a "categorical" taking, and is therefore subject to the more stringent analysis employed in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992). 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT 244 BABBITT v. YOUPEE Opinion of the Court 199. Amended § 207 still trains on income generated from the land, not on the value of the parcel. The Court observed in Irving that "[e]ven if . . . the income generated by such parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis," the value of the land may not fit that description. 481 U. S., at 714. The parcels at issue in Irving were valued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $2,700 and $1,816, amounts we found "not trivial." Ibid. The value of the disputed parcels in this case is not of a different order; as the Ninth Circuit reported, the value of decedent Youpee's fractional interests was $1,239. 67 F. 3d, at 199. In short, the economic impact of amended § 207 might still be palpable. Even if the economic impact of amended § 207 is not sig- nificantly less than the impact of the original provision, the United States correctly comprehends that Irving rested primarily on the "extraordinary" character of the govern- mental regulation. Irving stressed that the original § 207 "amount[ed] to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property-the small undivided inter- est-to one's heirs." 481 U. S., at 716; see also id., at 717 ("both descent and devise are completely abolished"). The Irving Court further noted that the original § 207 "effec- tively abolish[ed] both descent and devise [of fractional inter- ests] even when the passing of the property to the heir might result in consolidation of property." Id., at 716. As the United States construes Irving, Congress cured the fatal in- firmity in § 207 when it revised the section to allow transmis- sion of fractional interests to successors who already own an interest in the allotment. Congress' creation of an ever-so-slight class of individuals equipped to receive fractional interests by devise does not suffice, under a fair reading of Irving, to rehabilitate the measure. Amended § 207 severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property. Allowing a decedent to leave an interest only to a current owner in the 519us2$17P 06-03-99 19:00:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 245 Opinion of the Court same parcel shrinks drastically the universe of possible suc- cessors. And, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the "very limited group [of permissible devisees] is unlikely to contain any lineal descendants." 67 F. 3d, at 199­200. Moreover, amended § 207 continues to restrict devise "even in circum- stances when the governmental purpose sought to be ad- vanced, consolidation of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the further descent of the property." Irving, 481 U. S., at 718. William Youpee's will, the United States acknowledges, bequeathed each fractional interest to one heir. Giving effect to Youpee's directive, therefore, would not further fractionate Indian land holdings. The United States also contends that amended § 207 satis- fies the Constitution's demand because it does not diminish the owner's right to use or enjoy property during his life- time, and does not affect the right to transfer property at death through nonprobate means. These arguments did not persuade us in Irving and they are no more persuasive today. See id., at 716­718. The third alteration made in amended § 207 also fails to bring the provision outside the reach of this Court's holding in Irving. Amended § 207 permits tribes to establish their own codes to govern the disposition of fractional interests; if approved by the Secretary of the Interior, these codes would govern in lieu of amended § 207. See 25 U. S. C. § 2206(c). The United States does not rely on this new provision to defend the statute. Nor does it appear that the United States could do so at this time: Tribal codes governing dis- position of escheatable interests have apparently not been developed. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42­43. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Affirmed. 519US2 Unit: $U17 [02-24-00 10:13:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 246 BABBITT v. YOUPEE Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, dissenting. Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U. S. C. § 2206, did not, in my view, effect an unconstitutional taking of William Youpee's right to make a testamentary dis- position of his property. As I explained in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 719­720 (1987) (opinion concurring in judg- ment), the Federal Government, like a State, has a valid in- terest in removing legal impediments to the productive de- velopment of real estate. For this reason, the Court has repeatedly "upheld the power of the State to condition the retention of a property right upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time." Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 529 (1982). I remain convinced that "Congress has ample power to require the owners of fractional interests in allotted lands to consolidate their holdings during their lifetimes or to face the risk that their interests will be deemed to be abandoned." Hodel, 481 U. S., at 732 (Ste- vens, J., concurring in judgment). The federal interest in minimizing the fractionated ownership of Indian lands-and thereby paving the way to the productive development of their property-is strong enough to justify the legislative remedy created by § 207, provided, of course, that affected owners have adequate notice of the requirements of the law and an adequate opportunity to adjust their affairs to protect against loss. See ibid. In my opinion, William Youpee did have such notice and opportunity. With regard to notice, the requirements of § 207 are set forth in the United States Code. "Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to fa- miliarize itself with its terms and to comply. . . . It is well established that persons owning property within a [jurisdic- tion] are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provi- sions affecting the control or disposition of such property." Texaco, 454 U. S., at 531­532. Unlike the landowners in Hodel, Mr. Youpee also had adequate opportunity to comply. 519US2 Unit: $U17 [02-24-00 10:13:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 234 (1997) 247 Stevens, J., dissenting More than six years passed from the time § 207 was amended until Mr. Youpee died on October 19, 1990 (this period spans more than seven years if we count from the date § 207 was originally enacted). During this time, Mr. Youpee could have realized the value of his fractional interests (approxi- mately $1,239) in a variety of ways, including selling the property, giving it to his children as a gift, or putting it in trust for them. I assume that he failed to do so because he was not aware of the requirements of § 207. This loss is unfortunate. But I believe Mr. Youpee's failure to pass on his property is the product of inadequate legal advice rather than an unconstitutional defect in the statute.* Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. *Whether his heirs might have had a right to some relief from the au- thor of Mr. Youpee's will if the Court had upheld the statute is not before us. Though not constitutionally required, it would certainly seem pru- dent for the Government or Mr. Youpee's lawyer to have notified him of § 207's requirements. 519us2$18Z 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 248 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC., et al. v. DIREC- TOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 95­1081. Argued November 12, 1996-Decided February 18, 1997 While working for petitioner Ingalls as a shipfitter, Jefferson Yates was exposed to asbestos. After he was diagnosed as suffering from asbesto- sis and related conditions, he filed a claim for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act). Ingalls admitted compensability and eventually settled with Mr. Yates, who, in the meantime, had sued the manufacturers and suppliers of the asbestos products that were allegedly present in his workplace when he contracted asbestosis. Before his death, he settled with some of these defendants, each of whom required releases from respondent Yates, Mr. Yates' wife, even though she was not a party to the litigation. None of these predeath settlements was approved by Ingalls. After Mr. Yates' death, Mrs. Yates filed a claim for death benefits under the Act. Ingalls contested the claim under Act § 33(g)(1), which states: "If the person entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third person . . . for an amount less than the compensation to which the person . . . would be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable for compensation . . . only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer . . . before the settlement is executed." The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled for Mrs. Yates, and the Ben- efits Review Board (Board) affirmed, holding that, at the time she executed the predeath settlements, she was not a "person entitled to compensation" under § 33(g)(1) because her husband still lived, and, therefore, her right to death benefits had not yet vested. The Fifth Circuit agreed and affirmed. The court also rejected Ingalls' argument that the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), lacked standing to participate as a respondent in the appeal of a Board decision. Held:1. Before an injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to compensation" for death benefits within § 33(g)'s 519us2$18Z 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 249 Syllabus meaning, and does not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the Act for failure to obtain the worker's employer's approval of settlements entered into before the worker's death. Section 33(g)(1)'s plain language reveals two salient points. First, the use of the present tense (i. e., "enters") indicates that the "person entitled to compensa- tion" must be so entitled at the time of settlement. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475. Second, the ordinary meaning of the word "entitle" indicates that the "person entitled to com- pensation" must at the very least be qualified to receive compensation. Id., at 477. Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether Mrs. Yates satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining death benefits under the Act at the time she signed the releases contained in the predeath settle- ments. Taken together, § 9 of the Act, which governs the distribution of death benefits, and § 2, which contains relevant definitions, indicate that a surviving spouse qualifies for death benefits only if: (i) the survi- vor's deceased worker-spouse dies from a work-related injury; (ii) the survivor is married to the worker-spouse at the time of death; and (iii) the survivor is either living with the worker-spouse, dependent upon the worker-spouse, or living apart from the worker-spouse because of desertion or other justifiable cause at the time of death. It is impossi- ble to ascertain whether these prerequisites have been met at any time prior to the death of the injured worker. The Court therefore rejects the argument that a person seeking death benefits under the Act can satisfy the prerequisites for those benefits at any earlier time-e. g., when the worker is initially injured or when the worker enters into a predeath settlement. Because Mrs. Yates' husband was alive at the time she signed the releases, she was not a "person entitled to compen- sation" at that time and was therefore not obligated to seek Ingalls' approval to preserve her entitlement to statutory death benefits. In- galls' arguments to the contrary-that § 33(g)(1) effectively brings any person who "would be entitled" to compensation within its purview, and that strict adherence to the section's plain language is at odds with the Act's underlying policy of avoiding double recovery-are unpersuasive. Pp. 255­262. 2. Although the Act itself does not speak to the issue, the right to appear as a respondent before the courts of appeals is conferred upon the Director, OWCP, by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a), which, in pertinent part, states: "Review of an order of an administra- tive . . . board . . . must be obtained by filing with the clerk of a court of appeals . . . [the appropriate form]. . . . In each case, the agency must be named respondent." (Emphasis added.) The Court declines to adopt the narrower reading of Rule 15(a) set forth in Parker v. Director, 519us2$18Z 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 250 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Syllabus OWCP, 75 F. 3d 929, 934 (CA4), and McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 514 F. 2d 198, 200 (CADC). Where a single overarching agency has two subagencies that wear the hats of, respectively, litigator/enforcer and adjudicator, the "agency" that must be named as a respondent under Rule 15(a) is the overarching agency, which is free to designate its enforcer/litigator as its voice before the courts of appeals. It is not necessary that the overarching agency have absolute veto power over the decisions of its adjudicator, so long as it has substantial control over those decisions. By statute and regulation, the LHWCA adjudicative and enforcement/litigation functions of the Department of Labor are divided between the ALJ's and the Board on the one hand, and the Director on the other, and the Secretary of Labor has named the Direc- tor as the Department's designated litigant in the courts of appeals. The Department is thus the "agency" for Rule 15(a) purposes, and the Court concludes that the Director may be named as a respondent in the courts of appeals. Although the Director does not always have the right to appeal as a petitioner to those courts, Director, Office of Work- ers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 135­136, this does not result in a "lopsided" representation scheme whereby the Director can appear only in defense of the Board's decisions. The Director, even as a respondent, is free to argue on behalf of the petitioner, see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 301, and to challenge the Board's decision. Pp. 262­270. 65 F. 3d 460, affirmed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 270. Richard P. Salloum argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Paul B. Howell, William J. Powers, Jr., and George M. Simmerman, Jr. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the federal respondent. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, and Edward D. Sieger. 519us2$18Z 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 251 Opinion of the Court Wynn E. Clark argued the cause for respondent Yates. With him on the brief was Ransom P. Jones III.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 33 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com- pensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 933, gives the "person entitled to compensation" two avenues of recovery: Such a person may seek to recover damages from the third parties ultimately at fault for any injuries and still recover compensation under the Act from the covered worker's employer as long as the worker's em- ployer gives its approval before the person settles with any of the third party tortfeasors. The question we decide today is whether an injured worker's spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under the Act after the worker dies, is a "person entitled to compensation" when the spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker's death. We also consider whether the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) is a proper respondent in proceedings before the courts of appeals. I Jefferson Yates worked for Ingalls as a shipfitter at its Pascagoula shipyards in Mississippi between 1953 and 1967 and was exposed to asbestos in his workplace during this time. In March 1981, Mr. Yates was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis, chronic bronchitis, and possible malignancy in his lungs. Less than a month later, he filed a claim for disability benefits under § 8 of the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 908, asserting that his present condition resulted from his expo- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Bethlehem Steel Corp. by Robert E. Babcock; and for the National Association of Water- front Employers et al. by Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Thomas D. Wilcox, and Franklin W. Losey. Victoria Edises and Anne Michelle Burr filed a brief for the Asbestos Victims of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 252 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court sure to asbestos while employed by Ingalls. Ingalls ad- mitted the compensability of this claim and eventually en- tered into a formal settlement with Mr. Yates in satisfaction of its liability under the Act. Mr. Yates, in the meantime, filed a lawsuit in Federal Dis- trict Court against the 23 manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos whose products were allegedly present at the Pas- cagoula shipyards during the period in which Mr. Yates con- tracted asbestosis. Before his death in 1986, Mr. Yates en- tered into settlement agreements with 8 of the 23 defendants (predeath settlements). Each defendant required Maggie Yates, Mr. Yates' wife, to join in the settlement and to re- lease her present right to sue for loss of consortium, even though she was not a party to the litigation. Six of the eight defendants also required Mrs. Yates to release any cause of action for wrongful death that might accrue to her after her husband died. None of the third party settlements was ap- proved by Ingalls. After her husband's death, which the parties have stipu- lated resulted from asbestos exposure that occurred "in the course and scope of [his] employment," App. to Pet. for Cert. A­59, Mrs. Yates filed a claim for death benefits as Mr. Yates' widow under § 9 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 909. Ingalls con- tested the claim on the ground that Mrs. Yates had been a "person entitled to compensation" under the Act when she entered into the predeath settlements. Ingalls argued that by failing to obtain its approval of those settlements she for- feited, under § 33(g)(1), her eligibility for death benefits. In response, Mrs. Yates argued that she was not a "person enti- tled to compensation" when she entered into those settle- ment agreements because her husband was still alive at that time. The deputy commissioner referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ ruled in favor of Mrs. Yates. Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 26 BRBS 174 (1992). The ALJ recog- nized that Mrs. Yates was no more than a "potential widow" 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 253 Opinion of the Court when she entered into the settlement agreements. App. to Pet. for Cert. A­67. Reasoning that the prerequisites for the recovery of death benefits could not be established prior to the worker's death, he found that the "spouse of an injured employee has no cause of action [under the Act] until the injured employee dies from his work-related injury." Id., at A­68. Because Mrs. Yates had no cause of action for death benefits prior to her husband's death, the ALJ con- cluded that she was not a "person entitled to compensation" obligated to seek the employer's approval of any settlements signed at that time. Ingalls appealed to the Benefits Review Board. Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 28 BRBS 137 (1994). The Direc- tor, OWCP, appeared as a respondent in support of Mrs. Yates. The Board affirmed, largely in reliance upon our de- cision in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469 (1992), in which we held that an injured worker was a "person entitled to compensation" for the purpose of disabil- ity benefits under § 8 of the Act at "the moment his right to recovery vested," id., at 477, which in that case was when the worker suffered his permanent injury. The Board rea- soned that Cowart's "vesting" rationale applied to death as well as disability benefits, and observed that Mrs. Yates' "right to death benefits under the Act could not have vested before she became a widow." App. to Pet. for Cert. A­35 (emphasis in original). Although it might appear at the time of settlement that Mrs. Yates would likely become a "person entitled to compensation" under the Act, before her hus- band's death any one of several events might occur that would prevent her from recovering any death benefits under the Act-she might predecease her husband, she might di- vorce her husband, or her husband might die from causes independent of his work-related injury. For these reasons, the Board held that Mrs. Yates was not a "person entitled to compensation" at the time she entered into the predeath settlements, but acknowledged that its ruling was at odds 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 254 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- cuit in Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F. 3d 843 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U. S. 1219 (1994). Ingalls again appealed, this time to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 65 F. 3d 460 (1995). Although Ingalls renewed its § 33(g) argument, the Court of Appeals rejected it for the reasons advanced by the Board. Ingalls also moved to strike the brief of the Director and to disallow the Director's further participation in the appeal on the ground that the Director lacked standing. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument in a footnote, citing its prior deci- sion in Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Systems, Inc. v. White, 681 F. 2d 275, 280­284 (CA5 1982), overruled on other grounds, Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Round- tree, 723 F. 2d 399, 406­407 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 818 (1984), in which the court held that "the Director has standing to participate as a respondent in the appeal of a [Benefits Review Board] decision [before the Court of Appeals]." 65 F. 3d, at 463, n. 2. The court distinguished our decision in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122 (1995), as relevant only to the question of the Director's standing as a petitioner to the Court of Appeals, and not as a respondent. The Courts of Appeals are in disagreement over both questions addressed. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are divided on the meaning of the phrase "person entitled to compensation." Compare 65 F. 3d, at 464 (potential widow is not a "person entitled to compensation"), with Cretan, supra, at 847 (potential widow is a "person enti- tled to compensation"). The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, and for the District of Co- lumbia, are split over whether the Director may participate in proceedings before the Courts of Appeals as a respondent. Compare Parker v. Director, OWCP, 75 F. 3d 929, 935 (CA4 1996) (Director may not appear), cert. denied, post, p. 812, 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 255 Opinion of the Court with Shahady v. Atlas Tile & Marble Co., 673 F. 2d 479, 483­484 (CADC 1982) (Director is a proper respondent as a person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the decision below); Goldsmith v. Director, OWCP, 838 F. 2d 1079, 1080 (CA9 1988) (same); White, supra, at 281­282 (Director may appear pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a)). We granted certiorari to resolve these splits, 517 U. S. 1186 (1996). II We begin our inquiry into the meaning of the phrase "per- son entitled to compensation" in § 33(g), as we must, with an examination of the language of the statute. Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990) ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Section 33(g)(1) states in perti- nent part: "If the person entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third person . . . for an amount less than the compensation to which the person . . . would be entitled under this chapter, the employer shall be liable for compensation as determined under subsection (f) of this section only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer and the employer's carrier, before the settlement is executed, and by the person entitled to compensation . . . ." 33 U. S. C. § 933(g)(1) (emphasis added). The plain language of this subsection reveals two salient points. First, the use of the present tense (i. e., "enters") indicates that the "person entitled to compensation" must be so entitled at the time of settlement. Second, the ordinary meaning of the word "entitle" indicates that the "person enti- tled to compensation" must at the very least be qualified to receive compensation. Black's Law Dictionary 532 (6th ed. 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 256 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court 1990) (defining "entitle" as "To qualify for; to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or claiming"). We reached the same conclusion in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469 (1992). There, Cowart, an injured worker, settled with a third party without obtain- ing the consent of his employer or his employer's insurance carrier. Cowart thereafter filed a claim for disability bene- fits under the Act, which his employer contested. The em- ployer argued that Cowart had been a "person entitled to compensation" under the Act at the time of his settlement, and that his failure to obtain his employer's approval of the settlement barred any further recovery of benefits under the Act. In response, Cowart asserted that he had not been a "person entitled to compensation" when he entered into the settlement because that phrase referred only "to injured workers who are either already receiving compensation pay- ments from their employer, or in whose favor an award of compensation has been entered." Id., at 475. The Court held that Cowart was barred by § 33(g) from receiving further compensation under the Act. We recog- nized that the relevant time for examining whether a person is "entitled to compensation" is the time of settlement. Ibid. ("The question is whether Cowart, at the time of . . . settle- ment, was a `person entitled to compensation' under the terms of § 33(g)(1) of the LHWCA"). We then addressed the definition of the term "person entitled to compensation." We said: "Both in legal and general usage, the normal meaning of entitlement includes a right or benefit for which a person qualifies, and it does not depend upon whether the right has been acknowledged or adjudicated. It means only that the person satisfies the prerequisites attached to the right." Id., at 477. We concluded that Cowart had satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining the permanent disability benefits at issue in that 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 257 Opinion of the Court case when he was injured, so that he was a "person entitled to compensation" and required to obtain his employer's ap- proval at the time he entered into the settlement agree- ment. Ibid. With Cowart and the plain language of § 33(g) in mind, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether Mrs. Yates satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining death benefits under the Act at the time she signed the releases contained in the predeath settlements. Section 9 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 909(b), gov- erns the distribution of death benefits, and provides that a "widow or widower" is entitled to such benefits "[i]f the [em- ployee's] injury causes death." See also § 902(11) (defining "death" as a basis for a right to compensation as "death re- sulting from an injury"); § 902(2) (defining "injury" as "acci- dental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment"). The Act defines a "widow or widower" as "the decedent's wife or husband living with or dependent for support upon him or her at the time of his or her death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his or her desertion at such time." § 902(16). Taken together, these statutes indicate that a surviving spouse qualifies for death benefits only if: (i) the survivor's deceased worker-spouse dies from a work-related injury; (ii) the survivor is married to the worker-spouse at the time of the worker-spouse's death; and (iii) the survivor is either liv- ing with the worker-spouse, dependent upon the worker- spouse, or living apart from the worker-spouse because of desertion or other justifiable cause at the time of the worker-spouse's death. Cf. Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U. S. 334, 336 (1954) (looking to status of spouse at time of death to determine whether spouse is a "widow" or "widower" for purposes of LHWCA). It is impossible to ascertain whether these prerequisites have been met at any time prior to the death of the injured worker. Accord, Cortner v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 22 BRBS 218, 220 (1989) ("It is not until death occurs that the right to benefits arises and the potential ben- 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 258 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court eficiaries are identified"); 51 Fed. Reg. 4270, 4276 (1986) ("Since a claim for survivor benefits does not arise until the employee's death, there is no claim [against the employer] that can be settled [before then]"). We therefore reject the argument that a person seeking death benefits under the Act can satisfy the prerequisites for those benefits at any earlier time-e. g., when the worker is initially injured or when the worker enters into a predeath settlement. See also 20 CFR § 702.241(g) (1996) (no one can enter a settlement agreement with the employer regarding death benefits before the worker dies). Because Mrs. Yates' husband was alive at the time she released her potential wrongful death actions, she was not a "person entitled to compensation" at that time and was therefore not obligated to seek Ingalls' approval to pre- serve her entitlement to statutory death benefits. Ingalls contends that the plain language of § 33(g)(1) man- dates a contrary conclusion. Ingalls' analysis focuses on the presence of the phrase "would be entitled": "If the person entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third person . . . for an amount less than the compensation to which the person . . . would be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable [only if approval is obtained]." 33 U. S. C. § 933(g)(1) (emphasis added). Because this subsection examines the compensation to which the person "would be entitled" under the Act, argues Ingalls, it "encompasses a broad forward looking concept" that effec- tively brings any "person who would be entitled to compen- sation" within its purview. Brief for Petitioners 15. As support, Ingalls draws upon the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F. 3d 843 (1993). On facts almost identical to those presented here, the Court of Appeals held that the injured worker's spouse was a "person entitled to compensation" for death benefits prior to her husband's death. The court found "lit- 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 259 Opinion of the Court tle sense in a distinction that turns on whether the death for which settlement is made has yet to occur." Id., at 847. Ingalls essentially takes issue with our conclusion that the proper time to evaluate whether a person is "entitled to com- pensation" is the time of settlement. Ingalls' position is at odds with our precedent, see Cowart, 505 U. S., at 475, and with the plain language of this statute, supra, at 255. The phrase "would be entitled" in subsection (g)(1) simply frames the inquiry into whether the approval requirement applies at all. If the person entitled to compensation enters into a settlement for an amount less than that to which the person "would be entitled" under the Act, then the employer's ap- proval must be obtained. If the settlement is for an amount greater than or equal to the amount to which the person "would be entitled," then the employer's approval need not be obtained. 505 U. S., at 482. Ingalls' reading would as- sign an additional and unnecessary purpose to the phrase. Under Ingalls' suggested reading, a worker's spouse who signs a predeath settlement is considered a "person entitled to compensation" even though, in the time between the set- tlement and the worker's death, the worker's spouse might become ineligible for those death benefits (e. g., by prede- ceasing or divorcing the worker). In this context, the work- er's spouse would not actually be entitled to death benefits, but would nonetheless be considered the "person entitled" to such benefits. This reading cannot be supported by the statutory language. Ingalls also contends that we should depart from a plain reading of the statutory language because strict adherence to it is at odds with the policies underlying the Act. More specifically, Ingalls avers that our reading of § 33(g) will ef- fectively abrogate the employer's right to offset its liability for death benefits by any amounts received by the surviving spouse in predeath settlements. Section 33(f) allows an em- ployer to reduce its compensation obligations under the Act by the net amount of damages that the "person entitled 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 260 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court to compensation" recovers from third parties. 33 U. S. C. § 933(f) ("If the person entitled to compensation institutes proceedings . . . the employer shall be required to pay as compensation under this chapter a sum equal to the excess of the amount which the Secretary determines is payable on account of such injury or death over the net amount recov- ered against such third person"). If, as Ingalls asserts, the phrase "person entitled to compensation" means the same thing under § 33(f) as it does under § 33(g), see Cowart, supra, at 479, then our holding today means that an employer would not be permitted to reduce the spouse's death benefits by any amounts the spouse receives from predeath settle- ments. Such a spouse would be able to recover once from the third party and again from the worker's employer under the Act after the worker's death. In effect, a spouse in this situation-unlike a spouse who entered into settlements the day after the worker dies-would receive double recovery for her injuries. This double recovery, Ingalls contends, contravenes one of the central tenets of the Act set forth in § 3(e), 33 U. S. C. § 903(e), of the Act: "[A]ny amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers' compensation law or section 688 of title 46, Appendix (relating to recovery for injury to or death of seamen), shall be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter." See also Cowart, supra, at 483 (noting that the Act "ensures against fraudulent double recovery by the employee"); 2A A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 71.21 (1996) ("[T]he policy of avoiding double recovery is a strong one . . ."). In Ingalls' view, our reading of the statute gives a "potential widow . . . greater benefits and protections than that afforded to covered employees who settle their third party claims." Brief for Petitioners 22­23. This entire argument, however, presupposes that the definition we today give to "person entitled to compensation" under § 33(g) applies without qualification to § 33(f) as well. 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 261 Opinion of the Court This is a question we have yet to decide, and is one we leave for another day. If, for the sake of argument, we assumed that Ingalls' proposition were correct, our conclusion on the question presented in this case would not change. We agree that the Act generally reflects a policy of avoiding double recovery. See 33 U. S. C. § 903(e). But § 903(e) is of fairly recent vintage, Pub. L. 98­426, 98 Stat. 1640; E. P. Paup Co. v. Director, OWCP, 999 F. 2d 1341, 1350 (CA9 1993) ("Prior to [enactment of] section 903(e), the credit doctrine allowed offset of benefits against LHWCA awards only if prior bene- fits were awarded under the LHWCA") (emphasis added), and its reach is not all inclusive. See, e. g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 848 F. 2d 125 (CA9 1998) (allowing double recovery of veterans disability benefits and LHWCA benefits); Brown v. Forest Oil Corp., 29 F. 3d 966, 971 (CA5 1994) ("Although admittedly the LHWCA has a general pol- icy to avoid double recoveries, we have also noted that limi- tations on employee recovery are not favored absent statu- tory authority") (footnote omitted). Because the prohibition against double recovery is not absolute, we do not find the possibility of such recovery in this context to be so absurd or glaringly unjust as to warrant a departure from the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484 (1984) (plain language controls unless it leads to results that are " `absurd or glaringly unjust' "). Further- more, as Ingalls acknowledges, see Reply Brief for Petition- ers 13, subrogation under the Act is not an employer's exclu- sive remedy against third parties responsible for employees' injuries; an employer in Ingalls' position would remain free to seek indemnification against a third party through a tort action in state or federal court. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U. S. 529, 538 (1983); Federal Marine Ter- minals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U. S. 404, 412­414 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that before an injured work- er's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to compensation" for death benefits within the meaning of 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 262 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court LHWCA § 33(g), and does not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the Act for failure to obtain the work- er's employer's approval of settlements entered into before the worker's death. III Ingalls also challenges the "standing" of the Director, OWCP, to appear before the courts of appeals as a respond- ent in cases in which there are already two adverse litigants. To assess this claim, familiarity with the Act's appeals proc- ess, as well as with the Director's role within that process, is helpful. A person seeking compensation under the Act must file a timely claim with the local deputy commissioner. 33 U. S. C. § 913(a) (1-year limitation period). The commissioner noti- fies the employer of the claim, § 919(b), at which time the employer might: (i) agree to pay the amount of benefits fixed by the Act, 20 CFR § 702.231 et seq. (1996) (procedures for payment of noncontroverted claims); (ii) enter into a formal settlement with the person seeking compensation for a (pre- sumably) lesser amount, subject to the approval of the dep- uty commissioner or an ALJ, 33 U. S. C. § 908(i); 20 CFR § 702.241 et seq. (1996); or (iii) give notice that it is denying liability for, or controverting, the claim, § 702.251. If the employer controverts the claim, the deputy commissioner is empowered to attempt to resolve the parties' dispute infor- mally. § 702.311 et seq. Should informal discussions prove unsuccessful, the commissioner refers the matter to an ALJ and a formal hearing is held. 33 U. S. C. §§ 919(c)­(d); 20 CFR § 702.316 (1996). "[A]ny party in interest" may appeal the ALJ's decision to the Benefits Review Board. 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(3). An appeal from the Board's decision to the courts of appeals may be initiated by "[a]ny person ad- versely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board." § 921(c); see also 20 CFR § 802.410(a) (1996). The Director, OWCP, plays a significant role in this proc- ess. In addition to being charged with the LHWCA's ad- 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 263 Opinion of the Court ministration, § 701.202 (transferring to the Director "all func- tions of the Department of Labor with respect to the administration of benefits programs under the [LHWCA]"), and enforcement, § 802.410(b) (noting that Director is "re- sponsible for the administration and enforcement of the [LHWCA]"); see also Newport News, 514 U. S., at 134 (noting Director's "duty of uniform administration and enforce- ment"), the Director has also been authorized by the Secre- tary of Labor to appear as a litigant before the relevant adju- dicative branches of the Department of Labor, the ALJ, and the Benefits Review Board. 20 CFR § 702.333(b) (1996) ("The Solicitor of Labor or his designee may appear and par- ticipate in any formal hearing [before an ALJ] held pursuant to these regulations on behalf of the Director as an inter- ested party"); § 802.202(a) ("Any party . . . may appear before and/or submit written argument to the [Benefits Review] Board"); § 801.2(a)(10) (defining "party" to include "the Sec- retary or his designee"); § 802.201(a) ("The Director, OWCP, . . . shall [under certain circumstances] be considered a party adversely affected" for purposes of initiating appeal to Board). The Director may also appear before the courts of appeals, although the limits of the Director's authority to do so are less clear. Section 21(c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921(c), pro- vides in relevant part that "[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred . . . ." In Newport News, we held that "the phrase `person ad- versely affected or aggrieved' does not refer to an agency acting in its governmental capacity," 514 U. S., at 130, so that the Director was therefore not permitted to appeal from a decision of the Benefits Review Board when the Board's deci- sion did no more than "impai[r] [the Director's] ability to 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 264 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court achieve the Act's purposes and to perform the administrative duties the Act prescribes," id., at 126. We expressed no view on the question whether the Director can appear before the court of appeals, not as a petitioner seeking review, but as a respondent. Id., at 127, n. 2. Any impediment to the Director's appearance as a re- spondent in this case is not of constitutional origin. As we stated in Newport News, although the Director had no statu- tory authorization to petition the Court of Appeals, "Con- gress could have conferred standing upon the Director with- out infringing Article III of the Constitution." Id., at 133. In light of this observation, Article III surely poses no bar to the Director's participation as a respondent in those courts. Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 68­69 (1986) (reserving question whether persons seeking to intervene "must satisfy not only the requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III"). Whether the Director has statutory authority to appear as a respondent before the courts of appeals is not as easily resolved. The Act itself does not speak to the issue. Sec- tion 21(c) of the Act, by its very terms, defines only who "may obtain a review of [a final order of the Board]," 33 U. S. C. § 921(c); it does not purport to delineate who may appear in those proceedings once a proper party initiates them. Thus, we must reject Ingalls' argument that § 21(c) requires the Director to demonstrate an "advers[e] [e]ffect or aggriev[ement]" in order to appear as a respondent. Section 21a of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921a, similarly provides no authorization. While § 21a states that "[a]ttorneys ap- pointed by the Secretary shall represent the Secretary, the deputy commissioner, or the Board in any court proceedings under section 921 of this title or other provisions of this chap- ter," it says nothing about when the Secretary may be a party to those proceedings in the first place. See also 20 CFR § 802.410(b) (1996) ("The Director, OWCP, . . . shall be 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 265 Opinion of the Court deemed to be the proper party on behalf of the Secretary of Labor in all review proceedings conducted pursuant to sec- tion 21(c) of the LHWCA"). Nor need we infer the Direc- tor's right to appear as a respondent in order for § 21a to have meaning. Although Newport News curtailed the Sec- retary's right to appear as a petitioner before the courts of appeals in most circumstances, that decision did not foreclose an appearance as a petitioner in all situations. See, e. g., Newport News, supra, at 128, n. 3 (leaving open the possibil- ity that the Director may be a "person adversely affected or aggrieved" when appealing a Board ruling adverse to the § 944 fund). Left with no guidance from the Act itself, we turn to the general rule that governs all appeals from administrative agencies to the courts of appeals, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a). That Rule, in pertinent part, states: "Review of an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer (hereinafter, the term `agency' will include agency, board, commission, or officer) must be obtained by filing with the clerk of a court of appeals . . . [the appropriate form indicated by law]. . . . In each case the agency must be named respondent." (Empha- sis added.) We believe that it is this Rule that confers upon the Director the right to appear as a respondent before the courts of ap- peals. Rule 15(a) clearly applies to appeals from the Bene- fits Review Board: The LHWCA authorizes appellate review of the "final order of the [Benefits Review] Board," 33 U. S. C. § 921(c), and Rule 15(a) applies to "[r]eview of an order of an administrative agency [or] board." We decline to read Rule 15(a) more narrowly, as the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the District of Columbia have done. Those courts have held that Rule 15(a) applies only where "a single private party is contesting the action of an agency, which agency must appear and defend on the merits 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 266 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court to insure the proper adversarial clash requisite to a `case or controversy.' " McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 514 F. 2d 198, 200 (CADC 1975). Where "there is sufficient adversity between [the employer and the claimant] to insure proper litigation," ibid., they reason, "the Director's presence as a party is not necessary" and would in fact run afoul of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 1(b) by " `extend[ing] . . . the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.' " Parker, 75 F. 3d, at 934 (citing McCord, supra, at 200); see also Fed. Rule App. Proc. 1(b) ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as established by law"). We reject this interpretation, which would effectively re- quire us to tack the words "when necessary to preserve ad- versity" onto the otherwise unqualified language in Rule 15(a) that "the agency must be named respondent." Where there is already a case or controversy between parties prop- erly before a court, as there is in this case between Ingalls and Mrs. Yates who properly appear pursuant to 33 U. S. C. § 921(c), that court's jurisdiction is not extended by the inclu- sion of an additional party whose presence is also consistent with Article III, see supra, at 264. See Pittston Stevedor- ing Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d 35, 43, n. 5 (CA2 1976) ("The existence of sufficient adversity between private par- ties has not been thought to preclude the Government's right to be a party in many other sorts of review of federal admin- istrative action"), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249 (1977). Jus- tice Scalia is concerned that Rule 1(b) might be violated in the converse situation-i. e., when the Director is the sole respondent whose presence is "necessary to preserve adver- sity." See post, at 274. Although the Director's participa- tion in that case would not extend the courts' jurisdiction beyond the perimeter of Article III, see Newport News, 514 U. S., at 133 (no Article III impediment to the Director's par- ticipation), it is possible that such participation might exceed 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 267 Opinion of the Court the court's statutory authority to hear the case. While this transgression of statutory authority is not a question we de- cide today, it nevertheless raises a concern relevant to our interpretation of Rule 15(a). We do not find this concern controlling, however, when, as in this case, the Director is not in fact the sole respondent. Having concluded that Rule 15(a) applies, the question becomes which "agency" must be named as a respondent. When an agency has a unitary structure-i. e., where a single entity wears the hats of adjudicator and litigator/ enforcer-the application of Rule 15(a) is straightforward. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for in- stance, has adjudicative duties, 47 U. S. C. §§ 154(j), 155(c), as well as enforcement duties that require it to appear as a litigant, § 402. It is therefore proper to name the FCC as the respondent "agency" in proceedings before the courts of appeals under Rule 15(a). Indeed, it is necessary to do so, since the FCC is the only "agency" that could be named. See also 29 U. S. C. § 160(f) (National Labor Relations Board adjudicates unfair labor practice claims and litigates before the courts of appeals); 16 U. S. C. §§ 825f, 825g (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission investigates, enforces, and adjudicates violations of the Federal Power Act). But not all agencies share this unitary structure. Some have a split-function regime in which Congress places adjudi- catory authority outside the agency charged with adminis- tering and enforcing the statute. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, for example, gives general enforce- ment authority to the Department of Labor, but vests adjudi- catory authority in an independent body, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 651(b)(3), 661; Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 147 (1991). See also 30 U. S. C. §§ 811, 823 (authorizing Secretary of Labor to pro- mulgate health and safety standards under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, but establishing independent 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 268 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of the Court Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission to ex- ercise adjudicatory authority under the Act). Other split- function regimes involve only one agency, whose adjudicative and enforcement/litigation duties have been divided by Con- gress between two sub-"agencies," both of which are under the umbrella of the same overarching agency. In this latter type of split-function regime, the only type that we address today, it is the overarching agency that is the "agency" for the purposes of Rule 15(a), since an order of the agency's designated adjudicator is in reality an order of the agency itself. That "agency" may then be free to des- ignate its enforcer/litigator as its voice before the courts of appeals. To require the agency's adjudicator to appear be- fore the courts of appeals makes little sense because that adjudicator has no more interest or stake in defending its orders in the courts of appeals than does a district court. It would also compel what we believe is a strange result-the substitution of an agency's adjudicator for its designated liti- gator once the case reaches the courts of appeals. Although our interpretation of Rule 15(a), as the dissent points out, is not free from anomalies, neither is the dissent's interpretation. In particular, we take issue with the dis- sent's view that the overarching agency must have absolute veto power over the decisions of its adjudicator before the adjudicator is deemed to be "within" the agency and before the order of one can be considered the order of the other. Cf. 8 CFR § 3.1(h) (1996) (Attorney General may review and modify decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's adjudicator). Other methods of agency oversight exist, and an agency's inability to employ the most compelling form of oversight does not mean it possesses no supervisory authority over its tribunal or that it is therefore somehow unfair to treat the adjudicator's order as the agency's. The Secretary of La- bor's power under the LHWCA to appoint all five members of the Benefits Review Board, 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(1), and 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 269 Opinion of the Court to establish the rules of procedure of the Board, 20 CFR § 802.101 et seq. (1996), demonstrates the Secretary's indirect but substantial control over the Board and its decisions. Perhaps these concerns animated the Courts of Appeals ac- tually confronted with this situation, since they have seen fit, in over 2,000 decisions, to allow the Director's participa- tion as a respondent. WESTLAW, CTA database (Jan. 21, 1997). Should Congress wish to alter this review scheme, it is, of course, free to do so. As it stands now, however, we conclude that the Director may be named as a respondent in the courts of appeals. By statute and by regulation, the adjudicative and enforcement/ litigation functions of the Department of Labor with respect to the LHWCA are divided between the ALJ's and the Bene- fits Review Board on the one hand, 20 CFR § 702.332 (1996) (formal hearings conducted by ALJ's); 33 U. S. C. § 921(b) (appeals from ALJ's heard by Benefits Review Board), and the Director on the other, see supra, at 262­263. Because the Benefits Review Board is a subdivision of the Depart- ment of Labor, see H. R. Rep. No. 92­1441, p. 12 (1972) (de- scribing Board as "provid[ing] an internal administrative re- view of initial decisions in contested cases by a three-man board within the Department of Labor") (emphasis added); 20 CFR § 801 et seq. (1996) (describing "establishment and the organizational structure of the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor") (emphasis added), the Board's order is the Department's order, and the Department of Labor is the "agency" for the purposes of Rule 15(a). Con- gress, however, has delegated to the Secretary of Labor, the Department's chief administrator, the right to choose the De- partment's legal representative, 33 U. S. C. § 921a, and the Secretary has exercised that discretion by naming the Direc- tor as the Department's designated litigant in the courts of appeals. 20 CFR § 802.410(b) (1996). This conclusion does not upset the balance of representa- tion in the courts of appeals. Although in Newport News 519us2$18J 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 270 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of Scalia, J. we held that the Director does not always have the right to appeal as a petitioner to the courts of appeals, 514 U. S., at 135­136, and we now hold that the Director may appear as a respondent before those courts, this will not result in a "lop- sided" scheme whereby the Director can appear only in defense of the Benefits Review Board's decisions. The Di- rector, even as a respondent, is free to argue on behalf of the petitioner, see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 301 (1983) (Director appeared as respondent before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit but filed a brief on behalf of the petitioner), and to challenge the decision of the Board. Indeed, the Director's participation before the courts of appeals would be plenary but for the inability to initiate an appeal; the Director must usually wait for some- one else to do so first. Although this is unusual, it does not result in a "lopsided" proceeding and is an oddity wrought by congressional "oversight," Newport News, 514 U. S., at 128­129 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and not by virtue of our holding today. For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Today's opinion concludes, on the basis of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a), that the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, a subagency within the Department of Labor, is a proper respondent in the courts of appeals when review is sought of an order of the Benefits Review Board (Board or BRB), an independent adjudicatory body within that Department. This conclusion is at odds with the plain language of the Rule, and produces a bizarre arrangement that will have troublesome consequences for 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 271 Opinion of Scalia, J. both agencies and private parties. I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment on this issue. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a) provides: "Review of an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer (hereinafter, the term `agency' will include agency, board, commission, or officer) must be obtained by filing [a petition for review]. . . . In each case the agency must be named respondent." It is clear (and the Court does not say otherwise) that de- spite the Rule's shorthand use of "agency" in the second sen- tence, the entity that must be named respondent is the one whose order is under review, whether it is an agency, board, commission, or officer. Thus, in determining whether the Rule authorizes the Director, as representative of the De- partment of Labor, to appear as a respondent in the courts of appeals, the central question is whether the order under review is that of the Department. The answer to that ques- tion is obviously and unavoidably no. To begin with, the very statute that provides for the judi- cial review at issue indicates that the order under review is that of the BRB: "Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred . . . . Upon such filing, the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall have the power to give a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, the order of the Board . . . ." 44 Stat. 1436­1437, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 921(c) (emphasis added). The governing statute elsewhere specifies that the Board is the statutorily created entity responsible for "hear[ing] and determin[ing] appeals . . . taken by any party in interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees under" the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 272 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of Scalia, J. (LHWCA). § 921(b)(3). The Board's disposition of those appeals is not subject to review by the Secretary of Labor in his capacity as head of the Department, but must be ap- pealed to the courts pursuant to the review provision quoted above. Despite the clarity of the statute, the Court concludes that it is "in reality" an order of the Department that is under review in the courts of appeals. Ante, at 267­270. It offers two arguments in support of this proposition. First, it says-relying upon a regulation promulgated by the Secre- tary, 20 CFR § 801.1 (1996), and upon a statement in the House Report on the LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1251-that the Board is "a subdivision of the Department of Labor." Ante, at 269. But of course neither a Secretary's regulation nor a House Committee's report has the power to transform a statutory entity into something it is not. While the Board may be a "subdivision" of the Department of Labor-and thereby subject to the Secretary's authority- for certain purposes, see, e. g., 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(1) (Secre- tary appoints Board members); § 939(a) ("Except as other- wise specifically provided, the Secretary shall administer the provisions of" the LHWCA); 20 CFR § 802.101 et seq. (1996) (regulations of Secretary establishing rules of procedure for Board), the Court expressly acknowledges that the Board is not a subdivision in the sense that the Secretary, as head of the Department, can direct or override its decisions. Ante, at 268. But that sense is the one relevant to the question whether an order of the Board is "in reality" an order of the Department, ibid. Insofar as vindication of the order is concerned, there is no "necessary identity of interest" be- tween the Board and the Department or the Director as its chosen delegate. Shahady v. Atlas Tile & Marble Co., 673 F. 2d 479, 485 (CADC 1982) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, the Department through its delegate may well be hoping to see the Board's order overturned in the court of appeals. See, e. g., Parker v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 273 Opinion of Scalia, J. Programs, 75 F. 3d 929, 932­934, 935, n. 7 (CA4), cert. denied, post, p. 812; Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compen- sation Programs, 681 F. 2d 81, 82 (CA1 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Work- ers' Compensation Programs, 459 U. S. 1127 (1983). The Court's attribution of the Board's order to the Department contradicts our recognition, only two Terms ago, that it is "quite simply contrary to the whole structure" of the LHWCA to view the Board's adjudicatory functions as the province of (implicitly) the Department as overarching agency and (explicitly) the Director as its delegate. Direc- tor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 134 (1995). The second argument offered in support of the view that the Director is a proper respondent when review is sought of an order of the Board is that (1) Rule 15(a) requires the naming of someone representing the agency, and (2) the Di- rector is certainly a more sensible candidate than the Board. Ante, at 267, 268. The second part of this analysis, the faute de mieux point, is questionable: The Board could readily de- velop a staff to defend its judgments, and it is hard to imag- ine a worse defender than an entity that is free to disagree (and often does disagree) with the order under review. Cf. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d 35, 42, n. 5 (CA2 1976) (Friendly, J.) (suggesting that Board rather than Director is proper respondent), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249 (1977). But the real flaw in the reasoning is the first step, which assumes that when Rule 15(a) states that the "agency, board, commission, or officer" whose order is under review "must be named respondent," it means to con- fer upon such entities (or, in the Court's view, their parent agencies) a party status and litigating power they would not otherwise possess-so that a purely adjudicatory body with no policymaking responsibility, which would otherwise not be a party, is suddenly free to step in (perhaps through its 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 274 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of Scalia, J. parent) to "defend" its judgment. That is not only an un- likely function for the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to perform (and thus an unlikely reading of the language of Rule 15(a), which, contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 266, is far from unambiguous on this point); it is an impermissible function, since it may give appellate courts jurisdiction over a dispute (if it can be called a dispute) that would otherwise be beyond their ken, namely, one in which the victorious private party to the lower court adjudication has no interest in defending it, and only the adjudicator itself (or its parent) appears. That extension of litigation would violate Rule 1(b), which provides that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as established by law." Fed. Rule App. Proc. 1(b). In the present context, for example, if the victorious employer against whom the employee takes an appeal chooses not to contest it, or ceases to exist while the appeal is pending, the agency's status as a party respondent would permit continued litigation of the appeal. The concern with extending the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals through participation of the Director is more than theoretical; he has in the past sought to continue litigation of claims (at least at the Board level) that the em- ployee and employer preferred not to pursue. E. g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Systems, Inc. v. White, 681 F. 2d 275, 277 (CA5 1982), overruled on other grounds, Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F. 2d 399, 407 (CA5 1984). The Court's response to all of this is that concerns about extension of jurisdiction are "not . . . controlling" in this case, since both private parties are participating. Ante, at 267. But of course when we interpret a rule of general applica- tion, such as Rule 15(a), we are bound to take into account not only the ramifications of our interpretation for the case before us, but also the ramifications for future cases. In- 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 275 Opinion of Scalia, J. deed, a different approach would make the meaning we as- cribe to the general rule turn on the specifics of the case that first raises the issue. For good reason, that is not our practice. Because interpreting Rule 15(a) to make the Di- rector a party would sometimes extend the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, and because Rule 1(b) requires that the Rule be construed to avoid that result, the Rule should not be given the meaning that today's opinion accords it. Invoking Rule 15(a) (and, of course, ignoring the identity of the body that issued the order) is the only imaginable basis for concluding that the Director is always a proper respond- ent in the courts of appeals, regardless of the outcome below. There is, however, a respectable argument in support of his respondent status when he participates before the Board and prevails. That parties in whose favor the judgment under review runs are ordinarily proper respondents or ap- pellees in the courts of appeals is so obvious that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-which, contrary to the Court's belief, purport to prescribe which parties must be named, not who is a party-do not bother to provide for the naming of such individuals. (That is to say, there is no ana- logue to Rule 15(a) for them.) But the Director-even assuming he is entitled to par- ticipate as a party before the Board, compare 20 CFR § 802.201(a)(1) (1996) (allowing participation) with Newport News, supra, at 125­126 ("[T]he [LHWCA] does not by its terms . . . grant [the Director] authority to prosecute appeals to the Board")-is not an ordinary prevailing party. An or- dinary party in that position would, if he had lost below, have the right to prosecute an appeal. The Director, in contrast, has no such power. Newport News, supra. This inability to appeal reflects the limited character of the interests of the Director affected by the Board's judgment, which include neither his exposure to financial or other liability, nor nullifi- cation of one of his own orders, but only legal or policy dis- 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 276 INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS Opinion of Scalia, J. agreement with the Board's decision.* It would be an odd and novel result if the Director, in cases of this nature, could be named as a respondent if he was on the prevailing side below, but could not initiate an appeal if he was on the losing side. I would not reach such a result unless the statute left no choice, which is not the case here. Finally, I may observe that today's game has really not been worth the candle. The strange and countertextual ar- rangement that the Court has constructed might perhaps be excused if excluding the Director from party status would do some substantial harm to the scheme of the LHWCA. But it does not. His "significant role" in administering the Act, ante, at 262, does not mean that his participation in pro- ceedings before the courts of appeals is essential. As we emphasized in Newport News, limits on the Director's ability to participate in the judicial-review process are of relatively minor consequence because his "power to resolve legal ambi- guities in the statute" may always be exercised through his rulemaking authority. 514 U. S., at 134. In addition, the Director is guaranteed the right to file an amicus brief in the court of appeals, with or without the consent of the par- ties. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 29. * * * I think it plain that the intent of Rule 15(a) is not to restructure the Executive Branch, or to convert Article I courts (or their parent agencies) into litigating arms, but rather simply to require that those agencies entitled to party status-i. e., those that would be entitled to intervene in the appeal under the criteria set forth in Rule 15(d)-must be *In my view the Director is akin to an ordinary respondent or appellee when he prevails before the Board in his capacity as administrator of the LHWCA special fund established by 33 U. S. C. § 944. In Newport News, we left open the question whether the Director has standing to appeal an adverse ruling of the Board when he participates in that capacity. 514 U. S., at 125, n. 1. 519us2$18K 06-03-99 19:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997) 277 Opinion of Scalia, J. named as respondents. By making the Rule much more than that, and then flatly misidentifying, through sheer will power, the agency whose "order" is at issue, the Court cre- ates a zany system in which an Executive officer from whom the Board has carefully been made independent, and one who will often disagree with-and perhaps even have argued against-the Board's judgment, will be charged with "de- fending" that judgment in the court of appeals, where, once arrived, he is free instead to maintain an independent attack upon the judgment, even though, as we held in Newport News, he would not have been able to launch that attack by appealing on his own. Today's disposition regarding the Director's status is at odds with the relevant provisions of law and creates the potential for disruption of orderly liti- gation and settlement of disputes between employers and employees. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the judgment. 519us2$19Z 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 278 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY, TAX COMMISSIONER OF OHIO certiorari to the supreme court of ohio No. 95­1232. Argued October 7, 1996-Decided February 18, 1997 Ohio imposes general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, that do not meet its statutory definition of a "natural gas company." Ohio's state-regulated natural gas utilities (generally termed "local distribution companies" or LDC's) satisfy the statutory definition, but the State Supreme Court has deter- mined that producers and independent marketers generally do not. LDC gas sales thus enjoy a tax exemption inapplicable to gas sales by other vendors. The very possibility of nonexempt gas sales reflects an evolutionary change in the natural gas industry's structure. Tradition- ally, nearly all sales of natural gas directly to consumers were by LDC's, and were therefore exempt from Ohio's sales and use taxes. As a result of congressional and regulatory developments, however, a new market structure has evolved in which consumers, including large industrial end users, may buy gas from producers and independent marketers rather than from LDC's, and pay pipelines separately for transportation. In- deed, during the tax period in question, petitioner General Motors Cor- poration (GMC) bought virtually all the gas for its plants from out-of- state independent marketers, rather than from LDC's. Respondent Tax Commissioner applied the general use tax to GMC's purchases, and the State Board of Tax Appeals sustained that action. GMC argued on appeal, inter alia, that denying a tax exemption to sales by marketers but not LDC's violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Supreme Court of Ohio initially concluded that the tax regime does not violate the Commerce Clause because Ohio taxes natural gas sales at the same rate for both in-state and out-of-state companies that do not meet the statutory definition of "natural gas company." The court then stepped back to hold, however, that GMC lacked standing to bring a Commerce Clause challenge, and dismissed the equal protection claim as submerged in GMC's Commerce Clause argument. Held:1. GMC has standing to raise a Commerce Clause challenge. Cog- nizable injury from unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce does not stop at members of the class against whom a State ultimately discriminates. Customers of that class may also be injured, as in this case where the customer is liable to pay the tax and as a result 519us2$19Z 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 279 Syllabus presumably pays more for gas purchased from out-of-state producers and marketers. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 267. Pp. 286­287. 2. Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utili- ties and independent marketers does not violate the Commerce Clause. Pp. 287­311. (a) Congress and this Court have long recognized the value of state-regulated monopoly arrangements for gas sales and distribution directly to local consumers. See, e. g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U. S. 329. Even as congres- sional and regulatory developments resulted in increasing opportunity for a consumer to choose between gas sold by marketers and gas bun- dled with state-mandated rights and benefits as sold by LDC's, two things remained the same: Congress did nothing to limit the States' traditional autonomy to authorize and regulate local gas franchises, and those franchises continued to provide bundled gas to the vast majority of consumers who had neither the capacity to buy on the interstate mar- ket nor the resilience to forgo the reliability and protection that state regulation provided. To this day, all 50 States recognize the need to regulate utilities engaged in local gas distribution. Pp. 288­297. (b) Any notion of discrimination under the Commerce Clause as- sumes a comparison of substantially similar entities. When the alleg- edly competing entities provide different products, there is a threshold question whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for consti- tutional purposes. If the difference in products means that the entities serve different markets, and would continue to do so even if the suppos- edly discriminatory burden were removed, eliminating the burden would not serve the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective of pre- serving a national market for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident competi- tors. Here, the LDCs' bundled product reflects the demand of a core market-typified by residential customers to whom stability of rate and supply is important-that is neither susceptible to competition by the interstate sellers nor likely to be served except by the regulated natural monopolies that have historically supplied its needs. So far as this non- competitive market is concerned, competition would not be served by eliminating any tax differential as between sellers, and the dormant Commerce Clause has no job to do. On the other hand, eliminating the tax differential at issue might well intensify competition between LDC's and marketers for the noncaptive market of bulk buyers like GMC, which have no need for bundled protection. Thus, the question here is whether the existence of competition between marketers and LDC's in the noncaptive market requires treating the entities as alike for dor- 519us2$19Z 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 280 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Syllabus mant Commerce Clause purposes. A number of reasons support a deci- sion to give the greater weight to the distinctiveness of the captive market and the LDCs' singular role in serving that market, and hence to treat marketers and LDC's as dissimilar for Commerce Clause pur- poses. Pp. 297­303. (c) First and most important, this Court has an obligation to pro- ceed cautiously lest it imperil the LDCs' delivery of bundled gas to the noncompetitive captive market. Congress and the Court have recog- nized the importance of not jeopardizing service to this market. Pan- handle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra. State regulation of gas sales to consumers serves important health and safety interests in fairly obvious ways, in that requirements of depend- able supply and extended credit assure that individual domestic buyers are not frozen out of their houses in the cold months. The legitimate state pursuit of such interests is compatible with the Commerce Clause, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443­444, and such a justification may be weighed in the process of deciding the threshold question addressed here. Second, the Court lacks the expertness and the institutional resources necessary to predict the economic effects of judicial intervention invalidating Ohio's tax scheme on the LDCs' capac- ity to serve the captive market. See, e. g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325, 341­342. Thus, the most the Court can say is that modi- fication of Ohio's tax scheme could subject LDC's to economic pressure that in turn could threaten the preservation of an adequate customer base to support continued provision of bundled services to the captive market. Finally, should intervention by the National Government be necessary, Congress has both the power and the institutional compe- tence to decide upon and effectuate any desirable changes in the scheme that has evolved. For a half century Congress has been aware of this Court's conclusion in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind., 332 U. S. 507, that the Natural Gas Act of 1938 exempts state regulation of in-state retail gas sales from the dormant Commerce Clause, and since that decision has only reaffirmed the States' power in this regard. Pp. 303­310. (d) GMC's argument that Ohio's tax regime facially discriminates because the sales and use tax exemption would not apply to sales by out-of-state LDC's is rejected. Ohio courts might extend the challenged exemption to out-of-state utilities if confronted with the question, and this Court does not deem a hypothetical possibility of favoritism to constitute discrimination transgressing constitutional commands. Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 654. Pp. 310­311. 519us2$19Z 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 281 Opinion of the Court 3. Ohio's tax regime does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The differential tax treatment of LDC and independent marketer sales does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, and there is unquestionably a rational basis for Ohio's distinction between these two kinds of entities. Pp. 311­312. 73 Ohio St. 3d 29, 652 N. E. 2d 188, affirmed. Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 312. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 313. Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gregory A. Castanias and John C. Duffy, Jr. Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Betty D. Mont- gomery, Attorney General, and Barton A. Hubbard, Robert C. Maier, Paul A. Colbert, and Thomas McNamee, Assistant Attorneys General.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Ohio imposes its general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Walter Hellerstein, Carter G. Phillips, Rebecca H. Noecker, Karen L. Pauley, Robin S. Conrad, and Jan S. Amundson; and for the Process Gas Consumers Group et al. by Jerome B. Libin and William H. Penniman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Kansas et al. by Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, and Stephen R. McAllister, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Daniel E. Lungren of Cali- fornia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commission- ers by William Paul Rodgers, Jr.; and for Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., by Kenneth W. Christman. Paull Mines and Richard D. Pomp filed a brief for the Multistate Tax Commission as amicus curiae. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 282 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court out-of-state, except regulated public utilities that meet Ohio's statutory definition of a "natural gas company." The question here is whether this difference in tax treatment be- tween sales of gas by domestic utilities subject to regulation and sales of gas by other entities violates the Commerce Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. We hold that it does not. I During the tax period at issue,1 Ohio levied a 5% tax on the in-state sales of goods, including natural gas, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 5739.02, 5739.025 (Supp. 1990), and it im- posed a parallel 5% use tax on goods purchased out-of-state for use in Ohio. See § 5741.02 (1986). Local jurisdictions were authorized to levy certain additional taxes that in- creased these sales and use tax rates to as much as 7% in some municipalities. See § 5739.025 (Supp. 1990); Reply Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 11. Since 1935, when Ohio's first sales and use taxes were imposed, the State has exempted natural gas sales by "nat- ural gas compan[ies]" from all state and local sales taxes. § 5739.02(B)(7).2 Under Ohio law, "[a]ny person . . . [i]s a natural gas company when engaged in the business of sup- plying natural gas for lighting, power, or heating purposes to consumers within this state." § 5727.01(D)(4) (1996); see also § 5727.01(E)(4) (Supp. 1990); § 5727.01(E)(8) (1986). It is undisputed that natural gas utilities (generally termed "local distribution companies" or LDC's) located in Ohio sat- isfy this definition of "natural gas company." The Supreme Court of Ohio has, however, interpreted the statutory term to exclude non-LDC gas sellers, such as producers and inde- pendent marketers, see Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St. 1 The natural gas purchases that gave rise to petitioner's challenge were made during the period from October 1, 1986, to June 30, 1990. 2 The exemption was originally codified at Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 5546­ 2(6) (Baldwin 1952). As part of a general recodification in 1953, it was moved to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5739.02(B)(7), where it remains today. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 283 Opinion of the Court 3d 26, 652 N. E. 2d 185 (1995), and the State has accordingly treated their sales as outside the exemption and so subject to the tax. The very question of such an exclusion, and consequent taxation of gas sales or use, reflects a recent stage of evolu- tion in the structure of the natural gas industry. Tradition- ally, the industry was divisible into three relatively distinct segments: producers, interstate pipelines, and LDC's. This market structure was possible largely because the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq., failed to require interstate pipelines to offer transportation services to third parties wishing to ship gas. As a result, "interstate pipelines [were able] to use their monopoly power over gas transportation to create and maintain monopsony power in the market for the purchase of gas at the wellhead and monopoly power in the market for the sale of gas to LDCs." Pierce, The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 Nat. Resources & Env't 53, 53­54 (Summer 1995) (hereinafter Pierce). For the most part, then, producers sold their gas to the pipelines, which resold it to utilities, which in turn provided local distribution to consumers. See, e. g., Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F. 2d 981, 993 (CADC 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 1006 (1988); Mogel & Gregg, Appropriateness of Imposing Common Carrier Status on Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 4 Energy L. J. 155, 157 (1983). Congress took a first step toward increasing competition in the natural gas market by enacting the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3350, 15 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq., which was designed to phase out regulation of wellhead prices charged by producers of natural gas, and to "promote gas transportation by interstate and intrastate pipelines" for third parties. 57 Fed. Reg. 13271 (1992). Pipelines were reluctant to provide common carriage, however, when doing so would displace their own sales, see Associated Gas Dis- tributors v. FERC, supra, at 993, and in 1985, the Federal 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 284 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took the further step of promulgating Order No. 436, which contained an "open access" rule providing incentives for pipelines to offer gas transportation services, see 50 Fed. Reg. 42408. In 1992, this evolution culminated in FERC's Order No. 636, which required all interstate pipelines to "unbundle" their transportation services from their own natural gas sales and to provide common carriage services to buyers from other sources that wished to ship gas. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13267. Although FERC did not take the further step of requiring intrastate pipelines to provide local transportation services to ensure that gas sold by producers and independent mar- keters could get all the way to the point of consumption,3 under the system of open access to interstate pipelines that had emerged in the mid-1980's "larger industrial end-users" began increasingly to bypass utilities' local distribution net- works by "construct[ing] their own pipeline spurs to [inter- state] pipeline[s] . . . ." Fagan, From Regulation to Deregu- lation: The Diminishing Role of the Small Consumer Within the Natural Gas Industry, 29 Tulsa L. J. 707, 723 (1994). By- pass posed a problem for LDC's, since the departure of large end users from the system left the same fixed costs to be spread over a smaller customer base. The State of Ohio consequently took steps in 1986 to keep some income from large industrial customers within the utility system by adopting regulations that allowed industrial end users in Ohio to buy natural gas from producers or independent mar- keters, pay interstate pipelines for interstate transportation, and pay LDC's for local transportation. See In re Commis- 3 Section 1(b) of the NGA, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717(b), explicitly exempts "local distribution of natural gas" from federal regulation. In addition, the Hinshaw Amendment to the NGA, 15 U. S. C. § 717(c), ex- empts from FERC regulation intrastate pipelines that operate exclusively in one State and with rates and service regulated by the State. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 71 F. 3d 897, 898, n. 2 (CADC 1995). See also infra, at 293. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 285 Opinion of the Court sion Ordered Investigation of the Availability of Gas Transportation Service Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Utilities to End-Use Customers, No. 85­800­GA­COI (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, Apr. 15, 1986); see generally Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee, 1990 Annual Re- port, in Natural Resources Energy and Environmental Law, 1990 Year in Review 57, 91­92, and n. 207 (1991). This new market structure led to the question whether purchases from non-LDC sellers of natural gas qualified for the state sales tax exemption under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5739.02(B)(7) (Supp. 1990). In Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, the Ohio Supreme Court held that they do not. The court rea- soned that independent marketers do not "suppl[y]" natural gas as required by § 5727.01(D)(4), because they do "not own or control any physical assets to . . . distribute natural gas." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 28, 652 N. E. 2d, at 187. This determina- tion of state law led in turn to the case before us now. During the tax period in question here, petitioner General Motors Corporation (GMC) bought virtually all the natural gas for its Ohio plants from out-of-state marketers, not LDC's.4 Respondent Tax Commissioner of Ohio applied the State's general use tax to GMC's purchases, and the State Board of Tax Appeals sustained that action. GMC appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio on two grounds. GMC first contended that its purchases should be exempt from the sales tax because independent marketers fell within the statutory definition of "natural gas company." The State Supreme Court, citing its decision the same day in Chrysler, rejected this argument. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St. 3d 29, 30, 652 N. E. 2d 188, 189 (1995). GMC also argued that denying the tax exemption to sales by marketers violated the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Ohio court initially concluded that the State's 4 App. 156. Pursuant to Ohio's regulations authorizing LDC's to pro- vide local transportation services, GMC took delivery of much of this gas from local utilities. Id., at 156­157. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 286 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court regime did not violate the Commerce Clause because Ohio taxes sales by "compan[ies] that d[o] not own any production, transportation, or distribution equipment" at the same rate regardless of "whether [the companies sell] natural gas in- state or out-of-state." Id., at 31, 652 N. E. 2d, at 190. The court then stepped back to rule, however, that GMC lacked standing to bring its Commerce Clause challenge: "On close inspection, GM actually argues that the commissioner's application burdens out-of-state vendors of natural gas. However, GM is not a member of that class and lacks standing to challenge the constitutional- ity of this application on that basis; our further comment on this question is inappropriate." Ibid. Finally, the court dismissed GMC's equal protection claim as "submerged in its Commerce Clause argument." Id., at 31­32, 652 N. E. 2d, at 190. We granted GMC's petition for certiorari to address the question of standing as well as the Commerce and Equal Protection Clause issues. 517 U. S. 1118 (1996). II The Supreme Court of Ohio held GMC to be without standing to raise this Commerce Clause challenge because the company is not one of the sellers said to suffer discrimi- nation under the challenged tax laws. But cognizable injury from unconstitutional discrimination against interstate com- merce does not stop at members of the class against whom a State ultimately discriminates, and customers of that class may also be injured, as in this case where the customer is liable for payment of the tax and as a result presumably pays more for the gas it gets from out-of-state producers and marketers. Consumers who suffer this sort of injury from regulation forbidden under the Commerce Clause satisfy the standing requirements of Article III. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560­561 (1992). 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 287 Opinion of the Court On similar facts, we held in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984), that in-state liquor wholesalers had standing to raise a Commerce Clause challenge to a Hawaii tax regime exempting certain alcohols produced in-state from liquor taxes. Although the wholesalers were not among the class of out-of-state liquor producers allegedly burdened by Hawaii's law, we reasoned that the wholesalers suffered economic injury both because they were directly lia- ble for the tax and because the tax raised the price of their imported goods relative to the exempted in-state beverages. Id., at 267; see also Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325 (1996) (in-state stockholder challenged tax regime imposing higher taxes on stock from issuers with out-of-state opera- tions than on stock from purely in-state issuers); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186 (1994) (in-state milk dealers challenged tax and subsidy scheme discriminating against out-of-state milk producers). Bacchus applies with equal force here, and GMC "plainly ha[s] standing to chal- lenge the tax in this Court," Bacchus Imports v. Dias, supra, at 267. We therefore turn to the merits. III A The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation, see, e. g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 312­313 (1992), or regulation, see, e. g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 578­579 (1986), that dis- criminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby "imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace," Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 437 (1980). GMC claims that Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by marketers and regulated local utilities consti- tutes "facial" or "patent" discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause, and it argues that differences in the na- ture of the businesses of LDC's and interstate marketers 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 288 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court cannot justify Ohio's differential treatment of these in-state and out-of-state entities. Although the claim is not that the Ohio tax scheme distinguishes in express terms between in- state and out-of-state entities, GMC argues that by granting the tax exemption solely to LDC's, which are in fact all lo- cated in Ohio, the State has "favor[ed] some in-state com- merce while disfavoring all out-of-state commerce," Brief for Petitioner 16. That is, because the favored entities are all located within the State, "the tax exemption did not need to be drafted explicitly along state lines in order to demon- strate its discriminatory design," Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S. 66, 76 (1989). Assessing these arguments requires an un- derstanding of the historical development of the contem- porary retail market for natural gas, to which we referred before and now turn in greater detail. B Since before the Civil War, gas manufactured from coal and other commodities had been used for lighting purposes, and of course it was understood that natural gas could be used the same way. See Dorner, Initial Phases of Regula- tion of the Gas Industry, in 1 Regulation of the Gas Industry §§ 2.03­2.06 (American Gas Assn. 1996) (hereinafter Dorner). By the early years of this century, areas in "proximity to the gas field[s]," West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 246 (1911), did use natural gas for fuel, but it was not until the 1920's that the development of high-tensile steel and elec- tric welding permitted construction of high-pressure pipe- lines to transport natural gas from gas fields for distant con- sumption at relatively low cost. Pierce 53. By that time, the States' then-recent experiments with free market compe- tition in the manufactured gas and electricity industries had dramatically underscored the need for comprehensive regu- lation of the local gas market. Companies supplying manu- factured gas proliferated in the latter half of the 19th century 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 289 Opinion of the Court and, after initial efforts at regulation by statute at the state level proved unwieldy, the States generally left any regu- lation of the industry to local governments. See Dorner §§ 2.03, 2.04. Many of those municipalities honored the ten- ets of laissez-faire to the point of permitting multiple gas franchisees to serve a single area and relying on competition to protect the public interest. Ibid. The results were both predictable and disastrous, including an initial period of "wasteful competition," 5 followed by massive consolidation and the threat of monopolistic pricing.6 The public suffered through essentially the same evolution in the electric indus- try.7 Thus, by the time natural gas became a widely mar- 5 During this period, " `[t]he public grew weary of the interminable rate wars which were invariably followed by a period of recoupment during which the victorious would attempt to make the price of the battle of the consumers by way of increased rates. Investors suffered heavy losses through the manipulation of fly-by-night paper concerns operating with `nuisance' franchises. . . . Everybody suffered the inconvenience of city streets being constantly torn up and replaced by installation and reloca- tion of duplicate facilities. The situation in New York City alone, prior to the major gas company consolidations, threatened municipal chaos.' " Dorner § 2.03 (quoting Welch, The Odyssey of Gas-A Record of Industrial Courage, 24 Pub. Utils. Fortnightly 500, 501­502 (1939)). 6 Reticence was not the order of the day. When, for example, the last two surviving gas companies supplying the citizens of Brooklyn announced their merger in October 1883, they also announced that gas prices would immediately double. Dorner § 2.03. 7 The electric industry burgeoned following Thomas Edison's patent on the first incandescent electric lamp in 1878. Dorner, Beginnings of the Gas Industry, in 1 Regulation of the Gas Industry § 1.06 (American Gas Assn. 1996). Again, after an initial period of unsuccessful regulation by state statute, States mostly left regulation of the electric industry to municipal or local government. Swartwout, Current Utility Regulatory Practice from a Historical Perspective, 32 Nat. Res. J. 289, 298 (1992). "[M]ultiple franchises were handed out, and duplicative utility systems came into being." Id., at 299. The results were "ruinous and short lived." Ibid. For example, 45 mostly overlapping franchises were granted for electric utility operation in Chicago between 1882 and 1905. By 1905, however, a single monopoly entity had emerged from the chaos, and customers ended up paying monopoly prices. Id., at 300. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 290 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court ketable commodity, the States had learned from chastening experience that public streets could not be continually torn up to lay competitors' pipes, that investments in parallel de- livery systems for different fractions of a local market would limit the value to consumers of any price competition, and that competition would simply give over to monopoly in due course. It seemed virtually an economic necessity for States to provide a single, local franchise with a business opportunity free of competition from any source, within or without the State, so long as the creation of exclusive fran- chises under state law could be balanced by regulation and the imposition of obligations to the consuming public upon the franchised retailers. Almost as soon as the States began regulating natural gas retail monopolies, their power to do so was challenged by interstate vendors as inconsistent with the dormant Com- merce Clause. While recognizing the interstate character of commerce in natural gas, the Court nonetheless affirmed the States' power to regulate, as a matter of local concern, all direct sales of gas to consumers within their borders, absent congressional prohibition of such state regulation. See, e. g., Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 252 U. S. 23, 28­31 (1920); Public Util. Comm'n of Kan. v. Lan- don, 249 U. S. 236, 245­246 (1919). At the same time, the Court concluded that the dormant Commerce Clause pre- vents the States from regulating interstate transportation or sales for resale of natural gas. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 307­310 (1924); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 596­ 600, reaffirmed on rehearing, 263 U. S. 350 (1923). See gen- erally Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 504­505 (1942) (summarizing prior cases distinguishing between permissible and impermissible state regulation of commerce in natural gas). Thus, the Court never questioned the power of the States to regulate retail 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 291 Opinion of the Court sales of gas within their respective jurisdictions. Dorner § 2.06.8 When federal regulation of the natural gas industry finally began in 1938, Congress, too, clearly recognized the value of such state-regulated monopoly arrangements for the sale and distribution of natural gas directly to local consumers. Thus, § 1(b) of the NGA, 15 U. S. C. § 717(b), explicitly exempted "local distribution of natural gas" from federal regulation, even as the NGA authorized the Federal Power 8 In Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U. S. 375 (1983), we rejected the bright-line distinction between whole- sale and retail sales drawn by these older cases and concluded that state regulation of wholesale sales of electricity transmitted in interstate com- merce is not precluded by the Commerce Clause. Reasoning that utilities should not be insulated from our contemporary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence by formalistic judge-made rules, id., at 391, we looked in- stead to " `the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce,' " id., at 390 (quoting Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 505 (1942)), to determine whether States have a sufficient interest in regulating wholesale rates within their bor- ders, and had no problem concluding that States do indeed have such an interest, with the result that state regulation of wholesale rates is not precluded by the Commerce Clause (in the absence of pre-emptive con- gressional action), id., at 394­395. While the holding of Arkansas Elec- tric thereby expanded both the permissible scope of state utility regula- tion and judicial recognition of the important state interests in such regulation, the reasoning of the case equally implies that state regulation of retail sales is not, as a constitutional matter, immune from our ordinary Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and to the extent that our earlier cases may have implied such immunity they are no longer good law. Nothing in Arkansas Electric undermines the earlier cases' recognition of the pow- erful state interest in regulating sales to domestic consumers buying at retail, however, which we reaffirm here. In addition, Arkansas Electric does not disturb the relevance of the wholesale/retail distinction for con- struing the jurisdictional provisions of statutes such as the NGA, which we discuss immediately below. See id., at 380, and n. 3; see also Schneide- wind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 300­301 (1988) ("The NGA con- fers upon FERC exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale"). 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 292 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court Commission (FPC) to begin regulating interstate pipelines. Congress's purpose in enacting the NGA was to fill the regu- latory void created by the Court's earlier decisions prohibit- ing States from regulating interstate transportation and sales for resale of natural gas, while at the same time leaving undisturbed the recognized power of the States to regulate all in-state gas sales directly to consumers. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind., 332 U. S. 507, 516­522 (1947). Thus, the NGA "was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way," id., at 517­518; "the scheme was one of cooperative action between federal and state agencies" to "protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies," id., at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted); and "Congress' action . . . was an unequivocal recognition of the vital interests of the states and their people, consumers and industry alike, in the regula- tion of rates and service," id., at 521; see also Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U. S. 329, 334 (1951) ("Direct sales [of natural gas] for con- sumptive use were designedly left to state regulation" by the NGA). Indeed, the Court has construed § 1(b) of the NGA as altogether exempting state regulation of in-state retail sales of natural gas from attack under the dormant Commerce Clause: "The declaration [in the NGA], though not identical in terms with the one made by the McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1011, concerning continued state regula- tion of the insurance business, is in effect equally clear, in view of the [NGA's] historical setting, legislative his- tory and objects, to show intention for the states to con- tinue with regulation where Congress has not expressly taken over. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 [(1946) (upholding discriminatory state taxa- tion of out-of-state insurance companies as authorized 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 293 Opinion of the Court by the McCarran Act)]." Panhandle-Indiana, supra, at 521. And Congress once again acknowledged the important role of the States in regulating intrastate transportation and dis- tribution of natural gas in 1953 when, in the wake of a deci- sion of this Court permitting the FPC to regulate intrastate gas transportation by LDC's, see FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464 (1950), Congress amended the NGA to "leav[e] jurisdiction" over "companies engaged in the distribution" of natural gas "exclusively in the States, as always has been intended." S. Rep. No. 817, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1­2 (1953); see 15 U. S. C. § 717(c). For 40 years, the complementary federal regulation of the interstate market and congressionally approved state regu- lation of the intrastate gas trade thus endured unchanged in any way relevant to this case. The resulting market struc- ture virtually precluded competition between LDC's and other potential suppliers of natural gas for direct sales to consumers, including large industrial consumers. The sim- plicity of this dual system of federal and state regulation began to erode in 1978, however, when Congress first encour- aged interstate pipelines to provide transportation services to end users wishing to ship gas,9 and thereby moved toward providing a real choice to those consumers who were able to buy gas on the open market and were willing to take it free of state-created obligations to the buyer. The upshot of con- gressional and regulatory developments over the next 15 years was increasing opportunity for a consumer in that class to choose between gas sold by marketers and gas bundled with rights and benefits mandated by state regulators as sold by LDC's. But amidst such changes, two things remained the same throughout the period involved in this case. Con- 9 For a more complete description of these changes in federal regulatory policy, and the relevant modifications of Ohio regulation of local utilities that they prompted, see supra, at 283­285. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 294 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court gress did nothing to limit the States' traditional autonomy to authorize and regulate local gas franchises, and the local franchised utilities (though no longer guaranteed monopolies as to all natural gas demand) continued to provide bundled gas to the vast majority of consumers who had neither the capacity to buy on the interstate market nor the resilience to forgo the reliability and protection that state regulation provided. To this day, all 50 States recognize the need to regulate utilities engaged in local distribution of natural gas.10 10 Alabama: Ala. Code § 37­4­1(7)(b) (Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 37­ 1­80 through 37­1­105 (1992 and Supp. 1996); Alaska: Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 42.05.141, 42.05.291, 42.05.990(4)(D) (1989 and Supp. 1995); see generally §§ 42.05.010­42.05.995; Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40­201.4, 40­203 (1996); see generally §§ 40­201 through 40­495; Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 23­1­101(4)(A)(i), 23­4­101 (1987 and Supp. 1995); see generally §§ 23­ 1­101 through 23­4­637; California: Cal. Pub. Util. Code Ann. §§ 216, 701 (West 1975 and Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 201 through 882 (West 1975 and Supp. 1996), §§ 1001 through 1906 (West 1994 and Supp. 1996); Colo- rado: Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40­1­103(1)(a), 40­3­101 (1993); see generally §§ 40­1­101 through 40­8.5­107 (1993 and Supp. 1996); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 16­1(a)(4), (9), 16­6b (West 1988 and Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 16­1 through 16­50f; Delaware: Del. Code Ann., Tit. 26, § 102(2) (Supp. 1996); see generally Tit. 26, §§ 101 through 511 (1989 and Supp. 1996); District of Columbia: D. C. Code Ann. §§ 43­203, 43­212 (1990); see generally §§ 43­101 through 43­1107 (1990 and Supp. 1996); Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 366.02(1), 366.03 (West Supp. 1997); see gener- ally §§ 366.01 through 366.14 (West 1968 and Supp. 1997); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 46­2­20(a) (1992); see generally §§ 46­2­20 through 46­2­94 (1992 and Supp. 1996); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 269­1, 269­6, 269­16 (Michie 1992 and Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 269­1 through 269­32; Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 61­129, 61­501, 61­502 (1994); see generally §§ 61­101 through 61­714; Illinois: Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 220, §§ 5/3­105, 5/ 4­101, 5/9­101 (1994); see generally ch. 220, §§ 5/1­101 through 5/10­204; Indiana: Ind. Code §§ 8­1­2­1, 8­1­2­4, 8­1­2­87 (West Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 8­1­2­1 through 8­1­2­127; Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. § 476.1 (West Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 476.1 through 476.66 (West 1991 and Supp. 1996); Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 66­104, 66­1,200 through 66­1,208 (1985 and Supp. 1995); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.010(3)(c) (Bald- win 1992); see generally §§ 278.010 through 278.450; Louisiana: La. Rev. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 295 Opinion of the Court Ohio's treatment of its gas utilities has been a typical blend of limitation and affirmative obligation. Its natural gas util- ities, during the period in question, bore with a variety of Stat. Ann. § 33:4161 (West 1988); see generally §§ 33:4161 through 33:4174, 33:4301 through 33:4308, 33:4491 through 33:4496 (West 1988 and Supp. 1996); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35­A, §§ 102, 103, 301 (1988 and Supp. 1996­1997); see generally Tit. 35­A, §§ 101­1210; Maryland: Md. Ann. Code, Art. 78, §§ 1, 2(o) (1991); see generally Art. 78, §§ 1 through 2, 23 through 27A, 51 through 54K, 68 through 88 (1991 and Supp. 1994); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 164:1, 164:93, 164:94 (1994); see gener- ally ch. 164, §§ 1 through 128; Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 460.6­ 460.6b (West 1991 and Supp. 1996­1997); see generally §§ 460.1 through 460.8; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 216B.02(4), 216B.03 (West 1992); see generally §§ 216B.01 through 216B.67 (1994 and Supp. 1995); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 77­3­3(d)(ii), 77­3­5 (1991 and Supp. 1996); see gener- ally §§ 77­3­1 through 77­3­307; Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 386.020, 393.130 (1994); see generally §§ 386.010 through 386.710, 393.010 through 393.770; Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 69­3­101, 69­3­102, 69­3­201 (1995); see generally §§ 69­3­101 through 69­3­713; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14­2119 (Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 19­4601 through 19­4623 (1991 and Supp. 1996); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 704.020(2)(a) (1995); see generally §§ 704.001 through 704.320, 704.755; New Hampshire: N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 362:2, 374:1, 374:2 (1995); see generally §§ 378:1 through 378:42; New Jersey: N. J. Stat. Ann. § 48:2­13 (West Supp. 1996); see gener- ally §§ 48:2­13 through 48:2­91, 48:9­5 through 48:9­32 (West 1969 and Supp. 1996­1997); New Mexico: N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 62­3­3, 62­6­4, 62­8­1 (1993 and Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 62­1­1 through 62­13­14; New York: N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 65 (McKinney 1989); see generally §§ 30 through 52, 64 through 77 (McKinney 1989 and Supp. 1996); North Caro- lina: N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 62­3(23), 62­30 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see gener- ally §§ 62­1 through 62­171; North Dakota: N. D. Cent. Code §§ 49­02­01, 49­02­02, 49­04­02 (1978 and Supp. 1995); see generally §§ 49­02­01 through 49­07­06; Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4905.03(A)(6), 4905.04, 4905.22 (1991); see generally §§ 4901.01­4909.99 (Baldwin 1991 and Supp. 1995); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat., Tit. 17, §§ 15, 152, 160.1 (West 1986 and Supp. 1997); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 757.005, 757.020, 756.040 (1991); see gener- ally §§ 756.010 through 757.991; Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, §§ 102, 501, 1301 (Purdon 1979 and Supp. 1996­1997); see generally Tit. 66, §§ 101 through 2107; Rhode Island: R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 39­1­2(7), 39­1­3(a) (Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 39­1­1 through 39­2­19 (1990 and Supp. 1996); South Carolina: S. C. Code Ann. §§ 58­5­10(3), 58­5­210 (1976 and 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 296 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court requirements: they had to submit annual forecasts of future supply and demand for gas, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4905.14 (Supp. 1990), comply with a range of accounting, reporting, and disclosure rules, §§ 4905.14, 4905.15 (1977 and Supp. 1990), and get permission from the state Public Utilities Commission to issue securities and even to enter certain con- tracts, §§ 4905.40, 4905.41, 4905.48. The "just and reason- able" rates to which they were restricted, see §§ 4905.22, 4905.32, 4909.15, 4909.17, included a single average cost of gas, see Ohio Admin. Code 4901:1­14, Ohio Monthly Record (Nov. 1991), together with a limited return on investment.11 Supp. 1995); see generally §§ 58­5­10 through 58­5­1070; South Dakota: S. D. Codified Laws §§ 49­34A­1, 49­34A­4, 49­34A­6 (1993 and Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 49­34A­1 through 49­34A­78; Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 65­4­101, 65­5­201 (Supp. 1996); see generally §§ 65­4­101 through 65­5­205 (1993 and Supp. 1996); Texas: Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6050, § 1(a)(4), Art. 6053 (Vernon Supp. 1996­1997); see generally Arts. 6050 through 6066g (Vernon 1962 and Supp. 1996­1997); Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 54­2­1(8), 54­3­1, 54­4­1 (1994 and Supp. 1996); see gener- ally §§ 54­2­1 through 54­4­30; Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 30, § 215 (1986); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 56­232, 56­234 (1995); see generally §§ 56­232 through 56­260.1 (1995 and Supp. 1996); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code §§ 80.04.010, 80.28.020 (West 1991 and Supp. 1996­1997); see gener- ally §§ 80.04.010 through 80.04.520, 80.28.010 through 80.28.260; West Vir- ginia: W. Va. Code § 24­2­1 (1992); see generally §§ 24­1­1 through 24­5­1 (1992 and Supp. 1996); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 196.01(5), 196.02, 196.03 (West 1992 and Supp. 1996­1997); see generally §§ 196.01 through 196.98; Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §§ 37­1­101(a)(vi)(D), 37­2­112 (1996); see generally §§ 37­1­101 through 37­6­107. 11 Ohio's Amended Substitute House Bill 476, signed into law in 1996, requires the state Public Utilities Commission to exempt certain sales of natural gas and/or related services by an LDC from this rate regulation if the commission finds that the LDC is subject to effective competition with respect to such service and that the customers for such service have reasonably available alternatives, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4929.04, as amended by H. R. 476, § 1, effective Sept. 17, 1996. Although this law had not been enacted at the time of the purchases involved in this case, petitioner contended at oral argument that during the tax period in ques- tion here, Ohio permitted some natural gas sales by public utilities at unregulated, negotiated rates, and that those sales were not subject to 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 297 Opinion of the Court The LDC's could not exact "a greater or lesser compensation for any services rendered . . . than [exacted] . . . from any other [customer] for doing a like and contemporaneous serv- ice under substantially the same circumstances and condi- tions." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4905.33 (Supp. 1990). The State also required LDC's to serve all members of the public, without discrimination, throughout their fields of operations. See, e. g., Industrial Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 408, 21 N. E. 2d 166 (1939). They could not "pick out good portions of a particular terri- tory, serve only select customers under private contract, and refuse service . . . to . . . other users," id., at 413, 21 N. E. 2d, at 168, or terminate service except for reasons defined by statute and by following statutory procedures, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4933.12, 4933.121 (Supp. 1990). When serving "human needs" consumers including "residential [and] other customers . . . where the element of human welfare [was] the predominant factor," In re Commission Ordered Investiga- tion of the Availability of Gas Transportation Service Pro- vided by Ohio Gas Distribution Utilities to End-Use Cus- tomers, No. 85­800­GA­COI (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, Aug. 1, 1989), Ohio LDC's were required to provide a firm backup supply of gas, see ibid., and administer specific protective schemes, as by helping to assure a degree of continued serv- ice to low-income customers despite unpaid bills. See, e. g., Ohio Admin. Code 4901:1­18 (Ohio Monthly Record Nov. 1991). IV The fact that the local utilities continue to provide a prod- uct consisting of gas bundled with the services and protec- tions summarized above, a product thus different from the marketer's unbundled gas, raises a hurdle for GMC's claim sales tax. The record provides no support for this contention, and the constitutionality of Ohio exempting from state sales tax utility sales that are not price regulated is therefore not before the Court in this case. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 298 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court that Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas utilities and independent marketers violates our " `virtually per se rule of invalidity,' " Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 647 (1994) (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 624 (1978)), prohibiting facial discrimination against interstate commerce. A Conceptually, of course, any notion of discrimination12 assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities. Al- 12 Although GMC raises only a "facial discrimination" challenge to Ohio's tax scheme, our cases have indicated that even nondiscriminatory state legislation may be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, when, in the words of the so-called Pike undue burden test, "the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits," Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). There is, however, no clear line between these two strands of analysis, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 579 (1986), and several cases that have purported to apply the undue burden test (including Pike itself) arguably turned in whole or in part on the discriminatory character of the challenged state regulations, see, e. g., Pike, supra, at 145 (declaring packing order "virtually per se illegal" because it required business operation to be performed in-state); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U. S. 662, 677 (1981) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (noting that in adopting invalidated truck- length regulation the State "seems to have hoped to limit the use of its highways by deflecting some through traffic"); id., at 679­687 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing that truck-length regulation should be invalidated solely in view of its protectionist purpose); see gen- erally Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1986). Nonethe- less, a small number of our cases have invalidated state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause that appear to have been genuinely nondis- criminatory, in the sense that they did not impose disparate treatment on similarly situated in-state and out-of-state interests, where such laws undermined a compelling need for national uniformity in regulation. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520 (1959) (conflict in state laws governing truck mud flaps); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761 (1945) (train lengths); see also CTS Corp. v. Dy- namics Corp. of America, 481 U. S. 69, 88 (1987) ("This Court's recent 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 299 Opinion of the Court though this central assumption has more often than not itself remained dormant in this Court's opinions on state discrimi- nation subject to review under the dormant Commerce Clause, when the allegedly competing entities provide differ- ent products, as here, there is a threshold question whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes. This is so for the simple reason that the differ- ence in products may mean that the different entities serve different markets, and would continue to do so even if the supposedly discriminatory burden were removed. If in fact that should be the case, eliminating the tax or other regula- tory differential would not serve the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective of preserving a national mar- ket for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident competi- tors. In Justice Jackson's now-famous words: "Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encour- aged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home em- bargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competi- tion from every producing area in the Nation to protect Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regula- tions"); L. Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws § 3.2.3, pp. 144­148 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Court's review of conflicting state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause). In the realm of taxation, the requirement of appor- tionment plays a similar role by assuring that interstate activities are not unjustly burdened by multistate taxation. See generally Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 184­185 (1995) (discussing "internal" and "external" consistency tests for apportionment of state taxes). Of course, the fact that Ohio exempts local utilities from its sales and use taxes could not support any claim of undue burden in this nondis- criminatory sense, since the exemption itself does not give rise to conflict- ing regulation of any transaction or result in malapportionment of any tax. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 300 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality." H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 539 (1949). See also, e. g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 469 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence grew out of the notion that the Consti- tution implicitly established a national free market . . ."); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S., at 437 (The dormant Com- merce Clause prevents "state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace"); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333, 350 (1977) (referring to "the Commerce Clause's overriding requirement of a national `common market' "). Thus, in the absence of actual or prospective competition be- tween the supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a single market there can be no local preference, whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply. The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and participants in markets, not taxpayers as such. Our cases have, however, rarely discussed the comparabil- ity of taxed or regulated entities as operators in arguably distinct markets; the closest approach to the facts here oc- curred in Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199 (1961). In Arctic Maid, a 4% tax on the value of salmon taken from territorial waters by so-called freezer ships and frozen for transport and later canning outside the State was challenged as discriminatory in the face of a 1% tax on the value of fish taken from territorial waters and frozen by on-shore cold storage facilities for later sale on the domestic fresh-frozen fish market. The State prevailed on the Court's holding that the claimants and cold storage facilities served separate mar- kets, did not compete with one another, and thus could not properly be compared for Commerce Clause purposes. The proper comparison, the Court held, was between the freezer 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 301 Opinion of the Court ships and domestic salmon canners, who shipped interstate into the same markets served by the freezer ships. Since the canners were taxed even more heavily than the freezer ships, there was no unfavorable burden upon the latter. Id., at 204. Although the Court's opinion did not discuss the possibility that competition in the domestic fresh-frozen mar- ket might have occurred in the absence of the tax disparity between the two types of salmon freezers, the freezer ships had made no attempt to compete in that market and neither claimed nor demonstrated an interest in entering it. See Brief for Respondents in Alaska v. Arctic Maid, O. T. 1960, No. 106, pp. 27­33. Arctic Maid provides a partial analogy to this case. Here, natural gas marketers did not serve the Ohio LDCs' core market of small, captive users, typified by residential consumers who want and need the bundled product. See, e. g., Darr, A State Regulatory Strategy for the Transitional Phase of Gas Regulation, 12 Yale J. Reg. 69, 99 (1995) ("[T]he large core residential customer base is bound to the LDC in what currently appears to be a natural-monopoly rela- tionship"); App. 199 (a marketer from which GMC purchased gas does not hold itself out to the general public as a gas supplier, but rather selectively contacts industrial end users that it has identified as potentially profitable customers). While this captive market is not geographically distin- guished from the area served by the independent marketers, it is defined economically as comprising consumers who are captive to the need for bundled benefits. These are buyers who live on sufficiently tight budgets to make the stability of rate important, and who cannot readily bear the risk of losing a fuel supply in harsh natural or economic weather. See, e. g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. FERC, 676 F. 2d 763, 766, n. 5 (CADC 1982) ("[R]esidential users [of natural gas cannot] switch temporarily to other fuels and so they must endure cold homes" if their gas supply is inter- rupted); Samuels, Reliability of Natural Gas Service for Cap- 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 302 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court tive End-Users Under the Federal Energy Regulatory Com- mission's Order No. 636, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 718, 749 (1994) ("Gas service disruptions lasting just a few days can cause severe health risks to captive end-users"). They are also buyers without the high volume requirements needed to make investment in the transaction costs of individual pur- chases on the open market economically feasible. Pierce, In- trastate Natural Gas Regulation: An Alternative Perspec- tive, 9 Yale J. Reg. 407, 409­410 (1992) ("Purchasing gas service [from marketers] requires considerable time and ex- pertise. Its benefits are likely to exceed its costs only for consumers who purchase very large quantities of gas"). The demands of this market historically arose free of any influ- ence of differential taxation (since there was none during the pre-1978 period when only LDC's generally served end users), and because the market's economic characteristics appear to be independent of any effect attributable to the State's sales taxation as imposed today, there is good reason to assume that any pricing changes that could result from eliminating the sales tax differential challenged here would be inadequate to create competition between LDC's and marketers for the business of the utilities' core home market. On the other hand, one circumstance of this case is unlike what Arctic Maid assumed, for there is a possibility of com- petition between LDC's and marketers for the noncaptive market. Although the record before this Court reveals vir- tually nothing about the details of that competitive market, in the period under examination it presumably included bulk buyers like GMC, which have no need for bundled protection, see, e. g., State Issue: Atlanta Gas Light Takes Step to Aban- don Gas Sales by Unbundling Services for Non-Core Custom- ers, Foster Natural Gas Report, June 20, 1996, p. 22 (indicat- ing that prior to "unbundling" marketers accounted for 80% of sales to large commercial and industrial users in Georgia), and consumers of middling volumes of natural gas who found 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 303 Opinion of the Court some value in Ohio's state-imposed protections but not enough to offset lower price at some point, see, e. g., Piero- bon, Small Customers: The Yellow Brick Road to Deregula- tion?, 134 Pub. Utils. Fortnightly, No. 6, pp. 14, 15 (1996) (marketers' efforts in California are increasingly directed to attracting consumers in the "small commercial sector," in- cluding "schools, hospitals, hotels, restaurants, laundromats, and master-metered apartments," which currently purchase bundled gas from utilities); Salpukas, New Choices for Natu- ral Gas: Retailers Find Users Puzzled as Industry Deregu- lates, N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1996, pp. D1, D4 (indicating that some natural gas marketers in New York City are attempt- ing to lure "mom-and-pop businesses like restaurants and dry-cleaners" away from LDC's, with mixed success). Elim- inating the sales tax differential at issue here might well intensify competition between LDC's and marketers for customers in this noncaptive market. B In sum, the LDCs' bundled product reflects the demand of a market neither susceptible to competition by the interstate sellers nor likely to be served except by the regulated natu- ral monopolies that have historically supplied its needs. So far as this market is concerned, competition would not be served by eliminating any tax differential as between sellers, and the dormant Commerce Clause has no job to do. There is, however, a further market where the respective sellers of the bundled and unbundled products apparently do compete and may compete further. Thus, the question raised by this case is whether the opportunities for competition between marketers and LDC's in the noncaptive market requires treating marketers and utilities as alike for dormant Com- merce Clause purposes. Should we accord controlling sig- nificance to the noncaptive market in which they compete, or to the noncompetitive, captive market in which the local utili- 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 304 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court ties alone operate? Although there is no a priori answer, a number of reasons support a decision to give the greater weight to the captive market and the local utilities' singular role in serving it, and hence to treat marketers and LDC's as dissimilar for present purposes. First and most impor- tant, we must recognize an obligation to proceed cautiously lest we imperil the delivery by regulated LDC's of bundled gas to the noncompetitive captive market. Second, as a Court we lack the expertness and the institutional resources necessary to predict the effects of judicial intervention inval- idating Ohio's tax scheme on the utilities' capacity to serve this captive market. Finally, should intervention by the Na- tional Government be necessary, Congress has both the re- sources and the power to strike the balance between the needs of the competitive and captive markets. 1 Where a choice is possible, as it is here, the importance of traditional regulated service to the captive market makes a powerful case against any judicial treatment that might jeopardize LDCs' continuing capacity to serve the captive market. Largely as a response to the monopolistic shakeout that brought an end to the era of unbridled competition among gas utilities, regulation of natural gas for the princi- pal benefit of householders and other consumers of relatively small quantities is the rule in every State in the Union. Congress has also long recognized the desirability of these state regulatory regimes. Supra, at 291­293. Indeed, half a century ago we concluded that the NGA altogether ex- empts state regulation of retail sales of natural gas (includ- ing in-state sales to large industrial customers) from the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause, see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind., 332 U. S. 507 (1947), and to this day, notwithstanding the national regulatory revolution, Congress has done nothing to limit its unbroken recognition of the state regulatory authority that 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 305 Opinion of the Court has created and preserved the local monopolies.13 The clear implication is that Congress finds the benefits of the bundled product for captive local buyers well within the realm of what the States may reasonably promote and preserve. This Court has also recognized the importance of avoiding any jeopardy to service of the state-regulated captive mar- ket, and in circumstances remarkably similar to those of the present case. In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Mich- igan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U. S. 329 (1951), Ford Motor Company had entered a contract with an interstate pipeline for supply of gas at Ford's plant in Dearborn, Michigan, thus bypassing the local distribution company. The Michigan Public Service Commission ordered the pipeline to cease and desist from making direct sales of natural gas to the State's industrial customers without a certificate of public conven- ience and necessity, and the pipeline brought a Commerce Clause challenge to the commission's action. The Court ob- served that "[a]ppellant asserts a right to compete for the cream of the volume business without regard to the local public convenience or necessity. Were appellant successful in this venture, it would no doubt be reflected adversely in [the LDC's] over-all costs of service and its rates to customers whose only source of supply is [the LDC]. This clearly presents a situation of . . . vital interest to the State of Michigan." Id., at 334. In view of the economic threat that competition for large industrial consumers posed to gas service to small captive 13 In the present case, the parties have not briefed the question whether the present amended version of the NGA and related federal legislation continues the express Commerce Clause exemption for state regulation and taxation of retail natural gas sales recognized in Panhandle-Indiana, and we do not decide this issue. We note, however, that the language of § 1(b) of the NGA, which the Panhandle-Indiana Court construed as cre- ating the exemption, itself remains unchanged. (Compare 52 Stat. 821 with 15 U. S. C. § 717(b) (1994).) 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 306 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court users, the Court again reaffirmed its longstanding doctrine upholding the States' power to regulate all direct in-state sales to consumers, even if such regulation resulted in an outright prohibition of competition for even the largest end users. Id., at 336­337; see also Panhandle-Indiana, supra (upholding state regulation of direct sales to large industrial users as not pre-empted by the NGA or precluded by the dormant Commerce Clause).14 The continuing importance of the States' interest in pro- tecting the captive market from the effects of competition for the largest consumers is underscored by the common sense of our traditional recognition of the need to accommo- date state health and safety regulation in applying dormant Commerce Clause principles. State regulation of natural gas sales to consumers serves important interests in health and safety in fairly obvious ways, in that requirements of dependable supply and extended credit assure that individ- ual buyers of gas for domestic purposes are not frozen out of their houses in the cold months. We have consistently recognized the legitimate state pursuit of such interests as compatible with the Commerce Clause, which was " `never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country.' " Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 14 Under today's altered market structure, see supra, at 283­285, several Courts of Appeals have held that the NGA confers jurisdiction on FERC, rather than the States, to regulate such bypass arrangements for supply- ing gas to large industrial consumers when the sale of gas itself occurs outside the State and an interstate pipeline merely transports the gas to the industrial consumer for delivery in-state. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F. 2d 1412, 1414­1422 (CA10 1992); Michigan Consoli- dated Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 887 F. 2d 1295, 1299­ 1301 (CA6 1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1079 (1990); Michigan Consoli- dated Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F. 2d 117, 121­122 (CADC 1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1079 (1990). We express no view on the correctness of these decisions. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 307 Opinion of the Court 440, 443­444 (1960) (quoting Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103 (1876)). Just so may health and safety considerations be weighed in the process of deciding the threshold question whether the conditions entailing application of the dormant Commerce Clause are present.15 2 The size of the captive market, its noncompetitive charac- ter, the values served by its traditional regulation: all coun- sel caution before making a choice that could strain the ca- pacity of the States to continue to demand the regulatory benefits that have served the home market of low-volume users since natural gas became readily available. Here we have to assume that any decision to treat the LDC's as simi- lar to the interstate marketers would change the LDCs' posi- tion in the noncaptive market in which (we are assuming) they compete, at least at the margins, by affecting the over- all size of the LDCs' customer base. As we recognized in Panhandle, a change in the customer base could affect the LDCs' ability to continue to serve the captive market where there is no such competition. To be sure, what in fact would happen as a result of treat- ing the marketers and LDC's alike we do not know. We might assume that eliminating the tax on marketers' sales would leave those sellers stronger competitors in the noncap- tive market, especially at the market's boundaries, and that any resulting contraction of the LDCs' total customer base would increase the unit cost of the bundled product. We might also suppose that the State would not respond to our decision by subjecting the LDC's and marketers both to the 15 Of course, if a State discriminates against out-of-state interests by drawing geographical distinctions between entities that are otherwise similarly situated, such facial discrimination will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny even if it is directed toward a legitimate health and safety goal. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 626­628 (1978); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 353­354 (1951). 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 308 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court same sales tax now imposed on marketers alone, since the utilities are already subject to a complicated scheme of prop- erty taxation quite different from the tax treatment of the marketers.16 It seems, in fact, far more likely that eliminat- ing the tax challenged here would portend, among other things, some reduction of the total taxes levied against LDC's, in order to strengthen their position in trying to compete with marketers in the noncaptive market. The degree to which these very general suggestions might prove right or wrong, however, is not really significant; the point is simply that all of them are nothing more than sug- gestions, pointedly couched in terms of assumption or suppo- sition. This is necessarily so, simply because the Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which eco- nomic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make them. See, e. g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S., at 341­342, and authorities cited therein; Hunter, Fed- eralism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises, 32 Emory L. J. 89, 108 (1983) ("It is virtually impossible for a court, with its limited resources, to determine with any de- gree of accuracy the costs to a town, county, or state of a particular industry"); see also Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1203, 1211 (1986) (noting that "[e]ven expert economists" may have dif- ficulty determining "whether the overall economic benefits 16 For example, public utilities pay personal property tax on 88% of true value, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5727.111 (1996), while marketers pay per- sonal property tax on 25% of their true value, § 5711.22(D). Public utili- ties also pay a special tax assessment for the expenses of the Public Utility Commission, § 4905.10 (1991), and for the expenses of the Ohio Consumer Counsel, § 4911.18. Moreover, natural gas utilities must pay a gross re- ceipts tax of 4.75% on gas sales, § 5727.38 (1996), while marketers pay none. Independent marketers, for their part, are subject to a franchise tax, § 5733.01, that does not apply to utilities, § 5733.09(a). Thus, this sales and use tax challenge would not be the last available to marketers and their customers; the franchise tax, which also does not apply to utilities, is presumably next in line. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 309 Opinion of the Court and burdens of a regulation favor local inhabitants against outsiders"). We are consequently ill qualified to develop Commerce Clause doctrine dependent on any such predictive judgments, and it behooves us to be as reticent about pro- jecting the effect of applying the Commerce Clause here, as we customarily are in declining to engage in elaborate analy- sis of real-world economic effects, Fulton Corp., supra, at 341­342, or to consider subtle compensatory tax defenses, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmen- tal Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 105 (1994). The most we can say is that modification of Ohio's tax scheme could sub- ject LDC's to economic pressure that in turn could threaten the preservation of an adequate customer base to support continued provision of bundled services to the captive mar- ket. The conclusion counsels against taking the step of treating the bundled gas seller like any other, with the con- sequent necessity of uniform taxation of all gas sales. 3 Prudence thus counsels against running the risk of weak- ening or destroying a regulatory scheme of public service and protection recognized by Congress despite its noncom- petitive, monopolistic character. Still less is that risk justi- fiable in light of Congress's own power and institutional com- petence to decide upon and effectuate any desirable changes in the scheme that has evolved. Congress has the capacity to investigate and analyze facts beyond anything the Judi- ciary could match, joined with the authority of the commerce power to run economic risks that the Judiciary should con- front only when the constitutional or statutory mandate for judicial choice is clear. See, e. g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 389 (1983) (Congress "may inform itself through fact- finding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts"). One need not adopt Justice Black's extreme reticence in Commerce Clause jurisprudence to recognize in this instance the soundness of his statement that a challenge 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 310 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Opinion of the Court like the one before us "call[s] for Congressional investigation, consideration, and action. The Constitution gives that branch of government the power to regulate commerce among the states, and until it acts I think we should enter the field with extreme caution." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 302 (1944) (concurring opinion). This conclusion applies a fortiori here, because for a half century Congress has been aware of our conclusion in Pan- handle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind., 332 U. S. 507 (1947), that the NGA exempts state regu- lation of in-state retail natural gas sales from the dormant Commerce Clause and in the years following that decision has only reaffirmed the power of the States in this regard. * * * Accordingly, we conclude that Ohio's regulatory response to the needs of the local natural gas market has resulted in a noncompetitive bundled gas product that distinguishes its regulated sellers from independent marketers to the point that the enterprises should not be considered "similarly situ- ated" for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination under the Commerce Clause. GMC's argument that the State dis- criminates between regulated local gas utilities and unregu- lated marketers must therefore fail. C GMC also suggests that Ohio's tax regime "facially dis- criminates" because the State's sales and use tax exemption would not apply to sales by out-of-state LDC's. See, e. g., Reply Brief for Petitioner 2, n. 1. As respondent points out, however, the Ohio courts might well extend the challenged exemption to out-of-state utilities if confronted with the question. Indeed, in Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Tracy, No. 94­K­526 (Ohio Bd. Tax App., Nov. 17, 1995), reported in CCH Ohio Tax Rep. ¶ 402­254, the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals accepted the argument of a Pennsylvania public util- 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 311 Opinion of the Court ity that insofar as the out-of-state utility sold natural gas to Ohio consumers it qualified as a utility under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5727.01 and was therefore exempt from the State's corporate franchise tax. Out-of-state public utilities may therefore also qualify for Ohio's sales and use tax exemption. Because "we have never deemed a hypothetical possibility of favoritism to constitute discrimination that transgresses constitutional commands," Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S., at 654, this argument, too, must be rejected. V Finally, GMC claims that Ohio's tax regime violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating LDCs' natural gas sales differently from those of producers and marketers. Once again, the hurdle facing GMC is a high one, since state tax classifications require only a rational basis to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S., at 80. Indeed, "in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940). It is true, of course, that in some peculiar circumstances state tax classifications facially discriminating against inter- state commerce may violate the Equal Protection Clause even when they pass muster under the Commerce Clause. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869, 874­ 883 (1985).17 But as we explain in Part IV, supra, Ohio's 17 Ward involved an Alabama statute that facially discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing a lower gross premiums tax on in-state than out-of-state insurance companies. The case did not present a Com- merce Clause violation only because Congress, in enacting the McCarran- Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011­1015, intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field. Ward, 470 U. S., at 880. We nonetheless invalidated Alabama's classifica- tion because "neither of the two purposes furthered by the [statute] . . . is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause . . . ." Id., at 883. 519us2$19M 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 312 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Scalia, J., concurring differential tax treatment of LDC and independent marketer sales does not facially discriminate against interstate com- merce. And in any event, there is unquestionably a rational basis for Ohio's distinction between these two kinds of entities. * * * We conclude that Ohio's differential tax treatment of public utilities and independent marketers violates neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause and that petitioner's claims are without merit otherwise. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring. I join the Court's opinion, which thoroughly explains why the Ohio tax scheme at issue in this case does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. I write sepa- rately to note my continuing adherence to the view that the so-called "negative" Commerce Clause is an unjustified judi- cial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing do- main. "The historical record provides no grounds for read- ing the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says-an authorization for Congress to regulate Commerce." Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I have previously stated that I will enforce on stare decisis grounds a "negative" self-executing Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held uncon- stitutional by this Court. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 210 (1994) (opinion concurring in judg- ment); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U. S. 60, 78 (1993) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in 519us2$19K 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 313 Stevens, J., dissenting judgment) (collecting cases). Although petitioner contends that Ohio facially discriminates against interstate commerce with respect to natural gas sales, its argument is based on a novel premise: that private marketers engaged in the sale of natural gas are similarly situated to public utility companies. Nothing in this Court's negative Commerce Clause jurispru- dence compels that conclusion. To hold that States must tax gas sales by these two types of entities equally would broaden the negative Commerce Clause beyond its existing scope, and intrude on a regulatory sphere traditionally occu- pied by Congress and the States. Justice Stevens, dissenting. In Ohio, as in other States, regulated utilities selling natu- ral gas-referred to by the Court as "LDC's"-operate in two markets, one that is monopolistic and one that is competitive. In the first, they sell a "noncompetitive bundled gas prod- uct," ante, at 310, to small consumers who have no practical alternative source of supply. The LDCs' dominant position in that market justifies detailed regulation of their activities in order to protect consumers from the risk of exploitation by a seller with monopoly power. See ante, at 294­297. The basic purpose of that regulation is to protect consumers, not to subsidize the LDC's. The second market in which LDC's sell natural gas is a competitive market in which large customers like the Gen- eral Motors Corporation (GMC) have alternative sources of supply. Although Ohio possesses undoubted power to regu- late the activities of all sellers in that market, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U. S. 329 (1951), it has not done so in any manner relevant here. The purchasers in this competitive market do not need the protections afforded by the state regulation of the monopolistic market, see ante, at 302­303, and the benefits provided by these regulations will thus not affect a competi- 519us2$19I 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT 314 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. TRACY Stevens, J., dissenting tive consumer's choice of seller. Customers like GMC are not "captive to the need for bundled benefits," ante, at 301. Nor do the burdens imposed by the regulations have a sig- nificant impact on LDCs' activities within this market. Thus, while the gas sold by LDC's on the competitive market may be subject to the same regulations as the gas sold in the noncompetitive market, the different impact of the regula- tions on the economic decisions of both consumers and sellers makes it appropriate to characterize all gas sold in that mar- ket as "unbundled gas," see ante, at 297. Although the physical composition of the gas sold in the two markets is identical, I agree with what I understand the Court to be assuming, namely, that as a matter of economics "bundled gas" and "unbundled gas" should be viewed as different products. See ante, at 299, 301­303. It is not uncommon for a firm with a monopolistic position in one market also to sell a second product in a competitive market. See, e. g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936). Even regulated mo- nopolies such as electric utilities may distribute goods, such as light bulbs, in a competitive market. See, e. g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 (1976). There is no reason why an LDC might not develop a product line, such as ther- mostats or gas furnaces, to sell in the competitive market for such products. I do not believe that the fact that the LDC is heavily regulated in the "bundled gas" market would justify granting it a special preference in the market for thermo- stats or gas furnaces. Nor do I discern a significant relevant difference between competition in "unbundled gas" and com- petition in thermostats or gas furnaces. It may well be true that without a discriminatory tax ad- vantage in the competitive market, the LDC's would lose business to interstate competitors and therefore be forced to increase the rates charged to small local consumers. This circumstance may require the States to find new, and nondis- criminatory, methods for accommodating the needs of small 519us2$19I 06-03-99 20:31:11 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 278 (1997) 315 Stevens, J., dissenting consumers for regular and reasonably priced natural gas service. As the Court recognizes, speculation about the "real-world economic effects" of a decision like this one is beyond our institutional competence. See ante, at 309. Such speculation is not, therefore, a sufficient justification for a tax exemption that discriminates against interstate commerce. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984). Accordingly, while I agree with Parts II and IV of the Court's opinion, I respectfully dissent from the judgment. 519us2$20Z 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 316 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT et al. v. DILLINGHAM CONSTRUCTION, N. A., INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­789. Argued November 5, 1996-Decided February 18, 1997 California requires a public works project contractor to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in a state-approved apprenticeship program. After respondent Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media, the latter entered a collective-bargaining agreement that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. Sound Systems Media thereafter relied on that committee for its ap- prentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. Petitioner California Division of Apprenticeship Standards issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and Sound Systems Media, charging that paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state prevailing wage law. Respondents sued to prevent petitioners from interfering with payment under the subcontract, alleging, inter alia, that § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre- empted enforcement of the state law. The District Court granted peti- tioners summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the apprenticeship program was an "employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA § 3(1), and that the state law "relate[d] to" the plan and was therefore superseded under § 514(a). Held: California's prevailing wage law does not "relate to" employee bene- fit plans, and thus is not pre-empted by ERISA. Pp. 323­334. (a) A state law "relate[s] to" a covered employee benefit plan for § 514(a) purposes if it (1) has a "connection with" or (2) "reference to" such a plan. E. g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125, 129. A law has the forbidden reference where it acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, or where the existence of such plans is essential to its operation, as in, e. g., Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, supra, and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133. To determine whether a state law has a connection with 519us2$20Z 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 317 Syllabus ERISA plans, this Court looks both to ERISA's objectives as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 656, and to the nature of the law's effect on ERISA plans, id., at 658­659. Where federal law is said to pre-empt state action in fields of traditional state regulation, this Court as- sumes that the States' historic police powers are not superseded unless that was Congress' clear and manifest purpose. E. g., id., at 655. Pp. 323­325. (b) Because it appears that approved apprenticeship programs need not be ERISA plans, the California law does not make "reference to" such plans. On its face, the law seems to allow the lower apprentice wage only to a contractor who acquires apprentices through a "joint apprenticeship committee"-an apprenticeship program sponsored by the collective efforts of management and organized labor. To comport with federal law, the expenses of such a committee must be defrayed out of moneys placed into a separate fund, the existence of which trig- gers ERISA coverage. However, applicable regulations make clear that the class of apprenticeship program sponsors who may provide approved apprentices under California law is broad enough to include a single employer who defrays the costs of its program out of gen- eral assets. An employee benefit program so funded, and not paid for through a separate fund, is not an ERISA plan. See, e. g., Massa- chusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115. The California law is indiffer- ent to the funding, and, thus, to the ERISA coverage, of apprentice- ship programs; accordingly, it makes no "reference to" ERISA plans. Pp. 325­328. (c) Nor does the California law have a "connection with" ERISA plans. In every relevant respect, that law is indistinguishable from the New York statute upheld in Travelers, supra. As with the New York statute, the Court discerns no congressional intent to pre-empt the areas of traditional state regulation with which the California law is concerned. 514 U. S., at 661. And, like the New York statute, the California prevailing wage law does not bind ERISA plans-legally or as a practical matter-to anything. It merely provides some measure of economic incentive to apprenticeship programs to comport with the State's apprenticeship standards by authorizing lower wage payments to workers enrolled in approved apprenticeship programs. Cf. id., at 668. This Court could not hold the California law superseded based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to the presumption that Congress does not intend the pre-emption of state laws in tradition- ally state-regulated areas. Pp. 328­334. 57 F. 3d 712, reversed and remanded. 519us2$20Z 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 318 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Syllabus Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 334. John M. Rea argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Vanessa L. Holton, Fred D. Lonsdale, Sarah Cohen, and H. Thomas Cadell, Jr. James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Edward D. Sieger. Richard N. Hill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Wash- ington et al. by Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, and Lynn D. W. Hendrickson and Jeff B. Kray, Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral, Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Victoria A. Graffeo, Solicitor General, and Daniel F. De Vita and M. Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady, Attorney General of Delaware, Charles F. C. Ruff, Corpora- tion Counsel for the District of Columbia, Margery S. Bronster, Attorney General of Hawaii, Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, and Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania; for the American Federa- tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Laurence J. Cohen, Terry R. Yellig, Laurence Gold, Marsha S. Berzon, and Donald J. Capuano; for the California Association of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association et al. by Robert E. Jesinger; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Lee Fennell; and for the National Electrical Contrac- tors Association, Inc., by Gary L. Lieber. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Associated Build- ers and Contractors, Inc., et al. by Mark R. Thierman; and for Signatory Members of the Coalition to Preserve ERISA Preemption by Maurice Baskin. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Association of Re- tired Persons et al. by Mary Ellen Signorille, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 319 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of California requires a contractor on a public works project to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale. An exception to this requirement permits a contractor to pay a lower wage to workers participating in an approved apprenticeship program. This case presents the question whether the pre-emption provision of the Em- ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., supersedes California's prevailing wage law to the extent that the law prohibits payment of an apprentice wage to an apprentice trained in an unapproved program. We conclude that Cali- fornia's law does not "relate to" employee benefit plans, and thus is not pre-empted. I A Since 1931, the Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §§ 276a to 276a­5, has required that the wages paid on federal public works projects equal wages paid in the project's locale on similar, private construction jobs. California, in 1937, adopted a similar statute, which requires contractors who are awarded public works projects to pay their workers "not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar character in the locality in which the public work is performed." Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1771 (West 1989). Under both the Davis-Bacon Act and California's prevailing wage law, public works contrac- tors may pay less than the prevailing journeyman wage to apprentices in apprenticeship programs that meet standards promulgated under the National Apprenticeship Act, 50 Stat. Melvin Radowitz, and Daniel Feinberg; for the Associated General Con- tractors of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., et al. by John G. Roberts, Jr., Michael E. Kennedy, William G. Jeffery, and David P. Wolds; for the California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association et al. by James P. Watson; and for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel H. Bromberg, Stephen A. Bokat, Mona C. Zeiberg, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel. 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 320 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court 664, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 50 (known popularly as the Fitzgerald Act).1 See 29 CFR § 29.5(b)(5) (1996); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1777.5 (West 1989 and Supp. 1997). In most circumstances, California public works contractors are not obliged to employ apprentices, but if they do, the apprentice wage is only permitted for those apprentices in approved programs. The federal arbiter of apprenticeship program adequacy is the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT), located within the Department of Labor. An apprenticeship pro- gram that seeks to provide federal public works contractors with apprentice-wage-eligible apprentices must receive the blessing of either the BAT or a "State Apprenticeship Agency." 29 CFR § 29.3 (1996). Since 1978, California's state apprenticeship agency, the California Apprenticeship Council (CAC), has been authorized under 29 CFR § 29.12 to approve apprenticeship programs for federal purposes. App. 37. California has also charged the CAC with approv- ing apprenticeship programs for purposes of California's pre- vailing wage statute. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 3071 (West 1989). Pursuant to the Fitzgerald Act, the United States Secretary of Labor has promulgated apprenticeship program standards. 29 CFR § 29.5 (1996). California has adopted its own apprenticeship standards, 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 212 (1996), that are "substantively similar" to the federal stand- ards. Southern Cal. Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. Cali- fornia Apprenticeship Council, 4 Cal. 4th 422, 434, 841 P. 2d 1 The Fitzgerald Act provides: "The Secretary of Labor is authorized and directed to formulate and promote the furtherance of labor standards necessary to safeguard the welfare of apprentices, to extend the applica- tion of such standards by encouraging the inclusion thereof in contracts of apprenticeship, to bring together employers and labor for the formulation of programs of apprenticeship, [and] to cooperate with State agencies engaged in the formulation and promotion of standards of apprentice- ship . . . ." 29 U. S. C. § 50. 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 321 Opinion of the Court 1011, 1017 (1992) (Southern Cal. ABC). The CAC uses its own standards whether approving an apprenticeship pro- gram for federal or for state purposes. An apprenticeship program in California may be spon- sored by an individual employer, an individual labor union, a group of employers, a group of labor organizations, or by a joint management-labor venture (a so-called joint apprentice- ship committee). See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 3075 (West 1989). B In the spring of 1987, respondent Dillingham Construction was awarded a public works contract as the general contrac- tor for the construction of the Sonoma County Main Adult Detention Facility. Dillingham subcontracted electronic in- stallation work to respondent Manuel J. Arceo, doing busi- ness as Sound Systems Media. When Sound Systems Media was awarded the subcontract, it was signatory to a collective-bargaining agreement that provided a wage scale for apprentices, and required Sound Systems Media to contribute to a CAC-approved apprentice- ship program, the Northern California Sound and Communi- cations Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee. In May 1988, after work on the project was underway, the existing union withdrew its representation of Sound Systems Media employees. Two months later, Sound Systems Media entered a new collective-bargaining agreement with a differ- ent union. That agreement, like the earlier one, included a scale of wages for apprentices and provided for an affiliation with a joint apprenticeship committee, the Electronic and Communications Systems Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee (Electronic and Communications Systems JATC). Sound Systems Media relied on this new committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage provided in the collective-bargaining agreement. The Electronic and Communications Systems JATC, however, did not seek CAC 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 322 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court approval until August 1989 and did not gain approval until October 1990. That approval was not retroactive. In March 1989, yet another union filed a complaint against Sound Systems Media with petitioner Division of Appren- ticeship Standards of the California Department of Indus- trial Relations. Petitioner issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham Construction and Sound Systems Media, charging that Sound Systems Media had violated Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1771 (West 1989) by paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from a nonapproved program. The County of Sonoma was ordered to withhold certain moneys from Dillingham Con- struction for the violation. Respondents filed suit to prevent petitioners from inter- fering with payment under the subcontract. Their com- plaint alleged, inter alia, that ERISA pre-empted enforce- ment of the prevailing wage law. Respondents argued that the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC was an "employee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA § 3(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1),2 and that California's prevailing wage statute "relate[d] to" it, and was therefore superseded by ERISA's pre-emption provision, § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a).3 The District Court agreed that the pre- vailing wage statute "relate[d] to" ERISA plans, but con- 2 Section 3(1) defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as: "[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main- tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid legal services . . . ." 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1) (emphasis added). 3 The pre-emption clause provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title." § 1144(a). 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 323 Opinion of the Court cluded that pre-emption was forestalled by ERISA's saving clause, § 514(d), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(d).4 Pre-emption of the prevailing wage statute, the District Court determined, would "impair the purposes of the Fitzgerald Act and its regulations within the meaning of ERISA's savings clause." Dillingham Constr. N. A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 778 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (ND Cal. 1991). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 57 F. 3d 712 (1995). Agreeing with the District Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC was an employee welfare benefit plan and that § 1777.5 "relate[d] to" it. Id., at 718­719. Because California's prevailing wage statute was not an "enforcement mechanism" of the Fitzgerald Act, however, the Ninth Cir- cuit parted company with the District Court and held that § 1777.5 was not preserved by ERISA's saving clause. Id., at 721. The decision of the Court of Appeals accorded with that of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Na- tional Elevator Industry, Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F. 2d 1555, cert. denied, 506 U. S. 953 (1992). Both decisions conflict- as to whether a state prevailing wage law "relate[s] to" ap- prenticeship programs, and as to the reach of the saving clause-with that of the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Chap- ter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Minne- sota Dept. of Labor and Industry, 47 F. 3d 975 (1995). We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1133 (1996), and now reverse. II Both lower courts determined, and neither party disputes, that the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC was a "plan, fund, or program [that] was established or is main- tained for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . 4 ERISA's saving clause provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any laws of the United States . . . or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." § 1144(d). 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 324 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court apprenticeship or other training programs." § 3(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1). The question thus presented to us is whether California's prevailing wage statute "relate[s] to" that "employee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption clause. Since shortly after its enactment, we have endeavored with some regularity to interpret and apply the "unhelpful text" of ERISA's pre-emption provision. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 656 (1995). We have long acknowl- edged that ERISA's pre-emption provision is "clearly expan- sive." Id., at 655. It has "a `broad scope,' Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa- chusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985), and an `expansive sweep,' Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47 (1987); and . . . it is `broadly worded,' Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 138 (1990), `deliberately expansive,' Pilot Life, supra, at 46, and `conspicuous for its breadth,' [FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 58 (1990)]." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384 (1992). Our efforts at applying the provision have yielded a two-part inquiry: A "law `relate[s] to' a covered employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) `if it [1] has a connection with or [2] reference to such a plan.' " District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125, 129 (1992) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96­97 (1983)). Under the latter inquiry, we have held pre-empted a law that "impos[ed] requirements by reference to [ERISA] covered programs," Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, supra, at 130­ 131; a law that specifically exempted ERISA plans from an otherwise generally applicable garnishment provision, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 828, n. 2, 829­830 (1988); and a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan, 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 325 Opinion of the Court Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 140 (1990). Where a State's law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in Mackey, or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation, as in Greater Washington Bd. of Trade and Ingersoll-Rand, that "refer- ence" will result in pre-emption. A law that does not refer to ERISA plans may yet be pre-empted if it has a "connection with" ERISA plans. Two Terms ago, we recognized that an "uncritical literalism" in applying this standard offered scant utility in determining Congress' intent as to the extent of § 514(a)'s reach. Travel- ers, 514 U. S., at 656. Rather, to determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to "the objec- tives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive," ibid., as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans, id., at 658­659. As is always the case in our pre-emption jurisprudence, where "federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation, . . . we have worked on the `as- sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Id., at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)) (citation omitted). A Respondents and several of their amici urge us to conclude that § 1777.5 makes "reference to" ERISA plans. Because it seems that approved apprenticeship programs need not necessarily be ERISA plans, we decline to do so. On its face, § 1777.5 appears to allow the lower apprentice wage only to a contractor who acquires apprentices through a "joint apprenticeship committee"-an apprenticeship pro- gram sponsored by the collective efforts of management and organized labor. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 3075, 3076 (West 1989). Were this the true extent of the prevailing 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 326 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court wage law's reach, respondents' "reference to" argument might be more persuasive. The CAC has, however, promul- gated regulations making clear that the class of apprentice- ship program sponsors who may provide approved appren- tices is broader. See 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 230.1(a) (1992) ("Registered apprentices can only be obtained from the Ap- prenticeship Committee of the craft or trade in the area of the site of the public work" (emphasis added)); id., § 228(c) (defining an apprenticeship committee as "an apprenticeship program sponsor"); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 3075 (West 1989) (stating that an "apprenticeship program sponsor may be a joint apprenticeship committee, unilateral management or labor apprenticeship committee, or an individual employer"). An apprenticeship program, it would seem, can be main- tained by a single employer, and its costs can be defrayed out of that employer's general assets. To comport with § 302(c)(6) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 186(c)(6), the expenses of any joint apprenticeship commit- tee must be defrayed out of moneys placed into a separate fund. The existence of that fund triggers ERISA coverage over programs like that of the Electronic and Communica- tions Systems JATC. See ERISA Advisory Op. No. 94­14A (Apr. 20, 1994). But an employee benefit program not funded through a separate fund is not an ERISA plan. In Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989), we recog- nized a distinction between vacation benefits paid out of an accumulated fund and those paid out of an employer's gen- eral assets. A fund established to pay vacation benefits, we held, constituted an employee welfare benefit plan; the policy at issue in Morash, whereby vacation benefits were paid out of general assets, did not. The distinction, we concluded, was compelled by ERISA's object and policy: "In enacting ERISA, Congress' primary concern was with the mismanagement of funds accumulated to fi- nance employee benefits and the failure to pay employ- 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 327 Opinion of the Court ees benefits from accumulated funds. To that end, it established extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duty requirements to insure against the possibility that the employee's expectation of the benefit would be de- feated through poor management by the plan adminis- trator." Id., at 115 (citation and footnote omitted). Benefits paid out of an employer's general assets presented risks indistinguishable from "the danger of defeated expecta- tions of wages for services performed," a hazard with which ERISA is unconcerned. Ibid. The Secretary has carried this funded/unfunded distinc- tion into areas that are, we think, analogous to that of apprenticeship programs. See, e. g., 29 CFR § 2510.3­1(k) (1994) (scholarship programs paid for out of an employer's general assets are not ERISA plans); § 2510.3­1(b)(3)(iv) (training provided on the job with general assets does not constitute ERISA plan); see also ERISA Advisory Op. No. 94­14A (Apr. 20, 1994) (apprenticeship programs paid for out of trust funds are ERISA plans); ERISA Advisory Op. No. 83­32A (June 21, 1983) (in-house professional development program financed out of general assets is not an ERISA plan). Although none of these regulations specifically an- swers the question whether an unfunded apprenticeship pro- gram is covered by ERISA, they suggest-as does our deci- sion in Morash-that it is not.5 5 We are told that "[m]ost state-approved apprenticeship programs in the construction industry in California appear to be ERISA plans." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 8. Between April and June 1994, California had 175 joint apprenticeship programs and 13 "unilateral" ones. Ibid. As noted above, the costs of the joint apprenticeship pro- grams are necessarily defrayed out of separate funds. The Government points out that some of the 13 unilateral programs may also have separate funds. Ibid. No party before us has established that all programs do. Cf. The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F. 3d 708, 711 (CA2 1994) (noting that 88% of "non-elderly Americans have private health care insurance through [ERISA] plans"), rev'd by New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995). 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 328 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court Section 1777.5, then, "functions irrespective of . . . the ex- istence of an ERISA plan." Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U. S., at 139. An apprenticeship program meeting the substantive standards set forth in the Fitzgerald Act regulations can be approved whether or not its funding apparatus is of a kind as to bring it under ERISA. See Southern Cal. ABC, 4 Cal. 4th, at 429, n. 1, 841 P. 2d, at 1014, n. 1. Section 1777.5 is indifferent to the funding, and attendant ERISA coverage, of apprenticeship programs. Accordingly, California's pre- vailing wage statute does not make reference to ERISA plans. We turn now to the question whether it nonetheless has a "connection with" such plans. B In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., we held that the New York Human Rights Law, which prohibited "employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy," and New York's Disability Benefits Law, which required "employers to pay employees specific benefits," "relate[d] to" ERISA plans. 463 U. S., at 97. Shaw and other of our ERISA pre-emption decisions, see, e. g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52 (1990); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981), presented us with state statutes that "mandated em- ployee benefit structures or their administration"; in those cases, we concluded that these requirements amounted to "connection[s] with" ERISA plans. See Travelers, 514 U. S., at 658. The state law at issue in Travelers, our most recent exer- cise in ERISA pre-emption, stands in considerable contrast. That statute regulated hospital rates, and required hospitals to exact surcharges (ranging from 9% to 24% of the rate set under the statute) from patients whose hospital bills were paid by any of a variety of non-Blue Cross/Blue Shield pro- viders. Because ERISA plans, as might be expected, were predominant among the purchasers of insurance, see Brief 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 329 Opinion of the Court for Petitioner in Travelers, O. T. 1994, No. 93­1408, p. 1­2, the statute was asserted to run afoul of ERISA's pre- emption provision. The differential rates charged to com- mercially insured patients and to patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (collectively "the Blues") made commercial insurance relatively more expensive-and relatively less attractive. The resulting cost variations encouraged in- surance purchasers, including ERISA plans, to provide in- surance benefits through the Blues. Commercial insurers argued that these cost variations and their resulting eco- nomic effects had a "connection with" those ERISA plans, requiring pre-emption of the law that dictated them. We upheld the statute. The "indirect economic influence" of the surcharge, we noted, did not "bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself." 514 U. S., at 659. Nor did the indi- rect influence of the surcharge "preclude uniform administra- tive practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wishe[d] to provide one." Id., at 660. In- deed, if ERISA were concerned with any state action-such as medical-care quality standards or hospital workplace reg- ulations-that increased costs of providing certain benefits, and thereby potentially affected the choices made by ERISA plans, we could scarcely see the end of ERISA's pre-emptive reach, and the words "relate to" would limit nothing. Id., at 660­661. We also noted that several States regulated hospital charges at the time that ERISA was enacted, and yet neither ERISA's language nor legislative history made any mention of pre-empting these state efforts.6 6 In fact, the very same Congress that enacted ERISA adopted, a short time later, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA), Pub. L. 93­641, 88 Stat. 2225, §§ 1­3, repealed by Pub. L. 99­660, title VII, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799, which "sought to encourage and help fund state responses to growing health care costs and the widely diverging availability of health services." Travelers, supra, at 665. The NHPRDA had in mind a system akin to New York's, and we thought it 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 330 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court We think that, in every relevant respect, California's pre- vailing wage statute is indistinguishable from New York's surcharge program. At the outset, we note that apprentice- ship standards and the wages paid on state public works have long been regulated by the States. As discussed in Part I­A, supra, California has required that prevailing wages be paid on its public works projects for nearly as long as Congress has required them to be paid on federal projects, and for more than 40 years prior to the enactment of ERISA. Similarly, California has legislated in the apprenticeship area for the better part of this century. See, e. g., The Shelley- Maloney Apprentice Labor Standards Act, 1939 Cal. Stat. 220, codified at Cal. Lab. Code § 3070 et seq. Congress, in the Fitzgerald Act, recognized pre-existing state efforts in regulating apprenticeship programs and apparently ex- pected that those efforts would continue. See 29 U. S. C. § 50 (directing the Secretary of Labor "to cooperate with State agencies engaged in the formulation and promotion of standards of apprenticeship"); see also H. R. Rep. No. 945, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). That the States traditionally regulated these areas would not alone immunize their efforts; ERISA certainly contem- plated the pre-emption of substantial areas of traditional state regulation. The wages to be paid on public works projects and the substantive standards to be applied to ap- prenticeship training programs are, however, quite remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly concerned- " `reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like.' " Travelers, supra, at 661 (quoting Shaw, 463 U. S., at 98). A reading of § 514(a) resulting in the pre-emption of tradition- ally state-regulated substantive law in those areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be "unsettling," Travelers, unlikely that the Congress that enacted ERISA would later have sought to encourage a state program that ERISA would pre-empt. 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 331 Opinion of the Court 514 U. S., at 665.7 Given the paucity of indication in ERISA and its legislative history of any intent on the part of Con- gress to pre-empt state apprenticeship training standards, or state prevailing wage laws that incorporate them, we are reluctant to alter our ordinary "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act." Rice, 331 U. S., at 230.8 Accordingly, as in 7 In Travelers, we were convinced that Congress did not intend pre- emption of New York's law both by the lack of any positive indication that Congress harbored such an intent, and by indirect evidence-the NHPRDA-that the Congress that enacted ERISA did not intend to su- persede state laws like New York's regulation of hospital charges. 514 U. S., at 664­668. We face here a similar absence of positive indications on the part of Congress that apprenticeship or prevailing wage statutes would be superseded. The United States further argues that the Fitzger- ald Act is analogous to the NHPRDA: Were we to hold § 1777.5 pre- empted "[t]hat result `would leave States without the authority to do just what Congress was expressly trying to induce them to do by enacting the Fitzgerald Act.' " Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In Travelers, we thought it im- plausible that the Congress that enacted ERISA intended to pre-empt state laws that the same Congress subsequently sought to encourage with the NHPRDA. It is not, however, inconceivable for the ERISA Congress to intend the pre-emption of state statutes resulting from the pre-existing Fitzgerald Act. So, the United States' analogy is not decisive. It does, however, aid our conclusion that Congress' silence on the pre-emption of state statutes that Congress previously sought to foster counsels against pre-emption here. 8 Respondents and two of their amici point to bills introduced in Con- gress for the purpose, at least in part, of overruling lower court decisions holding prevailing wage statutes like California's pre-empted. See Brief for Respondent 23, Brief for Signatory Members of the Coalition to Pre- serve ERISA Pre-emption as Amicus Curiae 11, and Brief for Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 26­27 (all citing H. R. 1036, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1580, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). It is argued that Congress' unwillingness to amend § 514(a) in response to these decisions is evidence that Congress believed that those opinions accurately interpreted ERISA's pre-emptive scope. We have rejected similar arguments before. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 332 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Opinion of the Court Travelers, we address the substance of the California statute with the presumption that ERISA did not intend to sup- plant it. Like New York's surcharge requirement, the apprentice- ship portion of the prevailing wage statute does not bind ERISA plans to anything. No apprenticeship program is required by California law to meet California's standards. See Southern Cal. ABC, 4 Cal. 4th, at 428, 841 P. 2d, at 1013. If a contractor chooses to hire apprentices for a public works project, it need not hire them from an approved program (although if it does not, it must pay these apprentices jour- neyman wages). So, apprenticeship programs that have not gained CAC approval may still supply public works contrac- tors with apprentices. Unapproved apprenticeship pro- grams also may supply apprentices to private contractors.9 The effect of § 1777.5 on ERISA apprenticeship programs, therefore, is merely to provide some measure of economic incentive to comport with the State's requirements, at least to the extent that those programs seek to provide appren- tices who can work on public works projects at a lower wage. Apprenticeship programs have confronted these differen- tial economic incentives since well before the enactment of ERISA, and would face them today even if California had no prevailing wage statute. To supply apprentices eligible for the apprenticeship wage to federal public works contractors, an apprenticeship program must meet the standards promul- gated by California under the Fitzgerald Act.10 What is Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 114 (1989); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one"). 9 In New York, we are told, "approximately half of all construction is not subject to state or federal prevailing wage requirements." Brief for State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae 21, n. 14 (citing F. W. Dodge Division, McGraw-Hill Information Systems, Inc. (1996)). 10 It may also be that, because California's standards are "substantively similar," Southern California ABC, 4 Cal. 4th, at 434, 841 P. 2d, at 1017, to the federal standards, multistate apprenticeship programs are not 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 333 Opinion of the Court more, with or without the possibility of being able to provide apprentices eligible for a lower wage on public projects, ap- prenticeship programs in California have other incentives to seek CAC approval. See Southern Cal. ABC, supra, at 429, 841 P. 2d, at 1013 ("In California, additional financial in- centives exist in the form of direct financial subsidies for training provided by approved programs," and because "an apprentice who completes an approved training program ob- tains a certificate of completion naming him or her a skilled journeyman in the chosen trade"). It cannot be gainsaid that § 1777.5 has the effect of encouraging apprentice- ship programs-including ERISA plans-to meet the stand- ards set out by California, but it has not been demon- strated here that the added inducement created by the wage break available on state public works projects is tantamount to a compulsion upon apprenticeship programs.11 saddled with "the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 142 (1990). Then again, the area of apprenticeship training may be one where uniformity of substantive standards across States is impossible. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 ("[P]revailing wages in dif- ferent States-or even in different areas of a single State-may vary sub- stantially, and training requirements for membership in skilled trades may also vary among different trades, different communities, and different States"). We need not resolve this question. Suffice it to say that the federal and state apprenticeship standards are not mandatory, and Califor- nia's standards do not result in disuniformities different in kind from those that would exist without them. 11 It is not conclusive as to California's apprenticeship programs, but we note that some data support the conclusion that the prevailing wage break for approved apprenticeship programs does not present ERISA plans with a Hobson's choice. Amici State of Washington et al. inform us that "[w]hile the federal government and twenty-seven of the thirty-one states which have prevailing wage laws have [a wage break], it is estimated that only fifty percent of apprentices in this country are in state or federally `approved' programs." Brief for State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae 20, and n. 13. 519us2$20N 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 334 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Scalia, J., concurring The effect of the prevailing wage statute on ERISA- covered apprenticeship programs in California is substan- tially similar to the effect of New York law on ERISA plans choosing whether to provide health insurance benefits in New York through the Blues, or through a commercial car- rier. The prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans. In this regard, it is "no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate." Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668. We could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended nothing of the sort. We thus con- clude that California's prevailing wage laws and apprentice- ship standards do not have a "connection with," and there- fore do not "relate to," ERISA plans.12 III For the reasons stated herein, the judgment below is re- versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring. Since ERISA was enacted in 1974, this Court has accepted certiorari in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts in the Courts of Appeals regarding ERISA pre- emption of various sorts of state law.1 The rate of accept- 12 Because we determine that § 1777.5 does not "relate to" ERISA plans, we need not determine whether ERISA's saving clause, § 514(d), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(d), nonetheless forestalls pre-emption. 1 In addition to the case at bar, the Court has addressed the application of ERISA's pre-emption provision in the following cases: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. 519us2$20K 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 316 (1997) 335 Scalia, J., concurring ance, moreover, has not diminished (we have taken two more ERISA pre-emption cases so far this Term),2 suggesting that our prior decisions have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law. I join the Court's opinion today because it is a fair descrip- tion of our prior case law, and a fair application of the more recent of that case law. Today's opinion is no more likely than our earlier ones, however, to bring clarity to this field- precisely because it does obeisance to all our prior cases, instead of acknowledging that the criteria set forth in some of them have in effect been abandoned. Our earlier cases sought to apply faithfully the statutory prescription that state laws are pre-empted "insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan." Hence the many statements, re- peated today, to the effect that the ERISA pre-emption pro- vision has a "broad scope," an "expansive sweep," is "broadly worded," "deliberately expansive," and "conspicuous for its breadth." Ante, at 324. But applying the "relate to" provi- sion according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, every- thing is related to everything else. Accord, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995). The statutory text pro- vides an illusory test, unless the Court is willing to decree a Bank, 510 U. S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U. S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85 (1983); and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981). 2 See Boggs v. Boggs, cert. granted, post, p. 957; De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, cert. granted, post, p. 926. 519us2$20K 06-03-99 21:50:25 PAGES OPINPGT 336 CALIFORNIA DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCE- MENT v. DILLINGHAM CONSTR., N. A., INC. Scalia, J., concurring degree of pre-emption that no sensible person could have intended-which it is not. I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the "relate to" clause of the pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in which ordi- nary field pre-emption applies-namely, the field of laws reg- ulating "employee benefit plan[s] described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title," 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). Our new approach to ERISA pre-emption is set forth in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86, 99 (1993): "[W]e discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional pre-emption analysis." I think it accurately describes our current ERISA jurisprudence to say that we apply ordinary field pre-emption, and, of course, ordinary conflict pre- emption. See generally Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984) (explaining general principles of field and conflict pre-emption); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) (field pre-emption); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142­143 (1963) (conflict pre-emption). Nothing more mysterious than that; and except as establishing that, "relates to" is irrelevant. 519us2$21Z 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 337 Syllabus ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 95­1376. Argued November 6, 1996-Decided February 18, 1997 After he was fired by respondent, petitioner filed an employment discrimi- nation charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, petitioner applied for a job with another company, which contacted respondent for an employment reference. Claiming that respondent gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, petitioner filed suit under § 704(a) of Title VII, which makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the action, and the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the term "employees" in § 704(a) refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not cognizable under Title VII. Held: Because the term "employees," as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, in- cludes former employees, petitioner may sue respondent for its allegedly retaliatory postemployment actions. Pp. 340­346. (a) Consideration of the statutory language, the specific context in which it is used, and the broader context of Title VII as a whole leads to the conclusion that the term "employees" in § 704(a) is ambiguous as to whether it excludes former employees. First, there is no temporal qualifier in § 704(a) such as would make plain that it protects only per- sons still employed at the time of the retaliation. Second, § 701(f)'s gen- eral definition of "employee" likewise lacks any temporal qualifier and is consistent with either current or past employment. Third, a number of other Title VII provisions, including §§ 706(g)(1), 717(b), and 717(c), use the term "employees" to mean something more inclusive or different from "current employees." That still other sections use the term to refer unambiguously to a current employee, see, e. g., §§ 703(h), 717(b), at most demonstrates that the term may have a plain meaning in the context of a particular section-not that it has the same meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts. Once it is established that "employees" includes former employees in some sections, but not in oth- ers, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a definite meaning. Pp. 340­345. 519us2$21Z 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT 338 ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. Syllabus (b) A holding that former employees are included within § 704(a)'s coverage is more consistent with the broader context provided by other Title VII sections and with § 704(a)'s primary purpose of maintaining unfettered access to Title VII's remedial mechanisms. As noted, sev- eral sections of the statute plainly contemplate that former employees will make use of Title VII's remedial mechanisms. These include § 703(a), which prohibits discriminatory "discharge." Insofar as § 704(a) expressly protects employees from retaliation for filing a "charge," and a charge under § 703(a) alleging unlawful discharge would necessarily be brought by a former employee, it is far more consistent to include former employees within the scope of "employees" protected by § 704(a). This interpretation is supported by the arguments of petitioner and the EEOC that exclusion of former employees from § 704(a) would under- mine Title VII's effectiveness by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims. Pp. 345­346. 70 F. 3d 325, reversed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Allen M. Lenchek argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Eric Schnapper, Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, and Charles Ste- phen Ralston. Paul R. Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, C. Gregory Stewart, and Gwendolyn Young Reams. L. Chris Butler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Patricia McHugh Lambert.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Paul C. Saunders, Marc L. Fleischaker, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Hen- derson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, Dennis Courtland Hayes, Judith H. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, Helen 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 337 (1997) 339 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who have either availed themselves of Title VII's protections or assisted others in so doing. 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­3(a). We are asked to decide in this case whether the term "employees," as used in § 704(a), includes former employees, such that petitioner may bring suit against his former employer for postemployment actions allegedly taken in retaliation for petitioner's having filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- sion (EEOC). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the term "employ- ees" in § 704(a) referred only to current employees and there- fore petitioner's claim was not cognizable under Title VII. We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1154 (1996), and now reverse. I Respondent Shell Oil Co. fired petitioner Charles T. Rob- inson, Sr., in 1991. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that respondent had dis- charged him because of his race. While that charge was pending, petitioner applied for a job with another company. That company contacted respondent, as petitioner's former employer, for an employment reference. Petitioner claims that respondent gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge. L. Norton, Stephen R. Shapiro, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Martha F. Davis; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Douglas A. Hedin and Robert Belton. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Em- ployment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by J. Thomas Kil- patrick, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar. 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT 340 ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. Opinion of the Court Petitioner subsequently sued under § 704(a), alleging retal- iatory discrimination. On respondent's motion, the District Court dismissed the action, adhering to previous Fourth Cir- cuit precedent holding that § 704(a) does not apply to former employees. Petitioner appealed, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel deci- sion, and thereafter affirmed the District Court's determina- tion that former employees may not bring suit under § 704(a) for retaliation occurring after termination of their employ- ment. 70 F. 3d 325 (1995). We granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on this issue.1 II A Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambig- uous and "the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 240 (1989); see also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253­254 (1992). 1 The other Courts of Appeals to have considered this issue have held that the term "employees" in § 704(a) does include former employees. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F. 3d 194, 198­200 (CA3), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1022 (1994); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F. 2d 1506, 1509 (CA11 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F. 2d 864, 869 (CA9 1982), overruled on other grounds by Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F. 2d 1477, 1481­1482 (CA9 1987) (en banc); Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge Co., 581 F. 2d 1052, 1055 (CA2 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Com- merce, 565 F. 2d 1162, 1165 (CA10 1977). The Fourth Circuit indicated that it joined the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Reed v. Shep- ard, 939 F. 2d 484, 492­493 (1991). But the Seventh Circuit has since repudiated the Fourth Circuit's view of Reed. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F. 3d 881, 886 (1996). 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 337 (1997) 341 Opinion of the Court The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is deter- mined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drill- ing Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136, 139 (1991). In this case, consideration of those factors leads us to conclude that the term "employees," as used in § 704(a), is ambiguous as to whether it excludes for- mer employees. At first blush, the term "employees" in § 704(a) would seem to refer to those having an existing employment relationship with the employer in question. Cf. Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., ante, at 207­208 (interpreting the term "employees" in § 701(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b)). This initial impression, however, does not withstand scrutiny in the context of § 704(a). First, there is no temporal qualifier in the statute such as would make plain that § 704(a) protects only persons still employed at the time of the retaliation. That the statute could have expressly included the phrase "former employees" does not aid our inquiry. Congress also could have used the phrase "current employees." But no- where in Title VII is either phrase used-even where the specific context otherwise makes clear an intent to cover cur- rent or former employees.2 Similarly, that other statutes have been more specific in their coverage of "employees" and 2 Our recent decision in Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., ante, p. 202, held that the term "employees" in § 701(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b), referred to those persons with whom an employer has an ex- isting employment relationship. See ante, at 207­208. But § 701(b) has two significant temporal qualifiers. The provision, which delimits Title VII's coverage, states that the Act applies to any employer "who has fif- teen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). The emphasized words specify the time frame in which the employment relationship must exist, and thus the spe- cific context of that section did not present the particular ambiguity at issue in the present case. 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT 342 ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. Opinion of the Court "former employees," see, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 1301(4) (1994 ed., Supp. I) (defining "employee" to include "former employee"); 5 U. S. C. § 1212(a)(1) (including "employees, former employ- ees, and applicants for employment" in the operative provi- sion), proves only that Congress can use the unqualified term "employees" to refer only to current employees, not that it did so in this particular statute. Second, Title VII's definition of "employee" likewise lacks any temporal qualifier and is consistent with either current or past employment. Section 701(f) defines "employee" for purposes of Title VII as "an individual employed by an em- ployer." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(f). The argument that the term "employed," as used in § 701(f), is commonly used to mean "[p]erforming work under an employer-employee rela- tionship," Black's Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990), begs the question by implicitly reading the word "employed" to mean "is employed." But the word "employed" is not so limited in its possible meanings, and could just as easily be read to mean "was employed." Third, a number of other provisions in Title VII use the term "employees" to mean something more inclusive or dif- ferent from "current employees." For example, §§ 706(g)(1) and 717(b) both authorize affirmative remedial action (by a court or EEOC, respectively) "which may include . . . re- instatement or hiring of employees." 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e­ 5(g)(1) and 2000e­16(b). As petitioner notes, because one does not "reinstat[e]" current employees, that language nec- essarily refers to former employees. Likewise, one may hire individuals to be employees, but one does not typically hire persons who already are employees. Section 717(b) requires federal departments and agencies to have equal employment opportunity policies and rules, "which shall include a provision that an employee or appli- cant for employment shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him there- under." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­16(b). If the complaint involves 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 337 (1997) 343 Opinion of the Court discriminatory discharge, as it often does, the "employee" who must be notified is necessarily a former employee. Similarly, § 717(c) provides that an "employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, . . . may file a civil action . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­16(c). Again, given that discriminatory discharge is a forbidden "personnel actio[n] affecting employees," see § 717(a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­16(a), the term "employee" in § 717(c) necessarily includes a former employee. See Loef- fler v. Frank, 486 U. S. 549 (1988) (involving a discriminatory discharge action successfully brought under § 717 by a for- mer Postal Service employee).3 Of course, there are sections of Title VII where, in context, use of the term "employee" refers unambiguously to a cur- rent employee, for example, those sections addressing salary or promotions. See § 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(h) (allow- ing different standards of compensation for "employees who work in different locations"); § 717(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­ 16(b) (directing federal agencies to establish a plan "to pro- vide a maximum opportunity for employees to advance so as to perform at their highest potential"). But those examples at most demonstrate that the term "employees" may have a plain meaning in the context of a particular section-not that the term has the same meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts. Once it is established that the term "employees" includes former em- ployees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section must be ana- 3 Other sections also seem to use the term "employees" to mean some- thing other than current employees. Section 701(c) defines "employment agency" as "any person regularly undertaking . . . to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(c). This language most naturally is read to mean "prospective employees." Section 701(e) uses identical language when providing that a labor organization affects commerce if it "operates a hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an employer . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(e). 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT 344 ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. Opinion of the Court lyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.4 Respondent argues that the addition of the word "his" be- fore "employees" narrows the scope of the provision. Brief for Respondent 19. That argument is true, so far as it goes, but it does not resolve the question before us-namely, in what time frame must the employment relationship exist. The phrase "his employees" could include "his" former employees, but still exclude persons who have never worked for the particular employer being charged with retaliation. Nor are we convinced by respondent's argument that Con- gress' inclusion in § 704(a) of "applicants for employment" as persons distinct from "employees," coupled with its failure to include "former employees," is evidence of congressional intent not to include former employees. The use of the term "applicants" in § 704(a) does not serve to confine, by negative inference, the temporal scope of the term "employees." Re- spondent's argument rests on the incorrect premise that the term "applicants" is equivalent to the phrase "future employ- ees." But the term "applicants" would seem to cover many persons who will not become employees. Unsuccessful ap- plicants or those who turn down a job offer, for example, would have been applicants, but not future employees. And the term fails to cover certain future employees who may be offered and will accept jobs without having to apply for those jobs. Because the term "applicants" in § 704(a) is not synon- ymous with the phrase "future employees," there is no basis for engaging in the further (and questionable) negative infer- 4 Petitioner's examples of non-Title VII cases using the term "employee" to refer to a former employee are largely irrelevant, except to the extent they tend to rebut a claim that the term "employee" has some intrinsically plain meaning. See, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81, 83 (1971) (unemployed disabled worker); Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U. S. 235, 239 (1967) (individual who had been fired); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960) (retired worker). 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 337 (1997) 345 Opinion of the Court ence that inclusion of the term "applicants" demonstrates intentional exclusion of former employees. Finally, the use of the term "individual" in § 704(a), as well as in § 703(a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a), provides no meaningful assistance in resolving this case. To be sure, "individual" is a broader term than "employee" and would facially seem to cover a former employee. But it would also encompass a present employee as well as other persons who have never had an employment relationship with the employer at issue. The term "individual," therefore, does not seem designed to capture former employees, as distinct from current employ- ees, and its use provides no insight into whether the term "employees" is limited only to current employees. B Finding that the term "employees" in § 704(a) is ambigu- ous, we are left to resolve that ambiguity. The broader con- text provided by other sections of the statute provides con- siderable assistance in this regard. As noted above, several sections of the statute plainly contemplate that former em- ployees will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII. See supra, at 342­343. Indeed, § 703(a) expressly in- cludes discriminatory "discharge" as one of the unlawful em- ployment practices against which Title VII is directed. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a). Insofar as § 704(a) expressly protects employees from retaliation for filing a "charge" under Title VII, and a charge under § 703(a) alleging unlawful discharge would necessarily be brought by a former employee, it is far more consistent to include former employees within the scope of "employees" protected by § 704(a). In further support of this view, petitioner argues that the word "employees" includes former employees because to hold otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by § 704(a). See Brief for Petitioner 20­30. This is also the position taken by the EEOC. See Brief for 519us2$21N 06-03-99 21:52:45 PAGES OPINPGT 346 ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO. Opinion of the Court United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 16­25; see also 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 614.7(f). According to the EEOC, exclusion of former employees from the protection of § 704(a) would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire em- ployees who might bring Title VII claims. Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 18­21. Those arguments carry persuasive force given their co- herence and their consistency with a primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms. Cf. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U. S. 117, 121­122 (1972) (National Labor Relations Act); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, 292­ 293 (1960) (Fair Labor Standards Act). The EEOC quite persuasively maintains that it would be destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII-for example, complaints regarding dis- criminatory termination. We agree with these contentions and find that they support the inclusive interpretation of "employees" in § 704(a) that is already suggested by the broader context of Title VII. III We hold that the term "employees," as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, is ambiguous as to whether it includes former employees. It being more consistent with the broader con- text of Title VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a), we hold that former employees are included within § 704(a)'s cov- erage. Accordingly, the decision of the Fourth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. 519us2$22Z 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 347 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. BROCKAMP, administrator of the ESTATE OF McGILL, DECEASED certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1225. Argued December 3, 1996-Decided February 18, 1997* After the taxpayer in each of these cases paid the Internal Revenue Serv- ice (IRS) money he did not owe, he (or his representative) submitted an administrative refund claim several years past the end of the applicable filing period set forth in § 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Each taxpayer asked the court to extend the statutory period for an "equitable" reason, namely, that he had a mental disability (senility or alcoholism) that caused the delay. Such a reason is not mentioned in § 6511, but, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit read the statute as if it contained an implied "equitable tolling" exception. It then applied eq- uity principles to each case, found that those principles justified tolling the statutory period, and permitted the actions to proceed. Held: Congress did not intend the "equitable tolling" doctrine to apply to § 6511's time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims. The taxpayers misplace their reliance on Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 94­96. Even assuming, as they con- tend, that a tax refund suit and a private restitution suit are sufficiently similar to warrant asking Irwin's negatively phrased question-Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply in a suit against the Government?-there are strong reasons for answering that question in the Government's favor. Sec- tion 6511 sets forth its time limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, reiterates them several times in different ways, imposes sub- stantive limitations, and sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits that do not include "equitable tolling." To read such tolling into these provisions would require one to assume an implied tolling excep- tion virtually every time a number appears in § 6511, and would require the tolling of that section's substantive limitations on the amount of recovery-a kind of tolling for which there is no direct precedent. There are no counterindications of congressional intent. Reading "equitable tolling" into the statute could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large *Together with United States v. Scott, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court's Rule 12.4). 519us2$22Z 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT 348 UNITED STATES v. BROCKAMP Opinion of the Court numbers of late claims. That fact suggests that, at the least, Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute's limitations periods, rather than dele- gate to the courts a generalized power to do so wherever it appears that equity so requires. The taxpayers' counterrebuttal, consisting primar- ily of a historical analysis of the tax refund provisions, actually helps the Government's argument. Pp. 349­354. 67 F. 3d 260 and 70 F. 3d 120, reversed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Kent L. Jones, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, and Bridget M. Rowan. Robert F. Klueger argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The two cases before us raise a single question. Can courts toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons, the statutory time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in § 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986? We hold that they cannot. These two cases present similar circumstances. In each case a taxpayer initially paid the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) several thousand dollars that he did not owe. In each case the taxpayer (or his representative) filed an administra- tive claim for refund several years after the relevant statu- tory time period for doing so had ended. In each case the taxpayer suffered a disability (senility or alcoholism), which, he said, explained why the delay was not his fault. And in each case he asked the court to extend the relevant statutory time period for an "equitable" reason, namely, the existence of a mental disability-a reason not mentioned in § 6511, but which, we assume, would permit a court to toll the statutory limitations period if, but only if, § 6511 contains an implied 519us2$22Q 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 347 (1997) 349 Opinion of the Court "equitable tolling" exception. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056 (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1996); see also Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F. 3d 847, 852 (CA7 1996) (defining equitable tolling). In both cases, the Ninth Circuit read § 6511 as if it did contain an implied exception that would permit "equitable tolling." It then applied principles of equity to each case. It found those principles justified tolling the statutory time period. And it permitted the actions to proceed. 67 F. 3d 260 (1995); judgt. order reported at 70 F. 3d 120 (1995). All other Circuits that have considered the matter, however, have taken the opposite view. They have held that § 6511 does not authorize equitable tolling. See Amoco Production Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F. 3d 1464 (CA10 1996); Lovett v. United States, 81 F. 3d 143 (CA Fed. 1996); Webb v. United States, 66 F. 3d 691 (CA4 1995); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F. 2d 25 (CA1 1993) (per curiam); and Vintilla v. United States, 931 F. 2d 1444 (CA11 1991). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. And we conclude that the latter Cir- cuits are correct. The taxpayers rest their claim for equitable tolling upon Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), a case in which this Court considered the timeliness of an employee's lawsuit charging his Government employer with discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The Court found the lawsuit untimely, but nevertheless tolled the limitations pe- riod. It held that the "rule of equitable tolling" applies "to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is ap- plicable" to Title VII suits against private employers. 498 U. S., at 94­95. The Court went on to say that the "same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States." Id., at 95­96. The taxpayers, pointing to Irwin, argue that principles of equitable tolling would have applied had they sued private 519us2$22Q 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT 350 UNITED STATES v. BROCKAMP Opinion of the Court defendants, e. g., had they sought restitution from private de- fendants for "Money Had and Received." See C. Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading 220 (2d ed. 1934). They add that given Irwin's language, there must be a "presump- tion" that limitations periods in tax refund suits against the Government can be equitably tolled. And, they say, that "presumption," while "rebuttable," has not been rebutted. They conclude that, given Irwin, the Ninth Circuit correctly tolled the statutory period for "equitable" reasons. In evaluating this argument, we are willing to assume, fa- vorably to the taxpayers but only for argument's sake, that a tax refund suit and a private suit for restitution are suffi- ciently similar to warrant asking Irwin's negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply? But see Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 153­154 (1960) (citing Curtis's Administratrix v. Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479 (1863)) (distinguishing common-law suit against the tax collector from action of assumpsit for money had and received); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 382­383 (1933); see also Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 685, 687 (1947) (de- scribing collector suit as a fiction solely designed to bring the Government into court). We can travel no further, however, along Irwin's road, for there are strong reasons for answer- ing Irwin's question in the Government's favor. Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as con- taining an implied "equitable tolling" exception. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­16(c) (requiring suit for employment dis- crimination to be filed "[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of notice of final [EEOC] action . . . "). But § 6511 uses language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations in a highly de- tailed technical manner, that, linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. Moreover, 519us2$22Q 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 347 (1997) 351 Opinion of the Court § 6511 reiterates its limitations several times in several dif- ferent ways. Section 6511 says, first, that a "[c]laim for . . . refund . . . of any tax . . . shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no re- turn was filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid." 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a). It then says that "[n]o credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund is filed . . . within such period." § 6511(b)(1). It reiterates the point by imposing substantive limitations: "If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3- year period . . . the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. . . ." § 6511(b)(2)(A). And "[i]f the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim." § 6511(b)(2)(B). The Tax Code reemphasizes the point when it says that re- funds that do not comply with these limitations "shall be considered erroneous," § 6514, and specifies procedures for the Government's recovery of any such "erroneous" refund payment. §§ 6532(b), 7405. In addition, § 6511 sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not include "equitable tolling." See § 6511(d) (establishing special time limit rules for refunds re- 519us2$22Q 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT 352 UNITED STATES v. BROCKAMP Opinion of the Court lated to operating losses, credit carrybacks, foreign taxes, self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 610 (1990) (discussing mitigation provisions set forth in 26 U. S. C. §§ 1311­1314); § 507 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 961 (temporarily tolling limitations period during wartime). To read an "equitable tolling" provision into these provi- sions, one would have to assume an implied exception for tolling virtually every time a number appears. To do so would work a kind of linguistic havoc. Moreover, such an interpretation would require tolling, not only procedural lim- itations, but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery-a kind of tolling for which we have found no direct precedent. Section 6511's detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substan- tive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken to- gether, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, "equitable" exceptions into the statute that it wrote. There are no counter- indications. Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities. The nature of the underlying subject matter-tax collec- tion-underscores the linguistic point. The IRS processes more than 200 million tax returns each year. It issues more than 90 million refunds. See Dept. of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Data Book 8­9. To read an "equita- ble tolling" exception into § 6511 could create serious admin- istrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and per- haps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for "equitable tolling" which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1926) (deleting provision excusing tax deficiencies in the estates of insane or deceased individuals because of difficulties involved in defining incompetence). The nature and potential magni- tude of the administrative problem suggest that Congress 519us2$22Q 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 347 (1997) 353 Opinion of the Court decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably de- layed) in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system. At the least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute's limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires. The taxpayers' counterrebuttal consists primarily of an in- teresting historical analysis of the Internal Revenue Code's tax refund provisions. They try to show that § 6511's spe- cific, detailed language reflects congressional concern about matters not related to equitable tolling. They explain some language, for example, in terms of a congressional effort to stop taxpayers from keeping the refund period open indefi- nitely through the device of making a series of small tax payments. See S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 (1924). They explain other language as an effort to make the refund time period and the tax assessment period coex- tensive. See H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 52 (1942). Assuming all that is so, however, such congressional efforts still seem but a smaller part of a larger congressional objective: providing the Government with strong statutory "protection against stale demands." Cf. United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528, 533 (1938) (statute of limita- tions bars untimely amendment of claim for additional re- fund). Moreover, the history to which the taxpayers point reveals that § 6511's predecessor tax refund provisions, like § 6511, contained highly detailed language with clear time limits. See, e. g., § 281(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 301 (4-year limit on claims for overpayment of in- come, war-profits, or excess-profits tax and cap on refund amount); § 322(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 242 (2-year limit for claim filing and corresponding limit on refund amount); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 808 (adopting current alternative time and amount limita- 519us2$22Q 04-11-98 09:16:52 PAGES OPINPGT 354 UNITED STATES v. BROCKAMP Opinion of the Court tions); see also § 810 of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 283 (imposing time and amount limits for estate tax refunds). And that history lacks any instance (but for the present cases) of equitable tolling. On balance, these histor- ical considerations help the Government's argument. For these reasons, we conclude that Congress did not in- tend the "equitable tolling" doctrine to apply to § 6511's time limitations. The Ninth Circuit's decisions are Reversed. 519us2$23Z 06-07-99 17:28:07 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 355 Per Curiam BIBLES, OREGON DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT v. OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­713. Decided February 18, 1997 Certiorari granted; 83 F. 3d 1168, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6), did not forbid disclosure of a mailing list maintained by petitioner for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and sought by respondent, the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA). In reaching this con- clusion, the Court of Appeals relied upon the "substan- tial public interest in knowing to whom the government is directing information, or as ONDA characterizes it, `propaganda,' so that those persons may receive information from other sources that do not share the BLM's self-interest in presenting government activities in the most favor- able light." 83 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (1996) (emphasis added). "There is," the Court of Appeals said, "a significant public interest in knowing with whom the government has chosen to communicate and in providing those persons with addi- tional information . . . ." Id., at 1172 (emphasis added). These statements, which are the sum total of the Court of Appeals' analysis of the public interest in disclosure, make clear that the court's judgment rested on a perceived public interest in "providing [persons on the BLM's mailing list] with additional information." That is inconsistent with our opinion in Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U. S. 487 (1994), which said that "the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis" is "the extent to which disclo- 519us2$23K 06-07-99 17:28:07 PAGES OPINPGT 356 BIBLES v. OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSN. Per Curiam sure of the information sought would `she[d] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties' or otherwise let citizens know `what their government is up to.' " Id., at 497 (emphasis added) (quoting Department of Justice v. Report- ers Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 773 (1989)). " `[T]he purposes for which the request for information is made,' " we said, have no bearing on whether information must be disclosed under FOIA. 510 U. S., at 496 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, supra, at 771). The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 357 Syllabus SCHENCK et al. v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 95­1065. Argued October 16, 1996-Decided February 19, 1997 Respondents, upstate New York abortion doctors and clinics and an orga- nization dedicated to maintaining access to abortion services, filed a complaint in the District Court seeking to enjoin petitioners, other indi- viduals, and three organizations from engaging in blockades and other illegal conduct at the clinics. The record shows that, before the com- plaint was filed, the clinics were subjected to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters marched, stood, knelt, sat, or lay in clinic parking lot driveways and doorways, blocking or hindering cars from entering the lots, and patients and clinic employees from entering the clinics. In addition, smaller groups of protesters consistently at- tempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations by, among other things, milling around clinic doorways and driveway entrances, trespassing onto clinic parking lots, crowding around cars, and surrounding, crowd- ing, jostling, grabbing, pushing, shoving, and yelling and spitting at women entering the clinics and their escorts. On the sidewalks outside the clinics, protesters called "sidewalk counselors" used similar methods in attempting to dissuade women headed toward the clinics from having abortions. The local police were unable to respond effectively to the protests due, in part, to the fact that the defendants harassed them verbally and by mail. The District Court issued a temporary restrain- ing order (TRO), and later, after the protests and sidewalk counseling continued, a preliminary injunction. As relevant here, injunction pro- visions banned "demonstrating within fifteen feet . . . of . . . doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of [clinic] facilities" (fixed buffer zones), or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving such facilities" (floating buffer zones). Another provision allowed two sidewalk coun- selors inside the buffer zones, but required them to "cease and desist" their counseling if the counselee so requested. In its accompanying opinion, the District Court, inter alia, rejected petitioners' assertion that the injunction violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 358 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Syllabus Held: The injunction provisions imposing "fixed buffer zone" limitations are constitutional, but the provisions imposing "floating buffer zone" limitations violate the First Amendment. Pp. 371­385. (a) Because Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, bears many similarities to this case and because many of the parties' arguments depend on the application of Madsen here, the Court reviews that decision. In Madsen, the Court said that "standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous" for evaluating content- neutral injunctions that restrict speech, and held, instead, that the test is "whether the challenged provisions . . . burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Id., at 765. Pp. 371­374. (b) Petitioners' argument that no significant governmental interests support the injunction at issue is rejected. Given the factual similarity between this case and Madsen, the Court concludes that the govern- mental interests underlying the injunction there-ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and side- walks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services, 512 U. S., at 767­768-also underlie the injunction here, and in combination are certainly significant enough to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to secure unimpeded physi- cal access to the clinics. Pp. 374­376. (c) The floating buffer zones are struck down because they burden more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant governmental inter- ests. Such zones around people prevent defendants-except for side- walk counselors tolerated by the targeted individual-from communicat- ing a message from a normal conversational distance or handing out leaflets on the public sidewalks. This is a broad prohibition, both be- cause of the type of speech restricted and the nature of the location. Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypi- cal example of a traditional public forum. See, e. g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 322. Although a record of abusive conduct sometimes makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public sidewalk per- missible, see, e. g., Madsen, supra, at 769­770, the Court need not decide whether the governmental interests involved would ever justify a sepa- ration zone measured by the distance between targeted individuals and protesters, since the fact that this broad speech prohibition "floats" ren- ders it unsustainable on this record. Protesters on the public sidewalks who wish to communicate their message to a targeted individual and to remain as close as possible (while maintaining an acceptable conversa- tional distance) must move as the individual moves, maintaining 15 feet 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 359 Syllabus of separation. But this would be difficult to accomplish at, e. g., one of the respondent clinics which is bordered by a 17-foot-wide sidewalk. The lack of certainty as to how to remain in compliance with the injunc- tion leads to a substantial risk that much more speech will be burdened than the injunction by its terms prohibits. There may well be other ways to both effect the desired separation and yet provide certainty (so that speech protected by the injunction's terms is not burdened). Because the Court strikes down the floating zones around people, it does not address the constitutionality of the "cease and desist" provision respecting those zones. The floating buffer zones around vehicles also fail the Madsen test. Such zones would restrict the speech of those who simply line the sidewalk or curb in an effort to chant, shout, or hold signs peacefully. Nothing in the record or the District Court's opinion contradicts the commonsense notion that a more limited injunction- e. g., one that keeps protesters away from driveways and parking lot entrances and off the streets-would be sufficient to ensure that drivers are not confused about how to enter the clinic and are able to gain access to its driveways and parking lots safely and easily. Pp. 377­380. (d) The fixed buffer zones around the clinic doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances are upheld. That these zones are necessary to en- sure that people and vehicles can enter or exit the clinic property or parking lots is demonstrated by evidence in the record showing that, both before and after the TRO issued, protesters purposefully or effec- tively blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the door- ways and from driving up to and away from the entrances and in and out of the lots; that sidewalk counselors followed and crowded people right up to the doorways (and sometimes beyond) and then tended to stay in the doorways, shouting at the individuals who had managed to get inside; and that defendants' harassment of the local police made it far from certain that the police would be able to quickly and effectively counteract protesters who blocked doorways or threatened the safety of entering patients and employees. Deference is due the District Court's reasonable assessment that 15 feet is the proper distance to ensure ac- cess. See Madsen, supra, at 769­770. Petitioners' various arguments against the fixed buffer zones-that other, unchallenged injunction pro- visions are sufficient to ensure access to the clinics; that the District Court should first have tried a "non-speech-restrictive" injunction; that there is no extraordinary record of pervasive lawlessness here; and that the injunction's term "demonstrating" is vague-are rejected. Also re- jected is petitioners' contention that the "cease and desist" provision limiting the sidewalk counselors exception in connection with the fixed buffer zone violates the First Amendment. This limitation must be as- sessed in light of the fact that the entire exception for counselors was 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 360 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Syllabus an effort to enhance petitioners' speech rights. Moreover, the "cease and desist" provision is not content based simply because it allows a patient to terminate a protester's right to speak when the patient dis- agrees with the message being conveyed. Counselors remain free to espouse their message outside the 15-foot zone, and the condition on their freedom to espouse it within the zone is the result of their own previous harassment and intimidation of patients. Pp. 380­385. 67 F. 3d 377, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II­A, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II­C, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II­B and II­D, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concur- ring in part and dissenting in part, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 385. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 395. Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Vincent P. McCarthy, Joseph P. Se- cola, Thomas P. Monaghan, James M. Henderson, Sr., Wal- ter M. Weber, Keith A. Fournier, and John G. Stepanovich. Lucinda M. Finley argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Martha F. Davis and Deborah A. Ellis. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Pat- rick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Beth S. Brinkmann, and Jessica Dunsay Silver.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc., et al. by James K. Green and Richard A. Waples; for the Family Research Council by Cathleen A. Cleaver; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver; and for the Rutherford Institute by Anne-Marie Amiel and John W. Whitehead. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Connecticut et al. by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecti- cut, and Jennifer C. Jaff, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attor- neys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Gale A. Norton 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 361 Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether an injunction that places restrictions on demonstrations outside abortion clinics violates the First Amendment. We uphold the provisions imposing "fixed bubble" or "fixed buffer zone" limitations, as hereinafter described, but hold that the provisions imposing "floating bubble" or "floating buffer zone" limitations violate the First Amendment. I Respondents include three doctors and four medical clinics (two of which are part of larger hospital complexes) in and around Rochester and Buffalo in upstate New York. These health care providers perform abortions and other medical services at their facilities. The eighth respondent is Pro- Choice Network of Western New York, a not-for-profit cor- of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Calvin E. Holloway, Sr., of Guam, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Deborah T. Po- ritz of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Christine O. Gregoire of Washing- ton, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the State of New York by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Victoria A. Graffeo, Solicitor General, Barbara G. Billet, Deputy Solicitor General, and Robert A. Forte, Assistant Attorney General; for the City of Phoenix, Arizona, by David A. Strauss, Roderick G. McDougall, and Marvin A. Sondag; for the Amer- ican Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, Marjorie Heins, Elliot Mincberg, and Lois Waldman; for the American College of Obste- tricians and Gynecologists et al. by Elaine Metlin, Laura B. Feigin, Ann E. Allen, Roger K. Evans, and Eve W. Paul; for the Feminist Majority Foundation et al. by Talbot D'Alemberte; and for the American Medical Women's Association et al. by Eve C. Gartner. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Marsha S. Berzon, and Laurence Gold; and for the Life Legal Defense Foundation by Anne J. Kindt. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 362 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court poration dedicated to maintaining access to family planning and abortion services. On September 24, 1990, respondents filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western District of New York against 50 individuals and 3 organizations-Operation Res- cue, Project Rescue Western New York, and Project Life of Rochester. The complaint alleged that defendants had con- sistently engaged in illegal blockades and other illegal con- duct at facilities in the Western District of New York where abortions were performed. (For convenience, we refer to these facilities as "clinics" throughout.) The complaint al- leged one federal and six state causes of action: conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions or other family planning services of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3); discrimination against and harassment of women seeking abortions and other family planning services, in violation of N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40­c (McKinney 1992) and N. Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1993); trespass; tortious interference with business; tortious har- assment; false imprisonment; and intentional infliction of emotional harm. The complaint alleged that a large block- ade was planned for September 28, and requested that the court issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop it. The complaint also sought a permanent injunction and damages. Before the complaint was filed, the clinics were subjected to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters would march, stand, kneel, sit, or lie in parking lot driveways and in doorways. This conduct blocked or hindered cars from entering clinic parking lots, and patients, doctors, nurses, and other clinic employees from entering the clinics. In addition to these large-scale blockades, smaller groups of protesters consistently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations. Protesters trespassed onto clinic parking lots and even entered the clinics themselves. Those trespassers who remained outside the clinics crowded around cars or 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 363 Opinion of the Court milled around doorways and driveway entrances in an effort to block or hinder access to the clinics. Protesters some- times threw themselves on top of the hoods of cars or crowded around cars as they attempted to turn into parking lot driveways. Other protesters on clinic property handed literature and talked to people entering the clinics-espe- cially those women they believed were arriving to have abortions-in an effort to persuade them that abortion was immoral. Sometimes protesters used more aggressive tech- niques, with varying levels of belligerence: getting very close to women entering the clinics and shouting in their faces; surrounding, crowding, and yelling at women entering the clinics; or jostling, grabbing, pushing, and shoving women as they attempted to enter the clinics. Male and female clinic volunteers who attempted to escort patients past protesters into the clinics were sometimes elbowed, grabbed, or spit on. Sometimes the escorts pushed back. Some protesters remained in the doorways after the patients had entered the clinics, blocking others from entering and exiting. On the sidewalks outside the clinics, protesters called "sidewalk counselors" used similar methods. Counselors would walk alongside targeted women headed toward the clinics, handing them literature and talking to them in an attempt to persuade them not to get an abortion. Unfortu- nately, if the women continued toward the clinics and did not respond positively to the counselors, such peaceful efforts at persuasion often devolved into "in your face" yelling, and sometimes into pushing, shoving, and grabbing. Men who accompanied women attempting to enter the clinics often be- came upset by the aggressive sidewalk counseling and some- times had to be restrained (not always successfully) from fighting with the counselors. The District Court found that the local police had been "unable to respond effectively" to the protests, for a number of reasons: the protests were constant, overwhelming police resources; when the police arrived, the protesters simply dis- 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 364 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court persed and returned later; prosecution of arrested protesters was difficult because patients were often reluctant to cooper- ate for fear of making their identity public; and those who were convicted were not deterred from returning to engage in unlawful conduct. In addition, the court found that de- fendants harassed the police officers verbally and by mail, including the deputy police chief. Also harassed were peo- ple who testified against the protesters and "those who in- voke[d] legal process against" the protesters. This, testified the deputy police chief, "made it more difficult for him to do his job." Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. v. Project Rescue Western N. Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1426­1427 (WDNY 1992). See also id., at 1431 ("[T]here has been substantial uncontradicted evidence that defendants' activities are in- tended, and do in fact, prevent and hinder local police from protecting the right of women to choose to have an abortion"). On September 27, 1990, three days after respondents filed their complaint and one day before the scheduled large-scale blockade, the District Court issued a TRO. The parties stipulated that the TRO might remain in force until decision on respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction. In per- tinent part, the TRO enjoined defendants from physically blockading the clinics, physically abusing or tortiously ha- rassing anyone entering or leaving the clinics, and "demon- strating within 15 feet of any person" entering or leaving the clinics. As an exception to this 15-foot "buffer zone" around people, the TRO allowed two sidewalk counselors to have "a conversation of a nonthreatening nature" with indi- viduals entering or leaving the clinic. If the individuals in- dicated that they did not want the counseling, however, the counselors had to "cease and desist" from counseling.1 1 Although the TRO (and the preliminary injunction) states that the "cease and desist" provision is triggered whenever the individual "wants to not have counseling," the District Court has construed this provision to apply only if "the targeted person or group of persons indicates, either 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 365 Opinion of the Court At first, defendants complied with the TRO, holding a peaceful demonstration rather than the scheduled blockade. Subsequently, they stipulated that "physical blockades" could be enjoined, and they conducted no such blockades between the issuance of the TRO and the issuance of the preliminary injunction 17 months later. Defendants, however, continued to engage in protests that the District Court labeled "con- structive blockades," as well as sidewalk counseling. Con- structive blockades consisted of "demonstrating and picket- ing around the entrances of the clinics, and . . . harassing patients and staff entering and leaving the clinics." Id., at 1424. This included many of the protest elements described above, including attempts to intimidate or impede cars from entering the parking lots, congregating in driveway en- trances, and crowding around, yelling at, grabbing, pushing, and shoving people entering and leaving the clinics. The purpose of constructive blockades was the same as physical blockades: "to prevent or dissuade patients from entering the clinic." Ibid. Clinic volunteer escorts testified that the protests were much quieter, calmer, and smaller during the first month after the TRO issued, but that the protests re- turned to their prior intensity thereafter, including aggres- sive sidewalk counseling with occasional shoving and elbow- ing, trespassing into clinic buildings to continue counseling of patients, and blocking of doorways and driveways. Alleging that Project Rescue and five individual defend- ants (including petitioner Schenck) breached the TRO on five separate occasions from late October 1990 through December 1990, respondents sought four contempt citations. A fifth contempt citation for a 1991 incident was sought against peti- tioner Schenck and another individual defendant. Through- out 1991 and into 1992, the District Court held 27 days of hearings in these contempt proceedings, and issued opinions verbally or non-verbally, that they do not wish to be counseled." 799 F. Supp., at 1434. See also 67 F. 3d 377, 391 (CA2 1995) (same). 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 366 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court concluding that five of the six incidents justified a finding of civil contempt.2 In February 1992, after hearing 12 additional days of tes- timony, the District Court issued the injunction, parts of which are challenged here. The relevant provisions are set forth in the margin.3 Although the injunction largely 2 Respondents filed other contempt motions after the District Court is- sued its preliminary injunction. Since we are only concerned with the propriety of the injunction, we consider only the evidence that was before the court when it issued the injunction. 3 "[D]efendants, the officers, directors, agents, and representatives of de- fendants, and all other persons whomsoever, known or unknown, acting in their behalf or in concert with them, and receiving actual or constructive notice of this Order, are: "1. Enjoined and restrained in any manner or by any means from: "(a) trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding, or obstructing access to, ingress into or egress from any facility, including, but not limited to, the parking lots, parking lot entrances, driveways, and driveway entrances, at which abortions are performed in the Western District of New York; "(b) demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of such facilities, or within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving such facilities, except that the form of demonstrating known as sidewalk counseling by no more than two persons as specified in paragraph (c) shall be allowed; "(c) physically abusing, grabbing, touching, pushing, shoving, or crowd- ing persons entering or leaving, working at or using any services at any facility at which abortions are performed; provided, however, that side- walk counseling consisting of a conversation of a non-threatening nature by not more than two people with each person or group of persons they are seeking to counsel shall not be prohibited. Also provided that no one is required to accept or listen to sidewalk counseling, and that if anyone or any group of persons who is sought to be counseled wants to not have counseling, wants to leave, or walk away, they shall have the absolute right to do that, and in such event all persons seeking to counsel that person or group of persons shall cease and desist from such counseling, and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of paragraph (b) per- taining to not demonstrating within fifteen feet of persons seeking access to or leaving a facility. In addition, it is further provided that this right to sidewalk counseling as defined herein shall not limit the right of the Police Department to maintain public order or such reasonably necessary 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 367 Opinion of the Court tracked the TRO, there were significant changes. First, while the TRO banned "demonstrating . . . within fifteen feet of any person" entering or leaving the clinics, the injunction more broadly banned "demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of such facilities" (fixed buffer zones), or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leav- ing such facilities" (floating buffer zones). In addition, the injunction clarified the "cease and desist" provision, specify- ing that once sidewalk counselors who had entered the buffer zones were required to "cease and desist" their counseling, they had to retreat 15 feet from the people they had been counseling and had to remain outside the boundaries of the buffer zones. In its opinion accompanying the preliminary injunction, the District Court stated the relevant inquiry as whether respondents had established (i) that they would be irrepara- bly harmed if the injunction was not granted and (ii) that they were likely to succeed on the merits. The court held that the irreparable harm requirement was met, because "those women denied unimpeded access to [the clinics] can- not be compensated merely by money damages. Injunctive relief alone can assure women unimpeded access to [the] clin- ics." Id., at 1428. The court also held that respondents were likely to succeed on at least three of their claims. First, relying on New York State National Organization for rules and regulations as they decide are necessary at each particular dem- onstration site; "(d) using any mechanical loudspeaker or sound amplification device or making any excessively loud sound which injures, disturbs, or endangers the health or safety of any patient or employee of a health care facility at which abortions are performed, nor shall any person make such sounds which interfere with the rights of anyone not in violation of this Order; "(e) attempting, or inducing, directing, aiding, or abetting in any man- ner, others to take any of the actions described in paragraphs (a) through (d) above." 799 F. Supp., at 1440­1441. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 368 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court Women v. Terry, 886 F. 2d 1339 (CA2 1989), cert. denied, 495 U. S. 947 (1990), the court held that women seeking abortions constituted a protected class under 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3), and that their constitutional right to travel between States and to choose to have an abortion was likely infringed by defend- ants, in violation of § 1985(3). Second, the court held that the same conduct that infringed this class of women's consti- tutional rights under § 1985(3) "clearly violates N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40­c." 4 799 F. Supp., at 1431. Finally, the court held that in light of the "overwhelming evidence that defendants have repeatedly trespassed upon [the clinics'] property in the past and may continue to trespass in the future," respondents had shown a likelihood of success on their trespass claim. Id., at 1432. Having already found likelihood of success on these claims, the court chose not to address respondents' other four state-law claims. Id., at 1432, n. 11. 4 Nevertheless, in explaining why respondents were likely to succeed on this claim, the District Court used different language to describe respond- ents' § 40­c claim than it had used to describe respondents' § 1985(3) claim. Compare id., at 1431 (§ 40­c: "defendants' conspiracy is intended to de- prive women of their constitutional rights to travel and to choose to have an abortion, and subjects them to harassment when they seek to exercise those rights"), with id., at 1430 (§ 1985(3): "[defendants are] engaging in a conspiracy . . . against a cognizable class of persons, with invidious class- based animus[,] . . . [they are] committing overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy[,] . . . [and the] conspiracy infringes two constitutional rights of women seeking abortions"). This was presumably to track the different language of § 40­c. Compare N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40­c(2) (McKinney 1992) ("No person shall, because of . . . sex . . . be subjected to any discrimi- nation in his civil rights, or to any harassment . . . in the exercise thereof, by any other person . . .") with 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3) ("If two or more per- sons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . [and] one or more persons engaged therein do . . . any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is . . . deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so . . . deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . ."). 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 369 Opinion of the Court In analyzing defendants' assertion that the injunction vio- lated their First Amendment right to free speech, the court applied our standard "time, place, and manner analysis," ask- ing whether the speech restrictions in the injunction (i) were content neutral, (ii) were narrowly tailored to serve a sig- nificant government interest, and (iii) left open ample alter- native channels for communication of the information. Id., at 1432 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988)). The court held that the injunction was content neutral be- cause "it merely restricts the volume, location, timing and harassing and intimidating nature of defendants' expressive speech." 799 F. Supp., at 1433. The court held that the in- junction served three significant governmental interests- public safety, ensuring that abortions are performed safely, and ensuring that a woman's constitutional rights to travel interstate and to choose to have an abortion were not sacri- ficed in the interest of defendants' First Amendment rights.5 As to narrow tailoring, the court explained that the 15-foot buffer zones "around entrances and . . . around people and vehicles seeking access . . . are necessary to ensure that people and vehicles seeking access to the clinics will not be impeded, and will be able to determine readily where the entrances are located." Id., at 1434. The court added that the buffer zones would also provide the benefit of "prevent- [ing] defendants from crowding patients and invading their personal space." Ibid. The court explained the "cease and desist" provision-allowing two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones but requiring them to "cease and desist" their counseling if the counselee asked to be left alone-as 5 The court noted that although defendants had stipulated to the entry of "an injunction against `blocking or obstructing' access" to the clinics and against trespassing on clinic property "for the purpose of `blocking or obstructing" access, the injunction's terms were "more comprehensive" than the term "blocking or obstructing access." A broader injunction was justified in this case, said the court, because it was "better tailored to the evidence." 799 F. Supp., at 1433. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 370 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court "an exception" to the buffer zones and as "an attempt to accommodate fully defendants' First Amendment rights." Ibid. The court held that this provision was "necessary in order to protect the right of people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone." Id., at 1435. Finally, the court held that the injunction left open ample alternative channels for communication, because defendants could still "picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in full view of people going into the clinics." Id., at 1437. After the District Court issued its opinion, we held in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 269 (1993), that "women seeking an abortion" were not a pro- tected class under 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3). In light of Bray, the District Court dismissed respondents' § 1985(3) claim, with leave to file an amended § 1985(3) cause of action. Pro- Choice Network of Western N. Y. v. Project Rescue Western N. Y., 828 F. Supp. 1018, 1025 (WDNY 1993). The court then decided to exercise pendent jurisdiction over respondents' remaining causes of action (the six state claims), regardless of the ultimate disposition of the § 1985(3) claim. In so de- ciding, the court noted that "the preliminary injunction is grounded not only on the § 1985(3) claim, but two state-law claims [the N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40­c claim and the tres- pass claim] as well." Id., at 1026, n. 4. The court explained that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness all suggested that it keep the case, since it had expended substantial re- sources on the case and its involvement in the case was ongo- ing. Id., at 1028­1029 (citing the contempt motions filed by respondents in 1990 and 1991, criminal contempt charges brought against six individuals for protests in 1992, and civil and criminal contempt motions filed in 1993). Petitioners, two individual defendants, appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While the case was on appeal, we decided Madsen v. Women's Health Cen- ter, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994), a case which also involved the effect of an injunction on the expressive activities of anti- 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 371 Opinion of the Court abortion protesters. (We discuss Madsen in greater depth in Part II­A, infra.) We held that "our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous" when it comes to evaluating content-neutral injunctions that re- strict speech. The test instead, we held, is "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government in- terest." 512 U. S., at 765. Applying Madsen, a panel of the Court of Appeals re- versed the District Court in a split decision. 67 F. 3d 359 (1994). The Court of Appeals then heard the case en banc, and affirmed the District Court by a divided vote. 67 F. 3d 377 (1995). Each of two opinions garnered a majority of the court. Judge Oakes' lead opinion, joined by eight other judges, affirmed for reasons that closely track the reasoning of the District Court. Id., at 388­392. A concurring opin- ion by Judge Winter, joined by nine other judges, affirmed primarily on the ground that the protesters' expressive ac- tivities were not protected by the First Amendment at all, and because the District Court's injunction was a "reason- able response" to the protesters' conduct. Id., at 396, 398. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1170 (1996). II A Petitioners challenge three aspects of the injunction: (i) the floating 15-foot buffer zones around people and vehicles seeking access to the clinics; (ii) the fixed 15-foot buffer zones around the clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot en- trances; and (iii) the "cease and desist" provision that forces sidewalk counselors who are inside the buffer zones to re- treat 15 feet from the person being counseled once the per- son indicates a desire not to be counseled. Because Madsen bears many similarities to this case and because many of the parties' arguments depend on the application of Madsen here, we review our determination in that case. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 372 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court A Florida state court had issued a permanent injunction enjoining specified organizations and individuals from block- ing or interfering with clinic access and from physically abus- ing people entering or leaving the clinic. Six months after the injunction issued, the court found that protesters still impeded access by demonstrating on the street and in the driveways, and that sidewalk counselors approached enter- ing vehicles in an effort to hand literature to the occupants. In the face of this evidence, the court issued a broader in- junction that enjoined the defendant protesters from " `phys- ically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting' " anyone entering or leaving the clinic; from " `congregating, picketing, patrol- ling, demonstrating or entering that portion of public right- of-way or private property within [36] feet of the property line of the Clinic' "; from approaching anyone " `seeking the services of the Clinic' " who is within 300 feet of the clinic, unless the person " `indicates a desire to communicate' "; and from making any noise or displaying any image which could be heard or seen inside the clinic. 512 U. S., at 759­760. After determining that the injunction was not a prior re- straint and was content neutral, id., at 762­764, we held that the proper test for evaluating content-neutral injunctions under the First Amendment was "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than nec- essary to serve a significant government interest," id., at 765. The Florida Supreme Court had concluded that the in- junction was based on a number of governmental interests: protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services, ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting prop- erty rights, and protecting the medical privacy of patients whose psychological and physical well-being were threatened as they were held "captive" by medical circumstance. Id., at 767­768. We held that the combination of these interests was "quite sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored in- 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 373 Opinion of the Court junction" to protect unimpeded access to the clinic by way of public streets and sidewalks. Id., at 768. We held that some of the injunction's provisions burdened more speech than necessary to serve these interests, and that others did not. We upheld the 36-foot buffer zone as applied to the street, sidewalks, and driveways "as a way of ensuring access to the clinic." We explained that the trial court had few other options to protect access to the clinic: Allowing protesters to remain on the sidewalks and in the clinic driveway was not a valid option because of their past conduct, and allowing them to stand in the street was obvi- ously impractical. In addition, we stated that "some defer- ence must be given to the state court's familiarity with the facts and the background of the dispute between the parties even under our heightened review." Id., at 769­770 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 294 (1941)). We struck down the 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic, however, stating that it was difficult "to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches . . . regardless of how peaceful the contact may be . . . . Ab- sent evidence that the protesters' speech is independ- ently proscribable (i. e., `fighting words' or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, see Milk Wagon Driv- ers, 312 U. S., at 292­293, this provision cannot stand. `As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. [312, 322 (1988)] (internal quotation marks omitted). The `consent' re- quirement alone invalidates this provision; it burdens more speech than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic." 512 U. S., at 774. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 374 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court We now apply Madsen to the challenged provisions of the injunction and ask whether they burden more speech than necessary to serve a significant governmental interest.6 B Petitioners first argue that there are no significant govern- mental interests that support the injunction. The argument goes as follows: Of the seven causes of action in respondents' complaint, the only one left standing after the District Court's most recent opinion is respondents' trespass claim; a trespass cause of action can support an injunction banning trespass, but nothing else; thus, the injunction's provisions banning "demonstrating" within 15 feet of people, cars, and entrances are overbroad. First, this argument is factually incorrect. The trespass claim is not the only one left standing at this point. In its opinion issuing the preliminary injunction, the District Court held that the conduct that satisfied the elements of a § 1985(3) claim under federal law also satisfied the elements of a § 40­c claim under state law. After our decision in Bray, the Dis- trict Court dismissed respondents' § 1985(3) claim. Petition- ers argue that in doing so, the District Court necessarily and implicitly dismissed the § 40­c claim as well, since the two claims were based on the same conduct. But our opin- ion in Bray did not attempt to construe any statute other than § 1985(3). And the fact that certain conduct does not state a claim under § 1985(3) does not necessarily mean that the same conduct does not state a claim under a state 6 Petitioners argue that the injunction is an unlawful prior restraint and that the standard we set out in Madsen is therefore inapplicable. Be- cause we rejected this argument in Madsen and because petitioners make no effort to distinguish Madsen on this ground, we reject it again. As in Madsen, alternative channels of communication were left open to the protesters, and "the injunction was issued not because of the content of [the protesters'] expression, . . . but because of their prior unlawful con- duct." Madsen, 512 U. S., at 764, n. 2. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 375 Opinion of the Court law that uses the same or similar language as § 1985(3), since state courts may of course choose to construe their own law more broadly (or more narrowly) than its federal counter- part. In any event, the language of the two statutes is no- ticeably different. See n. 4, supra. Thus, the dismissal of the § 1985(3) claim in light of Bray did not also act as a dis- missal of respondents' § 40­c claim. This is confirmed by the District Court's comment in its post-Bray opinion that "the preliminary injunction is grounded not only on the § 1985(3) claim, but two state-law claims as well." 828 F. Supp., at 1026, n. 4. Although petitioners contend that the § 40­c cause of ac- tion is no longer valid simply because the § 1985(3) claim is no longer valid, an argument we reject, they do not contend that the District Court erred in concluding as an independ- ent matter that respondents were likely to succeed on their § 40­c and trespass claims. See Brief for Petitioners 32. The injunction's terms are clearly crafted to remedy these violations. An injunction tailored to respondents' claims for relief may nonetheless violate the First Amendment. In making their First Amendment challenge, petitioners focus solely on the interests asserted by respondents in their complaint. But in assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court looks not only at the private claims asserted in the complaint, but also inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and order. Madsen, 512 U. S., at 767­768; Milk Wagon Drivers, supra, at 294­295. Both the injunction in Madsen and the injunction here are supported by this gov- ernmental interest. In Madsen, it was permissible to move protesters off the sidewalk and to the other side of the street in part because other options would block the free flow of traffic on the streets and sidewalks. 512 U. S., at 767­768. Here, the District Court cited public safety as one of the interests justifying the injunction-certainly a reasonable 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 376 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court conclusion, if only because of the dangerous situation created by the interaction between cars and protesters and because of the fights that threatened to (and sometimes did) develop. Even though the governmental interest in public safety is clearly a valid interest here, as it was in Madsen, plaintiffs in neither case pleaded a claim for "threat to public safety." Indeed, this would be a strange concept, since a plaintiff cus- tomarily alleges violations of private rights, while "public safety" expresses a public right enforced by the government through its criminal laws and otherwise. Thus, the fact that "threat to public safety" is not listed anywhere in respond- ents' complaint as a claim does not preclude a court from relying on the significant governmental interest in public safety in assessing petitioners' First Amendment argument.7 Given the factual similarity between this case and Mad- sen, we conclude that the governmental interests underlying the injunction in Madsen-ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's free- dom to seek pregnancy-related services,8 ibid.-also underlie the injunction here, and in combination are certainly signifi- cant enough to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to secure unimpeded physical access to the clinics. 7 Justice Scalia in dissent contends that the District Court's reliance on "public safety" was not permissible because only the government may seek an injunction based on that factor. But the District Court's reliance on this factor was not to use it as an element which supported respondents' claim for an injunction. Rather, the court used this factor as a basis for rejecting petitioners' challenge to the injunction on First Amendment grounds. 8 We need not decide whether the governmental interest in protecting the medical privacy and well-being of patients "held `captive' by medical circumstance"-at issue in Madsen-is implicated here. That interest was relevant in Madsen because patients while inside the clinic heard the chanting and shouting of the protesters and suffered increased health risks as a result. See id., at 772. Here, although the District Court found that the loud voices of sidewalk counselors could be heard inside the clinic, petitioners do not challenge the injunction's ban on excessive noise. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 377 Opinion of the Court C We strike down the floating buffer zones around people entering and leaving the clinics because they burden more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests. The floating buffer zones prevent defendants- except for two sidewalk counselors, while they are tolerated by the targeted individual-from communicating a message from a normal conversational distance or handing leaflets to people entering or leaving the clinics who are walking on the public sidewalks. This is a broad prohibition, both because of the type of speech that is restricted and the nature of the location. Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public forum. See, e. g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 322 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 180 (1983). On the other hand, we have before us a record that shows physically abusive conduct, harassment of the po- lice that hampered law enforcement, and the tendency of even peaceful conversations to devolve into aggressive and sometimes violent conduct. In some situations, a record of abusive conduct makes a prohibition on classic speech in lim- ited parts of a public sidewalk permissible. See, e. g., Part II­D, infra; Madsen, supra, at 769­770. We need not decide whether the governmental interests involved would ever jus- tify some sort of zone of separation between individuals en- tering the clinics and protesters, measured by the distance between the two. We hold here that because this broad pro- hibition on speech "floats," it cannot be sustained on this record. Since the buffer zone floats, protesters on the public side- walks who wish (i) to communicate their message to an in- coming or outgoing patient or clinic employee and (ii) to re- main as close as possible (while maintaining an acceptable conversational distance) to this individual, must move as the 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 378 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court individual moves, maintaining 15 feet of separation. But this would be difficult to accomplish at, for instance, the GYN Womenservices clinic in Buffalo, one of the respondent clinics. The sidewalk outside the clinic is 17-feet wide. This means that protesters who wish to walk alongside an individual entering or leaving the clinic are pushed into the street, unless the individual walks a straight line on the outer edges of the sidewalk. Protesters could presumably walk 15 feet behind the individual, or 15 feet in front of the individual while walking backwards. But they are then faced with the problem of watching out for other individuals entering or leaving the clinic who are heading the opposite way from the individual they have targeted. With clinic es- corts leaving the clinic to pick up incoming patients and en- tering the clinic to drop them off, it would be quite difficult for a protester who wishes to engage in peaceful expressive activities to know how to remain in compliance with the in- junction.9 This lack of certainty leads to a substantial risk that much more speech will be burdened than the injunction by its terms prohibits. That is, attempts to stand 15 feet from someone entering or leaving a clinic and to communi- cate a message-certainly protected on the face of the in- junction-will be hazardous if one wishes to remain in com- pliance with the injunction.10 Since there may well be other 9 We suspect that these floating buffer zones would also be quite difficult for a district court to enforce. Contempt proceedings would likely focus on whether protesters who thought they were keeping pace with the tar- geted individual from a distance of 15 feet actually strayed to within 14 or 13 feet of the individual for a certain period of time. 10 Significantly, the District Judge himself expressed this same concern at the September 27 TRO hearing, stating his understanding that a "mov- ing" buffer zone would be quite infeasible. Nevertheless, the terms of the TRO and the injunction provide exactly that, and the District Court never authoritatively put a limiting construction on the injunction. Justice Breyer in dissent places great stress on the District Court's statement at this September 27 hearing, and concludes that the District 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 379 Opinion of the Court ways to both effect such separation and yet provide certainty (so that speech protected by the injunction's terms is not burdened), we conclude that the floating buffer zones burden more speech than necessary to serve the relevant govern- mental interests. Because we strike down the floating buffer zones, we do not address the constitutionality of the "cease and desist" provision that allows sidewalk counselors within those buffer zones. Court never understood the TRO, or even the injunction, to contain float- ing buffer zones. We believe Justice Breyer misreads the record. First, despite the District Court's statements at the September 27 hear- ing, the court held petitioner Schenck and one other defendant in contempt for violating paragraph 1(a) of the TRO, because they came within 15 feet of an individual attempting to enter the clinic even though they were more than 15 feet from any doorway or driveway entrance to the clinic. See Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. v. Project Rescue Western N. Y., No. 90­CV­1004A (WDNY, Sept. 28, 1992), pp. 7­8, 20­21 (doctor parked sev- eral hundred feet from clinic and then attempted to walk on sidewalk toward clinic; contemnors followed doctor the length of the sidewalk, yell- ing at him from a distance of only a few feet, up until the point where doctor was 10 to 20 feet from clinic driveway entrance; court held that this conduct violates the TRO's "proscription against demonstrating within fifteen feet of any person seeking access to a clinic"). Thus, we conclude that the District Court read the TRO the way an ordinary person would-to create a floating buffer zone. Second, the District Court's opinion accompanying the issuance of the preliminary injunction shows that the court interpreted the injunction to contain floating buffer zones. The court described paragraph (b) of the injunction as "setting dual `clear zones' of fifteen feet around entrances and fifteen feet around people and vehicles seeking access." 799 F. Supp., at 1434 (emphasis added). And the injunction by its terms bans "demon- strating" within 15 feet of clinic entrances "or within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to [the clinic]." (Emphasis added.) Finally, we note that no judge of the en banc Court of Appeals expressed doubt that the injunction included floating buffer zones, cf. 67 F. 3d, at 389, n. 4 (discussing "how far from a clinic a floating buffer zone may reach," not, as Justice Breyer suggests, whether the injunction creates floating buffer zones at all), and that none of the parties before us has suggested that the injunction does not provide for such zones. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 380 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court We likewise strike down the floating buffer zones around vehicles. Nothing in the record or the District Court's opin- ion contradicts the commonsense notion that a more limited injunction-which keeps protesters away from driveways and parking lot entrances (as the fixed buffer zones do) and off the streets, for instance-would be sufficient to ensure that drivers are not confused about how to enter the clinic and are able to gain access to its driveways and parking lots safely and easily. In contrast, the 15-foot floating buffer zones would restrict the speech of those who simply line the sidewalk or curb in an effort to chant, shout, or hold signs peacefully. We therefore conclude that the floating buffer zones around vehicles burden more speech than necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests. D We uphold the fixed buffer zones around the doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances. These buffer zones are necessary to ensure that people and vehicles trying to enter or exit the clinic property or clinic parking lots can do so. As in Madsen, the record shows that protesters purposefully or effectively blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the clinic doorways, from driving up to and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and out of clinic parking lots. Based on this conduct-both before and after the TRO issued-the District Court was entitled to conclude that the only way to ensure access was to move back the demonstrations away from the driveways and parking lot entrances. Similarly, sidewalk counselors-both before and after the TRO-followed and crowded people right up to the doorways of the clinics (and sometimes beyond) and then tended to stay in the doorways, shouting at the individuals who had managed to get inside. In addition, as the District Court found, defendants' harassment of the local police made it far from certain that the police would be able to quickly and effectively counteract protesters who blocked doorways 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 381 Opinion of the Court or threatened the safety of entering patients and employees. Based on this conduct, the District Court was entitled to conclude that protesters who were allowed close to the en- trances would continue right up to the entrance, and that the only way to ensure access was to move all protesters away from the doorways.11 Although one might quibble about whether 15 feet is too great or too small a distance if the goal is to ensure access, we defer to the District Court's rea- sonable assessment of the number of feet necessary to keep the entrances clear. See Madsen, 512 U. S., at 769­770 ("[S]ome deference must be given to the state court's famil- iarity with the facts and the background of the dispute be- tween the parties even under our heightened review"). Petitioners claim that unchallenged provisions of the in- junction are sufficient to ensure this access, pointing to the bans on trespassing, excessive noise, and "blocking, impeding or obstructing access to" the clinics. They claim that in light of these provisions, the only effect of a ban on "demon- strating" within the fixed buffer zone is "a ban on peaceful, nonobstructive demonstrations on public sidewalks or rights of way." Brief for Petitioners 47. This argument, however, ignores the record in this case. Based on defendants' past conduct, the District Court was entitled to conclude that some of the defendants who were allowed within 5 to 10 feet 11 The fact that the injunction allows two sidewalk counselors into the fixed buffer zones-subject to the "cease and desist" provision-does not detract from this conclusion. It is clear from the District Court's opinion that its decision to allow two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones was an effort to bend over backwards to "accommodate" defendants' speech rights. See 799 F. Supp., at 1434. Because the District Court was entitled to conclude on this record that the only feasible way to shield individuals within the fixed buffer zone from unprotected conduct-espe- cially with law enforcement efforts hampered by defendants' harassment of the police-would have been to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters, the District Court's extra effort to enhance defendants' speech rights by allowing an exception to the fixed buffer zone should not redound to the detriment of respondents. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 382 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court of clinic entrances would not merely engage in stationary, nonobstructive demonstrations but would continue to do what they had done before: aggressively follow and crowd individuals right up to the clinic door and then refuse to move, or purposefully mill around parking lot entrances in an effort to impede or block the progress of cars. And because defendants' harassment of police hampered the ability of the police to respond quickly to a problem, a prophylactic meas- ure was even more appropriate. Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 206­207 (1992) (upholding 100-foot "no- campaign zone" around polling places: "Intimidation and in- terference laws fall short of serving a State's compelling in- terests because they `deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts' to impede elections. Moreover, because law enforcement officers generally are barred [under state law] from the vicinity of the polls to avoid any appearance of coercion in the electoral process, many acts of interference would go undetected. These undetected or less than blatant acts may nonetheless drive the voter away before remedial action can be taken" (citations omitted)). The ban on "block- ing, impeding, and obstructing access" was therefore insuffi- cient by itself to solve the problem, and the fixed buffer zone was a necessary restriction on defendants' demonstrations. Petitioners also argue that under Madsen, the fixed buffer zones are invalid because the District Court could not impose a "speech-restrictive" injunction (or TRO) without first try- ing a "non-speech-restrictive" injunction, as the trial court did in Madsen. But in Madsen we simply stated that the failure of an initial injunction "to accomplish its purpose may be taken into consideration" in determining the constitution- ality of a later injunction. 512 U. S., at 770. The fact that the District Court's TRO included a "speech-restrictive" provision certainly does not mean that the subsequent in- junction is automatically invalid. Since we can uphold the 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 383 Opinion of the Court injunction under the Madsen standard without this "consid- eration" being present, petitioners' argument fails. Finally, petitioners make several arguments that may be quickly refuted. They argue that, unlike Madsen, there is "no extraordinary record of pervasive lawlessness," Brief for Petitioners 45, and that the buffer zones are therefore unnec- essary. As explained above, our review of the record con- vinces us that defendants' conduct was indeed extraordinary, and that based on this conduct the District Court was en- titled to conclude that keeping defendants away from the entrances was necessary to ensure access. Petitioners also argue that the term "demonstrating" is vague. When the injunction is read as a whole, see Grayned v. City of Rock- ford, 408 U. S. 104, 110 (1972), we believe that people "of ordinary intelligence" (and certainly defendants, whose dem- onstrations led to this litigation in the first place) have been given "a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited," id., at 108. Petitioners also contend that the "cease and desist" provi- sion which limits the exception for sidewalk counselors in connection with the fixed buffer zone is contrary to the First Amendment. We doubt that the District Court's reason for including that provision-"to protect the right of the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone"- accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence in this area. Madsen sustained an injunction designed to se- cure physical access to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right "to be left alone" on a public street or side- walk. As we said in Madsen, quoting from Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S., at 322, " `[a]s a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' " 512 U. S., at 774. But as earlier noted, the entire exception for sidewalk counselors was an effort to en- 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 384 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of the Court hance petitioners' speech rights, see n. 11, supra, and the "cease and desist" limitation must be assessed in that light.12 Petitioners and some of their amici attack the "cease and desist" provision accompanying the exception for sidewalk counselors as content based, because it allows a clinic patient to terminate a protester's right to speak based on, among other reasons, the patient's disagreement with the message being conveyed. But in Madsen we held that the injunction in that case was not content based, even though it was di- rected only at abortion protesters, because it was only abor- tion protesters who had done the acts which were being en- joined. Here, the District Court found that "[m]any of the 12 Although petitioners argue that our disapproval of the 300-foot no- approach zone in Madsen requires disapproval of the "cease and desist" provision, Madsen is easily distinguishable on this point, since the no- approach zone was eight times broader than the "buffer zone" deemed necessary to ensure access to the clinic in Madsen. Justice Scalia in dissent suggests that our failure to endorse the Dis- trict Court's reason for including the "cease and desist" provision requires us to reverse the District Court's decision setting the injunction's terms. This suggestion is inconsistent with our precedents. See, e. g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 76 (1990) ("[A]lthough we affirm the Seventh Circuit's judgment . . . , we do not adopt the Seventh Circuit's reasoning"); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 215, n. 6 (1982) ("Respondent may, of course, defend the judgment below on any ground which the law and the record permit, provided the asserted ground would not expand the relief which has been granted"); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943) ("[W]e do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct `al- though the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong rea- son' " (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937)); Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 536­537 (1931) ("[T]he entire record is before this court with power to review the action of the court of appeals and direct such disposition of the case as that court might have done upon the writ of error sued out for the review of the [district] court"); Williams v. Nor- ris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827) (Marshall, C. J.) ("If the judgment [of the lower court] should be correct, although the reasoning, by which the mind of the Judge was conducted to it, should be deemed unsound, that judg- ment would certainly be affirmed in [this] Court"). 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 385 Opinion of Scalia, J. `sidewalk counselors' and other defendants ha[d] been ar- rested on more than one occasion for harassment, yet persist in harassing and intimidating patients, patient escorts and medical staff." 799 F. Supp., at 1425. These counselors re- main free to espouse their message outside the 15-foot buffer zone, and the condition on their freedom to espouse it within the buffer zone is the result of their own previous harass- ment and intimidation of patients.13 * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Instead of evaluating the injunction before us on the basis of the reasons for which it was issued, the Court today postu- lates other reasons that might have justified it and pro- nounces those never-determined reasons adequate. This is contrary to the settled practice governing appellate review of injunctions, and indeed of all actions committed by law to the initial factfinding, predictive and policy judgment of an entity other than the appellate court, see, e. g., SEC v. Chen- ery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943). The Court's opinion also claims for the judiciary a prerogative I have never heard of: the power to render decrees that are in its view justified by concerns for public safety, though not justified by the need 13 The defendants, including the two petitioners, stipulated before the District Court that "[i]f [the District Court] concludes that some or all of the relief requested by plaintiffs should be granted on a preliminary in- junctive basis, defendants will consent to the entry of such an injunction against each and every one of them." App. to Pet. for Cert. A­136. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 386 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Scalia, J. to remedy the grievance that is the subject of the lawsuit. I dissent. I The most important holding in today's opinion is tucked away in the seeming detail of the "cease-and-desist" discus- sion in the penultimate paragraph of analysis: There is no right to be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while seeking entrance to or exit from abortion clinics. Ante, at 383­384. "As we said in Madsen [v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994)], quoting from Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S., at 322, `[a]s a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' " Ante, at 383 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the District Court in this case (like the Court of Appeals) believed that there was such a right to be free of unwanted speech, and the validity of the District Court's action here under review cannot be assessed without taking that belief into account. That erroneous view of what con- stituted remediable harm shaped the District Court's injunc- tion, and it is impossible to reverse on this central point yet maintain that the District Court framed its injunction to bur- den "no more speech than necessary," Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994), to protect legit- imate governmental interests. The District Court justified the "fixed buffer" provision of the injunction on two separate grounds, each apparently tied to a different feature of the provision. First, the court said, the fixed buffer zone was "necessary to ensure that people . . . seeking access to the clinics will not be impeded." Pro- Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New York, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1434 (WDNY 1992). And second, "the `clear zones' will prevent defendants from crowding patients and invading their personal space." Ibid. Thus, the fixed buffer had a dual purpose: In order to prevent 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 387 Opinion of Scalia, J. physical obstruction of access, it excluded crowds of protest- ers from a 15-foot zone around clinic entrances, while permit- ting two nonobstructive "sidewalk counselors" to enter that zone. (Allowing a small number of protesters is a common practice in picketing injunctions, e. g., Mine Workers v. Bag- well, 512 U. S. 821, 823 (1994), and of course a required prac- tice when no more than that is necessary, see Madsen, supra, at 765.) And the second purpose of the fixed buffer provi- sion, the purpose that justified the requirement that even the two nonobstructive sidewalk counselors "cease and desist" if the "targeted person" did not wish to hear them, was to as- sure "personal space" on the public streets-or, as the Dis- trict Court described it in the next paragraph of its order, "to protect the right of people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone." 799 F. Supp., at 1435. The terms of the injunction's cease-and-desist provision make no attempt to conceal the fact that the supposed right to be left alone, and not the right of unobstructed access to clinics, was the basis for the provision: "[N]o one is required to accept or listen to sidewalk counseling, and . . . if anyone or any group of persons who is sought to be counseled wants not to have coun- seling, wants to leave, or walk away, they shall have the absolute right to do that, and in such event all persons seeking to counsel that person or group of persons shall cease and desist from such counseling, and shall thereaf- ter be governed by the provisions of [the injunction] pertaining to not demonstrating within fifteen feet of persons seeking access to or leaving a facility." Id., at 1440 (preliminary injunction, paragraph 1(c)) (emphasis added). It is difficult to imagine a provision more dependent upon the right to be free of unwanted speech that today's opinion rejects as applied to public streets. The District Court's 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 388 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Scalia, J. own explanation of the provision makes that dependency even more starkly clear: "Th[e] `cease and desist' provision is necessary in order to protect the right of people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone. ". . . [Defendants] argue that, because their `sidewalk counseling' occurs on a public sidewalk, they cannot be forced to cease communicating their message just be- cause their audience may be unwilling to hear it. The Court, however, rejects this argument. . . . . . ". . . The evidence adduced at the hearings clearly shows that, even when women seeking access to the clin- ics signal their desire to be left alone, defendants con- tinue to follow right alongside them and persist in com- municating their message. [W]omen seeking access to plaintiffs' facilities cannot, as a practical matter, escape defendants' message. . . . ". . . [T]he . . . `cease and desist' provision advances the values of the marketplace of ideas by permitting lis- teners to exercise their autonomy to make their own de- terminations among competing ideas. Once a women seeking access to one of the clinics has made a determi- nation not to listen to defendants' message, defendants must respect her choice." Id., at 1435­1436 (emphasis added). II The District Court thought the supposed "right to be left alone" central enough to its order to devote two full pages in the federal reports to the subject, ibid., and both majority opinions of the Court of Appeals discussed it in extenso, 67 F. 3d 377, 391­393 (CA2 1995); id., at 395­397. The magic of today's opinion for this Court is that it renders this essential element of the injunction that was issued irrelevant by the simple device of approving instead an injunction that the 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 389 Opinion of Scalia, J. District Court (in the exercise of its discretion) chose not to issue-viz., an absolute ban on all protesters within the 15-foot zone. Ante, at 381, n. 11. The Court asserts (in carefully selected words) that "the District Court was entitled to conclude that the only way to ensure access was to move back the demonstrations." Ante, at 380 (emphasis added). And again: "[T]he District Court was entitled to conclude on this record that the only feasible way to shield individuals within the fixed buffer zone from unprotected conduct . . . would have been to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters." Ante, at 381, n. 11 (em- phasis added). And (lest the guarded terminology be thought accidental), yet a third time: "Based on [the defend- ants'] conduct, the District Court was entitled to conclude . . . that the only way to ensure access was to move all pro- testers away from the doorways." Ante, at 381 (first em- phasis added; second in original). But prior to the question whether it was entitled to conclude that is the question whether it did conclude that. We are not in the business (or never used to be) of making up conclusions that the trial court could permissibly have reached on questions involving assessments of fact, credibility, and future conduct-and then affirming on the basis of those posited conclusions, whether the trial court in fact arrived at them or not.1 That is so even in ordinary cases, but it is doubly true when we review a trial court's order imposing a prior restraint upon speech. As we said in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982), when a court decides to impose a speech-restrictive injunction, the conclusions it reaches must be "supported by findings that adequately disclose the[ir] 1 The Court's lengthy citation of cases standing for the proposition that an appellate court can affirm on a mandatory legal ground different from that relied upon by the trial court, ante, at 384, n. 12, has no relevance to the question whether an appellate court can substitute its own assess- ments of past facts, of future probabilities, and hence of injunctive necessi- ties, for the assessments made (and required to be made) by the trial court. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 390 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Scalia, J. evidentiary basis . . . , that carefully identify the impact of [the defendants'] unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity." Id., at 933­934. The Court candidly concedes that the nonexistent "right to be left alone" underlay the District Court's imposition of the cease-and-desist provision. Ante, at 383. It appears not to grasp, however, the decisive import of this conces- sion-which is that the District Court did not think it neces- sary to exclude all demonstrators from the buffer zone as a means of preventing physical obstruction of clinic entrances or other violations of law (other than the faux violation of intruding upon the speech targets' "private space"). Thus, the Court's statements about what "the District Court was entitled to conclude" are not only speculative (which is fatal enough) but positively contrary to the record of what the District Court did conclude-which was that permitting a few demonstrators within the buffer zone was perfectly ac- ceptable, except when it would infringe the clinic employees' and patrons' right to be free of unwanted speech on public streets. In fact, the District Court expressly stated that if in the future it found that a complete ban on speech within the buffer zone were necessary, it would impose one. 799 F. Supp., at 1436, n. 13. I do not grasp the relevance of the Court's assertions that admitting the two counselors into the buffer zone was "an effort to enhance petitioners' speech rights," ante, at 383­ 384, "an effort to bend over backwards to `accommodate' de- fendants' speech rights," ante, at 381, n. 11, and that "the `cease and desist' limitation must be assessed in that light," ante, at 384. If our First Amendment jurisprudence has stood for anything, it is that courts have an obligation "to enhance speech rights," and a duty "to bend over backwards to `accommodate' speech rights." That principle was reaf- firmed in Madsen, which requires that a judicial injunction against speech burden "no more speech than necessary to 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 391 Opinion of Scalia, J. serve a significant government interest." 512 U. S., at 765 (emphasis added). Thus, if the situation confronting the District Court permitted "accommodation" of petitioners' speech rights, it demanded it. The Court's effort to rechar- acterize this responsibility of special care imposed by the First Amendment as some sort of judicial gratuity is perhaps the most alarming concept in an opinion that contains much to be alarmed about. III I disagree with the Court's facile rejection of the argu- ment that no cause of action was properly found to support the present injunction. Petitioners contend that the only cause of action which could conceivably support the injunc- tion is a trespass claim; but that cannot support the restric- tions at issue, which are designed, as the District Court stated, to prevent obstruction of access and the invasion of "personal space," 799 F. Supp., at 1434, rather than to pre- vent trespass. The Court responds by pointing out that the case contains a nontrespass claim under N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40­c(2) (McKinney 1992), which provides that "[n]o person shall, be- cause of . . . sex . . . be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights, or to any harassment . . . in the exercise thereof, by any other person." That is true enough, but it seems to me clear that that imaginative state-law claim cannot sup- port a preliminary injunction because it does not have a probability of success on the merits. See 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.3 (2d ed. 1995). It is, to put it mildly, far from apparent that seeking to prevent both men and women from aborting both male and female human fetuses constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. Moreover, the reasoning which led the Dis- trict Court to conclude otherwise has been specifically re- jected by this Court. The District Court wrote: "Having demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their federal § 1985(3) claim, plaintiffs have also, by definition, 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 392 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Scalia, J. demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim under N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40­c." 799 F. Supp., at 1431. Sub- sequently, however, this Court's opinion in Bray v. Alexan- dria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 269­273 (1993), held that claims of the sort at issue here do not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3). Since there is also, as far as I have been able to determine, no decision by any New York court saying that they consti- tute sex discrimination under § 40­c, there is no basis on which the District Court could have concluded (or this Court could affirm) that the chance of success on this claim was anything other than a long shot.2 The Court proceeds from there to make a much more sig- nificant point: An injunction on speech may be upheld even if not justified on the basis of the interests asserted by the plaintiff, as long as it serves "public safety." "[I]n assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court . . . inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and order. . . . Here, the District Court cited public safety as one of the interests justifying the injunction . . . . [T]he fact that `threat to public safety' is not listed anywhere in respond- ents' complaint as a claim does not preclude a court from relying on the significant governmental interest in public safety in assessing petitioners' First Amendment argument." Ante, at 375­376. This is a wonderful expansion of judicial power. Rather than courts' being limited to according relief justified by the 2 The Court contends that petitioners only raise the issue whether the § 40­c cause of action is "valid," and not the issue whether the District Court erred in concluding that the claim was "likely to succeed." Ante, at 375. The concept of an invalid claim that is likely to succeed is an interesting one, but there is no doubt that petitioners did not entertain it: They plainly challenged "[t]he district court's ruling that respondents were likely to prevail on their state antidiscrimination claim." Brief for Peti- tioners 32; see also id., at 15. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 393 Opinion of Scalia, J. complaints brought before them, the Court today announces that a complaint gives them, in addition, ancillary power to decree what may be necessary to protect-not the plaintiff, but the public interest! Every private suit makes the dis- trict judge a sort of one-man Committee of Public Safety. There is no precedent for this novel and dangerous proposi- tion. In Madsen, the Court says, "it was permissible to move protesters off the sidewalk and to the other side of the street in part because other options would block the free flow of traffic on the streets and sidewalks." Ante, at 375; see also Madsen, 512 U. S., at 769. But acknowledging, as we did in Madsen, that some remedial options are eliminated because they conflict with considerations of public safety is entirely different from asserting, as the Court does today, that public safety can provide part of the justification for the remedy.3 The only other case cited by the Court is Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 294­295 (1941). Ante, at 375. But Milk Wagon Drivers upheld an injunction against a union's intimidation of store- keepers, not because "the public interest" demanded it, but because the storekeepers were customers of the plaintiff dairy, which it was the purpose and effect of the intimidation to harm. 312 U. S., at 294­295. We have in our state and federal systems a specific entity charged with responsibility for initiating action to guard the public safety. It is called the Executive Branch. When the public safety is threatened, that branch is empowered, by invoking judicial action and by other means, to provide pro- tection. But the Judicial Branch has hitherto been thought powerless to act except as invited by someone other than itself. That is one of the reasons it was thought to be "the least dangerous to the political rights of the [C]onstitu- 3 Madsen also refers to "public safety" as one of the government inter- ests on which the state court relied in justifying the challenged injunction, 512 U. S., at 768, but nothing in our decision approved or relied upon that feature of the state court's approach. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 394 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Scalia, J. tion"-because it "can take no active resolution whatever" and "may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment." The Federalist No. 78, p. 396 (M. Beloff ed. 1987). It is contrary to the most fundamental principles of separation of powers for the District Court to decree measures that would eliminate obstruction of traffic, in a lawsuit which has established nothing more than trespass.4 * * * Today's opinion makes a destructive inroad upon First Amendment law in holding that the validity of an injunction against speech is to be determined by an appellate court on the basis of what the issuing court might reasonably have found as to necessity, rather than on the basis of what it in fact found. And it makes a destructive inroad upon the separation of powers in holding that an injunction may con- tain measures justified by the public interest apart from re- mediation of the legal wrong that is the subject of the com- plaint. Insofar as the first point is concerned, the Court might properly have upheld the fixed buffer zone without the cease-and-desist provision, since the District Court evidently did conclude (with proper factual support, in my view) that limiting the protesters to two was necessary to prevent repe- 4 The Court approves reliance on "public safety" not "as an element which supported respondents' claim for an injunction," but only "as a basis for rejecting petitioners' challenge to the injunction on First Amendment grounds." Ante, at 376, n. 7. Such a distinction makes no sense. In the context before us here, whether there is "a basis for rejecting petitioners' challenge to the injunction on First Amendment grounds" depends en- tirely on whether the "element[s] which suppor[t] the respondents' claim for an injunction" are strong enough. The issues are one and the same. Any injunction must be justified by the elements that support it. The involvement of First Amendment rights does not alter that rule, but merely increases the degree of justification required. Of course, illogical or not, by simply saying so, the Court can limit its novel "public safety" rationale to injunctions involving the freedom of speech. But I would hardly consider that a small and unimportant area for the newly created judicial Committees of Public Safety to control. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 395 Opinion of Breyer, J. tition of the obstruction of access that had occurred in the past. But even that more limited injunction would be inval- idated by the second point: the fact that no cause of action related to obstruction of access was properly found to sup- port the injunction. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II­A, and II­C, but dissent from the Court's judgment upholding the fixed buffer zone, and would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in its entirety. Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Words take on meaning from context. Considered in con- text, the preliminary injunction's language does not neces- sarily create the kind of "floating bubble" that leads the Court to find the injunction unconstitutionally broad. See Part II­C, ante. And until quite recently, no one thought that it did. The "floating bubble" controversy apparently arose during oral argument before the en banc Court of Ap- peals. The Court of Appeals then gave the District Judge, who has ongoing responsibility for administering the injunc- tion, an initial opportunity to consider the petitioners' claim and, if necessary, to clarify or limit the relevant language. 67 F. 3d 377, 389, n. 4 (CA2 1995) (en banc). The Court of Appeals' response, in my view, is both legally proper and sensible. I therefore would affirm its judgment. The preliminary injunction's key language prohibits dem- onstrating "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seek- ing access to or leaving such facilities." This language first appeared in the temporary restraining order (TRO), where it defined the precise scope of the order's prohibition against blocking "ingress into or egress from" facilities. That por- tion of the TRO enjoined the defendants from "trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or ob- structing access to, ingress into or egress from any facil- ity at which abortions are performed in the Western District of New York, including demonstrating within 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 396 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Breyer, J. 15 feet of any person seeking access to or leaving such facilities . . . ." App. 23 (emphasis added). Before the District Court issued the TRO, Reverend Schenck asked whether this language would create a floating bubble. The District Court replied: "THE COURT: I don't think that was the intent. . . . [W]e're talking about . . . free access. . . . It's not a moving 15 feet. "REV. SCHENCK: So in other words, you're speaking of the facility itself? "THE COURT: I think that's what we were talking about . . . . We're talking fifteen feet from [e. g., a door- way] to go right out to where ever you're going. . . . [M]y gosh, you would never be able . . . to deal with that if it was a moving length. "It's fifteen feet from the entrance. . . . [Y]ou have to apply common sense . . . and [an interpretation of the language creating a moving zone] would not in any way at all be a fair interpretation of what we're talking about. "REV. SCHENCK: Well, I'm glad you pointed that out . . . . [T]here is, I think, a very high degree of ambi- guity . . . and no one . . . said what we're talking about here is 15 feet from an entranceway. "THE COURT: I think everyone is clear on that now." App. to Reply Brief for Petitioners A­2 to A­3. The identical key language (with the added words "or vehicle") then found its way into the preliminary injunction, issued 16 months later, where its presence apparently remained subject to the "no-float" understanding that the District Court had called "clear." The preliminary injunc- tion simply separated the key language from the words that had immediately preceded it in the TRO (the "trespassing on, sitting in, blocking . . . ingress into or egress from" lan- 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 397 Opinion of Breyer, J. guage) and it added a phrase that more specifically described the fixed zone as "fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances . . . ." There is little reason to believe that the District Court, in relettering the paragraphs or inserting this new phrase, thereby intended to give the key language a significantly dif- ferent meaning or a new purpose other than its original pur- pose of narrowing through specification the broader "block- ing . . . ingress" language, now appearing a little earlier on in the injunction. The District Court's reference, in an ac- companying opinion, to "dual `clear zones' of fifteen feet around entrances and fifteen feet around people and vehicles seeking access," see ante, at 379, n. 10, by itself (and it is by itself) shows little, if anything, more than a "bubble" that surrounds an individual within or just beyond a fixed zone. In all other respects, given the presence of a new additional narrowing phrase-the phrase that speaks of, e. g., "fifteen feet from either side"-the key language at issue here would simply have become redundant. The District Court's and the parties' subsequent words and deeds suggest that the key language has had no signifi- cant independent injunctive life. The contempt motions and orders under the TRO, for example, refer to violations of a fixed 15-foot zone from entrances (though in one instance, after counsel repeated the District Court's "no moving zone" clarification (quoted supra, at 396), Record, Doc. No. 232, pp. 276­279, the court found that a "totality" of the defend- ant's conduct, which involved serious obstruction within "10 to 20 feet" of an entrance, violated two provisions of the TRO including the key language. See ante, at 379, n. 10; Record, Doc. No. 263, pp. 6, 8). The contempt motions and orders, however, say nothing about violations of a bubble floating outside the fixed entrance zones-though the facts suggest 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 398 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Breyer, J. that the contemnors would have violated such floating zones had the TRO called them into existence. Nor is there any- thing in the many District Court filings in respect to the preliminary injunction that suggests an intent to create a floating bubble of the sort contemplated by this Court. The diagrams that plaintiffs submitted to clarify the injunction's scope contain no reference to a floating zone. Rather, they are marked to indicate 15-foot fixed buffer zones from en- trances to clinic property. See Appendix B, infra. In fact, at oral argument before the appeals court panel, counsel for the petitioners confirmed that the injunction's bubble did not "float" in the way contemplated by this Court. At that time an appeals court judge asked counsel (for the demonstrators) whether the 15-foot zone would apply after "someone leaves the abortion clinic and goes to a grocery store," perhaps "three miles away," and counsel replied as follows: "COUNSEL: I don't think that would [be] prohibit[ed] [by] the court's order. I think the court's order pro- vides for a 15-foot setback or bubble zone around the clinic property . . . . "APPEALS COURT: Well, my question is to what extent can you . . . `leave' and still be subject to this injunction? "COUNSEL: Maybe I just didn't see the full implica- tions of the injunction, but I never considered that be- yond the 15-foot bubble zone there would be this same restriction. Even I'm not arguing that the injunction goes that far. Maybe I just didn't see that but I didn't interpret it that way." Not surprisingly, the appeals court's panel opinion did not mention floating bubbles. Nor did the parties mention the matter in subsequent District Court proceedings related to modifying or restoring the injunction-proceedings that took 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 399 Opinion of Breyer, J. place after the Court of Appeals' panel decision invalidating the injunction, but before the Court of Appeals heard the case en banc and reversed. At the latter time, apparently for the first time, the parties agreed that the injunction's language produced a zone that moved in some way or another. Given this posture, it is not surprising that the en banc Court of Appeals did not deny the existence of a floating bubble zone, but left the initial resolution of the floating bub- ble controversy to the District Court. The Court of Appeals addressed the parties' argument regarding what the court termed a "floating buffer"-an issue that had never been raised before-by holding that the "floating buffer" was permissible, 67 F. 3d, at 389, on the assumption that the Dis- trict Court would apply it in a constitutional manner, id., at 389, n. 4. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not definitively interpret the scope of the relevant language, but instead left it to the District Court to resolve in the first instance any linguistic ambiguity that might create a constitutional problem. In my view, this action by the Court of Appeals was appro- priate, and this Court should do the same. Appellate courts do not normally consider claims that have not been raised first in the District Court. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 120 (1976) (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 556 (1941)). There is no good reason to depart from this ordi- nary principle here. The District Court understands the history, and thus the meaning, of the language in context better than do we. If the petitioners show a need for inter- pretation or modification of the language, the District Court, which is directly familiar with the facts underlying the in- junction, can respond quickly and flexibly. An appellate de- cision is not immediately necessary because the key language in the injunction has not yet created, nor does it threaten to create, any significant practical difficulty. No defendant in 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 400 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Opinion of Breyer, J. this case has been threatened with contempt for violating the ostensible floating bubble provision. Nor is there any realistic reason to believe that the provision will deter the exercise of constitutionally protected speech rights. I recognize that the District Court, interpreting or rein- terpreting the key language, might find that it creates some kind of bubble that "floats," perhaps in the way I mention above. See supra, at 397. But even then, the constitu- tional validity of its interpretation would depend upon the specific interpretation that the court then gave and the po- tentially justifying facts. Some bubbles that "float" in time or space would seem to raise no constitutional difficulty. For example, a 15-foot buffer zone that is "fixed" in place around a doorway but that is activated only when a clinic patient is present can be said to "float" in time or, to a small degree, in space. See Appendix B, infra, Diagram 1 (Point X). Another example of a possibly constitutional "floating" bubble would be one that protects a patient who alights from a vehicle at the curbside in front of the Buffalo GYN Women- services clinic and must cross the two-foot stretch of side- walk that is outside the 15-foot fixed buffer. See Appendix B, infra, Diagram 2 (Point Y). Other bubbles, such as a bubble that follows a clinic patient to a grocery store three miles away, apparently are of no interest to anyone in this case. A floating bubble that follows a patient who is walk- ing along the sidewalk just in front of a clinic, but outside the 15-foot fixed zone, could raise a constitutional problem. See Appendix B, infra, Diagram 3 (Point Z). But the consti- tutional validity of that kind of bubble should depend upon the particular clinic and the particular circumstances to which the District Court would point in justification. The Court of Appeals wisely recognized that these matters should be left in the first instance to the consideration of the District Court. In sum, ordinary principles of judicial administration would permit the District Court to deal with the petitioners' current objection. These principles counsel against this 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 401 Appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J. Court's now offering its own interpretation of the injunc- tion-an interpretation that is not obvious from the language and that has never been considered by the District Court. I do not see how the Court's review of the key language, in the absence of special need and in violation of those principles, can make the lower courts' difficult, ongoing, circumstance-specific task any easier. To the contrary, dis- trict judges cannot assure in advance, without the benefit of argument by the parties, that the language of complex, fact-based injunctions is free of every ambiguity that later interpretation or misinterpretation finds possible. And I see no special need here for the Court to make an apparently general statement about the law of "floating bubbles," which later developments may show to have been unnecessary or unwise. Hence, I join all but Part II­C of the Court's opinion. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety. APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER "Upon hearing . . . it is hereby "ORDERED THAT Defendants, the officers, directors, agents, and representatives of defendants, and all other per- sons whomsoever, known or unknown, acting in their behalf or in concert with them, and receiving actual notice of this Order, are: "1. Temporarily enjoined and restrained in any manner or by any means from: "(a) trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or ob- structing access to, ingress into or egress from any facility at which abortions are performed in the Western District of New York, including demonstrating within 15 feet of any person seeking access to or leaving such facilities, except that sidewalk counseling by no more than two persons as specified in paragraph (b) shall be allowed; 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 402 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J. "(b) physically abusing or tortiously harassing persons en- tering or leaving, working at or using any services at any facility at which abortions are performed; Provided, how- ever, that sidewalk counseling, consisting of a conversation of a nonthreatening nature by not more than two people with each person they are seeking to counsel shall not be prohib- ited. Also provided that no one is required to accept or lis- ten to sidewalk counseling and that if anyone who wants to, or who is sought to be counseled who wants to not have coun- seling, wants to leave, or walk away, they shall have the ab- solute right to do that, and in such event the persons seeking to counsel that person shall cease and desist from such coun- seling of that person. In addition, provided that this right to sidewalk counseling as defined herein shall not limit the right of the Police Department to maintain public order or reasonably necessary rules and regulations as they decide are necessary at each particular demonstration site; "(c) making any excessively loud sound which disturbs, in- jures, or endangers the health or safety of any patient or employee of a health care facility where abortions are per- formed in the Western District of New York, nor shall any person make such sounds which interferes with the rights of anyone not in violation of this Order; . . . ". . . and it is further "ORDERED that nothing in this Order shall be construed to limit Project Rescue participants' exercise of their legiti- mate First Amendment rights . . . ." App. 22­26 (emphasis added). "PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION "Upon consideration of the evidence introduced at a hear- ing . . . it is hereby "ORDERED that defendants, the officers, directors, agents, and representatives of defendants, and all other per- sons whomsoever, known or unknown, acting in their behalf or in concert with them, and receiving actual or constructive notice of this Order, are: 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 403 Appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J. "11. Enjoined and restrained in any manner or by any means from: "(a) trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding, or ob- structing access to, ingress into or egress from any facility, including, but not limited to, the parking lots, parking lot entrances, driveways, and driveway entrances, at which abortions are performed in the Western District of New York; "(b) demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, park- ing lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of such facilities, or within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seek- ing access to or leaving such facilities, except that the form of demonstrating known as sidewalk counseling by no more than two persons as specified in paragraph (c) shall be allowed; "(c) physically abusing, grabbing, touching, pushing, shov- ing, or crowding persons entering or leaving, working at or using any services at any facility at which abortions are per- formed; provided, however, that sidewalk counseling consist- ing of a conversation of a non-threatening nature by not more than two people with each person or group of persons they are seeking to counsel shall not be prohibited. Also pro- vided that no one is required to accept or listen to sidewalk counseling, and that if anyone or any group of persons who is sought to be counseled wants to not have counseling, wants to leave, or walk away, they shall have the absolute right to do that, and in such event all persons seeking to counsel that person or group of persons shall cease and desist from such counseling, and shall thereafter be governed by the provi- sions of paragraph (b) pertaining to not demonstrating within fifteen feet of persons seeking access to or leaving a facility. In addition, it is further provided that this right to sidewalk counseling as defined herein shall not limit the right of the Police Department to maintain public order or 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 404 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J. such reasonably necessary rules and regulations as they de- cide are necessary at each particular demonstration site; "(d) using any mechanical loudspeaker or sound amplifica- tion device or making any excessively loud sound which in- jures, disturbs, or endangers the health or safety of any pa- tient or employee of a health care facility at which abortions are performed, nor shall any person make such sounds which interfere with the rights of anyone not in violation of this Order; ". . . and it is further "ORDERED that nothing in this Order shall be construed to limit defendants and those acting in concert with them from exercising their legitimate First Amendment rights . . . ." 799 F. Supp., at 1440­1441. 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 405 Appendix B to opinion of Breyer, J. APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. Diagram 1 Alexander Women's Group 220 Alexander Street, Ste. 300 Rochester, NY 14607 (part of Genesee Hospital Complex) 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN 406 SCHENCK v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN N. Y. Appendix B to opinion of Breyer, J. APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. Diagram 2 Buffalo GYN Womenservices 1241 Main Street Buffalo, NY 14607 519US2 Unit: $U24 [06-14-99 20:58:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 357 (1997) 407 Appendix B to opinion of Breyer, J. APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. Diagram 3 The Family Medicine Center 885 South Ave. Rochester, NY 14620 (part of Highland Hospital complex) 519us2$25Z 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 408 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus MARYLAND v. WILSON certiorari to the court of special appeals of maryland No. 95­1268. Argued December 11, 1996-Decided February 19, 1997 After stopping a speeding car in which respondent Wilson was a passen- ger, a Maryland state trooper ordered Wilson out of the car upon notic- ing his apparent nervousness. When Wilson exited, a quantity of co- caine fell to the ground. He was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Baltimore County Circuit Court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, deciding that the trooper's ordering him out of the car constituted an unreasonable sei- zure under the Fourth Amendment. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, that an officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, does not apply to passengers. Held: An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop. Statements by the Court in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1047­1048 (Mimms "held that police may order persons out of an automobile during a [traffic] stop" (empha- sis added)), and by Justice Powell in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 155, n. 4 (Mimms held "that passengers . . . have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle, once a proper stop is made" (emphasis added)), do not constitute binding precedent, since the former statement was dictum, and the latter was contained in a concurrence. Nevertheless, the Mimms rule applies to passengers as well as to driv- ers. The Court therein explained that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is the reasonableness of the particular governmen- tal invasion of a citizen's personal security, 434 U. S., at 108­109, and that reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary inter- ference by officers, id., at 109. On the public interest side, the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver, as in Mimms, see id., at 109­110, or a passenger, as here. Indeed, the danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car. On the personal liberty side, the case for passengers is stronger than that for the driver in the sense that there is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehic- ular offense, see id., at 110, but there is no such reason to stop or detain 519us2$25Z 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 409 Syllabus passengers. But as a practical matter, passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle, so that the additional intrusion upon them is minimal. Pp. 411­415. 106 Md. App. 24, 664 A. 2d 1, reversed and remanded. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 415. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 422. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, ar- gued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gary E. Bair, Mary Ellen Barbera, and Kathryn Grill Graeff, Assistant Attorneys General. Byron L. Warnken, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804 (1996), argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Attorney General Reno argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attor- ney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, David C. Frederick, and Nina Goodman.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sut- ton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas and Stuart A. Cole, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Scott Harshbarger of Massachu- setts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Condon of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, 519us2$25H 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 410 MARYLAND v. WILSON Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we consider whether the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam), that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a law- fully stopped car to exit his vehicle, extends to passengers as well. We hold that it does. At about 7:30 p.m. on a June evening, Maryland state trooper David Hughes observed a passenger car driving southbound on I­95 in Baltimore County at a speed of 64 miles per hour. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour, and the car had no regular license tag; there was a torn piece of paper reading "Enterprise Rent-A-Car" dangling from its rear. Hughes activated his lights and sirens, signal- ing the car to pull over, but it continued driving for another mile and a half until it finally did so. During the pursuit, Hughes noticed that there were three occupants in the car and that the two passengers turned to look at him several times, repeatedly ducking below sight level and then reappearing. As Hughes approached the car on foot, the driver alighted and met him halfway. The driver was trembling and appeared extremely nervous, but nonetheless produced a valid Connecticut driver's license. Hughes instructed him to return to the car and retrieve the rental documents, and he complied. During this encounter, Hughes noticed that the front-seat passenger, respondent Jerry Lee Wilson, was sweating and also appeared extremely Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Julio A. Brady of the U. S. Virgin Islands, Christine O. Grego- ire of Washington, Darrell McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, Robert Wennerholm, James P. Manek, John Kaye, Richard M. Weintraub, and Bernard J. Farber; for the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., by William J. John- son; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. 519us2$25H 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 411 Opinion of the Court nervous. While the driver was sitting in the driver's seat looking for the rental papers, Hughes ordered Wilson out of the car. When Wilson exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. Wilson was then arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Before trial, Wilson moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Hughes' ordering him out of the car constituted an unreason- able seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County agreed, and granted respond- ent's motion to suppress. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, 106 Md. App. 24, 664 A. 2d 1 (1995), ruling that Pennsylvania v. Mimms does not apply to passengers. The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari. 340 Md. 502, 667 A. 2d 342 (1995). We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1003 (1996), and now reverse. In Mimms, we considered a traffic stop much like the one before us today. There, Mimms had been stopped for driv- ing with an expired license plate, and the officer asked him to step out of his car. When Mimms did so, the officer no- ticed a bulge in his jacket that proved to be a .38-caliber revolver, whereupon Mimms was arrested for carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Mimms, like Wilson, urged the suppression of the evidence on the ground that the officer's ordering him out of the car was an unreasonable seizure, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, agreed. We reversed, explaining that "[t]he touchstone of our anal- ysis under the Fourth Amendment is always `the reasonable- ness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security,' " 434 U. S., at 108­ 109 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968)), and that reasonableness "depends `on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,' " 434 U. S., at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 519us2$25H 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 412 MARYLAND v. WILSON Opinion of the Court 878 (1975)). On the public interest side of the balance, we noted that the State "freely concede[d]" that there had been nothing unusual or suspicious to justify ordering Mimms out of the car, but that it was the officer's "practice to order all drivers [stopped in traffic stops] out of their vehicles as a matter of course" as a "precautionary measure" to protect the officer's safety. 434 U. S., at 109­110. We thought it "too plain for argument" that this justification-officer safety-was "both legitimate and weighty." Id., at 110. In addition, we observed that the danger to the officer of stand- ing by the driver's door and in the path of oncoming traffic might also be "appreciable." Id., at 111. On the other side of the balance, we considered the intru- sion into the driver's liberty occasioned by the officer's or- dering him out of the car. Noting that the driver's car was already validly stopped for a traffic infraction, we deemed the additional intrusion of asking him to step outside his car "de minimis." Ibid. Accordingly, we concluded that "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic viola- tion, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's pro- scription of unreasonable seizures." Id., at 111, n. 6. Respondent urges, and the lower courts agreed, that this per se rule does not apply to Wilson because he was a passen- ger, not the driver. Maryland, in turn, argues that we have already implicitly decided this question by our statement in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), that "[i]n [Mimms], we held that police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation," id., at 1047­1048 (em- phasis added), and by Justice Powell's statement in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978), that "this Court determined in [Mimms] that passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle, once a proper stop is made," id., at 155, n. 4 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., concurring) (emphasis added). We agree with respondent that the former statement was dictum, and the 519us2$25H 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 413 Opinion of the Court latter was contained in a concurrence, so that neither consti- tutes binding precedent. We must therefore now decide whether the rule of Mimms applies to passengers as well as to drivers.1 On the public interest side of the balance, the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger. Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters. In 1994 alone, there were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71, 33 (1994). In the case of passengers, the danger of the officer's standing in the path of oncoming traf- fic would not be present except in the case of a passenger in the left rear seat, but the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources of harm to the officer.2 On the personal liberty side of the balance, the case for the passengers is in one sense stronger than that for the driver. There is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers. But as a practical 1 Respondent argues that, because we have generally eschewed bright- line rules in the Fourth Amendment context, see, e. g., Ohio v. Robinette, ante, p. 33, we should not here conclude that passengers may constitution- ally be ordered out of lawfully stopped vehicles. But, that we typically avoid per se rules concerning searches and seizures does not mean that we have always done so; Mimms itself drew a bright line, and we believe the principles that underlay that decision apply to passengers as well. 2 Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion points out, post, at 416, that these statistics are not further broken down as to assaults by passengers and assaults by drivers. It is, indeed, regrettable that the empirical data on a subject such as this are sparse, but we need not ignore the data which do exist simply because further refinement would be even more helpful. Justice Stevens agrees that there is "a strong public interest in mini- mizing" the number of assaults on law officers, ibid., and we believe that our holding today is more likely to accomplish that result than would be the case if his views were to prevail. 519us2$25H 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 414 MARYLAND v. WILSON Opinion of the Court matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car. Outside the car, the passengers will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be concealed in the interior of the passenger compartment. It would seem that the possi- bility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary re- action of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop. And the motivation of a passen- ger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the driver. We think that our opinion in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), offers guidance by analogy here. There the police had obtained a search warrant for contraband thought to be located in a residence, but when they arrived to execute the warrant they found Summers coming down the front steps. The question in the case depended "upon a determi- nation whether the officers had the authority to require him to re-enter the house and to remain there while they con- ducted their search." Id., at 695. In holding as it did, the Court said: "Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a war- rant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Id., at 702­703 (footnote omitted). In summary, danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car. While there is not the same basis for ordering the passengers out of the car as there is 519us2$25H 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 415 Stevens, J., dissenting for ordering the driver out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal. We therefore hold that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.3 The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per cu- riam), the Court answered the "narrow question" whether an "incremental intrusion" on the liberty of a person who had been lawfully seized was reasonable. Id., at 109. This case, in contrast, raises a separate and significant question concerning the power of the State to make an initial seizure of persons who are not even suspected of having violated the law. My concern is not with the ultimate disposition of this par- ticular case, but rather with the literally millions of other cases that will be affected by the rule the Court announces. Though the question is not before us, I am satisfied that- under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)-if a police officer conducting a traffic stop has an articulable sus- picion of possible danger, the officer may order passengers to exit the vehicle as a defensive tactic without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I assume that the facts recited in the majority's opinion provided a valid justi- 3 Maryland urges us to go further and hold that an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop. But respondent was subjected to no detention based on the stopping of the car once he had left it; his arrest was based on probable cause to believe that he was guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The question which Maryland wishes answered, therefore, is not presented by this case, and we express no opinion upon it. 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 416 MARYLAND v. WILSON Stevens, J., dissenting fication for this officer's order commanding the passengers to get out of this vehicle.1 But the Court's ruling goes much further. It applies equally to traffic stops in which there is not even a scintilla of evidence of any potential risk to the police officer. In those cases, I firmly believe that the Fourth Amendment prohibits routine and arbitrary seizures of obviously innocent citizens. I The majority suggests that the personal liberty interest at stake here, which is admittedly "stronger" than that at issue in Mimms, is outweighed by the need to ensure officer safety. Ante, at 413, 414­415. The Court correctly observes that "traffic stops may be dangerous encounters." Ante, at 413. The magnitude of the danger to police officers is reflected in the statistic that, in 1994 alone, "there were 5,762 officer as- saults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." Ibid. There is, unquestionably, a strong public in- terest in minimizing the number of such assaults and fatali- ties. The Court's statistics, however, provide no support for the conclusion that its ruling will have any such effect. Those statistics do not tell us how many of the incidents involved passengers. Assuming that many of the assaults were committed by passengers, we do not know how many occurred after the passenger got out of the vehicle, how many took place while the passenger remained in the vehicle, or indeed, whether any of them could have been prevented 1 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held, inter alia, that the State had not properly preserved this claim during the suppression hearing. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The State similarly fails to press the point here. Pet. for Cert. 4, n. 1; Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1. The issue is therefore not before us, and I am not free to concur in the Court's judg- ment on this alternative ground. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 327 (1985); this Court's Rule 14.1(a). 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 417 Stevens, J., dissenting by an order commanding the passengers to exit.2 There is no indication that the number of assaults was smaller in ju- risdictions where officers may order passengers to exit the vehicle without any suspicion than in jurisdictions where they were then prohibited from doing so. Indeed, there is no indication that any of the assaults occurred when there was a complete absence of any articulable basis for concern about the officer's safety-the only condition under which I would hold that the Fourth Amendment prohibits an order commanding passengers to exit a vehicle. In short, the sta- tistics are as consistent with the hypothesis that ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases the danger of assault as with the hypothesis that it reduces that risk. Furthermore, any limited additional risk to police officers must be weighed against the unnecessary invasion that will be imposed on innocent citizens under the majority's rule in the tremendous number of routine stops that occur each day. We have long recognized that "[b]ecause of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic . . . the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substan- tially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441 (1973).3 Most traffic 2 I am assuming that in the typical case the officer would not order passengers out of a vehicle until after he had stopped his own car, exited, and arrived at a position where he could converse with the driver. The only way to avoid all risk to the officer, I suppose, would be to adopt a routine practice of always issuing an order through an amplified speaker commanding everyone to get out of the stopped car before the officer ex- posed himself to the possibility of a shot from a hidden weapon. Given the predicate for the Court's ruling-that an articulable basis for suspect- ing danger to the officer provides insufficient protection against the possi- bility of a surprise assault-we must assume that every passenger, no matter how feeble or infirm, must be prepared to accept the "petty indig- nity" of obeying an arbitrary and sometimes demeaning command issued over a loud speaker. 3 See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 113 (1986); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976); cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 810, 818 (1996). 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 418 MARYLAND v. WILSON Stevens, J., dissenting stops involve otherwise law-abiding citizens who have com- mitted minor traffic offenses. A strong interest in arriving at a destination-to deliver a patient to a hospital, to witness a kickoff, or to get to work on time-will often explain a traffic violation without justifying it. In the aggregate, these stops amount to significant law enforcement activity. Indeed, the number of stops in which an officer is actually at risk is dwarfed by the far greater number of routine stops. If Maryland's share of the national total is about average, the State probably experiences about 100 officer assaults each year during traffic stops and pursuits. Making the un- likely assumption that passengers are responsible for one- fourth of the total assaults, it appears that the Court's new rule would provide a potential benefit to Maryland officers in only roughly 25 stops a year.4 These stops represent a minuscule portion of the total. In Maryland alone, there are something on the order of one million traffic stops each year.5 Assuming that there are passengers in about half of the cars stopped, the majority's rule is of some possible advantage to police in only about one out of every twenty thousand traffic stops in which there is a passenger in the car. And, any benefit is extremely marginal. In the overwhelming major- ity of cases posing a real threat, the officer would almost 4 This figure may in fact be smaller. The majority's data aggregate as- saults committed during "[t]raffic [p]ursuits and [s]tops." Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71 (1994). In those assaults that occur during the pursuit of a moving vehicle, it would obviously be impossible for an officer to order a passenger out of the car. 5 Maryland had well over one million nontort motor vehicle cases during a 1-year period between 1994 and 1995. Annual Report of the Maryland Judiciary 80 (1994­1995). Though the State does not maintain a count of the number of stops performed each year, this figure is probably a fair rough proxy. The bulk of these cases likely represent a traffic stop, and this total does not include those stops in which the police officer simply gave the driver an informal reprimand. I presume that these figures are representative of present circumstances. 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 419 Stevens, J., dissenting certainly have some ground to suspect danger that would justify ordering passengers out of the car. In contrast, the potential daily burden on thousands of innocent citizens is obvious. That burden may well be "minimal" in individual cases. Ante, at 415. But countless citizens who cherish individual liberty and are offended, embarrassed, and sometimes provoked by arbitrary official commands may well consider the burden to be significant.6 In all events, the aggregation of thousands upon thousands of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as substantial, and which in my view clearly outweighs the evanescent safety concerns pressed by the majority. II The Court concludes today that the balance of convenience and danger that supported its holding in Mimms applies to passengers of lawfully stopped cars as well as drivers. In Mimms itself, however, the Court emphasized the fact that the intrusion into the driver's liberty at stake was "occa- sioned not by the initial stop of the vehicle, which was admit- tedly justified, but by the order to get out of the car." 434 U. S., at 111. The conclusion that "this additional intrusion can only be described as de minimis" rested on the premise that the "police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained." Ibid.7 6 The number of cases in which the command actually protects the officer from harm may well be a good deal smaller than the number in which a passenger is harmed by exposure to inclement weather, as well as the number in which an ill-advised command is improperly enforced. Con- sider, for example, the harm caused to a passenger by an inadequately trained officer after a command was issued to exit the vehicle in Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 67 F. 3d 1174 (CA5 1995), cert. granted, 517 U. S. 1154 (1996). 7 Dissenting in Mimms, I criticized the Court's reasoning and, indeed, predicted the result that the majority reaches today. 434 U. S., at 122­123. 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 420 MARYLAND v. WILSON Stevens, J., dissenting In this case as well, the intrusion on the passengers' lib- erty occasioned by the initial stop of the vehicle is not chal- lenged. That intrusion was a necessary by-product of the lawful detention of the driver. But the passengers had not yet been seized at the time the car was pulled over, any more than a traffic jam caused by construction or other state- imposed delay not directed at a particular individual consti- tutes a seizure of that person. The question is whether a passenger in a lawfully stopped car may be seized, by an order to get out of the vehicle, without any evidence whatso- ever that he or she poses a threat to the officer or has com- mitted an offense.8 To order passengers about during the course of a traffic stop, insisting that they exit and remain outside the car, can hardly be classified as a de minimis intrusion. The traffic violation sufficiently justifies subjecting the driver to deten- tion and some police control for the time necessary to con- clude the business of the stop. The restraint on the liberty of blameless passengers that the majority permits is, in con- trast, entirely arbitrary.9 In my view, wholly innocent passengers in a taxi, bus, or private car have a constitutionally protected right to decide whether to remain comfortably seated within the vehicle rather than exposing themselves to the elements and the ob- servation of curious bystanders. The Constitution should not be read to permit law enforcement officers to order inno- cent passengers about simply because they have the misfor- 8 The order to the passenger is unquestionably a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As we held in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975): "The Fourth Amendment ap- plies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16­19 (1968)." 9 Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979) (" `[A] person's mere pro- pinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person' " (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62­63 (1968))). 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 421 Stevens, J., dissenting tune to be seated in a car whose driver has committed a minor traffic offense. Unfortunately, the effect of the Court's new rule on the law may turn out to be far more significant than its immedi- ate impact on individual liberty. Throughout most of our history the Fourth Amendment embodied a general rule re- quiring that official searches and seizures be authorized by a warrant, issued "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 10 During the prohibition era, the exceptions for warrantless searches supported by probable cause started to replace the general rule.11 In 1968, in the landmark "stop and frisk" case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court placed its stamp of ap- proval on seizures supported by specific and articulable facts that did not establish probable cause. The Court crafted Terry as a narrow exception to the general rule that "the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant proce- dure." Id., at 20. The intended scope of the Court's major departure from prior practice was reflected in its statement that the "demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id., at 21, n. 18; see also id., at 27. In the 1970's, the Court twice re- jected attempts to justify suspicionless seizures that caused only "modest" intrusions on the liberty of passengers in auto- mobiles. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 879­880 (1975); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 662­663 10 See, e. g., Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 315 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 393 (1914). 11 See, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925) (automobile search). We had also recognized earlier in dictum the now well- established doctrine permitting warrantless searches incident to a valid arrest. See Weeks, 232 U. S., at 392; see also J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 87 (1966). 519us2$25I 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT 422 MARYLAND v. WILSON Kennedy, J., dissenting (1979).12 Today, however, the Court takes the unprece- dented step of authorizing seizures that are unsupported by any individualized suspicion whatsoever. The Court's conclusion seems to rest on the assumption that the constitutional protection against "unreasonable" sei- zures requires nothing more than a hypothetically rational basis for intrusions on individual liberty. How far this ground-breaking decision will take us, I do not venture to predict. I fear, however, that it may pose a more serious threat to individual liberty than the Court realizes. I respectfully dissent. Justice Kennedy, dissenting. I join in the dissent by Justice Stevens and add these few observations. The distinguishing feature of our criminal justice system is its insistence on principled, accountable decisionmaking in individual cases. If a person is to be seized, a satisfactory explanation for the invasive action ought to be established by an officer who exercises reasoned judgment under all the circumstances of the case. This principle can be accommo- dated even where officers must make immediate decisions to ensure their own safety. Traffic stops, even for minor violations, can take upwards of 30 minutes. When an officer commands passengers inno- cent of any violation to leave the vehicle and stand by the side of the road in full view of the public, the seizure is seri- ous, not trivial. As Justice Stevens concludes, the com- mand to exit ought not to be given unless there are objective circumstances making it reasonable for the officer to issue the order. (We do not have before us the separate question whether passengers, who, after all, are in the car by choice, 12 Dissenting in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (1979), then-Justice Rehnquist characterized the motorist's interest in freedom from random stops as "only the most diaphanous of citizen interests." Id., at 666. 519us2$25L 06-03-99 22:05:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 408 (1997) 423 Kennedy, J., dissenting can be ordered to remain there for a reasonable time while the police conduct their business.) The requisite showing for commanding passengers to exit need be no more than the existence of any circumstance jus- tifying the order in the interests of the officer's safety or to facilitate a lawful search or investigation. As we have acknowledged for decades, special latitude is given to the police in effecting searches and seizures involving vehicles and their occupants. See, e. g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106 (1986); New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981). Just last Term we ad- hered to a rule permitting vehicle stops if there is some ob- jective indication that a violation has been committed, re- gardless of the officer's real motives. See Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996). We could discern no other, workable rule. Even so, we insisted on a reasoned explana- tion for the stop. The practical effect of our holding in Whren, of course, is to allow the police to stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances. When Whren is coupled with today's hold- ing, the Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police. If the command to exit were to become commonplace, the Constitution would be dimin- ished in a most public way. As the standards suggested in dissent are adequate to protect the safety of the police, we ought not to suffer so great a loss. Since a myriad of circumstances will give a cautious officer reasonable grounds for commanding passengers to leave the vehicle, it might be thought the rule the Court adopts today will be little different in its operation than the rule offered in dissent. It does no disservice to police officers, however, to insist upon exercise of reasoned judgment. Adherence to neutral principles is the very premise of the rule of law the police themselves defend with such courage and dedication. Most officers, it might be said, will exercise their new power with discretion and restraint; and no doubt this often 519us2$25L 06-03-99 22:05:56 PAGES OPINPGT 424 MARYLAND v. WILSON Kennedy, J., dissenting will be the case. It might also be said that if some jurisdic- tions use today's ruling to require passengers to exit as a matter of routine in every stop, citizen complaints and politi- cal intervention will call for an end to the practice. These arguments, however, would miss the point. Liberty comes not from officials by grace but from the Constitution by right. For these reasons, and with all respect for the opinion of the Court, I dissent. 519us2$26z 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 425 Syllabus REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al. v. DOE certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1694. Argued December 2, 1996-Decided February 19, 1997 Respondent Doe, a New York citizen, sued the Regents of the University of California and others, alleging, inter alia, that the University had agreed to employ him at a laboratory it operates pursuant to a contract with the federal Department of Energy, and that it had wrongfully breached its agreement with him upon determining that he could not obtain a required security clearance. Relying on Circuit precedent holding that the University is "an arm of the state," the District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred Doe from maintaining his breach-of-contract action in federal court. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that liability for money judgments is the single most impor- tant factor in determining whether an entity is an arm of the State, and gave decisive weight to the terms of the University's agreement with the Energy Department, under which the Department, not the State, is liable for any judgment rendered against the University in its perform- ance of the contract. Held: The fact that the Federal Government has agreed to indemnify a state instrumentality against litigation costs, including adverse judg- ments, does not divest the state agency of Eleventh Amendment immu- nity. Nothing in this Court's opinions supports the notion that the presence or absence of a third party's undertaking to indemnify a state agency should determine whether it is the kind of entity that should be treated as an arm of the State. Just as with the arm-of-the-state in- quiry, see, e. g., Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 51­52, it is the entity's potential legal liability for judgments, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the first instance, that is relevant in determining the underlying Eleventh Amendment question. Accord- ingly, the Court rejects Doe's principal contention-that the Amend- ment does not apply to this litigation because any damages award would be paid by the Energy Department, and therefore have no impact upon California's treasury. Because the question on which certiorari was granted does not encompass Doe's alternative argument attacking the Ninth Circuit cases holding the University to be an arm of the State, the Court declines to address that argument. Pp. 429­432. 65 F. 3d 771, reversed. 519us2$26z 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 426 REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. v. DOE Opinion of the Court Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Charles A. Miller argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert A. Long, Jr., John F. Duffy, James E. Holst, and Patrick J. O'Hern. Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attor- ney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, and Mark B. Stern. Richard Gayer, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Madeleine Tress.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The narrow question presented by this case is whether the fact that the Federal Government has agreed to indemnify a state instrumentality against the costs of litigation, including adverse judgments, divests the state agency of Eleventh Amendment immunity. We hold that it does not. I Respondent, a citizen of New York, brought suit against the Regents of the University of California and several indi- vidual defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Although he alleged other claims, we are concerned only with respondent's breach-of- contract claim against the University. Doe contends that the University agreed to employ him as a mathematical physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which the University operates pursuant to a contract with the Federal Government. According to his complaint, the *Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley filed a brief for the National Con- ference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. James K. T. Hunter, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 519us2$26I 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 425 (1997) 427 Opinion of the Court University wrongfully refused to perform its agreement with Doe because it determined that he could not obtain the required security clearance from the Department of Energy (Department). Relying on Ninth Circuit cases holding that the University is "an arm of the state," 1 the District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred respondent from maintaining his breach-of-contract action in federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. As- suming that in some, but not all, of its functions the Univer- sity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,2 the court addressed the narrow question whether it is an arm of the State when "acting in a managerial capacity" for the Liver- more Laboratory. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 65 F. 3d 771, 774 (1995). Although the majority applied "a five-factor analysis," 3 it emphasized that "liability 1 See App. to Pet. for Cert. A­22, A­24, and A­28 (citing Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F. 2d 1439, 1442­1443 (1989), and Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F. 2d 1344, 1350 (1982)). 2 The court relied on one case holding that Congress had abrogated the University's immunity from suit for patent infringement, Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F. 2d 931, 940­941 (CA Fed. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1140 (1994), and another holding that the University had waived its immunity in some cases, In re Holoholo, 512 F. Supp. 889, 901­902 (Haw. 1981), for its conclusion that the "University is an enormous entity which functions in various capacities and which is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for all of its functions." Doe v. Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory, 65 F. 3d 771, 775 (1995). We have no occasion to consider questions of waiver or abrogation of immunity in this case. Nor is it necessary to decide whether there may be some state instrumen- talities that qualify as "arms of the State" for some purposes but not others. 3 The five factors considered by the court in evaluating whether the Uni- versity is an arm of the State were: "[1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, [2] whether the entity performs central governmental functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be sued, [4] whether the entity has power to take property in its own name or only the name of the state, and [5] the corporate status of the entity." Id., at 774. 519us2$26I 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 428 REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. v. DOE Opinion of the Court for money judgment is the single most important factor in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state." Ibid. The majority opinion gave decisive weight to the terms of the University's agreement with the Department, which made it "clear that the Department, and not the State of California, is liable for any judgment rendered against the University in its performance of the Contract." Ibid. The dissenting judge did not take issue with the majority's emphasis on the importance of the defendant's liability for a money judgment, but he reasoned that the proper analysis should focus on the primary legal liability rather than the ultimate economic impact of the judgment. Noting that it was undisputed that a judgment against the University "is a legal obligation of the State of California," id., at 777, he discounted the significance of the indemnitor's secondary, or indirect, liability. For his conclusion, he relied on Ninth Cir- cuit precedent suggesting that a State may not confer Elev- enth Amendment immunity on an entity or individual who would otherwise not enjoy that immunity simply by volun- teering to satisfy judgments against the entity, Durning v. Citibank, N. A., 950 F. 2d 1419, 1425, n. 3 (1991), or by pass- ing a statute indemnifying individual officers from liability, Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F. 2d 1352, 1353­1354 (1988). "The question is not who pays in the end; it is who is legally obligated to pay the judgment that is being sought." 65 F. 3d, at 777­778. Because other Courts of Appeals agree with the dissent's focus on legal rather than financial liability,4 we granted cer- tiorari to resolve the conflict. 518 U. S. 1004 (1996). 4 See Cronen v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 977 F. 2d 934, 938 (CA5 1992) ("[T]he source of the damages is irrelevant when the suit is against the state itself or a state agency"); Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 710 F. 2d 351, 357 (CA7 1983) ("No authority supports Cannon's argument that [the Eleventh Amend- ment] analysis is altered by the possibility that a damage award would be met through insurance proceeds or from federal funds"). 519us2$26I 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 425 (1997) 429 Opinion of the Court II The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com- menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." It has long been settled that the reference to actions "against one of the United States" encompasses not only ac- tions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instru- mentalities. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 287 (1885); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487 (1887); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 438­439 (1900); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945). Thus, "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Id., at 464. When deciding whether a state instrumentality may in- voke the State's immunity, our cases have inquired into the relationship between the State and the entity in question. In making this inquiry, we have sometimes examined "the essential nature and effect of the proceeding," ibid.; see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573, 576 (1946), and sometimes focused on the "nature of the en- tity created by state law" 5 to determine whether it should 5 Ultimately, of course, the question whether a particular state agency has the same kind of independent status as a county or is instead an arm of the State, and therefore "one of the United States" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of federal law. But that federal question can be answered only after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency's character. 519us2$26I 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 430 REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. v. DOE Opinion of the Court "be treated as an arm of the State," Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977).6 Of course, the question whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any evalu- ation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued. Hess v. Port Authority Trans- Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 45­51 (1994); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor, 323 U. S., at 464. In Hess, we evaluated the relationship between an entity created by a bistate compact and the States that had joined to create that entity in order to determine whether that entity could properly be denominated as an "arm" of either of its founding States for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. In addition to considering the position of the bistate entity as a unique creature within the federal system, 513 U. S., at 39­42, and the nature of the claims at issue in the underlying proceeding, id., at 42, we focused particu- lar attention on the fact that "both legally and practically" neither of the relevant States would have been obligated to pay a judgment obtained against the bistate entity, id., at 51­52. Respondent seeks to detach the importance of a State's legal liability for judgments against a state agency from its 6 We relied in Mt. Healthy on our earlier decision that a California county is not an "arm of the State" and therefore may be considered a "citizen" of California for the purpose of determining the federal court's diversity jurisdiction over a state-law claim. Moor v. County of Ala- meda, 411 U. S. 693, 717­721 (1973). In Moor we made a "detailed exami- nation of the relevant provisions of California law" defining counties, not- ing that the county "is liable for all judgments against it and is authorized to levy taxes to pay such judgments," that it is "empowered to issue gen- eral obligation bonds," and that it has other characteristics that provide "persuasive indicia of the independent status occupied by California coun- ties relative to the State of California." Id., at 719­721. 519us2$26I 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 425 (1997) 431 Opinion of the Court moorings as an indicator of the relationship between the State and its creation and to convert the inquiry into a for- malistic question of ultimate financial liability. But none of the reasoning in our opinions lends support to the notion that the presence or absence of a third party's undertaking to indemnify the agency should determine whether it is the kind of entity that should be treated as an arm of the State. Just as with the arm-of-the-state inquiry, we agree with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that with re- spect to the underlying Eleventh Amendment question, it is the entity's potential legal liability, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to dis- charge the liability in the first instance, that is relevant. Surely, if the sovereign State of California should buy insur- ance to protect itself against potential tort liability to pedes- trians stumbling on the steps of the State Capitol, it would not cease to be "one of the United States." Accordingly, we reject respondent's principal contention- that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to this litiga- tion because any award of damages would be paid by the Department of Energy, and therefore have no impact upon the treasury of the State of California. The Eleventh Amendment protects the State from the risk of adverse judgments even though the State may be indemnified by a third party. III As an alternative ground for affirmance, respondent in- vites us to reexamine the validity of the Ninth Circuit cases holding that the University is an arm of the State. He ar- gues that we should look beyond the potential impact of an adverse judgment on the state treasury, and examine the extent to which the elected state government exercises "real, immediate control and oversight" over the University, see id., at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), as well as the char- 519us2$26I 06-03-99 22:08:25 PAGES OPINPGT 432 REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. v. DOE Opinion of the Court acter of the function that gave rise to the litigation. Be- cause the question we granted certiorari to address does not encompass this argument, we decline to address it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 433 Syllabus LYNCE v. MATHIS, SUPERINTENDENT, TOMOKA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 95­7452. Argued November 4, 1996-Decided February 19, 1997 Beginning in 1983 the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986 petitioner received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992 he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of "provisional credits" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Shortly thereafter, the state attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroac- tively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Petitioner was therefore rearrested and returned to custody. He filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Relying on precedent rejecting this argument on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding, the District Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable cause. Held: The 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Pp. 439­449. (a) This Court rejects respondents' contention that the cancellation of petitioner's provisional credits did not violate the Clause because the credits had been issued as part of administrative procedures designed to alleviate prison overcrowding and were therefore not an integral part of petitioner's punishment. To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective and "disadvantage the offender affected by it," Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 29, by, inter alia, increasing the punishment for the crime, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 50. The operation of the 1992 statute was clearly retrospective, and a deter- mination that it disadvantaged petitioner by increasing his punishment is supported by Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S., at 36, in which the Court held that retroactively decreasing the amount of gain-time awarded for an inmate's good behavior violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because Weaver and subsequent cases focused on whether the legislature's action 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 434 LYNCE v. MATHIS Syllabus lengthened the prisoner's sentence without examining the subjective purposes behind the sentencing scheme, see, e. g., id., at 33, the fact that the generous gain-time provisions in Florida's 1983 statute were motivated more by the interest in avoiding overcrowding than by a de- sire to reward good behavior is not relevant to the essential ex post facto inquiry. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499, 507, distinguished. Respondents are foreclosed by Weaver, 450 U. S., at 32, to the extent they argue that overcrowding gain-time is not in some technical sense part of the sentence. Their further argument that petitioner could not reasonably have expected to receive any over- crowding credits when he entered his plea of nolo contendere is singu- larly unpersuasive, given the facts that he was actually awarded 1,860 days and that those credits were retroactively canceled as a result of the 1992 statute. Pp. 439­447. (b) The Court disagrees with respondents' argument that petitioner is not entitled to relief because his provisional overcrowding credits were awarded pursuant to statutes enacted after the date of his offense rather than pursuant to the 1983 statute. Although the overcrowding statute in effect at the time of his crime was slightly modified in subse- quent years, its basic elements remained the same, and the changes do not affect his core ex post facto claim. However, the differences in the statutes may have affected the precise amount of release time he re- ceived. Because this point was not adequately developed earlier in the proceeding, and because it may not in any event affect petitioner's enti- tlement to release, the Court leaves it open for further consideration on remand. Pp. 447­449. Reversed and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 449. Joel T. Remland argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Carter G. Phillips. Parker D. Thomson, Assistant Attorney General of Flor- ida, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief for respondent Butterworth were Mr. Butterworth, Attorney 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 435 Opinion of the Court General, pro se, and Jason Vail, Assistant Attorney General. Susan A. Maher filed a brief for respondent Mathis.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1983 and thereafter the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the department of corrections to award early release credits to prison inmates when the population of the state prison system exceeded predeter- mined levels. The question presented by this case is whether a 1992 statute canceling such credits for certain classes of offenders after they had been awarded-indeed, after they had resulted in the prisoners' release from cus- tody-violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. I In 1986 petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and received a sentence of 22 years (8,030 days) in prison. In 1992 the Florida Department of Correc- tions released him from prison based on its determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days.1 Of that total, 1,860 days were *Chet Kaufman filed a brief for the Florida Public Defender Associa- tion, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Nevada et al. by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and Anne B. Cathcart, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Daniel E. Lungren of Cali- fornia, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, and James S. Gilmore III of Virginia. Lisa B. Kemler and Baya Harrison III filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae. 1 The total included: (1) a 170-day credit for time spent in jail prior to his conviction; (2) "basic gain-time" of 2,640 days; (3) "additional [incentive] 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 436 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court "provisional credits" awarded as a result of prison over- crowding. Shortly after petitioner's release, the state attor- ney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder or attempted murder. Peti- tioner was therefore rearrested and returned to custody. His new release date was set for May 19, 1998. In 1994 petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor- pus alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Relying on Elev- enth Circuit 2 and Florida 3 precedent holding that the revoca- tion of provisional credits did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because their sole purpose was to alleviate prison overcrowding, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition. The District Court adopted that recommen- dation, dismissed the petition, and denied a certificate of probable cause. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir- cuit also denied a certificate of probable cause in an unpub- lished order. Because the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion on similar facts, Ar- nold v. Cody, 951 F. 2d 280 (1991), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 517 U. S. 1186 (1996).4 gain-time" of 958 days; (4) "administrative gain-time" of 335 days; and (5) "provisional credits" of 1,860 days. Disciplinary action resulted in a forfeiture of 295 days. 2 Hock v. Singletary, 41 F. 3d 1470 (1995). 3 Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Rodrick v. Singletary, 502 U. S. 1037 (1992). 4 Petitioner did not advance his ex post facto claim in state court. In the District Court respondents challenged his failure to exhaust his state remedies, but do not appear to have raised the exhaustion issue in the Court of Appeals; nor have they raised it in this Court. Presumably they are satisfied, as we are, that exhaustion would have been futile. The Florida Supreme Court, in Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (1991), held that retrospective application of the provisional credits statute's offense- based exclusion did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court reasoned that overcrowding credits, unlike basic gain-time or incentive gain-time, were merely "procedural" and did not create any substantive 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 437 Opinion of the Court II Motivated largely by the overcrowded condition of the en- tire Florida prison system,5 in 1983 the state legislature enacted the Correctional Reform Act of 1983, a comprehen- sive revision of the State's sentencing laws.6 The Act au- thorized generous awards of early release credits including "basic gain-time" at the rate of 10 days for each month, "up to 20 days of incentive gain time, which shall be credited and applied monthly," and additional deductions of "meritorious gain-time of from 1 to 60 days." See 1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83­131, § 8.7 The Act also created an emergency procedure to be followed "whenever the population of the state correc- tional system exceeds 98 percent of the lawful capacity of the system for males or females, or both." § 5(1).8 When rights. Relying on Dugger, the Florida Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (1994), that cancellation of provisional credits actually awarded to a prisoner did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Respondents have not suggested any reason why the Florida courts would have decided petitioner's case differently. 5 In 1980 the Florida Department of Corrections consented to the entry of a decree establishing a limit on the prison population that could not be exceeded without court approval. See Costello v. Wainwright, 489 F. Supp. 1100 (MD Fla. 1980). In 1982 a special session of the legislature created a Corrections Overcrowding Task Force, which drafted the 1983 legislation. 6 1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83­131. 7 Section 8 amended § 944.275 of the Florida Statutes. 8 Section 5, in pertinent part, provides: "(1) The Department of Corrections shall advise the Governor of the exist- ence of a state of emergency in the state correctional system whenever the population of the state correctional system exceeds 98 percent of the lawful capacity of the system for males or females, or both. In conveying this information, the secretary of the department shall certify the rated design capacity, maximum capacity, lawful capacity, system maximum ca- pacity, and current population of the state correctional system. When the Governor verifies such certification by letter, the secretary shall declare a state of emergency. "(2) Following the declaration of a state of emergency, the sentences of all inmates in the system who are eligible to earn gain-time shall be re- 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 438 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court such an emergency was declared, "the sentences of all in- mates in the system who are eligible to earn gain-time shall be reduced by the credit of up to 30 days gain-time in 5-day increments as may be necessary to reduce the inmate popula- tion to 97 percent of lawful capacity." § 5(2). In the ensuing years, the Florida Legislature modified the overcrowding gain-time system. In 1987 the legislature raised the threshold for awarding emergency release credits from 98% to 99% of capacity. At the same time, the legisla- ture authorized a new form of overcrowding credit, adminis- trative gain-time, with a 98% threshold, which authorized up to a maximum of 60 days additional gain-time to inmates already earning incentive gain-time. Inmates serving sen- tences for certain offenses were ineligible for the awards. In 1988 the legislature repealed the administrative gain-time provision, and replaced it with a provisional credits system.9 The language of the provisional credits statute was virtually identical to that of the administrative gain-time statute-it also authorized up to 60 days of gain-time but was triggered when the inmate population reached 97.5% of capacity. In addition, the legislature expanded the list of offenders who were ineligible for the awards. Having received overcrowding gain-time under the admin- istrative gain-time and provisional credits statutes, as well as basic and incentive gain-time, petitioner was released from prison in 1992. That same year, the legislature can- celed provisional overcrowding credits for certain classes of duced by the credit of up to 30 days gain-time in 5-day increments as may be necessary to reduce the inmate population to 97 percent of lawful capacity." 1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83­131, § 5. 9 1988 Fla. Laws, ch. 88­122, § 5. The provisional credits statute was repealed in 1993. 1993 Fla. Laws, ch. 93­406, §§ 32, 35. The only over- crowding credit system in place today in Florida is the "control release" provision, first enacted in 1989, which authorizes release from incarcera- tion rather than gain-time to control prison population. See Fla. Stat. § 947.146 (Supp. 1992). 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 439 Opinion of the Court inmates, including those convicted of attempted murder.10 As a result of that action, credits for 2,789 inmates who were still in custody were canceled, and rearrest warrants were issued for 164 offenders who had been released.11 Petitioner was in the latter class. Respondents contend that the cancellation of petitioner's provisional credits did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause for two reasons: (1) Because the credits had been issued as part of administrative procedures designed to alleviate over- crowding, they were not an integral part of petitioner's pun- ishment; and (2) in petitioner's case, the specific overcrowd- ing credits had been awarded pursuant to statutes enacted after the date of his offense rather than pursuant to the 1983 statute. We consider the arguments separately. III The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. That presump- tion "is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic." Land- graf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). This doctrine finds expression in several provisions of our Consti- 10 See Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 92­96 (1992), reprinted in Lodging, p. 53; Grif- fin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d, at 501. In 1989 the Florida Legislature amended the provisional credits statute to render those convicted of certain murder offenses, including attempted murder, ineligible for pro- visional credits. Fla. Stat. § 944.277 (1989). The Florida Department of Corrections interpreted the 1989 amendments, and subsequent amend- ments enacted in 1990 and 1991 which contained the same exclusion, to apply prospectively. The 1992 amendment at issue in this case was origi- nally interpreted by the department of corrections to apply only prospec- tively, but the subsequent 1992 opinion by the attorney general concluded that the statute applied retroactively. 11 Department of Corrections Letter of July 9, 1996, App. to Brief for Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., as Amicus Curiae. The peti- tioner's administrative gain-time credits were also canceled, but he does not challenge that action. 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 440 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court tution.12 The specific prohibition on ex post facto laws is only one aspect of the broader constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In both the civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bar- gains it has made with its subjects. The basic principle is one that protects not only the rich and the powerful, United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839 (1996), but also the indigent defendant engaged in negotiations that may lead to an acknowledgment of guilt and a suitable punishment. Article I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law." In his opinion for the Court in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), Justice Stone explained: "The constitutional prohibition and the judicial interpre- tation of it rest upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts crimi- nal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive, and that the criminal quality attribut- able to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused." Id., at 170. 12 "The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws `impairing the Obligation of Contracts.' The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legis- lature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a `public use' and upon payment of `just compensation.' The prohibitions on `Bills of Attainder' in Art. I, §§ 9­10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 456­462 (1965). The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation . . . ." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S., at 266 (foot- note omitted). 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 441 Opinion of the Court The bulk of our ex post facto jurisprudence has involved claims that a law has inflicted "a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (emphasis deleted).13 We have explained that such laws implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause: "the lack of fair notice and govern- mental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consum- mated." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 30 (1981). To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective-that is, "it must apply to events occurring before its enactment"-and it "must disadvantage the of- fender affected by it," id., at 29, by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 50 (1990). In this case the operation of the 1992 statute to effect the can- cellation of overcrowding credits and the consequent reincar- ceration of petitioner was clearly retrospective. The nar- row issue that we must decide is thus whether those consequences disadvantaged petitioner by increasing his punishment. In arguing that the cancellation of overcrowding credits inflicts greater punishment, petitioner relies primarily on our decision in Weaver v. Graham, in which we considered whether retroactively decreasing the amount of gain-time awarded for an inmate's good behavior violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. In that case the petitioner had pleaded guilty 13 This case falls in the third of the four categories of ex post facto laws described by Justice Chase: "1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., at 390 (emphasis deleted). 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 442 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court to second-degree murder and had been sentenced to prison for 15 years. At the time of Weaver's plea, Florida law pro- vided credits contingent on the good conduct of the prisoner of 5 days per month for the first two years of his sentence, 10 days per month for the third and fourth years, and 15 days per month thereafter. The law therefore provided him with an opportunity to be released after serving less than nine years of his sentence. In 1978 the Florida Legislature enacted a new formula for computing gain-time; instead of 5, 10, and 15 days per month, it authorized only 3, 6, and 9 days. The new statute did not withdraw any credits already awarded to Weaver, but by curtailing the availability of fu- ture credits it effectively postponed the date when he would become eligible for early release. Because the statute made the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment "more onerous," we unanimously concluded that it ran "afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto laws." 450 U. S., at 36. According to petitioner, although this case involves over- crowding credits, it is essentially like Weaver because the issuance of these credits was dependent on an inmate's good conduct. Respondents, on the other hand, submit that Weaver is not controlling because it was the overcrowded condition of the prison system, rather than the character of the prisoner's conduct, that gave rise to the award. In our view, both of these submissions place undue emphasis on the legislature's subjective intent in granting the credits rather than on the consequences of their revocation. In arriving at our holding in Weaver, we relied not on the subjective motivation of the legislature in enacting the gain- time credits, but rather on whether objectively the new stat- ute "lengthen[ed] the period that someone in petitioner's po- sition must spend in prison." Id., at 33. Similarly, in this case, the fact that the generous gain-time provisions in Flori- da's 1983 statute were motivated more by the interest in avoiding overcrowding than by a desire to reward good be- havior is not relevant to the essential inquiry demanded by 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 443 Opinion of the Court the Ex Post Facto Clause: whether the cancellation of 1,860 days of accumulated provisional credits had the effect of lengthening petitioner's period of incarceration. In our post-Weaver cases, we have also considered whether the legislature's action lengthened the sentence without examining the purposes behind the original sentenc- ing scheme. In Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423 (1987), we unanimously concluded that a revision in Florida's sentenc- ing guidelines that went into effect between the date of peti- tioner's offense and the date of his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Our determination that the new guideline was " `more onerous than the prior law,' " id., at 431 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977)), rested entirely on an objective appraisal of the impact of the change on the length of the offender's presumptive sentence. 482 U. S., at 431 ("Looking only at the change in primary offense points, the revised guidelines law clearly disadvan- tages petitioner and similarly situated defendants"). In California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995), we also relied entirely on objective considerations to support our conclusion that an amendment to California's parole procedures that decreased the frequency of parole hearings for certain offenders had not made any "change in the `quantum of punishment,' " id., at 508. The amendment at issue in Morales allowed the parole board, after holding an initial parole hearing, to defer for up to three years subse- quent parole suitability hearings for prisoners convicted of multiple murders if the board found that it was unreasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the subsequent years. We stated that the relevant inquiry is whether the "change alters the definition of criminal con- duct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punish- able." Id., at 507, n. 3.14 After making that inquiry, we 14 Later in the opinion we restated the test in similar language: "In eval- uating the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment, we must determine whether it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punish- 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 444 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court found that "there is no reason to conclude that the amend- ment will have any effect on any prisoner's actual term of confinement." Id., at 512. Our holding rested squarely on the conclusion that "a prisoner's ultimate date of release would be entirely unaffected by the change in the timing of suitability hearings." Id., at 513. Although we held that "speculative and attenuated possibilit[ies]" of increasing the measure of punishment do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, id., at 509, the bulk of our analysis focused on the effect of the law on the inmate's sentence. We did not imply in Morales, as respondents contend, that the constitutionality of retroactive changes in the quantum of punishment depended on the purpose behind the parole sentencing system. The only mention of legislative purpose in Morales was in the following passage: "In contrast to the laws at issue in Lindsey [v. Washing- ton, 301 U. S. 397 (1937)], Weaver, and Miller (which had the purpose and effect of enhancing the range of avail- able prison terms, see Miller, supra, at 433­434), the evident focus of the California amendment was merely ` " `to relieve the [Board] from the costly and time- consuming responsibility of scheduling parole hear- ings' " ' for prisoners who have no reasonable chance of being released. In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464, 473, 703 P. 2d 100, 106 (1985) (quoting legislative history)." Id., at 507. Thus, we concluded, the change at issue had neither the pur- pose nor the effect of increasing the quantum of punishment. Whether such a purpose alone would be a sufficient basis for concluding that a law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when it actually had no such effect is a question the Court has never addressed. Moreover, in Morales our statements regarding purpose did not refer to the purpose behind the ment attached to the covered crimes." California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S., at 509. 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 445 Opinion of the Court creation of the original sentencing scheme; they referred in- stead to the question whether, in changing that sentencing scheme, the legislature intended to lengthen the inmate's sentence. To the extent that any purpose might be relevant in this case, it would only be the purpose behind the legisla- ture's 1992 enactment of the offense-based exclusion. Here, unlike in Morales, there is no evidence that the legislature's change in the sentencing scheme was merely to save time or money. Rather, it is quite obvious that the retrospective change was intended to prevent the early release of prison- ers convicted of murder-related offenses who had accumu- lated overcrowding credits.15 Respondents also argue that the retroactive cancellation of overcrowding credits is permissible because overcrowding gain-time-unlike the incentive gain-time at issue in Weaver which is used to encourage good prison behavior and pris- oner rehabilitation-"b[ears] no relationship to the original penalty assigned the crime or the actual penalty calculated under the sentencing guidelines." Brief for Respondent Mathis 20. To the extent that respondents' argument rests on the notion that overcrowding gain-time is not "in some technical sense part of the sentence," Weaver, 450 U. S., at 32, this argument is foreclosed by our precedents. As we recognized in Weaver, retroactive alteration of parole or early release provisions, like the retroactive application of provisions that govern initial sentencing, implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are "one determinant of petitioner's prison term . . . and . . . [the petitioner's] effec- tive sentence is altered once this determinant is changed." Ibid. We explained in Weaver that the removal of such pro- visions can constitute an increase in punishment, because a "prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a signifi- 15 Indeed, the attorney general issued the 1992 opinion interpreting the statute to apply retroactively in response to concerns about the release of a notorious sex offender and murderer. See Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 92­96, at 283, reprinted in Lodging, at 53. 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 446 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court cant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be im- posed." Ibid. Respondents argue that this reasoning does not apply to overcrowding credits because, when petitioner pleaded nolo contendere, he could not reasonably have expected to receive any such credits. The State, after all, could have alleviated the overcrowding problem in various ways: It could have built more prisons; it could have paroled a large category of nonviolent offenders; or it might have discontinued prosecu- tion of some classes of victimless crimes. Respondents thus argue that the 1992 statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because, like the California amendment at issue in Morales, it "create[d] only the most speculative and atten- uated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of in- creasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes." 514 U. S., at 509.16 Given the fact that this petitioner was actually awarded 1,860 days of provisional credits and the fact that those credits were retroactively canceled as a result of the 1992 amendment, we find this argument singularly unpersuasive. In this case, unlike in Morales, the actual course of events makes it unnecessary to speculate about what might have happened. The 1992 statute has unques- 16 The support for our conclusion in Morales that the Act was merely speculative has no counterpart in this case. In Morales, we first relied on the fact that the amendment affected a class of prisoners-multiple murderers-who had little chance of being released on parole. Second, we found that the amendment did not alter the date of the prisoner's initial parole suitability hearing, and therefore only affected those initially deemed unsuitable for parole. Lastly, we recognized that the parole board "retain[ed] the authority to tailor the frequency of subsequent suit- ability hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner." 514 U. S., at 511. Simply put, we rejected the inmate's claim in Morales, because it could not be said with any certainty that the amended statutory scheme was more "onerous" than at the time of the crime. See id., at 509­510 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977), for "refus- ing to accept `speculation' that the effective punishment under a new stat- utory scheme would be `more onerous' than under the old one"). 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 447 Opinion of the Court tionably disadvantaged petitioner because it resulted in his rearrest and prolonged his imprisonment. Unlike the Cali- fornia amendment at issue in Morales, the 1992 Florida stat- ute did more than simply remove a mechanism that created an opportunity for early release for a class of prisoners whose release was unlikely; rather, it made ineligible for early release a class of prisoners who were previously eligi- ble-including some, like petitioner, who had actually been released.17 IV Although it does not appear that respondents advanced this argument in the papers filed in the District Court, the Court of Appeals, or in their brief in opposition to the peti- tion for certiorari in this Court, they now argue that peti- tioner is not entitled to relief because his overcrowding cred- its were awarded pursuant to statutes enacted after the date of his offense rather than pursuant to the 1983 statute. We disagree. The overcrowding statute in effect at the time of petition- er's crime was modified in subsequent years, but its basic elements remained the same: The statute provided for reduc- tions in a prisoner's sentence when the population of the prison system exceeded a certain percentage of lawful capac- ity. At the time of petitioner's sentence in 1986, the emer- gency gain-time statute was in effect. Under that statute, when the prison population reached 98% of lawful capacity, 17 We note that respondents do not argue, as the Magistrate Judge found, that the revocation of overcrowding credits is constitutional because such an act is merely "procedural." There is no merit to this argument in any case. We explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282 (1977), that a procedural statute is one that "simply alter[s] the methods employed in determining" whether the punishment is "to be imposed" rather than "chang[ing] . . . the quantum of punishment attached to the crime." Id., at 293­294. Because the 1992 law did not change the method of determin- ing the sentence, but rather lengthened the sentences of certain prisoners by making them ineligible for early release, it was not merely procedural. 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 448 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of the Court the secretary of the department of corrections was required to advise the Governor and, after receiving the Governor's verification of the capacity certification, to declare a state of emergency whereupon the sentences of all eligible inmates "shall be reduced by the credit of up to 30 days gain-time, in 5-day increments, as may be necessary to reduce the inmate population to 97 percent of lawful capacity." Fla. Stat. § 944.598(2) (1983).18 The later statutes slightly modified the procedures out- lined in the 1983 statute. The administrative gain-time statute enacted in 1987 (after petitioner's plea of nolo con- tendere) provided that the secretary, after certification to the Governor, "may grant up to a maximum of 60 days ad- ministrative gain-time." Fla. Stat § 944.276(1). Unlike the emergency gain-time statute, the administrative gain-time statute made the issuance of gain-time discretionary, and it contained certain offense-based exclusions. The provi- sional credits provision was enacted to replace administra- tive gain-time and is essentially the same, except that it pro- vides for the issuance of gain-time when the prison reaches 18 Respondent Attorney General Butterworth suggests that under the emergency gain-time statute, the maximum award petitioner could have realized was 30 days of emergency gain-time. Therefore, according to the attorney general, it is unlikely that the gain-time statute would have had any effect on petitioner's sentence. We do not agree that the statute lends itself to such a reading. The statute required the department of corrections to advise the Governor "whenever the population of the state correctional system exceeds 98 percent of lawful capacity." Fla. Stat. § 944.598(1) (1983) (emphasis added). The duty to grant up to 30 days gain-time in 5-day increments was continuing until the inmate population reached 97% of lawful capacity. If the inmate population were to rise again to 98%, the Secretary was required to issue additional gain-time. Moreover, the attorney general's reading of the emergency gain-time statute would also limit the award of gain-time under the administrative gain-time and provisional credits statute. These statutes contain word- ing similar to the emergency gain-time statute, see Fla. Stat. § 944.276(1) (1987); Fla. Stat. § 944.277(1) (1989), yet the State has not interpreted the statutes to limit the award of gain-time to a total of 60 days. 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 449 Opinion of Thomas, J. 97.5% of lawful capacity, rather than 98%. Fla. Stat. § 944.277 (1988). See Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994). The changes in the series of statutes authorizing the award of overcrowding gain-time do not affect petitioner's core ex post facto claim. Petitioner could have accumulated gain-time under the emergency gain-time provision in much the same manner as he did under the provisional credits stat- ute. We recognize, however, that although the differences in the statutes did not affect petitioner's central entitlement to gain-time, they may have affected the precise amount of gain-time he received. Between 1988 and 1992, the provi- sional credits were authorized when the prison reached 97.5% capacity rather than 98% capacity as under the emer- gency gain-time statute. If the prison population did not exceed 98% of capacity between 1988 and 1992, and if peti- tioner received provisional credits during those years, there is force to the argument that the cancellation of that portion of the 1,860-day total did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because this point was not adequately developed earlier in the proceeding, and because it may not in any event affect petitioner's entitlement to release, we leave it open for further consideration on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I understand the Court's opinion to hold that retroactively canceling petitioner's so-called "provisional credits" after he has used them to gain his freedom violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. This result naturally follows from our consistent view that the Clause is intended to prohibit laws that "retro- actively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punish- 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 450 LYNCE v. MATHIS Opinion of Thomas, J. ment for criminal acts." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 43 (1990). Whether a particular law retroactively increases a crimi- nal punishment is often a close question. In California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995), for example, respondent challenged a retroactive change to the frequency of parole hearings. Given that the retroactive change "create[d] only the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes," we found no ex post facto violation. Id., at 514. Unlike in Morales, the increase in petitioner's punishment here was neither "speculative" nor "attenuated." Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and was duly sentenced. During the period of his confine- ment, petitioner accumulated release credits under a state statute adopted in response to prison overcrowding. Those credits enabled petitioner to be freed from prison before his sentence (as originally imposed) had run. Shortly before petitioner secured his release, however, the Florida Legis- lature enacted a statute preventing certain categories of offenders from taking advantage of the provisional credits. Although petitioner's offense placed him among the offend- ers denied the opportunity to acquire those particular cred- its, the statute was not applied retroactively. Petitioner was thus released. The state attorney general subsequently issued an opinion giving the statute retroactive effect. The State thereafter rearrested petitioner and returned him to custody. Under these narrow circumstances, I agree with the Court that the State's retroactive nullification of petitioner's pre- viously accrued, and then used, release credits violates the Constitution's ban on ex post facto lawmaking. I do not, however, join the majority's discussion of Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981), which I find unnecessary to the resolution of this case. In Weaver, we considered whether a statute 519US2 Unit: $U27 [06-14-99 21:00:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 519 U. S. 433 (1997) 451 Opinion of Thomas, J. that merely altered the availability of "good conduct" credits ran afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id., at 25. The pres- ent case involves not merely an effect on the availability of future release credits, but the retroactive elimination of credits already earned and used. Accordingly, I concur in part and concur in the judgment. 519us2$28Z 04-11-98 09:18:31 PAGES OPINPGT 452 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus AUER et al. v. ROBBINS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­897. Argued December 10, 1996-Decided February 19, 1997 Petitioners, St. Louis police sergeants and a lieutenant, sued respondent police commissioners for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Respondents argued that petitioners were "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by 29 U. S. C. § 213(a)(1). Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a "salary basis," which requires that the "compensation . . . not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." Petition- ers claimed that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced (though this was not the department's general practice) for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the "quality or quantity" of their work. Both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit dis- agreed with that assertion, holding that the salary-basis test was satis- fied as to all petitioners. Held:1. The "no disciplinary deductions" element of the salary-basis test reflects a permissible reading of the FLSA as it applies to public-sector employees. It is not apparent that the Secretary's interpretation of § 213(a)(1) is rendered unreasonable, as applied to public-sector employ- ees, by the absence of other (non-salary-reduction) means of discipline, or by the peculiar needs of "quasi military" law enforcement organiza- tions. The Secretary's approach must therefore be sustained, given § 213(a)(1)'s grant of broad authority to the Secretary to "defin[e] and delimi[t]" the statutory exemption's scope. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842­843. Re- spondents' procedural objection to the Secretary's failure to amend the disciplinary-deduction rule in the wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro- politan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, cannot be raised in the first instance in this lawsuit, but must be presented initially in a petition to the Secretary for amendatory rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553(e). Pp. 456­459. 2. The Secretary has reasonably interpreted the salary-basis test to be met when an employee's compensation may not "as a practical mat- 519us2$28Z 04-11-98 09:18:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 452 (1997) 453 Syllabus ter" be adjusted in ways inconsistent with the test. The standard is violated, the Secretary says, if there is either an actual practice of mak- ing deductions or an employment policy that creates a "significant likeli- hood" of them. Because the regulation's critical phrase "subject to" comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns, his interpretation of his own test is not "plainly erroneous," and thus is controlling. Rob- ertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 359. The Sec- retary's interpretation is not rendered unworthy of deference by the fact that it is set forth in an amicus brief; it is not a position adopted in response to litigation, and there is no reason to suspect that it does not reflect the Secretary's fair and considered judgment. Nor does the rule requiring that FLSA exemptions be narrowly construed against employers apply here; that rule governs judicial interpretation of stat- utes and regulations, and does not limit the Secretary's power to resolve ambiguities in his own regulations. Pp. 459­463. 3. The regulations entitle employers to preserve the exempt status of employees who have been subjected to pay deductions inconsistent with the salary-basis test by reimbursing those employees and promising to comply with the test in the future, so long as the deductions in question were either inadvertent or made for reasons other than lack of work. Pp. 463­464. 65 F. 3d 702, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Michael T. Leibig argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Mark S. Flynn. John B. Renick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were James N. Foster, Jr., and Judith Anne Ronzio.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jona- than P. Hiatt; for the International Union of Police Associations AFL­ CIO et al. by Richard Cobb; for the National Association of Police Organi- zations, Inc., by William J. Johnson; for the National Employment Law 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:31 PAGES OPINPGT 454 AUER v. ROBBINS Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 201 et seq., exempts "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees from overtime pay requirements. This case presents the question whether the Secretary of Labor's "salary-basis" test for determining an employee's exempt status reflects a permissible reading of the statute as it applies to public- sector employees. We also consider whether the Secretary has reasonably interpreted the salary-basis test to deny an Project, Inc., by Kenneth E. Labowitz; and for Non-Union Employees in the Private and Public Sectors by Brenda J. Carter. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Wisconsin et al. by James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Rich- ard Briles Moriarty, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Con- necticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and Christine O. Gre- goire of Washington; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by William J. Kilberg, Mark Snyderman, Stephan A. Bokat, and Mona C. Zeiberg; for the New York City Transit Authority by Richard Schoolman; for the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles by James K. Hahn, Thomas C. Hokinson, and Olga Her- nandez Garau; for the Labor Policy Association by Sandra J. Boyd and Daniel V. Yager; and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, and Ronald S. Cooper. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Broward County, Florida, by John J. Copelan, Jr., and Anthony C. Musto; for the City of New York by Paul A. Crotty, Leonard J. Koerner, and Timothy J. O'Shaughnessy; for the League of California Cities et al. by Arthur A. Hartinger, Louise H. Renne, and Jonathan V. Holtzman; and for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., by Jody M. Litchford, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Roy Caldwell Kime. 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 452 (1997) 455 Opinion of the Court employee salaried status (and thus grant him overtime pay) when his compensation may "as a practical matter" be ad- justed in ways inconsistent with the test. I Petitioners are sergeants and a lieutenant employed by the St. Louis Police Department. They brought suit in 1988 against respondents, members of the St. Louis Board of Po- lice Commissioners, seeking payment of overtime pay that they claimed was owed under § 7(a)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U. S. C. § 207(a)(1). Respondents argued that petitioners were not entitled to such pay because they came within the exemption provided by § 213(a)(1) for "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees. Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary, one re- quirement for exempt status under § 213(a)(1) is that the em- ployee earn a specified minimum amount on a "salary basis." 29 CFR §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e) (1996). According to the regulations, "[a]n employee will be considered to be paid `on a salary basis' . . . if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less fre- quent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduc- tion because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." § 541.118(a). Petitioners contended that the salary-basis test was not met in their case because, under the terms of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Manual, their compensation could be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the "quality or quantity" of work performed. Petitioners also claimed that they did not meet the other requirement for exempt status under § 213(a)(1): that their duties be of an executive, administra- tive, or professional nature. See §§ 541.1(a)­(e), 541.2(a)­ (d), 541.3(a)­(d). The District Court found that petitioners were paid on a salary basis and that most, though not all, also satisfied the 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT 456 AUER v. ROBBINS Opinion of the Court duties criterion. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that both the salary-basis test and the duties test were satisfied as to all petitioners. 65 F. 3d 702 (CA8 1995). We granted certiorari. 518 U. S. 1016 (1996).1 II The FLSA grants the Secretary broad authority to "de- fin[e] and delimi[t]" the scope of the exemption for executive, administrative, and professional employees. § 213(a)(1). Under the Secretary's chosen approach, exempt status re- quires that the employee be paid on a salary basis, which in turn requires that his compensation not be subject to reduc- tion because of variations in the "quality or quantity of the work performed," 29 CFR § 541.118(a) (1996). Because the regulation goes on to carve out an exception from this rule for "[p]enalties imposed . . . for infractions of safety rules of major significance," § 541.118(a)(5), it is clear that the rule embraces reductions in pay for disciplinary violations. The Secretary is of the view that employees whose pay is ad- justed for disciplinary reasons do not deserve exempt status because as a general matter true "executive, administrative, or professional" employees are not "disciplined" by piece- meal deductions from their pay, but are terminated, de- moted, or given restricted assignments. 1 Respondents contend that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over petitioners' suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment. The Board of Police Commissioners, however, does not share the immunity of the State of Missouri. While the Governor appoints four of the board's five mem- bers, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.030 (1994), the city of St. Louis is responsible for the board's financial liabilities, § 84.210, and the board is not subject to the State's direction or control in any other respect. It is therefore not an "arm of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Hess v. Port Au- thority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 47­51 (1994); Lake Coun- try Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401­ 402 (1979). 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 452 (1997) 457 Opinion of the Court A The FLSA did not apply to state and local employees when the salary-basis test was adopted in 1940. See 29 U. S. C. § 203(d) (1940 ed.); 5 Fed. Reg. 4077 (1940) (salary-basis test). In 1974 Congress extended FLSA coverage to virtually all public-sector employees, Pub. L. 93­259, § 6, 88 Stat. 58­62, and in 1985 we held that this exercise of power was con- sistent with the Tenth Amendment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985) (over- ruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976)). The salary-basis test has existed largely in its pres- ent form since 1954, see 19 Fed. Reg. 4405 (1954), and is expressly applicable to public-sector employees, see 29 CFR §§ 553.2(b), 553.32(c) (1996). Respondents concede that the FLSA may validly be ap- plied to the public sector, and they also do not raise any general challenge to the Secretary's reliance on the salary- basis test. They contend, however, that the "no disciplinary deductions" element of the salary-basis test is invalid for public-sector employees because as applied to them it re- flects an unreasonable interpretation of the statutory exemp- tion. That is so, they say, because the ability to adjust public-sector employees' pay-even executive, administra- tive or professional employees' pay-as a means of enforcing compliance with work rules is a necessary component of effective government. In the public-sector context, they contend, fewer disciplinary alternatives to deductions in pay are available. Because Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," we must sustain the Secretary's approach so long as it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De- fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842­843 (1984). While respondents' objections would perhaps support a different application of the salary-basis test for public employees, we 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT 458 AUER v. ROBBINS Opinion of the Court cannot conclude that they compel it. The Secretary's view that public employers are not so differently situated with regard to disciplining their employees as to require whole- sale revision of his time-tested rule simply cannot be said to be unreasonable. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that no "principle of public administration that has been drawn to our attention . . . makes it imperative" that public-sector employers have the ability to impose disciplinary pay deduc- tions on individuals employed in genuine executive, admin- istrative, or professional capacities. Mueller v. Reich, 54 F. 3d 438, 442 (1995), cert. pending, No. 95­586. Respondents appeal to the "quasi military" nature of law enforcement agencies such as the St. Louis Police Depart- ment. The ability to use the full range of disciplinary tools against even relatively senior law enforcement personnel is essential, they say, to maintaining control and discipline in organizations in which human lives are on the line daily. It is far from clear, however, that only a pay deduction, and not some other form of discipline-for example, placing the offending officer on restricted duties-will have the neces- sary effect. Because the FLSA entrusts matters of judg- ment such as this to the Secretary, not the federal courts, we cannot say that the disciplinary-deduction rule is invalid as applied to law enforcement personnel. B The more fundamental objection respondents have to the disciplinary-deduction rule is a procedural one: The Secre- tary has failed to give adequate consideration to whether it really makes sense to apply the rule to the public sector. Respondents' amici make the claim more specific: The Secre- tary's failure to revisit the rule in the wake of our Garcia decision was "arbitrary" and "capricious" in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). It is certainly true that application of the disciplinary- deduction rule to public-sector employees raises distinct is- 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 452 (1997) 459 Opinion of the Court sues that may warrant the Secretary's formal consideration; this much is suggested by the veritable flood of post-Garcia litigation against public employers in this area, see, e. g., Car- penter v. Denver, 82 F. 3d 353 (CA10 1996), cert. pending, No. 95­2088; Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F. 3d 1249 (CA7 1995); Shockley v. Newport News, 997 F. 2d 18 (CA4 1993); Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local 134 v. Atlanta, 920 F. 2d 800 (CA11 1991). But respondents' complaints about the failure to amend the disciplinary-deduction rule cannot be raised in the first instance in the present suit. A court may certainly be asked by parties in respondents' position to disregard an agency regulation that is contrary to the sub- stantive requirements of the law, or one that appears on the public record to have been issued in violation of procedural prerequisites, such as the "notice and comment" require- ments of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 553. But where, as here, the claim is not that the regulation is substantively unlawful, or even that it violates a clear procedural prerequisite, but rather that it was "arbitrary" and "capricious" not to conduct amendatory rulemaking (which might well have resulted in no change), there is no basis for the court to set aside the agency's action prior to any application for relief addressed to the agency itself. The proper procedure for pursuit of respondents' grievance is set forth explicitly in the APA: a petition to the agency for rulemaking, § 553(e), denial of which must be justified by a statement of reasons, § 555(e), and can be appealed to the courts, §§ 702, 706. III A primary issue in the litigation unleashed by application of the salary-basis test to public-sector employees has been whether, under that test, an employee's pay is "subject to" disciplinary or other deductions whenever there exists a the- oretical possibility of such deductions, or rather only when there is something more to suggest that the employee is ac- tually vulnerable to having his pay reduced. Petitioners in 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT 460 AUER v. ROBBINS Opinion of the Court effect argue for something close to the former view; they contend that because the police manual nominally subjects all department employees to a range of disciplinary sanctions that includes disciplinary deductions in pay, and because a single sergeant was actually subjected to a disciplinary de- duction, they are "subject to" such deductions and hence non- exempt under the FLSA.2 The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' approach, say- ing that "[t]he mere possibility of an improper deduction in pay does not defeat an employee's salaried status" if no prac- tice of making deductions exists. 65 F. 3d, at 710­711. In the Court of Appeals' view, a "one-time incident" in which a disciplinary deduction is taken under "unique circumstances" does not defeat the salaried status of employees. Id., at 711. (In this case the sergeant in question, who had violated a residency rule, agreed to a reduction in pay as an alternative to termination of his employment.) The requirement of ac- tual deductions was also imposed in an earlier ruling by the Eighth Circuit, McDonnell v. Omaha, 999 F. 2d 293, 296­297 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1163 (1994), and in an Eleventh Circuit case, Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local 134 v. Atlanta, supra, at 805. Other Circuits have rejected the requirement, Yourman v. Dinkins, 84 F. 3d 655, 656 (CA2 1996), cert. pending, No. 96­152; Carpenter v. Denver, supra, at 359­360; Bankston v. Illinois, supra, at 1253; Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F. 2d 6, 10­11 (CADC 1993); Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F. 2d 483, 486­488 (CA9 1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1068 (1991); or else have imposed a requirement of actual deductions only in the face of vagueness or ambiguity in the governing policy, Michigan Assn. of Governmental Employees v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 992 F. 2d 82, 86 (CA6 1993). 2 Petitioners also contend that additional sergeants were actually sub- jected to disciplinary deductions, but that fact is not established by the portions of the record petitioners cite. 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 452 (1997) 461 Opinion of the Court The Secretary of Labor, in an amicus brief filed at the request of the Court, interprets the salary-basis test to deny exempt status when employees are covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or other deductions in pay "as a practi- cal matter." That standard is met, the Secretary says, if there is either an actual practice of making such deductions or an employment policy that creates a "significant likeli- hood" of such deductions. The Secretary's approach rejects a wooden requirement of actual deductions, but in their ab- sence it requires a clear and particularized policy-one which "effectively communicates" that deductions will be made in specified circumstances. This avoids the imposition of mas- sive and unanticipated overtime liability (including the possi- bility of substantial liquidated damages, see, e. g., Kinney v. District of Columbia, supra, at 12) in situations in which a vague or broadly worded policy is nominally applicable to a whole range of personnel but is not "significantly likely" to be invoked against salaried employees. Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Sec- retary's own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless " `plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' " Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945)). That deferential standard is easily met here. The critical phrase "subject to" comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns. See American Heritage Dictionary 1788 (3d ed. 1992) (def. 2: defining "subject to" to mean "prone; disposed"; giving as an example "a child who is sub- ject to colds"); Webster's New International Dictionary 2509 (2d ed. 1950) (def. 3: defining "subject to" to mean "[e]xposed; liable; prone; disposed"; giving as an example "a country sub- ject to extreme heat"). The Secretary's approach is usefully illustrated by refer- ence to this case. The policy on which petitioners rely is contained in a section of the police manual that lists a total of 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT 462 AUER v. ROBBINS Opinion of the Court 58 possible rule violations and specifies the range of penalties associated with each. All department employees are nomi- nally covered by the manual, and some of the specified penal- ties involve disciplinary deductions in pay. Under the Sec- retary's view, that is not enough to render petitioners' pay "subject to" disciplinary deductions within the meaning of the salary-basis test. This is so because the manual does not "effectively communicate" that pay deductions are an an- ticipated form of punishment for employees in petitioners' category, since it is perfectly possible to give full effect to every aspect of the manual without drawing any inference of that sort. If the statement of available penalties applied solely to petitioners, matters would be different; but since it applies both to petitioners and to employees who are unques- tionably not paid on a salary basis, the expressed availability of disciplinary deductions may have reference only to the latter. No clear inference can be drawn as to the likelihood of a sanction's being applied to employees such as petitioners. Nor, under the Secretary's approach, is such a likelihood es- tablished by the one-time deduction in a sergeant's pay, under unusual circumstances. Petitioners complain that the Secretary's interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of defer- ence. The Secretary's position is in no sense a "post hoc rationalizatio[n]" advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212 (1988). There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question. Petitioners also suggest that the Secretary's ap- proach contravenes the rule that FLSA exemptions are to be "narrowly construed against . . . employers" and are to be withheld except as to persons "plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit." Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U. S. 388, 392 (1960). But that is a rule governing 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 452 (1997) 463 Opinion of the Court judicial interpretation of statutes and regulations, not a limi- tation on the Secretary's power to resolve ambiguities in his own regulations. A rule requiring the Secretary to con- strue his own regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute. IV One small issue remains unresolved: the effect upon the exempt status of Sergeant Guzy, the officer who violated the residency requirement, of the one-time reduction in his pay. The Secretary's regulations provide that if deductions which are inconsistent with the salary-basis test-such as the de- duction from Guzy's pay-are made in circumstances indicat- ing that "there was no intention to pay the employee on a salary basis," the exemption from the FLSA is "[not] applica- ble to him during the entire period when such deductions were being made." 29 CFR § 541.118(a)(6) (1996). Con- versely, "where a deduction not permitted by [the salary- basis test] is inadvertent, or is made for reasons other than lack of work, the exemption will not be considered to have been lost if the employer reimburses the employee for such deductions and promises to comply in the future." Ibid. Petitioners contend that the initial condition in the latter provision (which enables the employer to take corrective ac- tion) is not satisfied here because the deduction from Guzy's pay was not inadvertent. That it was not inadvertent is true enough, but the plain language of the regulation sets out "inadverten[ce]" and "made for reasons other than lack of work" as alternative grounds permitting corrective action. Petitioners also contend that the corrective provision is un- available to respondents because Guzy has yet to be reim- bursed for the residency-based deduction; in petitioners' view, reimbursement must be made immediately upon the discovery that an improper deduction was made. The lan- guage of the regulation, however, does not address the tim- 519us2$28K 04-11-98 09:18:32 PAGES OPINPGT 464 AUER v. ROBBINS Opinion of the Court ing of reimbursement, and the Secretary's amicus brief in- forms us that he does not interpret it to require immediate payment. Respondents are entitled to preserve Guzy's ex- empt status by complying with the corrective provision in § 541.118(a)(6). * * * Petitioners have argued, finally, that respondents failed to carry their affirmative burden of establishing petitioners' ex- empt status even under the Secretary's interpretation of the salary-basis test. Since, however, that argument was inade- quately preserved in the prior proceedings, we will not con- sider it here. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 519us2$29Z 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 465 Syllabus DUNN et al. v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 95­1181. Argued November 13, 1996-Decided February 25, 1997 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought this action, claiming that petitioners solicited investments in and operated a fraudu- lent scheme involving transactions in foreign currency options in viola- tion of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations. Petitioners allegedly engaged in the transactions by contracting directly with international banks and others, rather than using a regulated exchange or board of trade. This is known as trading in the "off- exchange" or "over-the-counter" market. Both petitioners and their customers suffered heavy losses. The District Court appointed a tem- porary receiver to take control of petitioners' property, rejecting their defense that the transactions were exempt from the CEA under the so-called "Treasury Amendment," which excepts "transactions in for- eign currency" unless they involve a sale "for future delivery" "con- ducted on a board of trade." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The Treasury Amendment exempts from CFTC regulation off- exchange trading in foreign currency options. Options (transactions in which the buyer purchases the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an agreed amount of a commodity at a set rate at any time prior to the option's expiration) like those at issue here are plainly "transactions in foreign currency" within the statute's meaning. The Court is not persuaded by any of the CFTC's arguments in support of a narrower reading that would exempt futures contracts (agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commodity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date) without exempting options. The normal reading of the last-quoted phrase encompasses all transactions in which foreign currency is the fungible good whose fluctuating market price provides the motive for trading. Reading the text to include only the actual purchase or sale of foreign currency, as the CFTC urges, violates the ordinary meaning of the key word "in." On the CFTC's reasoning, the exemption's application to futures contracts could not be sustained, in clear contravention of Congress' intent to exempt off-exchange foreign currency futures from CFTC regulation. This interpretation would also render the provision mere surplusage, and is not supported by the Treasury Amendment's legislative history. Given the history of evolv- 519us2$29Z 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 466 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court ing congressional regulation in this area, it is natural to read the exemp- tion as a complete exclusion of foreign currency transactions from the regulatory scheme, except to the extent that the proviso for transac- tions "conducted on a board of trade" qualifies that exclusion. Contrary to the CFTC's position, there is little to suggest that elsewhere in the CEA Congress used the term transactions "involving" a particular com- modity to describe options, and transactions "in" the commodity to indi- cate a narrower exclusion. The proviso "conducted on a board of trade" does not aid the CFTC's cause because a broad reading of the proviso to include both options and futures is faithful to the contemporary legal context in which the amendment was drafted. The arguments favoring each side in the important public policy dispute over whether off- exchange foreign currency options should be exempt from CEA regula- tion are best addressed to the Congress, not the courts. Pp. 468­480. 58 F. 3d 50, reversed and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 480. Gary D. Stumpp argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Adam M. Bond. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Commodity Futures Trading Commission were Acting Solicitor General Dellin- ger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Pat G. Nicolette, Jay L. Witkin, and Gracemary Rizzo.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether Congress has author- ized the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Cre´dit Lyonnais et al. by John M. Quitmeyer, Danforth Newcomb, Kent T. Stauffer, and David M. Lindley; and for the Foreign Exchange Committee et al. by Kenneth M. Raisler, Edward J. Rosen, Peter Buscemi, and Maris M. Rodgon. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago by Kenneth W. Starr, Mark D. Young, and Richard A. Cordray; and for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange by Jerrold E. Salzman and James T. Malysiak. 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 467 Opinion of the Court Commission) to regulate "off-exchange" trading in options to buy or sell foreign currency. I The CFTC brought this action in 1994, alleging that, be- ginning in 1992, petitioners solicited investments in and op- erated a fraudulent scheme in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and CFTC reg- ulations.1 App. 10. See 7 U. S. C. § 6c(b); 17 CFR § 32.9 (1996).2 The CFTC's complaint, affidavits, and declarations submitted to the District Court indicate that customers were told their funds would be invested using complex strat- egies involving options to purchase or sell various foreign currencies. App. 8. Petitioners apparently did in fact engage in many such transactions. Ibid.; 58 F. 3d 50, 51 (CA2 1995). To do so, they contracted directly with in- ternational banks and others without making use of any reg- ulated exchange or board of trade. In the parlance of the business, petitioners traded in the "off-exchange" or "over- 1 The complaint names as defendants William C. Dunn, Delta Consult- ants, Inc., Delta Options, Ltd., and Nopkine Co., Ltd. App. 6­7. Only Dunn and Delta Consultants are petitioners here. 2 The statute provides: "No person shall offer to enter into, enter into or confirm the execution of, any transaction involving any commodity reg- ulated under this chapter which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an `option' . . . contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any such transaction or allowing any such transaction under such terms and conditions as the Commission shall prescribe." 7 U. S. C. § 6c(b). The regulations at issue here further make it unlawful "for any person directly or indirectly . . . [t]o cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud any other person; . . . [t]o make or cause to be made to any other person any false report or statement thereof or cause to be entered for any person any false record thereof; . . . [or] [t]o deceive or attempt to deceive any other person by any means whatsoever . . . in or in connection with an offer to enter into, the entry into, or the confirmation of the execution of, any commodity option transaction." 17 CFR § 32.9 (1996). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 468 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court the-counter" (OTC) market.3 Ibid. No options were ever sold directly to petitioners' customers. However, their posi- tions were tracked through internal accounts, and investors were provided weekly reports showing the putative status of their holdings. Petitioners and their customers suffered heavy losses. Id., at 51­52. Subsequently, the CFTC com- menced these proceedings. Rejecting petitioners' defense that off-exchange trans- actions in foreign currency options are exempt from the CEA, the District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of their property for the benefit of their custom- ers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5b­6b. Relying on Circuit prec- edent,4 and acknowledging a conflict with another Circuit,5 the Court of Appeals affirmed. 58 F. 3d, at 54. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 517 U. S. 1219 (1996). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. II The outcome of this case is dictated by the so-called "Treasury Amendment" to the CEA. 88 Stat. 1395, 7 U. S. C. § 2(ii). We have previously reviewed the history of the CEA and generally described how it authorizes the CFTC to regulate the "volatile and esoteric" market in 3 We are informed by amici that participants in the "highly evolved, sophisticated" OTC foreign currency markets include "commercial and in- vestment banks, . . . foreign exchange dealers and brokerage companies, corporations, money managers (including pension, mutual fund and com- modity pool managers), commodity trading advisors, insurance companies, governments and central banks." Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 8. These markets serve a variety of functions, including providing ready access to foreign currency for international transactions, and allowing businesses to hedge against the risk of ex- change rate movements. Id., at 8­9. 4 58 F. 3d 50, 53 (CA2 1995) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F. 2d 1242 (CA2 1986)). 5 58 F. 3d, at 54 (citing Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F. 3d 966 (CA4 1993), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1031 (1994)). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 469 Opinion of the Court futures contracts in fungible commodities. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 356, 357­367 (1982). As a part of the 1974 amendments that created the CFTC and dramatically expanded the cover- age of the statute to include nonagricultural commodities "in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in," see 88 Stat. 1395, 7 U. S. C. § 2 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), Congress enacted the following exemption, which has come to be known as the "Treasury Amendment": "Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, govern- ment securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7 U. S. C. § 2(ii) (emphasis added). The narrow issue that we must decide is whether the itali- cized phrase ("transactions in foreign currency") includes transactions in options to buy or sell foreign currency. An option, as the term is understood in the trade, is a transac- tion in which the buyer purchases from the seller for consid- eration the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an agreed amount of a commodity at a set rate at any time prior to the option's expiration.6 We think it plain that foreign currency options are "transactions in foreign currency" within the meaning of the statute. We are not persuaded 6 See G. Munn & F. Garcia, Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance 736 (8th ed. 1983) (hereinafter Munn & Garcia); C. Luca, Trading in the Global Currency Markets 243 (1995) (hereinafter Luca). Participants in these markets refer to an option that provides the right to sell currency as a "put," and one that provides the right to buy as a "call." Munn & Garcia 737; Luca 270, 272. Options can themselves be traded, at values that vary depending upon the exchange rate of the underlying currencies prior to the option's expiration. Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 5, n. 5. 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 470 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court by any of the arguments advanced by the CFTC in support of a narrower reading that would exempt futures contracts (agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commod- ity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date)7 without exempting options. III "[A]bsent any `indication that doing so would frustrate Congress's clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.' " Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 703 (1995) (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 570 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)). The CFTC argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that an option is not itself a transac- tion "in" foreign currency, but rather is just a contract right to engage in such a transaction at a future date. Brief for CFTC 30­31; 58 F. 3d, at 53. Hence, the Commission sub- mits that the term "transactions in foreign currency" in- cludes only the "actual exercise of an option (i. e., the actual purchase or sale of foreign currency)" but not the purchase or sale of an option itself. Brief for CFTC 31. That read- ing of the text seems quite unnatural to us, and we decline to adopt it. The more normal reading of the key phrase encompasses all transactions in which foreign currency is the fungible good whose fluctuating market price provides the motive for trading. The CFTC's interpretation violates the ordinary meaning of the key word "in," which is usually thought to be "synonymous with [the] expressions `in regard to,' `respect- ing,' [and] `with respect to.' " Black's Law Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Commu- nities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 697­698 (1995). There can be no question that the purchase or sale of a foreign 7 See Munn & Garcia 414; City of New York Bar Association Committee on Futures Regulation, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Foreign Currency Trading 9 (1986). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 471 Opinion of the Court currency option is a transaction "respecting" foreign cur- rency. We think it equally plain as a matter of ordinary meaning that such an option is a transaction "in" foreign cur- rency for purposes of the Treasury Amendment. Indeed, adopting the Commission's reading would deprive the exemption of the principal effect Congress intended. The CFTC acknowledges that futures contracts fall squarely within the Treasury Amendment's exemption, Brief for CFTC 30, and there is no question that the exemption of off-exchange foreign currency futures from CFTC regulation was one of Congress' primary goals.8 Yet on the CFTC's reasoning the exemption's application to futures contracts could not be sustained. A futures contract is no more a transaction "in" foreign currency as the Commission understands the term than an option. The Commission argues that because a futures con- tract creates a legal obligation to purchase or sell currency on a particular date, it is somehow more clearly a transaction "in" the underlying currencies than an option, which gener- ates only the right to engage in a transaction. Id., at 30­ 32. This reasoning is wholly unpersuasive. No currency changes hands at the time a futures contract is made. And, 8 The amendment was enacted on the suggestion of the Treasury De- partment at the time of a dramatic expansion in the scope of federal com- modities regulation. The Department expressed concerns in a letter to the relevant congressional committee that this development might lead, inter alia, to the unintended regulation of the off-exchange market in foreign currency futures. See S. Rep. No. 93­1131, pp. 49­50 (1974) ("The Department feels strongly that foreign currency futures trading, other than on organized exchanges, should not be regulated by the new agency") (letter of Donald Ritger, Acting General Counsel). The Treasury Amend- ment, which tracks almost verbatim the language proposed by the Depart- ment, cf. id., at 51, was included in the legislation to respond to these concerns. Id., at 23. The CFTC is therefore plainly correct to reject the suggestion of its amici that the Treasury Amendment's exemption be construed not to include futures contracts within its coverage. See Brief for Chicago Mercantile Exchange as Amicus Curiae 17­18; Brief for Board of Trade of City of Chicago as Amicus Curiae 10. 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 472 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court the existence of a futures contract does not guarantee that currency will actually be exchanged. Indeed, the Commis- sion concedes that, in most cases, futures contracts are "ex- tinguished before delivery by entry into an offsetting futures contract." Id., at 30 (citing 1 T. Snider, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets § 2.05 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Snider)); see also Munn & Garcia 414. Adopting the CFTC's reading would therefore place both futures and options outside the exemption, in clear contra- vention of Congress' intent. Furthermore, this interpretation would leave the Treas- ury Amendment's exemption for "transactions in foreign cur- rency" without any significant effect at all, because it would limit the scope of the exemption to "forward contracts" (agreements that anticipate the actual delivery of a commod- ity on a specified future date) and "spot transactions" (agree- ments for purchase and sale of commodities that anticipate near-term delivery).9 Both are transactions "in" a commod- ity as the CFTC would have us understand the term. But neither type of transaction for any commodity was subject to intensive regulation under the CEA at the time of the Treasury Amendment's passage. See 7 U. S. C. § 2 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) ("term `future delivery,' as used in this chapter, shall not include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery"); Snider § 9.01; J. Markham, The His- tory of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation 201­ 203 (1987). Our reading of the exemption is therefore also consonant with the doctrine that legislative enactments should not be construed to render their provisions mere sur- plusage. See Babbitt, 515 U. S., at 698 (noting "reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage"); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U. S. 237, 249 (1985). 9 See Snider § 9.01 (defining "spot transactions" and "forward contracts"). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 473 Opinion of the Court Finally, including options in the exemption is consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the Treasury Amend- ment. Although at the time the Treasury Amendment was drafted a thriving off-exchange market in foreign currency futures was in place, the closely related options market at issue here had not yet developed. See City of New York Bar Association Committee on Futures Regulation, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Foreign Currency Trading 18, 23 (1986). The CFTC therefore suggests that Congress could not have intended to exempt foreign cur- rency options from the CEA's coverage. Brief for CFTC 41­ 42. The legislative history strongly suggests to the con- trary that Congress' broad purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment was to provide a general exemption from CFTC regulation for sophisticated off-exchange foreign currency trading, which had previously developed entirely free from supervision under the commodities laws. In explaining the Treasury Amendment, the Senate Com- mittee Report notes in broad terms that the amendment "provides that inter-bank trading of foreign currencies and specified financial instruments is not subject to Commission regulation." S. Rep. No. 93­1131, p. 6 (1974).10 Elsewhere, the Report again explains in general terms-without making reference to any distinction between options and futures- that the legislation "included an amendment to clarify that the provisions of the bill are not applicable to trading in foreign curren- cies and certain enumerated financial instruments unless such trading is conducted on a formally organized fu- tures exchange. A great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried out through an informal network of banks and tellers. The Committee 10 Similarly, the Conference Committee Report points out that the Treasury Amendment "provides that interbank trading of foreign curren- cies and specified financial instruments is not subject to Commission regu- lation." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93­1383, p. 35 (1974). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 474 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court believes that this market is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory agencies and that, therefore, reg- ulation under this legislation is unnecessary." Id., at 23. Similarly, the Treasury Department submitted to the Chair- man of the relevant Senate Committee a letter that was the original source of the Treasury Amendment. While focus- ing on the need to exempt the foreign currency futures mar- ket from CFTC regulation, the letter points out that the "participants in this market are sophisticated and informed institutions," and "the [CFTC] would clearly not have the expertise to regulate a complex banking function and would confuse an already highly regulated business sector." Id., at 50 (letter of Donald Ritger, Acting General Counsel). The Department further explained that "new regulatory lim- itations and restrictions could have an adverse impact on the usefulness and efficiency of foreign exchange markets for traders and investors." Ibid. Although the OTC market for foreign currency options had not yet developed in 1974, the reasons underlying the Treas- ury Department's express desire at that time to exempt off- exchange commodity futures trading from CFTC regulation apply with equal force to options today. Foreign currency options and futures are now traded in the same off-exchange markets, by the same entities, for quite similar purposes. See Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 19. Contrary to the Commission's suggestion, we therefore think the purposes underlying the Treasury Amendment are most properly fulfilled by giving effect to the plain meaning of the language as Congress enacted it. The CFTC rejoins that the Treasury Amendment should be construed in the light of Congress' history of regulating options more strictly than futures. See Snider §§ 7.03­7.04; Brief for CFTC 38­39. The Commission submits that this distinction was motivated by the view that options lend 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 475 Opinion of the Court themselves more readily to fraudulent schemes than futures contracts. Hence, the CFTC argues that Congress would have acted reasonably and consistently with prior practice had it regulated commodities differently from options. While that may be true, we give only slight credence to these general historical considerations, which are unsupported by statutory language, or any evidence evocative of the particu- lar concerns focused on by the legislators who enacted the Treasury Amendment. We think the history of the Treas- ury Amendment suggests-contrary to the CFTC's view- that it was intended to take all transactions relating to for- eign currency not conducted on a board of trade outside of the CEA's ambit. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that, prior to the enactment of the CEA in 1974, foreign currency trading had been entirely unregulated under the commodities laws. Our interpretation is also consonant with the history of evolving congressional regulation in this area. That history has been one of successively broadening the coverage of reg- ulation by the addition of more and more commodities to the applicable legislation.11 It seems quite natural in this con- text to read the Treasury Amendment's exemption of trans- 11 The Grain Futures Act, enacted by Congress in 1922 to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to supervise trading in grain futures on "contract markets," defined the regulated commodities to include "wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, flax, and sorghum." 42 Stat. 998. In 1936 Congress ex- panded the coverage of the legislation to add further agricultural commod- ities, including cotton, rice, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491. (The contrast between the title of the 1936 Act-"Commodity Exchange Act"-and the title of its predecessor-"Grain Futures Act"- suggests that an easy way to describe the coverage of the legislation is to identify the commodities that it regulates.) In 1968 the coverage of the legislation was again expanded, this time to include livestock and livestock products. 82 Stat. 26. The 1974 amendment expanded the coverage of the statute to include nonagricultural commodities and, appropriately, replaced regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture with regulation by a new commission whose title included the word "Commodity." 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 476 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court actions in foreign currencies as a complete exclusion of that commodity from the regulatory scheme, except, of course, to the extent that the proviso for transactions "conducted on a board of trade" qualifies that exclusion. See 7 U. S. C. § 2(ii). IV To buttress its reading of the statute, the CFTC argues that elsewhere in the CEA Congress referred to transactions "involving" a particular commodity to describe options or used other "more encompassing terminology," rather than what we are told is the narrower term transactions "in" the commodity, which was reserved for futures, spot transac- tions, and forward contracts. Brief for CFTC 30­33. Not only do we think it unlikely that Congress would adopt such a subtle method of drawing important distinctions, there is little to suggest that it did so. Congress' use of these terms has been far from consistent. Most strikingly, the use of the word "involving" in the Treas- ury Amendment itself completely eviscerates the force of the Commission's argument. After setting forth exemptions for, inter alia, "transactions in foreign currency," the amend- ment contains a proviso sweeping back into the statute's cov- erage "such transactions involv[ing] the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7 U. S. C. § 2(ii) (emphasis added). As we have already noted, the CFTC agrees that futures contracts are a subset of "transac- tions in foreign currency." The Commission further submits that the proviso uses the word "involve" to make the exemp- tion inapplicable to those futures contracts that are con- ducted on a board of trade. This contradicts the "in" versus "involving" distinction. We would expect on the Commis- sion's reasoning that this provision would refer to "transac- tions in futures." The use of the term "involving" instead, within the very amendment that the CFTC claims embraces 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 477 Opinion of the Court this distinction, weighs heavily against the view that any such distinction was intended by Congress.12 The CFTC argues further that the proviso properly under- stood aids its cause. The proviso sweeps back into the CFTC's jurisdiction otherwise exempt "transactions in for- eign currency" that "involve the sale thereof for future deliv- ery" and are "conducted on a board of trade." Since the proviso refers to futures without mentioning options, the Commission submits that the exemption itself should be read only to cover futures because Congress cannot reasonably have intended to regulate exchange trading in foreign cur- rency futures without also regulating exchange trading in 12 Similarly, the statute refers at one point to "[t]ransactions in commodi- ties involving the sale thereof for future delivery . . . and known as `fu- tures.' " 7 U. S. C. § 5 (emphasis added). Had Congress meant to main- tain the Commission's distinction, we would not have expected the Legislature to use the words "in" and "involving" loosely in the same sentence to refer to futures, which the CFTC informs us are transactions "in" (but not "involving") foreign currency. Similarly, the statute refers elsewhere to "transaction[s] in an option on foreign currency." § 6c(f) (emphasis added). If Congress had spoken in the manner the CFTC sug- gests, that provision would instead use the phrase "transactions involving an option." The statute's general jurisdictional provision also fails to maintain the distinction the Commission presses. The CEA provides that the CFTC "shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an `option' . . .), and transactions involving con- tracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery." § 2(i) (emphasis added). The Commission submits that this language gives the CFTC regulatory authority over options on futures contracts, see Snider § 10.11, and argues that the use of the word "involving" is therefore in keeping with its inter- pretation of the statutory scheme. See Brief for CFTC 32. But § 2(i) provides the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over far more. Among other things, it explicitly grants jurisdiction over any "transactio[n] in- volving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery," plainly mean- ing at a minimum ordinary futures contracts, which the Commission other- wise insists are transactions "in" commodities. 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 478 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of the Court such options. We agree that Congress intended no such anomaly. But we are satisfied that the anomaly is best avoided by reading the proviso broadly rather than reading the exemption narrowly. The proviso's language fairly accommodates inclusion of both options and futures. To fall within the proviso, a trans- action must "involve the sale [of foreign currency] for future delivery." § 2(ii) (emphasis added). Because options con- vey the right to buy or sell foreign currency at some future time prior to their expiration, they are transactions "involv- [ing]" or related to the sale of foreign currency for future delivery. Thus, both futures and options are covered by both the exemption and the proviso. While that may not be the only possible reading of the literal text, and we do not intend to suggest that a similar construction would be re- quired with respect to other provisions of the CEA, our in- terpretation is faithful to the "contemporary legal context" in which the Treasury Amendment was drafted. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979); see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115 (1989) (noting that " `in expounding a statute, we [are] not . . . guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy' ") (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987)). Finally, the CFTC calls our attention to statements in the legislative history of a 1982 amendment to the CEA,13 indi- cating that the drafters of that amendment believed that the CFTC had the authority to regulate foreign currency options "when they are traded other than on a national securities exchange." See S. Rep. No. 97­384, p. 22 (1982). Those statements, at best, might be described as "legislative dicta" because the 1982 amendment itself merely resolved a conflict between the Securities Exchange Commission and the CFTC 13 Futures Trading Act of 1982, Tit. I, § 102, 96 Stat. 2296, 7 U. S. C. § 6c(f). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 479 Opinion of the Court concerning their respective authority to regulate transac- tions on an exchange. See Snider § 10.24. The amendment made no change in the law applicable to off-exchange trading. Although these "dicta" are consistent with the position that the CFTC advocates, they shed no light on the intent of the authors of the Treasury Amendment that had been adopted eight years earlier. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839­840 (1988).14 V Underlying the statutory construction question before us, we recognize that there is an important public policy dis- pute-with substantial arguments favoring each side. Pe- 14 Though the CFTC's brief disclaims any need for it, Brief for CFTC 48, at oral argument the Commission requested for the first time that we give deference to its interpretation of the Treasury Amendment as the agency "charged with administering" it. Smiley v. Citibank (South Da- kota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 739 (1996); Tr. of Oral Arg. 54; see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If Chevron principles were applicable, we are unsure that the CFTC's position would be the one owed deference. As the Commission concedes, Brief for CFTC 25, the Treasury Department has taken a quite different view of the statute-one consonant with the interpretation set forth here-to which petitioners argue deference is owed if Chevron is invoked. A reasonable argument could be made that Congress intended to charge Treasury, rather than the Commission, with administering the dimensions of the aptly named Treasury Amendment, which was specifi- cally enacted at the behest of Treasury to confine the CFTC's activities. Cf. Smiley, 517 U. S., at 740­741 (explaining that Chevron deference arises out of background presumptions of congressional intent); Martin v. Occu- pational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 157­158 (1991) (allocating power "authoritatively to interpret . . . regulations" after as- sessing "available indicia of legislative intent"). We need not "resolve the difficult issues regarding deference which would be lurking in other circumstances." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992). Because "the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention" to include foreign currency options within the Treasury Amend- ment's exemption, administrative deference is improper. Dole v. Steel- workers, 494 U. S. 26, 42 (1990). 519us2$29I 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT 480 DUNN v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N Opinion of Scalia, J. titioners, their amici, and the Treasury Department argue that if off-exchange foreign currency options are not treated as exempt from CEA regulation, the increased costs associ- ated with unnecessary regulation of the highly sophisticated OTC foreign currency markets might well drive this business out of the United States.15 The Commission responds that to the extent limited exemptions from regulation are neces- sary, it will provide them, but argues that options are partic- ularly susceptible to fraud and abuse if not carefully policed. Brief for CFTC 26, 49. As the Commission properly ac- knowledges, however, these are arguments best addressed to the Congress, not the courts. See United States v. Ruth- erford, 442 U. S. 544, 555 (1979). Lacking the expertise or authority to assess these important competing claims, we note only that "a literal construction of a statute" does not "yiel[d] results so manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design." Ibid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court that "the purposes underlying the Treasury Amendment are most properly fulfilled by giving effect to the plain meaning of the language as Congress enacted it," ante, at 474, which includes options to buy or sell foreign currency. This principle is contradicted, how- ever, by the Court's extensive discussion of legislative his- tory, see ante, at 471, n. 8, 473­474, 478­479, as though that were necessary to confirm the "plain meaning of the lan- 15 Brief for Petitioners 23­25; Brief for Cre´dit Lyonnais et al. as Amici Curiae 3; Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 6; Brief for CFTC 25. 519us2$29K 06-03-99 22:18:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997) 481 Opinion of Scalia, J. guage," or (worse) might have power to overcome it. I join all except those portions of the opinion, which achieve noth- ing useful and sow confusion in the law. 519us2$30Z 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 482 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. WELLS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­1228. Argued November 4, 1996-Decided February 26, 1997 An indictment charged respondents with, inter alia, knowingly making false and "material" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1014. At the trial's end, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's behest, that withholding a "material fact" made a statement or representation false and that materiality of an allegedly false statement was for the judge, not the jury, to determine. The jury convicted respondents, the court treated their statements as material, and they appealed. This Court then decided, in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, that if materiality is an element of § 1001, it is a question for the jury. When the Eighth Circuit requested supplemen- tal briefing on Gaudin's applicability in this case, respondents argued that materiality is an element of § 1014 on which they were entitled to a jury's determination; the Government argued, for the first time, that materiality is not an element under § 1014, so that no harm had been done when the trial judge dealt with the issue. The Eighth Circuit agreed with respondents, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial. Held:1. Respondents' preliminary arguments do not block this Court from reaching the question on which the writ of certiorari was granted. Al- though the Government proposed jury instructions to the effect that materiality is an element of § 1014, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 and the doctrines of "law of the case" and "invited error" do not prevent the Government from taking the contrary position here. Al- though the indictment charged respondents with submitting material false statements, the "law of the case" doctrine does not prevent the Government from arguing here that materiality is not an element of § 1014. While the Government failed to argue in its initial briefs sub- mitted to the Court of Appeals that materiality is not an element of § 1014, it did so in its supplemental filings, and thus the "invited error" doctrine could not prevent the Government from taking the opposite position here. Pp. 487­489. 2. Materiality of falsehood is not an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank under § 1014. Pp. 489­500. 519us2$30Z 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 483 Syllabus (a) The falsehood's materiality-i. e., its "natural tendency to in- fluence, or capa[bility] of influencing, the decision of the . . . body to which it was addressed," Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 770- would not be an element of § 1014 under the first criterion in the statu- tory interpretation hierarchy, a natural reading of the full text, see United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542­ 543. The section's text-which criminalizes "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action" of a federally insured bank "upon any application, advance, . . . commitment, or loan"-nowhere says that a material fact must be the subject of the false statement or so much as mentions materiality. To the contrary, its terms cover "any" false statement that meets the statute's other requirements, and the term "false statement" carries no general suggestion of influential significance, see, e. g., Kungys, supra, at 781. Nor have respondents come close to showing that at common law the term "false statement" acquired any implication of materiality that came with it into § 1014. See, e. g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 322. Finally, statutory history confirms the nat- ural reading of § 1014. When Congress enacted § 1014, it consolidated into one section 3 prior provisions that had included an explicit material- ity requirement, and 10 that did not, and Congress enacted other provi- sions that included express materiality requirements. The most likely inference is that Congress did not intend materiality to be an element of § 1014. United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 13­14. In addition, Con- gress enacted § 1014 after Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, which stands in the way of any assumption that Congress might have understood § 1014 to contain an implicit materiality requirement. Pp. 489­495. (b) Respondents' arguments for affirmance-that Congress has rati- fied decisions holding materiality to be a § 1014 element by repeatedly amending the statute without rejecting those decisions; that the fail- ure of the 1948 Reviser's Note to § 1014 to mention the section's omis- sion of the materiality element contained in 3 of its 13 predecessor stat- utes means that Congress must have overlooked the issue; that material- ity must be read into the statute to avoid the improbability that Congress intended to impose substantial criminal penalties on relatively trivial or innocent conduct; and that the rule of lenity must be applied here-are unavailing to change the straightforward reading of § 1014. Pp. 495­499. (c) Since respondents' further arguments-that because the in- struction taking materiality from the jury probably left the impression that respondents' statements as alleged were material, the instructions influenced the jury in passing on the falsity and purpose elements; and that because the indictment alleged materiality, any ruling that materi- ality need not be shown in this case would impermissibly "amend" the 519us2$30Z 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 484 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court indictment contrary to the Fifth Amendment-were neither raised in respondents' briefs before, nor passed on by, the Eighth Circuit, it is left to that court on remand to take up the propriety of raising them now and to address them if warranted. Pp. 499­500. 63 F. 3d 745, vacated and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 500. Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Paul A. Engelmayer, and William C. Brown. James R. Wyrsch argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Ronald D. Lee.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal issue before us is whether materiality of falsehood is an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank, 18 U. S. C. § 1014. We hold that it is not. I In 1993, the Government charged respondents, Jerry Wells and Kenneth Steele, with violating and conspiring to violate the cited statute as officers and part owners of Copytech Systems, Inc., a lessor of office copiers for a monthly fee cov- ering not only use of the equipment but any service that might be required. To raise cash, Copytech sold its interest in the income stream from these contracts to banks. In Count I of the indictment, the Government charged respondents with conspiring to violate § 1014 by conceal- ing from several banks the true contractual terms.1 Re- *Bruce S. Rogow and Beverly A. Pohl filed a brief for the National As- sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 1 Title 18 U. S. C. § 371 makes it a crime to "conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States." 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 485 Opinion of the Court spondents supposedly conspired to provide the banks with versions of lease contracts purporting to indicate that Copytech's customers were responsible for servicing the equipment when, in fact, secret side agreements placed that responsibility on Copytech at no further cost to the lessees. See App. 24­25; 63 F. 3d 745, 748 (CA8 1995). The Govern- ment alleged that respondents concealed the service obliga- tions in order to avoid tying up needed cash in reserve ac- counts, which the banks might have required Copytech to maintain if they had known of the company's servicing obli- gations. Ibid. In Count II, respondents were charged with violating § 1014 by giving a bank forgeries of respondents' wives' sig- natures on personal guaranties designed to enable the bank to pursue the wives' assets if Copytech defaulted on any lia- bility to the bank. See App. 21, 30­31; 63 F. 3d, at 748.2 Each count of the indictment charged respondents with sub- mitting one or more statements that were both false and "material." App. 24, 25, 29, 30­31. At the end of the trial, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's behest, that withholding a "mate- rial fact" made a statement or representation false, id., at 41, 42, and defined a material fact as one "that would be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to en- gage or not to engage in a particular transaction," id., at 42. Although there was no controversy over the law as stated in these instructions, the Government argued that materiality was for the judge to determine, while respondents said it was an issue for the jury. 63 F. 3d, at 749, nn. 3 and 4. Following Eighth Circuit precedent then prevailing, the Dis- trict Court agreed with the Government and told the jury that "[t]he materiality of the statement . . . alleged to be false . . . is not a matter with which you are concerned and 2 The Government also charged respondents with three other counts of violating § 1014. The District Court dismissed one count prior to trial and granted judgment of acquittal on the other two. 63 F. 3d, at 748; Brief for Respondents 2; Brief for United States 3, n. 1. 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 486 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court should not be considered by you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant[s]," App. 43. The jury convicted respondents on both counts, the court treated the statements as material, and respondents appealed. While the appeal was pending, we decided United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995), in which the parties agreed that materiality was an element of 18 U. S. C. § 1001, but dis- puted whether materiality was a question for the judge or jury, 515 U. S., at 509. Applying the rule that "[t]he Consti- tution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine . . . his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged," we held that the jury was entitled to pass on the materiality of Gaudin's statements, id., at 522­ 523. When the Court of Appeals in this case requested sup- plemental briefing on the applicability of Gaudin, respond- ents argued that under § 1014 materiality is an element on which they were entitled to a jury's determination; the Gov- ernment argued, for the first time, that materiality is not an element under § 1014, so that no harm had been done when the judge dealt with the issue. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial. 63 F. 3d, at 749­751. We granted the Government's petition for certiorari to decide whether materiality of a false statement or report is an element under § 1014.3 517 U. S. 1154 (1996). We now vacate and remand. 3 Most, but not all, of the Federal Courts of Appeals have held that materiality is an element. Compare United States v. Lopez, 71 F. 3d 954, 960 (CA1 1995), cert. denied, 518 U. S. 1008 (1996); United States v. Ryan, 828 F. 2d 1010, 1013, n. 1 (CA3 1987); United States v. Bonnette, 663 F. 2d 495, 497 (CA4 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 951 (1982); United States v. Thompson, 811 F. 2d 841, 844 (CA5 1987); United States v. Spears, 49 F. 3d 1136, 1141 (CA6 1995); United States v. Staniforth, 971 F. 2d 1355, 1358 (CA7 1992); Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F. 2d 492, 496­497 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1059 (1988); United States v. Haddock, 956 F. 2d 1534, 1549 (CA10), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 828 (1992); United States v. Rapp, 871 F. 2d 957, 964 (CA11), cert. denied sub nom. Bazarian v. 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 487 Opinion of the Court II We first address respondents' efforts to block us from reaching the question on which we granted certiorari. Given the Government's proposal for jury instructions to the effect that materiality is an element under § 1014, respond- ents argue that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 and the doctrines of "law of the case" and "invited error" each bar the Government from taking the position here that mate- riality is not an element. None of these reasons stands in our way to reaching the merits. Rule 30 (applicable in this Court, see Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 1, 54(a)) provides that "[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge [given to the jury] . . . unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict." But the Government is not challenging the jury instruction in an effort to impute error to the trial court; it is merely arguing that the instruction it proposed was harm- less surplusage insofar as it was directed to the jury. As for the two doctrines, respondents are correct that sev- eral Courts of Appeals have ruled that when the Govern- ment accepts jury instructions treating a fact as an element of an offense, the "law of the case" doctrine precludes the Government from denying on appeal that the crime includes the element. See United States v. Killip, 819 F. 2d 1542, 1547­1548 (CA10), cert. denied sub nom. Krout v. United States, 484 U. S. 987 (1987); United States v. Tapio, 634 F. 2d 1092, 1094 (CA8 1980); United States v. Spletzer, 535 F. 2d 950, 954 (CA5 1976).4 They are also correct that Courts of United States, 493 U. S. 890 (1989) (all holding materiality to be an element of § 1014), with United States v. Cleary, 565 F. 2d 43, 46 (CA2 1977) (con- cluding that materiality is not an element), cert. denied sub nom. Passa- relli v. United States, 435 U. S. 915 (1978). 4 In this context, the "law of the case" doctrine is something of a misno- mer. It does not counsel a court to abide by its own prior decision in a given case, but goes rather to an appellate court's relationship to the court of trial. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (1981). 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 488 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court Appeals have stated more broadly under the "invited error" doctrine " `that a party may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the [district] court . . . to commit.' " United States v. Sharpe, 996 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA6) (quoting Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F. 2d 59, 60 (CA6 1991)), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 951 (1993). But however valuable these doctrines may be in controlling the party who wishes to change its position on the way from the district court to the court of appeals, they cannot dispositively oust this Court's traditional rule that we may address a question properly presented in a petition for certiorari if it was "pressed [in] or passed on" by the Court of Appeals, United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 42 (1992) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we have treated an inconsistency between a party's request for a jury instruc- tion and its position before this Court as just one of several considerations bearing on whether to decide a question on which we granted certiorari.5 See Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 259­260 (1987) (per curiam).6 Here, it seems sen- sible to reach the question presented. 5 Respondents offer variations on their "law of the case" and "invited error" doctrines. In addition to arguing that the "law of the case" doc- trine holds the Government to the position it took on the jury instructions, respondents contend this doctrine holds the Government to the position it adopted in the indictment. See Brief for Respondents 14­16 (citing United States v. Norberg, 612 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1979)). For the reasons set forth in the text, this latter version of the doctrine does not stand in our way to reaching the question presented. Along with arguing that the Government "invited error" in the District Court by proposing its jury instructions, respondents claim that the Gov- ernment invited error in the Court of Appeals by failing to argue that materiality is not an element of § 1014 in its initial brief to that court. This claim is wrong. After the Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefing, the Government argued that materiality is not an element of § 1014 and therefore hardly "invited" that court's contrary ruling. 6 In Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S., at 259, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari on prudential grounds in part because the petitioner there, like the Government here, sought "to revers[e] a judgment because of 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 489 Opinion of the Court The question of materiality as an element was raised be- fore the Court of Appeals, ruled on there, clearly set forth in the certiorari petition, fully briefed, and argued. Nor would reaching the issue excuse inattention or reward cunning. For some time before respondents' trial in 1993, the Eighth Circuit had assumed that the Government was bound to prove a false statement's materiality as an element under § 1014, see 63 F. 3d, at 750­751; United States v. Ribaste, 905 F. 2d 1140, 1143 (1990); United States v. McKnight, 771 F. 2d 388, 389 (1985), and had treated this issue as one for the judge, not the jury, see United States v. Ribaste, supra, at 1143. Since the Government was confident that it had evi- dence of materiality to satisfy the Circuit rule, it had no rea- son not to address the element when it drafted the indict- ment and its proposed jury instructions. When Gaudin rendered it reversible error to assign a required materiality ruling to the court, the Government suddenly had reason to contest the requirement to show materiality at all. Nothing the Government has done disqualifies it from the chance to make its position good in this Court. III We accordingly consider whether materiality of falsehood is an element under § 1014, understanding the term in ques- tion to mean "ha[ving] a natural tendency to influence, or [being] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision- making body to which it was addressed," Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 770 (1988) (internal quotation marks [jury] instructions that petitioner accepted, and indeed itself requested." In contrast to the case at hand, however, the petitioner in Kibbe had not, in the Court of Appeals, raised an issue critical to resolving the question presented in its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals had not considered that related issue, and the petitioner had not explicitly raised that related issue in its certiorari petition, id., at 258­260. See also United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 43, n. 3 (1992) (discussing Kibbe). 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 490 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court omitted); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S., at 509.7 We begin with the text. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 739 (1989). Section 1014 criminalizes "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action" of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured bank "upon any application, advance, . . . commit- ment, or loan." 18 U. S. C. § 1014. Nowhere does it further say that a material fact must be the subject of the false state- ment or so much as mention materiality.8 To the contrary, its terms cover "any" false statement that meets the other requirements in the statute, and the term "false statement" carries no general suggestion of influential significance, see Kungys v. United States, supra, at 781; cf. Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 5­6 (1938). Thus, under the first crite- rion in the interpretive hierarchy, a natural reading of the full text, see United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542­543 (1940), materiality would not be an element of § 1014.9 7 The Court of Appeals here also appears to have understood materiality to have this meaning. See 63 F. 3d, at 750 (relying on United States v. Adler, 623 F. 2d 1287, 1291 (CA8 1980), which defined "materiality" as having "a natural tendency to influence or [being] capable of influencing" an entity's decision (internal quotation marks omitted)). 8 The pertinent text of § 1014 is: "Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . any institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo- ration . . . , upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by renewal, deferment of action or other- wise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both." 9 Justice Stevens argues that the four criminal acts other than "false statement" listed in § 1014 would in fact involve material misstatements, and that it follows on the theories of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis that false statements must also be shown to be material. Post, at 510­ 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 491 Opinion of the Court Nor have respondents come close to showing that at com- mon law the term "false statement" acquired any implication of materiality that came with it into § 1014. We do, of course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-law meaning of the terms it uses if those " `terms . . . have accu- mulated settled meaning under . . . the common law' " and " `the statute [does not] otherwise dictat[e],' " Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, supra, at 739). Respondents here, however, make no claims about the settled meaning of "false statement" at common law; they merely note that some common-law crimes involving false statements, such as perjury, required proof of materiality. See Brief for Respondents 23­24. But Congress did not codify the crime of perjury or comparable common-law crimes in § 1014; as we discuss next, it simply consolidated 13 statutory provisions relating to financial institutions, and, in fact, it enacted a separate general perjury provision at 18 U. S. C. § 1621, see 62 Stat. 773.10 511, n. 12. But this does not follow. The question is not whether the specified categories of statements will almost certainly be material state- ments in point of fact; like false statements made for the purpose of influencing a lender, the four other criminal acts will virtually always in- volve material misstatements. The question, however, is whether materi- ality must be proven as a separate element, and on that question a list of criminal acts, none of which is expressly described as "material," is no premise for the dissent's conclusion under the ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis canons. 10 Nor does Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490 (1981), help re- spondents here. In Fedorenko, we agreed with the Government that, even though the phrase "willfully make a misrepresentation" in § 10 of the Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1013, did not use the term "material," it nonetheless applied only to willful misrepresentations about "material" facts, 449 U. S., at 507­508, and n. 28. The dissent argues we should reach a similar conclusion here, because Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 781 (1988), made it clear that "misrepresentation" and "false statement" were on par at common law. Post, at 504, and n. 6. But the passage from Kungys quoted by the dissent addressed the historic meaning of the 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 492 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court Statutory history confirms the natural reading. When Congress originally enacted § 1014 as part of its recodifica- tion of the federal criminal code in 1948, 62 Stat. 752, it ex- plicitly included materiality in other provisions involving false representations.11 Even more significantly, of the 13 provisions brought together by § 1014, 10 had previously con- tained no express materiality provision and received none in the recodification,12 while 3 of the 13 had contained express term "material," see 485 U. S., at 769, not the common-law meaning of "misrepresentation" or "false statement." Although Kungys supports the view that "materiality" has the same meaning in criminal statutes that prohibit falsehoods to public officials, whether the statutes refer to misrep- resentations, see id., at 772­776, or to some form of false statements, see id., at 779­782, that does not mean that "misrepresentation" and "false statement" are identical in carrying an implicit requirement of materiality. Indeed, Kungys distinguished between the common-law meaning of "mis- representation" and "false testimony," concluding that while the former had been held to carry a materiality requirement in many contexts, the terms "false" or "falsity" did not as frequently carry such an implication. Id., at 781. More fundamentally, we disagree with our colleague's apparent view that any term that is an element of a common-law crime carries with it every other aspect of that common-law crime when the term is used in a statute. Justice Stevens seems to assume that because "false statement" is an element of perjury, and perjury criminalizes only material statements, a statute criminalizing "false statements" covers only material statements. See post, at 504. By a parity of reasoning, because common-law perjury involved statements under oath, a statute criminalizing a false statement would reach only statements under oath. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended to impose such restric- tions sub silentio, however, and so our rule on imputing common-law meaning to statutory terms does not sweep so broadly. 11 See 18 U. S. C. § 1621, 62 Stat. 773 (entitled "Perjury generally," and prohibiting statements under oath regarding "any material matter which [one] does not believe to be true"); 18 U. S. C. § 1001, 62 Stat. 749 (entitled "Statements or entries generally," and prohibiting, inter alia, "knowingly and willfully falsif[ying] . . . a material fact"). 12 See 7 U. S. C. § 1514(a) (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false . . . for the purpose of influencing"); 12 U. S. C. § 981 (1946 ed.) ("knowingly mak[ing] any false statement in an application for [a] loan"); 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 493 Opinion of the Court materiality requirements and lost them in the course of con- solidation.13 See Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 288 (1982). The most likely inference in these circumstances is that Congress deliberately dropped the term "materiality" without intending materiality to be an element of § 1014. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 13­14 (1994).14 12 U. S. C. § 1122 (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of obtaining . . . any advance"); § 1123 (1946 ed.) ("willfully overvalu[ing] any property offered as security"); 12 U. S. C. § 1248 (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement . . . knowing the same to be false"); 12 U. S. C. § 1312 (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of obtaining"); 12 U. S. C. § 1313 (1946 ed.) ("willfully overvalu[ing] any property offered as security"); 12 U. S. C. § 1441(a) (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, . . . for the purpose of influencing"); 12 U. S. C. § 1467(a) (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, . . . for the purpose of influencing"); 15 U. S. C. § 616(a) (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false . . . for the purpose of obtaining . . . or for the purpose of influencing"). 13 See 7 U. S. C. § 1026(a) (1946 ed.) (making a "material representation"); 12 U. S. C. § 596 (1946 ed.) (making a "material statement"); and 12 U. S. C. § 1138d(a) (1946 ed.) (making a "material representation"). 14 Justice Stevens suggests that because he can discern no meaningful difference between the subject matter and penalties involved in the 42 sections of the United States Code criminalizing false statements that ex- pressly include a materiality requirement, and the 54 sections criminaliz- ing false statements that lack an express materiality requirement, we must infer that Congress intended all of the sections to include a material- ity element. See post, at 505­509. In other words, Congress must have thought that including materiality in 42 statutes was surplusage. This, of course, is contrary to our presumption that each term in a criminal statute carries meaning. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145 (1995). Moreover, the dissent's approach to statutory interpretation leads to remarkable results. The statutes cited by the dissent contain a variety of different requirements; for example, some criminalize statements only if they were made with a particular intent, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1919; 33 U. S. C. § 931, while others do not, see, e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 13(a)(3); 7 U. S. C. § 6407(e). Under our colleague's reasoning, unless a court could readily discern a meaningful difference between these two categories of statutes, apart from the language used, it should import the mens rea requirements expressly appearing in some sections to those that lack them. 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 494 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court While 2 of the 3 offenses from which the express materiality requirement was dropped used the term "representation," see n. 12, supra, and thus could have included a materiality element implicitly, see Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S., at 781 (noting that "misrepresentation" had been held to imply materiality), the remaining 11 would not have, as was clear from the opinion of the Court in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938). Kay had construed 1 of the 10 statutes that were later mirrored in the language of § 1014; 15 when the petitioner claimed that the statements she had made could not "endanger or directly influence any loan made by" the decisionmaker, id., at 5, we thought her arguments unim- pressive, ibid., and explained: "It does not lie with one knowingly making false state- ments with intent to mislead the officials of the Corpora- tion to say that the statements were not influential or the information not important. There can be no ques- tion that Congress was entitled to require that the infor- mation be given in good faith and not falsely with intent to mislead. Whether or not the Corporation would act 15 Compare § 8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. 134 (providing that "[w]hoever makes any statement, knowing it to be false, or whoever willfully overvalues any security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation or the Board or an association upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, or re- purchase agreement, or loan, under this Act, or any extension thereof by renewal deferment, or action or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both"), with § 1014 as enacted in 1948, 62 Stat. 752 (providing that "[w]hoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [enumerated institutions] upon any application, advance, dis- count, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by renewal, defer- ment of action or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both"). 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 495 Opinion of the Court favorably on the loan is not a matter which concerns one seeking to deceive by false information. The case is not one of an action for damages but of criminal liability and actual damage is not an ingredient of the offense." Id., at 5­6.16 Although some courts have read Kay as holding only that there is no need for the Government to prove that false statements actually influenced the decisionmaker, see, e. g., United States v. Goberman, 458 F. 2d 226, 229 (CA3 1972), the opinion speaks of the importance of the statements as well as their efficacy, and no one reading Kay could reason- ably have assumed that criminal falsity presupposed materi- ality. Since we presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court's precedents, see, e. g., North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S. 29, 34 (1995), and since the relevant language of the statute in Kay was substantially like that in § 1014, Kay stands in the way of any assumption that Congress might have understood an express materiality provision to be redundant. Respondents' remaining arguments for affirmance are un- availing. They contend that Congress has ratified holdings of some of the Courts of Appeals that materiality is an ele- ment of § 1014 by repeatedly amending the statute without rejecting those decisions. But the significance of subse- quent congressional action or inaction necessarily varies with the circumstances, and finding any interpretive help in congressional behavior here is impossible. Since 1948, Con- gress has amended § 1014 to modify the list of covered insti- tutions and to increase the maximum penalty,17 but without 16 We ultimately did not uphold the conviction in Kay, 303 U. S., at 9­10, but vacated the lower court's judgment so that it would be free to address a separate issue relating to the indictment. 17 See Pub. L. 91­609, § 915, 84 Stat. 1815 (adding FDIC-insured banks to the list of covered institutions); Pub. L. 101­73, § 961(h), 103 Stat. 500 (increasing the maximum punishment from its 1948 level of a $5,000 fine and two years' imprisonment to $1,000,000 and 20 years' imprisonment); 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 496 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court ever touching the original phraseology criminalizing "false statement[s]" made "for the purpose of influencing" the ac- tions of the enumerated institutions. We thus have at most legislative silence on the crucial statutory language, and we have "frequently cautioned that `[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a control- ling rule of law,' " NLRB v. Plasterers, 404 U. S. 116, 129­130 (1971) (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946)). But even if silence could speak, it could not speak unequivocally to the issue here, since over the years judicial opinion has divided on whether § 1014 includes a materiality element, see n. 3, supra, and we have previously described the elements of § 1014 without any mention of materiality, see Williams v. United States, 458 U. S., at 284. It would thus be impossible to say which view Congress might have endorsed. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517, 527­ 532 (1994).18 Respondents also rely on the 1948 Reviser's Note to § 1014, which discussed the consolidation of the 13 provisions into one, and explained that, apart from two changes not relevant here,19 the consolidation "was without change of substance," Pub. L. 101­647, § 2504(g), 104 Stat. 4861 (increasing the maximum prison term to 30 years). 18 If we were to rely on legislative history, the reports would be of no help to respondents. See H. R. Rep. No. 91­1556, pp. 70­71 (1970) (ad- dressing the amendment adding FDIC-insured institutions, describing the statute as "provid[ing] penalties for making false statements or reports in connection with loans or similar transactions"); H. R. Rep. No. 101­54, pt. 1, p. 400 (1989) (on the amendment increasing the maximum prison term to 20 years and a $1,000,000 fine, describing § 1014 as "deal[ing] with false statements in loan and credit applications"); H. R. Rep. No. 101­681, pt. 1, p. 175 (1990) (on the amendment increasing the maximum prison term to 30 years, describing § 1014 as "relating to fraudulent loan or credit applications"). 19 The two substantive changes were: the adoption of a single punish- ment, which was identical to the punishment set forth in the majority of the predecessor statutes; and the enumeration of a uniform definition of the types of transactions covered by the statute, which was a newly 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 497 Opinion of the Court Historical and Revision Notes following § 1014, 18 U. S. C., p. 247. Respondents say that the revisers' failure to men- tion the omission of materiality from the text of § 1014 means that Congress must have "completely overlooked" the issue. Brief for Respondents 29­30. But surely this indication that the "staff of experts" who prepared the legislation, Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454, 470, n. 10 (1975), either overlooked or chose to say nothing about changing the lan- guage of three of the former statutes does nothing to muddy the ostensibly unambiguous provision of the statute as enacted by Congress, cf. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statu- tory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"). In any event, the revisers' assumption that the consolidation made no substantive change was simply wrong. As re- spondents candidly conceded at oral argument, they failed to discover a single case holding that any of the predecessor statutes lacking a materiality requirement implicitly con- tained one, and after our decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), Congress could not have assumed that a materiality element was implicit in a comparable statute that was silent on the issue, see supra, at 494­495. Dropping the materiality element from the three statutes could not, then, reasonably have been seen as making no change. Those who write revisers' notes have proven fallible before. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 532, n. 11 (1967).20 phrased "composite" of the then-existing terms. See Historical and Revi- sion Notes following § 1014, 18 U. S. C., p. 247. 20 The dissent contends that, because McClanahan v. United States, 12 F. 2d 263, 264 (CA7 1926), and United States v. Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. 402, 403 (SD Iowa 1935), "held or assumed that" two statutes without an explicit materiality requirement nonetheless carried an implicit one, the revisers likely assumed that all of the statutes consolidated in § 1014 con- tained a materiality requirement. Post, at 502­503. Neither case, how- ever, held that one of § 1014's predecessor statutes contained a materiality 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 498 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Opinion of the Court Respondents next urge that we follow the reasoning of some Courts of Appeals in reading materiality into the stat- ute to avoid the improbability that Congress intended to impose substantial criminal penalties on relatively trivial or innocent conduct. See 63 F. 3d, at 751; United States v. Williams, 12 F. 3d 452, 458 (CA5 1994); United States v. Staniforth, 971 F. 2d 1355, 1358 (CA7 1992). But we think there is no clear call to take such a course. It is true that we have held § 1014 inapplicable to depositing false checks at a bank, in part because we thought that it would have "ma[d]e a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law," Williams v. United States, 458 U. S., at 286­287, n. 8, and elsewhere thought it possible to construe a prohibition narrowly where a loose mens rea re- quirement would otherwise have resulted in a surprisingly broad statutory sweep, see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 71­72 (1994). But an unqualified requirement. In Kreidler, the defendant challenged his indictment under § 8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act (the same provision at issue two years later in Kay, see n. 14, supra), arguing that a statement "must be material and calculated to deceive," Kreidler, 11 F. Supp., at 403. The District Court simply "assume[d]" the statement "must be relevant and material," and then found that the indictment satisfied those require- ments. Id., at 403­404. The question in McClanahan was whether the defendant's prosecution under § 31 of the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 382, 12 U. S. C. § 981 (1946 ed.), was beyond Congress's constitu- tional power because the statute did "not limit the [punishable] statement to such as relate or are material to the proposed loan." 12 F. 2d, at 263. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. While stating that it "would in all probability be concluded" that "wholly frivolous and unre- lated" false statements made in a loan application "did not supply the basis for a prosecution under section 31," the court made it clear that this was dicta, because it explained in the very next sentence that "there [was] no question of the relevancy of the alleged false statements knowingly made" in the case before it. Id., at 264. In determining what the revisers might have thought the words of § 1014 meant, we think it far more likely that they would have relied on the clear implication of our 1938 decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, rather than on the dicta from two earlier District or Appeals Court cases. 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 499 Opinion of the Court reading of § 1014 poses no risk of criminalizing so much con- duct as to suggest that Congress meant something short of the straightforward reading. The language makes a false statement to one of the enumerated financial institutions a crime only if the speaker knows the falsity of what he says and intends it to influence the institution. A statement made "for the purpose of influencing" a bank will not usually be about something a banker would regard as trivial, and "it will be relatively rare that the Government will be able to prove that" a false statement "was . . . made with the subjec- tive intent" of influencing a decision unless it could first prove that the statement has "the natural tendency to influ- ence the decision," Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S., at 780­781. Hence the literal reading of the statute will not normally take the scope of § 1014 beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would impose. Finally, the rule of lenity is no help to respondents here. "The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,' . . . we can make `no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.' " Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993), and Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958)). Read straightforwardly, § 1014 reveals no ambiguity, its mens rea requirements narrow the sweep of the statute, and this is not a case of guesswork reaching out for lenity. IV Respondents advance two further reasons to affirm the Court of Appeals's judgment, even on the assumption that materiality is not an element. According to respondents, the trial judge's instruction that "[t]he materiality of the statement . . . alleged to be false . . . is not a matter with which you are concerned and should not be considered by you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defend- ant[s]," App. 43, probably left the jurors with the impression that the statements as alleged would have been material, and 519us2$30M 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 500 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting that impression could have improperly influenced the jury in passing on the elements of falsity and purpose. Respond- ents also suggest that because the indictment alleged materi- ality, any ruling that materiality need not be shown in this case would impermissibly "amend" the indictment contrary to the Fifth Amendment's requirement that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. Since respondents failed to raise either of these issues in their briefs before the Court of Appeals and that court did not pass on these questions, we leave it to the Court of Appeals on remand to take up the propriety of raising these issues now and to address them if warranted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. Violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1014 is a crime punishable by up to 30 years in prison, a fine of up to $1,000,000, "or both." I am convinced that Congress did not intend this draconian statute to apply to immaterial falsehoods, even when made for the purpose of currying favor with a bank's loan officer. The Court's contrary conclusion relies heavily on three du- bious assumptions: (1) that our decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), speaks to the issue in this case; (2) that the revisers of § 1014 erred in advising us that their 1948 consolidation of 13 earlier statutes did not change the law; and (3) that flattery of bank officers is uncommon. I disagree with each of those assumptions. I Our opinion in Kay, on which the majority relies, does not address the issue in this case. It does, however, illuminate 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 501 Stevens, J., dissenting the problems with the Court's holding today. Ms. Kay was convicted of making false statements under the Home Own- ers' Loan Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1467(a) and (e) (1940 ed.). 303 U. S., at 3­4. She had falsely stated that the amount of the claims she presented for settlement was two to four times their actual value. Id., at 5. Among the challenges that Kay pressed before this Court was an argument that she could not be convicted under § 1467(a) because the Government produced no evidence that her false statement had any effect on the actions of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Ibid. In rightly rejecting this argument, this Court reasoned: "Whether or not the Corporation would act favorably on the loan is not a matter which concerns one seeking to deceive by false information. The case is not one of an action for damages but of criminal liability, and actual damage is not an ingredient of the offense." Id., at 6. There is a clear distinction between the concept of materi- ality-whether the information provided could have played a proper role in the loan approval process-and the concept of reliance-whether the information did play a role in the process. Kay could not plausibly have contended that her false statement was immaterial. Certainly a misrepresen- tation regarding the proposed amount of settlement was rel- evant and could have affected the Corporation's decision. Instead, she argued that the charge was insufficient because it did not allege that the application had been approved, i. e., that her material false statement had played a causal role. The Court, quite properly, rejected that argument because the crime was complete when the material false statement was made. Since the materiality of the statement was not disputed, the Court had no occasion to address the question presented by this case. The difference between the issue in Kay and the issue in this case does, however, illustrate the importance of the Court's holding today. Conceivably a prohibition against making intentional false statements might encompass four different categories: (1) all lies, including idle conversation; 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 502 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting (2) all lies intended to encourage a favorable response, in- cluding mere flattery; (3) all material misstatements; or (4) only those material misstatements that are relied upon by the deceived decisionmaker. Kay held that the coverage of one of the predecessor statutes that became § 1014 is broader than the fourth category. In my opinion, § 1014 embraces only the third category. The Court, however, concludes that it encompasses all of the second category, which I call the "flattery category" even though that label does not ade- quately describe its breadth. As now construed, § 1014 cov- ers false explanations for arriving late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm about the results of a football game or an election, as well as false com- pliments about the subject of a family photograph. So long as the false statement is made "for the purpose of influenc- ing" a bank officer, it violates § 1014. Ante, at 499. II The history of § 1014 also refutes the Court's interpreta- tion of that statute. Prior to the 1948 codification, three of the statutes that became a part of § 1014 included an express materiality requirement. The others did not. The Revis- er's Note states that the amalgamation of these 13 statutes made no "change of substance" in the law.1 The majority, today interpreting § 1014 as making a substantial change in the law, concludes that the reviser was "simply wrong." Ante, at 497. A more plausible explanation shows that the reviser was, in fact, correct. Prior to the 1948 codification, no federal court appears to have held that any of § 1014's pred- ecessor statutes encompassed immaterial statements. At least two cases, however, had held or assumed that the nonexplicit statutes did contain a materiality requirement. See McClanahan v. United States, 12 F. 2d 263, 264 (CA7 1 Historical and Revision Notes following § 1014, 18 U. S. C., p. 247. 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 503 Stevens, J., dissenting 1926); 2 United States v. Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. 402, 403 (SD Iowa 1935).3 Given these federal cases and the absence of any common-law precedent for punishing immaterial false statements, it is far more likely that the revisers assumed that all of these statutes included the common-law require- ment of materiality than that congressional silence was in- tended to make a dramatic change in the law.4 In my judg- ment, the fact that the materiality element had been ex- pressly included in some of the predecessor statutes, and only implicitly included in the others, explains why the Reviser's Note could accurately state that the omission of the express reference to materiality was not a "change of substance." 5 At least three additional reasons support the conclusion that the revisers correctly assumed that all of the federal statutes criminalizing false statements included a material- ity requirement that was sometimes implicit and sometimes 2 "If the false statements charged and proved were wholly frivolous and unrelated, it would in all probability be concluded that they did not supply the basis for a prosecution under [the Act]." 3 "We may assume that a statement . . . not likely to influence one exer- cising common prudence and caution, would not support the charge. . . . [I]t must be relevant and material." 4 The Court argues that these cases are not persuasive because they did not hold that the relevant predecessor statutes to § 1014 contained a materiality requirement. Ante, at 497­498, n. 20. Even if this is true, the fact remains that the only reported cases to address this issue stated that these statutes did contain a materiality requirement. The natural inference is that the prevailing view at the time, and therefore the prevail- ing view of the Congress that enacted § 1014, was that all "false state- ments" had to be material to result in criminal penalties. Instead of these cases, the Court asserts, Congress "likely . . . relied on the clear implica- tion of our 1938 decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1." Ante, at 498, n. 20. It is difficult to see how Congress could have relied on this "clear implication" when the opinion does not in any way address material- ity, but instead holds that reliance is not a requirement of § 1014. See United States v. Goberman, 458 F. 2d 226, 229 (CA3 1972); United States v. Kernodle, 367 F. Supp. 844, 851­852 (MDNC 1973). 5 Historical and Revision Notes following § 1014, 18 U. S. C., p. 247. 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 504 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting explicit. First, contrary to the Court's assertion, crimes in- volving "false statements" have a common-law heritage that includes an assumption of a materiality requirement. This conclusion is consistent with our prior holding that the term "misrepresentation" in § 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1013, implicitly contained a materiality re- quirement. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 507­508, and n. 28 (1981). Today the Court discounts the significance of that holding because it assumes that at com- mon law there was a critical difference between a "misrepre- sentation" and a "false statement." Ante, at 491­492, n. 10. However, Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759 (1988), from which the Court draws this inference, made it perfectly clear that "false statements" share a common-law ancestry with "misrepresentations." 6 At common law, neither term in- cluded immaterial falsehoods such as mere flattery.7 6 "The term `material' in § 1451(a) is not a hapax legomenon. Its use in the context of false statements to public officials goes back as far as Lord Coke, who defined the crime of perjury as follows: " `Perjury is a crime committed, when a lawful oath is ministred by any that hath authority, to any person, in any judicial proceeding, who sweareth absolutely, and falsly in a manner material to the issue, or cause in question, by their own act, or by the subornation of others.' 3 E. Coke, Institutes 164 (6th ed. 1680). "Blackstone used the same term, explaining that in order to constitute `the crime of wilful and corrupt perjury' the false statement `must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid,' it is not punish- able. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137. See also 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 27, § 8, p. 433 (Curwood ed. 1824). Given these common-law antecedents, it is unsurprising that a number of federal stat- utes criminalizing false statements to public officials use the term `mate- rial.' " 485 U. S., at 769 (some emphases added). See also Saks, United States v. Gaudin: A Decision with Material Impact, 64 Ford. L. Rev. 1157, 1163­1166 (1995) (tracing § 1001 and other federal false statement statutes back to the common law). 7 Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, at 491­492, n. 10, I do not assume that when Congress criminalizes an element of a common-law crime, the federal offense carries with it every other element of the 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 505 Stevens, J., dissenting Second, at least 100 federal false statement statutes may be found in the United States Code. About 42 of them con- tain an express materiality requirement; approximately 54 do not.8 The kinds of false statements found in the first cat- egory 9 are, to my eyes at least, indistinguishable from those common-law crime. I do presume, however, that when Congress crimi- nalizes an element of a common-law crime, it intends that element to have the same meaning it had at common law. 8 Judge Kozinski catalogued these statutes in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Gaudin, 28 F. 3d 943, 959­960, nn. 3 and 4 (CA9 1994). He made the assumption (which I share) that a materiality requirement "is probably implied" in every one of these statutes that does not contain such an express requirement. Id., at 959. 9 See id., at 959, n. 3 ("7 U. S. C. § 13(a)(3) (felony to knowingly make statement that `was false or misleading with respect to any material fact' in report required by statute or futures association); 8 U. S. C. § 1160(b)(7) (penalizing knowing and willful false statement of material fact in applica- tion for status of special agricultural worker); 8 U. S. C. § 1225a(c)(6) (pen- alizing knowing and willful false statement of material fact in application for special status by virtue of entering U. S. before Jan. 1, 1982); 8 U. S. C. § 1325(a) (penalizing improper entry into U. S. by virtue of willful false statement of material fact); 10 U. S. C. § 931 (perjury in military proceed- ing); 18 U. S. C. § 152 (maximum five year sentence for knowing and fraud- ulent receipt of material amount of property with intent to defeat bank- ruptcy code); 18 U. S. C. § 542 (maximum prison term of two years for entry of goods by means of material false statement); 18 U. S. C. § 1919 (maximum one year prison term for false statement of material fact know- ingly made to obtain unemployment compensation for federal service); 19 U. S. C. § 1629(f)(2) (maximum five year prison term for any person who knowingly and willfully covers up a material fact from customs official); 19 U. S. C. § 1919 (maximum two year prison term for knowingly making false statement of material fact with intent to influence tariff adjustment); 19 U. S. C. § 2316 (maximum one year prison term for knowingly making false statement of material fact when seeking relief from injury under section 2311); 19 U. S. C. § 2349 (maximum two year prison term for mak- ing false statement of material fact for purposes of obtaining relief from injury under Trade Act of 1974); 20 U. S. C. § 1097(b) (maximum one year prison term for knowingly and willfully concealing material information in connection with assignment of federally insured student loan); 20 U. S. C. § 4442(c)(1) (maximum one year prison term for knowingly making false statement of material fact in seeking cultural and art development grants); 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 506 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting in the second category.10 Nor is there any obvious distinc- tion between the range of punishments authorized by the two different groups of statutes. Moreover, some statutes, 22 U. S. C. § 618(a)(2) (maximum six month prison term for willfully mak- ing false statement of material fact in registering to distribute political propaganda); 22 U. S. C. § 2778(c) (maximum 10 year prison term for will- fully making untrue statement of material fact in report required for con- trol of arms exports and imports); 26 U. S. C. § 7206(1) (maximum three year prison term for willfully making false declaration as to material mat- ter regarding income taxes when under penalty of perjury); 26 U. S. C. § 9012(d) (maximum five year prison term for knowingly and willfully mak- ing misrepresentation of material fact during examination of campaign's matching payment account); 29 U. S. C. § 439(b) (maximum one year prison term for person who knowingly makes false statement of material fact in report required under section 431); 29 U. S. C. § 461(d) (maximum one year prison term for knowing misrepresentation of material fact in report labor organization must file once it assumes trusteeship over subordinate orga- nization); 31 U. S. C. § 5324(b)(2) (prohibiting material omission or mis- statement of fact in report on monetary instruments transactions); 42 U. S. C. § 290cc­32 (maximum five year prison term for knowingly making false statement of material fact in sale to state for items or services funded by federal government under Medicare); 42 U. S. C. § 300d­20 (same); 42 U. S. C. § 300e­17(h) (maximum five year prison term for knowingly and willfully making false statement of material fact in [a health maintenance organization's] financial disclosure); 42 U. S. C. § 300w­8(1) (maximum five year prison term for knowingly and willfully making false statement of material fact in sale to state of items or services subsidized by federal government); 42 U. S. C. § 300x­56(b) (same); 42 U. S. C. § 300dd­9 (same- under formula grants to states for care of AIDS patients); 42 U. S. C. § 300ee­19(b) (same-under funds for AIDS prevention); 42 U. S. C. § 707(a)(1) (same-under funds for social security); 42 U. S. C. § 1320a­ 7b(a)(1) (maximum five year prison term for knowingly and willfully mak- ing false statement of material fact in application for payments in federally-approved plans for medical assistance); 42 U. S. C. § 1383a(a)(1) (maximum one year prison term for knowingly and willfully making false statement of material fact in application for Supplemental Security In- come benefits); 42 U. S. C. § 1973i (penalizing knowingly false information for purpose of establishing eligibility to vote); 42 U. S. C. § 3795a (penaliz- ing knowing and willful misstatement or concealment of material fact in any application or record required under chapter); 42 U. S. C. § 6928(d)(3) [Footnote 10 is on p. 507] 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 507 Stevens, J., dissenting such as the one we construed in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995), criminalize two equally culpable catego- ries of false statements but include an explicit materiality (maximum two year prison term for knowingly making false material statement in compliance documents); 42 U. S. C. § 6992d(b)(2) (maximum two year prison term for knowingly making false material statement in compliance documents); 42 U. S. C. § 7413(c)(2) (maximum two year prison term for knowingly making false material statement in documents re- quired under chapter); 46 U. S. C. § 1171(b) (any person who, in application for financial aid under merchant marine act, willfully makes untrue state- ment of material fact is guilty of misdemeanor); 46 U. S. C. § 31306(d) (max- imum five year prison sentence for knowingly making false statement of material fact in declaration of citizenship under Shipping Act); 46 U. S. C. App. § 839 (maximum five year prison term for knowingly making false statement of material fact to secure required approval of Secretary of Transportation); 49 U. S. C. App. § 1472 (maximum three year prison term for knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing a material fact to ob- tain [Federal Aviation Administration] certificate); 50 U. S. C. § 855 (maxi- mum five year prison term for willfully making false statement of material fact in registration statement); 50 U. S. C. App. § 1193(h) (maximum two year prison term for knowingly furnishing information that is false or misleading in any material respect regarding renegotiation of airplane contracts)"). 10 See id., at 960, n. 4 ("7 U. S. C. § 614(b­3)(3) (penalizing those who make false statement in application for tax-payment warrant); 7 U. S. C. § 2028(d) (punishing those who obtain funds from a Puerto Rico block grant `by . . . false statement'); 7 U. S. C. § 6407(e) (barring `false or unwarranted statements' regarding fluid milk products); 12 U. S. C. § 1782(a)(3) (penaliz- ing false statement in administration of insurance fund); 13 U. S. C. § 213 (penalties for perjury); 12 U. S. C. § 1847 (penalizing false entries in book, report, or statement of bank holding company); 15 U. S. C. § 50 (penalizing false statement to [Federal Trade Commission]); 15 U. S. C. § 645 (offenses and penalties for certain crimes related to commerce and trade); 15 U. S. C. § 714m (punishing knowingly false statement to Commodity Credit Corpo- ration); 15 U. S. C. § 1825(a)(2)(B) (penalizing false statement in report re- quired by Horse Protection Act); 16 U. S. C. § 831t(b) (penalizing false statement to or on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority); 18 U. S. C. § 287 (penalizing false claims against U. S. government); 18 U. S. C. § 288 (penalizing false claims for postal losses); 18 U. S. C. § 289 (penalizing false claims for pensions); 18 U. S. C. § 924 (penalizing knowing false statement in information gun dealers must provide); 18 U. S. C. § 1011 (penalizing 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 508 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting requirement in one but not the other category. See id., at 524­525 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). It seems far- fetched that Congress made a deliberate decision to include knowing false statement in sale of mortgage to federal land bank); 18 U. S. C. § 1012 (penalizing intentional false entry in book of Department of Housing and Urban Development); 18 U. S. C. § 1014 (penalizing false statement to influence federal loan or credit agency); 18 U. S. C. § 1015 (penalizing false statement in naturalization proceeding); 18 U. S. C. § 1018 (penalizing public official who knowingly falsifies official certificate or writ- ing); 18 U. S. C. § 1020 (penalizing false statement regarding highway proj- ects); 18 U. S. C. § 1026 (penalizing false statement regarding farm indebt- edness for purpose of influencing Secretary of Agriculture); 18 U. S. C. § 1027 (penalizing false statement in documents required by [Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974]); 18 U. S. C. § 1158 (penalizing false statement to secure Indian Arts & Crafts Board trademark); 18 U. S. C. § 1542 (penalizing willful and knowing false statement in passport application); 18 U. S. C. § 1546 (penalizing false statement in immigration documents); 18 U. S. C. § 1712 (penalizing falsification of postal returns to increase compensation); 18 U. S. C. § 1920 (penalizing false statement to obtain Federal employees' compensation); 18 U. S. C. § 2386 (penalizing willful false statement when registering certain organizations); 18 U. S. C. § 2388(a) (penalizing willful false statement with intent to interfere with armed forces during war); 18 U. S. C. § 2424 (penalizing knowing and will- ful false statement about alien procured or maintained for immoral pur- poses); 22 U. S. C. § 1980(g) (penalizing false statement in seeking compen- sation for loss or destruction of commercial fishing vessel or gear); 22 U. S. C. § 2197(n) (penalizing false statement regarding federal insurance of investment in foreign nations); 26 U. S. C. § 7232 (penalizing false state- ment regarding registration as manufacturer or dealer in gasoline); 29 U. S. C. § 666(g) (penalizing false statement in health and safety report required under this chapter); 30 U. S. C. § 820 (penalizing false statement in document required under subchapter governing mine safety and health); 30 U. S. C. § 941 (penalizing false statement or representation in seeking benefits under subchapter governing mine safety and health); 30 U. S. C. § 1232(d)(1) (penalizing false statement in report submitted with reclama- tion fee); 30 U. S. C. § 1268(g) (penalizing false statement in documents required by Federal program or Federal Lands program regarding surface mining); 31 U. S. C. § 5322 (penalizing willful violations of subchapter); 33 U. S. C. § 931 (penalizing false statement for purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefit); 33 U. S. C. § 990(b) (penalizing false statement to corporation governing Saint Lawrence Seaway); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(c)(2) 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 509 Stevens, J., dissenting or to omit a materiality requirement every time it created a false statement offense. Far more likely, in my view, Con- gress simply assumed-as the Government did in Gaudin- that the materiality requirement would be implied wherever it was not explicit. Third, § 1014 was revised at a time when a different view of statutory interpretation held sway. When Congress enacted the current version of the law in 1948, a period marked by a spirit of cooperation between Congress and the Federal Judiciary, Congress looked to the courts to play an important role in the lawmaking process by relying on common-law tradition and common sense to fill gaps in the law-even to imply causes of action and remedies that were not set forth in statutory text. It was only three years ear- lier that one of the greatest judges of the era-indeed, of any era-had admonished us "not to make a fortress out of the dictionary." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (CA2 (penalizing knowing false statement in record required by chapter on navi- gation and navigable waters); 38 U. S. C. § 1987 (penalizing knowing false statement in application, waiver of premium, or claim for benefits, for National Service Life Insurance or U. S. government life insurance); 40 U. S. C. § 883(b) (penalizing false statement to Pennsylvania Avenue Devel- opment Corp.); 42 U. S. C. § 408 (penalizing false statement to obtain social security benefits); 42 U. S. C. § 1761(o) (penalizing false statement in con- nection with summer food service programs for children at service institu- tions); 42 U. S. C. § 1973i(c) (penalizing knowing false information for pur- pose of establishing eligibility to vote); 42 U. S. C. § 3220 ([penalizing] false statement to obtain financial assistance or defraud Secretary of Depart- ment of Health and Human Services); 42 U. S. C. § 4912(c) (penalizing false statement in documents filed pursuant to chapter's noise control require- ments); 43 U. S. C. § 1350(c) (penalizing knowing false statement in ap- plication required under subchapter on submerged public lands); 45 U. S. C. § 231(l)(a) (penalizing knowing false statement in report required by subchapter on Rail Road Retirement Accounts); 45 U. S. C. § 359(a) (penalizing knowing false statement to obtain unemployment insurance); 49 U. S. C. Appx. § 2216 (penalizing U. S. officials who knowingly make false statement regarding projects submitted for approval of Secretary of Transportation)"). 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 510 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting 1945) (L. Hand, J.) The Court's approach to questions of statutory construction has changed significantly since that time.11 The textual lens through which the Court views the work product of the 1948 revisers is dramatically different from the contemporary legal context in which they labored. In 1948, it was entirely reasonable for Congress and the re- visers to assume that the Judiciary would imply a materiality requirement that was a routine aspect of common-law litiga- tion about false statements. Indeed, subsequent history confirms the reasonableness of such an assumption: The vast majority of judges who have confronted the question have found an implicit materiality requirement in § 1014. As the Court recognizes, all but one of the Courts of Appeals have so held. Ante, at 486, n. 3. Moreover, both in this case and in Gaudin the prosecutor initially proceeded on the assumption that a nonexplicit stat- ute contained an implicit materiality requirement. Only after it failed to convince us in Gaudin that the materiality issue should be resolved by the judge rather than the jury did the Government switch its position and urge us to reject that assumption entirely. III Because precedent and statutory history refute the Court's position, its decision today must persuade, if at all, on the basis of its textual analysis. But congressional silence cannot be so convincing when the resulting interpretation is so unlikely.12 Even the Court's recent jurisprudence affirms 11 See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam- mers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 24­26 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 12 In fact, the text of § 1014 supports the conclusion that "false state- ment" was intended to cover only material false statements. That stat- ute forbids a person, in the relevant circumstances, to make "any [1] false statement or [2] report, or willfully overvalu[ing] any [3] land, [4] property or [5] security." 18 U. S. C. § 1014. The four covered actions other than "false statement[s]" are inherently material. Obviously the overvaluing 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 511 Stevens, J., dissenting that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 96 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mindful of this dictate, the Court has routinely rejected literal statu- tory interpretations that would lead to anomalous results. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing cases). We have been especially willing to reject a purely literal reading of a federal statute that would, as here, expand its coverage far beyond any common-law antecedent.13 And, as the majority of any "land, property or security" will be material to any relevant bank- ing transaction. Similarly, the making of a "false report" will presumably be inherently material since the information requested on the report form will be that which the bank deems "capable of influencing" its decision. Read in this context, and drawing on standard statutory construction techniques, see Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991) (applying "ejusdem generis"-that general terms should be understood in context of specific ones); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (resolving statutory question problem with "noscitur a sociis"-that "a word is known by the company it keeps"), "false state- ment" means those false statements that are material. 13 For instance, in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64 (1994), we held that the "knowingly" requirement of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U. S. C. § 2252, ap- plied to the age of the individual visually depicted. We interpreted the statute this way even though it flew in the face of the "most natural gram- matical reading." 513 U. S., at 68. To hold otherwise, we explained, would lead to results that were "absurd." Similarly, in Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), we held that the National Firearms Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 5801­5872, contained an implicit mens rea requirement although one was not apparent on the face of the statute. "Section 5861(d) is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation," we explained. 511 U. S., at 605. "Nevertheless, silence on this point by itself does not neces- sarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element . . . ." Ibid. An understanding of these cases also exposes the illogic of the Govern- ment's and the Court's reliance on United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10 (1994). In Shabani, lacking a clear textual directive, we declined to de- part from the common-law tradition of not requiring proof of an overt act 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT 512 UNITED STATES v. WELLS Stevens, J., dissenting acknowledges, this would not be the first time that we have had to interpret § 1014 so that it would not " `make a surpris- ingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of fed- eral law.' " Ante, at 498 (quoting Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286­287 (1982)). Congress, the Court seems to recognize, could not have intended that someone spend up to 30 years in prison for falsely flattering a bank officer for the purpose of obtain- ing favorable treatment.14 Yet the Court justifies its inter- pretation of the statute by positing that a literal reading of § 1014 will not "normally" extend the statute "beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would impose." Ante, at 499. In making this assertion, the Court correctly avoids relying on prosecutors not to bring frivolous cases.15 to establish conspiracy. In this case, of course, the Government asks us to do the opposite: to derogate the common law without clear congres- sional approval. 14 Consider the following scenario. A crafty homeowner in need of a mortgage, having learned that the bank's loan officer is a bow tie aficio- nado, purchases his first bow tie to wear at their first meeting. As ex- pected, the loan officer is wearing such a tie, which, incidentally, the pro- spective borrower considers downright ugly. Nevertheless, thinking that flattery will increase the likelihood that the officer will be favorably dis- posed to approving the loan, the applicant swallows hard and compliments the officer on his tie; he then volunteers the information that he too always wears a bow tie. This is a lie. Under the majority's interpretation, this person could spend 30 years in federal prison. He made a "false state- ment." 18 U. S. C. § 1014. In fact, until that day he had never worn a bow tie. And the statement was made "for the purpose of influencing" the bank. Ibid. The applicant subjectively hoped that the loan officer- flattered and feeling a sartorial common ground-would be more likely to approve his mortgage. 15 It is well settled that courts will not rely on "prosecutorial discretion" to ensure that a statute does not ensnare those beyond its proper confines. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 373­374 (1964) ("It will not do to say that a prosecutor's sense of fairness and the Constitution would prevent a successful . . . prosecution for some of the activities seemingly embraced within the sweeping statutory definitions"); Keyishian v. Board of Re- gents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 599 (1967) ("It is no answer 519us2$30I 06-07-99 18:16:01 PAGES OPFXPGT Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997) 513 Stevens, J., dissenting Rather, it appears to have made an empirical judgment that false statements will not "usually" be about a trivial matter, and that the Government will " `relatively rare[ly]' " be able to prove that nonmaterial statements were made for the pur- pose "of influencing a decision." Ibid. I am not at all sure, nor do I know how the Court determined, that attempted flattery is less common than false statements about material facts. Even if it were, the "unusual" nature of trivial state- ments provides scant justification for reaching the conclusion that Congress intended such peccadillos to constitute a felony. IV Today the Court misconstrues § 1014, its history, and our precedents in holding that the statute does not contain a basic materiality requirement. In doing so, the Court con- fidently asserts that almost every court to interpret § 1014, the revisers of the statute, and the courts discussing Kay were all simply wrong. Unwarranted confidence in one's own ability to ascertain the truth has prompted many a vic- tim of deception to make the false statement that "flattery will get you nowhere." It now appears that flattery may get you into a federal prison. I respectfully dissent. to say that the statute would not be applied in such a case"). Prosecutors necessarily enjoy much discretion and generally use it wisely. But the liberty of our citizens cannot rest at the whim of an individual who could have a grudge or, perhaps, just exercise bad judgment. 05-12-99 06:52:35 519BV$note Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 513 and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita- tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS FOR OCTOBER 7, 1996, THROUGH FEBRUARY 26, 1997 October 7, 1996 Affirmed for Absence of Quorum No. 95­1733. United States v. Hatter, Judge, United States District Court for the Central District of Cali- fornia, et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Because the Court lacks a quo- rum, 28 U. S. C. § 1, and since a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment is affirmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances the Court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided Court. Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 647. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­1708. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc., et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid- eration in light of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484 (1996). Reported below: 69 F. 3d 1296. No. 95­2010. Crouse v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 (1996). Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1097. No. 95­2090. Fields, Director, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, et al. v. Battle et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104­134, 110 Stat. 1321. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 172. 801 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 802 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­8936. Coffman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995). Reported below: 67 F. 3d 1154. No. 95­9077. Moore v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995). Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1189. No. 96­112. Maryland v. Dennis. Ct. App. Md. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996). Reported below: 342 Md. 196, 674 A. 2d 928. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1621. In re Disbarment of Harvey. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 516 U. S. 1006.] No. D­1639. In re Disbarment of Farrell. Motion to vacate order of disbarment [516 U. S. 1169] denied. No. D­1680. In re Disbarment of Calvert. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 517 U. S. 1185.] No. D­1699. In re Disbarment of Barr. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1037.] No. D­1701. In re Disbarment of Schimenti. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1037.] No. D­1704. In re Disbarment of Cooke. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1038.] No. D­1706. In re Disbarment of Swaim. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1038.] No. D­1729. In re Disbarment of Gilbert. Wayne Free- man Gilbert, of Rapid City, S. D., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 803 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. M­71 (O. T. 1995). Le May v. Secretary of Health and Human Services; No. M­1. Lawrence v. Secretary of the Treasury; No. M­3. Strickland v. Linahan, Warden; No. M­4. Luhrs v. Krohn; No. M­5. Finney v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; No. M­6. Harris v. Rector and Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia, et al.; No. M­7. Hall v. Brown; No. M­8. Miller v. United States Department of Labor et al.; No. M­10. Colston v. Madison Correctional Institution et al.; No. M­11. Scheidemann v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service; No. M­12. Matthews v. Price, Superintendent, Arkan- sas Valley Correctional Facility, et al.; and No. M­13. Mmubango v. Minnesota Department of Agri- culture. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­2. Rachal v. Texas. Motion to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by peti- tioner granted. No. M­9. Persimmon Hollow Co. v. City of Austin. Mo- tion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is awarded $4,752.67 for the period April 1 through June 30, 1996, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 517 U. S. 1232.] No. 124, Orig. Collins v. Alabama et al. Motion of plain- tiff to expedite consideration of motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied. No. 94­820. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al., 515 U. S. 291. Motion of respondent Rambo for attorney's fees denied without prejudice to refiling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 804 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 94­923. Shaw et al. v. Hunt, Governor of North Car- olina, et al.; and No. 94­924. Pope et al. v. Hunt, Governor of North Car- olina, et al., 517 U. S. 899. Motion of appellees to retax costs denied. No. 95­1268. Maryland v. Wilson. Ct. Sp. App. Md. [Cer- tiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1003.] Motion for appointment of coun- sel granted, and it is ordered that Byron L. Warnken, Esq., of Baltimore, Md., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 95­1521. United States Department of State, Bu- reau of Consular Affairs, et al. v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1003.] Motion of respondents to join additional parties granted. Justice Scalia, Justice Sou- ter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg dissent. Motion of respondents for class certification denied. No. 95­1605. United States v. Gonzales et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1003.] Motion for appoint- ment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Edward Busta- mante, Esq., of Albuquerque, N. M., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Miguel Gonzales in this case. Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Angela Arellanes, Esq., of Albuquerque, N. M., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Orlenis Hernandez-Diaz in this case. No. 95­1682. Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus et al. v. Hays et al., 518 U. S. 1014. Appellees are invited to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days. No. 95­1694. Regents of the University of California et al. v. Doe. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1004.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is or- dered that Richard Gayer, Esq., of San Francisco, Cal., be ap- pointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 95­1717. United States v. Lanier. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1004.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Alfred H. Knight, Esq., of Nashville, Tenn., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 805 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1918. Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Cen- tral Arkansas et al. C. A. 8th Cir.; and No. 96­44. CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. C. A. 7th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States. No. 95­8736. Ogbomon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1056.] Thomas G. Hungar, Esq., of Washington, D. C., is invited to brief and argue this case as ami- cus curiae in support of the judgment below. No. 95­8942. Shoemaker v. California et al. C. A. 2d Cir.; No. 96­5120. Webb v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. C. A. 8th Cir.; No. 96­5214. de la Cruz v. New York City Human Re- sources Administration, Department of Social Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.; No. 96­5351. Geary v. Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Cen- ter and Hospital. C. A. 4th Cir.; and No. 96­5360. Gaston v. Stone Container Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 28, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­9203. In re Vey; and No. 95­9386. In re Vey. Motions of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until October 28, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­9348. In re Franz; No. 96­5038. In re Thompson; No. 96­5254. In re Pierson; No. 96­5265. In re Cross; No. 96­5526. In re Tripati; and No. 96­5769. In re Norman. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 95­2045. In re Moretti; 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 806 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9035. In re White; No. 95­9076. In re Alston; No. 95­9180. In re Everett; No. 95­9314. In re Price; No. 95­9365. In re Anderson; No. 95­9382. In re Hope; No. 95­9461. In re Williams; No. 96­60. In re Ratcliff; No. 96­5015. In re Seagrave; No. 96­5241. In re North; No. 96­5342. In re Anderson; No. 96­5356. In re Nelson; and No. 96­5669. In re Parenteau. Petitions for writs of man- damus denied. No. 95­9184. In re Jaffer. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. No. 95­9235. In re Benton. Petition for writ of prohibition denied. No. 96­157. In re USAir, Inc. Motion of Air Transport As- sociation of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Petition for writ of prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1488. Swift v. Texas Department of Criminal Jus- tice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 474. No. 95­1498. Hill v. Department of the Air Force et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Petition for extraordinary writ and for writ of certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 483. No. 95­1523. Skott v. United States; No. 95­1883. Stambaugh v. United States; No. 95­8995. Ketchum v. United States; No. 95­9041. Wilson v. United States; and No. 95­9081. Balint v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 675. No. 95­1571. Turner et al. v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 260, 661 N. E. 2d 329. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 807 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1573. Stattin v. Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- poration, as Statutory Successor to Resolution Trust Corporation, and as Receiver for Florida Federal Sav- ings, F. S. B., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 74 F. 3d 1252. No. 95­1575. McGlory v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1160. No. 95­1592. Cousin v. Office of Thrift Supervision, De- partment of the Treasury. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­1631. Stangl v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1027. No. 95­1633. Leinenbach, aka Nelson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1258. No. 95­1639. Fields et al. v. United States; and No. 95­9441. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1200. No. 95­1659. Lowe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1137. No. 95­1662. United Association of Journeymen and Ap- prentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry, AFL­CIO, et al. v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1134. No. 95­1674. Golden et al. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. et al.; andNo. 95­1884. Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Golden et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 648. No. 95­1675. Conforti, dba C&C Produce v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 838. No. 95­1676. Pettus v. I. T. O. Corporation of Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 523. No. 95­1680. General Secretariat of the Organization of American States v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 403. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 808 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1690. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 375. No. 95­1693. Portillo et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 390. No. 95­1698. Georgoulis v. United States et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1082. No. 95­1709. Templeton Coal Co., Inc., et al. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.; and No. 95­1751. Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1114. No. 95­1711. Allders International (Ships) Ltd. et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 942. No. 95­1725. Golden Gate Hotel Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 386. No. 95­1727. Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 599. No. 95­1742. Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans- portation Authority et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1133. No. 95­1743. Hill et al. v. Clifton. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1087. No. 95­1744. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 134. No. 95­1746. Longshore v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 440. No. 95­1749. Heil v. Lebow et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 401. No. 95­1756. Toshiba America Medical Systems, Inc. v. OEC Medical Systems, Inc. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 809 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1757. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 66 v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., a Subsidiary of Houston Industries, Inc., as Successor in Interest to Utility Fuels, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 179. No. 95­1760. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL­CIO, Local No. 243 v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 292. No. 95­1762. DeAnnuntis v. United States; and Atlantic Science & Technology, Inc. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 464. No. 95­1765. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., et al. v. Superior Form Builders, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 488. No. 95­1766. Law Practice of J. B. Grossman, P. A. v. Securities and Exchange Commission. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1191. No. 95­1768. Ballard v. Albright, Chairman, Newport Airport Commission, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 382. No. 95­1769. McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1296. No. 95­1770. Lafayette Morehouse Inc. et al. v. Chroni- cle Publishing Co. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46. No. 95­1774. Murray, aka Costa, by His Mother and Next Friend, Miller v. Thompson, Secretary, Pennsylva- nia Department of Public Welfare, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 463. No. 95­1781. Hennessy v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1784. Koss et ux. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 705. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 810 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1785. Nesson v. McIntyre. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 274 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 691 N. E. 2d 1203. No. 95­1788. Trim v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 909 P. 2d 841. No. 95­1789. Gregory et al. v. Flores et ux. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1793. Stiltner v. Beretta U. S. A. Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1473. No. 95­1794. Masotto v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1233. No. 95­1796. Basich et al. v. Board of Pensions, Evan- gelical Lutheran Church in America, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 540 N. W. 2d 82. No. 95­1797. Furrow v. Bisson. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1802. Couchot et ux. v. Ohio Lottery Commission et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 417, 659 N. E. 2d 1225. No. 95­1803. Sporting Club Acquisitions, Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1282. No. 95­1805. Busch, Administrator of the Estate of Busch, Deceased v. AMREP, Inc. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 325, 662 N. E. 2d 397. No. 95­1807. Branch, Trustee of Bank of New England Corp., Derivately and on Behalf and in the Name of Maine National Bank v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 1571. No. 95­1808. Unisys Corp. et al. v. Meinhardt et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 420. No. 95­1809. Hill et al., Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Hill, a Minor v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 118. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 811 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1810. Conkle v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Jeong, dba Laird's Food Market, et al., Real Parties in Interest). C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 909. No. 95­1811. Storer et ux. v. City of Ocean City. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1139. No. 95­1812. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund et al.; and Central Transport, Inc., et al. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 484 (first judgment); 76 F. 3d 114 (second judgment). No. 95­1819. McDonnell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 581. No. 95­1821. Marable v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­1825. Laffond v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Mass. App. 917, 655 N. E. 2d 384. No. 95­1828. Certain Real Property Located at 11869 Westshore Drive, Putnam Township, Livingston County, Michigan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 923. No. 95­1831. Cedar Point Oil Co. v. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 546. No. 95­1832. Park v. Howard University. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 904. No. 95­1834. Friedline v. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1835. Doctors Hospital Real Estate, Ltd., Doc- tors Hospital Management Co., Inc., Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1144. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 812 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1837. Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 176. No. 95­1839. McDonald v. King County. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 Wash. App. 1002. No. 95­1840. Parker et al v. Director, Office of Work- ers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 929. No. 95­1841. Pels v. District of Columbia Bar Assn. et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 A. 2d 388. No. 95­1842. Merrett et al. v. Moore, Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1547. No. 95­1844. American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed- eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, dba Freddie Mac; and Mortgage Network, Inc., et al. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, dba Freddie Mac, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1401 (first judgment); 77 F. 3d 489 (second judgment). No. 95­1846. Holman Warfield v. Warfield. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 661 So. 2d 924. No. 95­1847. Santa Cruz Operation, Inc., et al. v. Moskowitz et al. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1848. Dowling v. Atlanta City School District et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ga. 217, 466 S. E. 2d 588. No. 95­1851. Holmes v. Griffin. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 667 So. 2d 1319. No. 95­1852. Orientations Gallery, Inc. v. Bakery Cen- tre Associates et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 688. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 813 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1854. Mauri v. City of Portland et al. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 Ore. App. 662, 901 P. 2d 247. No. 95­1855. Barton et al. v. Landmark Land Company of Carolina, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 553. No. 95­1856. McGowan v. Metropolitan Dade County et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. No. 95­1860. Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 158. No. 95­1861. Immediato et al. v. Rye Neck School Dis- trict et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 454. No. 95­1863. Klinger et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1226. No. 95­1865. Hofman v. Godoy. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1867. Webb v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 183. No. 95­1868. Thompson, Administratrix of the Estate of Tabor and Tabor, Deceased, et al. v. BIC Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 464. No. 95­1869. Dammer v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1137. No. 95­1871. Dunn v. Denk. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 401. No. 95­1874. Mayo et al. v. Missouri et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 915 S. W. 2d 758. No. 95­1878. Nelson v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 343. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 814 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1880. PFS Corp. v. Turner et ux. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 60. No. 95­1885. Montag, Individually and as Personal Rep- resentative of the Estate of Montag, Deceased v. Ameri- can Honda Motor Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1414. No. 95­1886. Frazier v. King, Director, Office of Person- nel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 77 F. 3d 1361. No. 95­1887. Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 931. No. 95­1888. Gimbel v. Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- poration. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 593. No. 95­1889. Bechtel Energy Corp. v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1890. Turner v. Brown et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 370. No. 95­1891. Anderson v. Johnson, aka Dortch. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1893. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 737, et al. v. Auto Glass Employees Fed- eral Credit Union et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1243. No. 95­1895. Asam v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 866. No. 95­1896. Fully Informed Jury Assn. et al. v. County of San Diego et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 78 F. 3d 593. No. 95­1897. Macaluso v. Anderson, dba Anderson Stu- dios, et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 Ariz. 447, 891 P. 2d 914. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 815 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1898. Shong-Ching Tong v. Turner et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1280. No. 95­1901. Horton v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 1068, 906 P. 2d 478. No. 95­1902. Upjohn Co. v. Scovish, Administratrix of the Estate of Scovish, Deceased. App. Ct. Conn. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­1904. Botello Cervantes v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1908. Teleconcepts, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunica- tions Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 1086. No. 95­1911. Vega v. Rexene Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­1912. Matyastik v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1914. Narducci et al. v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 446 Pa. Super. 678 and 680, 667 A. 2d 420 and 422. No. 95­1915. Schulze v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 766. No. 95­1916. Moore et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 A. 2d 677. No. 95­1917. Randell v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 101. No. 95­1920. Binderup et al. v. Brooks et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 501. No. 95­1922. Ricketts v. City of Hartford et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1397. No. 95­1924. Jones et al. v. Klein et al.; and 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 816 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­9. Arkoma Production Co. et al. v. Klein et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 779. No. 95­1925. Oxford House-C. et al. v. City of St. Louis. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 249. No. 95­1926. Barber v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1248. No. 95­1927. Cannon, Individually, and on Behalf of the Estate of Cannon, Deceased v. Group Health Service of Oklahoma, Inc., dba Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla- homa, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 77 F. 3d 1270. No. 95­1928. Blinder et al. v. Hoxworth et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 205. No. 95­1930. General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 143 N. J. 336, 671 A. 2d 560. No. 95­1931. Neumann v. Page, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 587. No. 95­1932. Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 234. No. 95­1933. Rogers et al. v. Rogers et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1935. Glover et al. v. McGinnis et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 264. No. 95­1937. Schwartz v. Doc's Food Stores, Inc. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1938. Izadpanah et al. v. Gross et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 373. No. 95­1939. All Right, Title and Interest in Real Property and Appurtenances Thereto Known as 143­147 East 23rd Street, New York, New York, et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 648. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 817 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1940. McKoy et ux. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 446. No. 95­1941. McAllister v. Telxon Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 95­1942. Harney v. California State Bar. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1943. Barkley, Trustee v. Conner et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 258. No. 95­1944. Pippin v. Bennett. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 578. No. 95­1945. Greenspan v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 107. No. 95­1946. Sims v. Brown & Root Industrial Services, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 581. No. 95­1947. Valmet Oy et al. v. Aldy, Individually and as Legal Representative of Aldy, Deceased, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 72. No. 95­1949. Neuman v. Bennett. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 664 So. 2d 261. No. 95­1950. Dunmeyer et al. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­1952. Fukutomi v. United States Trustee. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 256. No. 95­1953. Burns v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 595. No. 95­1954. Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., dba KELO-Land News, et al. Sup. Ct. S. D. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 538 N. W. 2d 780. No. 95­1955. Goranowski v. Department of Education. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 111. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 818 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1957. Alaska v. Babbitt, Secretary of the Inte- rior, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 449. No. 95­1958. Jackson v. City of Atlanta et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 60. No. 95­1959. Abou-Kassem v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 161. No. 95­1960. Spang & Co. et al. v. Brytus et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1137. No. 95­1961. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 745. No. 95­1963. Rucker v. Citicorp Savings of Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1964. Hinchliffe et ux. v. Transamerica Finan- cial Consumer Discount Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 123. No. 95­1965. Bregar v. City of Cleveland. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 Ohio App. 3d 713, 667 N. E. 2d 42. No. 95­1967. Seetharaman v. Commonwealth Edison Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1150. No. 95­1968. Bono et ux. v. Hamilton et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1970. Suehl v. Suehl. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1971. Village of Chagrin Falls, Ohio v. Kruse et ux. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 694. No. 95­1972. Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mount Calvary Baptist Church, aka Mount Calvary Baptist Church and School, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 51. No. 95­1973. Greater Ministries International, Inc. v. Florida. Cir. Ct. Hillsborough County, Fla. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 819 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­1976. Rambo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 948. No. 95­1977. Commodities Export Co. et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 380. No. 95­1978. Cal-Almond, Inc., et al. v. Department of Agriculture. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 874. No. 95­1979. Hogan et al. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 Wis. 2d 792, 543 N. W. 2d 825. No. 95­1983. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1191. No. 95­1984. Preferred Meal Systems, Inc. v. Kalwaytis et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 117. No. 95­1985. Santobello v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 108. No. 95­1986. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 316. No. 95­1987. Dayton Hudson Department Store Co., a Division of Dayton Hudson Corp. v. National Labor Re- lations Board. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 546. No. 95­1988. Bovis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1989. Soto v. Lebedeva. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1990. Albanese et al. v. Federal Election Com- mission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 66. No. 95­1991. Antonio Duque v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1146. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 820 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1992. Thomas et ux. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 701. No. 95­1993. Brown v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 891. No. 95­1995. Melton et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 95­1996. Kunkes v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1549. No. 95­1997. Ameritas Investment Corp., fka BLN In- vestment Corp. v. Slinkard. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1998. Tseng v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 95­2000. Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affili- ates, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1538. No. 95­2001. Cowhig v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 110. No. 95­2002. Packer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 357. No. 95­2003. Benson v. Communications Workers of America et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 148. No. 95­2004. Nobile v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 465. No. 95­2005. Valder v. Moore. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 189. No. 95­2008. Marks v. United States; No. 95­2013. Tucker v. United States; and No. 95­2070. Haley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1313. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 821 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­2009. Pipkin v. Mortgage Creditcorp., Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 138. No. 95­2012. Fent et vir v. Southwestern Bell Tele- phone Co. et al. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­2014. Knight v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 309. No. 95­2015. McGill v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 64. No. 95­2016. Sandoval v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 531. No. 95­2017. Ryckman et al. v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 579. No. 95­2019. Achilles Corp. v. Kaepa, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 624. No. 95­2020. Jaspan et al. v. Glover Bottled Gas Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 38. No. 95­2021. Gandara-Granillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 545. No. 95­2022. Thiry et al. v. Carlson, Secretary of Transportation of Kansas, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1491. No. 95­2023. Lindsey v. Alabama State Bar. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 677 So. 2d 252. No. 95­2026. Pettit v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 Md. App. 777. No. 95­2027. Depenbrock v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 95­2028. Cox et al. v. Treadway et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 230. No. 95­2029. Simmons v. Burns, Commissioner, Connecti- cut Department of Transportation. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:00 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 822 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­2030. Schulz v. City of Vernon et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 66. No. 95­2032. SunAmerica Corp. et al. v. Sun Life Assur- ance Company of Canada et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1325. No. 95­2035. Moorman et al. v. Florida Department of Community Affairs. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 664 So. 2d 930. No. 95­2036. Bonnette et al. v. Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 671. No. 95­2037. Picklesimer v. Cox et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1141. No. 95­2039. Logan v. Bennington College Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1017. No. 95­2040. Tseng Fu Lin, dba Oriental Jade Restau- rant v. City of Goldsboro et al. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 121 N. C. App. 220, 465 S. E. 2d 348. No. 95­2041. Para-Ordnance Manufacturing, Inc. v. SGS Importers International, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1085. No. 95­2042. Varallo v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 913 P. 2d 1. No. 95­2043. Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glick- man, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 896. No. 95­2044. Ray et ux. v. Willett. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 App. Div. 2d 613, 634 N. Y. S. 2d 160. No. 95­2046. Howard v. Town of Chapel Hill et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 373. No. 95­2047. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Interna- tional Union et al. v. Mountaineer Gas Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 606. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 823 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­2048. Mobile Telecommunication Technologies Corp. et al. v. Federal Communications Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1399. No. 95­2049. Generes v. Morrell et vir. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 821. No. 95­2050. J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan et al. v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1245. No. 95­2051. Stiffarm v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 170. No. 95­2053. Beckey, dba American Institute of Law, Economics & Comparative Studies v. Cenlar Federal Sav- ings Bank. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­2054. Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 778. No. 95­2055. Angino et ux. v. Board of Supervisors of Middle Paxton Township. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 A. 2d 900. No. 95­2056. Sinisterra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 101. No. 95­2057. Goss v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1253. No. 95­2058. Chrysler Corp. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1173. No. 95­2059. Boggi v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 470. No. 95­2061. Nordahl v. Studer Revox America, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 585. No. 95­2063. Lang v. Furr. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 824 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­2064. Lord, Superintendent, Bedford Hills Cor- rectional Facility, et al. v. DeLuca. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 578. No. 95­2065. Yang et al. v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 932. No. 95­2066. Levine v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 129. No. 95­2067. Robinson et ux. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 34. No. 95­2068. Sperling v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­2069. Florida Department of Revenue et al. v. General Development Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 428. No. 95­2071. Hargett v. National Westminster Bank, USA, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 836. No. 95­2073. Arena Sports, Inc., et al. v. First American Bank of Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 64 F. 3d 659. No. 95­2075. Harvey v. Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 197 Wis. 2d 121, 539 N. W. 2d 453. No. 95­2076. Fernandes v. Rockaway Township Town Council et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 405. No. 95­2078. Spring Meadows Apartment Complex Lim- ited Partnership v. Stallings et ux. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 185 Ariz. 156, 913 P. 2d 496. No. 95­2079. Haas, By and Through Her Father and Legal Guardian, Haas v. Wyatt et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 498. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 825 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­2080. Zucker v. Quasha et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 408. No. 95­2081. Williams v. San Gorgonio Farms, Inc. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­2083. Cherry Hills Resort Development Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. No. 95­2084. Chakales et ux. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 726. No. 95­2085. Durkin et al. v. Major League Baseball et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 611. No. 95­2086. Broderick v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 64. No. 95­2087. McCarthy et al. v. Recordex Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 842. No. 95­2089. Strobridge v. New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 826. No. 95­2092. Faruqui v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 135. No. 95­2094. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Harrison et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 609. No. 95­2095. Serot v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1227. No. 95­8311. Jones v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 1190. No. 95­8319. Ogden v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 658 So. 2d 621. No. 95­8346. Garza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1342. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 826 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­8374. Pitts v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 128. No. 95­8402. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 1375. No. 95­8415. Owens v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1254. No. 95­8437. Henry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1238. No. 95­8451. Broussard v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 910 S. W. 2d 952. No. 95­8478. Witherspoon v. Bibbings, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8487. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1140. No. 95­8509. Lee v. Hall. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8511. Lawton v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 913 S. W. 2d 542. No. 95­8520. Lloyd v. Robinson, Secretary, Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 Md. App. 800. No. 95­8536. Wofford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 679. No. 95­8551. Walker v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 910 S. W. 2d 381. No. 95­8585. Jones v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 542 Pa. 464, 668 A. 2d 491. No. 95­8588. Summers v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­8630. Lowe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 389. No. 95­8631. McQuilkin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 105. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 827 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­8637. Pigott v. United Homes for Children et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Mass. App. 1108, 655 N. E. 2d 390. No. 95­8640. Henderson v. Stewart et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 415. No. 95­8653. Patch v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 498. No. 95­8665. Mack v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 Wis. 2d 955, 543 N. W. 2d 867. No. 95­8676. Knight v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 117. No. 95­8677. Lopez v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 157. No. 95­8698. Dortch v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 666 So. 2d 146. No. 95­8704. Johnson v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 542 Pa. 384, 668 A. 2d 97. No. 95­8710. Jackson v. United States; and No. 95­8714. Walls v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1323. No. 95­8712. Dienstberger v. General Motors Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 325. No. 95­8722. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 685. No. 95­8725. Zucco v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 188. No. 95­8727. Gary v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 913 S. W. 2d 822. No. 95­8750. LeDuc v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 421 Mass. 433, 657 N. E. 2d 755. No. 95­8757. Coleman v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 168 Ill. 2d 509, 660 N. E. 2d 919. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 828 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­8767. Buckner v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 198, 464 S. E. 2d 414. No. 95­8768. Keene v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 1, 660 N. E. 2d 901. No. 95­8785. Kaczynski v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8793. Janes v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 168 Ill. 2d 382, 660 N. E. 2d 980. No. 95­8795. Sims v. Ault, Commissioner, Georgia Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8797. Williams v. Lewis et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 154. No. 95­8809. Frederick v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 881. No. 95­8811. Hemmerle v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 77 F. 3d 497. No. 95­8812. Horton v. Scott, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 877. No. 95­8813. Lockerby v. Pima County. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8819. Zavesky v. Miller, Superintendent, Cor- rectional Industrial Complex, Pendleton, Indiana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 554. No. 95­8825. Van Doren v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Pa. Super. 686, 663 A. 2d 255. No. 95­8826. Haynes v. Lemann et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 338. No. 95­8827. Hofmann v. Pressman Toy Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 829 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­8829. McAdams v. MNC Credit Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 133. No. 95­8830. Kukes v. Calderon, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1153. No. 95­8835. Smith v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 666 So. 2d 986. No. 95­8838. Williams v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 259 Kan. 432, 913 P. 2d 587. No. 95­8841. Jennings v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Huron County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8842. Klais v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1282. No. 95­8844. Lane v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 App. Div. 2d 948, 635 N. Y. S. 2d 573. No. 95­8852. Heiden v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8856. Dix v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 496. No. 95­8859. Enoch v. Gramley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1490. No. 95­8861. Valliere et al. v. Maine Workers' Compen- sation Board et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 669 A. 2d 1328. No. 95­8863. Delia v. Itochu International, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 825. No. 95­8864. Luis v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8865. Mitchell v. Roy et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 536. No. 95­8868. McIntyre et ux. v. Gilmore, Attorney Gen- eral of Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 374. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 830 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­8870. Gregory et al. v. Botzheim et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 910. No. 95­8871. Haynes v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 So. 2d 1278. No. 95­8873. Negewo v. Abebe-Jiri et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 844. No. 95­8877. Penman v. Leavitt, Governor of Utah, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 493. No. 95­8879. Rodriguez v. Edmondson, Attorney Gen- eral of Oklahoma. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 78 F. 3d 597. No. 95­8885. Siegel v. Doe et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­8886. Wellons v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ga. 77, 463 So. 2d 868. No. 95­8887. Williams v. Jackson Stone Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 621. No. 95­8889. Wilson v. Lane, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 419. No. 95­8892. Fischer v. Delsante et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 941. No. 95­8893. Owens v. Love, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­8895. Strickland v. Gridley, Judge, Circuit Court of Florida, Orange County, et al.; and Strickland v. United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8897. Gaines v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8898. Black v. Morales, Attorney General of Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 831 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­8903. Everman v. Albertson's, Inc. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8904. Foster v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 168 Ill. 2d 465, 660 N. E. 2d 951. No. 95­8905. Warren v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 327. No. 95­8906. Pargo et al. v. Elliott et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 280. No. 95­8909. Sloan v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8911. McDaniel v. Berger. Ct. App. Okla. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­8912. McBride v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 12th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8913. Metcalf v. Carlton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8914. McLeod, aka Hogan v. Butterworth, Attor- ney General of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­8915. McNabb v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8918. Lucas v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 120 N. C. App. 884, 464 S. E. 2d 95. No. 95­8920. Edwards v. Kernan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 368. No. 95­8921. Miller v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 697 N. E. 2d 25. No. 95­8925. Blackmon v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 647 N. E. 2d 1126. No. 95­8935. Cargle v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 909 P. 2d 806. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 832 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­8938. Collins v. Maryland. Cir. Ct. Somerset County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8939. White v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8945. Reams v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 Ark. 336, 909 S. W. 2d 324. No. 95­8948. Smith v. Local Union 28 Sheet Metal Work- ers et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 943. No. 95­8951. Roland v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1279. No. 95­8953. Smith v. United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­8958. Gould v. Pellella et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8960. Davis v. Leonardo, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8963. Howard v. Potter et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 175. No. 95­8967. Forrest v. Vasquez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 562. No. 95­8968. Ebb v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341 Md. 578, 671 A. 2d 974. No. 95­8969. Hageman v. Leason. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1254. No. 95­8970. Sawyer v. Hickey et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 472. No. 95­8973. Mayrant v. Goff, Clerk, Magistrate's Court of Sumter County. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8974. McCullough v. Texas Department of Crimi- nal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1267. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 833 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­8975. El Jabaar v. Young. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­8976. Minetti v. Port of Seattle et al. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8978. Iguwa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 418. No. 95­8981. Kochvi v. New Hampshire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 140 N. H. 662, 671 A. 2d 115. No. 95­8983. Coleman v. Murphy et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8984. Chaudhary v. O'Neil et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1277. No. 95­8985. Cochran v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 371. No. 95­8986. Craig v. Martin, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 392. No. 95­8987. Tyler v. Carnahan, Governor of Missouri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 589. No. 95­8989. Baker v. Lusk et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­8991. Coronado v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 Cal. 4th 145, 906 P. 2d 1232. No. 95­8993. Simpson v. Rowan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 134. No. 95­8997. Meshell v. Roberts, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 471. No. 95­9002. Long v. Sparkman, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 160. No. 95­9004. Pazol v. Parker, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1113. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 834 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9005. Ross v. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Loui- siana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 475. No. 95­9006. Carroll v. Local 144 Pension Fund et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 943. No. 95­9007. Bradley v. Fields. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Ill. App. 3d 1134, 688 N. E. 2d 150. No. 95­9009. Carey v. Johnson et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­9010. Griffin v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ga. 115, 464 S. E. 2d 371. No. 95­9011. Domino v. White, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9013. Godaire v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9016. Franklin v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 571. No. 95­9017. Graham v. Oregon et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 489. No. 95­9018. Akbar-El v. Wise et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­9019. Portee v. Clarke, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9020. Barry v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 543 Pa. 610, 673 A. 2d 914. No. 95­9021. Memro v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 786, 905 P. 2d 1305. No. 95­9023. Chalmars v. Mitchell, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1262. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 835 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9024. Thomas v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 477. No. 95­9026. Mouradian v. Michigan Attorney Discipline Board. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 584. No. 95­9027. Moghal v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 406. No. 95­9028. Murrell v. University of South Carolina. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9029. Padilla v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 891, 906 P. 2d 388. No. 95­9032. Khalil v. Carroll, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 135. No. 95­9034. McDuff v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 414. No. 95­9036. Ross v. Communication Workers of America, Local 1110. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 944. No. 95­9037. Sanchez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 12 Cal. 4th 1, 906 P. 2d 1129. No. 95­9039. Ponce-Partida v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9040. Valencia Romero v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 944. No. 95­9042. Maddox v. Odom et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 358. No. 95­9044. Carpenter v. Chapleau, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1269. No. 95­9046. Lazich v. Burrows, Judge, Supreme Court of New York, 9th Judicial District. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 943. No. 95­9049. Williams v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 569, 660 N. E. 2d 724. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 836 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9051. Otte v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 555, 660 N. E. 2d 711. No. 95­9053. Banks v. Sikes, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1108. No. 95­9055. Blake v. Murray et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 124. No. 95­9057. Butler v. New York (two judgments). App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 App. Div. 2d 1115, 636 N. Y. S. 2d 700 (first judgment); 222 App. Div. 2d 1115, 636 N. Y. S. 2d 536 (second judgment). No. 95­9058. Mitchell v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9059. Hoover v. Suffolk University Law School et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 554. No. 95­9062. Fisher v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9065. Howard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 484. No. 95­9066. Greenlaw v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9067. Hubbard v. Dorsey, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 492. No. 95­9068. Sawyer v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 473. No. 95­9069. Coe v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1261. No. 95­9072. Fuller v. Police Department of Bossier City et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 414. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 837 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9078. Sawyer v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 154. No. 95­9083. Waterfield v. Vocelle, Judge, Circuit Court of Florida, Indian River County, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 So. 2d 617. No. 95­9084. Waterfield v. Swigert, Chief Judge, Cir- cuit Court of Florida, Marion County. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9085. Reyes v. Roe, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9087. Richie v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 908 P. 2d 268. No. 95­9088. Brown v. American Express Travel Re- lated Services Co., Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 878. No. 95­9089. Laufman v. Mayer et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 489. No. 95­9091. Morvant v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 581. No. 95­9094. Garrett v. Department of Defense. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9095. Greene et al. v. Tucker et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 325. No. 95­9096. Galloway v. Roe, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9097. Finfrock v. Jordan C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9098. Gibbons v. Higgins et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 364. No. 95­9099. Ashford v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 168 Ill. 2d 494, 660 N. E. 2d 944. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 838 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9100. Stewart v. Gramley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 132. No. 95­9101. Cordova-Perez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1552. No. 95­9102. Benoit v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 154. No. 95­9105. Marek v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1295. No. 95­9106. Nouraie v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 912. No. 95­9107. Lucas v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 12 Cal. 4th 415, 907 P. 2d 373. No. 95­9108. Okparaocha v. Taco Bell Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 95­9109. Burgess v. Board of Trustees of the Uni- versity of New Hampshire et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 110. No. 95­9110. Kinnell et ux. v. Convenient Loan Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 492. No. 95­9111. Boyd v. Armstrong, Commissioner, Connecti- cut Department of Correction. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 60. No. 95­9114. Brimage v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 918 S. W. 2d 466. No. 95­9115. Sanders v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 475, 905 P. 2d 420. No. 95­9117. Sockwell v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 38. No. 95­9122. Dunlap v. Hill, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 839 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9125. Tyler et al. v. Ashcroft et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1244. No. 95­9127. Gentry v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 882. No. 95­9128. Fink v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9129. Key v. Clarke et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 469. No. 95­9130. Klopp v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 945. No. 95­9131. Johnson v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 911 P. 2d 918. No. 95­9132. Jackson v. Kessler. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 95­9134. Jackson v. Peugh et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 492. No. 95­9135. McDonald v. Saxton. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 448 Pa. Super. 662, 671 A. 2d 776. No. 95­9136. Martins v. Charles Hayden Goodwill Inn School C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 460. No. 95­9137. Kemp v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 Ariz. 52, 912 P. 2d 1281. No. 95­9139. Matthews v. Martin, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1232. No. 95­9140. Schlicher v. Martin et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 393. No. 95­9141. Starr v. Metzer, Chairman, Virginia Parole Board. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9142. Castro v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 495. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 840 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9143. Floris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 580. No. 95­9144. Erickson v. Gordon et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1159. No. 95­9145. Emery v. Galose. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 1523, 660 N. E. 2d 742. No. 95­9146. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 486. No. 95­9147. Sanders v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 79 F. 3d 1142. No. 95­9148. Small v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9149. Luckette v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 S. W. 2d 663. No. 95­9150. Connolly v. Williams, Chairman, Illinois Prison Review Board. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9151. Convertino v. Jabe, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 371. No. 95­9152. Cookus v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 592. No. 95­9153. Abdullah v. Milonas. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9154. Hasan v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1260. No. 95­9155. Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau Interna- tional, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9156. Baba v. Warren Management Consultants, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 826. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 841 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9157. Harris v. Roe, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9158. Barberena-Jimenez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 486. No. 95­9160. Barone v. Feldmeyer et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9162. Under Seal v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 526. No. 95­9165. Kumar v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 407. No. 95­9166. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­9167. Knighton v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 912 P. 2d 878. No. 95­9168. Morgan v. Nevada Board of Prison Commis- sioners et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1733. No. 95­9169. Allen v. United States; No. 95­9196. Swift v. United States; and No. 95­9205. Cihak v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1348. No. 95­9170. Popejoy et al. v. Boston Pointe Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 95­9171. Sherbondy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­9172. Russell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 808. No. 95­9173. Pennington v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 913 P. 2d 1356. No. 95­9174. Singleton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 596. No. 95­9175. Curtis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 175. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 842 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9176. Watson v. General Motors Corp., Electro- Motive Division. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 365. No. 95­9177. Williams v. Iowa et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1244. No. 95­9178. Gunnell v. Littlefield, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9179. Dixon v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 App. Div. 2d 952, 634 N. Y. S. 2d 313. No. 95­9181. Giles v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 161. No. 95­9182. Miller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 813. No. 95­9183. Moore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 177. No. 95­9185. Laster v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9186. Jones v. Associated Universities, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 406. No. 95­9187. Krivonak v. Berkey et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 162. No. 95­9188. Long v. Sparkman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 422. No. 95­9189. LeFebre v. Circuit Court of Wisconsin, La- Crosse County. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9190. Maciel v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 275 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 692 N. E. 2d 874. No. 95­9191. Kinard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 580. No. 95­9192. Louis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 416. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 843 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9193. Parker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 417. No. 95­9194. Shimp v. Keycorp Mortgage, Inc. Ct. App. Ohio, Portage County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9195. Poullard v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 919. No. 95­9197. Cleckner v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 Md. App. 770. No. 95­9198. Boone v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 558. No. 95­9199. Altimus v. Perry, Secretary of Defense, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9200. Borcsik v. Johnson, Director of the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9201. Bierley v. Walters, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Mercer. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9202. Rhinehart v. Marshall. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­9204. Allen v. Clarke, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9206. Alver v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 672. No. 95­9207. Dickerson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 774. No. 95­9208. Sewell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 480. No. 95­9210. Hines v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 944. No. 95­9211. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 844 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9212. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 348. No. 95­9213. Dawson v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 673 A. 2d 1186. No. 95­9214. Cotten v. General Motors Fisher-Body Di- vision et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 482. No. 95­9215. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 156. No. 95­9217. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 82, 661 N. E. 2d 728. No. 95­9218. Whiting v. Utah. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9219. Walker v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 887, 668 N. E. 2d 433. No. 95­9220. Divetta v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 423. No. 95­9223. Irwin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1107. No. 95­9224. James v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 851. No. 95­9225. Geoghegan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. No. 95­9226. Graham v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 943. No. 95­9227. Ebenhart v. Cohen et al. Sup. Ct. Vt. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Vt. 652, 677 A. 2d 430. No. 95­9228. Bowman v. Bowling. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 160. No. 95­9229. Brewer v. Puckett, Commissioner, Missis- sippi Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 845 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9231. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 580. No. 95­9232. Chinn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 579. No. 95­9233. Wilson v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 381, 659 N. E. 2d 292. No. 95­9234. White v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1252. No. 95­9236. Brahms-Garcia v. United States; and No. 96­5050. Cisneros-Silva v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 170. No. 95­9237. Lussier v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 40. No. 95­9238. Medlock v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 434. No. 95­9239. Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 949. No. 95­9240. Suarez-Riascos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. No. 95­9241. Rivera v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 682. No. 95­9242. Carter v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Cal. App. 4th 683, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726. No. 95­9243. Spiva v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 419. No. 95­9244. Brown v. Yount, Superintendent, Graham Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9245. Shilling v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 414. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 846 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9246. Seddens v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9247. Siers v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9248. Scott v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 175. No. 95­9249. Perry v. Miller et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 414. No. 95­9250. Camilo Montoya v. Stock, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 498. No. 95­9251. Mosby v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 413. No. 95­9252. Messick v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9254. Mitchell v. Simonet et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1156. No. 95­9255. Yurtis, aka Coan v. Jones et ux. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 Wash. App. 1024. No. 95­9256. Krehnbrink et ux. v. Maryland Depart- ment of Education et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 127. No. 95­9257. Kinsey v. Clenney. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 657. No. 95­9258. Arroyo Jusino v. Brown, Secretary of Vet- erans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 421. No. 95­9259. Morera v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 471. No. 95­9260. Arteaga v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9262. Adesanya v. Prunty, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 334. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 847 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9265. Adigwu v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­9266. Gonzales v. Wright, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 372. No. 95­9267. George v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 418. No. 95­9268. Hines v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 919 S. W. 2d 573. No. 95­9269. Harris v. Gillis, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9270. Andrade v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. No. 95­9271. Hawkins v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 530, 660 N. E. 2d 454. No. 95­9272. Fells v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 168. No. 95­9273. Hudson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9274. Gullett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 941. No. 95­9275. Nance v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 323 Ark. 583, 918 S. W. 2d 114. No. 95­9276. Lopez v. Scott. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9277. Evans v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 428. No. 95­9278. Giraldo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 667. No. 95­9279. Helton v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 160. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 848 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9280. Quintero-Barraza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1344. No. 95­9281. Marbury v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 379. No. 95­9283. Nguyen v. Department of Defense. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 358. No. 95­9284. Wacker v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1453. No. 95­9285. Riascos-Suarez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 616. No. 95­9286. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1161. No. 95­9287. Pagan v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9288. Bowyer v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 N. E. 2d 270. No. 95­9289. Equils v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1142. No. 95­9290. Gardner v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9291. Sims v. Bunnell, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 95­9292. Vanderbeck v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9293. Coleman v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 148. No. 95­9294. Beagles v. Department of the Navy. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 605. No. 95­9295. Browder v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1144. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 849 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9296. Word v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 131. No. 95­9297. Reynolds v. Tele-Communications, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 493. No. 95­9298. Weaver v. Williams et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 487. No. 95­9299. Barnett v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1224. No. 95­9300. Garnett v. Sobol, Commissioner, New York State Department of Education. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 App. Div. 2d 850, 634 N. Y. S. 2d 882. No. 95­9301. Fuller v. Board of Selectmen for the Town of Canton et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 37 F. 3d 1484. No. 95­9303. Lowe-Bey v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9304. Johnson v. Rosemeyer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Greensburg, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9305. Cancil v. Florida Department of State, Di- vision of Licensing. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 669 So. 2d 250. No. 95­9306. McKinney v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 398. No. 95­9307. Jones v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 436. No. 95­9309. Koynok v. Estate of Koynok et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 445 Pa. Super. 638, 664 A. 2d 1065. No. 95­9310. Lewis v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 156. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 850 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9311. Jones v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 681. No. 95­9312. Campbell v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 128. No. 95­9313. zu Mike v. Reno, Attorney General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9315. Williams v. Cousin-Williams. Ct. App. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 Neb. App. xxxv. No. 95­9316. Hernando Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 298. No. 95­9317. Skeet v. City of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9318. Ramer v. Ness et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1250. No. 95­9319. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 419. No. 95­9321. Jones v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 491. No. 95­9322. Klade, aka Klady v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1155. No. 95­9324. Rezaabady v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 424. No. 95­9325. Santana-Molina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 398. No. 95­9326. Brinkley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 95­9327. Ragland v. Hundley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 702. No. 95­9328. Polite v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 429. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 851 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9329. Swain v. District Court of Appeal of Flor- ida, Third District, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 929. No. 95­9330. Young v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1150. No. 95­9331. Thomas v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9332. Pugh v. Huffman. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 418. No. 95­9333. Harris v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 223. No. 95­9334. Esparza v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. No. 95­9337. Carr v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 667 So. 2d 1238. No. 95­9338. Thompson v. Thompson et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9339. Ballard v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9340. Benson et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 123. No. 95­9342. Hester v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1142. No. 95­9343. Herrera-Rivera v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 429. No. 95­9344. Espinosa-Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1136. No. 95­9345. Howard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 362. No. 95­9346. Floyd v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1517. No. 95­9347. Dickey v. McMahan et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 852 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9349. Hall v. Browning, Judge, United States District Court for the District of Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 422. No. 95­9350. Marion v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Conn. App. 906, 668 N. E. 2d 401. No. 95­9352. LaRue v. Blodgett et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 636. No. 95­9353. Lusty v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9354. McFadden v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­9355. Kiel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 435. No. 95­9356. Martin v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9357. Irving v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9358. Magoon v. Turner et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1144. No. 95­9359. Jones v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 479. No. 95­9360. Luna v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1228. No. 95­9362. Montoya v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 310. No. 95­9364. Aguilar v. New Mexico. Dist. Ct. N. M., Ber- nalillo County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9367. Casper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 170. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 853 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9368. Panton v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 942. No. 95­9369. Seymour v. New Hampshire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 140 N. H. 736, 673 A. 2d 786. No. 95­9370. Roulette v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 418. No. 95­9371. Chapman v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 393. No. 95­9372. Givings v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9374. Rodrigo Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 857. No. 95­9375. Manning v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 212. No. 95­9376. Brown v. Georgia Department of Correc- tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9377. Jefferson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 464. No. 95­9378. Canatella v. Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll, Thompson & Horn et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9379. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1161. No. 95­9380. Caldwell v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 917 S. W. 2d 662. No. 95­9381. Hope v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9383. Forbes v. Patrissi, Commissioner, Vermont Department of Corrections. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9384. Hill v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 122. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 854 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9385. Teel v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9387. Washington v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1147. No. 95­9388. Williams v. Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 Ore. 620, 912 P. 2d 364. No. 95­9389. Bruce v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1506. No. 95­9390. Verbeck v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 122. No. 95­9391. Brown v. Gunn et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1230. No. 95­9392. Bowman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1144. No. 95­9393. Sprosty v. Buchler, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 635. No. 95­9394. Onitiri v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 942. No. 95­9395. Roscoe v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 Ariz. 484, 910 P. 2d 635. No. 95­9396. Buzea v. Stanhope Hotel. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 944. No. 95­9397. Woods v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1017. No. 95­9399. Igbonwa v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 95­9400. Medina v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 694, 906 P. 2d 2. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 855 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9401. Stevens v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 543 Pa. 204, 670 A. 2d 623. No. 95­9402. Romano v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 909 P. 2d 92. No. 95­9403. Perdue v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 916 S. W. 2d 148. No. 95­9404. Mejia-Uribe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 395. No. 95­9405. Markoff v. Markoff. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9406. Young v. Jones, Commissioner, Alabama De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 496. No. 95­9407. Meservy v. Meservy. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 111 Nev. 1724, 916 P. 2d 206. No. 95­9408. Cooper v. Malone et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­9409. Lennon v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 661 So. 2d 1047. No. 95­9410. Neal v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 901. No. 95­9411. Palaimo v. Lutz et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 109. No. 95­9412. Murphy v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 99 F. 3d 401. No. 95­9413. Temple v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 581. No. 95­9415. Young v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 95­9416. Weaver v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 App. Div. 2d 1046, 635 N. Y. S. 2d 861. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 856 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9417. Weaver v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 912 S. W. 2d 499. No. 95­9418. Perez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 79. No. 95­9419. Rodriguez v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 413. No. 95­9421. Schulte v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 388. No. 95­9422. Tyler v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9423. Concepcion v. Puerto Rico. Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9425. Marsh v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 196 Wis. 2d 649, 539 N. W. 2d 338. No. 95­9426. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 241. No. 95­9427. Denogean v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1010. No. 95­9428. Hamm v. Latessa, Superintendent, Massa- chusetts Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 947. No. 95­9429. Padilla v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1155. No. 95­9430. Kaufman v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­9431. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 68. No. 95­9432. Medina-Morales v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 95­9433. Krueger v. Woods, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 419. No. 95­9434. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 146. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 857 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9435. Lee v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 407. No. 95­9436. McCarthy v. Kupec, Warden. Super. Ct. Conn., Tolland Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9437. Stabile v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 407. No. 95­9438. Cruz-Fernandez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1160. No. 95­9440. Staula v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 596. No. 95­9442. Askew v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 160. No. 95­9443. Barnes v. United States; and No. 96­5041. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 934. No. 95­9444. Glass v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Reformatory. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9446. Dotson v. California Public Utilities Com- mission et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9447. Fletcher v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 49. No. 95­9448. Holt v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 14. No. 95­9449. Dees v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 916 S. W. 2d 287. No. 95­9450. Falciso v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 422. No. 95­9451. Guichard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9452. Fortescue v. Simpson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 111. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 858 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9453. Gibson v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 78 F. 3d 372. No. 95­9454. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 74. No. 95­9455. Hill v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1477. No. 95­9456. Gordon v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­9457. Harper v. United States District Court for the District of Kansas et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 426. No. 95­9458. Dahler v. Meyer et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­9459. Hanberry et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1142. No. 95­9460. Williams v. Hofbauer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9462. Montgomery, aka Zulu X, aka Howard v. United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 616. No. 95­9464. Impola v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 165. No. 95­9465. Cheren v. Fitch. Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9466. Walters v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9467. Clarke v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 95­9468. Cotton v. Dorsey, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 172. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 859 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9469. Smith v. National Corporation of Housing Partnerships. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9470. Caldwell v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 S. W. 2d 7. No. 95­9471. Chappell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 161. No. 95­9472. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1168. No. 95­9473. Berk v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 257, 667 N. E. 2d 308. No. 95­9474. Azeez v. Duncil, Warden. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9475. Long v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1060. No. 95­9476. McDonald v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 429. No. 95­9477. Moran v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 600. No. 95­9478. Nash v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1470. No. 95­9479. Melhorn v. United States; and No. 96­5398. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1304 and 82 F. 3d 989. No. 95­9481. Hoang v. Mercury Insurance Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9483. Douglas v. Miller, Superintendent, Indi- ana Correctional Industrial Complex. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 163. No. 95­9484. Hampton v. Brown et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 860 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­9486. Garner v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 M. J. 435. No. 95­9487. Taylor v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 669 So. 2d 364. No. 95­9488. Carter v. Bowlen, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9489. Barton v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9490. Brewington v. Woodard, Superintendent, Johnston Correctional Center. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 467. No. 95­9491. Rodriguez v. United States; and No. 96­5097. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 431. No. 95­9492. Bolton v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 156. No. 95­9493. Burgess v. Nitzschke. Dist. Ct., Town of Dur- ham, N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9494. Bryant v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9495. Cotton v. Hilbig et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 477. No. 95­9496. Barth v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 309. No. 95­9497. Fergurson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 274 Ill. App. 3d 1124, 691 N. E. 2d 1206. No. 95­9498. Hosna et al. v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 298. No. 95­9499. Henao v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 681. No. 95­9500. Wimberly v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 673. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 861 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 95­9501. Contreras et al. v. Hawk, Director, Fed- eral Bureau of Prisons, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 484. No. 96­3. Texas v. Sierra Club et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 155. No. 96­4. Rowinsky, Next Friend of Doe et al., Her Minor Children v. Bryan Independent School District et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1006. No. 96­5. Panzer et al. v. Nelkin et al. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6. Wilkinson & Monaghan et al. v. Hillcrest Healthcare Corp. et al. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 914 P. 2d 1060. No. 96­7. Wheeler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­8. Fontao v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 423. No. 96­10. In re Geschke et ux. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­12. Hunter, on Behalf of Hunter et al. v. Knoll Rig & Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 803. No. 96­13. Lee et al. v. Goodman. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1007. No. 96­14. Andrick et ux. v. Pool Energy Services Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 480. No. 96­15. Smith v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 275 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 692 N. E. 2d 875. No. 96­16. Wudtke et vir v. Childers et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 391. No. 96­18. Neely v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 376. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 862 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­19. Vencil, Trustee of the Trust of White et ux., et al. v. Quigley, President Judge, Court of Com- mon Pleas, 41st Judicial District, Juniata and Perry Coun- ties, Orphan's Court Division. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­21. Gravel v. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128 Wash. 2d 707, 911 P. 2d 389. No. 96­22. Armstrong et al. v. California. App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied. No. 96­23. Amato et al. v. City of Richmond et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 578. No. 96­24. Grosz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­26. Zientek v. New York et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 App. Div. 2d 1041, 635 N. Y. S. 2d 893. No. 96­27. Levin v. Maya Construction. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1395. No. 96­28. Rivers v. Federal Express Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­29. Northern States Power Co. et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 764. No. 96­30. Tinch et al. v. City of Dayton et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 483. No. 96­32. Manning et al. v. City of Chicago et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Ill. App. 3d 260, 657 N. E. 2d 1123. No. 96­33. Chodos v. Shop Television Network, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­34. Ratcliff et al. v. Daniel et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 432. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 863 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­35. Dooley, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Dooley, Deceased, et al. v. International Safety Instruments, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 432. No. 96­36. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Harrison. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1107. No. 96­37. Rees et al. v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 909 S. W. 2d 264. No. 96­38. Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 754. No. 96­39. Interoceanica Corp. et al. v. Ball et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 73. No. 96­41. Harris et ux. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 414. No. 96­42. Furtick v. Shults et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 664 So. 2d 288. No. 96­45. Coffey v. Winske et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 147. No. 96­46. Zielinski et al. v. Schmalbeck et al. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 572, 646 N. E. 2d 655. No. 96­47. Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 48. No. 96­48. Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Botaba Realty Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 593. No. 96­49. Estate of Buice, Deceased, et al. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 414. No. 96­50. Concourse Nursing Home v. Perales, Commis- sioner, New York State Department of Social Serivices, et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 219 App. Div. 2d 451, 631 N. Y. S. 2d 156. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 864 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­51. Adams et al. v. Burlington Northern Rail- road Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1377. No. 96­52. Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 485. No. 96­55. Bayshore National Bank of La Porte v. Evans et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1143. No. 96­56. Pure Waters, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­57. Schiffer v. Tarrytown Boat Club, Inc., et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 219 App. Div. 2d 704, 631 N. Y. S. 2d 435. No. 96­58. Harris v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 66. No. 96­59. Cazier v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp., fka Keycorp Mortgage Inc. et al. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Idaho 879, 908 P. 2d 572. No. 96­62. Voytek v. University of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 491. No. 96­64. Di Lauro et ux. v. Ver Strate et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1226. No. 96­65. Grumman Technical Services, Inc., et al. v. Estate of Ishee et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 84 F. 3d 434. No. 96­67. Saathoff v. Whelan et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 169. No. 96­69. Thompson v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 604. No. 96­71. Philadelphia Tribune Co. et al. v. Brown. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 447 Pa. Super. 52, 668 A. 2d 159. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 865 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­72. City of Jasper v. Jasper Civil Service Board. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 677 So. 2d 761. No. 96­74. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio et al. v. Schachner. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 889. No. 96­75. Singleton et al. v. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 26. No. 96­76. Swisher v. Texas State Bar. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­77. Morgan et al. v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 S. W. 2d 620. No. 96­78. Spiegel v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 277 Ill. App. 3d 340, 660 N. E. 2d 200. No. 96­80. Garcia v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 27. No. 96­81. Rennick et al. v. Option Care, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 309. No. 96­82. Omnitrition International, Inc., et al. v. Webster et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 776. No. 96­85. McCracken v. Coshocton County et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­87. Moody v. Alabama Department of Education et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 498. No. 96­88. Sayco Ltd. v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1173. No. 96­89. United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1465. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 866 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­92. Wolf v. Buss America, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 914. No. 96­94. Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Zehnder, Direc- tor, Illinois Department of Revenue, et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 171 Ill. 2d 410, 665 N. E. 2d 795. No. 96­95. Dinkins, Personal Representative of the Es- tate of Dinkins, Deceased v. Hutzel Hospital et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 378. No. 96­96. Wyshak v. American Savings Bank, F. A., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 596. No. 96­97. Central Regional School District v. M. C. et al., on Behalf of Their Son, J. C. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 389. No. 96­99. Dahl et al. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 545 N. W. 2d 918. No. 96­101. Ben Yahweh et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1518. No. 96­103. Hood v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­104. Holt v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 675 A. 2d 474. No. 96­105. Studio Art Theatre of Evansville, Inc., et al. v. City of Evansville, Indiana, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 128. No. 96­107. Froeman v. Maryland. Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­108. Huston v. Tennessee Board of Regents et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 422. No. 96­114. Gallego v. Service Lloyds Insurance Co. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 867 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­115. City of East Palo Alto et al. v. Hazzard. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1245. No. 96­117. Maxwell et al. v. Samson Resources Co. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­118. Hill v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 422 Mass. 147, 661 N. E. 2d 1285. No. 96­120. Veneklase et al. v. City of Fargo et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1264. No. 96­121. Smith v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­122. Dunworth v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1167. No. 96­124. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., et al. v. BankAtlantic Financial Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1508. No. 96­125. Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 620. No. 96­127. Greene v. City of Montgomery. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 677 So. 2d 794. No. 96­128. Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 415. No. 96­129. Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, Nebraska, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1261. No. 96­130. Antonio Santiago, aka Gomez Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 390. No. 96­131. Ozuna Galan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 639. No. 96­132. Bolt v. Ptarmigan Co., Inc. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 P. 2d 1357. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 868 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­133. Wood v. County of San Mateo et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­134. Giffler v. Abel et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 122. No. 96­136. Abele Associates v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 A. 2d 533. No. 96­138. DeRewal v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 407. No. 96­139. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1480. No. 96­142. Hauert v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 838. No. 96­143. Village of Westhaven et al. v. Creek. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 186. No. 96­144. Narumanchi v. Abdelsayed. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Conn. App. 778, 668 A. 2d 378. No. 96­145. United States ex rel. Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 624. No. 96­147. Balasubramani v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 89 F. 3d 844. No. 96­148. Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 839. No. 96­149. Morris v. United States; and No. 96­5429. Gardner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­150. Schall v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 341. No. 96­151. Brunson v. Los Angeles County Superior Court (California, Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 869 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­153. Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC, et al. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 606. No. 96­154. Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith et al. v. Shelton et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 Pa. Super. 692, 673 A. 2d 398. No. 96­155. Harris et ux. v. City of Port Huron. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­158. St. Hilaire et al. v. Maine Real Estate Com- mission. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 A. 2d 956. No. 96­159. Williams v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­161. Cornish v. District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­162. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 421. No. 96­163. Dalis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­164. Sea Gull Lighting, Inc. v. Hydramatic Pack- ing Co., Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1390. No. 96­165. Ramiro Muniz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 413. No. 96­166. Kahre-Richardes Family Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Village of Baldwinsville et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­169. Andrade et al. v. City of Burlingame et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­170. Pipola v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 556. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 870 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­171. Nelson v. Nelson, aka Martin, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 594. No. 96­173. Griffin et al. v. Box et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 625. No. 96­175. Lory, Administratrix of the Estate of Barr, Deceased, et al. v. City of Philadelphia. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 38, 674 A. 2d 673. No. 96­177. Singleton v. Christ the Servant Evangeli- cal Lutheran Church et al.; and Olson v. Luther Memo- rial Church et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 541 N. W. 2d 606 (first judgment). No. 96­178. Edgar v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 499. No. 96­179. Great Western Bank v. Kapsimalis et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­181. Allred v. A. L. L. et al. Ct. App. Kan. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d 119, 912 P. 2d 761. No. 96­182. American Deposit Corp. et al. v. Schacht, Individually and as Illinois Acting Director of Insur- ance. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 834. No. 96­183. Dolihite, Individually and as Father and Next Friend of Dolihite, et al. v. King et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1027. No. 96­187. Bowlin v. Mease, Sheriff, Stone County. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1243. No. 96­190. Hall v. Benet-Melendez. Ct. App. P. R. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­191. Mett et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1531. No. 96­192. Ramsey v. Colonial Life Insurance Company of America, dba Chubb LifeAmerica. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 625. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 871 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­196. JA­RU v. City of New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 163, 666 N. E. 2d 537. No. 96­198. Kosisky v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 447 Pa. Super. 629, 668 A. 2d 1192. No. 96­199. Pilot Air Freight Corp. et al. v. Jellico, dba Jellico Studio of Western Art. Dist. Ct., City and County of Denver, Colo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­206. Oney v. Nennig. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 197 Wis. 2d 954, 543 N. W. 2d 867. No. 96­208. Klein v. Collard & Roe, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 941. No. 96­211. Taylor v. Meacham et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1556. No. 96­212. In re Smith. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 335. No. 96­213. Lopreato v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 571. No. 96­214. Sharp v. Miller et al. Ct. App. N. C. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 121 N. C. App. 616, 468 S. E. 2d 799. No. 96­218. Shumate v. NationsBank. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 150. No. 96­220. Allen v. Unison Transformer Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 461. No. 96­221. Fowler v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­223. Jones v. Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­224. Finizie v. City of Bridgeport. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 Conn. 909, 675 A. 2d 456. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 872 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­226. Anderson v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 675 A. 2d 943. No. 96­227. Fraser, Executrix of the Estate of Fraser v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 591. No. 96­232. Dubin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 490. No. 96­239. Ramirez et al. v. City of Wichita et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 597. No. 96­241. Lopez et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1032. No. 96­242. Alt v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 779. No. 96­251. Vega v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­255. MacDonald v. Delaware County Board of Supervisors. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 42. No. 96­256. Dalton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1255. No. 96­257. Simmons v. Wetherall et al. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­260. Mann v. City of Chicago et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1242. No. 96­266. Collins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1021. No. 96­274. Acty v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1054. No. 96­277. Ragland et al. v. SMS Financial, L. L. C. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 918 P. 2d 400. No. 96­281. Gutstein v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1162. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 873 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­283. Dee v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 403. No. 96­285. Taylor v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 526. No. 96­293. Jeong Kyo Lim v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­304. Denbicare U. S. A., Inc., et al. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1143. No. 96­310. Castaneda v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 470. No. 96­327. Smith v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 40 Conn. App. 789, 673 A. 2d 1149. No. 96­5001. Reed v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 217, 914 P. 2d 184. No. 96­5002. Sessoms v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 892, 467 S. E. 2d 243. No. 96­5003. Rice v. Wood, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 77 F. 3d 1138. No. 96­5004. Oaks v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 409, 662 N. E. 2d 1328. No. 96­5005. Ruff v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 123. No. 96­5006. Stanley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 162. No. 96­5007. Slater v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 162. No. 96­5008. Doyle v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 Mich. 93, 545 N. W. 2d 627. No. 96­5009. Reyes v. Standard Mortgage Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 594. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 874 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5010. Rogers v. White, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5011. Stokes v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 448 Pa. Super. 657, 671 A. 2d 773. No. 96­5012. Roberson v. Franklin et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­5013. Storey v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5014. Sallee v. Sherakas et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5016. Hamilton v. Schriro, Director, Missouri De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1545. No. 96­5018. Maxie v. Hamilton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 422. No. 96­5019. Murray v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P. 2d 542. No. 96­5020. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 162. No. 96­5021. Jones v. Washington, Director, Illinois De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5022. Leigh v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 580. No. 96­5023. Maxie v. County of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5024. McGee v. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5026. Laszczynski v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5027. Jenner v. Class, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 736. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 875 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5028. Knaub v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­5029. Gutierrez-Munoz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 419. No. 96­5031. Michael v. Zervakos et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 469. No. 96­5032. Moore v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 171 Ill. 2d 74, 662 N. E. 2d 1215. No. 96­5033. Kirkland v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 891, 467 S. E. 2d 242. No. 96­5035. Winnicki v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 630. No. 96­5036. Wells v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5037. Vogt v. Churchill et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 147. No. 96­5039. Brookins v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5040. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1251. No. 96­5042. Arthur v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­5043. Chandler v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 742, 467 S. E. 2d 636. No. 96­5044. Brown v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1499. No. 96­5045. Barr v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 681. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 876 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5046. Bounds v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 171 Ill. 2d 1, 662 N. E. 2d 1168. No. 96­5048. Romer v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5049. Haynes v. Compton, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5051. Hodrick v. United States; and No. 96­5157. Sparks v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­5053. Souvannarath v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 545 N. W. 2d 30. No. 96­5054. Archer v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 17. No. 96­5055. Gould v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1719. No. 96­5056. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­5057. Tyler et al. v. Carnahan, Governor of Missouri, et al. (two judgments). C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5058. Barber et ux. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 964. No. 96­5059. Abandy v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­5060. Gough v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1247. No. 96­5061. Boulden v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 467. No. 96­5062. Anderson v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 621. No. 96­5063. Middleton v. Moore, Director, South Caro- lina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 469. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 877 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5065. King v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5066. Leonard v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 422 Mass. 504, 663 N. E. 2d 828. No. 96­5067. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 420. No. 96­5068. Adams v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 436. No. 96­5069. Boccella v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­5070. Williams v. Netherland, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5071. Woodard v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5072. Tlaga v. Reno, Attorney General. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 96­5073. Claywell v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 219 Ga. App. XXVI. No. 96­5074. Clay v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5075. Basey v. Herklotz et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 477. No. 96­5076. Thomas v. Evans et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5077. Whitehead v. Washington Post et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5078. Peagler v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 526. No. 96­5079. Ray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 881. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 878 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5080. Sanders v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 Vt. 638, 678 A. 2d 460. No. 96­5081. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 427. No. 96­5082. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 9. No. 96­5083. Hoff v. Wilson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 357. No. 96­5084. Green v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 152. No. 96­5085. Galowski v. Berge, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1176. No. 96­5086. Dworzanski v. Dworzanski. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 688 N. E. 2d 150. No. 96­5087. Peterson v. Williams, Superintendent, Go- wanda Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 39. No. 96­5088. Torres Serrano v. Marshall, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 594. No. 96­5089. Simmons v. Bienvenu et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 173. No. 96­5090. Boateng v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 170. No. 96­5091. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 393. No. 96­5092. Phelps et ux. v. Denton County Sheriff et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 418. No. 96­5093. Best v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 502, 467 S. E. 2d 45. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 879 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5094. Baker v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5095. Demarey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 161. No. 96­5096. Oliver v. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5098. Hickman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­5099. Dillingham v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5100. Dunbar v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5101. Baucum v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 362. No. 96­5102. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1169. No. 96­5103. Jackson v. Tamminga. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5104. McCarthy v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5105. McCarthy v. Kupec, Warden. Super. Ct. Conn., Tolland Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5106. Newport v. Michelin Aircraft Tire, aka Michelin Tire Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 73 F. 3d 366. No. 96­5107. Isaacs v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 N. E. 2d 1036. No. 96­5108. Nowaczyk v. New Hampshire et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5109. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 880 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5110. Moats v. White, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5111. Marks v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 396. No. 96­5112. Munson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 171 Ill. 2d 158, 662 N. E. 2d 1265. No. 96­5113. Mejorado-Soto v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 363. No. 96­5114. Noltimier v. Minnesota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 589. No. 96­5115. Kirby v. Davis, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5116. Kashannejad v. Gomez, Director, Califor- nia Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5117. Mains v. Hall et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 10. No. 96­5118. Johnson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5119. Weber v. Erickson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5121. Leaphart v. Peterson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­5122. Ayeboua v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5123. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 436. No. 96­5125. Rodriquez v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 543 Pa. 651, 674 A. 2d 225. No. 96­5126. Schmidt et ux. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 139. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 881 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5127. Boyd v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 915 P. 2d 922. No. 96­5129. Heistand v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5130. Walton v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 604. No. 96­5131. Smith v. Becker et al. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5132. Brown v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 267 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 684 N. E. 2d 1119. No. 96­5133. Blandino v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 352, 914 P. 2d 624. No. 96­5135. Balcazar v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1143. No. 96­5137. Thomas v. Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1252. No. 96­5138. Amitin v. Maryland Department of Social Services. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 Md. App. 206, 667 A. 2d 931. No. 96­5140. Bowman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5141. Gomez v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 967. No. 96­5142. Hayes v. Correction Management Affili- ates, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 373. No. 96­5143. Hervey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 419. No. 96­5144. Mills v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 427. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 882 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5145. Keesee, aka Murphy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 407. No. 96­5146. Minarik v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 447 Pa. Super. 631, 668 A. 2d 1194. No. 96­5147. Rayford v. Morgan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5148. Segler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 413. No. 96­5149. Rutherford v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5151. Bazel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­5152. Childs v. Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 129. No. 96­5153. Wells v. Zent, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 423. No. 96­5154. Thorne v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5155. Tripati v. Arizona (two judgments). Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5156. Reed v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1419. No. 96­5158. Brown v. Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 148. No. 96­5159. Fields v. American Express Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 435. No. 96­5160. Doran v. McGinnis, Director, Michigan De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5161. Flattum v. Baker et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 169. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 883 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5162. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 681. No. 96­5163. Adams v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5165. Shelton v. Gudmanson, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 420. No. 96­5166. Smallwood v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1343. No. 96­5167. Scott v. Tansy, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 426. No. 96­5168. Ishikawa v. City of New York Department of Cultural Affairs. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 109. No. 96­5169. Gonzalez Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­5170. Morris et ux. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 387. No. 96­5171. Mills v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 So. 2d 489. No. 96­5172. Luna v. Walton et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5173. Jhaveri v. Muro. Ct. App. Cal, 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5174. Temple v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 581. No. 96­5175. Wilson v. Prunty, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­5176. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 877. No. 96­5177. Martel v. New Hampshire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 884 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5179. Gadson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 96­5180. Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Man- agement. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1163. No. 96­5181. Gilbert v. Parker, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5182. Esposito v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­5183. Coleman v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 371. No. 96­5184. Bates v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1101. No. 96­5187. Pullen v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 427. No. 96­5188. Sallee v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 945. No. 96­5189. Rogers v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5191. Simpson v. Cepak, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 579. No. 96­5192. Santos v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 App. Div. 2d 731, 619 N. Y. S. 2d 684. No. 96­5193. Smith v. Englewood Associates et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5194. Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 439. No. 96­5195. Briscoe v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mob- erly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 588. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 885 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5196. Crowder v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 830. No. 96­5197. Toepeaka v. Department of the Treasury. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5198. Willmes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 421. No. 96­5199. Banko v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board of Pennsylvania. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5200. Rodriguez Macias v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 619. No. 96­5201. Mammah v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1312. No. 96­5202. McQueen v. Baker et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1313. No. 96­5203. Johnson v. Sullivan et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5204. Burks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­5205. Cabrera-Sosa v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 998. No. 96­5207. Schueller v. Edgar et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­5208. Schultz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­5209. Woody v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5210. Pierce v. McCaughtry, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 163. No. 96­5211. Ragan v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5212. Patrick v. South Carolina. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 S. C. 352, 457 S. E. 2d 632. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 886 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5213. Sawyer v. Dairy Queen. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­5215. Forbey v. New Hampshire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5216. Harrison v. Digital Equipment Corp. et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5217. Harrison v. Moya, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­5218. Deas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 415. No. 96­5220. Gilliam v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5221. Hodges v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­5222. Henderson v. Brown, Secretary of Veter- ans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 432. No. 96­5223. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­5224. Fetrow v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­5226. McClure v. City of Charlotte, North Caro- lina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­5227. McGhee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 438. No. 96­5228. King v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1564. No. 96­5229. McManus v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1309. No. 96­5230. Langston v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 410. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 887 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5231. Chapman v. Vander Ark, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5233. Atamian v. Chin et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 Md. App. 715. No. 96­5235. Williams v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1510. No. 96­5236. Christensen v. Scott, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 46. No. 96­5237. Deckard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5238. Babineaux v. Klevenhagen et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5240. Matthews v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 275 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 692 N. E. 2d 874. No. 96­5243. Goins v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Va. 442, 470 S. E. 2d 114. No. 96­5245. Offiong v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 430. No. 96­5247. Bane v. Sprouse et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 148. No. 96­5248. Morrison v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 423. No. 96­5249. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­5250. Iqbal v. Berkeley Marina Marriott Man- agement et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 427. No. 96­5251. Olguini v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 428. No. 96­5253. Simpson v. Freeman. Ct. App. N. M. Certio- rari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 888 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5255. Rodriguez v. Mitchell, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 945. No. 96­5256. Enriquez v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5257. Holloway v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 373. No. 96­5258. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 423. No. 96­5260. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­5262. Wagner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 485. No. 96­5263. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 618. No. 96­5264. Cardan v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5266. Benge v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 136, 661 N. E. 2d 1019. No. 96­5267. Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 620. No. 96­5268. Glock v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 878. No. 96­5270. Feher v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 434. No. 96­5271. Flores v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 7. No. 96­5273. Wages v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 261 Ill. App. 3d 576, 633 N. E. 2d 855. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 889 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5274. Westbrooks v. Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Allegheny County. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5275. Bretschneider v. Brown. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5276. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 434. No. 96­5277. Basket v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 44. No. 96­5278. Beals v. United States; and No. 96­5720. Voss et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1521. No. 96­5279. Long v. Love, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5280. Resnik v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­5281. Ruff v. Armontrout, Assistant Director, Zone II, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 265. No. 96­5282. Salazar Gonzales v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 622. No. 96­5283. Rochester v. Reed et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 415. No. 96­5284. Payne v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5285. Joseph v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 389. No. 96­5286. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1258. No. 96­5287. Thompson v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1571. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 890 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5288. Torres v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 427. No. 96­5289. Favarolo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 687. No. 96­5290. French v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 186. No. 96­5291. Faulk v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 620. No. 96­5292. Day v. Committee of Bar Examiners. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5293. Hand v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 462. No. 96­5294. Noltimier v. Court of Appeals of Minne- sota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5295. Mosley v. Low Country Media, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 150. No. 96­5296. Jacobs v. Supreme Court of Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5297. Richardson v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 772, 467 S. E. 2d 685. No. 96­5298. Kulinski v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 373. No. 96­5299. Lopes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 421. No. 96­5300. Waters v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 157. No. 96­5301. Bruen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­5302. Buck v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1167. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 891 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5303. Reese v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5304. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 154. No. 96­5305. Williams v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 321 S. C. 327, 468 S. E. 2d 626. No. 96­5307. Hoskins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 624. No. 96­5309. Geralds v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 96. No. 96­5310. Alver v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1179. No. 96­5311. Bankston et al. v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. et al. (two judgments). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5312. Brito v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5313. Cornely v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­5314. Cook et ux. v. Boyd. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 611. No. 96­5317. Abidekun v. Commissioner of Social Serv- ices of the City of New York et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5318. Dais v. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Pennsylva- nia, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5319. Duarte v. United States Bureau of Prisons et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 431. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 892 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5320. Dempsey v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1125, 665 N. E. 2d 1039. No. 96­5321. Fenton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 152. No. 96­5322. Onaghise v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 638. No. 96­5323. Rhode v. Olk Long, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 284. No. 96­5324. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5325. Sullivan v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 676 A. 2d 908. No. 96­5326. Kwan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 387. No. 96­5327. Kokoski v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­5329. Johnson v. National Association of Securi- ties Dealers, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1166. No. 96­5332. Shern v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 275 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 692 N. E. 2d 875. No. 96­5333. Parisi v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 267 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 684 N. E. 2d 1120. No. 96­5334. Buker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 490. No. 96­5336. McCall v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5338. Lonchar v. Hofbauer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5339. Washington v. Singer et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 848. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 893 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5340. Thomas v. Sanders et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5341. Baker v. Independent Order of Foresters et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5343. Hill v. Gooden et al. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5344. Derr v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 414. No. 96­5345. Emmons v. Lumley. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5346. Pineda Duque v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 638. No. 96­5347. Harris v. United States; and No. 96­5537. Dorsey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­5348. Shelly v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 425. No. 96­5350. Dotson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 425. No. 96­5352. Cambas Hernandez et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 429. No. 96­5353. Reinbold v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5354. Stanton v. Witkowski, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5355. Lawal v. Stanley Bostitch Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5357. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1480. No. 96­5358. Ceballos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1107. No. 96­5359. Tynes v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 434. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 894 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5361. Cielto v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­5363. Williams v. Caspari, Superintendent, Mis- souri Eastern Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5364. Tuggle v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1386. No. 96­5367. Staup v. First Union National Bank of Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 929. No. 96­5368. Dellenbach v. Hanks, Superintendent, Wa- bash Valley Correctional Institute. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 820. No. 96­5370. Lyons v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 1, 468 S. E. 2d 204. No. 96­5371. Kandies v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 419, 467 S. E. 2d 67. No. 96­5372. Chuquimarca v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 682. No. 96­5373. Bacchi v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clin- ton Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­5375. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1252. No. 96­5376. Rawls v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 643. No. 96­5377. Mehio v. Graber et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 493. No. 96­5378. Jones v. Farley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 424. No. 96­5379. Knight v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 489. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 895 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5381. Neadle v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1104. No. 96­5382. Killingsworth v. Stock, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5383. McDonald v. Inland Container Corp. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 Ga. App. XXIX. No. 96­5384. Shores v. Stock, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1171. No. 96­5385. Shelton v. Lensing, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1145. No. 96­5386. Sceifers v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 N. E. 2d 1191. No. 96­5387. Adelman v. Mercy Catholic Medical Cen- ter. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5388. Wogenstahl v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 344, 662 N. E. 2d 311. No. 96­5389. Wells v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 624. No. 96­5390. Wishnatsky v. Bergquist et al. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 550 N. W. 2d 394. No. 96­5391. Wadley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 510. No. 96­5392. Vargas v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1273. No. 96­5393. Wright v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 127. No. 96­5394. Williams et al. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5396. Hill v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 195, 661 N. E. 2d 1068. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 896 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5397. Hutchinson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 626. No. 96­5399. Floyd v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 101, 468 S. E. 2d 46. No. 96­5401. DeCastro v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 667, 467 S. E. 2d 653. No. 96­5402. Farris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 391. No. 96­5403. Douglas v. United States; No. 96­5495. Douglas v. United States; and No. 96­5501. King v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1315. No. 96­5404. Daniels v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 436. No. 96­5405. Graham v. Furlong, Superintendent, Limon Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 392. No. 96­5406. Henson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 425. No. 96­5407. Brown v. American Express Travel Re- lated Services Co., Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­5409. Broadnax v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­5410. Richards v. General Services Administra- tion. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 132. No. 96­5411. Felton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1142. No. 96­5412. Hupp v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 897 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5413. Felder v. Stock, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5414. Allphin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 598. No. 96­5415. Owes v. Sessions, Attorney General of Al- abama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 438. No. 96­5416. Salmon v. Branton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 96­5418. Contreras v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5419. Brown v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treas- ury, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5420. Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 108. No. 96­5421. Irving v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 558. No. 96­5422. Burger v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 941. No. 96­5423. Steele v. Han Chul Choi. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 175. No. 96­5424. Borromeo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 579. No. 96­5425. Patterson v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 838. No. 96­5426. Campbell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­5427. Gibbons v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 942. No. 96­5428. Dortch v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1713. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 898 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5430. Madden v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 417. No. 96­5431. Lusk v. Pope County, Arkansas, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5432. Kontakis v. Morton, Administrator, New Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5433. Misskelley v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 323 Ark. 449, 915 S. W. 2d 702. No. 96­5434. Nero v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 847. No. 96­5435. Lekhovitser v. Lekhovitser. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 666 So. 2d 144. No. 96­5436. Long v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 642. No. 96­5437. Moore v. Kuhlmann, Superintendent, Sulli- van Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­5438. Kinnell v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d xxiii, 918 P. 2d 649. No. 96­5439. Munoz-Mosquera v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­5440. Ainge v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 170. No. 96­5442. Kay v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 98. No. 96­5443. Waldrop v. Hopper, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1308. No. 96­5444. Whaley v. Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 430. No. 96­5445. Yulee v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 837. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 899 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5446. Wilmoth v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 848. No. 96­5447. Cohen v. Waters, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 409. No. 96­5448. Staude v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1, 908 P. 2d 1373. No. 96­5449. Omoike v. Lee et al. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 615. No. 96­5450. Spaulding v. Hill, Superintendent, Odom Correctional Institution. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 133. No. 96­5451. Calder v. Bayer, Director, Nevada Depart- ment of Prisons, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5452. Wills v. Andrews, Superintendent, Albion Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5453. Kelley v. United States District Court for the District of Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1150. No. 96­5455. Marx v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 486. No. 96­5456. Waterman v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1105, 661 N. E. 2d 958. No. 96­5457. Alberto Pelaez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 435. No. 96­5458. Spratt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­5459. Neville et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 750. No. 96­5460. Card v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 926. No. 96­5463. Stulz v. United States Parole Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 625. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 900 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5464. Phachansiri v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 100, 645 N. E. 2d 60. No. 96­5465. Stavrakas v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­5466. Petaway v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 617. No. 96­5467. Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 977. No. 96­5468. Ward v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 630. No. 96­5469. Williams et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­5470. Jelinek v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 224 App. Div. 2d 717, 638 N. Y. S. 2d 731. No. 96­5471. Noble v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5472. Acosta Coronado v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 638. No. 96­5474. Pineda-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 847. No. 96­5475. Pless v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1217. No. 96­5476. Moore v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5478. Mongelli v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 436. No. 96­5480. Billis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 209. No. 96­5482. Harrison v. Letsinger. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 901 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5485. Vey v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 451 Pa. Super. 605, 678 A. 2d 835. No. 96­5487. Heldon v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5488. Hampton v. Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5489. Hickman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1199. No. 96­5493. Harvey v. Shillinger, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1528. No. 96­5494. Hickman v. United States; No. 96­5554. Ivy, aka Norwood v. United States; No. 96­5619. Traylor v. United States; No. 96­5634. Taylor v. United States; and No. 96­5655. Norwood v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1266. No. 96­5496. Hicks v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5497. Bryant v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1150. No. 96­5500. Lavigne v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1. No. 96­5502. Walker v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 216, 469 S. E. 2d 919. No. 96­5503. Jessep v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 53 Ark. App. xviii. No. 96­5506. Hargis v. Waters, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 414. No. 96­5507. Howard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 629. No. 96­5509. Tierney v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 902 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5510. Allen v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5511. Lowe v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5514. Huffman v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5516. Graham v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5518. Zuniga Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1144. No. 96­5519. Stevens v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 60. No. 96­5521. Minnifield v. Department of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5523. Bastidas v. United States; and No. 96­5524. Bastidas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 642. No. 96­5525. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 626. No. 96­5527. Serrano v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1168. No. 96­5532. Fountain v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­5533. Fitzhugh v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1326. No. 96­5538. Sims v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 853. No. 96­5541. Savage v. District of Columbia. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5542. Richardson v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Conn. App. 526, 671 A. 2d 840. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 903 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5544. Sule v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 173. No. 96­5545. Island v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­5546. McCarty v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 943. No. 96­5547. Joseph v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5548. Medina v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 419. No. 96­5550. Jefferson v. Hart. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1314. No. 96­5551. Mallard v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5552. Martin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 626. No. 96­5557. Crawford v. United States; and Huff v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 964 (first judgment); 89 F. 3d 842 (second judgment). No. 96­5558. Conerly v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 144. No. 96­5559. Chase v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 436. No. 96­5561. Contreras-Contreras v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1103. No. 96­5562. Chavez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347. No. 96­5565. Irvin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 860. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 904 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5566. Moore v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­5574. Mallory et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 96­5577. Cross v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5578. Alzate-Yepez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 656. No. 96­5579. Bryan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 595. No. 96­5580. Tobias v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 157. No. 96­5582. Mark v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 472. No. 96­5583. Morris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5584. Tokarevich v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 161. No. 96­5585. Walker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 94. No. 96­5587. Nugent v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 44. No. 96­5589. Muse v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 672. No. 96­5590. Kulinski v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 373. No. 96­5591. Brown v. Hampton, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 414. No. 96­5592. Adams v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­5598. Martinez-Cortez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 626. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 905 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5600. Christy v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 841. No. 96­5606. Smith v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5607. Baker v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5608. Bell v. Administrator of Attorney Regis- tration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5610. McAllister v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 387. No. 96­5612. Waters v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 86. No. 96­5613. Poe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 152. No. 96­5620. McMillian v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1311. No. 96­5621. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1313. No. 96­5623. Brooks v. Price. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5626. Haywood v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 507. No. 96­5631. Boots v. United States; No. 96­5635. Cook v. United States; and No. 96­5645. Lazore v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 580. No. 96­5632. Walker v. Waters, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 580. No. 96­5633. Wheeler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1170. No. 96­5637. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 906 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5639. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 152. No. 96­5641. Rose v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5647. Merritt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1025. No. 96­5649. Greenwood v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­5650. Geter v. Franklin National Bank of Wash- ington, D. C. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5651. Denha v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1315. No. 96­5652. Holt v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 629. No. 96­5656. Miller v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1312. No. 96­5657. Jones v. Ignacio, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5664. Olivo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 1057 and 80 F. 3d 1466. No. 96­5665. Almero v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 422. No. 96­5667. Garza Cantu et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1118. No. 96­5668. Osayande v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. No. 96­5670. Guzman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1090. No. 96­5671. Finno et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1169. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 907 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5673. Montgomery v. Meloy, Superintendent, Rockville Training Center. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­5675. Warren v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5676. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1165. No. 96­5683. King v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5685. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1549. No. 96­5686. Bradley v. Meko, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5687. Bray v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­5691. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5692. Espericueta v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 433. No. 96­5699. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 50. No. 96­5701. Kambitsis et al. v. Schwegmann Giant Su- permarkets, Inc. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 So. 2d 500. No. 96­5704. Pierce v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­5709. Gateward v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 670. No. 96­5710. Gray v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 380. No. 96­5711. Hoskins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1159. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 908 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5712. Halsey v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 424. No. 96­5713. Gulley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­5717. Creasey v. Kemna, Superintendent, West- ern Missouri Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5718. Segines v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­5721. Cathcart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 431. No. 96­5722. Westcott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1354. No. 96­5724. Weekley v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mob- erly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1459. No. 96­5726. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 498. No. 96­5730. Kammefa v. Maryland Department of Agri- culture. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 150. No. 96­5735. D'Souza v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5743. Sluder et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1157. No. 96­5744. Ayers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­5746. Garcia-Rivas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5747. Rashid v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5748. Kalyan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 909 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 No. 96­5751. Bond v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1009. No. 96­5752. Hobbs v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1057. No. 96­5753. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­5754. Lee v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5755. Kendricks v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­5764. Slater v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 471. No. 96­5767. Tsosie v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­5768. Woodson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5771. Griffith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 284. No. 96­5772. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­5774. Caves v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1167. No. 96­5776. Clark v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 506. No. 96­5785. Mathieu v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 137. No. 96­5786. Lomayaoma v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 142. No. 96­5787. Jordan v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5793. Willis et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1371. 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 910 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­1779. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correc- tional Center v. Driscoll. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respond- ent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 701. No. 95­1820. Connecticut v. Cassidy. Sup. Ct. Conn. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 236 Conn. 112, 672 A. 2d 899. No. 95­1969. Tate, Warden v. Glenn. C. A. 6th Cir. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 1204. No. 95­2093. Movsesian et al. v. Hamer. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 405. No. 96­137. Florida v. Soca. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of re- spondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 24. No. 95­1782. Price v. S­B Power Tool, aka Skil Corp., a Division of Emerson Electric Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 362. No. 96­5454. Mason v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, N. A., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 95­1910. Zimmer et ux. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company of Michigan et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 585. No. 95­2018. Howmedica Inc. v. Haudrich, Executor and Sole Legatee of Haudrich, Deceased. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 525, 662 N. E. 2d 1248. No. 96­68. Schuver et al. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 911 519 U. S. October 7, 1996 no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 546 N. W. 2d 610. No. 96­282. Bio-Technology General Corp. et al. v. Gen- entech, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1553. No. 95­1929. McCabe, Administratrix of the Estate of Zinger v. City of Lynn. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 540. No. 95­1980. Rivkin et al., t/a Galaxy Manor v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Board. Sup. Ct. N. J. Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 143 N. J. 352, 671 A. 2d 567. No. 95­2011. Blackman v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to file a document under seal denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­2033. BP Chemicals Ltd. et al. v. Hoechst Cel- anese Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Union Carbide Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1575. No. 95­8790. White v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer would grant cer- tiorari. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 432. No. 95­8910. Lackey v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer would grant cer- tiorari. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 116. No. 95­9230. Ballard et al. v. Kapila C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. No. 95­9351. Kneeland v. United States et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to amend petition for writ of 519ORD$$1a 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 912 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 7, 1996 519 U. S. certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 147. No. 95­9414. Van Poyck v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to amend petition for writ of certio- rari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 285 and 491. No. 96­109. Hickman v. County of Los Angeles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Lawyer's Second Amendment Society et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 98. No. 96­111. Central Cartage Co. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Area Pension Fund et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of National Association for Dispute Resolu- tion, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 988. Rehearing Denied No. 95­1534. Constellation Development Corp. v. Dow- den, Successor Trustee, et al., 518 U. S. 1017; No. 95­1806. Shoffeitt v. United States, 517 U. S. 1246; No. 95­8553. Messler et al. v. Farmer, Judge, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, et al., 517 U. S. 1247; No. 95­8705. Lekhovitser v. Lekhovitser, 518 U. S. 1022; No. 95­8807. Abidekun v. Coombe, Acting Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services, 518 U. S. 1025; No. 95­8947. Stedman v. United States, 517 U. S. 1250; and No. 95­9090. MacKenzie v. Internal Revenue Service et al., 518 U. S. 1027. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 95­8803. St. Louis v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission et al., 518 U. S. 1024. Motion for leave to file peti- tion for rehearing denied. Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Justice White (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during the period from November 18 through November 22, 1996, and for such time 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 913 519 U. S. October 7, 9, 15, 1996 as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294(a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. October 9, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­236. Pennsylvania v. Riley, Secretary of Educa- tion. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 125. October 15, 1996 Appeal Dismissed No. 96­63. Hansberger et al. v. United States. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. dismissed as moot. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­1826. Thomas et ux. v. American Home Products, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment va- cated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 266 Ga. 607, 469 S. E. 2d 171 (1996). Reported below: 39 F. 3d 325. Justice Scalia, concurring. Since I have been critical of the Court's excessive use of the GVR mechanism, I think it appropriate to explain why I think it proper to GVR here. As I described in Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 177 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), our practice of granting certiorari, vacat- ing the judgment below, and remanding for further proceedings in light of intervening developments apparently began when we first set aside the judgments of state supreme courts to allow those courts to consider the impact of state statutes enacted after their judgments had been entered. E. g., Missouri ex rel. Wa- bash R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126 (1927). By 1945, the practice of vacating state judgments in light of super- vening events had become so commonplace that we could describe it as "[a] customary procedure." State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 161. "Similarly, where a federal court of appeals' decision on a point of state law had been cast in doubt by an intervening state supreme court decision, it became 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 914 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Scalia, J., concurring 519 U. S. our practice to vacate and remand so that the question could be decided by judges `familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law and practice.' " Lawrence, supra, at 180 (Scalia, J., dissent- ing) (quoting Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237 (1944)). See also Conner v. Simler, 367 U. S. 486 (1961); cf. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Inc., 426 U. S. 310 (1976) (GVR'ing in light of an intervening state statute). Thus, the present case falls squarely within our historical use of the GVR mechanism. The Supreme Court of Georgia's deci- sion in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 266 Ga. 607, 609­610, 469 S. E. 2d 171, 174 (1996) (Banks II), handed down after the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision, makes clear that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Georgia law was incorrect. The sequence of events was as follows: After the Court of Appeals had issued its per curiam opinion affirming the District Court's entry of summary judgment against petitioners, the Georgia Su- preme Court, in Banks v. I. C. I., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S. E. 2d 671 (1994) (Banks I), in effect overruled the Georgia case that was the basis for the District Court's holding. Petitioners' petition to the Eleventh Circuit for rehearing was denied, the only explana- tion given being that "the holding of the Georgia Supreme Court in [Banks I] would not apply to the injuries involved in this case" because that holding had no retroactive application. Thomas v. American Home Products, Inc., No. 93­9214 (CA11 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Shortly before the present petition for writ of certiorari was filed, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Banks II that Banks I was retroactive. The Chief Justice points out that "[p]etitioners' request for relief meets none of the tests set forth in this Court's Rule 10, `Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari.' " Post, at 916. That is certainly so. Of course as this Court's Rule 10 itself makes plain, those tests "neither control[l] nor fully measur[e] the Court's discretion," but rather merely "indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers" in deciding whether to grant certiorari. More importantly, however, we have never regarded Rule 10, which indicates the general character of reasons for which we will grant plenary consideration, as applicable to our practice of GVR'ing. See, e. g., Lawrence v. Chater, supra, at 166­167. Indeed, most of the cases in which we exercise our power to GVR plainly do not meet the "tests" set forth in Rule 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 915 913 Scalia, J., concurring 10. See, e. g., Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994) (GVR in light of administrative reinterpretations of federal statutes); Crouse v. United States, ante, p. 801 (GVR in light of Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 (1996)); Greater N. O. Broadcasting v. United States, ante, p. 801 (GVR in light of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484 (1996)). We are not remanding this state-law case, as The Chief Jus- tice suggests, because the Eleventh Circuit failed to prophesy the course that the Supreme Court of Georgia would ultimately take, see post, at 917, any more than we remand federal-law cases in light of intervening decisions of this Court because the court of appeals failed adequately to predict how we would decide. In both instances, we are vacating the decision below to allow the Court of Appeals to consider an intervening decision of the Court that is the final expositor of a particular body of law-with federal questions, the Supreme Court of the United States, and with questions of Georgia law, the Supreme Court of Georgia. We assuredly would not decline to GVR a case affected by one of our own intervening decisions merely because the case "is of no gen- eral importance beyond the interest of the parties." Post, at 917. Almost all of our GVR's fit this description-for example, the many cases GVR'd in recent months in light of our decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), e. g., Cuellar v. United States, 518 U. S. 1014 (1996). I can think of no possible reason why we would routinely GVR "unimportant" cases in light of our own opinions but not in light of state supreme court opin- ions, unless, of course, we have less regard for the federal courts' correct application of state law than for their correct application of federal law-an attitude we should certainly not acknowledge. I do not share The Chief Justice's fear that our action today will flood the Court with applications to review questions of state law by petitioners "unhappy" with the result below. Post, at 917. As I have described, today's action breaks no new ground but merely continues a longstanding practice. It does not involve us in an intensive review of state law, but requires only the simple determination (rarely available) that the federal-court decision on state law appears to contradict a subsequent decision of the state supreme court. When the conflict is of "far more dubious . . . relevance" than the one at issue here, ibid., we can and should exercise our discretion to deny the petition for writ of certiorari. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 916 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting 519 U. S. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. This is a personal-injury, products-liability case which is in the federal court system by virtue of diversity of citizenship. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment against petitioners by the District Court, and petitioners have sought review here. In a supplemental brief filed after their petition, they have called attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 266 Ga. 607, 609­610, 469 S. E. 2d 171, 174 (1996), handed down on April 29, 1996, 21 2 months after the Court of Appeals denied rehearing. Petitioners' request for relief meets none of the tests set forth in this Court's Rule 10, "Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari." The first of these considerations, as outlined in the Rule, is if a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals, or has decided a federal question in a way which conflicts with the decision of a state court of last resort, or "has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power." There is clearly no conflict between courts of appeals in this case, nor do petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has decided a federal question in a way which conflicts with a state court of last resort. Nor could it be claimed that the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, since the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Banks was handed down more than two months after the Court of Appeals denied rehearing. The other considerations governing review of certiorari like- wise have no application to this case. The Court of Appeals here has not decided an important question of federal law which should be settled by this Court, or decided a federal question in a way that conflicts with applicable decisions of this Court. Thus, one must ask, why is this Court intervening to vacate and remand this case to the Court of Appeals? The Court's answer, I suspect, would be that Banks suggests that the Court of Appeals may have wrongly decided an issue of Georgia law in the case. But this Court's function, generally speaking, is not to correct federal courts' misapplications of state law, except, perhaps, in exceptional cases with importance beyond the parties' particular 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 917 913 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting dispute. This is not such an exceptional case; there is no reason to think that the Eleventh Circuit will not apply Banks faithfully in future cases. Nor is this a case which we must, for one reason or another, decide on the merits and where the views of another court as to the intervening state-law decision might be useful, or a case where certiorari has already been granted and the case argued on the merits. See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 176 (1996) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in No. 94­9323 and dis- senting in No. 94­8988) (citing and distinguishing cases). To be sure, there is a "special deference owed to state law and state courts in our system of federalism," id., at 179 (Scalia, J., dissenting), but by failing to predict the Georgia Supreme Court's Banks decision the Eleventh Circuit has in no way slighted the State of Georgia or upset the balance of our federalism. I do not believe that this Court has a stake in the correctness of discrete state-law decisions by federal courts, nor, in such cases, any " `ob- ligat[ion] to weigh justice among contesting parties.' " Lawrence, supra, at 177 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in No. 94­9323 and dissenting in No. 94­8988) (quoting 2 H. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 997­998 (1939)). I trust I am correct in thinking that the Court would not grant certiorari in this case to decide whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Banks requires a different out- come than that reached below. I am equally sanguine that the Court would not summarily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on a question of Georgia law, a subject about which that court knows a great deal more than we do. Because we are only granting, vacating, and remanding to the Court of Appeals, the Court's action may seem more palatable here. But I believe it is just as incorrect as would be our deciding the merits of a question of state law in some other diversity case which is of no general importance beyond the interest of the parties. The decision to vacate and remand in this case doubtless seems an easy one to those who join it; the Court of Appeals specifically mentioned the retroactivity issue later decided in Banks in its opinion denying rehearing, and respondents have filed no response to petitioners' supplemental brief. But today's action will encourage numerous similar requests from other parties unhappy with the decision of a court of appeals in their diversity cases, and the relevance of the intervening factors which they urge may be far more dubious than is the relevance of Banks to this case. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 918 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. Finally, requiring the Court of Appeals to delve into the facts and law of the case again, months after it denied rehearing, is not without cost. The typical active judge of the Court of Ap- peals for the Eleventh Circuit participates in somewhere between 150 and 200 panel decisions each year. For us to require a busy court to once more revisit the merits of this state-law dispute gives these petitioners more of the time and resources of the federal judicial system than they deserve. I dissent from the Court's disposition of this case. No. 95­1830. Gomez, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al. v. Fierro et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3604 (West Supp. 1996). Reported below: 77 F. 3d 301. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. There are powerful reasons for concluding capital cases as promptly as possible. Delay in the execution of judgments impos- ing the death penalty frustrates the public interest in deterrence and eviscerates the only rational justification for that type of punishment.1 From the standpoint of the defendant, the delay can become so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual pun- ishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.2 Unfortunately, 1 See, e. g., Kozinski & Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1995) ("Whatever purposes the death penalty is said to serve-deterrence, retribution, assuaging the pain suffered by vic- tims' families-these purposes are not served by the system as it now oper- ates"); Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1035 (1989) ("[Y]ears of delay between sentencing and execution . . . undermin[e] the deterrent effect of capital punishment and reduc[e] public confidence in the criminal justice system"). 2 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U. S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., con- curring in judgment) (noting that when the death penalty "ceases realisti- cally to further [the aims of deterrence and retribution] its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal con- 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 919 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 however, the Court has exhibited a callous indifference to these concerns, first by refusing to hear the claims of two inmates who have suffered under a "sword of Damocles" since they were first sentenced to death in 1978 and 1979,3 and now by ordering a remand that can serve no purpose other than to delay the conclu- sion of these cases. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that these two respondents may be put to death by lethal injection, but that using the gas chamber to carry out the sentence is constitutionally impermissible. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F. 3d 301, 309 (1996). Subse- quent to that decision the California Legislature amended the State's death penalty statute to provide that lethal injections should be used to carry out death sentences unless the defendant requests that the State use the gas chamber. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3604(b) (West Supp. 1996). Thus, under either the terms of the new statute or the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, lethal injections will be used to carry out these respondents' sentences. It seems perfectly clear that nothing but delay will be accomplished by this Court's decision to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand for further proceedings in the light of the new statute. I therefore respect- fully dissent. No. 95­1956. Department of the Interior et al. v. South Dakota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals with instruc- tions to vacate the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and remand the matter to the tributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment"). 3 See Lackey v. Johnson, ante, p. 911 (October 7, 1996) (order denying cert.); White v. Johnson, ante, p. 911 (October 7, 1996) (same). Sadly, in refusing to hear these claims, the Court turns a deaf ear to an argument that courts in other countries have found persuasive. See, e. g., State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94 (So. Afr. Const. Ct. June 6, 1995); Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A. C. 1, 4 All E. R. 769 (P. C. 1993) (en banc). 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 920 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. Secretary of the Interior for reconsideration of his administrative decision. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 878. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. This case arises from the 1990 action of the Department of the Interior acquiring 91 acres in trust for the Lower Brule Tribe of the Sioux Indians, pursuant to § 5 of the 1934 Indian Reorganiza- tions Act (IRA), 48 Stat. 985, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 465. Re- spondents challenged this action in Federal District Court, con- tending both that the Department's particular action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706, and that the Secretary's statutory authority to acquire lands under the IRA is unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power. Throughout this litigation, until now, it has been the Depart- ment's position that IRA land acquisitions are unreviewable under the APA because they fall within the exception for matters "com- mitted to agency discretion by law." § 701(a)(2). The District Court agreed that APA review was unavailable, although on dif- ferent grounds, holding that since the United States had acquired title, the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, provided the sole statutory means of challenging the action, and that the QTA explicitly prohibits actions challenging title to Indian lands. The District Court also upheld the Secretary's constitutional authority to acquire land on behalf of the United States under the IRA. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed on the ground that § 5 of the IRA constitutes a delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of the Interior and is hence unconstitutional. 69 F. 3d 878 (1995). Following the Eighth Circuit's sweeping decision, the Depart- ment of the Interior did an about-face with regard to the availabil- ity of judicial review under the APA. It promulgated a new regulation providing that "the Secretary shall publish in the Fed- eral Register, or in a newspaper of general circulation serving the affected area a notice of his/her decision to take land into trust," and that "the Secretary shall acquire title in the name of the United States no sooner than 30 days after the notice is published." Department of the Interior, Land Acquisitions (Non- gaming), 61 Fed. Reg. 18083 (1996) (to be codified at 25 CFR § 151.12). The preamble to that regulation recites that it is being adopted "[i]n response to a recent court decision, State of South 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 921 919 Scalia, J., dissenting Dakota v. U. S. Department of the Interior, 69 F. 3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995)," and asserts that the procedure it sets forth "permits judi- cial review before transfer of title to the United States." The Solicitor General now represents to us that it is the position of the Department of the Interior, as well as that of the Department of Justice, that judicial review of an IRA land trust acquisition may be obtained by filing suit within the 30-day waiting period, although action will continue to be barred by the QTA after the United States formally acquires title. The decision today-to grant, vacate, and remand in light of the Government's changed position-is both unprecedented and inexplicable. This Court has in recent years occasionally entered a "GVR" in light of a position newly taken by the Solicitor Gen- eral where the United States was the prevailing party below. See, e. g., Stutson v. United States, 516 U. S. 193 (1996) (per cu- riam); Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994); Wells v. United States, 511 U. S. 1050 (1994); Reed v. United States, 510 U. S. 1188 (1994); Chappell v. United States, 494 U. S. 1075 (1990). Even that extension of our earlier practice is in my view unsound. See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 168, 184­186 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But we have never before GVR'd simply because the Government, having lost below, wishes to try out a new legal position. The unfairness of such a practice to the litigant who prevailed in the court of appeals is obvious. ("Heads I win big," says the Government; "tails we come back down and litigate again on the basis of a more moderate Government theory.") Today's decision encourages the Government to do what it did here: to "go for broke" in the courts of appeals, rather than get the law right the first time. What makes today's action inexplicable as well as unprece- dented is the fact that the Government's change of legal position does not even purport to be applicable to the present case. The Government now concedes only that APA review is available be- fore the Secretary's taking of title under the IRA; it has not altered its view that once title has passed to the United States APA review is precluded by the QTA. 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(a); Pet. for Cert. 7. Since in this case title has passed, the Government's position in the present litigation remains what it was: Judicial review is unavailable. The Government contends, however, that the Court of Appeals' determination that the IRA was a delegation of legislative power was based in part upon the unavailability of judicial review. I 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 922 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Scalia, J., dissenting 519 U. S. fail to see how the availability of judicial review has anything to do with that question; perhaps the Court of Appeals thought otherwise, though its opinion on this point is somewhat contradic- tory.* If, however, judicial reviewability was germane to the Court of Appeals' judgment, surely it was only such reviewability as would exist of right, and not such as would be accorded only at the discretion of the agency. It is merely the latter that we have here: The Government concedes only that, if the Secretary chooses to announce his acquisition decision before the acquisition becomes effective (as the new regulation graciously requires), judicial review is available. It is inconceivable that this reviewability-at-the-pleasure-of-the-Secretary could affect the constitutionality of the IRA in anyone's view, including that of the Court of Appeals. Finally, the existence of the new regulation does not make this a case in which a postjudgment change in the law applicable to the dispute warrants a remand. The preamble to the regulation acknowledges that "the Eighth Circuit decision precludes the Sec- retary from taking into trust the land at issue in that particular case," and explicitly states that "[t]he procedure announced in today's rule . . . will apply to all pending and future trust acquisi- tions." 61 Fed. Reg. 18083 (1996) (emphasis added). Of course that statement merely recites the obvious, since, title already having been acquired in this case, it is quite impossible for the Secretary to provide 30-day advance notice of intent to take title. Evidently for that reason, the Government asks this Court, if it declines to grant certiorari, not merely to GVR, but to do so "with instructions that the judgment of the district court sustaining the Secretary's decision also be vacated and that the matter, in turn, be remanded to the Secretary of the Interior for reconsideration and issuance of a new administrative decision." Pet. for Cert. 25. I cannot imagine where we would derive the authority for this. If, as the Government asserts in its brief, statutory judicial *At one point the court quoted approvingly its statement in United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F. 3d 451, 459 (CA8 1994), that " `[j]udicial review is a factor weighing in favor of upholding a statute against a nondelegation challenge.' " 69 F. 3d 878, 882 (1995). This seems inconsistent, however, with the ap- proach the court takes elsewhere in its opinion, when it says: "We doubt whether the Quiet Title Act precludes APA review of agency action by which the United States acquires title. But given our conclusion that § 465 is an unconstitutional delegation of power, we need not decide this issue." Id., at 881, n. 1. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 923 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 review of a land-trust decision under § 5 of the IRA is unavailable once title has passed to the United States, then certainly federal courts cannot construct the necessary conditions for judicial re- view by simply ordering the land acquisition undone. In sum, there is no basis in precedent or in reason for a GVR in the present case. Since a federal statute has been held uncon- stitutional, I would grant the petition for certiorari. No. 96­184. Life Insurance Company of Georgia v. John- son. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559 (1996). Reported below: 684 So. 2d 685. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­167 (96­555). Rehman v. ECC International Corp. et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­208 (96­340). Vaughn v. Ohio Medical Board. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­254. McVicar, Warden v. Griffin. C. A. 7th Cir. Application to recall the mandate, addressed to The Chief Jus- tice and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1718. In re Disbarment of LaRene. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1046.] No. D­1730. In re Disbarment of Mekler. Arlen B. Mekler, of Wilmington, Del., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1731. In re Disbarment of Brown. Warren Ernest Brown, of Lafayette, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1732. In re Disbarment of Silver. Jack Silver, of Littleton, Colo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 924 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1733. In re Disbarment of Wade. William Vernon Wade, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1734. In re Disbarment of Busby. Donald Lee Busby, of Temple, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1735. In re Disbarment of Kimes. Larry Wayne Kimes, of Austin, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­14. Emery v. City of Toledo; No. M­16. Johnson v. Sparkman et al.; No. M­17. Jones v. Nance et al.; No. M­18. Helbling v. Bevere et al.; No. M­19. Whitaker v. Whitaker; and No. M­20. Doe et al. v. Purity Supreme, Inc., et al. Mo- tions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­15. Sweeney v. National Transportation Safety Board. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied. No. 95­897. Auer et al. v. Robbins et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1016.] Motion of International As- sociation of Chiefs of Police for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 95­939. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 516 U. S. 1170.] Motion of California for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted nunc pro tunc. No. 95­1081. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., et al. v. Direc- tor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Depart- 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 925 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 ment of Labor, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1186.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted. No. 95­1425. Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and No. 95­1460. United States v. Johnson et al. D. C. S. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1207.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted. No. 95­1181. Dunn et al. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1219.] Motion of Foreign Exchange Committee et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied. No. 95­1448. Nernberg v. Ludmer, 517 U. S. 1220. Motion of petitioner to vacate lower court order denied. No. 95­1853. Clinton v. Jones. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1016.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­6510. Gray v. Netherland, Warden, 518 U. S. 152. Motion of respondent to retax costs denied. No. 96­235. California Franchise Tax Board v. MacFar- lane. C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­5534. Hoffmann v. Hoffmann. Ct. App. Md.; No. 96­5555. Viswanathan v. Scotland County Board of Education et al. C. A. 4th Cir.; No. 96­5818. Sanders v. Raytheon Engineers & Con- structors, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir.; and No. 96­5882. Pararas-Carayannis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until November 5, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­6003. In re Castillo. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 926 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­249. In re Moretti; No. 96­326. In re Panthong; No. 96­5531. In re Pallett; No. 96­5564. In re Moore; and No. 96­5576. In re Parrish. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 96­5571. In re Washington. Petition for writ of prohi- bition denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 95­2024. Lawyer v. Department of Justice et al. Appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla. Probable jurisdiction noted. Re- ported below: 920 F. Supp. 1248. Certiorari Granted No. 95­1594. De Buono, New York Commissioner of Health, et al. v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Serv- ices Fund, by Its Trustees, Bowers et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 28. No. 95­1764. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 1432. No. 95­2074. City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Re- ported below: 73 F. 3d 1352. No. 95­1340. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1512. No. 96­243. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Tahoe Lakefront Owners' Association, and Southeastern Legal Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 359. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1567. Indiana v. Bryant. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 N. E. 2d 290. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 927 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 95­1966. Russo et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1383. No. 95­1999. Nebraska v. Ryan. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Neb. 218, 543 N. W. 2d 128. No. 95­2007. Construction Products Research, Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 73 F. 3d 464. No. 95­2038. Mincieli v. Bruder. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1107. No. 95­9123. Quatrevingt v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 670 So. 2d 197. No. 95­9480. Green v. Franco et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­20. Caribbean Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc.; and No. 96­200. Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Carib- bean Petroleum Corp. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 79 F. 3d 182. No. 96­25. Edmonds v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 810. No. 96­43. Wilkinson v. Legal Services Corp. et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 535. No. 96­53. Price et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 46. No. 96­70. Columbia Machine, Inc. v. Schnidrig. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1406. No. 96­73. Maloney v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 645. No. 96­91. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Wilson. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 742. No. 96­93. Levitoff et al. v. Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1246. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 928 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­100. Futernick, dba Holiday West Mobile Home Park et al. v. Caterino et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1051. No. 96­102. Bradshaw v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1175. No. 96­123. United States v. Northrop Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 545. No. 96­135. Kevorkian v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 Mich. App. 601, 534 N. W. 2d 172. No. 96­156. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al. v. Montcalm Publishing Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 105. No. 96­193. Myers v. Burns et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 420. No. 96­194. Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kagaku Co., Ltd. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 266. No. 96­195. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Harold's Stores, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 82 F. 3d 1533. No. 96­197. Rehman v. Garwood, McKenna, McKenna & Wolf et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 553. No. 96­202. Urichich v. City of Youngstown et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Mahoning County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­204. Koven et al. v. Pacific-Major Construction Co. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­205. Toro v. Depository Trust Co. et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 223 App. Div. 2d 489, 636 N. Y. S. 2d 1010. No. 96­209. Kelly Foods Corp. et al. v. Windmill Corp., dba Martha White Foods. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 380. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 929 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­210. Can Do, Inc., Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, Individually and as Trustee for Holder v. Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith et al. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 922 S. W. 2d 865. No. 96­215. Reed v. Chevron Pipe Line Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 432. No. 96­219. Noel v. International Cablevision, Inc., dba Adelphia Cable. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 123. No. 96­222. Paisley v. City of Minneapolis et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 722. No. 96­225. Welz v. New York; Draghi v. New York; Draghi v. New York; Draghi v. New York; McShane et al. v. New York; and Waugh et al. v. New York. App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 9th and 10th Jud. Dists. Certiorari denied. No. 96­230. Hancock Electronics Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 451. No. 96­231. Einhorn Yaffee Prescott Architecture & Engineering, P. C., et al. v. Turpin et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 107. No. 96­233. Rohan v. American Bar Assn. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 945. No. 96­237. Lockmiller v. Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­238. Ehrlich, Trustee v. City of Culver City et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 Cal. 4th 854, 911 P. 2d 429. No. 96­240. Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. Bock, Personal Representative of the Estate of Bock, De- ceased, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 423. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 930 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­246. Hedden v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­247. Bevil v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 220 Ga. App. 1, 467 S. E. 2d 586. No. 96­248. Allgood, Individually and as Independent Executrix of the Estate of Allgood, Deceased, et al. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 168. No. 96­250. KHD Deutz of America Corp. v. Stewart et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 1522. No. 96­253. Jarabe, Individually and for the Benefit of the Estate of Jarabe, Deceased v. Industrial Commission of Illinois et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172 Ill. 2d 345, 666 N. E. 2d 1. No. 96­254. Flynn et al. v. Kornwolf et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 924. No. 96­258. Hardin v. Cunningham. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­259. Stjernholm et ux. v. Peterson et al. (two judgments). C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 347 (first judgment); 85 F. 3d 641 (second judgment). No. 96­261. Lowery v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­263. Hallgrimson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­264. Montana v. Fuller. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Mont. 155, 915 P. 2d 809. No. 96­268. Jackson v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1112. No. 96­269. Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Clark, Rhode Island Tax Administrator. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 A. 2d 330. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 931 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­273. Pocchia v. Nynex Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 275. No. 96­275. Kennedy v. Goldin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1170. No. 96­276. Rizzi v. Underwater Construction Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 199. No. 96­278. Whitworth v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 671 So. 2d 666. No. 96­290. Oklahoma Publishing Co. et al. v. Burks. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 975. No. 96­295. South Division Credit Union v. McFarland. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 943. No. 96­297. Parkson Corp. v. ACS Construction Company, Inc., of Mississippi. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 83 F. 3d 436. No. 96­302. Edgewater Sun Spot, Inc., et al. v. Penning- ton & Haben, P. A. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 84 F. 3d 438. No. 96­303. Human Services Plaza Partnership v. Hun- tington National Bank et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­305. Daley, Individually and as Personal Repre- sentative of the Estate of Hippeard v. Ferguson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­311. Gray v. United States; and No. 96­329. Olano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1180. No. 96­314. Schapiro v. Schapiro (two judgments). Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­332. Drummond et al. v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 137. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 932 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­335. Harrison v. United States et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 177. No. 96­346. Scianna v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 985. No. 96­351. Cook et ux., Individually and dba Andy Cook's Truck Stop v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1095. No. 96­352. Vines v. Hamilton. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1329. No. 96­368. Martinez v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 201 Wis. 2d 216, 549 N. W. 2d 792. No. 96­369. Retired Chicago Police Assn. v. City of Chi- cago et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 856. No. 96­378. Kupcho v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 127. No. 96­392. Sertich v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 545. No. 96­393. Stowe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 589. No. 96­401. Scambos v. Petrie et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 416. No. 96­406. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 842. No. 96­407. Nierengarten et ux. v. Wisconsin Depart- ment of Health and Social Services. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 Wis. 2d 818, 549 N. W. 2d 287. No. 96­410. Gate v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5047. Glendora v. Malone. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 933 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­5185. Bostic v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 429. No. 96­5186. Raffield v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 611. No. 96­5206. Royal v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5225. Lovett v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 143. No. 96­5246. Spires v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 645. No. 96­5261. Williams v. Horner et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 630. No. 96­5269. Harrison v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 659 N. E. 2d 480. No. 96­5316. Tokar v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 918 S. W. 2d 753. No. 96­5349. Grune v. Thoubboron et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5461. Bowen v. Thurman, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 591. No. 96­5462. Reeves v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1424. No. 96­5473. Land v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 224. No. 96­5477. Becker v. Southwest Travis County Road District No. 1. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5479. Lee v. Lenhardt et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5484. Williams v. Wright, Superintendent, Maxi- mum Control Complex, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1150. No. 96­5486. Hess v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 934 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5490. Gabor et ux. v. Frazer et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 593. No. 96­5491. Harrell v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5492. Erickson v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­5508. Grayson v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 516. No. 96­5513. Dortch et al. v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 277 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 698 N. E. 2d 718. No. 96­5515. Guilette v. Maine Department of Human Services. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5517. DiCesare v. Stuart et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 425. No. 96­5520. Massengale v. Mills, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5522. Cone v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 S. W. 2d 579. No. 96­5529. Spurgetis v. United States Judiciary. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5530. Spencer v. White et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5535. Hernandez v. El Paso Community College. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 480. No. 96­5536. Hedlund v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 185 Ariz. 567, 917 P. 2d 1214. No. 96­5540. Sepulvado v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 158. No. 96­5543. Steward v. Hofstetter et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5549. Tart v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 116. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 935 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­5553. Wade v. Byles et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 902. No. 96­5560. Martin v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 593. No. 96­5563. McCarthy v. Teta. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 108. No. 96­5567. Jeffries v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5568. Miller v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 415. No. 96­5569. McCullough v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5570. Vick v. Foote, Inc., t/a Foote Tire. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­5572. Fabianich v. Holmes. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1041. No. 96­5573. Green v. South Carolina. Ct. Common Pleas of Charleston County, S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5575. Robinson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5581. Reyes Miranda v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5588. Rubio v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 449 Pa. Super. 726, 674 A. 2d 319. No. 96­5593. Manning v. Michigan Department of Cor- rections et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 834. No. 96­5595. Smith v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Pima County. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 936 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5596. Styles v. VanZandt, Superintendent, Wash- ington Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­5597. Perkins v. Derstein et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1166. No. 96­5599. Augustine v. Roe, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5611. Bowling v. Cates, Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Florida, Alachua County. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 412. No. 96­5614. Stone v. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5617. Ward v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 620. No. 96­5618. White v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 378, 471 S. E. 2d 593. No. 96­5622. Barbee v. Philadelphia School District et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5624. Morgart v. Workmen's Compensation Ap- peal Board of Pennsylvania et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5625. Johnson v. Shillinger, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 159. No. 96­5630. Johnson v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5646. Jefferson v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5648. Hoyett v. Johnson, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5680. Dayse v. Department of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1260. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 937 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­5688. Plante v. Gallant et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 403. No. 96­5705. Cooper v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5707. Rosenbalm v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5716. Coyle v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1313. No. 96­5719. Bergmann v. Erdmann. Ct. App. Ind. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5723. Miller v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 189. No. 96­5737. DeBardeleben v. Hawk, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5738. Clark et ux. v. City of Portland. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 634. No. 96­5740. Shelton v. Looker. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5742. Watkins v. Parker, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­5745. White v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5749. Lawrence v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5756. Armendariz-Mata v. Department of Justice et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 679. No. 96­5761. Salahuddin v. Coughlin et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 App. Div. 2d 950, 636 N. Y. S. 2d 145. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 938 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5762. Rainier v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 685. No. 96­5763. Smith v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1194. No. 96­5770. Donovan v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5773. Veneri v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 450 Pa. Super. 720, 676 A. 2d 287. No. 96­5788. Whitney v. United States Postal Service. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 686. No. 96­5790. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1329. No. 96­5791. Walton v. United States; and No. 96­5849. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­5792. Staples v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 461. No. 96­5795. Montanye v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 226. No. 96­5796. Gary v. Pension Fund of International Union of Operating Engineers, #478. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 682. No. 96­5799. Rodgers v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 688. No. 96­5801. Renteria-Caicedo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5802. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­5805. Ellisor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1329. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 939 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­5806. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. No. 96­5808. Robles v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5810. Pulgaron v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 599. No. 96­5813. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1434. No. 96­5814. Toler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1165. No. 96­5815. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 830. No. 96­5820. Lapierre v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1309. No. 96­5821. Coburn v. Morton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5822. Cook v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 596. No. 96­5823. Jensen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. No. 96­5825. Kalasho v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1315. No. 96­5826. Haynes v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 828. No. 96­5829. Enriquez-Varela v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 138. No. 96­5830. Dawn v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 163. No. 96­5834. Early v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1323. No. 96­5835. Gault v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 990. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 940 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5840. Evans v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5841. Tchoder v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5842. Adams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 835. No. 96­5844. Evans v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 591. No. 96­5846. Moorehead v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5847. Lightner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1309. No. 96­5850. Mercer, aka Williams v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­5852. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 842. No. 96­5853. Ornelas-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­5858. Williamson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­5861. Brown v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5864. Vann v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 162. No. 96­5866. Almonte-Nunez v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 591. No. 96­5869. Bulgier v. Department of Justice. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 172. No. 96­5871. McCall et vir v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 358. No. 96­5874. Margiotti v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 100. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 941 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­5889. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 139. No. 96­5893. Moseley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­5894. Parrish v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 430. No. 96­5895. Sorenson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 171. No. 96­5898. Nugent v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­5899. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 618. No. 96­5907. Olachea-Jimenes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­5909. Aldi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 682. No. 96­5910. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 853. No. 96­5918. Hatney v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 458. No. 96­5919. Aparacio-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1323. No. 96­5920. Greenberg v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 438. No. 96­5923. Hughes v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1150. No. 96­5930. Howell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­5931. Eyoum v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1004. No. 96­5934. Lucas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1190. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 942 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5935. Cole, aka Coleman v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 A. 2d 554. No. 96­5939. Cotnam v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 487. No. 96­5941. Duplessis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­5942. Gardner v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5943. Downs v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 435. No. 96­5945. Patterson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5946. Daniels v. Burke, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 760. No. 96­5951. Brawner v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 591. No. 96­5952. Pridgett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 163. No. 96­5953. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 127. No. 96­5954. Sirois v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 34. No. 96­5962. Juvenile (JJAC) v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. No. 96­5966. O'Brien v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­5968. Massey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 136. No. 96­5972. Young v. Lowe. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1167. No. 96­5973. Segura-Del Real v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 275. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 943 519 U. S. October 15, 1996 No. 96­5974. Audia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1323. No. 96­5981. Frazier v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1323. No. 96­5982. Carmona de la Torre v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 595. No. 96­5983. Gilbert v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 126. No. 96­5987. Jones et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 433. No. 96­5991. Miller v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 434. No. 96­5992. Wilson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5994. Robinson et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­6004. Spencer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­6006. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­6007. Campbell v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6008. Kapadia v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 127. No. 96­6009. McLaughlin v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6010. Mack v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­6011. Martinez v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227 App. Div. 2d 751, 642 N. Y. S. 2d 566. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 944 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 15, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6012. Williams v. Toombs, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6015. Grant v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 644. No. 96­6017. Morrison v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 853 and 854. No. 96­6018. Martinez-Perez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 598. No. 96­6019. Lacey v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 956. No. 96­6020. Ewain v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 689. No. 96­6022. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 856. No. 96­6023. Withrow v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 527. No. 96­6025. Woodrup v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 359. No. 96­6033. Langford v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 629. No. 96­6070. Lake v. Hope, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 427. No. 95­1882. California v. Mitchell. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. No. 96­217. Abraham, District Attorney, Philadelphia County, et al. v. Young. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 72. No. 95­9341. Hogan v. McDaniel, Warden. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg would grant certiorari. Reported below: 109 Nev. 952, 860 P. 2d 710. 519ORD$$1b 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 945 519 U. S. October 15, 17, 20, 1996 No. 96­2. McDermott, Inc. v. Capital Welding & Fabrica- tion, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Forest Oil Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 20. No. 96­54. Sheet Metal Workers International Assn. Local Union No. 28 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com- mission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this peti- tion. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1162. No. 96­189. Michigan v. Barrera et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent Patrick Michael Musall for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 Mich. 261, 547 N. W. 2d 280. No. 96­403. Corporation v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to file information under seal granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 377. October 17, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 96­6293 (A­263). Bush v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 1099. October 20, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­6390 (A­283). In re Bush. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­6373 (A­281). Bush v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 85. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 946 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 519 U. S. October 21, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1702. In re Disbarment of Scott. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1038.] No. D­1705. In re Disbarment of Grines. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1038.] No. D­1710. In re Disbarment of Sandvoss. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1044.] No. D­1713. In re Disbarment of Spann. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1044.] No. D­1716. In re Disbarment of Grossman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1045.] No. D­1717. In re Disbarment of Levin. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1045.] No. D­1736. In re Disbarment of Du Bois. Elliott L. Du Bois, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1737. In re Disbarment of Gill. LeRoi Lionel Gill, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­21. Kennedy et al. v. Goldin, Administrator, Na- tional Aeronautics and Space Administration; and No. M­22. Orozco et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­23. Doe v. Grievance Administrator, Michigan At- torney Grievance Commission. Motion for leave to file peti- tion for writ of certiorari using a pseudonym denied. No. 95­897. Auer et al. v. Robbins et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1016.] Motion of National League of Cities et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 947 519 U. S. October 21, 1996 No. 95­1425. Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and No. 95­1460. United States v. Johnson et al. D. C. S. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1207.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted. No. 95­1455. Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board et al.; and No. 95­1508. Price et al. v. Bossier Parish School Board et al. D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1232.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted. No. 95­1694. Regents of the University of California et al. v. Doe. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1004.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to partici- pate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argu- ment granted. No. 96­531. Lungren, Attorney General of California v. Doe; and No. 96­547. Doe v. Lungren, Attorney General of Cali- fornia. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of the parties to expedite consid- eration of petitions for writs of certiorari denied. No. 96­6138. In re Javier Romero. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­354. In re Bardsley; and No. 96­5627. In re Hoyett. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­292. Johnson et al. v. Fankell. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari granted. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1439. Lakoski v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 66 F. 3d 751. No. 95­1864. Ellerbee v. Mills. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 600. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 948 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 21, 1996 519 U. S. No. 95­2034. Schledwitz v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 130. No. 95­8659. Hawks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1234. No. 95­8992. Sparks v. Stutler et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 259. No. 95­9033. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 299. No. 95­9133. Jones, aka Lee v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1234. No. 95­9221. Garrison v. Department of Justice. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1566. No. 95­9398. Lamarr et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 964. No. 95­9485. Hascall v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 902. No. 96­1. Thomasson v. Perry, Secretary of Defense, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 915. No. 96­83. Simpson v. Kansas; and No. 96­84. Jensen v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 259 Kan. 781, 915 P. 2d 109. No. 96­113. Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys- tem v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1063. No. 96­116. AutoZone, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 422. No. 96­244. In re Smith. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 493. No. 96­267. Brooks v. George County, Mississippi, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 157. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 949 519 U. S. October 21, 1996 No. 96­271. Redding, Individually and as Legal Guard- ian of Bell, a Minor v. Independent School District No. 33 of Creek County, Oklahoma, et al. Ct. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­280. Haygood et ux. v. Savage, Individually and as a Law Enforcement Officer, Fayette County Sheriff's Department. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 92. No. 96­284. Laube, dba Kim E. Laube Co. v. Sunbeam Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­286. City of Albuquerque et al. v. Church on the Rock et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1273. No. 96­287. Klayman & Associates, P. C., et al. v. Bald- win Hardware Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 78 F. 3d 550. No. 96­289. Ferguson et al. v. F. R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1221. No. 96­291. Wing, Acting Commissioner, New York De- partment of Social Services v. James Square Nursing Home, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 591. No. 96­299. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al. v. Sini- cropi et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 116. No. 96­301. Peters v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­308. Loyal American Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. Mattiace. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 So. 2d 229. No. 96­312. United States ex rel. Devlin et al. v. Cali- fornia et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 358. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 950 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 21, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­313. Pruitt v. National Casualty Insurance Co. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 697 N. E. 2d 24. No. 96­339. Brown Group, Inc., dba Brown Shoe Co. v. Aaron et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1220. No. 96­348. Cotter & Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Ap- peal Board et al. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 277 Ill. App. 3d 538, 660 N. E. 2d 1283. No. 96­362. Campbell v. McCarthy Brothers Co./Clark Bridge, as Owner Pro Hac Vice of Barge #AEB1. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 821. No. 96­384. Wyshak v. American Savings Bank, F. A., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­398. Lucre, Inc. v. Gibson County. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 N. E. 2d 150. No. 96­424. Garza v. Weekley, Mayor, City of San Be- nito. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 619. No. 96­439. Blalock et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­442. Mora v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 781. No. 96­445. Vebeliunas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1283. No. 96­446. Wilkerson v. Roswell Lincoln Mercury, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 219 Ga. App. XXX. No. 96­449. Johnston v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 599. No. 96­453. Buchanan, Individually and as Personal Representative for the Estate of Buchanan v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 197. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 951 519 U. S. October 21, 1996 No. 96­457. Vest et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 839. No. 96­459. B&M Farms et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1323. No. 96­482. Jackson et ux. v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 855. No. 96­5064. Jones v. Page, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 831. No. 96­5128. Demint v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 876. No. 96­5244. Diggs v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 195. No. 96­5315. Taylor v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 920 S. W. 2d 319. No. 96­5330. Love v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 942. No. 96­5362. Wilson v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 543 Pa. 429, 672 A. 2d 293. No. 96­5512. Davenport v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 1171, 906 P. 2d 1068. No. 96­5640. Rayford v. Bosse, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5642. Diaz v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Reformatory. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5643. Hussein v. Raban Supply Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 593. No. 96­5644. Lawal v. Cobb County Board of Health et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 644. No. 96­5654. Roach v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Va. 324, 468 S. E. 2d 98. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 952 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 21, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5661. Thomas v. Rogers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­5662. Meadows v. Hayling et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 405. No. 96­5663. Tesciuba v. Koch, Former Mayor of City of New York, et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 215 App. Div. 2d 222, 626 N. Y. S. 2d 164. No. 96­5666. Bishop v. State Bar of Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5672. Haynes v. Patterson. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5674. Tobias v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5677. James v. Ryan. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5678. Marcum v. McAninch, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­5682. Thomas v. Adams, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5684. Tobias v. Young, Judge, District Court of Texas, Tarrant County, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 433. No. 96­5690. Steele v. California Department of Social Services et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­5693. Williams v. Fountain et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 372. No. 96­5694. Williams v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 223 App. Div. 2d 491, 637 N. Y. S. 2d 379. No. 96­5695. Marks v. Roberts, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 953 519 U. S. October 21, 1996 No. 96­5696. Bigpond v. Champion, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 425. No. 96­5697. Jemzura v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­5698. Blackiston v. Johnson et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 122. No. 96­5702. Parham v. PepsiCo, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­5708. Mendenhall v. Alaska et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5736. Davis v. Freeman, Secretary, North Caro- lina Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­5741. Brown v. Ferguson, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1327. No. 96­5765. Zeitvogel v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 276. No. 96­5775. Carmen et ux. v. Mayo Foundation et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 165. No. 96­5778. Barrett v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 164, 469 S. E. 2d 888. No. 96­5798. Henderson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 171 Ill. 2d 124, 662 N. E. 2d 1287. No. 96­5803. Rojas v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5812. Stadler v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 919 P. 2d 439. No. 96­5828. Lugo v. Rocha, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 169. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 954 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 21, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5845. Lowe v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5880. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1155. No. 96­5883. Prechtl v. Witkowski, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1141. No. 96­5884. Odoms v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 428. No. 96­5902. Bell v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Scioto County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5922. Goudy v. Baker, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5929. Egbert v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 So. 2d 611. No. 96­5932. Herrera v. New Mexico Department of Corrections et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 82 F. 3d 426. No. 96­5936. Bierley v. Franz, District Director, Penn- sylvania Board of Probation and Parole. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5963. Resetar v. Lyman. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 107 Md. App. 749. No. 96­5967. McBride v. Circuit Court of Virginia, City of Norfolk. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6016. Green v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 93. No. 96­6028. Azhocar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 170. No. 96­6029. Altamirano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 912. No. 96­6030. Campbell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 126. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 955 519 U. S. October 21, 1996 No. 96­6031. Bedonie v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1163. No. 96­6034. Vega-Fleites v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 853. No. 96­6036. Amen-Ra, fka Tasby v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6046. Bell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 820. No. 96­6051. Rosch v. United States Parole Commission et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 839. No. 96­6052. Roston v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 430. No. 96­6053. Prado v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6054. Palacios v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­6057. Green v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 688. No. 96­6058. Holub v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 847. No. 96­6062. Tellier et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 578. No. 96­6065. Battle v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Conn. App. 742, 667 A. 2d 1288. No. 96­6067. Tavares v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 10. No. 96­6068. Wellington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1142. No. 96­6072. Mihaly v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1327. 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 956 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 October 21, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6074. Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 247. No. 96­6077. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 731. No. 96­6080. Strothers et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1389. No. 96­6091. Lindley et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. No. 96­6097. Garrett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1296. No. 96­6098. Hines v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1170. No. 96­6099. Anderson et al. v. United States; and Cabrera-Baez v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 436 (first judgment); 84 F. 3d 1453 (second judgment). No. 96­6100. Speight v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 671 A. 2d 442. No. 96­6102. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1174. No. 96­6103. Palmer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6104. Shrestha v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 847. No. 96­6105. Dusenbery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­6106. Montalvo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1247. No. 96­6109. Townsend v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1325. No. 96­6402 (A­290). Bush v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 957 519 U. S. October 21, 29, 30, November 1, 1996 Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. 96­6390. In re Bush, ante, p. 945. Petition for rehear- ing denied. October 29, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­298. Foreman et al. v. Dallas County, Texas, et al. D. C. N. D. Tex. Application for injunction and stay pending appeal, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him re- ferred to the Court, denied. October 30, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­1936. Stoller v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 710. November 1, 1996 Certiorari Granted No. 96­79. Boggs v. Boggs et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, Decem- ber 6, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before noon, Tuesday, December 31, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Fri- day, January 10, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 90. No. 96­270. Amchem Products, Inc., et al. v. Windsor et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. and National Association of Manu- facturers for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certio- rari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 16, 1996. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, January 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed 519ORD$$1c 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 958 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 1, 2, 1996 519 U. S. pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and this petition and will take no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 610. No. 96­320. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley. C. A. 2d Cir. Motions for leave to file briefs as amici curiae filed by the following are granted: Association of American Railroads, Consolidated Rail Corporation, American Tort Reform Association, Washington Legal Foundation, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and Defense Research Institute. Cer- tiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 16, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, January 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1337. No. 96­5658. Lambrix v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio- rari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 6, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before noon, Tuesday, December 31, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, January 10, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1500. November 2, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­310. Arkansas Term Limits et al. v. Donovan et al.; and No. A­320. Priest, Secretary of State of Arkansas v. Donovan et al. Applications for stay of decision and mandate of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, case No. 96­1120, decided October 21, 1996, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him re- ferred to the Court, granted pending the timely filing and disposi- 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 959 519 U. S. November 2, 4, 1996 tion by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the man- date of this Court. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would deny the applications. November 4, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded. (See No. 95­2025, ante, p. 2.) Miscellaneous Orders No. A­688 (O. T. 1995). Klecan et al. v. New Mexico Right to Choose et al. Dist. Ct. N. M., Santa Fe County. Applica- tion for stay, addressed to Justice Scalia and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­194. Hook v. McDade, United States District Judge for the Central District of Illinois. D. C. C. D. Ill. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­303. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections v. Bennett. Application to vacate the stay of ex- ecution of sentence of death granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on October 23, 1996, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted. Justice Stevens, dissenting. A procedural issue of greater importance than the timing of respondent's execution is presented by the application to vacate the stay entered by the Court of Appeals. In Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1217, Congress significantly limited the authority of the federal courts to entertain second or successive habeas corpus applica- tions by state prisoners. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651 (1996). That action by Congress increases the importance of making sure that the courts have a full and fair opportunity to consider the first federal petition filed by such prisoners. In this case, the Director of the Virginia Department of Correc- tions has asked this Court to take the extraordinary step of vacat- 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 960 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Breyer, J., dissenting 519 U. S. ing a stay that the Court of Appeals had entered to enable a death row inmate to have the time available to all other litigants to file a petition for certiorari to review the denial of his first federal habeas corpus petition. Evenhanded administration of this Court's Rules counsels against action that affords such special treatment to the director. Moreover, the Court's decision to va- cate the stay creates a precedent that will invite wardens gener- ally to ask us routinely to expedite our processing of certiorari petitions in similar cases. Given the irreparable consequences of error in a capital case, I believe we should steadfastly resist the temptation to endorse procedural shortcuts that can only increase the risk of error. In response to the congressional decision effec- tively to limit death row inmates to one meaningful opportunity to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, we should give greater, rather than less, scrutiny to a death row inmate's allegations in his first federal habeas petition. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting. Our cases make clear that a court of appeals should grant a stay (to permit application for a writ of certiorari) only in a special case-a case presenting a significant likelihood of a grant. E. g., Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995). There is no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals was unaware of the Tuggle standard when it granted the motion to stay Bennett's execution. Even if it mispredicted this Court's eventual view of the case, it did not act unreasonably in doing so. See 92 F. 3d 1336, 1345 (CA4 1996) (describing the prosecutor's closing argu- ment at Bennett's trial as "highly improper" and deserving "strong condemnation"). Further, the Court of Appeals issued its stay to permit this Court to review a first habeas petition. The petitioner, in other words, simply has used, not abused, the writ. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) (placing strict limits on subsequent habeas corpus applications). Given these circumstances, I can find no special reason for this Court to curtail the certiorari time normally available or, in ef- fect, to make its certiorari decision on a schedule determined by the State's execution timetable, rather than by this Court's Rules. Compare this Court's Rule 13.1 (providing for 90-day filing period) with Va. Code Ann. § 53.1­232.1 (Supp. 1996) (providing for maxi- 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 961 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 mum 60-day period before execution). Thus, I would permit this stay of execution to remain in place pending the filing and consid- eration of Bennett's petition for certiorari. No. D­1708. In re Disbarment of Lehman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1044.] No. D­1709. In re Disbarment of Hoare. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1044.] No. D­1711. In re Disbarment of Essrick. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1044.] No. D­1715. In re Disbarment of Gribetz. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1045.] No. D­1720. In re Disbarment of Bertagnolli. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1049.] No. D­1738. In re Disbarment of Brown. Victor L. Brown, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1739. In re Disbarment of McDaniels. Edison Penrow McDaniels, of San Bernardino, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1740. In re Disbarment of Cronin. Clinton E. Cro- nin, of Toms River, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1741. In re Disbarment of Atkins. Wilbur Dawkins Atkins, Jr., of Baton Rouge, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­24. Credit Counseling Centers of America, Inc. v. Credit Counseling Centers; and 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 962 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. M­28. Kramer v. City of Wichita, Kansas. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­25. Corporacion de Exportaciones Mexicanas USA, Inc., et al. v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation et al. Motion of petitioners to dis- pense with printing the petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. M­26. Corporacion de Exportaciones Mexicanas USA, Inc., et al. v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari by a nonattorney on behalf of a corporation denied. No. M­27. In re Tomasin. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied. No. M­29. Duff, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois v. Governor of Illinois et al. Motion of petitioner to waive requirements of this Court's Rule 33.1 denied. No. 95­1232. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, Tax Commis- sioner of Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1118.] Motion of respondent to strike petitioner's lodging denied. No. 95­1605. United States v. Gonzales et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1003.] Motion for appoint- ment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Roberto Alberto- rio, Esq., of Albuquerque, N. M., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Mario Perez in this case. No. 95­5661. Melendez v. United States, 518 U. S. 120. Motion for appointment of counsel nunc pro tunc granted, and it is ordered that Patrick A. Mullin, Esq., of Hackensack, N. J., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner. No. 96­529. In re Punchard; and No. 96­6210. In re Randy. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­6050. In re Vey; and No. 96­6176. In re Williams. Petitions for writs of manda- mus and/or prohibition denied. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 963 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 95­2072. Szenay v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­2091. Sharp et al. v. Myers, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Myers, Deceased, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 421. No. 95­9119. Ruiz et al. v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 1404. No. 95­9216. Bennett v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 598. No. 95­9222. Nickelson v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 10, 661 N. E. 2d 168. No. 95­9282. Melvin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 327. No. 95­9320. Cuch v. United States; and No. 95­9373. Appawoo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 987. No. 95­9336. Hedrick v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­9420. Spring v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1450. No. 95­9445. Harrison v. Floyd et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 357. No. 96­11. Cal-Almond, Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 381. No. 96­140. Sobocinski v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1167. No. 96­160. Kentucky State Police Department et al. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1086. No. 96­168. Snyder, Special Administrator of the Es- tate of Lovett, Deceased v. Viani, Individually and dba 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 964 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. Joe's Tavern, et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 112 Nev. 568, 916 P. 2d 170. No. 96­172. Holland v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 252. No. 96­186. Reese et al. v. City of Columbus et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 619. No. 96­207. Salyer v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compen- sation et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 784. No. 96­216. Maietta v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 100. No. 96­245. Edwards v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 Md. App. 740. No. 96­265. Sunenblick, dba Uptown Records v. Harrell et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­300. Adams et al. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1146. No. 96­307. Sapp v. Power Computing Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­309. Fairway Foods, Inc., et al. v. Minnesota et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 546 N. W. 2d 285. No. 96­316. Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana v. CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 642. No. 96­324. Riley et al. v. Murdock et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 415. No. 96­325. Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 96­328. Wilson Corp. et al. v. Udall, Attorney Gen- eral of New Mexico. Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 121 N. M. 677, 916 P. 2d 1344. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 965 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 No. 96­331. Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi v. Ingebretsen, on Behalf of Himself and His Daughter, Ingebretsen, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 88 F. 3d 274. No. 96­333. Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc., et al. v. Continen- tal Insurance Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 94 F. 3d 1219. No. 96­336. Eliasen et al. v. Itel Corp. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 731. No. 96­338. Kahn v. Beicker Engineering, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­340. Vaughn v. Ohio Medical Board. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 1449, 663 N. E. 2d 330. No. 96­342. United States v. Wabash Valley Power Assn., Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1305. No. 96­344. Bernklau v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 109. No. 96­347. Downhour et al. v. Somani, Director, Ohio Department of Health. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 261. No. 96­349. Musick et al. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 136. No. 96­357. Sprecher v. Securities and Exchange Com- mission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­363. Quisenberry v. County Collection Services, Inc., et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 138. No. 96­366. Desnick v. Illinois Department of Profes- sional Regulation et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 171 Ill. 2d 510, 665 N. E. 2d 1346. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 966 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­380. Barry v. Burdines et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 587. No. 96­383. Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 Ore. App. 688, 909 P. 2d 1243. No. 96­390. Swiftships, Inc. v. Loral Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 420. No. 96­411. Systems Fuel, Inc., et al. v. Alexander. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 669 So. 2d 1229. No. 96­416. Hasenstab v. New York City. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 942. No. 96­421. Kuntz v. Fadness, Individually and as Suc- cessor in Trust for Fadness. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. No. 96­441. Todd v. Alaska. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 917 P. 2d 674. No. 96­444. Suarez Corporation Industries v. West Vir- ginia, By and Through McGraw, Attorney General. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 W. Va. 346, 472 S. E. 2d 792. No. 96­473. Brighton Management Services, Inc., et al. v. Philadelphia Tax Review Board. Commw. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 667 A. 2d 757. No. 96­480. Jenkins v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­489. Gray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 436. No. 96­490. Pipes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 840. No. 96­492. Rothenberg v. Ruzicka. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1033. No. 96­505. Lindemann v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1232. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 967 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 No. 96­515. Story v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 647. No. 96­518. Jordan v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­5052. Williams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1098. No. 96­5232. Sanchez v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 472, 662 N. E. 2d 1199. No. 96­5335. Butler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 916. No. 96­5365. Ray v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 313, 914 P. 2d 846. No. 96­5366. Spears v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 Ariz. 277, 908 P. 2d 1062. No. 96­5374. Roquemore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 837. No. 96­5417. Thigpen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­5441. Bottoson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 621. No. 96­5481. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1572. No. 96­5689. Schurz v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5706. Rashid v. Society Hill Savings and Loan Assn. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 612. No. 96­5715. Hoversten v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5725. Johnson v. Brown et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1319. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 968 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5728. Turentine v. Miller, Superintendent, Cor- rectional Industrial Complex, Pendleton, Indiana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 222. No. 96­5732. Mitchell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5734. Ford v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5739. Hammons v. Presto Roofing Co., Inc. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 916 S. W. 2d 797. No. 96­5750. Chambers v. Halford, Director, Iowa De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5757. Citizen v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­5760. Wainwright v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1226. No. 96­5766. Wuornos v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 966. No. 96­5780. Lu v. Turk et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5781. Labickas v. Arkansas State University et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 333. No. 96­5782. Kulick v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5783. Montanez v. Jones, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­5784. Logan v. Beam, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 131. No. 96­5797. Domingues v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 683, 917 P. 2d 1364. No. 96­5800. Rhoton v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 969 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 No. 96­5804. Hooper v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172 Ill. 2d 64, 665 N. E. 2d 1190. No. 96­5807. Hill v. City & State Factors, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 437. No. 96­5809. Smith v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 1392. No. 96­5811. O'Brien v. Employment Appeal Board et al. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 550 N. W. 2d 737. No. 96­5816. Brown v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 669 So. 2d 253. No. 96­5817. Owusu v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­5819. Smith v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 846. No. 96­5824. Williams v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 831. No. 96­5827. Ellison v. Mitchell, Superintendent, East- ern New York Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5832. Herloski v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5836. Hollar v. Myers et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 149. No. 96­5837. Burnett v. Woods et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5838. Umar v. McVea et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 157. No. 96­5839. Carl v. White, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 970 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5843. Brown v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172 Ill. 2d 1, 665 N. E. 2d 1290. No. 96­5854. Stewart v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 477. No. 96­5855. Sanchez v. Santa Cruz County et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5856. Rust et al. v. Clarke et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 841. No. 96­5863. Wilson v. McCloud et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5867. McConico v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5868. Armentrout v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5870. Cotten v. Casler et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 422. No. 96­5872. Jackson v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5873. Lowe v. Holy Cross Hospital et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 Md. App. 723. No. 96­5875. Mahapatra v. Mahapatra (two judgments). App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 224 App. Div. 2d 960, 638 N. Y. S. 2d 367. No. 96­5879. Smith v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 915 P. 2d 927. No. 96­5885. Singla et al. v. Department of Health and Human Services et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5887. Kashannejad v. Pickett, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5901. Martinez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 91 F. 3d 138. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 971 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 No. 96­5903. Scott v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5905. Brown v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­5911. Cheatham v. Schneider, Governor of the Virgin Islands, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 85 F. 3d 611. No. 96­5912. Jones v. Texas Commerce Bank. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5914. Day v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5940. Fields v. Hinkle, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5948. Lipton v. Swest, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5956. Aziz v. Schriro, Director, Missouri Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5957. McCabe v. Department of the Air Force et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5969. Lipofsky v. New York State Insurance Fund. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 15. No. 96­5993. Johnson v. Griffin et al. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 922 P. 2d 860. No. 96­5995. March v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1260. No. 96­5997. Ash v. Swest, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6014. Harmon v. Hargett, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 640. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 972 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6021. Vaughan v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 842. No. 96­6024. Von Dohlen v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 S. C. 234, 471 S. E. 2d 689. No. 96­6044. Stanton v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6045. Larry v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6059. Gilliard v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1435. No. 96­6073. Nelson v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6081. Richardson v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 923 S. W. 2d 301. No. 96­6084. Pitts v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Depart- ment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 85 F. 3d 348. No. 96­6086. Brown-Kimble v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 846. No. 96­6111. Corrales v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 157. No. 96­6113. Chinn v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­6116. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 830. No. 96­6118. Winslow v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 390. No. 96­6119. Tidwell v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 540. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 973 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 No. 96­6121. Stephans v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 500. No. 96­6122. Payton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1195. No. 96­6127. Franks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 45. No. 96­6128. Esteban Moreno v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 46. No. 96­6131. Jones v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1206. No. 96­6134. Ramirez-Ferrer v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­6140. Adams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1371. No. 96­6141. Baez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 805. No. 96­6144. Polanco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 555. No. 96­6145. Pritchett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­6146. Lynch v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­6147. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 50. No. 96­6149. Roach v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 47. No. 96­6150. Lundis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 582. No. 96­6151. Jamal v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 913. No. 96­6154. Patch v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 96 F. 3d 1439. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 974 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6155. Williams v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 922 S. W. 2d 845. No. 96­6156. Thimm v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 430. No. 96­6157. McConaghy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 163. No. 96­6158. Mohr v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1732. No. 96­6164. Ruthers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­6166. Valenzuela Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 46. No. 96­6167. Sorensen v. Mahoney, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1322. No. 96­6171. Juri v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 162. No. 96­6174. Joost v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 640. No. 96­6178. Hogan v. Carter. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1113. No. 96­6179. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 722. No. 96­6181. Green v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 657. No. 96­6182. Greif v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­6183. Acevedo Gutierrez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­6186. Dietsch v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 123. No. 96­6187. Hazelett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 280. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 975 519 U. S. November 4, 1996 No. 96­6194. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 909. No. 96­6195. Woodall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­6198. Woodfolk v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1310. No. 96­6200. Chaudhry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­6202. Porter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­6203. Schoenbohm v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6206. Vigilante v. Irvin, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 687. No. 96­6208. Weiters v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 163. No. 96­6209. Thompson v. Crabtree, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 312. No. 96­6212. Cohen v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6219. Valdez-Anguiano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 139. No. 96­6222. Lopez Camacho v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1323. No. 96­6224. Stepp v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 145. No. 96­6228. Russell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­6229. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1373. No. 96­6231. Throneburg v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 851. 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 976 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6235. Perkins v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 160. No. 96­6237. Phea v. Benson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 660. No. 96­6239. Juarez-Moreno v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6247. Kisala v. Jenny Craig Weight Loss Cen- tres, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1179. No. 96­6252. West v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­185. Sakaria et al. v. Dare County Board of Ed- ucation. Sup. Ct. N. C. Motions of American Homeowners Foundation et al. and Clarendon Foundation et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 342 N. C. 648, 466 S. E. 2d 717. No. 96­229. Jordan v. Valdez, District Attorney for Neuces and Kleberg Counties, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed as a veteran pursuant to this Court's Rule 40 granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 729. No. 96­321. Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Sara Lee Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 455. No. 96­343. Village of Schaumburg v. Amoco Oil Co. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 277 Ill. App. 3d 926, 661 N. E. 2d 380. No. 96­531. Lungren, Attorney General of California v. Doe; and No. 96­547. Doe v. Lungren, Attorney General of Cali- fornia. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. No. 96­5892 (A­260). Iverson et al. v. Grant et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg 519ORD$$1d 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 977 519 U. S. November 4, 7, 8, 1996 and referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari before judgment denied. Rehearing Denied No. 95­8827. Hofmann v. Pressman Toy Corp. et al., ante, p. 828; and No. 96­5260. Wallace v. United States, ante, p. 888. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 93­1314. Tauber v. Salomon Forex, Inc., et al., 511 U. S. 1031 and 1138. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied. No. 95­8784. Page v. Runyon, Postmaster General, 518 U. S. 1024. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. November 7, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 96­6510 (A­314). Payne v. Netherland, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execu- tion. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 642. November 8, 1996 Certiorari Granted No. 96­262. Edmond v. United States; Lazenby v. United States; Leaver v. United States; Leonard v. United States; Nichols v. United States; and Venable v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 23, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, January 22, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 45 M. J. 19 (first judgment); 44 M. J. 273 (second, third, fifth, and sixth judgments), and 272 (fourth judgment). 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 978 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 519 U. S. November 12, 1996 Vacated and Remanded on Appeal No. 96­146. King v. Illinois Board of Elections et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996), and Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952 (1996). Reported below: 979 F. Supp. 582. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­299. Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Iowa Utilities Board et al. Application to vacate the stay issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­300. Association for Local Telecommunications Services et al. v. Iowa Utilities Board et al. Application to vacate the stay issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, addressed to Justice Stevens and re- ferred to the Court, denied. No. D­1742. In re Disbarment of Goble. Harold W. Goble, of Olympia, Wash., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1743. In re Disbarment of Henderson. John Wal- ton Henderson, Jr., of Atlanta, Ga., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1744. In re Disbarment of Ebbert. William Herb Ebbert, of Denver, Colo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1745. In re Disbarment of Crockett. Kenneth F. Crockett, of Topeka, Kan., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 979 519 U. S. November 12, 1996 requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­30. Baker v. City of Phoenix. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River Master for award of compensation and fees granted, and the Spe- cial Master is awarded a total of $1,218 for the period July 1 through September 30, 1996, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 803.] No. 95­897. Auer et al. v. Robbins et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1016.] Motion of League of Califor- nia Cities et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­1441. Blessing, Director, Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Freestone et al., on Behalf of Their Minor Children. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1186.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to partici- pate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argu- ment granted. No. 95­1478. Printz, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana v. United States; and No. 95­1503. Mack, Sheriff, Graham County v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1003.] Motion of petitioner Richard Mack for divided argument denied. No. 96­97. Central Regional School District v. M. C. et al., on Behalf of Their Son, J. C., ante, p. 866. Motion of respondents for award of attorney's fees denied without prejudice to refiling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. No. 96­124. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., et al. v. BankAtlantic Financial Corp. et al., ante, p. 867. Motion of respondents for award of attorney's fees denied. No. 96­6238. Neuton v. City National Bank (two judg- ments). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 980 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 12, 1996 519 U. S. until December 9, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­6092. In re Gaunce. C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of common­law certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 F. 2d 1052. No. 96­5915. In re Danik; and No. 96­5916. In re Hollingsworth. Petitions for writs of mandamus denied. Certiorari Denied. (See also No. 96­6092, supra.) No. 95­1975. Howard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 177. No. 95­9118. Smallwood v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 P. 2d 217. No. 95­9323. Manning v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 916 S. W. 2d 364. No. 96­40. San Pedro v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1065. No. 96­66. Autek Systems Corp. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 434. No. 96­201. Conlan v. Department of Labor. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 271. No. 96­337. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 875. No. 96­341. Duncan Aircraft Sales of Florida, Inc. v. Cappello et ux., Individually, and Cappello, Administra- tor of the Estate of Cappello, Deceased. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1465. No. 96­359. Rood et al. v. City of Oldsmar. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 564. No. 96­360. Branscum et al. v. United States; and 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 981 519 U. S. November 12, 1996 No. 96­361. Hill v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1307. No. 96­375. Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N. A., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 680. No. 96­376. Willbanks v. Keck et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­385. Stevens v. McGinnis, Inc.; and No. 96­396. McGinnis, Inc. v. Stevens. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1353. No. 96­394. Pickett v. City of Warr Acres et al. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­404. Romero, Individually and as Legal Repre- sentative of the Estate of Romero v. Thompson et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1311. No. 96­408. Lexie, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Lexie, Deceased v. State Farm Mutual Automo- bile Insurance Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Va. 390, 469 S. E. 2d 61. No. 96­412. Ellerbee v. Cobb County School Board et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 430. No. 96­413. Cox v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­422. Turner v. Investek Financial Corp. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­427. Johnson v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 582. No. 96­443. Coughlin v. Baptist Medical Center Princeton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 83 F. 3d 436. No. 96­448. In re Asam. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 516. No. 96­458. Waite v. Hippe et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 842. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 982 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 12, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­468. Helton et al. v. Kmart Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1086. No. 96­478. Asam v. Alabama State Bar et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 96­520. Smith v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 849. No. 96­539. Regalbuto et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 125. No. 96­544. Stringfellow, aka Fortini v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­580. Syverson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 227. No. 96­5178. Russell v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 670 So. 2d 816. No. 96­5351. Geary v. Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Cen- ter and Hospital. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 83 F. 3d 414. No. 96­5539. Salemo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1453. No. 96­5857. Simpson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172 Ill. 2d 117, 665 N. E. 2d 1228. No. 96­5862. O'Brien v. Bank One Columbus, N. A. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5886. Olguin et al. v. Lucero et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 401. No. 96­5890. Kemp v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 Ark. 178, 919 S. W. 2d 943. No. 96­5896. Schaffer v. Kirkland et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5897. Lee v. Berthelot et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 432. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 983 519 U. S. November 12, 1996 No. 96­5900. Logan v. German. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5904. Stover v. O'Connell & Associates. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 132. No. 96­5906. Sorbet v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5908. Jackson v. Sowa et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 152. No. 96­5913. Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 167. No. 96­5921. Gossage v. Barbour, Superintendent, Twin Rivers Correctional Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­5924. Dixon v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 608. No. 96­5925. Haynes v. Jones et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5927. Harris v. Coughlin, Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 687. No. 96­5928. DuBuc v. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 91 F. 3d 159. No. 96­5933. Johnson v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5937. Horton v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 319. No. 96­5944. Wesley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1312. No. 96­5960. Stallings v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 984 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 12, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5964. Ochoa v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5965. Sutton v. Kernan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5970. Wess v. Revell et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 139. No. 96­6013. Tierney v. Peterson, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6056. Hines v. Massachusetts (two judgments). Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 1005, 668 N. E. 2d 323 (first judgment); 423 Mass. 1004, 668 N. E. 2d 324 (second judgment). No. 96­6071. Nestler v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 406. No. 96­6107. Milner v. Stainer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1162. No. 96­6123. Royster v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 170. No. 96­6136. Sanchez v. Wyoming. 3d Jud. Dist. Ct., Sweet- water County, Wyo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6137. Russo v. Beyer, Assistant Commissioner, Di- vision of Operations, New Jersey Department of Correc- tions, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1172. No. 96­6152. Seagrave v. Spindler et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 154. No. 96­6173. Freeman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­6191. Slappy v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1181. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 985 519 U. S. November 12, 1996 No. 96­6196. Aguilar Riley Ozmen v. New Mexico. Dist. Ct. N. M., Bernalillo County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6201. Kemer v. Johnson, Administrator, General Services Administration. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 683. No. 96­6207. Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1357. No. 96­6215. Allah v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Frackville. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6236. Poindexter v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 27. No. 96­6242. Jackson v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 834. No. 96­6253. Thomas v. United States; and No. 96­6313. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 139. No. 96­6255. Van Hoorelbeke v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 654. No. 96­6256. Esquivel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 722. No. 96­6257. Geffrard v. United States; and No. 96­6263. Landry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 448. No. 96­6258. Hicks v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1244. No. 96­6259. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 679. No. 96­6266. Khamvongsa v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6275. Garza Cantu v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 436. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 986 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 12, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6276. Nguyen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 812. No. 96­6278. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 362. No. 96­6285. Nordquest v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­6286. Lartey-Trapman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­6289. Alonso v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 437. No. 96­6295. Ames v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­6297. Sallee v. United States Parole Commission et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 835. No. 96­6301. Rojas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­6303. Askew v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1065. No. 96­6304. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6311. Mandarino v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 682. No. 96­6315. Bastidas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 126. No. 96­6319. Moss v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­6320. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­6322. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 847. No. 96­6326. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1392. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 987 519 U. S. November 12, 1996 No. 96­6331. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6333. Hermanson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6334. Demeo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6335. Demonick v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1199. No. 96­6336. Dorrough v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1309. No. 96­6337. Harkrider v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1408. No. 96­6338. Fitzgerald v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 218. No. 96­6353. Murray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1199. No. 96­98. Kmart Corp. v. Helton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 79 F. 3d 1086. No. 96­517. Fry et al. v. UAL Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tions of Harvey L. Harris and Securities Victims of America for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 936. No. 96­543. Rehman v. Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P. A., et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Petition for writ of certiorari and writ of prohibition denied. Rehearing Denied No. 95­9002. Long v. Sparkman, Warden, et al., ante, p. 833; No. 95­9110. Kinnell et ux. v. Convenient Loan Co. et al., ante, p. 838; No. 95­9188. Long v. Sparkman, Warden, ante, p. 842; No. 95­9228. Bowman v. Bowling, ante, p. 844; 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 988 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 12, 13, 14, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­212. In re Smith, ante, p. 871; No. 96­5509. Tierney v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al., ante, p. 901; and No. 96­5541. Savage v. District of Columbia, ante, p. 902. Petitions for rehearing denied. November 13, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 96­6695 (A­350). Lonchar v. Turpin, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 95. No. 96­6696 (A­349). Lonchar v. Georgia Board of Par- dons and Paroles et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. The order heretofore entered by Justice Kennedy is vacated. Rehearing Denied No. 96­5063 (A­339). Middleton v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 876. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for rehearing denied. November 14, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­357 (96­6715). Felker v. Turpin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the peti- tion for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. No. 96­6698. In re Lonchar. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. 519ORD$$1e 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 989 519 U. S. November 14, 15, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 96­6699. Lonchar v. Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6697 (A­351). Felker v. Turpin, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 95. November 15, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­6716 (A­358). In re Felker. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­203. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Mon- day, December 30, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, January 29, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 14, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 429. Certiorari Denied No. 96­6715 (A­357). Felker v. Turpin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6717 (A­359). Felker v. Turpin, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 657. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 990 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­1948. United States v. Perez. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267 (1996). Reported below: 70 F. 3d 345. No. 96­5337. Meza v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 (1996). Reported below: 76 F. 3d 117. No. 96­5586. Mills v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690 (1996). Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1190. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1700. In re Disbarment of Henry. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1037.] No. D­1712. In re Disbarment of Hatcher. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1044.] No. D­1724. In re Disbarment of Parks. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1052.] No. D­1746. In re Disbarment of Brady. Michael J. Brady, of Tucson, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1747. In re Disbarment of Polischuk. Gregory J. Polischuk, of Springfield, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1748. In re Disbarment of D'Ambrosio. Vincent T. D'Ambrosio, of Brooklyn, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 991 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­31. Waller v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. Mo- tion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­32. Billy-Eko v. United States. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied. No. 95­2031. Young et al. v. Fordice et al. D. C. S. D. Miss. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 518 U. S. 1055.] Motion of appellees Kirk Fordice et al. to exclude the United States as a party in the case granted without prejudice to the Acting Solicitor General filing a brief as amicus curiae for the United States. No. 96­370. Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pen- sion Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of National Coordinating Com- mittee for Multiemployer Plans and Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­437. Christians, Trustee v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Minnesota Civil Liber- ties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari Denied No. 95­8942. Shoemaker v. California et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 108. No. 95­9302. McCarthy v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 522. No. 96­90. Regents of the University of California v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 291. No. 96­234. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 992 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 18, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­252. DCX, Inc. v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 132. No. 96­279. Stonehill et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­364. Highland Irrigation Co. et al. v. Colorado ex rel. Simpson, State Engineer, et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 917 P. 2d 1242. No. 96­373. Brooks et al. v. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­377. Braun, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Braun, Deceased v. Lorillard, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 230. No. 96­379. King, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 784. No. 96­381. New York State Thruway Authority v. Man- cuso et ux., Individually and on Behalf of Their Chil- dren Deanna and Theresa, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 289. No. 96­382. Powers, Next Friend of Powers, a Minor, et al. v. Bayliner Marine Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 789. No. 96­386. Haberbush v. Clark Oil Trading Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 846. No. 96­387. Dodaro et al. v. Christy. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 122. No. 96­391. Dailey v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 415. No. 96­399. Flanagan v. Cazalet et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­400. Paulsen v. Beyond, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 993 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 No. 96­414. Independent Charities of America, Inc., et al. v. Minnesota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 791. No. 96­417. North Dakota Association of Retarded Citi- zens v. Schafer, Governor of North Dakota, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1008. No. 96­418. Office and Professional Employees Inter- national Union, AFL­CIO, CLC v. Pope. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1492. No. 96­419. Brock, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Hardy, a Minor v. Lewis et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­420. Hughey v. JMS Development Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1523. No. 96­425. Loew et al. v. Hibbard et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 918 P. 2d 212. No. 96­432. Sanders et al. v. Venture Stores, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 420. No. 96­435. Kramer v. Vision Cable of Pinellas, Inc. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 134. No. 96­440. Bergstrom et al. v. Dalkon Shield Claim- ants Trust. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 364. No. 96­450. Gillen v. City of Boston. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­476. Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1332. No. 96­484. Cheek v. American Airlines, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 838. No. 96­522. Harris v. City of Hamtramck et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­555. Rehman v. ECC International Corp. et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 So. 2d 424. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 994 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 18, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­557. Anjelica Nurseries, Inc., et al. v. Corado- Ceron. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 Md. App. 735. No. 96­571. Smith v. Mail-Well Envelope Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 433. No. 96­600. LaPointe v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 Conn. 694, 678 A. 2d 942. No. 96­614. Froeman v. Glendening, Governor of Mary- land, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1178. No. 96­615. Miller v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 145. No. 96­621. Muracciole v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1169. No. 96­630. Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­634. Jackson et al. v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 976. No. 96­636. Shrock v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1187. No. 96­5025. Kinser v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 413. No. 96­5242. Hamilton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 619. No. 96­5272. Taylor v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 1246. No. 96­5556. Dunlap et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1190. No. 96­5602. Wesley v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1749. No. 96­5603. Everhart v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1715. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 995 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 No. 96­5604. Grasmick v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1719. No. 96­5605. Fisher v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1716. No. 96­5616. Bell v. City of Hallandale, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5636. Baird et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 450. No. 96­5638. Shoemaker v. Carlos et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5653. Faulder v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 515. No. 96­5681. Bonta v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1707. No. 96­5848. Land v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1726. No. 96­5851. Bonty v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1707. No. 96­5859. Williams v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1750. No. 96­5860. Wood v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1751. No. 96­5876. Gauthier v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1718. No. 96­5877. Garrett v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1718. No. 96­5878. Harpster v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1721. No. 96­5950. Jones v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1724. No. 96­5977. Harrison v. Thompson, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1331. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 996 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 18, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5978. Fort v. Hailey et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­5979. Davis v. Sacramento County District At- torney's Office. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 385. No. 96­5984. Harvey v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 932. No. 96­5985. Blandino v. Lindler et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 591. No. 96­5986. Vrba v. Wakatsuki et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5988. Muhummad v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5989. Ivy v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5990. Kelly v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6002. Gallegos v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 185 Ariz. 340, 916 P. 2d 1056. No. 96­6026. Neal v. Regan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6027. Johnson v. Hill, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6035. Woods v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1312. No. 96­6037. Turner v. Internal Revenue Service et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6038. Turner v. Kuykendall. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 134. No. 96­6039. Dickeson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1712. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 997 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 No. 96­6040. Walker v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1749. No. 96­6041. Jessop v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1724. No. 96­6042. Macalino v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1729. No. 96­6043. Moncrief v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1733. No. 96­6048. Rivas Linares v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ga. 812, 471 S. E. 2d 208. No. 96­6049. Lindsey v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 150. No. 96­6055. Galloway v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6060. Sam v. Independence Savings Bank. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 125. No. 96­6063. Wuornos v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 972. No. 96­6069. Williams v. McCausland et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6079. Blagg v. Oregon et al. Ct. App. Ore. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 Ore. App. 92, 911 P. 2d 942. No. 96­6083. Robinson v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 431, 662 N. E. 2d 798. No. 96­6087. Sierra v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1742. No. 96­6089. Olsen v. McDaniel, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6226. Berkley v. Department of the Army. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1166. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 998 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 18, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6241. Joyner v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6260. Garcia v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 1292. No. 96­6265. Marinoff v. Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6279. David v. Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­6288. Williams v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6296. Williams v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 3, 472 S. E. 2d 50. No. 96­6308. Rota v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1174. No. 96­6309. Lasiter v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 699. No. 96­6310. Lee v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­6316. Bolden v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6323. Pavlico v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 616. No. 96­6324. Parrado v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 402. No. 96­6327. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1253 and 1254. No. 96­6341. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. No. 96­6343. Rahman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 89. No. 96­6357. McClendon v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 160. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 999 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 No. 96­6359. Rux v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 912. No. 96­6361. Nunez-Elizarraraz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 390. No. 96­6362. Caton-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­6365. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1326. No. 96­6366. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 50. No. 96­6367. Salemo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 127. No. 96­6369. Kyle v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6376. Freeman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1199. No. 96­6377. Hebeka v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 279. No. 96­6379. Ford et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1350. No. 96­6380. Evans v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. No. 96­6382. Frias-Castro v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 586. No. 96­6388. Evans v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­6395. Berry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 148. No. 96­6396. Santiago-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1136. No. 96­6397. Osborne v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1000 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 18, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6398. Riazco v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 752. No. 96­6401. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 599. No. 96­6407. Lundy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 645. No. 96­6408. Irizarry-Sanabria v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 640. No. 96­6411. Proctor v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­6414. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. No. 96­6420. Eastland v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­6422. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­6423. Hart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 663. No. 96­6428. Bisaccia v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 9. No. 96­6429. Dolfi v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1173. No. 96­6432. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 624. No. 96­6433. Wills v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 704. No. 96­6437. Rickett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 224. No. 96­6447. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 163. No. 96­6449. Jaramillo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 521. 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1001 519 U. S. November 18, 1996 No. 96­6455. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1163. No. 96­6474. Gianfortuna v. Jabe, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­355. Calderon, Warden v. Angelo Morales. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1387. Rehearing Denied No. 95­1895. Asam v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, ante, p. 814; No. 95­2076. Fernandes v. Rockaway Township Town Council et al., ante, p. 824; No. 95­9006. Carroll v. Local 144 Pension Fund et al., ante, p. 834; No. 95­9129. Key v. Clarke et al., ante, p. 839; No. 95­9180. In re Everett, ante, p. 806; No. 95­9218. Whiting v. Utah, ante, p. 844; No. 95­9229. Brewer v. Puckett, Commissioner, Missis- sippi Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 844; No. 95­9297. Reynolds v. Tele-Communications, Inc., ante, p. 849; No. 95­9408. Cooper v. Malone et al., ante, p. 855; No. 96­60. In re Ratcliff, ante, p. 806; No. 96­89. United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, ante, p. 865; No. 96­283. Dee v. Reno, Attorney General, et al., ante, p. 873; No. 96­5074. Clay v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 877; No. 96­5159. Fields v. American Express Co., ante, p. 882; No. 96­5311. Bankston et al. v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. et al. (two judgments), ante, p. 891; No. 96­5358. Ceballos v. United States, ante, p. 893; No. 96­5432. Kontakis v. Morton, Administrator, New Jersey State Prison, et al., ante, p. 898; and 519ORD$$1f 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1002 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 November 18, 21, 27, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5934. Lucas v. United States, ante, p. 941. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. November 21, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­465. Coleman, Shaw, Willous Group, Inc., et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Conservator for Hollywood Federal Savings Bank. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 161. Certiorari Denied No. 96­6724 (A­360). Bennett v. Angelone, Director, Vir- ginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Applica- tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1336. November 27, 1996 Certiorari Granted No. 96­272. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Monday, January 13, 1997. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, February 12, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, March 3, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 840. No. 96­318. Richardson et al. v. McKnight. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Mon- day, January 13, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, February 12, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, March 3, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 417. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1003 519 U. S. November 27, December 2, 1996 No. 96­491. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 3 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 13, 1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, February 12, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, March 3, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 348. December 2, 1996 Affirmed on Appeal No. 96­471. Miller et al. v. Ohio et al. Affirmed on ap- peal from D. C. S. D. Ohio. Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 95­ 2082, ante, p. 54.) Certiorari Dismissed No. 96­6126. Richards v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1152. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 96­5831, ante, p. 59.) No. A­1063 (O. T. 1995). Owens v. United States. Applica- tion for bail pending appeal, addressed to Justice Souter and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1714. In re Disbarment of Schoor. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1045.] No. D­1719. In re Disbarment of Golkin. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1049.] No. D­1722. In re Disbarment of Cunningham. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1052.] No. D­1725. In re Disbarment of Hughes. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1053.] 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1004 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. D­1726. In re Disbarment of Caron. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1053.] No. D­1727. In re Disbarment of Adams. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1053.] No. D­1728. In re Disbarment of Mestman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1053.] No. D­1749. In re Disbarment of Keathley. Ernest L. Keathley, Jr., of Florissant, Mo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1750. In re Disbarment of Jacobs. Kent Francis Jacobs, of Seward, Neb., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1751. In re Disbarment of Principato. Saverio R. Principato, of Camden, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1752. In re Disbarment of Frieze. Jack Wendell Frieze, of Irving, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1753. In re Disbarment of Barone. Anthony F. Barone, of Palm Beach, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1754. In re Disbarment of Nedell. Jay Stuart Nedell, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1005 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. D­1755. In re Disbarment of Smotkin. Alan Melvyn Smotkin, of Beverly Hills, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1756. In re Disbarment of Allen. Robin W. Allen, of Sacramento, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­33. Marcus v. Carrasquillo et al. Motion of peti- tioner to waive requirements of this Court's Rule 33.1 denied. No. M­34. McMeans v. Leonard et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied. No. 105, Orig. Kansas v. Colorado. Motion of the Special Master for interim fees and expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded $107,199.16 for the period November 2, 1995, through October 18, 1996, to be paid equally by Kansas and Colo- rado. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 516 U. S. 1025.] No. 96­323. K. R., an Infant, by Her Parents and Next Friends, et al. v. Anderson Community School Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­5658. Lambrix v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 958.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Matthew C. Lawry, Esq., of Phila- delphia, Pa., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 96­6240. Lee v. Fuji Bank, Ltd. C. A. 1st Cir.; and No. 96­6244. McKinney v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until December 23, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1006 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6135. In re Stiles; and No. 96­6189. In re Gaydos. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 96­6213. In re Banks; and No. 96­6478. In re Lynn et al. Petitions for writs of man- damus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1780. Nebraska v. Reeder. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 249 Neb. 207, 543 N. W. 2d 429. No. 95­1951. Johnson v. Sheahan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 144. No. 95­1994. Macias-Munoz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 545. No. 95­2062. Multnomah County et al. v. Pierce. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1032. No. 95­9363. LaFave v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­61. Novak v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­141. Hatch v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1370. No. 96­167. City of Chicago v. Evans et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 658. No. 96­288. DiDomenico et al. v. United States; and No. 96­294. Marino v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 294. No. 96­296. C & D Charter Power Systems, Inc. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1278. No. 96­298. Sosa et al. v. Alvarez-Machain. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­306. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.; and 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1007 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­472. Robertson-Ceco Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 560. No. 96­322. Nachreiner Boie Art Factory et al. v. Goris et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 Wis. 2d 549, 549 N. W. 2d 273. No. 96­367. White v. Rush Health Systems, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 626. No. 96­426. Lo Duca v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1100. No. 96­433. City of Evergreen et al. v. Stallworth. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 So. 2d 229. No. 96­434. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United Arab Emirates et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 82 F. 3d 658. No. 96­436. Weiss v. Weiss. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 Cal. App. 4th 106, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339. No. 96­451. North Michigan Land & Oil Corp. et al. v. Michigan Public Service Commission et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 211 Mich. App. 424, 536 N. W. 2d 259. No. 96­452. Pitre et al. v. Louisiana Tech University et al. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 585. No. 96­455. DeJesus et al. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 65. No. 96­456. Healy v. Fairleigh Dickinson University et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 287 N. J. Super. 407, 671 A. 2d 182. No. 96­460. Liquidation Estate of De Laurentiis Enter- tainment Group v. Technicolor, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1061. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1008 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­462. KGET­TV Channel 17 et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Kern (California et al., Real Parties in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­463. Smith et al. v. Houston Oilers, Inc., dba The Houston Oilers, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 717. No. 96­464. Cline v. Rogers, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of McMinn County, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 176. No. 96­467. Jones et al. v. General Electric Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 209. No. 96­475. Lal v. Borough of Kennett Square. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 A. 2d 15. No. 96­477. Farquhar et al. v. City of Manhattan Beach et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P. 2d 160. No. 96­481. Oswald et ux. v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 So. 2d 668. No. 96­485. Long Island Jewish Medical Center v. Schonholz. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 72. No. 96­487. K. D. H. v. K. M. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 1084. No. 96­488. Jamell, an Infant, by His Mother and Next Friend, Jamell, et al. v. City of Chesapeake. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 828. No. 96­493. Anderson v. Envirotest Technologies, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 438. No. 96­494. Ertel v. Patriot-News Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 93, 674 A. 2d 1038. No. 96­495. Doe et al. v. Lockwood et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 833. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1009 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­496. Walton v. Throgmorton. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­499. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Adams et al. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 671 So. 2d 540. No. 96­500. Wilson v. Began et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­501. Anderson v. Mississippi et al. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. No. 96­502. Brown v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­503. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 403. No. 96­507. Graham v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 221 App. Div. 2d 1033, 635 N. Y. S. 2d 405. No. 96­508. Plassman et ux. v. City of Wauseon et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 629. No. 96­509. Pringle v. Wolfe, Town Justice of Wal- worth, et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 426, 668 N. E. 2d 1376. No. 96­510. Bland et al. v. Fessler et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 729. No. 96­512. Scypta v. Oglebay Norton Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 144. No. 96­513. V­1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128 Idaho 890, 920 P. 2d 909. No. 96­514. Yawczak v. Acosta et ux. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1143. No. 96­521. One World One Family Now et al. v. City and County of Honolulu et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1009. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1010 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­523. Salinas v. University of Texas-Pan Ameri- can et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1312. No. 96­524. Yohn v. Board of Regents, University of Michigan, et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­527. Power v. Alexandria Physicians Group, Ltd., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 132. No. 96­528. Smith v. City and County of Denver et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 849. No. 96­533. Brown v. Sanford, Individually and dba Tommie Ray's. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­535. Schley v. College of Charleston et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 416. No. 96­537. Hervey et al., Parents and Natural Guard- ians of Hervey, Deceased v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 88 F. 3d 1001. No. 96­549. Tovar v. IBP, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1167. No. 96­551. GcUBcMK Constructors v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 175. No. 96­558. Copy-Mor, Inc., et al. v. California Pacific Medical Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 150. No. 96­564. Hall v. American National Red Cross. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 919. No. 96­573. Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 87 F. 3d 457. No. 96­581. Overmyer et ux. v. Meeker, Executor of the Estate of Meeker, Deceased, et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 661 N. E. 2d 1271. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1011 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­587. Haley v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­589. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 351. No. 96­596. Cisneros v. Reno, Attorney General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­607. Kramer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1067. No. 96­641. New Jersey v. Womack. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 145 N. J. 576, 679 A. 2d 606. No. 96­646. Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Luecke. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 356. No. 96­649. Wilson v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 223. No. 96­658. Simon v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 906. No. 96­677. Cutler v. United States; No. 96­6494. DeJesus v. United States; and No. 96­6522. Balter v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 427. No. 96­682. Ehrlander v. Department of Transporta- tion of Alaska et al. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. No. 96­688. Hao Hoang Ho v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1145. No. 96­699. Rodriguez v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Ill. App. 3d 1125, 697 N. E. 2d 17. No. 96­5234. White v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 775. No. 96­5259. Walker v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 671 So. 2d 581. No. 96­5306. Habiger v. City of Fargo et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 289. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1012 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5308. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 411. No. 96­5380. Kenney v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1190 and 105 F. 3d 1. No. 96­5498. Spence v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; and No. 96­5499. Spence v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 989. No. 96­5714. Homick v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 304, 913 P. 2d 1280. No. 96­5729. Jenkin, aka Jennings, aka Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­5731. Lagoye v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5733. Flores v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­5789. Kubinski et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­5882. Pararas-Carayannis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. No. 96­5947. Buenoano v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1078. No. 96­6082. Saleem v. Helman et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6085. Shabazz v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6088. Sherrills v. Rogers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6090. Partee v. Pastrick et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1013 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­6094. Ford v. Washington, Director, Illinois De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 838. No. 96­6095. Harris v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6096. Duchene v. Plunkett et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 588. No. 96­6108. Tucker v. Department of Education et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6112. Cook v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Mohave County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6115. McAdams v. Automotive Rentals, Inc. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 Ark. 332, 924 S. W. 2d 464. No. 96­6125. Bernstein v. National Transportation Safety Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 90 F. 3d 591. No. 96­6129. Yuan Jin v. Temple University et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1171. No. 96­6139. Burke v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 129, 469 S. E. 2d 901. No. 96­6142. Wilkerson v. Smith et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6143. Rhines v. South Dakota. Sup. Ct. S. D. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 548 N. W. 2d 415. No. 96­6153. Shores v. Rhoades et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1181. No. 96­6160. Words v. Sherwood Medical Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6162. Brown v. Gross et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 640. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1014 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6163. Maddox v. Walker et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­6165. Pizzo v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 50. No. 96­6168. Montue v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 153. No. 96­6169. Loss v. Michigan Parole Board. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6170. Jackson v. Maine Department of Human Services. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6172. Jones v. Maryvale Samaritan Hospital. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6175. Turner v. Perry. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. No. 96­6177. Grismore v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 44. No. 96­6180. Ferguson v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 676 A. 2d 902. No. 96­6185. Hughes v. Ignacio, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 427. No. 96­6190. Slappy v. Vanmeter et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1181. No. 96­6192. Knapp v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6193. Buc-Hanan v. Nishi/Hompa Hongwaji Tem- ple. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6197. Boblett v. Terry et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1015 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­6199. Brown v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1127, 665 N. E. 2d 1040. No. 96­6204. Oriakhi v. Baltimore City Jail et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­6211. Spencer v. LeMay et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6214. Anthony v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6216. Litzenberg v. Maryland et al. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6217. Barnes v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6218. Blake v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­6230. Sweed v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1444. No. 96­6232. Vickson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 677 So. 2d 842. No. 96­6233. Thompson et al. v. Kramer et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 502. No. 96­6243. Jackson v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Ariz. 20, 918 P. 2d 1038. No. 96­6245. Kirkpatrick v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 436, 668 N. E. 2d 790. No. 96­6246. Truesdale v. Moore, Director, South Caro- lina Department of Corrections. Ct. Common Pleas of Lan- caster County, S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6248. Moates v. Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1392. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1016 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6249. Mazzell v. Moore, Director, South Caro- lina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 263. No. 96­6251. Nawachie v. Department of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1163. No. 96­6280. Earnest v. Dorsey, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1123. No. 96­6290. Rawlins v. Allen, Clerk, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 490. No. 96­6299. Nesbitt v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 118. No. 96­6302. Steele v. City of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6312. Wilson v. Netherland, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6317. Preston v. Berry, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6330. White v. Gregory et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 429. No. 96­6332. Hawkins v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 1475, 663 N. E. 2d 1302. No. 96­6339. McKenzie v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 W. Va. 429, 475 S. E. 2d 521. No. 96­6342. Rendelman v. Keohane, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1181. No. 96­6354. Andrews v. United States; and No. 96­6425. Grimes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1110. No. 96­6363. Barton v. Morris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 143. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1017 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­6368. Meacham v. United States; and No. 96­6477. Botello v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­6371. Plante v. Ipswich Police Department et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1122, 664 N. E. 2d 1208. No. 96­6372. Schneider v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 335. No. 96­6385. Wutthidetgrainggrai et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 686. No. 96­6387. Godaire v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6391. Callins v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 210. No. 96­6409. Meredith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­6412. Sims v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6413. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1214. No. 96­6415. Moschgat v. Workmen's Compensation Ap- peal Board of Pennsylvania. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6424. De. D. v. District of Columbia et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 664 A. 2d 337. No. 96­6426. Ly Trinh Hinh v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 45. No. 96­6434. Wronke v. Madigan, Sheriff, Champaign County, Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1018 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6443. Cordoba v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 471. No. 96­6448. Wild v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 304. No. 96­6454. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 500. No. 96­6456. Cobb v. Thurman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­6458. Sewell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 326. No. 96­6464. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 920. No. 96­6465. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 686. No. 96­6466. Kemp v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1194. No. 96­6467. Giles v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­6469. Beasley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 400. No. 96­6471. Zakiya v. United States District Court for the District of Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 136. No. 96­6472. McMahon v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­6475. Dyce v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1462. No. 96­6476. Cotroneo v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 510. No. 96­6479. Lubin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­6482. Polak-Rudich v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1190. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1019 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­6486. Ireland v. Lowe. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1196. No. 96­6487. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1195. No. 96­6488. Ward v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1197. No. 96­6489. Ward v. North Carolina. Super. Ct. N. C., Pitt County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6491. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­6492. Foutch v. Alaska. Super. Ct. Alaska, 4th Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6495. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­6497. Arnold v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1186. No. 96­6498. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1197. No. 96­6501. Goggans v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6503. O'Rourke v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6506. Ali v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1182. No. 96­6508. Campos v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 261. No. 96­6509. Steward v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­6511. Jefferson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 240. No. 96­6512. Bernal-Arroyave v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1020 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6513. Scurlock v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 912. No. 96­6515. Smith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1188. No. 96­6523. O'Neil v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 835. No. 96­6525. Byrd v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 948. No. 96­6526. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6527. Brosky v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 915 S. W. 2d 120. No. 96­6532. Hall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­6533. Smith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1188. No. 96­6535. Evans v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 540. No. 96­6537. Guzman, aka Guzman Rivera v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 823. No. 96­6538. Arocho Gonzalez v. United States; and No. 96­6575. Arocho Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 121. No. 96­6539. McKnight v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­6540. Ford v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­6542. Weatherwax v. Government of the Virgin Islands. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1425. No. 96­6545. Baker v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 273. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1021 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 96­6548. Milam v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1440. No. 96­6553. Edwards v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 986. No. 96­6555. McCree v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6556. Argento v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­6563. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1186. No. 96­6565. Davidson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1435. No. 96­6566. Marin-Montoya v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 970. No. 96­6599. LaBarck et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­6623. Roach v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 146 N. J. 208, 680 A. 2d 634. No. 96­516. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Fuchs, Execu- tive Director, Florida Department of Revenue, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Motions of Newspaper Association of America and Printing Industries of America et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 670 So. 2d 113. No. 96­534. Anchondo et al. v. Cyprus Minerals Co. et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 96­545. Smith v. Regional Transportation District et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondents for award of damages and double costs denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 159. No. 96­6713 (A­356). Beaver v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1022 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 1996 519 U. S. the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens, Jus- tice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would grant the applica- tion for stay of execution. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1186. Rehearing Denied No. 95­1246. Smith v. Runyon, Postmaster General, 517 U. S. 1188; No. 95­1821. Marable v. Michigan, ante, p. 811; No. 95­1851. Holmes v. Griffin, ante, p. 812; No. 95­1944. Pippin v. Bennett, ante, p. 817; No. 95­1964. Hinchliffe et ux. v. Transamerica Finan- cial Consumer Discount Co., ante, p. 818; No. 95­1970. Suehl v. Suehl, ante, p. 818; No. 95­2001. Cowhig v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al., ante, p. 820; No. 95­2046. Howard v. Town of Chapel Hill et al., ante, p. 822; No. 95­2089. Strobridge v. New York et al., ante, p. 825; No. 95­2092. Faruqui v. California et al., ante, p. 825; No. 95­6127. Walters v. Allstate Insurance Co., 516 U. S. 1050; No. 95­8346. Garza v. United States, ante, p. 825; No. 95­8811. Hemmerle v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al., ante, p. 828; No. 95­8905. Warren v. United States, ante, p. 831; No. 95­9013. Godaire v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 834; No. 95­9058. Mitchell v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 836; No. 95­9100. Stewart v. Gramley, Warden, ante, p. 838; No. 95­9106. Nouraie v. West, Secretary of the Army, ante, p. 838; No. 95­9130. Klopp v. United States et al., ante, p. 839; No. 95­9132. Jackson v. Kessler, ante, p. 839; No. 95­9133. Jones, aka Lee v. United States, ante, p. 948; No. 95­9156. Baba v. Warren Management Consultants, Inc., et al., ante, p. 840; 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1023 519 U. S. December 2, 1996 No. 95­9158. Barberena-Jimenez v. United States, ante, p. 841; No. 95­9165. Kumar v. United States, ante, p. 841; No. 95­9255. Yurtis, aka Coan v. Jones et ux., ante, p. 846; No. 95­9283. Nguyen v. Department of Defense, ante, p. 848; No. 95­9337. Carr v. Louisiana, ante, p. 851; No. 95­9364. Aguilar v. New Mexico, ante, p. 852; No. 95­9433. Krueger v. Woods, Warden, ante, p. 856; No. 95­9452. Fortescue v. Simpson et al., ante, p. 857; No. 95­9457. Harper v. United States District Court for the District of Kansas et al., ante, p. 858; No. 95­9461. In re Williams, ante, p. 806; No. 95­9469. Smith v. National Corporation of Housing Partnerships, ante, p. 859; No. 95­9487. Taylor v. Louisiana, ante, p. 860; No. 95­9496. Barth v. United States, ante, p. 860; No. 96­10. In re Geschke et ux., ante, p. 861; No. 96­57. Schiffer v. Tarrytown Boat Club, Inc., et al., ante, p. 864; No. 96­92. Wolf v. Buss America, Inc., ante, p. 866; No. 96­96. Wyshak v. American Savings Bank, F. A., et al., ante, p. 866; No. 96­127. Greene v. City of Montgomery, ante, p. 867; No. 96­158. St. Hilaire et al. v. Maine Real Estate Com- mission, ante, p. 869; No. 96­161. Cornish v. District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility, ante, p. 869; No. 96­314. Schapiro v. Schapiro (two judgments), ante, p. 931; No. 96­5062. Anderson v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., et al., ante, p. 876; No. 96­5092. Phelps et ux. v. Denton County Sheriff et al., ante, p. 878; No. 96­5094. Baker v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al., ante, p. 879; No. 96­5095. Demarey v. United States, ante, p. 879; No. 96­5096. Oliver v. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al., ante, p. 879; 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1024 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 2, 4, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5106. Newport v. Michelin Aircraft Tire, aka Michelin Tire Corp., ante, p. 879; No. 96­5122. Ayeboua v. District of Columbia et al., ante, p. 880; No. 96­5142. Hayes v. Correction Management Affili- ates, Inc., et al., ante, p. 881; No. 96­5152. Childs v. Ohio et al., ante, p. 882; No. 96­5177. Martel v. New Hampshire, ante, p. 883; No. 96­5196. Crowder v. United States, ante, p. 885; No. 96­5275. Bretschneider v. Brown, ante, p. 889; No. 96­5314. Cook et ux. v. Boyd, ante, p. 891; No. 96­5320. Dempsey v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 892; No. 96­5364. Tuggle v. Netherland, Warden, ante, p. 894; No. 96­5367. Staup v. First Union National Bank of Florida et al., ante, p. 894; No. 96­5390. Wishnatsky v. Bergquist et al., ante, p. 895; No. 96­5410. Richards v. General Services Administra- tion, ante, p. 896; No. 96­5419. Brown v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treas- ury, et al., ante, p. 897; No. 96­5477. Becker v. Southwest Travis County Road District No. 1, ante, p. 933; and No. 96­5480. Billis v. United States, ante, p. 900. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 95­1933. Rogers et al. v. Rogers et al., ante, p. 816. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied. No. 95­8885. Siegel v. Doe et al., ante, p. 830. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. December 4, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 96­6907 (A­384). Mills v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Ken- nedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 580. 519ORD$$1g 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1025 519 U. S. December 5, 6, 1996 December 5, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­6953 (A­401). In re Mills. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­6908. Medina v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 580. No. 96­6949 (A­400). Mills v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 801. December 6, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 84, Orig. United States v. Alaska. Exceptions to Re- port of the Special Master set for oral argument in due course. Motion of Sierra Club et al. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 517 U. S. 1207.] Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 96­511. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted. Brief of appellants is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon oppos- ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, January 21, 1997. Briefs of appellees are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon oppos- ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, February 20, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 7, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 929 F. Supp. 824. Certiorari Granted No. 96­542. McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1026 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 6, 9, 1996 519 U. S. filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, January 21, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, February 20, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 7, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1573. December 9, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1721. In re Disbarment of Bartron. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 518 U. S. 1052.] No. D­1731. In re Disbarment of Brown. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 923.] No. D­1732. In re Disbarment of Silver. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 923.] No. D­1757. In re Disbarment of Taffer. Jack J. Taffer, of Miami, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1758. In re Disbarment of Morrell. Michael Xavier Morrell, of Washington, D. C., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­36. Abate v. Walton. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­37. Cross v. California; and No. M­38. Cross v. Murphy. Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without affidavits of indigency executed by petitioner denied. No. 95­1621. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai et ux. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1055.] Motion of Shipbuilders Council of America et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1027 519 U. S. December 9, 1996 No. 95­1764. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 926.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 96­262. Edmond v. United States; Lazenby v. United States; Leaver v. United States; Leonard v. United States; Nichols v. United States; and Venable v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 977.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 95­2031. Young et al. v. Fordice et al. D. C. S. D. Miss. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 518 U. S. 1055.] Motion of Community Service Society of New York et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 96­110. Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1057.] Motion of Schiller Institute for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 96­5534. Hoffmann v. Hoffmann. Ct. App. Md. Mo- tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 925] denied. No. 96­6681. In re Nagy; and No. 96­6749. In re Peth. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­6268. In re Sherrills. Petition for writ of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­9209. Grandison v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 341 Md. 175, 670 A. 2d 398. No. 96­180. Herring et al. v. Federal Deposit Insur- ance Corporation. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 82 F. 3d 282. No. 96­317. McClain, Judge, Vigo County Court v. Indi- ana Commission on Judicial Qualifications. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662 N. E. 2d 935. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1028 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 9, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­345. Greene et ux. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1348. No. 96­350. Starzenski et al. v. City of Elkhart et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 N. E. 2d 1132. No. 96­353. Green v. Phoenix Institute for Research & Education, Ltd. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1719. No. 96­389. Leonard v. Town of Brimfield et al.; and No. 96­605. Town of Brimfield et al. v. Leonard. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 152, 666 N. E. 2d 1300. No. 96­526. Johnson v. Zschach. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 648, 665 N. E. 2d 1070. No. 96­530. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Forman. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 446. No. 96­536. H. J. Heinz Co. et al. v. Dayhoff, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1287. No. 96­550. Chase et al. v. Lockheed Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 570. No. 96­554. SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 780. No. 96­556. Arkansas v. Bradford. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 325 Ark. 278, 927 S. W. 2d 329. No. 96­561. Pletz v. Thoeny et ux. Ct. App. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­570. Sorkin et al. v. County of Santa Cruz. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­574. Hetzel v. Prince William County et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 169. No. 96­579. Reynolds, dba Reynolds Fisheries, et al. v. Buchholzer, Director, Ohio Department of Natural Re- sources, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 827. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1029 519 U. S. December 9, 1996 No. 96­586. Arizona Central Railroad v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 438. No. 96­610. Weiss v. Moreno Valley Unified High School District et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­611. McIntosh et al. v. Jackson. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 330. No. 96­623. Saavedra, Special Administratrix of the Es- tates of Yamaguchi et al., Deceased v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 547. No. 96­624. Rehman v. ECC International Corp. et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 46. No. 96­633. Guerra v. Communications Workers of America, AFL­CIO. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 91 F. 3d 140. No. 96­637. Troutwine Family Trust v. County of Ne- vada et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­638. Ganyo v. Seguin Independent School Dis- trict et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. No. 96­654. Brown et al. v. First State Bank of Harvard et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­664. Williams et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­668. City of San Juan, Texas v. North Alamo Water Supply Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 90 F. 3d 910. No. 96­671. Lawrence et al. v. Melissa Holdings, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­692. Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 155. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1030 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 9, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­693. Mizani, aka Marjani v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­697. Arnold v. Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 838. No. 96­722. Borden, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­732. Godshalk v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 487. No. 96­733. Vaughters v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 377. No. 96­5124. Smith v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 919 S. W. 2d 96. No. 96­5555. Viswanathan v. Scotland County Board of Education et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 376. No. 96­5703. Ransom v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 920 S. W. 2d 288. No. 96­5758. Whitehead v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 169 Ill. 2d 355, 662 N. E. 2d 1304. No. 96­5779. Cole v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 172 Ill. 2d 85, 665 N. E. 2d 1275. No. 96­5833. Blue v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 1184. No. 96­5881. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1537. No. 96­5888. Narlock v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 162. No. 96­6250. Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1301. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1031 519 U. S. December 9, 1996 No. 96­6254. Houghteling v. Hutchinson. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6261. Hain v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 919 P. 2d 1130. No. 96­6262. Irving v. City of College Station et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­6267. Smith v. Puckett et al. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6269. Omoike v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 So. 2d 443. No. 96­6270. Williams v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6272. Toerper v. Trotter et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­6273. Wanzer v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6274. Allard v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 75 Ohio St. 3d 482, 663 N. E. 2d 1277. No. 96­6277. Graham v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6281. Glant v. Glant. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 338. No. 96­6282. Davis v. Goord, Acting Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6283. Muhammad v. Nuchia. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 138. No. 96­6287. Belcher v. Lesley et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6292. Aaron v. Cunningham et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1032 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 9, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6294. Straub v. Zollar. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 278 Ill. App. 3d 556, 663 N. E. 2d 80. No. 96­6300. Loomer v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 76 Ohio St. 3d 398, 667 N. E. 2d 1209. No. 96­6314. Kenney v. Stark et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 307. No. 96­6321. Messerschmidt v. Riley, Secretary of Edu- cation, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1459. No. 96­6340. Olson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6355. Laird v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Ariz. 203, 920 P. 2d 769. No. 96­6374. Hanson v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6375. Feinstein v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1169. No. 96­6462. Selby v. Abraham, District Attorney of Philadelphia County, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6473. Hunt v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 624. No. 96­6505. Nicholson v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 643. No. 96­6528. Hampton v. University of Maryland at Bal- timore. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 Md. App. 297, 674 A. 2d 145. No. 96­6536. Mitchell v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1033 519 U. S. December 9, 1996 No. 96­6550. Akins v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- teral Revenue. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 644. No. 96­6558. Orlando Rivas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 193. No. 96­6562. Colon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 57. No. 96­6564. Owens v. Presbyterian Hospital. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 682. No. 96­6576. Allen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 53. No. 96­6583. Haynes v. Town of Summerville et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 130. No. 96­6584. Weeks v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 A. 2d 60. No. 96­6592. Wexler v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 350. No. 96­6594. Voss v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1160. No. 96­6596. Dick v. City of Chicago et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 647. No. 96­6598. Hill v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­6603. Brown v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6606. Fujinaka v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6618. Arnold v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1155. No. 96­6625. Comer v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1271. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1034 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 9, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6626. Cathcart v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­6628. Mayes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 57. No. 96­6630. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 855. No. 96­6632. Feliciano v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­6634. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 642. No. 96­6635. Green v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 126. No. 96­6643. Johnson v. McCaughtry, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 585. No. 96­6648. Barfield v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1168. No. 96­6652. Casanova et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 160. No. 96­6662. Farnsworth v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1001. No. 96­6663. McNeil, aka McNeill v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 298. No. 96­6667. Darby v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 681 A. 2d 1156. No. 96­6669. Turner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 276. No. 96­6671. Willis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 842. No. 96­358. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Chittum. Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of Association of American Railroads for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Va. 408, 468 S. E. 2d 877. 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1035 519 U. S. December 9, 1996 No. 96­6291. Kimble v. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this peti- tion. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 489. Rehearing Denied No. 94­7620. Williams v. Metropolitan Transit Author- ity et al., 514 U. S. 1006; No. 95­1439. Lakoski v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, ante, p. 947; No. 95­8984. Chaudhary v. O'Neil et al., ante, p. 833; No. 95­9033. Johnson v. United States, ante, p. 948; No. 95­9235. In re Benton, ante, p. 806; No. 95­9301. Fuller v. Board of Selectmen for the Town of Canton et al., ante, p. 849; No. 95­9311. Jones v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., ante, p. 850; No. 96­47. Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co. et al., ante, p. 863; No. 96­218. Shumate v. NationsBank, ante, p. 871; No. 96­237. Lockmiller v. Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County, ante, p. 929; No. 96­244. In re Smith, ante, p. 948; No. 96­248. Allgood, Individually and as Independent Executrix of the Estate of Allgood, Deceased, et al. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al., ante, p. 930; No. 96­258. Hardin v. Cunningham, ante, p. 930; No. 96­384. Wyshak v. American Savings Bank, F. A., et al., ante, p. 950; No. 96­5179. Gadson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 884; No. 96­5413. Felder v. Stock, Warden, et al., ante, p. 897; No. 96­5490. Gabor et ux. v. Frazer et al., ante, p. 934; No. 96­5529. Spurgetis v. United States Judiciary, ante, p. 934; No. 96­5540. Sepulvado v. Louisiana, ante, p. 934; No. 96­5549. Tart v. Louisiana, ante, p. 934; No. 96­5567. Jeffries v. Oklahoma, ante, p. 935; No. 96­5575. Robinson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 935; No. 96­5582. Mark v. United States, ante, p. 904; 519ORD$$1h 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1036 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 9, 10, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­5625. Johnson v. Shillinger, Warden, et al., ante, p. 936; No. 96­5669. In re Parenteau, ante, p. 806; No. 96­5690. Steele v. California Department of Social Services et al., ante, p. 952; No. 96­5697. Jemzura v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. et al., ante, p. 953; No. 96­5730. Kammefa v. Maryland Department of Agri- culture, ante, p. 908; No. 96­5741. Brown v. Ferguson, Warden, et al., ante, p. 953; No. 96­5749. Lawrence v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, ante, p. 937; No. 96­5892. Iverson et al. v. Grant et al., ante, p. 976; No. 96­5893. Moseley v. United States, ante, p. 941; No. 96­5936. Bierley v. Franz, District Director, Penn- sylvania Board of Probation and Parole, ante, p. 954; No. 96­5966. O'Brien v. United States, ante, p. 942; and No. 96­6007. Campbell v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, ante, p. 943. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 95­9407. Meservy v. Meservy, ante, p. 855. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. December 10, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­6992 (A­418). In re Zeitvogel. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­6925 (A­392). Stout v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execu- tion. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 42. No. 96­7009 (A­420). Zeitvogel v. Bowersox, Superin- tendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Ap- 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1037 519 U. S. December 10, 16, 1996 plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 56. December 16, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 96-5369, ante, p. 145.) Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1564. In re Disbarment of Muraski. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1156.] No. D­1723. In re Disbarment of Peavy. Don E. Peavy, Sr., of Fort Worth, Tex., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on September 20, 1996 [518 U. S. 1052], is discharged. No. D­1729. In re Disbarment of Gilbert. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 802.] No. D­1737. In re Disbarment of Gill. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 946.] No. D­1759. In re Disbarment of Plust. Paul Neal Plust, of Brooklyn, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1760. In re Disbarment of Gomric. James John Gomric, of Belleville, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­1. Lawrence v. Secretary of the Treasury. Mo- tion for reconsideration of order denying leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [ante, p. 803] denied. No. M­39. Atkinson v. Oglesby Plant Laboratories, Inc.; and 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1038 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 16, 1996 519 U. S. No. M­40. American Legion Post No. 3 v. Separation of Church and State Committee et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­45. Holtz et al. v. Smith. Motion to treat an un- timely petition for writ of certiorari as a conditional cross-petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 84, Orig. United States v. Alaska. Motion of Alaska for additional time for oral argument granted, and 30 additional minutes are allotted for that purpose. Motion of California for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1025.] No. 108, Orig. Nebraska v. Wyoming et al. Motion of the Special Master for compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $19,530 for the period June 1 through November 15, 1996, to be paid as follows: 30% by Nebraska, 30% by Wyoming, 15% by Colorado, and 25% by the United States. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 518 U. S. 1002.] No. 120, Orig. New Jersey v. New York. Motion of the Special Master for compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $255,157.62 for the period May 15 through November 15, 1996, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 517 U. S. 1242.] No. 95­1425. Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and No. 95­1460. United States v. Johnson et al. D. C. S. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1207.] Motion of ap- pellees Davida Johnson et al. to supplement the record denied. No. 95­1621. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai et ux. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1055.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu- ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­1872. Strate, Associate Tribal Judge, Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berth- old Indian Reservation, et al. v. A­1 Contractors et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1056.] Motion of 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1039 519 U. S. December 16, 1996 the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu- ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­2031. Young et al. v. Fordice et al. D. C. S. D. Miss. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 518 U. S. 1055.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu- ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­79. Boggs v. Boggs et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 957.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­1858. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, et al. v. Quill et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1055.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of Wayne County, Michigan, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 96­110. Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1057.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu- ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Mo- tion of Wayne County, Michigan, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 96­568. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir.; and No. 96­577. Tristar Corp. v. Freitas et al. C. A. 2d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases ex- pressing the views of the United States. No. 96­6834. In re Valencia; and No. 96­6835. In re King. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­6344. In re Reiman; and No. 96­6356. In re Johnson. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1641. Brabson et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1040. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1040 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 16, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­371. Clayton et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 170. No. 96­395. Brown v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 645. No. 96­397. Samuel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 173. No. 96­423. Coulter et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insur- ance Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 78 F. 3d 1533 and 92 F. 3d 1074. No. 96­565. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 718. No. 96­569. McKay v. Jobin, Trustee, Estate of M & L Business Machine Co., Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­583. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3 et al. v. Hsu, By and Through Her Next Friend, Hsu, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 839. No. 96­584. Prince et ux. v. Unsecured Creditors Com- mittee. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 314. No. 96­585. Ethier v. Larson et al. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­588. Washington Times Corp. v. Berman. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­592. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life As- surance Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 85 F. 3d 21. No. 96­593. Living Springs Retreat v. County of Putnam et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 215 App. Div. 2d 449, 626 N. Y. S. 2d 268. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1041 519 U. S. December 16, 1996 No. 96­594. Mudie v. Miltland Raleigh-Durham. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 N. C. App. 168, 468 S. E. 2d 275. No. 96­599. Glenbrook Co. v. Ernst Home Center, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1161. No. 96­606. Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 614. No. 96­609. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians et al. v. Poodry et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 874. No. 96­612. Sheffield v. Andrews, Individually and as Attorney-in-Fact for Pugh. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 So. 2d 1052. No. 96­613. General Truck Drivers and Helpers Union Local No. 92, Affiliated With the International Brother- hood of Teamsters, AFL­CIO v. Wilson. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 747. No. 96­616. Billman v. Department of Human Services, Franklin County, Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­617. Hyland Hill North Condominium Assn., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 549 N. W. 2d 617. No. 96­620. Simms v. First Madison Bank, FSB. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1546. No. 96­626. Adams et al. v. CSX Transportation, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1377. No. 96­627. Davis v. O'Brien. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1118, 664 N. E. 2d 486. No. 96­639. Kissi v. Great American Insurance Cos. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­642. Wambaugh v. Smith. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 108. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1042 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 16, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­645. Subaru of America, Inc., et al. v. Compton. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1513. No. 96­666. Medico v. Sobolevitch, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­681. Greer et al. v. Kane, Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 489. No. 96­696. Culp v. Hood et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­715. African Union Methodist Protestant Church and Connection v. Mother African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church; Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church v. Mother African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church; and Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church et al. v. Mother African Union First Colored Methodist Protes- tant Church et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 683 A. 2d 58 (first and third judgments); 687 A. 2d 194 (second judgment). No. 96­718. Goetzman et ux. v. Agribank, FCB, fka Fed- eral Land Bank of St. Paul, fka Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1173. No. 96­726. Humphreys v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 840. No. 96­740. Watson et vir v. Isern. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 925 S. W. 2d 604. No. 96­745. Anchors v. United States; and No. 96­6650. Anderskow v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 245. No. 96­760. Honn v. R. J. Steichen & Co. et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­765. Kallevig v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 840. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1043 519 U. S. December 16, 1996 No. 96­5615. Dinwiddie v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 913. No. 96­5700. Parker v. Zant, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­5917. Barbee v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5959. Miranda v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 174. No. 96­5961. Brown v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 406, 676 A. 2d 1178. No. 96­6064. Betancourt v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6124. Simpson v. Hession et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6130. Mitchell v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 250. No. 96­6221. Rachal v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 917 S. W. 2d 799. No. 96­6325. Burton v. Christopher, Judge, 295th Judi- cial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6328. Reiman v. Wagstaff et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6329. Cook v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 674 So. 2d 957. No. 96­6345. Larzelere v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 394. No. 96­6346. Nance v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ga. 816, 471 S. E. 2d 216. No. 96­6347. Key v. Oakland Housing Authority et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 845. No. 96­6349. January v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1044 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 16, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6350. Thompson v. Thompson et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6351. Vann v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6352. Vann v. Oklahoma et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 160. No. 96­6358. Wallace v. Morrison, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1271. No. 96­6378. Glock v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 385. No. 96­6383. Golden v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6386. Griffith v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6389. Humphrey v. Potlatch Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1243. No. 96­6438. Oriakhi v. United States et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­6451. Martin v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Conn. App. 731, 663 A. 2d 1078. No. 96­6483. Muraski v. Thomas, Grievance Administra- tor, Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 Mich. 1203, 546 N. W. 2d 256. No. 96­6490. Williams v. Ferguson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6520. Bryant v. Bryant. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Conn. App. 944, 672 A. 2d 977 and 978. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1045 519 U. S. December 16, 1996 No. 96­6524. Williams et al. v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 635. No. 96­6529. Whipple v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 S. C. 43, 476 S. E. 2d 683. No. 96­6530. Holden v. Briggs, Superintendent, Cook Inlet Pretrial Facility. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 651. No. 96­6551. Trapp v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 356, 668 N. E. 2d 327. No. 96­6569. McQuade v. City of Kent. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 153. No. 96­6573. Harris v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6578. Johnson v. Robbinsdale Independent School District 281 et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6581. Lurie v. Caesar's Tahoe, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 387. No. 96­6601. Schumer v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6612. Thomas, aka Coleman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 476. No. 96­6627. Hy Thi Nguyen v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 642. No. 96­6633. Fort v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 540. No. 96­6654. Eltayib v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 157. No. 96­6655. Harper v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 656. No. 96­6656. Castro Quintana v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 782. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1046 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 16, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6660. Lawson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 656. No. 96­6664. Lattanzio v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 21. No. 96­6666. Mizell, aka Walker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 288. No. 96­6672. Reedom v. City of Fort Worth et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 53. No. 96­6674. Hollar v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1179. No. 96­6675. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6677. Granada v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 146. No. 96­6682. Cowan et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1439. No. 96­6683. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­6685. Morales v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 824. No. 96­6686. Hoy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 645. No. 96­6687. Goodman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­6702. Davage v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 830. No. 96­6704. Rebolledo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. No. 96­6706. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­6707. Iguade v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 986. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1047 519 U. S. December 16, 1996 No. 96­6710. Bean v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1441. No. 96­6711. Borjesson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 954. No. 96­6720. Pearson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 175. No. 96­6722. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1463. No. 96­6727. Prince v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 643. No. 96­6729. Adams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 114. No. 96­6732. Voigt v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1050. No. 96­6734. Taite v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­6735. Tiday v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6743. Bojorquez-Gastelum v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 656. No. 96­6744. Tamayo Baron v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1312. No. 96­6746. Burrell v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6754. Labella-Szuba v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 136. No. 96­6755. Morrison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. No. 96­6760. Gartner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 633. No. 96­6763. Fleming v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 642. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1048 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 16, 1996 519 U. S. No. 96­6765. Klein v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 698. No. 96­6767. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­6769. Osorio v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 161. No. 96­6779. Caldwell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 522. No. 96­6785. Kilaab al Ghashiyah (Khan) v. Smith, War- den. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 110. No. 96­591. Verex Assurance, Inc. v. Palma. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Mortgage Insurance Companies of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1453. No. 96­604. Special School District No. 1 v. H. M. Ct. App. Minn. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6951 (A­428). Hoke v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Jus- tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1350. Rehearing Denied No. 95­1963. Rucker v. Citicorp Savings of Illinois, ante, p. 818; No. 95­9246. Seddens v. Jones, Warden, ante, p. 846; No. 95­9258. Arroyo Jusino v. Brown, Secretary of Vet- erans Affairs, ante, p. 846; No. 96­150. Schall v. United States Postal Service, ante, p. 868; No. 96­206. Oney v. Nennig, ante, p. 871; No. 96­424. Garza v. Weekley, Mayor, City of San Be- nito, ante, p. 950; 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1049 519 U. S. December 16, 17, 1996 No. 96­5383. McDonald v. Inland Container Corp., ante, p. 895; No. 96­5407. Brown v. American Express Travel Re- lated Services Co., Inc., ante, p. 896; No. 96­5569. McCullough v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, ante, p. 935; No. 96­5592. Adams v. United States, ante, p. 904; No. 96­5663. Tesciuba v. Koch, Former Mayor of City of New York, et al., ante, p. 952; No. 96­5725. Johnson v. Brown et al., ante, p. 967; No. 96­5740. Shelton v. Looker, ante, p. 937; No. 96­5896. Schaffer v. Kirkland et al., ante, p. 982; No. 96­5903. Scott v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 971; No. 96­5993. Johnson v. Griffin et al., ante, p. 971; No. 96­6037. Turner v. Internal Revenue Service et al., ante, p. 996; No. 96­6038. Turner v. Kuykendall, ante, p. 996; No. 96­6091. Lindley et al. v. United States, ante, p. 956; and No. 96­6207. Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, ante, p. 985. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 95­1682. Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus et al. v. Hays et al., 518 U. S. 1014. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Sou- ter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. Because the appellants have convincingly shown that this case is not moot, I would grant the petition for rehearing. No. 96­5115. Kirby v. Davis, Warden, et al., ante, p. 880. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. December 17, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­424 (96­6867). O'Dell v. Netherland, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1050 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 December 17, 19, 1996 519 U. S. of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. December 19, 1996 Certiorari Granted No. 96­6867 (A­424). O'Dell v. Netherland, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, January 30, 1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, February 27, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, March 12, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1214. Statement of Justice Scalia respecting the grant of certiorari. My vote was to deny the petition for certiorari in this case (and hence to deny the application for stay of execution), but I think it important to point out that the issue on which certiorari has been granted, and for which stay has been accorded, has nothing to do with O'Dell's claimed innocence of his crime. The Court has expressly limited its grant of review to Questions 1 and 2 of the petition for certiorari, which present the legal issue of whether our decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994)-holding that a capital sentencing jury must in certain circumstances be instructed on the possibility of life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to a death sentence-has retroac- tive application to persons tried before Simmons was decided. We have not granted certiorari on Question 3, the actual- innocence claim based upon newly available DNA evidence. That claim has been rejected by every one of the 13 Court of Appeals Judges who have heard this case, as well as by the District Court that originally considered the claim. 95 F. 3d 1214, 1246­1254 (CA4 1996) (en banc); id., at 1255­1256 (Ervin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 1218 (describing District Court decision). The unanimity of these 14 federal judges is unsurpris- ing when the full story of the DNA evidence is told. While the DNA tests showed that blood stains on O'Dell's shirt did not come 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1051 519 U. S. December 19, 24, 27, 30, 1996 from the murder victim, Helen Schartner, they also showed that blood stains on his jacket did come from the victim-a conclusion consistent with the overwhelming evidence at trial that blood stains on numerous pieces of O'Dell's clothing came from her. Id., at 1247­1248. Not one of the judges reviewing this evidence has been persuaded of O'Dell's innocence. December 24, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders No. 95­8736. Ogbomon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1056.] Motion of the Acting Solici- tor General for divided argument granted, and time allotted for oral argument is as follows: 25 minutes for petitioner, 25 minutes for amicus curiae, and 10 minutes for the Acting Solicitor Gen- eral. Counsel for petitioner and the amicus curiae appointed by this Court are directed to file responses to the suggestion of mootness filed by the Acting Solicitor General on December 20, 1996. The responses, prepared temporarily under Rule 33.2 of the Rules of this Court, are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon counsel on or before noon, Wednesday, January 8, 1997. No. 96­126. Chandler et al. v. Miller, Governor of Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1057.] Motion of petitioners to permit American Civil Liberties Union et al. leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied. December 27, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­430 (96­958). Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections v. Gwong. Sup. Ct. Fla. Applica- tion for stay, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him re- ferred to the Court, denied. December 30, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­451. Colorado et al. v. Sanchez et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Application for stay, presented to Justice Breyer, and by him referred to the Court, denied. 519ORD$$1i 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1052 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 3, 6, 1997 519 U. S. January 3, 1997 Certiorari Granted No. 96­651. Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg Uni- versity, et al. v. Homar. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, February 11, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 7, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, March 18, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1009. No. 96­5955. Richards v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tues- day, February 11, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 7, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, March 18, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N. W. 2d 218. January 6, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 95­ 1906, ante, p. 148.) Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­461. Goffer v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the position as- serted by the Acting Solicitor General in his brief for the respond- ent filed November 25, 1996. No. 96­629. Calderon, Warden v. Caswell. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of California v. Roy, ante, p. 2. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­5926. Hoover v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1053 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of the position asserted by the Acting Solicitor General in his brief for the United States filed November 25, 1996. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 842. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1734. In re Disbarment of Busby. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 924.] No. D­1735. In re Disbarment of Kimes. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 924.] No. D­1738. In re Disbarment of Brown. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1739. In re Disbarment of McDaniels. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1740. In re Disbarment of Cronin. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1742. In re Disbarment of Goble. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 978.] No. D­1761. In re Disbarment of Hallock. Marcy Miller Hallock, of Baltimore, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1762. In re Disbarment of Payne. Robert Embert Payne, Sr., of Upper Marlboro, Md., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­41. Fletcher v. United States; No. M­42. Forman et al. v. IBEW Local Union No. 640 and Arizona Chapter NECA Pension Trust Fund et al.; No. M­43. Rosen v. Board of Medical Examiners of Arizona; No. M­46. Estrada Medrano v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; and 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1054 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. M­47. Poissenot et al. v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­44. Arias v. California. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. No. 93­935. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Jones, Widow of Jones, Deceased, et al., 512 U. S. 1231. Motion of respondent Fairy Dell Jones for fees denied without prejudice to refiling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. No. 96­270. Amchem Products, Inc., et al. v. Windsor et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 957.] Motion of respondents Aileen Cargile et al. to substitute parties granted. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 96­6547. McDonald v. George Meany Center for Labor Studies. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until January 27, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­6932. In re Delespine; No. 96­6943. In re Winkler; and No. 96­6963. In re Minniecheske. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­6417. In re Sheehy et vir; and No. 96­6920. In re Valdes. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­9482. Dobson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 613. No. 96­365. Arnold and Baker Farms v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1415. No. 96­372. Coughlin, Commissioner, New York Depart- ment of Correctional Services, et al. v. Griffin. Ct. App. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1055 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 674, 673 N. E. 2d 98. No. 96­405. Kayne v. United States; and No. 96­5794. Kalp v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 7. No. 96­409. Drobny et ux. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1174. No. 96­415. Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 400. No. 96­428. Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 191. No. 96­429. Michigan Education Assn.-NEA et al. v. Bromley et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 686. No. 96­430. Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. Environ- mental Protection Agency. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1371. No. 96­431. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Chater, Commis- sioner of Social Security, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 516. No. 96­438. Boltach et al. v. Dexter Township. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­469. Electro-Voice, Inc. v. National Labor Rela- tions Board. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1559. No. 96­470. Starzenski et al. v. City of Elkhart et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 872. No. 96­486. Hartsel v. Keys, Mayor, City of Elyria, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 795. No. 96­497. Charles Taylor Construction Co. et al. v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1056 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­498. Hein et ux. v. McNeil et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 210. No. 96­598. Norris v. Gimmel, Weiman, Savitz & Kron- thal, P. A., et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 107 Md. App. 747. No. 96­618. Chavez v. City of Arvada. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 861. No. 96­619. CenTra, Inc., et al. v. Garavaglia. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 211 Mich. App. 625, 536 N. W. 2d 805. No. 96­625. Doan v. Seagate Technology, Inc.; and Furr et al. v. Seagate Technology, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 974 (first judgment) and 980 (second judgment). No. 96­631. Johnson v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­632. North Avenue Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chi- cago. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 441. No. 96­640. Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1127, 665 N. E. 2d 1040. No. 96­644. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­647. Department of Revenue of Florida et al. v. Share International, Inc. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 1362. No. 96­648. Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 238. No. 96­655. Hannaford Bros. Co. v. Ciampi. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 A. 2d 4. No. 96­656. National Association of Home Builders of the United States et al. v. Chesterfield County. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1180. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1057 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­657. Martin v. Ridge, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1433. No. 96­659. Ubel et al. v. Minnesota et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 547 N. W. 2d 366. No. 96­661. Mantz v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­662. Bank of New York, as Collateral Trustee, et al. v. Continental Airlines, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 553. No. 96­665. Energy Transportation Corp. v. Garner. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 687. No. 96­672. Schulte Roth & Zabel v. Southmark Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 311. No. 96­673. Holt v. J. L. Prescott Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1319. No. 96­674. Burford v. Steptoe & Johnson. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1177. No. 96­683. Kauble v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo- ration. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 647. No. 96­689. Pierce v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­695. Trujillo et ux., as Next Friends and Guard- ians of Their Minor Child, Trujillo v. Taos Municipal Schools et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 160. No. 96­700. Kokoska, by Her Guardian Kokoska v. Bul- len, Commissioner, Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 399, 668 N. E. 2d 769. No. 96­701. Keem v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1058 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­704. Patterson et al. v. City of Lincoln. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 250 Neb. 382, 550 N. W. 2d 650. No. 96­709. Kauble et al. v. Union Employee Discretion- ary Trust. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­717. Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church v. Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 78. No. 96­719. Patterson et al. v. District of Columbia et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 667 A. 2d 1338. No. 96­724. Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1135. No. 96­729. Bowden v. Public Building Commission of Chicago. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 697 N. E. 2d 10. No. 96­735. Wright v. Carter, Attorney General of In- diana, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­736. Rosado et al. v. Curtis et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 437. No. 96­739. Lawson et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 145. No. 96­754. Jensen v. California Board of Psychology. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­759. Murray, dba America Speaks v. Cable Na- tional Broadcasting Co., dba America's Talking. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 858. No. 96­767. Gray v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­780. Rude et al. v. United States; and No. 96­6818. Mew v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1538. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1059 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­788. Quijano et ux. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 26. No. 96­799. Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Helwig et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 243. No. 96­805. Wall et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1444. No. 96­809. Goulding v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1187. No. 96­811. Standard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 430. No. 96­813. Grable v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 251. No. 96­824. Dixon v. Dixon. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 145 N. J. 370, 678 A. 2d 711. No. 96­825. Perkins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 127. No. 96­837. Pike et ux. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 54. No. 96­839. Haun v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1096. No. 96­849. Lermer Germany GmbH et al. v. Lermer Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1575. No. 96­854. Ureta v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 290. No. 96­857. Oxfort v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 337. No. 96­862. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­876. McGeeney v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 418. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1060 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­880. Gill v. New York State Board of Law Exam- iners. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 226 App. Div. 2d 462, 640 N. Y. S. 2d 805. No. 96­894. Barron v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1313. No. 96­5136. de la Mora v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1247. No. 96­5331. Moreno v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­5400. Beavers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 151. No. 96­5659. Wyatt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1311. No. 96­5727. McCoskey v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­5971. Cindy R. et al. v. James R. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507. No. 96­5976. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. No. 96­5980. Flatten v. United States et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6000. Ezeoke v. Pry et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6005. Pearson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 435. No. 96­6047. Cannady v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 913 S. W. 2d 741. No. 96­6061. Roseboro et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 642. No. 96­6075. Lerebours v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 582. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1061 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­6076. Mendez-Rosas v. Immigration and Natural- ization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 672. No. 96­6093. Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 96­6101. Saranchak v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 158, 675 A. 2d 268. No. 96­6120. Braswell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 830. No. 96­6132. Mua v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1462. No. 96­6184. Flores-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6271. Williams v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 345, 471 S. E. 2d 379. No. 96­6284. McWee v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 S. C. 387, 472 S. E. 2d 235. No. 96­6360. Snow et al. v. Halford et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 951. No. 96­6364. Scott et ux. v. Manilla et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 N. Y. 2d 1055, 666 N. E. 2d 1061. No. 96­6370. Amerson v. Iowa et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 510. No. 96­6392. Osband v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 622, 919 P. 2d 640. No. 96­6393. Shabazz v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 941. No. 96­6399. Simms v. Harrison, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1152. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1062 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6404. Mathews v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 Md. App. 746. No. 96­6406. Kyricopoulos v. Rollins et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 823. No. 96­6418. Schlicher v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d xxviii, 912 P. 2d 779. No. 96­6427. Cooper v. Malone et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6430. Lawson v. Moore, Attorney General of Mis- sissippi, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6431. Lowe v. Doe. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6435. Corthron v. Riley et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. No. 96­6436. Adams v. Florida Department of Veterans Affairs et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­6439. Burgos v. Michigan. Recorder's Court, City of Detroit, Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6440. Cochran v. City of Norton, Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1315. No. 96­6441. Cheshire v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 548 N. W. 2d 198. No. 96­6444. Bronson v. Walker et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1431. No. 96­6445. Adesanya v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­6446. Cooper v. Tropicana Products. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 436. No. 96­6452. Lee v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6453. May v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 138 Ore. App. 704, 909 P. 2d 1250. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1063 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­6457. Martini v. New Jersey et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 144 N. J. 603, 677 A. 2d 1106. No. 96­6459. Curiale v. Lowery, Governor of Washing- ton, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6460. Quate v. Oklahoma et al. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6461. Redd v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 173 Ill. 2d 1, 670 N. E. 2d 583. No. 96­6463. Richardson v. Quill. Ct. App. Ohio, Mont- gomery County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6468. Eline v. Frank et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6470. Ayer v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 141. No. 96­6480. Dutcher v. Moreo et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 426. No. 96­6484. Shown v. Spears, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6485. Reape v. New York Daily News. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 505. No. 96­6493. Houghteling v. Houghteling. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 453 Mich. 876, 554 N. W. 2d 2. No. 96­6499. Jaime Avena v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 394, 916 P. 2d 1000. No. 96­6500. Ibrahim v. Roach et al. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6502. Harris v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6504. Stoianoff v. TRW, Inc., et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 App. Div. 2d 498, 635 N. Y. S. 2d 531. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1064 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6507. Harrison v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6514. Ivy v. Miller, Superintendent, Boonville Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6516. Jones v. North Carolina. Super. Ct. N. C., Wake County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6517. Parker v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6519. Wilson v. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 59. No. 96­6521. Craven v. Bi-Lo, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1451. No. 96­6531. Jaakkola v. County of Ashland, Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 Wis. 2d 493, 546 N. W. 2d 886. No. 96­6534. Huntley v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 681 A. 2d 10. No. 96­6543. Stadler v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6544. Haynes v. Patterson. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6546. Ferguson v. Duncil, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1178. No. 96­6549. Lane v. Russell, Warden, et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Warren County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 Ohio App. 3d 470, 672 N. E. 2d 684. No. 96­6554. Marshall v. Kemp et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6557. Cole v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 399, 471 S. E. 2d 362. No. 96­6582. Ali, aka Perkins v. Gomez, Director, Cali- fornia Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1191. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1065 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­6607. Robinson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1739. No. 96­6610. White v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6613. Protopappas v. Ratelle, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­6629. Simms v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6639. Wilson v. Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 323 Ore. 498, 918 P. 2d 826. No. 96­6640. Hildebrand v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6641. Thomas v. Deaconess Hospital, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6644. Hameed, aka York, et al. v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 232, 666 N. E. 2d 1339. No. 96­6657. Ballew v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 76 Ohio St. 3d 244, 667 N. E. 2d 369. No. 96­6679. Contreras v. Kincheloe, Superintendent, Spring Creek Correctional Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­6688. Wilson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6689. Williamson v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 136. No. 96­6690. Altschul v. Texas (three judgments). Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6691. Altschul v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1066 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6692. Altschul v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6693. Altschul v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6705. Barker v. Kernan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­6712. Perryman v. Prado, Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1444. No. 96­6718. Diaz v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 165. No. 96­6721. Dumbrique v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­6726. Pullen v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 368. No. 96­6738. Smith v. Warnick et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1172. No. 96­6742. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1161. No. 96­6747. Watson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6748. Trautman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1436. No. 96­6750. Spencer v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 145. No. 96­6751. Ysassi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1160. No. 96­6756. Meadows v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 654. No. 96­6762. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1443. No. 96­6764. Juarez Godinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1445. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1067 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­6766. Martin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 642. No. 96­6768. Lee v. Nuth, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1448. No. 96­6770. Ordonoz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 654. No. 96­6781. Teague v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 81. No. 96­6783. Thompson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6784. Hockenberry v. DeTella, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 110. No. 96­6790. Pollack v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1174. No. 96­6792. Frederick v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6797. Bronson v. Walker et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1431. No. 96­6798. Elich v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1435. No. 96­6800. Murillo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­6801. Ogbeide v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1441. No. 96­6802. Velez v. Puerto Rico. Cir. Ct. App. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6803. Wzorek v. City of Chicago. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­6805. Gill v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­6807. Kelly v. United States; and 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1068 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6893. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1455. No. 96­6808. Harris et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 42. No. 96­6809. Lopez Garcia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 145. No. 96­6811. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 642. No. 96­6812. Arroyo-Reyes v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 17. No. 96­6813. Fox v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­6814. Fasken v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6820. O'Brien v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 836. No. 96­6823. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1457. No. 96­6824. Bauer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1467. No. 96­6827. Gibbs v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­6828. Regas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1165. No. 96­6829. Mujahid, fka Gaffney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1439. No. 96­6833. Parker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­6836. Moreno v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 46. No. 96­6837. McGrier, aka Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1069 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­6838. Metler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­6840. Moya v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 656. No. 96­6842. Davis et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 302. No. 96­6845. Orellana-Osorio v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1393. No. 96­6846. Roa v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­6847. Paries v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1324. No. 96­6850. Edgin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1044. No. 96­6851. Hall v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1435. No. 96­6852. Granada v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6853. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 643. No. 96­6854. Raney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6861. Crawley v. Parker, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 833. No. 96­6865. Zellmer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 43. No. 96­6866. Rotibi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 58. No. 96­6874. Sadler v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1448. No. 96­6875. Saiz v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 923 P. 2d 197. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1070 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6876. Allen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­6879. Page v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­6881. McCoy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­6885. Gilliam v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­6888. Robinson v. United States; and No. 96­6889. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­6890. Reilley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­6892. Maples v. United States; and No. 96­6895. Maples v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 35. No. 96­6894. Kuban v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 971. No. 96­6900. Carter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 162. No. 96­6902. Silva-Diaz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­6903. Smith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1450. No. 96­6909. Russell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6915. Beavers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1155. No. 96­6917. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 500. No. 96­6922. White v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 966. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1071 519 U. S. January 6, 1997 No. 96­6923. Andrews v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 357 and 92 F. 3d 1108. No. 96­6940. Arline v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­330. Official Committee of Tort Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. et al.; and No. 96­742. Breast Implant Tort Claimants Repre- sented by O'Quinn, Kerensky, McAninch & Laminack v. Dow Corning Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 482. No. 96­479. Advanced Communications Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of Foundation for Educational Advancement Today and William Philip Welty for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­833. In re Hook C. A. 7th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 350. Rehearing Denied No. 95­2025. California et al. v. Roy, ante, p. 2; No. 95­6347. Gordon v. Peoria School District 150 et al., 516 U. S. 1030; No. 95­8797. Williams v. Lewis et al., ante, p. 828; No. 95­9028. Murrell v. University of South Carolina, ante, p. 835; No. 95­9034. McDuff v. United States, ante, p. 835; No. 95­9089. Laufman v. Mayer et al., ante, p. 837; No. 95­9178. Gunnell v. Littlefield, Warden, ante, p. 842; No. 95­9382. In re Hope, ante, p. 806; No. 95­9495. Cotton v. Hilbig et al., ante, p. 860; No. 96­185. Sakaria et al. v. Dare County Board of Ed- ucation, ante, p. 976; No. 96­338. Kahn v. Beicker Engineering, Inc., et al., ante, p. 965; 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1072 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 6, 8, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­520. Smith v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. et al., ante, p. 982; No. 96­5165. Shelton v. Gudmanson, Warden, ante, p. 883; No. 96­5643. Hussein v. Raban Supply Co., ante, p. 951; No. 96­5696. Bigpond v. Champion, Warden, ante, p. 953; No. 96­5840. Evans v. United States, ante, p. 940; No. 96­5885. Singla et al. v. Department of Health and Human Services et al., ante, p. 970; No. 96­5911. Cheatham v. Schneider, Governor of the Virgin Islands, et al., ante, p. 971; No. 96­5933. Johnson v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, ante, p. 983; No. 96­5963. Resetar v. Lyman, ante, p. 954; No. 96­6013. Tierney v. Peterson, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center, ante, p. 984; No. 96­6049. Lindsey v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 997; No. 96­6092. In re Gaunce, ante, p. 980; No. 96­6137. Russo v. Beyer, Assistant Commissioner, Di- vision of Operations, New Jersey Department of Correc- tions, et al., ante, p. 984; No. 96­6196. Aguilar Riley Ozmen v. New Mexico, ante, p. 985; No. 96­6226. Berkley v. Department of the Army, ante, p. 997; and No. 96­6255. Van Hoorelbeke v. United States, ante, p. 985. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 95­1912. Matyastik v. Texas, ante, p. 815. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. January 8, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­485. Wainwright v. Huckabee, Governor of Ar- kansas, et al. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. 96­7337 (A­477). In re Ruiz et al. Application for stay of execution of sentences of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1073 519 U. S. January 8, 9, 10, 1997 No. 96­7341 (A­479). In re Wainwright. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­7351 (A­481). Wainwright v. Norris, Director, Ar- kansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7352 (A­483). Ruiz et al. v. Norris, Director, Ar- kansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentences of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 163. January 9, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­7392 (A­490). In re Waldrop. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. January 10, 1997 Certiorari Dismissed No. 95­8736. Ogbomon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1056.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. Certiorari Granted No. 96­663. Klehr et ux. v. A. O. Smith Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 21, 1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Friday, March 21, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, April 7, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 231. 519ORD$$1j 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1074 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 10, 13, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6133. Bracy v. Gramley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to the following question: "Whether a habeas petitioner who was convicted of a capital of- fense and sentenced to death in a trial before a judge who admit- tedly accepted bribes in other contemporaneous criminal cases is entitled to discovery to support his claim that he was denied the right to a trial before an impartial judge?" Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 21, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 21, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, April 7, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 684. No. 96­6298. Lindh v. Murphy, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, Febru- ary 21, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 21, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, April 7, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 856. January 13, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1743. In re Disbarment of Henderson. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 978.] No. D­1746. In re Disbarment of Brady. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 990.] No. D­1747. In re Disbarment of Polischuk. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 990.] No. D­1748. In re Disbarment of D'Ambrosio. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 990.] No. D­1758. In re Disbarment of Morrell. Michael Xavier Morrell, of Washington, D. C., having requested to resign 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1075 519 U. S. January 13, 1997 as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on Decem- ber 9, 1996 [ante, p. 1026], is discharged. No. D­1763. In re Disbarment of Ellis. David Dale Ellis, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1764. In re Disbarment of Mincey. Floyd Mincey, of Dublin, Ga., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1765. In re Disbarment of Fiore. Andrew J. Fiore, of Pleasantville, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1766. In re Disbarment of Pitt. Howard Pitt, of Greenwood Lake, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­48. Coleman v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., et al. Mo- tion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­49. In re Lyon. Motion to direct the Clerk to file common-law petition for writ of certiorari not in compliance with this Court's Rule 20.2 denied. No. 96­110. Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1057.] Motion of John Doe for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 96­270. Amchem Products, Inc., et al. v. Windsor et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 957.] Motions of Washington Legal Foundation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and National Association of Securities 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1076 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 13, 1997 519 U. S. and Commercial Lawyers for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions. No. 96­318. Richardson et al. v. McKnight. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1002.] Motion of petitioners to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 96­5268. Glock v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, ante, p. 888. Respondent is invited to file a response to the motion for leave to file and petition for rehearing within 30 days. No. 96­6936. O'Connor v. Army Claims Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until February 3, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­7021. In re Young; and No. 96­7078. In re Kennedy. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­6572. In re Price. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­8502. Tidik v. Tidik. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8867. Kemp v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 134. No. 96­315. Crouch v. United States; and No. 96­319. Frye v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1497. No. 96­374. Schneider National Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Pyatt et ux. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 146. No. 96­447. Pope v. Pope. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 167 Ill. 2d 568, 667 N. E. 2d 1062. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1077 519 U. S. January 13, 1997 No. 96­525. James Madison Ltd., by Hecht, Assignee v. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1085. No. 96­532. Aponte-Velazquez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 560. No. 96­546. Hines v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 624. No. 96­572. Baugher et al. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­687. Ruiz v. Blentech Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 320. No. 96­691. Younis Bros. & Co., Inc., et al. v. CIGNA Worldwide Insurance Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 13. No. 96­694. BIC Corp. v. Carney et ux. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 629. No. 96­698. Daugherty v. Sarasota County, Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1168. No. 96­702. Faircloth et al. v. Lundy Packing Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 648. No. 96­707. Boyett, a Minor Child, Suing by His Father and Next Friend, Boyett v. Tomberlin et al. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 124. No. 96­711. Ginberg v. Tauber. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 A. 2d 543. No. 96­716. Grynberg v. Klein et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­730. Aldrich et al. v. General Public Utilities Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1106. No. 96­750. Jarrett et al. v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 220 Ga. App. 559, 472 S. E. 2d 315. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1078 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 13, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­753. Chester v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­768. Windley et ux. v. City of Dover. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1437. No. 96­769. Mirin v. Eyerly et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 122. No. 96­784. Viviano Wine Importers, Inc. v. Brown- Forman Corp., dba Brown-Forman Beverage Co., Wine Divi- sion. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 837. No. 96­832. Board of County Commissioners of Cleve- land County, Oklahoma, et al. v. Shinault. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 367. No. 96­835. Bell v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 166. No. 96­864. Clardy Manufacturing Co. v. Marine Mid- land Business Loans, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 347. No. 96­878. Lutz v. Corbett, Attorney General of Penn- sylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1171. No. 96­898. Price v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 M. J. 430. No. 96­926. Nordberg et ux. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1445. No. 96­941. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1194. No. 96­5328. Moreno, aka Martinez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 595. No. 96­5594. Calder v. Armstrong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­5958. Ortiz v. United States; and No. 96­6384. Yepez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1325. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1079 519 U. S. January 13, 1997 No. 96­6110. Peterson v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 169. No. 96­6117. Loewe v. Rogers. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6223. Ajugwo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 925. No. 96­6225. Silvers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­6238. Neuton v. City National Bank (two judg- ments). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6305. Orme v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 677 So. 2d 258. No. 96­6306. Slaton v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 So. 2d 909. No. 96­6416. Oken v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 Md. 256, 681 A. 2d 30. No. 96­6552. O'Guinn v. Dutton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1409. No. 96­6559. Strong v. Glendening, Governor of Mary- land, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 41. No. 96­6560. Glendora v. Malone et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1393. No. 96­6568. Morton v. Bolden et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6571. Hunt v. North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 828. No. 96­6574. Patel v. Singer et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6577. Marin v. Norton, Attorney General of Col- orado, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 426. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1080 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 13, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6579. Gibson v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 921. No. 96­6586. Dooling v. Circuit Court of Illinois, Rock Island County. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1187. No. 96­6587. Csoka v. United States et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 647. No. 96­6588. Henton v. Frederick. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 46. No. 96­6589. Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6590. Wightman v. Supreme Court of Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 188. No. 96­6591. Thompson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6593. Williams v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6595. Foster v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6597. Kimble v. Montgomery County Police De- partment et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 150. No. 96­6600. Miller v. Clinton, President of the United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6602. Swoyer v. Reed et al.; Swoyer v. Kercher et al.; Swoyer v. Merchant Bank et al.; and Swoyer v. Edgars et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6604. Crawford v. Bexar County Tax Office et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6605. Jackson v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1081 519 U. S. January 13, 1997 No. 96­6611. Williams v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 Wash. App. 1044. No. 96­6617. Bast v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 91 F. 3d 128. No. 96­6619. Wilkerson v. Norgaard et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6621. Lennox v. Evans, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 431. No. 96­6622. Kilo v. Dickenson et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 338. No. 96­6624. Abdallah v. United Savings Bank et al. Ct. App. Cal., First App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 Cal. App. 4th 1101, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286. No. 96­6631. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1227. No. 96­6636. Hershey v. Santa Clara Valley Humane Society et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1319. No. 96­6637. Gillette v. Tansy, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1196. No. 96­6642. Montez Garcia v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 431. No. 96­6661. Campos Perez v. Immigration and Natural- ization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. No. 96­6701. Slone v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6731. Champion v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 452 Mich. 92, 549 N. W. 2d 849. No. 96­6774. Gregory C. v. Los Angeles County Depart- ment of Children's Services. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 952, 920 P. 2d 716. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1082 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 13, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6786. Burton v. Burton. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 A. 2d 58. No. 96­6819. Pizzo v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 549. No. 96­6843. Wesley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­6882. Martin v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6884. Eriksen v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1155. No. 96­6897. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 901. No. 96­6901. Ahmed v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 278 Mont. 200, 924 P. 2d 679. No. 96­6924. Brooks v. Sheppard Air Force Base. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­6928. Hughes et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­6930. Finch v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1448. No. 96­6933. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 649. No. 96­6935. Santangelo v. Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 87 F. 3d 1322. No. 96­6939. Boyd v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 449 Pa. Super. 716, 674 A. 2d 311. No. 96­6945. Gifford v. Maine Department of Correc- tions. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6955. Price v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 723. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1083 519 U. S. January 13, 1997 No. 96­6956. Walkenbach v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6958. Moody v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6961. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 58. No. 96­6964. McCrady v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1342. No. 96­6965. Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6970. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 142. No. 96­6971. Clark v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­6972. Coles v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 682 A. 2d 167. No. 96­6973. Fleming v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 416. No. 96­6975. Dowell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­6979. Riddick v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­6980. Ramos-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 369. No. 96­6984. Vivas-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 394. No. 96­6985. Kreutzer v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 928 S. W. 2d 854. No. 96­6986. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 695. No. 96­7001. Banshee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 99. 519ORD$$1k 06-09-99 12:44:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1084 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 13, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7005. Turner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 839. No. 96­7006. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1440. No. 96­7012. Gutierrez-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 582. No. 96­7013. Dorsett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­7014. Hanson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­7015. Hampshire v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 999. No. 96­7017. Gonzalez v. Hawley, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7024. King v. Jones. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7033. Eads v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­7045. Brown et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1439. No. 96­506. Dutton, Warden v. O'Guinn. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1409. No. 96­705. Committee of Dental Amalgam Alloy Manu- facturers and Distributors et al. v. Becker, Director, California Office of Environmental Health Hazard As- sessment, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioners to file Rule 29.6 statement under seal granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 92 F. 3d 807. No. 96­712. Kaye, Individually and in His Capacity as Monmouth County Prosecutor, et al. v. Coleman. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of New Jersey Association of Counties for leave to 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1085 519 U. S. January 13, 16, 17, 1997 file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 87 F. 3d 1491. Rehearing Denied No. 95­938. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, ante, p. 26; No. 95­8942. Shoemaker v. California et al., ante, p. 991; No. 96­336. Eliasen et al. v. Itel Corp. et al., ante, p. 965; No. 96­571. Smith v. Mail-Well Envelope Co. et al., ante, p. 994; No. 96­630. Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp., ante, p. 994; No. 96­5086. Dworzanski v. Dworzanski, ante, p. 878; No. 96­5272. Taylor v. Mississippi, ante, p. 994; No. 96­5807. Hill v. City & State Factors, Inc., ante, p. 969; No. 96­5944. Wesley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al., ante, p. 983; No. 96­6083. Robinson v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, ante, p. 997; No. 96­6199. Brown v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board et al., ante, p. 1015; No. 96­6242. Jackson v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, ante, p. 985; and No. 96­6296. Williams v. Virginia, ante, p. 998. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 96­5836. Hollar v. Myers et al., ante, p. 969. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. January 16, 1997 Miscellaneous Order. (For the Court's order adopting revisions to the Rules of this Court, see post, p. 1160.) January 17, 1997 Certiorari Granted No. 95­1918. Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Cen- tral Arkansas et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1086 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 17, 1997 519 U. S. are requested to brief and argue the following question: "Should the case have been dismissed by the District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, in light of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341?" Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 28, 1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Fri- day, March 28, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, April 9, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 961. No. 96­454. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 28, 1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 28, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, April 9, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1036. No. 96­552. Agostini et al. v. Felton et al.; and No. 96­553. Chancellor, Board of Education of the City of New York, et al. v. Felton et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. In addition to the questions presented by these petitions, the parties are requested to brief and argue the following question: "Whether Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- dure is a proper vehicle for obtaining the relief petitioner seeks?" Briefs of petitioners are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 28, 1997. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 28, 1997. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, April 9, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­667. United States v. Hyde. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, Feb- 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1087 519 U. S. January 17, 21, 1997 ruary 28, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 28, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, April 9, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 779. No. 96­842. United States v. O'Hagan. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, Feb- ruary 28, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 28, 1997. A reply brief, if any, may be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, April 9, 1997. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 612. January 21, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­106. Hess et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Southeast Bank, N. A., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Atherton v. FDIC, ante, p. 213. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­548. United States v. Crowder et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Old Chief v. United States, ante, p. 172. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1405. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1730. In re Disbarment of Mekler. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 923.] No. D­1745. In re Disbarment of Crockett. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 978.] No. D­1761. In re Disbarment of Hallock. Marcy Miller Hallock, of Baltimore, Md., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that her name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1088 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on January 6, 1997 [ante, p. 1053], is discharged. No. D­1767. In re Disbarment of Donnellon. Jerome J. Donnellon, of Cincinnati, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­50. Flores v. United States; No. M­51. Tinsley v. City of Indianapolis; No. M­52. Cousins v. North Carolina Department of Corrections et al.; No. M­53. Doyle v. United States; and No. M­55. Williams v. City of Los Angeles. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­56. In re Jaques. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Motion to seal petition and other pleadings in this case denied. No. 95­1340. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 926.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­1594. De Buono, New York Commissioner of Health, et al. v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Serv- ices Fund, by Its Trustees, Bowers et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 926.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu- riae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­243. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 926.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­2024. Lawyer v. Department of Justice et al. D. C. M. D. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 926.] Mo- tion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted. No. 95­2074. City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1089 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 p. 926.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argu- ment granted. Motion of Ohio et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument granted to be divided as follows: petition- ers, 20 minutes; respondents, 20 minutes; the Acting Solicitor Gen- eral, 15 minutes; amici curiae Ohio et al., 15 minutes. No. 96­79. Boggs v. Boggs et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 957.] Motion of Estate Planning Probate Law Section of State Bar of California for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 96­272. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1002.] Motions of National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. and National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. No. 96­491. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1003.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 96­542. McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1025.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 96­679. Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman. C. A. 3d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­5831. In re Gaydos. Motion of petitioner for recon- sideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 59] denied. No. 96­7122. In re Talamantes; and No. 96­7136. In re Murray. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­6728. In re Stiles; and No. 96­7098. In re Griffin. Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. No. 96­777. In re Moretti. Petition for writ of prohibition denied. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1090 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. Certiorari Denied No. 96­44. CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 285. No. 96­119. Zuill et al. v. Shanahan et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1366. No. 96­334. Ranger Insurance Co. v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 670 So. 2d 813. No. 96­402. Lisa Lee Mines (Terrilynne Coal Co.) v. Di- rector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, De- partment of Labor, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1358. No. 96­466. Stupak-Thrall et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1269. No. 96­483. Lowery v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 161. No. 96­559. Intervine Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Glou- cester City Zoning Board of Adjustment et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 290 N. J. Super. 78, 674 A. 2d 1027. No. 96­566. Webber v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 260 Kan. 263, 918 P. 2d 609. No. 96­567. Virginia v. Browner, Administrator of Envi- ronmental Protection Agency, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 869. No. 96­576. Daily News of Los Angeles, a Division of Cooke Media Group, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 406. No. 96­578. Allemnore Community Hospital, dba Hu- mana Hospital-Tacoma, et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1206. No. 96­582. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. v. St. David's Episcopal Church. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d 537, 921 P. 2d 821. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1091 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 No. 96­590. Sherman v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1134. No. 96­597. Hernandez v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­601. Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 917 P. 2d 1157. No. 96­608. Sahni v. American Diversified Investment Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1054. No. 96­622. O'Neill v. City of Auburn et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 685. No. 96­660. Lassiter v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­675. Guilbeau et ux. v. W. W. Henry Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­714. United States v. Weyerhaeuser Co. and Subsidiaries. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­720. Kienzle v. Englewood Disposal Co., Inc., et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 677 So. 2d 843. No. 96­727. Holmberg v. City of Ramsey. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 548 N. W. 2d 302. No. 96­731. Schultz et ux. v. Consolidation Coal Co. et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 W. Va. 375, 475 S. E. 2d 467. No. 96­734. Patterson et al. v. P. H. P. Healthcare Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 927. No. 96­744. Weible v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 108. No. 96­746. Canadian Consulate v. Holden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 918. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1092 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­748. Patel v. Scotland Memorial Hospital et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 132. No. 96­749. Hardy v. Louisiana Department of Social Service et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­751. Sciarrino v. City of Key West. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 364. No. 96­755. House of Lloyd, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 847. No. 96­756. Broad v. Sealaska Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 422. No. 96­757. Ward v. City of Streetsboro et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 837. No. 96­758. Taylor v. McLennan Community College et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 46. No. 96­762. Russell v. City of Strongsville. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­764. Shaw Agency et al. v. Morstein. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 715. No. 96­771. Lane, Conservator of the Estate of Jamer- son v. Landels, Ripley & Diamond et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­772. N. B., by Her Mother and Next Friend, D. G. v. Alachua County School Board et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1376. No. 96­773. Helland v. South Bend Community School Corporation. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 327. No. 96­774. Gerth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 644. No. 96­778. Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Pipeline Partnership. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d 410, 916 P. 2d 76. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1093 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 No. 96­783. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 619. No. 96­793. Bridges v. City of Bossier. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 329. No. 96­794. Roe v. Maskell et al. Ct. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 342 Md. 684, 679 A. 2d 1087. No. 96­796. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Bickel et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 151. No. 96­797. Heard v. Call et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 925 S. W. 2d 840. No. 96­807. Plescher v. Wille, Sheriff, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 855. No. 96­819. Soignier v. American Board of Plastic Sur- gery. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 547. No. 96­888. Rocky Mountain Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Winkler. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 923 P. 2d 152. No. 96­890. Felton et al. v. Agostini et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­901. Ronwin v. Altman. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 649. No. 96­5017. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 522. No. 96­5949. Taylor v. United States; No. 96­6719. Richards v. United States; and No. 96­6730. Nelson et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1313. No. 96­5996. Moore v. Roberts, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 699. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1094 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6032. Call v. Gomez, Commissioner of Human Serv- ices, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6066. Roark v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­6078. Nunley v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 923 S. W. 2d 911. No. 96­6159. Modderno v. King, Director, Office of Per- sonnel Management. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 82 F. 3d 1059. No. 96­6161. Brady v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 225. No. 96­6205. Westley v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 714. No. 96­6240. Lee v. Fuji Bank, Ltd. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­6264. Thornton v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 835. No. 96­6307. Ranum v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1020. No. 96­6381. Daniels v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­6403. O'Brien v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6421. Escobedo-Moreno v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­6442. Gurs v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 429. No. 96­6615. Cave v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1350. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1095 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 No. 96­6645. Martinez v. Letica Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 834. No. 96­6649. Carlton v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 1067. No. 96­6659. Scott v. Recession Hearing Official et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6668. Womble v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 667, 473 S. E. 2d 291. No. 96­6676. Lowe v. Cantrell et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1442. No. 96­6678. Stephen v. Prunty, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­6680. Ashton v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­6684. Bast v. Glasberg et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 128. No. 96­6694. Baptiste v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 225 App. Div. 2d 359, 639 N. Y. S. 2d 22. No. 96­6700. Allen v. Price, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 45. No. 96­6703. Samples v. Scott, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6708. Miller v. Delaware River Port Authority. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 405. No. 96­6709. Awkal v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 76 Ohio St. 3d 324, 667 N. E. 2d 960. No. 96­6723. Andrzejewski v. California Workers' Com- pensation Appeals Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6725. Rivers v. Wood, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1189. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1096 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6733. Wayne, aka Fenney v. Benson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 530. No. 96­6736. Balawajder v. Scott, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 141. No. 96­6737. Wronke v. Canady. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1150, 701 N. E. 2d 844. No. 96­6739. Parker v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 917 P. 2d 980. No. 96­6740. Lewis v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 45. No. 96­6741. Reiman v. Brousse. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6745. Crane v. Boothby. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6771. Peterson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 280. No. 96­6772. Boyd v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 699, 473 S. E. 2d 327. No. 96­6773. Foti v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6777. Cooper v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mob- erly Correctional Center, et al. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 926 S. W. 2d 97. No. 96­6778. Boney v. Scott, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 158. No. 96­6782. Walker v. United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1097 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 No. 96­6787. Struve v. Park Place Apartments. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6788. Nicholas v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. No. 96­6789. McIntosh v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6793. Bishop v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 518, 472 S. E. 2d 842. No. 96­6794. Blank v. Hawkesworth et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6795. Lawal v. Bridgetown Grill. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1171. No. 96­6799. Jones v. Roberts, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6804. Arteaga v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6806. Dent v. Wood, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 95 F. 3d 1157. No. 96­6815. Curiale v. Knowles, Governor of Alaska, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6816. Megrave v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Department et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6821. Pioterek v. Labor and Industry Review Commission et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 Wis. 2d 810, 549 N. W. 2d 286. No. 96­6831. Sorton v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6832. Colligan v. Trans World Airlines. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1098 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6844. Tucker Bey v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 169. No. 96­6849. Bell v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 277 Mont. 482, 923 P. 2d 524. No. 96­6855. Strother v. White, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6857. Reberger v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 111 Nev. 1729, 916 P. 2d 212. No. 96­6864. Brown v. Turpin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6877. Richardson v. Wood et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1193. No. 96­6878. Robinson v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1448. No. 96­6904. Penland v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 634, 472 S. E. 2d 734. No. 96­6919. Turner v. Johnson, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1182. No. 96­6938. Ball v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1203. No. 96­6946. Goldberg v. Metro Dade County, Florida, Building and Zoning Department. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1468. No. 96­6947. Amayo v. Paul Revere Insurance Group. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 644. No. 96­6960. DePiano v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 27, 926 P. 2d 494. No. 96­6968. Smith v. Banks, Superintendent, Goldsboro Correctional Center. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 97 F. 3d 1449. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1099 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 No. 96­6976. Packer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­6987. McCoy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­6997. Bryan et ux. v. Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 87 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­7019. Layeni v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 514. No. 96­7020. McMasters v. United States; and No. 96­7039. Foley et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­7030. McKinnion v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 244. No. 96­7034. Sage v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 101. No. 96­7038. Altschul v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7053. Gravely v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 135. No. 96­7054. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 950. No. 96­7055. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 645. No. 96­7056. Olson v. Fairfax-Falls Church Community Services Board. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7062. Wagner v. United States District Court for the District of Montana. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7064. Rafael v. United States; and No. 96­7092. Gonzaga v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­7066. Rashid v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:35 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1100 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7068. Kidd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. No. 96­7071. Rowe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 928. No. 96­7073. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. No. 96­7076. Kessell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 648. No. 96­7077. Moore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1453. No. 96­7079. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1306. No. 96­7083. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1135. No. 96­7084. Asher v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 270. No. 96­7085. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 438. No. 96­7087. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1469. No. 96­7090. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1469. No. 96­7094. Dudleson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­7123. Underwood v. United States; and No. 96­7160. Underwood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1453. No. 96­7127. Wolfe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1190. No. 96­7128. Witherspoon v. Beshears, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. No. 96­7131. Weaver v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 351. No. 96­7135. Navarrette v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1101 519 U. S. January 21, 1997 No. 96­356. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re- ported below: 83 F. 3d 660. No. 96­562. Organon, Inc. v. Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, et al.; No. 96­575. Bracco Diagnostics Inc. et al. v. Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, et al.; No. 96­728. Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, et al. v. Organon, Inc., et al.; and No. 96­761. Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Assn. v. Bracco Diagnostics Inc. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1543. No. 96­685. Carlson et al. v. Alaska Commercial Fisher- ies Entry Commission. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Motion of Tangier Sound Waterman's Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 919 P. 2d 1337. No. 96­743. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of New England Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 807. No. 96­747. Union Oil Company of California v. Citizens for a Better Environment-California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of American Automobile Manufacturers Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1111. No. 96­6665. Jacob v. AT&T Corporate Headquarters. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Rehearing Denied No. 95­9302. McCarthy v. United States, ante, p. 991; No. 96­202. Urichich v. City of Youngstown et al., ante, p. 928; No. 96­528. Smith v. City and County of Denver et al., ante, p. 1010; 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1102 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 January 21, 22, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­545. Smith v. Regional Transportation District et al., ante, p. 1021; No. 96­5242. Hamilton v. United States, ante, p. 994; No. 96­5520. Massengale v. Mills, Warden, ante, p. 934; No. 96­5702. Parham v. PepsiCo, Inc., ante, p. 953; No. 96­5826. Haynes v. South Carolina et al., ante, p. 939; No. 96­5906. Sorbet v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board et al., ante, p. 983; No. 96­5978. Fort v. Hailey et al., ante, p. 996; No. 96­5985. Blandino v. Lindler et al., ante, p. 996; No. 96­6027. Johnson v. Hill, Warden, ante, p. 996; No. 96­6090. Partee v. Pastrick et al., ante, p. 1012; No. 96­6129. Yuan Jin v. Temple University et al., ante, p. 1013; No. 96­6165. Pizzo v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office et al., ante, p. 1014; No. 96­6190. Slappy v. Vanmeter et al., ante, p. 1014; and No. 96­6290. Rawlins v. Allen, Clerk, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al., ante, p. 1016. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 95­9201. Bierley v. Walters, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Mercer, ante, p. 843; No. 95­9396. Buzea v. Stanhope Hotel, ante, p. 854; and No. 96­232. Dubin v. United States, ante, p. 872. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. January 22, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­7214 (A­523). Greenawalt v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Yuma County. Application for stay of execution of sen- tence of death, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her re- ferred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7573 (A­520). Greenawalt v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7577 (A­521). Greenawalt v. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1103 519 U. S. January 22, 23, 28, February 6, 7, 18, 1997 to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 1268. January 23, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­7584 (A­524). Greenawalt v. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this application and this petition. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 1287. January 28, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­7635 (A­535). Schneider v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. February 6, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­7691 (A­545). George v. Angelone, Director, Vir- ginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Applica- tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 353. February 7, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­270. Amchem Products, Inc., et al. v. Windsor et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 957.] Motions of Douglas Laycock et al. and Asbestos Victims of America for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of respondents Ai- leen Cargile et al. for divided argument denied. Justice O'Con- nor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions. February 18, 1997 Affirmed on Appeal No. 96­669. Dupree et al. v. Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Miss. 519ORD$$2L 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1104 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor would note probable jurisdiction. Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 96­713, ante, p. 355.) Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­603. Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470 (1996). Reported below: 82 F. 3d 79. No. 96­964. American Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Trostel et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104­208, § 2609. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 736. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1749. In re Disbarment of Keathley. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1004.] No. D­1768. In re Disbarment of Kaufman. Robert Scott Kaufman, of Coral Gables, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1769. In re Disbarment of Davison. Burns H. Dav- ison II, of Des Moines, Iowa, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1770. In re Disbarment of Henry. James D. Henry, Jr., of St. Petersburg, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1771. In re Disbarment of Lynn. Joseph M. Lynn, of San Francisco, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1105 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1772. In re Disbarment of Sturgis. Joseph B. Stur- gis, of Wilmington, Del., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1773. In re Disbarment of Takacs. John G. Takacs, of Evesham Township, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1774. In re Disbarment of McDonald. Robert David McDonald, of Great Falls, Va., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1775. In re Disbarment of Weisman. Steven Neil Weisman, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1776. In re Disbarment of Hansen. Lewis R. Han- sen, of West Valley City, Utah, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1777. In re Disbarment of Witchell. Barry A. Witchell, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1778. In re Disbarment of Rudd. Jeffrey D. Rudd, of Roanoke, Va., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1106 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. M­57. King v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; No. M­58. Quesada v. United States; and No. M­59. Cornell v. Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary. Motions to direct the Clerk to file peti- tions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­1521. United States Department of State, Bu- reau of Consular Affairs, et al. v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc., et al., ante, p. 1. Motion of respondents Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc., et al. to be relieved from taxation of costs granted. No. 96­454. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1086.] Respondents' suggestion of mootness rejected. No. 96­667. United States v. Hyde. C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1086.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Jonathan D. Soglin, Esq., of Oak- land, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 96­776. Board of Education of the Enlarged City School District of the City of Watervliet, New York v. Russman, Child With Disabilities, by Her Parents, Russ- man et vir. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of National School Boards Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 96­827. Crawford-El v. Britton. C. A. D. C. Cir.; and No. 96­896. Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker et al. C. A. 11th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­5955. Richards v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1052.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that David R. Karpe, Esq., of Madison, Wis., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 96­6133. Bracy v. Gramley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1074.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Gilbert H. Levy, Esq., of Seattle, Wash., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1107 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7370. Wilson v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 11, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­7181. In re Pallett; No. 96­7209. In re Brown; No. 96­7315. In re Kukes; No. 96­7345. In re Ramirez-Valadez; No. 96­7433. In re Stearman; No. 96­7498. In re Brewer; No. 96­7537. In re Campbell; No. 96­7567. In re Gallardo; No. 96­7637. In re Ries; No. 96­7661. In re Cotton; and No. 96­7670. In re YoungBear. Petitions for writs of ha- beas corpus denied. No. 96­7175. In re Barth; No. 96­7309. In re Tamayo; and No. 96­7539. In re Visintine. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 96­7272. In re Simon. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. No. 96­541. In re Steffen, Chief Justice, Nevada Su- preme Court, et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Petition for writ of manda- mus and/or prohibition and/or certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 815, 920 P. 2d 489. No. 96­829. In re Whitehead. Sup. Ct. Nev. Motion for leave to intervene in order to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition and/or certiorari denied. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition and/or certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 815, 920 P. 2d 489. Certiorari Granted No. 96­871. State Oil Co. v. Khan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1358. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1108 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7185. Bates v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 964. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 96­541 and 96­829, supra.) No. 96­474. Pacific Lumber Co. v. Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus Marmoratus) et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1060. No. 96­504. Little et al. v. Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 669 A. 2d 115. No. 96­519. Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1468. No. 96­563. Hartley Marine Corp. et al. v. Paige, Tax Commissioner of West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 W. Va. 669, 474 S. E. 2d 599. No. 96­602. Haas, Parent and Natural Guardian of Glenn v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 838. No. 96­635. Kirchgessner et al. v. Wilentz et al.; and No. 96­790. Probation Association of New Jersey v. Po- ritz et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1171. No. 96­650. Intercargo Insurance Co., fka Interna- tional Cargo & Surety Co. (Surety for Genauer) v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 391. No. 96­676. DeSarno et ux. v. Allegheny County et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1123. No. 96­678. Bennett v. Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Hol- brook & McDonough et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­680. Skeen et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­703. Merchant et al. v. Levy et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 51. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1109 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­706. Banknote Corporation of America, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 637. No. 96­708. Greene County Bank v. Federal Deposit In- surance Corporation. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 92 F. 3d 633. No. 96­721. Doe v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 67. No. 96­725. Trident Seafoods Corp. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 855. No. 96­737. John Labatt Ltd. et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­741. Florida Department of Labor and Employ- ment Security v. Department of Labor. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 435 and 436. No. 96­770. Acura of Bellevue et al. v. Reich, Secre- tary of Labor, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 90 F. 3d 1403. No. 96­782. Estate of Cole, by Its Administratrix, Par- due, et al. v. Butler. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 94 F. 3d 254. No. 96­785. Moore v. Jacobs. Ct. App. Miss. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 1017. No. 96­786. United States ex rel. Virani v. Hall & Phil- lips; and No. 96­787. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equipment, Inc., et al. v. Hall & Phillips et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 574. No. 96­789. WSB Electric, Inc., et al. v. Curry, Califor- nia Labor Commissioner, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 788. No. 96­791. Davis v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 640. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1110 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­798. Edgewood Baptist Church, dba New Begin- nings Adoption and Counseling Agency, et al. v. Cesnik et ux. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 902. No. 96­800. Kotam Electronics, Inc. v. JBL Consumer Products, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 724. No. 96­801. Booth v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­802. National Super Markets, Inc. v. Varner; and No. 96­1026. Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1209. No. 96­803. Sitkoff et ux., Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Sitkoff, a Minor, and as Admin- istrators of the Estate of Sitkoff, Deceased v. BMW of North America, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1172. No. 96­804. New Valley Corp. v. New Valley Corpora- tion Senior Executive Benefit Plan Participants et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 143. No. 96­808. Pennsylvania Nurses Assn. v. Pennsylvania State Education Assn. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 797. No. 96­810. Ashley v. City of Huntsville et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 176. No. 96­814. Rogers v. Overstreet et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1329. No. 96­816. Heady et ux., aka Heady Electric Co. v. Bar- clays Bank of New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 N. Y. 2d 1008, 665 N. E. 2d 658. No. 96­817. Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 32. No. 96­818. Maceri et al. v. Cimmino et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1171. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1111 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­820. Uithoven v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1445. No. 96­822. Dodson et al. v. Hillcrest Securities Corp., Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 52. No. 96­826. Katherine M., by Next Friend, Lesa T. v. Flour Bluff Independent School District. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 689. No. 96­830. Abbott et al. v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 522 Hospital, Medical, and Life Benefit Plan et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 236. No. 96­831. Mahern, Trustee, Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Adkins et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­836. Lyons v. Williams et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1308. No. 96­838. Waller v. Kentucky Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 S. W. 2d 181. No. 96­840. Tafuto v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­844. Duff, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois v. Governor of Illi- nois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 256. No. 96­848. Reinhard et al. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 174. No. 96­852. Wittmer et al. v. Peters et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 916. No. 96­855. Van Ort et ux. v. Estate of Stanewich, De- ceased, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 831. No. 96­861. Basinger v. CSX Transportation, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 143. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1112 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­865. Brown et al. v. Mendel. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 393. No. 96­866. Grey et al. v. Morris et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­867. Blytheville Compress Co., Inc., et al. v. Bankers Trust Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 89 F. 3d 292. No. 96­869. Cobb et al. v. Burlington Northern Rail- road Co., Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1457. No. 96­870. Campbell v. Quad City Times. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 547 N. W. 2d 608. No. 96­872. Oiness et al. v. Walgreen Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1025. No. 96­875. Harris v. City of Hamtramck et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­877. Stitt v. CNG Transmission Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1432. No. 96­879. Soffer v. Board of Trustees of the City Uni- versity of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­882. Lochman et ux. v. County of Charlevoix et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 248. No. 96­884. Takahashi v. Livingston Union School Dis- trict et al. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­885. Saathoff et al. v. FileNet Corp. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 851. No. 96­886. Ernst & Young LLP v. Knapp et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1431. No. 96­887. Wake County et al. v. Edward Valves, Inc. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 426, 471 S. E. 2d 342. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1113 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­892. Zdun v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­893. Sertich v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 520. No. 96­897. Booker v. Ward et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1052. No. 96­899. City of Philadelphia et al. v. Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 586. No. 96­902. Saelee v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 520. No. 96­907. Tassa et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Ger-Dan International Telecom, Inc., Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­909. Cherry v. Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­912. Gonzaba v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­913. Camilli v. Industrial Commission of Arizona. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­914. Minor v. Prudential Securities, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1103. No. 96­916. Lowery v. Redd et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 219. No. 96­917. Rapid Return, Inc., et al. v. Pennsylvania et al. Ct. Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­918. Ko Sai-Man et ux. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 20. No. 96­920. Frey v. Bank One, Indianapolis, N. A. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 45. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1114 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­921. Crawford v. Newkirk-Stewart et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1185. No. 96­923. Lin v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­925. McKinney et ux. v. Baldwin. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 427. No. 96­927. Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore, Inc., et al. v. Bullen et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 997. No. 96­929. Yin v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 864. No. 96­932. Neal v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­933. Seeger v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 653. No. 96­934. Riley, Administratrix of the Estate of Lowe, Deceased, et al. v. Newton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 632. No. 96­935. Maki et al. v. Laakko et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 361. No. 96­937. Croatian Roman Catholic Congregation of the Holy Trinity Church et al. v. Wuerl, Bishop, Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 447 Pa. Super. 208, 668 A. 2d 1151. No. 96­938. Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 517. No. 96­940. Poly et ux. v. Cargill, dba Cargill Associ- ates, et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 141, 667 N. E. 2d 250. No. 96­944. Hairston v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 102. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1115 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­947. Deramus, Individually and as Administra- trix of the Estate of Deramus, Deceased v. Jackson Na- tional Life Insurance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 274. No. 96­948. Blanchard et al. v. Williams, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­949. Neal v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 219. No. 96­950. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1121. No. 96­951. Firsdon et ux. v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 444. No. 96­952. Archuleta v. City of Farmington. Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied. No. 96­953. Skrzypczak v. Kauger et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1050. No. 96­955. Afaneh v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 144. No. 96­956. Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Board v. Kansas Pipeline Partnership. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d 410, 916 P. 2d 76. No. 96­960. Waszak v. Pasadena City College. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­961. Tonnelle Avenue Books & Video, Inc. v. Town- ship of North Bergen et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­963. Goins v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 M. J. 115. No. 96­965. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1261. No. 96­966. McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 610. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1116 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­970. Erwin et al. v. Daley et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 521. No. 96­971. Berndt v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 204 Wis. 2d 108, 552 N. W. 2d 897. No. 96­972. Mandrgoc v. Patapsco & Back Rivers Rail- road Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 641. No. 96­973. Produce Place v. Department of Agricul- ture et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 173. No. 96­975. Crosetto v. Wisconsin State Bar. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­977. South African Airways v. Brink's Ltd. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1022. No. 96­980. Billmyer v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1182. No. 96­981. United Farmers Agents Assn., Inc., et al. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 233. No. 96­982. Sokolow v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 396. No. 96­983. Ulczycki, Executor of the Estate of Ul- czycki, Deceased v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 839. No. 96­984. Osinowo v. Comptroller of the City of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­988. Curd v. City of Searcy et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 840. No. 96­993. Brown, Probate Judge for Jasper County, South Carolina v. South Carolina Board of Commissioners on Judicial Standards. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­996. Cox v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 153. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1117 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­999. Marshall v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 268. No. 96­1000. Perry v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 339. No. 96­1001. Sumrall v. United States; Lee v. United States; and Burrows v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 207 (first judgment); 46 M. J. 123 (second judgment) and 124 (third judgment). No. 96­1002. McCarty v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 334. No. 96­1003. Sepe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­1005. Montville v. Lewis et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 900. No. 96­1006. Moses v. City of Evanston. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­1008. Golia-Paladin v. North Carolina Bar. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 142, 472 S. E. 2d 878. No. 96­1011. Hungerschafer v. Gates et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 152. No. 96­1012. Carr v. Runyan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 327. No. 96­1016. Russo v. Marut. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1434. No. 96­1019. Salazar v. Morales, Attorney General of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 952. No. 96­1022. Daniels v. Lassalle, Judge, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and No. 96­1023. Daniels v. Lassalle, Judge, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 96­1022, 673 So. 2d 736; No. 96­1023, 673 So. 2d 704. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1118 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­1025. Moore v. Brewster et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1240. No. 96­1029. Local 100, Service Employees Interna- tional Union v. Foundation Industries, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1136. No. 96­1030. Zantop International Airlines, Inc. v. Mich- igan Department of Treasury, Revenue Division. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1031. Casteel v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 379. No. 96­1036. Houlihan et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1271. No. 96­1049. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1360. No. 96­1050. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 447. No. 96­1053. Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 446. No. 96­1057. Smith v. Grace et ux. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 919 S. W. 2d 673. No. 96­1058. Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 448. No. 96­1062. Roberts v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 Idaho 194, 923 P. 2d 439. No. 96­1064. Vominh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 19. No. 96­1068. Castro v. United States; and No. 96­7493. Luongo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1443. No. 96­1071. LaBrunerie v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1193. No. 96­1073. Matta-Ballesteros, aka Matta-Lopez v. United States (three judgments). C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1119 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 371 (first judgment); 72 F. 3d 136 (second judgment); 71 F. 3d 754 and 98 F. 3d 1100 (third judgment). No. 96­1076. Heitman, aka Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1081. Aubin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 141. No. 96­1087. Qureshi et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1094. Boyle v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1444. No. 96­1095. Bolden v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­1099. Mason v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 418. No. 96­1120. Bullock v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 896. No. 96­1154. Smith v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­5891. McFarland v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 928 S. W. 2d 482. No. 96­5999. Fritz v. Champion, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 338. No. 96­6188. Hill v. Jones, Commissioner, Alabama De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1015. No. 96­6394. Cook v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 361, 676 A. 2d 639. No. 96­6400. Speight v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 451, 677 A. 2d 317. No. 96­6405. Kuhns v. Team Bank et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 140. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1120 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6450. Lancaster et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 734. No. 96­6481. Gilliam v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­6580. Lewis Lang v. Reynolds et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 841. No. 96­6585. Travis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6609. Whitfield v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 148. No. 96­6620. Dalal v. Kaiser Permanente et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­6638. Witte v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­6646. Moskovits v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1303. No. 96­6651. Boyle v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 180. No. 96­6670. Willis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 53. No. 96­6753. O'Steen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1252. No. 96­6761. Hart/Cross v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 833. No. 96­6775. McAlister v. City of Wheat Ridge. Dist. Ct. Colo., Jefferson County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6796. Colvin v. Maryland. Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6826. England v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6848. Simmons et ux. v. City of Vacaville et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1121 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­6856. Short v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6858. Corr v. Gannett Pacific Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 634. No. 96­6859. Arewa v. Gearinger, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6862. Freeman v. Young, Executive Director, Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­6863. Banks v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 177. No. 96­6870. Harri v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6871. Peck v. Chafin, Judge, Circuit Court of West Virginia, Wayne County, et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 W. Va. 482, 475 S. E. 2d 858. No. 96­6872. Bartholic v. Stewart, Director, Arizona De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6873. Brown v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6880. Frederick v. Evans, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1196. No. 96­6883. Jones v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­6886. Hall v. County of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6896. Milligan v. Erath County, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 52. No. 96­6905. Spaight v. Goord, Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 350. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1122 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6906. Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 18. No. 96­6910. Quintanilla v. City of Downey, California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 353. No. 96­6911. Robert v. Ferreira. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 671. No. 96­6913. Tapar et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6916. Clagett v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 79, 472 S. E. 2d 263. No. 96­6918. Veale v. New Hampshire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6926. Frey v. Board of Regents of the Univer- sity of Wisconsin System et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6931. Glendora v. Walsh et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227 App. Div. 2d 377, 642 N. Y. S. 2d 545. No. 96­6934. Stone v. Farley, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 712. No. 96­6937. Peterson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 280. No. 96­6941. Lawson v. Fordice, Governor of Mississippi, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6942. Jones v. McGinnis, Director, Michigan De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6944. Dubois v. Netherland, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6948. Ardell v. Stark & Stark et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1170. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1123 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­6950. Venson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 342. No. 96­6952. Brooks v. Boynton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1331. No. 96­6954. Bergmann v. Armstrong Law Offices. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6957. Sweatt v. Campbell et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6959. Ames v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Cor- rectional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6962. Mittleman v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1240. No. 96­6969. Shoobs v. Zaveletta et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6974. Higgins v. Dennis et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­6977. Pope v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 679 So. 2d 710. No. 96­6981. Peterson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6982. Turner v. Couch, Judge, District Court of Oklahoma, Cleveland County, et al. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6983. VanDerBerg v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 1101. No. 96­6988. Light v. State Bar of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1320. No. 96­6989. McHenry v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1124 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­6991. Paland v. Brooktrails Community Services District Board of Directors. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6994. Wynne v. Wynne. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­6995. Young v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 58. No. 96­6996. Bush v. Hesse et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 592. No. 96­6998. Stephen v. Rowland. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 140. No. 96­6999. Schleeper v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7000. Banks v. Witt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 426. No. 96­7002. Williams v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7003. Williams v. Parke, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Prison. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1344. No. 96­7008. Valles v. Rubalcaba et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7010. Hershey v. California State Humane So- ciety et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1319. No. 96­7016. Harris v. San Diego County Department of Social Services. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7018. Hastings v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7025. McGee v. Ingraham et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1125 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7026. Kilo v. Chiles, Governor of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7029. Loss v. Attorney Grievance Commission et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7031. Lowe v. Craft et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7032. Lemons v. Department of Social Services of Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7035. Heon v. Vose et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1146. No. 96­7036. Brown v. Kristianson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1458. No. 96­7037. Campbell v. Zolin, Director, California De- partment of Motor Vehicles, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7040. Maxberry v. Paramount Communications et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7042. Wooten v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 325 Ark. 510, 931 S. W. 2d 408. No. 96­7043. Wagner v. Virginia Department of Correc- tions et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1184. No. 96­7044. Tucker v. Coggins/Continental Granite Co., Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7046. Bray v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7047. Fischer v. United Capital Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 685. No. 96­7048. Fischer v. Blackshear, Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 685. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1126 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7057. Seniw v. Portanova et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7058. Snipes v. DeTella, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 586. No. 96­7059. Dillard v. Security Pacific Corporation et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 621. No. 96­7061. Lykus v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 1012, 668 N. E. 2d 798. No. 96­7065. Velez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7070. Cudjo v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 925 P. 2d 895. No. 96­7072. Riddick v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­7075. McGhee v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1445. No. 96­7080. Poole v. Holland, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7081. Copeland v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 928 S. W. 2d 828. No. 96­7086. Johnson v. Snyder, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7088. McQuown v. Department of the Army. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7091. Greuling v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­7093. Ekwerekwu v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1134. No. 96­7095. Harvin v. Stephens et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 143. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1127 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7096. DeCastro v. Pataki Administration et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7097. Hightower v. Vose, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 823. No. 96­7099. Serito v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 554. No. 96­7100. Bishop v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­7101. MacInnes v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7102. Lawrence v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 701 N. E. 2d 835. No. 96­7104. Massey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1433. No. 96­7105. LaRue v. Rolfs et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7107. Holtzclaw v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1441. No. 96­7108. Glendora v. Hubbard et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 N. Y. 2d 861, 675 N. E. 2d 1236. No. 96­7109. Farr v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7110. Howard v. Hawley, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7111. Drennon v. Rodriguez et al. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7112. Grass v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7113. Howell v. Booker, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1166. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1128 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7114. Garner v. Pennington et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 50. No. 96­7115. Spivey v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 437. No. 96­7116. Pusl v. Pusl. Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7117. Cupidon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1438. No. 96­7118. Bernys v. Wing et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 88 N. Y. 2d 1064, 674 N. E. 2d 337. No. 96­7120. Picone v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7121. Rushing v. Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 695. No. 96­7124. Towery v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Ariz. 168, 920 P. 2d 290. No. 96­7125. Torres v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 452 Mich. 43, 549 N. W. 2d 540. No. 96­7126. Williams-Davis et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 490. No. 96­7129. Wheeler v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­7130. Zayid v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 694. No. 96­7132. Aleman v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 991, 667 N. E. 2d 615. No. 96­7133. Boone v. Tompkins et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7137. Solano Camacho v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1194. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1129 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7138. Clontz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1449. No. 96­7139. Hamm v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1183. No. 96­7140. Dean v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clin- ton Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 58. No. 96­7143. Campbell v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­7144. Wolfgram v. State Bar of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 158. No. 96­7145. Balog v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 448 Pa. Super. 480, 672 A. 2d 319. No. 96­7146. Cecil v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1344. No. 96­7147. Aldridge v. Hill, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1458. No. 96­7148. Restrepo v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 490. No. 96­7149. Anderson v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7150. Ali v. Dugger. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7152. Cooper v. Missouri Parole Board et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7153. Bretzing v. Harvey et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7154. Register v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 323 S. C. 471, 476 S. E. 2d 153. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1130 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7155. Price v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 A. 2d 60. No. 96­7156. Clarke v. Miller, Governor of Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7157. Mayeux v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­7158. Ramirez v. Belanger et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1442. No. 96­7159. Underwood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1343. No. 96­7161. Williams v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­7162. Yount v. Love, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7164. Brown v. Story, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1464. No. 96­7165. Atkins v. Goord, Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1393. No. 96­7166. Moore v. Groose et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7168. Madrid v. Cambra, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1146. No. 96­7169. Morrison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1132. No. 96­7170. Johnson v. Utah. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7172. Scott v. Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7173. Pope v. Jones et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1131 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7174. Holland v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7176. Bascue v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­7177. Duckett v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 919 P. 2d 7. No. 96­7178. Evans v. McBride et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1062. No. 96­7179. Meeks v. United States; No. 96­7223. Best v. United States; No. 96­7226. Bauer v. United States; and No. 96­7303. Treiber v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1549. No. 96­7182. Oliver v. Wood, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1106. No. 96­7183. Bates v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 564, 473 S. E. 2d 269. No. 96­7184. Fischer v. United Capital Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 685. No. 96­7187. Ibanez-Farias v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1354. No. 96­7188. McHenry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 125. No. 96­7189. Elder v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1110. No. 96­7191. Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7192. Kharrat v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 152. No. 96­7193. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1154. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1132 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7194. Throckmorton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1069. No. 96­7197. Terrell v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1466. No. 96­7199. Weaver v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7200. Wesley v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 924. No. 96­7201. Pohlman v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1465. No. 96­7211. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1353. No. 96­7212. Black v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 678. No. 96­7213. Abdullah, aka Roberson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1310. No. 96­7215. Hayes v. Rocha, Acting Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 845. No. 96­7218. Nagi v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 130. No. 96­7220. Israel-Treiber v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 1549. No. 96­7221. McMillan v. Department of the Interior et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1320. No. 96­7222. Chambers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 549. No. 96­7224. Bowden v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1128. No. 96­7225. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­7229. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 856. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1133 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7230. Salter v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1444. No. 96­7236. Cloird v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7240. Reid v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. No. 96­7242. Montoya v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 621. No. 96­7244. Alston v. Guillory et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 148. No. 96­7247. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1201. No. 96­7250. Herrera v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­7251. Feinberg v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 333. No. 96­7252. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 952. No. 96­7253. Horodner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1317. No. 96­7256. Induisi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1168. No. 96­7258. Fletcher v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­7259. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 204. No. 96­7261. Olsen v. Florida. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County, Fla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7263. Herron v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 234. No. 96­7266. Martinez et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 371. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1134 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7268. Girard v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1445. No. 96­7271. Saif'Ullah v. Wilson, Governor of Califor- nia, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7274. Villaloz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 952. No. 96­7275. Logan et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 57. No. 96­7277. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­7279. Yusuff v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 982. No. 96­7282. Jenkins v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 278 Ill. App. 3d 1134, 699 N. E. 2d 607. No. 96­7283. Sharrieff et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1348. No. 96­7284. Parker v. United States; and No. 96­7396. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 142. No. 96­7285. Habben v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1465. No. 96­7286. Del Mundo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­7289. Kinney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1132. No. 96­7292. Azubuko v. Board of Trustees, Framingham State College. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 764. No. 96­7295. Blais v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 647. No. 96­7298. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1388. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1135 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7299. Stroman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1184. No. 96­7300. Vasquez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­7302. Young v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1135. No. 96­7305. Williams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1155. No. 96­7311. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1449. No. 96­7312. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1353. No. 96­7314. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. No. 96­7316. Coble v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7328. Deases v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1465. No. 96­7331. Shanks v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 977. No. 96­7335. Perez v. United States; and No. 96­7564. Trinidad v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. No. 96­7336. Rivera-Flores v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1325. No. 96­7339. Barron v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1338. No. 96­7342. Sotelo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 782. No. 96­7343. Schwarz v. Clinton et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1407. No. 96­7354. Wanambisi v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1135. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1136 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7357. David v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1477. No. 96­7358. Graham v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 213. No. 96­7360. Frank v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 952. No. 96­7361. Finneran v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 58. No. 96­7362. Harper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1348. No. 96­7363. LaBayre v. Iowa. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1061. No. 96­7364. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­7365. Perkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 429. No. 96­7366. Monclova v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7368. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1348. No. 96­7371. Walters v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 831. No. 96­7372. Boyce v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­7373. Wrenn et al. v. Freeman, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1184. No. 96­7374. Amiri v. United States Marshals Service. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7375. Rothberg v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. No. 96­7376. Cherisson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1439. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1137 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7377. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 162. No. 96­7378. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 965. No. 96­7379. Plain v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7381. Szymanski v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1342. No. 96­7383. Vincent v. Tennessee et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7384. Moses v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 161. No. 96­7387. Romas-Miranda v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 143. No. 96­7390. Leyva Osuna v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­7393. Keel v. North Carolina. Super. Ct. N. C., Edgecombe County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7394. Young Yil Jo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­7395. Moreno v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 669. No. 96­7399. Hannah v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1267. No. 96­7400. Solis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7406. Christman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­7407. Stinson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 466. No. 96­7412. Corbin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1138 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7413. Shaw v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1463. No. 96­7415. Crawford v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­7416. Credit v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 362. No. 96­7417. Kiley v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 21. No. 96­7421. Maza v. United States; and No. 96­7551. Walker v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1390. No. 96­7425. Kissick v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­7428. Monroe v. United States Marshals Service et al.; and Monroe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 706 (first judgment); 105 F. 3d 665 (second judgment). No. 96­7429. Nahodil v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­7431. Monaco v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 57. No. 96­7432. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­7435. Bowman v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 641. No. 96­7438. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. No. 96­7441. Tirico v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 115. No. 96­7446. Ruffin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1139 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7448. Juvenile Male v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­7449. Juvenile Male v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­7455. Zuckerman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7457. Minnich v. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 132. No. 96­7458. Hyung Su Lee v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­7460. Tavares v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. No. 96­7461. Thompsen v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1562. No. 96­7462. Johnson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 923. No. 96­7463. Everard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 763. No. 96­7464. Gulati v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­7466. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. No. 96­7467. Dominguez-Alvarado v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­7471. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­7473. Harvey v. Perrill, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7474. Walker v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 944. No. 96­7477. Vargas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1456. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1140 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7479. Tisor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 370. No. 96­7484. Givans v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1198. No. 96­7490. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 697. No. 96­7494. Reid v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. No. 96­7496. Croft v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­7499. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 970. No. 96­7503. DeNoyer v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7505. Labansat v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 527. No. 96­7509. Almodovar v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 948. No. 96­7513. Indelicato v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 627. No. 96­7515. Small v. Perrill, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1350. No. 96­7516. Melegrito v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. No. 96­7517. Johnson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7519. Baker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­7520. Barry v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 373. No. 96­7521. Dorval v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 369. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1141 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 No. 96­7522. Denetclaw v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 454. No. 96­7531. Strickland v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 830. No. 96­7533. Wittman et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­7541. Ard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7544. Caffey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 549. No. 96­7545. Kime v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 870. No. 96­7546. Leaf, aka Lee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 370. No. 96­7547. Rowell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­7557. Sriyuth v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 739. No. 96­7558. Uribe v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7559. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 768. No. 96­7560. Yett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7561. Smith v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 693. No. 96­7569. Greer v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1465. No. 96­7574. Mejia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1391. No. 96­7583. Balboa v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1142 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7588. Acklen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 750. No. 96­7591. Foster v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­686. Amoco Energy Trading Corp. et al. v. Fed- eral Energy Regulatory Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 536. No. 96­763. Wood, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary v. Rupe. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Criminal Jus- tice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1434. No. 96­775. Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry et al. Sup. Ct. Utah. Motion of National Mining Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 921 P. 2d 1365. No. 96­891. Jordan v. Kenton County Board of Education et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed as a veteran granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­911. Lewis, Former Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections v. Hanlon. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1192. No. 96­958. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Gwong. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 109. No. 96­1065. Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. No. 96­1091. Saunders v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. No. 96­7069. McCoy v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1143 519 U. S. February 18, 1997 decision of this petition. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 223, 928 P. 2d 647. Rehearing Denied No. 95­1891. Anderson v. Johnson, aka Dortch, ante, p. 814; No. 95­9187. Krivonak v. Berkey et al., ante, p. 842; No. 95­9209. Grandison v. Maryland, ante, p. 1027; No. 96­78. Spiegel v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., ante, p. 865; No. 96­620. Simms v. First Madison Bank, FSB, ante, p. 1041; No. 96­627. Davis v. O'Brien, ante, p. 1041; No. 96­640. Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co., ante, p. 1056; No. 96­645. Subaru of America, Inc., et al. v. Compton, ante, p. 1042; No. 96­5555. Viswanathan v. Scotland County Board of Education et al., ante, p. 1030; No. 96­5908. Jackson v. Sowa et al., ante, p. 983; No. 96­5913. Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., ante, p. 983; No. 96­6189. In re Gaydos, ante, p. 1006; No. 96­6216. Litzenberg v. Maryland et al., ante, p. 1015; No. 96­6265. Marinoff v. Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, et al., ante, p. 998; No. 96­6270. Williams v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 1031; No. 96­6292. Aaron v. Cunningham et al., ante, p. 1031; No. 96­6302. Steele v. City of Los Angeles et al., ante, p. 1016; No. 96­6356. In re Johnson, ante, p. 1039; No. 96­6434. Wronke v. Madigan, Sheriff, Champaign County, Illinois, ante, p. 1017; No. 96­6536. Mitchell v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 1032; No. 96­6564. Owens v. Presbyterian Hospital, ante, p. 1033; No. 96­6627. Hy Thi Nguyen v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, ante, p. 1045; No. 96­6667. Darby v. United States, ante, p. 1034; and No. 96­6681. In re Nagy, ante, p. 1027. Petitions for rehear- ing denied. 519ORD$$2M 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1144 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 18, 20, 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. 95­1906. United States v. Watts; and United States v. Putra, ante, p. 148. Motion of respondent Vernon Watts for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied. No. 96­5915. In re Danik, ante, p. 980. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. February 20, 1997 Dismissals Under Rule 46 No. 96­863. Bindana Investments Co. Ltd. et al. v. Knee Deep Cattle Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dis- missed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 514. No. 96­7142. Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medi- cal Program of the Uniformed Services et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 950. Miscellaneous Order No. A­577. Calderon, Warden v. Moore. Application for stay, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted. Enforcement of the order of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, case No. CV 91­5976­KN, issued on March 31, 1995, is hereby stayed pending final disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Ninth Circuit. February 24, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­586. Wisconsin et al. v. Mueller et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996). Reported below: 54 F. 3d 438. No. 95­1415. Sabelko et al. v. City of Phoenix et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., ante, p. 357. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1169. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1145 519 U. S. February 24, 1997 No. 95­1509. Luzik et al. v. Virginia et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Auer v. Robbins, ante, p. 452. No. 95­1905. Hill et al. v. Colorado et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., ante, p. 357. Reported below: 911 P. 2d 670. No. 95­1981. Gnadt v. Castro et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., ante, p. 337. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1141. No. 95­2088. City and County of Denver v. Carpenter et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Auer v. Robbins, ante, p. 452. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 353. No. 95­6825. Magnotti v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynce v. Mathis, ante, p. 433. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 314. No. 96­152. Giuliani, Mayor of City of New York, et al. v. Yourman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Auer v. Robbins, ante, p. 452. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 655. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1736. In re Disbarment of Du Bois. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 946.] No. D­1741. In re Disbarment of Atkins. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1744. In re Disbarment of Ebbert. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 978.] No. D­1750. In re Disbarment of Jacobs. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1004.] 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1146 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. D­1751. In re Disbarment of Principato. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1004.] No. D­1753. In re Disbarment of Barone. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1004.] No. D­1754. In re Disbarment of Nedell. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1004.] No. D­1755. In re Disbarment of Smotkin. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1005.] No. D­1757. In re Disbarment of Taffer. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1026.] No. D­1760. In re Disbarment of Gomric. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1037.] No. D­1779. In re Disbarment of Gregory. Milan Ken- neth Gregory, of Northport, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1780. In re Disbarment of Mazzei. Rudolph L. Maz- zei, of Port Jefferson, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1781. In re Disbarment of Hamilton. Donald D. Hamilton, of Lebanon, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1782. In re Disbarment of Olson. Oscar William Olson, Jr., of Oakbrook Terrace, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1783. In re Disbarment of Passman. David Louis Passman, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requir- 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1147 519 U. S. February 24, 1997 ing him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1784. In re Disbarment of Levinson. Richard Lev- inson, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1785. In re Disbarment of Muhammad. Mustafa Abdullah Muhammad, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­60. Reed v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 96­987. Foreman et al. v. Dallas County, Texas, et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­1266. Antonio Perez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 96­7233. Bowers et al. v. Saturn General Motors Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 17, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­7380. In re Sandles. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­6891. In re Sandles; and No. 96­7475. In re Wesley. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­643. Steel Co., aka Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1237. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1148 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­792. Kalina v. Fletcher. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 653. No. 96­738. Salinas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted limited to Questions 2 and 3 presented by the petition. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1185. No. 96­843. National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co. et al.; and No. 96­847. AT&T Family Federal Credit Union et al. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allot- ted for oral argument. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 525. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1360. Webb et al., Co-Executors of the Estate of Parsons, Deceased v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 691. No. 95­2060. Hadley v. North Arkansas Community Tech- nical College. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1437. No. 96­652. Kuchinskas et al. v. Broward County. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1168. No. 96­806. Qasguargis v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 788. No. 96­821. Jonathan Woodner Co. et al. v. Breeden et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 A. 2d 929 and 681 A. 2d 1097. No. 96­834. Jensen et ux. v. County of Los Angeles. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­841. UAP/GA AG Chem., Inc. et al. v. Childree. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­873. Tsimbidaros v. International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 687. No. 96­883. Parker, Individually and as Next Friend of Parker, et al. v. Boyer et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 445. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1149 519 U. S. February 24, 1997 No. 96­903. Arkansas Term Limits et al. v. Donovan; and No. 96­919. Arkansas v. Donovan et al. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 326 Ark. 353, 931 S. W. 2d 119. No. 96­905. City of Tulsa v. Spradling et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1492. No. 96­906. Lohman et al. v. Hafley. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 264. No. 96­931. Grantwood Village v. Missouri Pacific Rail- road Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 654. No. 96­946. Fordham v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 481, 668 N. E. 2d 816. No. 96­990. Hudson et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 451. No. 96­991. Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc., et al. v. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1412. No. 96­992. Albino et al. v. Machado et al. Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 Haw. 474, 918 P. 2d 1130. No. 96­994. Brine et al. v. Iowa Board of Regents et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 271. No. 96­995. Chance Management, Inc., et al. v. South Dakota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1107. No. 96­997. Jonathan Woodner Co. et al. v. Breeden et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 A. 2d 1098. No. 96­1010. Crossley v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 366. No. 96­1014. Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Wilson. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 552. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1150 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­1020. Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District et al. v. Donato. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 623. No. 96­1021. Illinois High School Assn. v. GTE Vantage Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 244. No. 96­1035. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc. v. Jarrell. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 1092. No. 96­1039. Redge v. Michigan. Cir. Ct. Oakland County, Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1042. Simmons et al. v. Safeco Insurance Com- pany of America, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­1045. Gill v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 53. No. 96­1077. Illinois v. Yarber. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 279 Ill. App. 3d 519, 663 N. E. 2d 1131. No. 96­1078. Wiley v. General Motors Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­1086. Randall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 339. No. 96­1088. Geiser v. Mathew, Personal Representa- tive of the Estate of Mathew, Deceased, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1100. Warwick Mall Trust et al. v. Rhode Island et al. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 A. 2d 252. No. 96­1118. Pievsky v. Ridge, Governor of Pennsylva- nia. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 730. No. 96­1132. Wilson et al. v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Mass. App. 1105, 670 N. E. 2d 211. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1151 519 U. S. February 24, 1997 No. 96­1153. Poly-Tech Industries, Inc. v. Insty*Bit, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 663. No. 96­1159. City of Pittsburgh v. Beck. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 966. No. 96­1162. Cochran v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 M. J. 173. No. 96­1166. Larry v. Phillips, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1175. Gabel v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1345. No. 96­1191. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 550. No. 96­1196. Damico v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1431. No. 96­1228. Biddulph et al. v. Mortham, Secretary of State of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 89 F. 3d 1491. No. 96­6614. Alexander v. Chater, Commissioner of So- cial Security. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­6791. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 126. No. 96­6822. Becerra v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 145. No. 96­6830. Rowsey v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 603, 472 S. E. 2d 903. No. 96­6868. Burgos v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 849. No. 96­6966. Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1431. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1152 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7134. McGill v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 545 Pa. 180, 680 A. 2d 1131. No. 96­7163. Carter v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7180. Jones v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 309. No. 96­7190. Miller v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Ariz. 314, 921 P. 2d 1151. No. 96­7198. Taylor v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 S. W. 2d 209. No. 96­7202. Wells v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7203. York v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 326 Ark. xxxi. No. 96­7204. White v. Adams County Detention Facility et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 657. No. 96­7205. Burnett v. Bulson; and Burnett v. Riggle et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7206. Clemons v. Raney, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7207. Boulineau v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7208. Baticados v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7210. Carillo v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7216. Durham v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 So. 2d 196. No. 96­7219. Mark v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1153 519 U. S. February 24, 1997 No. 96­7228. Smith v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 219, 675 A. 2d 1221. No. 96­7231. Powell v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7232. Bartholic v. Stewart, Director, Arizona De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7234. Huss v. Acevedo, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7235. Jones v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7237. Cheek v. Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7239. Cross v. Murphy. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7241. King v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7243. Cross v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7248. Victor v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 276. No. 96­7287. Hyde v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Ariz. 252, 921 P. 2d 655. No. 96­7290. Foster v. Giant Food, Inc. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7333. Robinson v. Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1181. No. 96­7402. Eguita v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1168. No. 96­7403. Everett v. Board of Immigration Appeals. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1154 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7404. Coleman v. Morton, Administrator, New Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7426. Moseley v. North Carolina. Super. Ct. N. C., Stokes County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7427. Antonelli v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1124, 701 N. E. 2d 833. No. 96­7436. Brancato v. Grady. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1143. No. 96­7452. Moore et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 970. No. 96­7469. Husske v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 203, 476 S. E. 2d 920. No. 96­7512. Rupert v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1132, 701 N. E. 2d 836. No. 96­7529. Lennartz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­7530. Castillo Reyes v. Manuel Solloso et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7570. Foster v. United States Marshals Service. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7586. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 699. No. 96­7587. Russell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. No. 96­7594. Oguguo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 130. No. 96­7596. Schneider v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 649. No. 96­7600. Morrison v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 699. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1155 519 U. S. February 24, 1997 No. 96­7601. Brocchini v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 699. No. 96­7610. Betancourt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7612. Nwobi, aka Okorie, aka Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7615. Carpenter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 773. No. 96­7616. Ceccarani v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 126. No. 96­7619. Cowan v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­7620. Arnold v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­7624. Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 351. No. 96­7626. Runnels v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 390. No. 96­7627. Reveles-Ramos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1462. No. 96­7629. Scott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­7630. Previtte v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1132. No. 96­7632. Palmieri v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­7633. Alvarado-Delgado v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 492. No. 96­7634. Butler v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 120. No. 96­7642. Leon v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1156 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 February 24, 1997 519 U. S. No. 96­7644. Atcheson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1237. No. 96­7646. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­7654. Ezeoke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­7664. Cohen v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1173. No. 96­7667. Womack v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 A. 2d 603. No. 96­7668. Webb v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 585. No. 96­7678. Daniels v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1144. No. 96­7679. Flucas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 177. No. 96­7680. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1132. No. 96­7681. Delmarle v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 80. No. 96­7704. Welky v. Makowski, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­974. Henry v. City of Sherman. Sup. Ct. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 928 S. W. 2d 464. Rehearing Denied No. 96­662. Bank of New York, as Collateral Trustee, et al. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., ante, p. 1057; No. 96­780. Rude et al. v. United States, ante, p. 1058; No. 96­6271. Williams v. North Carolina, ante, p. 1061; No. 96­6485. Reape v. New York Daily News, ante, p. 1063; No. 96­6504. Stoianoff v. TRW, Inc., et al., ante, p. 1063; No. 96­6723. Andrzejewski v. California Workers' Com- pensation Appeals Board et al., ante, p. 1095; 519ORD$$2N 06-09-99 13:18:36 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1157 519 U. S. February 24, 26, 1997 No. 96­6802. Velez v. Puerto Rico, ante, p. 1067; No. 96­6804. Arteaga v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, ante, p. 1097; No. 96­6827. Gibbs v. United States, ante, p. 1068; No. 96­6854. Raney v. United States, ante, p. 1069; and No. 96­6965. Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ante, p. 1083. Petitions for rehearing denied. February 26, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­615. Gray v. Netherland, Warden. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. 96­7984 (A­609). In re Gray. Application for stay of exe- cution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus and petition for writ of mandamus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­7976 (A­612). Gray v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 158. 519us2rulf 04-01-99 09:25:34 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ADOPTED JANUARY 16, 1997 EFFECTIVE MAY 1, 1997 The following are the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States as revised on January 16, 1997. See post, p. 1160. The amended Rules became effective May 1, 1997, as provided in Rule 48, post, p. 1218. For previous revisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court see 346 U. S. 949, 388 U. S. 931, 398 U. S. 1013, 445 U. S. 985, 493 U. S. 1099, and 515 U. S. 1197. 1159 519us2rulg 04-01-99 09:25:45 PGT * USRULES ORDER ADOPTING REVISED RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 16, 1997 IT IS ORDERED that the revised Rules of this Court, today approved by the Court and lodged with the Clerk, shall be effective May 1, 1997, and be printed as an appendix to the United States Reports. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rules promulgated July 26, 1995, see 515 U. S. 1197, shall be rescinded as of April 30, 1997, and that the revised Rules shall govern all proceedings in cases commenced after that date and, to the extent feasible and just, cases then pending. 1160 519us2rulc 04-01-99 09:25:58 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I. THE COURT Page Rule 1. Clerk.............................................................................................. 1163 Rule 2. Library.......................................................................................... 1163 Rule 3. Term.............................................................................................. 1164 Rule 4. Sessions and Quorum................................................................. 1164 PART II. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS Rule 5. Admission to the Bar................................................................. 1164 Rule 6. Argument Pro Hac Vice ........................................................... 1165 Rule 7. Prohibition Against Practice.................................................... 1166 Rule 8. Disbarment and Disciplinary Action ...................................... 1166 Rule 9. Appearance of Counsel.............................................................. 1167 PART III. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI Rule 10. Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari................. 1167 Rule 11. Certiorari to a United States Court of Appeals Before Judgment.................................................................................. 1168 Rule 12. Review on Certiorari: How Sought; Parties......................... 1168 Rule 13. Review on Certiorari: Time for Petitioning.......................... 1171 Rule 14. Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari...................... 1172 Rule 15. Briefs in Opposition; Reply Briefs; Supplemental Briefs... 1175 Rule 16. Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari................ 1177 PART IV. OTHER JURISDICTION Rule 17. Procedure in an Original Action ............................................. 1178 Rule 18. Appeal from a United States District Court ........................ 1179 Rule 19. Procedure on a Certified Question.......................................... 1183 Rule 20. Procedure on a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ............ 1184 PART V. MOTIONS AND APPLICATIONS Rule 21. Motions to the Court ................................................................. 1187 1161 519us2rulc 04-01-99 09:25:58 PGT * USRULES 1162 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Rule 22. Applications to Individual Justices......................................... 1188 Rule 23. Stays ............................................................................................. 1189 PART VI. BRIEFS ON THE MERITS AND ORAL ARGUMENT Rule 24. Briefs on the Merits: In General............................................. 1189 Rule 25. Briefs on the Merits: Number of Copies and Time to File 1191 Rule 26. Joint Appendix............................................................................ 1192 Rule 27. Calendar ....................................................................................... 1195 Rule 28. Oral Argument............................................................................ 1196 PART VII. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 29. Filing and Service of Documents; Special Notifications; Corporate Listing................................................................... 1197 Rule 30. Computation and Extension of Time...................................... 1200 Rule 31. Translations ................................................................................. 1201 Rule 32. Models, Diagrams, and Exhibits.............................................. 1201 Rule 33. Document Preparation: Booklet Format; 81 2- by 11-Inch Paper Format .......................................................................... 1202 Rule 34. Document Preparation: General Requirements ................... 1205 Rule 35. Death, Substitution, and Revivor; Public Officers ............... 1207 Rule 36. Custody of Prisoners in Habeas Corpus Proceedings......... 1208 Rule 37. Brief for an Amicus Curiae..................................................... 1208 Rule 38. Fees ............................................................................................... 1210 Rule 39. Proceedings In Forma Pauperis ............................................ 1211 Rule 40. Veterans, Seamen, and Military Cases................................... 1213 PART VIII. DISPOSITION OF CASES Rule 41. Opinions of the Court ................................................................ 1213 Rule 42. Interest and Damages ............................................................... 1213 Rule 43. Costs.............................................................................................. 1214 Rule 44. Rehearing..................................................................................... 1215 Rule 45. Process; Mandates ...................................................................... 1216 Rule 46. Dismissing Cases........................................................................ 1217 PART IX. DEFINITIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE Rule 47. Reference to "State Court" and "State Law" ...................... 1217 Rule 48. Effective Date of Rules............................................................. 1218 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Adopted January 16, 1997-Effective May 1, 1997 PART I. THE COURT Rule 1. Clerk 1. The Clerk receives documents for filing with the Court and has authority to reject any submitted filing that does not comply with these Rules. 2. The Clerk maintains the Court's records and will not permit any of them to be removed from the Court building except as authorized by the Court. Any document filed with the Clerk and made a part of the Court's records may not thereafter be withdrawn from the official Court files. After the conclusion of proceedings in this Court, original records and documents transmitted to this Court by any other court will be returned to the court from which they were received. 3. Unless the Court or the Chief Justice orders otherwise, the Clerk's office is open from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except on federal legal holidays listed in 5 U. S. C. § 6103. Rule 2. Library 1. The Court's library is available for use by appropriate personnel of this Court, members of the Bar of this Court, Members of Congress and their legal staffs, and attorneys for the United States and for federal departments and agencies. 2. The library's hours are governed by regulations made by the Librarian with the approval of the Chief Justice or the Court. 1163 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1164 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 3. Library books may not be removed from the Court building, except by a Justice or a member of a Justice's staff. Rule 3. Term The Court holds a continuous annual Term commencing on the first Monday in October and ending on the day before the first Monday in October of the following year. See 28 U. S. C. § 2. At the end of each Term, all cases pending on the docket are continued to the next Term. Rule 4. Sessions and Quorum 1. Open sessions of the Court are held beginning at 10 a.m. on the first Monday in October of each year, and thereafter as announced by the Court. Unless it orders otherwise, the Court sits to hear arguments from 10 a.m. until noon and from 1 p.m. until 3 p.m. 2. Six Members of the Court constitute a quorum. See 28 U. S. C. § 1. In the absence of a quorum on any day appointed for holding a session of the Court, the Justices attending-or if no Justice is present, the Clerk or a Deputy Clerk-may announce that the Court will not meet until there is a quorum. 3. When appropriate, the Court will direct the Clerk or the Marshal to announce recesses. PART II. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS Rule 5. Admission to the Bar 1. To qualify for admission to the Bar of this Court, an applicant must have been admitted to practice in the highest court of a State, Commonwealth, Territory or Possession, or the District of Columbia for a period of at least three years immediately before the date of application; must not have been the subject of any adverse disciplinary action pro- nounced or in effect during that 3-year period; and must appear to the Court to be of good moral and professional character. 2. Each applicant shall file with the Clerk (1) a certificate from the presiding judge, clerk, or other authorized official of that court evidencing the applicant's admission to practice there and the applicant's current good standing, and (2) a 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1165 completely executed copy of the form approved by this Court and furnished by the Clerk containing (a) the applicant's per- sonal statement, and (b) the statement of two sponsors en- dorsing the correctness of the applicant's statement, stating that the applicant possesses all the qualifications required for admission, and affirming that the applicant is of good moral and professional character. Both sponsors must be members of the Bar of this Court who personally know, but are not related to, the applicant. 3. If the documents submitted demonstrate that the appli- cant possesses the necessary qualifications, and if the appli- cant has signed the oath or affirmation and paid the required fee, the Clerk will notify the applicant of acceptance by the Court as a member of the Bar and issue a certificate of ad- mission. An applicant who so wishes may be admitted in open court on oral motion by a member of the Bar of this Court, provided that all other requirements for admission have been satisfied. 4. Each applicant shall sign the following oath or affirma- tion: I, ..............., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that as an attorney and as a counselor of this Court, I will conduct my- self uprightly and according to law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United States. 5. The fee for admission to the Bar and a certificate bear- ing the seal of the Court is $100, payable to the United States Supreme Court. The Marshal will deposit such fees in a separate fund to be disbursed by the Marshal at the direction of the Chief Justice for the costs of admissions, for the benefit of the Court and its Bar, and for related purposes. 6. The fee for a duplicate certificate of admission to the Bar bearing the seal of the Court is $15, payable to the United States Supreme Court. The proceeds will be main- tained by the Marshal as provided in paragraph 5 of this Rule. Rule 6. Argument Pro Hac Vice 1. An attorney not admitted to practice in the highest court of a State, Commonwealth, Territory or Possession, or the District of Columbia for the requisite three years, but 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1166 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT otherwise eligible for admission to practice in this Court under Rule 5.1, may be permitted to argue pro hac vice. 2. An attorney qualified to practice in the courts of a foreign state may be permitted to argue pro hac vice. 3. Oral argument pro hac vice is allowed only on motion of the counsel of record for the party on whose behalf leave is requested. The motion shall state concisely the qualifica- tions of the attorney who is to argue pro hac vice. It shall be filed with the Clerk, in the form required by Rule 21, no later than the date on which the respondent's or appellee's brief on the merits is due to be filed, and it shall be accompa- nied by proof of service as required by Rule 29. Rule 7. Prohibition Against Practice No employee of this Court shall practice as an attorney or counselor in any court or before any agency of government while employed by the Court; nor shall any person after leaving such employment participate in any professional ca- pacity in any case pending before this Court or in any case being considered for filing in this Court, until two years have elapsed after separation; nor shall a former employee ever participate in any professional capacity in any case that was pending in this Court during the employee's tenure. Rule 8. Disbarment and Disciplinary Action 1. Whenever a member of the Bar of this Court has been disbarred or suspended from practice in any court of record, or has engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar of this Court, the Court will enter an order suspending that member from practice before this Court and affording the member an opportunity to show cause, within 40 days, why a disbarment order should not be entered. Upon response, or if no response is timely filed, the Court will enter an appropriate order. 2. After reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken, and after a hearing if material facts are in dispute, the Court may take any appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney who 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1167 is admitted to practice before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or for failure to comply with these Rules or any Rule or order of the Court. Rule 9. Appearance of Counsel 1. An attorney seeking to file a document in this Court in a representative capacity must first be admitted to practice before this Court as provided in Rule 5, except that admis- sion to the Bar of this Court is not required for an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, see 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(d)(6), or under any other applicable federal statute. The attorney whose name, address, and telephone number appear on the cover of a document presented for filing is considered counsel of record, and a separate notice of appearance need not be filed. If the name of more than one attorney is shown on the cover of the document, the at- torney who is counsel of record shall be clearly identified. 2. An attorney representing a party who will not be filing a document shall enter a separate notice of appearance as counsel of record indicating the name of the party repre- sented. A separate notice of appearance shall also be en- tered whenever an attorney is substituted as counsel of rec- ord in a particular case. PART III. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI Rule 10. Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, al- though neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1168 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a de- parture by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power; (b) a state court of last resort has decided an impor- tant federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; (c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law. Rule 11. Certiorari to a United States Court of Appeals Before Judgment A petition for a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United States court of appeals, before judgment is en- tered in that court, will be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(e). Rule 12. Review on Certiorari: How Sought; Parties 1. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Rule, the peti- tioner shall file 40 copies of a petition for a writ of certiorari, prepared as required by Rule 33.1, and shall pay the Rule 38(a) docket fee. 2. A petitioner proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39 shall file an original and 10 copies of a petition for a writ of certiorari prepared as required by Rule 33.2, together with an original and 10 copies of the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. A copy of the motion shall pre- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1169 cede and be attached to each copy of the petition. An in- mate confined in an institution, if proceeding in forma pauperis and not represented by counsel, need file only an original petition and motion. 3. Whether prepared under Rule 33.1 or Rule 33.2, the petition shall comply in all respects with Rule 14 and shall be submitted with proof of service as required by Rule 29. The case then will be placed on the docket. It is the peti- tioner's duty to notify all respondents promptly, on a form supplied by the Clerk, of the date of filing, the date the case was placed on the docket, and the docket number of the case. The notice shall be served as required by Rule 29. 4. Parties interested jointly, severally, or otherwise in a judgment may petition separately for a writ of certiorari; or any two or more may join in a petition. A party not shown on the petition as joined therein at the time the petition is filed may not later join in that petition. When two or more judgments are sought to be reviewed on a writ of certiorari to the same court and involve identical or closely related questions, a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the judgments suffices. A petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other pleading, except that any motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis shall be attached. 5. No more than 30 days after a case has been placed on the docket, a respondent seeking to file a conditional cross- petition (i. e., a cross-petition that otherwise would be un- timely) shall file, with proof of service as required by Rule 29, 40 copies of the cross-petition prepared as required by Rule 33.1, except that a cross-petitioner proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39 shall comply with Rule 12.2. The cross-petition shall comply in all respects with this Rule and Rule 14, except that material already reproduced in the ap- pendix to the opening petition need not be reproduced again. A cross-petitioning respondent shall pay the Rule 38(a) docket fee or submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The cover of the cross-petition shall indicate clearly that it is a conditional cross-petition. The cross- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1170 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT petition then will be placed on the docket, subject to the provisions of Rule 13.4. It is the cross-petitioner's duty to notify all cross-respondents promptly, on a form supplied by the Clerk, of the date of filing, the date the cross-petition was placed on the docket, and the docket number of the cross-petition. The notice shall be served as required by Rule 29. A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other pleading, except that any motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis shall be attached. The time to file a conditional cross-petition will not be extended. 6. All parties to the proceeding in the court whose judg- ment is sought to be reviewed are deemed parties entitled to file documents in this Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk of this Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of such notice shall be served as required by Rule 29 on all parties to the proceed- ing below. A party noted as no longer interested may re- main a party by notifying the Clerk promptly, with service on the other parties, of an intention to remain a party. All parties other than the petitioner are considered respondents, but any respondent who supports the position of a petitioner shall meet the petitioner's time schedule for filing docu- ments, except that a response supporting the petition shall be filed within 20 days after the case is placed on the docket, and that time will not be extended. Parties who file no doc- ument will not qualify for any relief from this Court. 7. The clerk of the court having possession of the record shall keep it until notified by the Clerk of this Court to cer- tify and transmit it. In any document filed with this Court, a party may cite or quote from the record, even if it has not been transmitted to this Court. When requested by the Clerk of this Court to certify and transmit the record, or any part of it, the clerk of the court having possession of the record shall number the documents to be certified and shall transmit therewith a numbered list specifically identifying each document transmitted. If the record, or stipulated por- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1171 tions, have been printed for the use of the court below, that printed record, plus the proceedings in the court below, may be certified as the record unless one of the parties or the Clerk of this Court requests otherwise. The record may consist of certified copies, but if the lower court is of the view that original documents of any kind should be seen by this Court, that court may provide by order for the trans- port, safekeeping, and return of such originals. Rule 13. Review on Certiorari: Time for Petitioning 1. Unless otherwise provided by law, a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any case, civil or crimi- nal, entered by a state court of last resort or a United States court of appeals (including the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Armed Forces) is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment. A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discre- tionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review. 2. The Clerk will not file any petition for a writ of cer- tiorari that is jurisdictionally out of time. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). 3. The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). But if a petition for re- hearing is timely filed in the lower court by any party, the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties (whether or not they requested rehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing or, if the petition for rehearing is granted, the subsequent entry of judgment. A suggestion made to a United States court of appeals for a rehearing en banc is not a petition for rehearing within the meaning of this Rule unless so treated by the United States court of appeals. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1172 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 4. A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari is timely when it is filed with the Clerk as provided in paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 of this Rule, or in Rule 12.5. However, a conditional cross-petition (which except for Rule 12.5 would be untimely) will not be granted unless another party's timely petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. 5. For good cause, a Justice may extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding 60 days. An application to extend the time to file shall set out the basis for jurisdiction in this Court, identify the judgment sought to be reviewed, include a copy of the opinion and any order respecting rehearing, and set out specific reasons why an extension of time is justified. The application must be received by the Clerk at least 10 days before the date the petition is due, except in extraordinary circumstances. For the time and manner of presenting the application, see Rules 21, 22, 30, and 33.2. An application to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari is not favored. Rule 14. Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 1. A petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order indicated: (a) The questions presented for review, expressed con- cisely in relation to the circumstances of the case, without unnecessary detail. The questions should be short and should not be argumentative or repetitive. If the petitioner or respondent is under a death sentence that may be affected by the disposition of the petition, the notation "capital case" shall precede the questions presented. The questions shall be set out on the first page following the cover, and no other information may appear on that page. The statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court. (b) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed (unless the caption of the case contains the names of all the parties), and a list 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1173 of parent companies and nonwholly owned subsidiaries as required by Rule 29.6. (c) If the petition exceeds five pages, a table of contents and a table of cited authorities. (d) Citations of the official and unofficial reports of the opinions and orders entered in the case by courts or admin- istrative agencies. (e) A concise statement of the basis for jurisdiction in this Court, showing: (i) the date the judgment or order sought to be re- viewed was entered (and, if applicable, a statement that the petition is filed under this Court's Rule 11); (ii) the date of any order respecting rehearing, and the date and terms of any order granting an extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari; (iii) express reliance on Rule 12.5, when a cross- petition for a writ of certiorari is filed under that Rule, and the date of docketing of the petition for a writ of certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; (iv) the statutory provision believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction to review on a writ of certiorari the judgment or order in question; and (v) if applicable, a statement that the notifications required by Rule 29.4(b) or (c) have been made. (f) The constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordi- nances, and regulations involved in the case, set out verba- tim with appropriate citation. If the provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone suffices at this point, and their pertinent text shall be set out in the appendix referred to in subparagraph 1(i). (g) A concise statement of the case setting out the facts material to consideration of the questions presented, and also containing the following: (i) If review of a state-court judgment is sought, spec- ification of the stage in the proceedings, both in the court of first instance and in the appellate courts, when 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1174 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT the federal questions sought to be reviewed were raised; the method or manner of raising them and the way in which they were passed on by those courts; and perti- nent quotations of specific portions of the record or sum- mary thereof, with specific reference to the places in the record where the matter appears (e. g., court opinion, ruling on exception, portion of court's charge and excep- tion thereto, assignment of error), so as to show that the federal question was timely and properly raised and that this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment on a writ of certiorari. When the portions of the record re- lied on under this subparagraph are voluminous, they shall be included in the appendix referred to in subpara- graph 1(i). (ii) If review of a judgment of a United States court of appeals is sought, the basis for federal jurisdiction in the court of first instance. (h) A direct and concise argument amplifying the reasons relied on for allowance of the writ. See Rule 10. (i) An appendix containing, in the order indicated: (i) the opinions, orders, findings of fact, and conclu- sions of law, whether written or orally given and tran- scribed, entered in conjunction with the judgment sought to be reviewed; (ii) any other relevant opinions, orders, findings of fact, and conclusions of law entered in the case by courts or administrative agencies, and, if reference thereto is necessary to ascertain the grounds of the judgment, of those in companion cases (each document shall include the caption showing the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the case, and the date of entry); (iii) any order on rehearing, including the caption showing the name of the issuing court, the title and number of the case, and the date of entry; (iv) the judgment sought to be reviewed if the date of its entry is different from the date of the opinion 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1175 or order required in sub-subparagraph (i) of this subparagraph; (v) material required by subparagraphs 1(f) or 1(g)(i); and (vi) any other material the petitioner believes essen- tial to understand the petition. If the material required by this subparagraph is voluminous, it may be presented in a separate volume or volumes with appropriate covers. 2. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari shall be set out in the body of the petition, as pro- vided in subparagraph 1(h) of this Rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed, and the Clerk will not file any petition for a writ of certiorari to which any supporting brief is annexed or appended. 3. A petition for a writ of certiorari should be stated briefly and in plain terms and may not exceed the page limi- tations specified in Rule 33. 4. The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to ready and ade- quate understanding of the points requiring consideration is sufficient reason for the Court to deny a petition. 5. If the Clerk determines that a petition submitted timely and in good faith is in a form that does not comply with this Rule or with Rule 33 or Rule 34, the Clerk will return it with a letter indicating the deficiency. A corrected petition received no more than 60 days after the date of the Clerk's letter will be deemed timely. Rule 15. Briefs in Opposition; Reply Briefs; Supplemental Briefs 1. A brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed by the respondent in any case, but is not man- datory except in a capital case, see Rule 14.1(a), or when ordered by the Court. 2. A brief in opposition should be stated briefly and in plain terms and may not exceed the page limitations speci- fied in Rule 33. In addition to presenting other arguments 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1176 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT for denying the petition, the brief in opposition should ad- dress any perceived misstatement of fact or law in the peti- tion that bears on what issues properly would be before the Court if certiorari were granted. Counsel are admonished that they have an obligation to the Court to point out in the brief in opposition, and not later, any perceived misstatement made in the petition. Any objection to consideration of a question presented based on what occurred in the proceed- ings below, if the objection does not go to jurisdiction, may be deemed waived unless called to the Court's attention in the brief in opposition. 3. Any brief in opposition shall be filed within 30 days after the case is placed on the docket, unless the time is ex- tended by the Court or a Justice, or by the Clerk under Rule 30.4. Forty copies shall be filed, except that a respondent proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies re- quired for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2, to- gether with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a copy of which shall precede and be attached to each copy of the brief in opposition. If the petitioner is proceeding in forma pauperis, the respondent may file an original and 10 copies of a brief in opposition prepared as required by Rule 33.2. Whether prepared under Rule 33.1 or Rule 33.2, the brief in opposition shall comply with the requirements of Rule 24 governing a respondent's brief, except that no sum- mary of the argument is required. A brief in opposition may not be joined with any other pleading, except that any motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis shall be attached. The brief in opposition shall be served as re- quired by Rule 29. 4. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed. Any objections to the juris- diction of the Court to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari shall be included in the brief in opposition. 5. The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1177 opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 10 days after the brief in opposition is filed. 6. Any petitioner may file a reply brief addressed to new points raised in the brief in opposition, but distribution and consideration by the Court under paragraph 5 of this Rule will not be deferred pending its receipt. Forty copies shall be filed, except that petitioner proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2. The reply brief shall be served as required by Rule 29. 7. If a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been dock- eted, distribution of both petitions will be deferred until the cross-petition is due for distribution under this Rule. 8. Any party may file a supplemental brief at any time while a petition for a writ of certiorari is pending, calling attention to new cases, new legislation, or other intervening matter not available at the time of the party's last filing. A supplemental brief shall be restricted to new matter and shall follow, insofar as applicable, the form for a brief in oppo- sition prescribed by this Rule. Forty copies shall be filed, except that a party proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2. The supplemental brief shall be served as required by Rule 29. Rule 16. Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 1. After considering the documents distributed under Rule 15, the Court will enter an appropriate order. The order may be a summary disposition on the merits. 2. Whenever the Court grants a petition for a writ of cer- tiorari, the Clerk will prepare, sign, and enter an order to that effect and will notify forthwith counsel of record and 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1178 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT the court whose judgment is to be reviewed. The case then will be scheduled for briefing and oral argument. If the rec- ord has not previously been filed in this Court, the Clerk will request the clerk of the court having possession of the record to certify and transmit it. A formal writ will not issue un- less specially directed. 3. Whenever the Court denies a petition for a writ of cer- tiorari, the Clerk will prepare, sign, and enter an order to that effect and will notify forthwith counsel of record and the court whose judgment was sought to be reviewed. The order of denial will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for rehearing except by order of the Court or a Justice. PART IV. OTHER JURISDICTION Rule 17. Procedure in an Original Action 1. This Rule applies only to an action invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution of the United States. See also 28 U. S. C. § 1251 and U. S. Const., Amdt. 11. A petition for an extraordinary writ in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction shall be filed as pro- vided in Rule 20. 2. The form of pleadings and motions prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is followed. In other re- spects, those Rules and the Federal Rules of Evidence may be taken as guides. 3. The initial pleading shall be preceded by a motion for leave to file, and may be accompanied by a brief in support of the motion. Forty copies of each document shall be filed, with proof of service. Service shall be as required by Rule 29, except that when an adverse party is a State, service shall be made on both the Governor and the Attorney Gen- eral of that State. 4. The case will be placed on the docket when the motion for leave to file and the initial pleading are filed with the Clerk. The Rule 38(a) docket fee shall be paid at that time. 5. No more than 60 days after receiving the motion for leave to file and the initial pleading, an adverse party shall 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1179 file 40 copies of any brief in opposition to the motion, with proof of service as required by Rule 29. The Clerk will dis- tribute the filed documents to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief is filed, upon the expi- ration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the filed documents to the Court for its consideration no less than 10 days after the brief in opposition is filed. A reply brief may be filed, but consideration of the case will not be deferred pending its receipt. The Court thereafter may grant or deny the motion, set it for oral argument, direct that additional documents be filed, or require that other proceedings be conducted. 6. A summons issued out of this Court shall be served on the defendant 60 days before the return day specified therein. If the defendant does not respond by the return day, the plaintiff may proceed ex parte. 7. Process against a State issued out of this Court shall be served on both the Governor and the Attorney General of that State. Rule 18. Appeal from a United States District Court 1. When a direct appeal from a decision of a United States district court is authorized by law, the appeal is commenced by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within the time provided by law after entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. The time to file may not be ex- tended. The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking the appeal, designate the judgment, or part thereof, ap- pealed from and the date of its entry, and specify the statute or statutes under which the appeal is taken. A copy of the notice of appeal shall be served on all parties to the proceed- ing as required by Rule 29, and proof of service shall be filed in the district court together with the notice of appeal. 2. All parties to the proceeding in the district court are deemed parties entitled to file documents in this Court, but a party having no interest in the outcome of the appeal may 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1180 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT so notify the Clerk of this Court and shall serve a copy of the notice on all other parties. Parties interested jointly, severally, or otherwise in the judgment may appeal sepa- rately, or any two or more may join in an appeal. When two or more judgments involving identical or closely related questions are sought to be reviewed on appeal from the same court, a notice of appeal for each judgment shall be filed with the clerk of the district court, but a single jurisdictional statement covering all the judgments suffices. Parties who file no document will not qualify for any relief from this Court. 3. No more than 60 days after filing the notice of appeal in the district court, the appellant shall file 40 copies of a jurisdictional statement and shall pay the Rule 38 docket fee, except that an appellant proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2, together with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a copy of which shall precede and be attached to each copy of the jurisdictional statement. The jurisdictional statement shall follow, insofar as applicable, the form for a petition for a writ of certiorari prescribed by Rule 14, and shall be served as required by Rule 29. The case will then be placed on the docket. It is the appellant's duty to notify all appellees promptly, on a form supplied by the Clerk, of the date of filing, the date the case was placed on the docket, and the docket number of the case. The no- tice shall be served as required by Rule 29. The appendix shall include a copy of the notice of appeal showing the date it was filed in the district court. For good cause, a Justice may extend the time to file a jurisdictional statement for a period not exceeding 60 days. An application to extend the time to file a jurisdictional statement shall set out the basis for jurisdiction in this Court; identify the judgment sought to be reviewed; include a copy of the opinion, any order re- specting rehearing, and the notice of appeal; and set out spe- cific reasons why an extension of time is justified. For the time and manner of presenting the application, see Rules 21, 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1181 22, and 30. An application to extend the time to file a juris- dictional statement is not favored. 4. No more than 30 days after a case has been placed on the docket, an appellee seeking to file a conditional cross- appeal (i. e., a cross-appeal that otherwise would be un- timely) shall file, with proof of service as required by Rule 29, a jurisdictional statement that complies in all respects (including number of copies filed) with paragraph 3 of this Rule, except that material already reproduced in the appen- dix to the opening jurisdictional statement need not be re- produced again. A cross-appealing appellee shall pay the Rule 38 docket fee or submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The cover of the cross-appeal shall indi- cate clearly that it is a conditional cross-appeal. The cross- appeal then will be placed on the docket. It is the cross- appellant's duty to notify all cross-appellees promptly, on a form supplied by the Clerk, of the date of filing, the date the cross-appeal was placed on the docket, and the docket num- ber of the cross-appeal. The notice shall be served as re- quired by Rule 29. A cross-appeal may not be joined with any other pleading, except that any motion for leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis shall be attached. The time to file a cross-appeal will not be extended. 5. After a notice of appeal has been filed in the district court, but before the case is placed on this Court's docket, the parties may dismiss the appeal by stipulation filed in the district court, or the district court may dismiss the appeal on the appellant's motion, with notice to all parties. If a notice of appeal has been filed, but the case has not been placed on this Court's docket within the time prescribed for docketing, the district court may dismiss the appeal on the appellee's motion, with notice to all parties, and may make any just order with respect to costs. If the district court has denied the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal, the appellee may move this Court to docket and dismiss the ap- peal by filing an original and 10 copies of a motion presented in conformity with Rules 21 and 33.2. The motion shall be accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29, and 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1182 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT by a certificate from the clerk of the district court, certifying that a notice of appeal was filed and that the appellee's mo- tion to dismiss was denied. The appellant may not thereaf- ter file a jurisdictional statement without special leave of the Court, and the Court may allow costs against the appellant. 6. Within 30 days after the case is placed on this Court's docket, the appellee may file a motion to dismiss, to affirm, or in the alternative to affirm or dismiss. Forty copies of the motion shall be filed, except that an appellee proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a peti- tion by such a person under Rule 12.2, together with a mo- tion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a copy of which shall precede and be attached to each copy of the motion to dismiss, to affirm, or in the alternative to affirm or dismiss. The motion shall follow, insofar as applicable, the form for a brief in opposition prescribed by Rule 15, and shall comply in all respects with Rule 21. 7. The Clerk will distribute the jurisdictional statement to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a motion to dismiss or to affirm or, if no waiver or motion is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a motion to dismiss or to affirm is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the jurisdictional statement, motion, and any brief opposing the motion to the Court for its consideration no less than 10 days after the motion is filed. 8. Any appellant may file a brief opposing a motion to dis- miss or to affirm, but distribution and consideration by the Court under paragraph 7 of this Rule will not be deferred pending its receipt. Forty copies shall be filed, except that an appellant proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2. The brief shall be served as required by Rule 29. 9. If a cross-appeal has been docketed, distribution of both jurisdictional statements will be deferred until the cross- appeal is due for distribution under this Rule. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1183 10. Any party may file a supplemental brief at any time while a jurisdictional statement is pending, calling attention to new cases, new legislation, or other intervening matter not available at the time of the party's last filing. A supple- mental brief shall be restricted to new matter and shall fol- low, insofar as applicable, the form for a brief in opposition prescribed by Rule 15. Forty copies shall be filed, except that a party proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2. The supplemental brief shall be served as required by Rule 29. 11. The clerk of the district court shall retain possession of the record until notified by the Clerk of this Court to cer- tify and transmit it. See Rule 12.7. 12. After considering the documents distributed under this Rule, the Court may dispose summarily of the appeal on the merits, note probable jurisdiction, or postpone consider- ation of jurisdiction until a hearing of the case on the merits. If not disposed of summarily, the case stands for briefing and oral argument on the merits. If consideration of jurisdiction is postponed, counsel, at the outset of their briefs and at oral argument, shall address the question of jurisdiction. If the record has not previously been filed in this Court, the Clerk of this Court will request the clerk of the court in possession of the record to certify and transmit it. 13. If the Clerk determines that a jurisdictional statement submitted timely and in good faith is in a form that does not comply with this Rule or with Rule 33 or Rule 34, the Clerk will return it with a letter indicating the deficiency. If a corrected jurisdictional statement is received no more than 60 days after the date of the Clerk's letter, its filing will be deemed timely. Rule 19. Procedure on a Certified Question 1. A United States court of appeals may certify to this Court a question or proposition of law on which it seeks in- struction for the proper decision of a case. The certificate 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1184 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT shall contain a statement of the nature of the case and the facts on which the question or proposition of law arises. Only questions or propositions of law may be certified, and they shall be stated separately and with precision. The cer- tificate shall be prepared as required by Rule 33.2 and shall be signed by the clerk of the court of appeals. 2. When a question is certified by a United States court of appeals, this Court, on its own motion or that of a party, may consider and decide the entire matter in controversy. See 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). 3. When a question is certified, the Clerk will notify the parties and docket the case. Counsel shall then enter their appearances. After docketing, the Clerk will submit the certificate to the Court for a preliminary examination to de- termine whether the case should be briefed, set for argu- ment, or dismissed. No brief may be filed until the prelimi- nary examination of the certificate is completed. 4. If the Court orders the case briefed or set for argument, the parties will be notified and permitted to file briefs. The Clerk of this Court then will request the clerk of the court in possession of the record to certify and transmit it. Any portion of the record to which the parties wish to direct the Court's particular attention should be printed in a joint ap- pendix, prepared in conformity with Rule 26 by the appellant or petitioner in the court of appeals, but the fact that any part of the record has not been printed does not prevent the parties or the Court from relying on it. 5. A brief on the merits in a case involving a certified question shall comply with Rules 24, 25, and 33.1, except that the brief for the party who is the appellant or petitioner below shall be filed within 45 days of the order requiring briefs or setting the case for argument. Rule 20. Procedure on a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ 1. Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ author- ized by 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised. To justify the granting of 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1185 any such writ, the petition must show that the writ will be in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court's discretion- ary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. 2. A petition seeking a writ authorized by 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), § 2241, or § 2254(a) shall be prepared in all respects as required by Rules 33 and 34. The petition shall be cap- tioned "In re [name of petitioner]" and shall follow, insofar as applicable, the form of a petition for a writ of certiorari prescribed by Rule 14. All contentions in support of the petition shall be included in the petition. The case will be placed on the docket when 40 copies of the petition are filed with the Clerk and the docket fee is paid, except that a peti- tioner proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, includ- ing an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2, together with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris, a copy of which shall precede and be attached to each copy of the petition. The petition shall be served as re- quired by Rule 29 (subject to subparagraph 4(b) of this Rule). 3. (a) A petition seeking a writ of prohibition, a writ of mandamus, or both in the alternative shall state the name and office or function of every person against whom relief is sought and shall set out with particularity why the relief sought is not available in any other court. A copy of the judgment with respect to which the writ is sought, including any related opinion, shall be appended to the petition to- gether with any other document essential to understanding the petition. (b) The petition shall be served on every party to the pro- ceeding with respect to which relief is sought. Within 30 days after the petition is placed on the docket, a party shall file 40 copies of any brief or briefs in opposition thereto, which shall comply fully with Rule 15. If a party named as a respondent does not wish to respond to the petition, that party may so advise the Clerk and all other parties by letter. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1186 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT All persons served are deemed respondents for all purposes in the proceedings in this Court. 4. (a) A petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus shall comply with the requirements of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2242, and in particular with the provision in the last paragraph of § 2242, which requires a statement of the "reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held." If the relief sought is from the judgment of a state court, the petition shall set out specifi- cally how and where the petitioner has exhausted available remedies in the state courts or otherwise comes within the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b). To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. This writ is rarely granted. (b) Habeas corpus proceedings, except in capital cases, are ex parte, unless the Court requires the respondent to show cause why the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. A response, if ordered, or in a capital case, shall comply fully with Rule 15. Neither the denial of the peti- tion, without more, nor an order of transfer to a district court under the authority of 28 U. S. C. § 2241(b), is an adjudication on the merits, and therefore does not preclude further appli- cation to another court for the relief sought. 5. The Clerk will distribute the documents to the Court for its consideration when a brief in opposition under subpar- agraph 3(b) of this Rule has been filed, when a response under subparagraph 4(b) has been ordered and filed, when the time to file has expired, or when the right to file has been expressly waived. 6. If the Court orders the case set for argument, the Clerk will notify the parties whether additional briefs are required, when they shall be filed, and, if the case involves a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, that the parties shall prepare a joint appendix in accordance with Rule 26. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1187 PART V. MOTIONS AND APPLICATIONS Rule 21. Motions to the Court 1. Every motion to the Court shall clearly state its pur- pose and the facts on which it is based and may present legal argument in support thereof. No separate brief may be filed. A motion should be concise and shall comply with any applicable page limits. Rule 22 governs an application ad- dressed to a single Justice. 2. (a) A motion in any action within the Court's original jurisdiction shall comply with Rule 17.3. (b) A motion to dismiss as moot (or a suggestion of moot- ness), a motion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae, and any motion the granting of which would dispose of the entire case or would affect the final judgment to be entered (other than a motion to docket and dismiss under Rule 18.5 or a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 46) shall be pre- pared as required by Rule 33.1, and 40 copies shall be filed, except that a movant proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file a motion prepared as required by Rule 33.2, and shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2. The motion shall be served as required by Rule 29. (c) Any other motion to the Court shall be prepared as required by Rule 33.2; the moving party shall file an original and 10 copies. The Court subsequently may order the mov- ing party to prepare the motion as required by Rule 33.1; in that event, the party shall file 40 copies. 3. A motion to the Court shall be filed with the Clerk and shall be accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29. No motion may be presented in open Court, other than a motion for admission to the Bar, except when the proceed- ing to which it refers is being argued. Oral argument on a motion will not be permitted unless the Court so directs. 4. Any response to a motion shall be filed as promptly as possible considering the nature of the relief sought and any 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1188 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT asserted need for emergency action, and, in any event, within 10 days of receipt, unless the Court or a Justice, or the Clerk under Rule 30.4, orders otherwise. A response to a motion prepared as required by Rule 33.1, except a re- sponse to a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief (see Rule 37.5), shall be prepared in the same manner if time permits. In an appropriate case, the Court may act on a motion without waiting for a response. Rule 22. Applications to Individual Justices 1. An application addressed to an individual Justice shall be filed with the Clerk, who will transmit it promptly to the Justice concerned if an individual Justice has authority to grant the sought relief. 2. The original and two copies of any application ad- dressed to an individual Justice shall be prepared as required by Rule 33.2, and shall be accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29. 3. An application shall be addressed to the Justice allotted to the Circuit from which the case arises. When the Circuit Justice is unavailable for any reason, the application ad- dressed to that Justice will be distributed to the Justice then available who is next junior to the Circuit Justice; the turn of the Chief Justice follows that of the most junior Justice. 4. A Justice denying an application will note the denial thereon. Thereafter, unless action thereon is restricted by law to the Circuit Justice or is untimely under Rule 30.2, the party making an application, except in the case of an application for an extension of time, may renew it to any other Justice, subject to the provisions of this Rule. Except when the denial is without prejudice, a renewed application is not favored. Renewed application is made by a letter to the Clerk, designating the Justice to whom the application is to be directed, and accompanied by 10 copies of the original application and proof of service as required by Rule 29. 5. A Justice to whom an application for a stay or for bail is submitted may refer it to the Court for determination. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1189 6. The Clerk will advise all parties concerned, by ap- propriately speedy means, of the disposition made of an application. Rule 23. Stays 1. A stay may be granted by a Justice as permitted by law. 2. A party to a judgment sought to be reviewed may pre- sent to a Justice an application to stay the enforcement of that judgment. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(f). 3. An application for a stay shall set out with particularity why the relief sought is not available from any other court or judge. Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, an application for a stay will not be entertained unless the relief requested was first sought in the appropriate court or courts below or from a judge or judges thereof. An applica- tion for a stay shall identify the judgment sought to be re- viewed and have appended thereto a copy of the order and opinion, if any, and a copy of the order, if any, of the court or judge below denying the relief sought, and shall set out specific reasons why a stay is justified. The form and con- tent of an application for a stay are governed by Rules 22 and 33.2. 4. A judge, court, or Justice granting an application for a stay pending review by this Court may condition the stay on the filing of a supersedeas bond having an approved surety or sureties. The bond will be conditioned on the satisfaction of the judgment in full, together with any costs, interest, and damages for delay that may be awarded. If a part of the judgment sought to be reviewed has already been satisfied, or is otherwise secured, the bond may be conditioned on the satisfaction of the part of the judgment not otherwise se- cured or satisfied, together with costs, interest, and damages. PART VI. BRIEFS ON THE MERITS AND ORAL ARGUMENT Rule 24. Briefs on the Merits: In General 1. A brief on the merits for a petitioner or an appellant shall comply in all respects with Rules 33.1 and 34 and shall contain in the order here indicated: 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1190 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (a) The questions presented for review under Rule 14.1(a). The questions shall be set out on the first page following the cover, and no other information may appear on that page. The phrasing of the questions presented need not be identi- cal with that in the petition for a writ of certiorari or the jurisdictional statement, but the brief may not raise addi- tional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented in those documents. At its option, how- ever, the Court may consider a plain error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and other- wise within its jurisdiction to decide. (b) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is under review (unless the caption of the case in this Court contains the names of all parties). Any amended list of parent companies and nonwholly owned sub- sidiaries as required by Rule 29.6 shall be placed here. (c) If the brief exceeds five pages, a table of contents and a table of cited authorities. (d) Citations of the official and unofficial reports of the opinions and orders entered in the case by courts and admin- istrative agencies. (e) A concise statement of the basis for jurisdiction in this Court, including the statutory provisions and time factors on which jurisdiction rests. (f) The constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordi- nances, and regulations involved in the case, set out verba- tim with appropriate citation. If the provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone suffices at this point, and their pertinent text, if not already set out in the petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or an appendix to either document, shall be set out in an appendix to the brief. (g) A concise statement of the case, setting out the facts material to the consideration of the questions presented, with appropriate references to the joint appendix, e. g., App. 12, or to the record, e. g., Record 12. (h) A summary of the argument, suitably paragraphed. The summary should be a clear and concise condensation of the argument made in the body of the brief; mere repetition 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1191 of the headings under which the argument is arranged is not sufficient. (i) The argument, exhibiting clearly the points of fact and of law presented and citing the authorities and statutes re- lied on. (j) A conclusion specifying with particularity the relief the party seeks. 2. A brief on the merits for a respondent or an appellee shall conform to the foregoing requirements, except that items required by subparagraphs 1(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of this Rule need not be included unless the respondent or appellee is dissatisfied with their presentation by the oppos- ing party. 3. A brief on the merits may not exceed the page limita- tions specified in Rule 33.1(g). An appendix to a brief may include only relevant material, and counsel are cautioned not to include in an appendix arguments or citations that prop- erly belong in the body of the brief. 4. A reply brief shall conform to those portions of this Rule applicable to the brief for a respondent or an appellee, but, if appropriately divided by topical headings, need not contain a summary of the argument. 5. A reference to the joint appendix or to the record set out in any brief shall indicate the appropriate page number. If the reference is to an exhibit, the page numbers at which the exhibit appears, at which it was offered in evidence, and at which it was ruled on by the judge shall be indicated, e. g., Pl. Exh. 14, Record 199, 2134. 6. A brief shall be concise, logically arranged with proper headings, and free of irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matter. The Court may disregard or strike a brief that does not comply with this paragraph. Rule 25. Briefs on the Merits: Number of Copies and Time to File 1. The petitioner or appellant shall file 40 copies of the brief on the merits within 45 days of the order granting the 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1192 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT writ of certiorari, noting probable jurisdiction, or postponing consideration of jurisdiction. 2. The respondent or appellee shall file 40 copies of the brief on the merits within 30 days after receiving the brief for the petitioner or appellant. 3. The petitioner or appellant shall file 40 copies of the reply brief, if any, within 30 days after receiving the brief for the respondent or appellee, but any reply brief must actu- ally be received by the Clerk not later than one week before the date of oral argument. 4. The time periods stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Rule may be extended as provided in Rule 30. An applica- tion to extend the time to file a brief on the merits is not favored. If a case is advanced for hearing, the time to file briefs on the merits may be abridged as circumstances re- quire pursuant to an order of the Court on its own motion or that of a party. 5. A party wishing to present late authorities, newly en- acted legislation, or other intervening matter that was not available in time to be included in a brief may file 40 copies of a supplemental brief, restricted to such new matter and otherwise presented in conformity with these Rules, up to the time the case is called for oral argument or by leave of the Court thereafter. 6. After a case has been argued or submitted, the Clerk will not file any brief, except that of a party filed by leave of the Court. 7. The Clerk will not file any brief that is not accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29. Rule 26. Joint Appendix 1. Unless the Clerk has allowed the parties to use the de- ferred method described in paragraph 4 of this Rule, the petitioner or appellant, within 45 days after entry of the order granting the writ of certiorari, noting probable juris- diction, or postponing consideration of jurisdiction, shall file 40 copies of a joint appendix, prepared as required by Rule 33.1. The joint appendix shall contain: (1) the relevant 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1193 docket entries in all the courts below; (2) any relevant plead- ings, jury instructions, findings, conclusions, or opinions; (3) the judgment, order, or decision under review; and (4) any other parts of the record that the parties particularly wish to bring to the Court's attention. Any of the foregoing items already reproduced in a petition for a writ of certiorari, ju- risdictional statement, brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari, motion to dismiss or affirm, or any appen- dix to the foregoing, that was prepared as required by Rule 33.1, need not be reproduced again in the joint appendix. The petitioner or appellant shall serve three copies of the joint appendix on each of the other parties to the proceeding as required by Rule 29. 2. The parties are encouraged to agree on the contents of the joint appendix. In the absence of agreement, the peti- tioner or appellant, within 10 days after entry of the order granting the writ of certiorari, noting probable jurisdiction, or postponing consideration of jurisdiction, shall serve on the respondent or appellee a designation of parts of the record to be included in the joint appendix. Within 10 days after receiving the designation, a respondent or appellee who con- siders the parts of the record so designated insufficient shall serve on the petitioner or appellant a designation of addi- tional parts to be included in the joint appendix, and the petitioner or appellant shall include the parts so designated. If the Court has permitted the respondent or appellee to proceed in forma pauperis, the petitioner or appellant may seek by motion to be excused from printing portions of the record the petitioner or appellant considers unnecessary. In making these designations, counsel should include only those materials the Court should examine; unnecessary designa- tions should be avoided. The record is on file with the Clerk and available to the Justices, and counsel may refer in briefs and in oral argument to relevant portions of the record not included in the joint appendix. 3. When the joint appendix is filed, the petitioner or appel- lant immediately shall file with the Clerk a statement of the cost of printing 50 copies and shall serve a copy of the state- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1194 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT ment on each of the other parties as required by Rule 29. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the cost of producing the joint appendix shall be paid initially by the petitioner or appellant; but a petitioner or appellant who considers that parts of the record designated by the respondent or appellee are unnecessary for the determination of the issues pre- sented may so advise the respondent or appellee, who then shall advance the cost of printing the additional parts, unless the Court or a Justice otherwise fixes the initial allocation of the costs. The cost of printing the joint appendix is taxed as a cost in the case, but if a party unnecessarily causes mat- ter to be included in the joint appendix or prints excessive copies, the Court may impose these costs on that party. 4. (a) On the parties' request, the Clerk may allow prepa- ration of the joint appendix to be deferred until after the briefs have been filed. In that event, the petitioner or ap- pellant shall file the joint appendix no more than 14 days after receiving the brief for the respondent or appellee. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Rule shall be followed, except that the designations referred to therein shall be made by each party when that party's brief is served. Deferral of the joint appendix is not favored. (b) If the deferred method is used, the briefs on the merits may refer to the pages of the record. In that event, the joint appendix shall include in brackets on each page thereof the page number of the record where that material may be found. A party wishing to refer directly to the pages of the joint appendix may serve and file copies of its brief prepared as required by Rule 33.2 within the time provided by Rule 25, with appropriate references to the pages of the record. In that event, within 10 days after the joint appendix is filed, copies of the brief prepared as required by Rule 33.1 contain- ing references to the pages of the joint appendix in place of, or in addition to, the initial references to the pages of the record, shall be served and filed. No other change may be made in the brief as initially served and filed, except that typographical errors may be corrected. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1195 5. The joint appendix shall be prefaced by a table of con- tents showing the parts of the record that it contains, in the order in which the parts are set out, with references to the pages of the joint appendix at which each part begins. The relevant docket entries shall be set out after the table of contents, followed by the other parts of the record in chrono- logical order. When testimony contained in the reporter's transcript of proceedings is set out in the joint appendix, the page of the transcript at which the testimony appears shall be indicated in brackets immediately before the statement that is set out. Omissions in the transcript or in any other document printed in the joint appendix shall be indicated by asterisks. Immaterial formal matters (e. g., captions, sub- scriptions, acknowledgments) shall be omitted. A question and its answer may be contained in a single paragraph. 6. Exhibits designated for inclusion in the joint appendix may be contained in a separate volume or volumes suitably indexed. The transcript of a proceeding before an adminis- trative agency, board, commission, or officer used in an action in a district court or court of appeals is regarded as an ex- hibit for the purposes of this paragraph. 7. The Court, on its own motion or that of a party, may dispense with the requirement of a joint appendix and may permit a case to be heard on the original record (with such copies of the record, or relevant parts thereof, as the Court may require) or on the appendix used in the court below, if it conforms to the requirements of this Rule. 8. For good cause, the time limits specified in this Rule may be shortened or extended by the Court or a Justice, or by the Clerk under Rule 30.4. Rule 27. Calendar 1. From time to time, the Clerk will prepare a calendar of cases ready for argument. A case ordinarily will not be called for argument less than two weeks after the brief on the merits for the respondent or appellee is due. 2. The Clerk will advise counsel when they are required to appear for oral argument and will publish a hearing list 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1196 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT in advance of each argument session for the convenience of counsel and the information of the public. 3. The Court, on its own motion or that of a party, may order that two or more cases involving the same or related questions be argued together as one case or on such other terms as the Court may prescribe. Rule 28. Oral Argument 1. Oral argument should emphasize and clarify the written arguments in the briefs on the merits. Counsel should as- sume that all Justices have read the briefs before oral argu- ment. Oral argument read from a prepared text is not favored. 2. The petitioner or appellant shall open and may conclude the argument. A cross-writ of certiorari or cross-appeal will be argued with the initial writ of certiorari or appeal as one case in the time allowed for that one case, and the Court will advise the parties who shall open and close. 3. Unless the Court directs otherwise, each side is allowed one-half hour for argument. Counsel is not required to use all the allotted time. Any request for additional time to argue shall be presented by motion under Rule 21 no more than 15 days after the petitioner's or appellant's brief on the merits is filed, and shall set out specifically and concisely why the case cannot be presented within the half-hour limitation. Additional time is rarely accorded. 4. Only one attorney will be heard for each side, except by leave of the Court on motion filed no more than 15 days after the respondent's or appellee's brief on the merits is filed. Any request for divided argument shall be presented by mo- tion under Rule 21 and shall set out specifically and concisely why more than one attorney should be allowed to argue. Divided argument is not favored. 5. Regardless of the number of counsel participating in oral argument, counsel making the opening argument shall present the case fairly and completely and not reserve points of substance for rebuttal. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1197 6. Oral argument will not be allowed on behalf of any party for whom a brief has not been filed. 7. By leave of the Court, and subject to paragraph 4 of this Rule, counsel for an amicus curiae whose brief has been filed as provided in Rule 37 may argue orally on the side of a party, with the consent of that party. In the absence of consent, counsel for an amicus curiae may seek leave of the Court to argue orally by a motion setting out specifically and concisely why oral argument would provide assistance to the Court not otherwise available. Such a motion will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances. PART VII. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 29. Filing and Service of Documents; Special Notifications; Corporate Listing 1. Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk. 2. A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing. Commercial postage meter labels alone are not acceptable. If submitted by an inmate confined in an institution, a document is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or be- fore the last day for filing and is accompanied by a notarized statement or declaration in compliance with 28 U. S. C. § 1746 setting out the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If the postmark is missing or not legible, the Clerk will require the person who mailed the document to submit a notarized statement or declaration in compliance with 28 U. S. C. § 1746 setting out the details of the mailing and stating that the mailing took place on a par- ticular date within the permitted time. A document also is timely filed if it is forwarded through a private delivery or 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:32 PGT * USRULES 1198 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT courier service and is actually received by the Clerk within the time permitted for filing. 3. Any document required by these Rules to be served may be served personally or by mail on each party to the proceeding at or before the time of filing. If the document has been prepared as required by Rule 33.1, three copies shall be served on each other party separately represented in the proceeding. If the document has been prepared as required by Rule 33.2, service of a single copy on each other separately represented party suffices. If personal service is made, it shall consist of delivery at the office of the counsel of record, either to counsel or to an employee therein. If service is by mail, it shall consist of depositing the document with the United States Postal Service, with no less than first- class postage prepaid, addressed to counsel of record at the proper post office address. When a party is not represented by counsel, service shall be made on the party, personally or by mail. 4. (a) If the United States or any federal department, of- fice, agency, officer, or employee is a party to be served, serv- ice shall be made on the Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N. W., Washington, DC 20530­0001. When an agency of the United States that is a party is authorized by law to appear before this Court on its own behalf, or when an officer or employee of the United States is a party, the agency, offi- cer, or employee shall be served in addition to the Solicitor General. (b) In any proceeding in this Court in which the constitu- tionality of an Act of Congress is drawn into question, and neither the United States nor any federal department, office, agency, officer, or employee is a party, the initial document filed in this Court shall recite that 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a) may apply and shall be served on the Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950 Penn- sylvania Ave., N. W., Washington, DC 20530­0001. In such a proceeding from any court of the United States, as de- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1199 fined by 28 U. S. C. § 451, the initial document also shall state whether that court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a), certified to the Attorney General the fact that the constitu- tionality of an Act of Congress was drawn into question. See Rule 14.1(e)(v). (c) In any proceeding in this Court in which the constitu- tionality of any statute of a State is drawn into question, and neither the State nor any agency, officer, or employee thereof is a party, the initial document filed in this Court shall recite that 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) may apply and shall be served on the Attorney General of that State. In such a proceeding from any court of the United States, as defined by 28 U. S. C. § 451, the initial document also shall state whether that court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b), certified to the State Attorney General the fact that the constitutionality of a statute of that State was drawn into question. See Rule 14.1(e)(v). 5. Proof of service, when required by these Rules, shall accompany the document when it is presented to the Clerk for filing and shall be separate from it. Proof of service shall contain, or be accompanied by, a statement that all par- ties required to be served have been served, together with a list of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of counsel indicating the name of the party or parties each counsel represents. It is not necessary that service on each party required to be served be made in the same manner or evidenced by the same proof. Proof of service may consist of any one of the following: (a) an acknowledgment of service, signed by counsel of record for the party served, and bearing the address and telephone number of such counsel; (b) a certificate of service, reciting the facts and circum- stances of service in compliance with the appropriate para- graph or paragraphs of this Rule, and signed by a member of the Bar of this Court representing the party on whose behalf service is made or by an attorney appointed to repre- sent that party under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, see 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1200 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(d)(6), or under any other applicable fed- eral statute; or (c) a notarized affidavit or declaration in compliance with 28 U. S. C. § 1746, reciting the facts and circumstances of service in accordance with the appropriate paragraph or paragraphs of this Rule, whenever service is made by any person not a member of the Bar of this Court and not an attorney appointed to represent a party under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, see 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(d)(6), or under any other applicable federal statute. 6. Every document, except a joint appendix or amicus cu- riae brief, filed by or on behalf of one or more corporations shall list all parent companies and nonwholly owned subsidi- aries of each of the corporate filers. If there is no parent or subsidiary company to be listed, a notation to this effect shall be included in the document. If a list has been included in a document filed earlier in the case, reference may be made to the earlier document (except when the earlier list ap- peared in an application for an extension of time or for a stay), and only amendments to the list to make it current need be included in the document being filed. Rule 30. Computation and Extension of Time 1. In the computation of any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, by order of the Court, or by an appli- cable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period begins to run is not included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless it is a Satur- day, Sunday, federal legal holiday listed in 5 U. S. C. § 6103, or day on which the Court building is closed by order of the Court or the Chief Justice, in which event the period shall extend until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, federal legal holiday, or day on which the Court building is closed. 2. Whenever a Justice or the Clerk is empowered by law or these Rules to extend the time to file any document, an application seeking an extension shall be filed within the pe- riod sought to be extended. An application to extend the 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1201 time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari or to file a juris- dictional statement must be received by the Clerk at least 10 days before the specified final filing date as computed under these Rules; if received less than 10 days before the final filing date, such application will not be granted except in the most extraordinary circumstances. 3. An application to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, to file a jurisdictional statement, to file a reply brief on the merits, or to file a petition for rehearing shall be made to an individual Justice and presented and served on all other parties as provided by Rule 22. Once denied, such an application may not be renewed. 4. An application to extend the time to file any document or paper other than those specified in paragraph 3 of this Rule may be presented in the form of a letter to the Clerk setting out specific reasons why an extension of time is justi- fied. The letter shall be served on all other parties as re- quired by Rule 29. The application may be acted on by the Clerk in the first instance, and any party aggrieved by the Clerk's action may request that the application be submitted to a Justice or to the Court. The Clerk will report action under this paragraph to the Court as instructed. Rule 31. Translations Whenever any record to be transmitted to this Court con- tains material written in a foreign language without a trans- lation made under the authority of the lower court, or ad- mitted to be correct, the clerk of the court transmitting the record shall advise the Clerk of this Court immediately so that this Court may order that a translation be supplied and, if necessary, printed as part of the joint appendix. Rule 32. Models, Diagrams, and Exhibits 1. Models, diagrams, and exhibits of material forming part of the evidence taken in a case and brought to this Court for its inspection shall be placed in the custody of the Clerk at least two weeks before the case is to be heard or submitted. 2. All models, diagrams, and exhibits of material placed in the custody of the Clerk shall be removed by the parties no 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1202 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT more than 40 days after the case is decided. If this is not done, the Clerk will notify counsel to remove the articles forthwith. If they are not removed within a reasonable time thereafter, the Clerk will destroy them or dispose of them in any other appropriate way. Rule 33. Document Preparation: Booklet Format; 81 2- by 11-Inch Paper Format 1. Booklet Format: (a) Except for a document expressly permitted by these Rules to be submitted on 81 2- by 11-inch paper, see, e. g., Rules 21, 22, and 39, every document filed with the Court shall be prepared using typesetting (e. g., wordprocessing, electronic publishing, or image setting) and reproduced by offset printing, photocopying, or similar proc- ess. The process used must produce a clear, black image on white paper. (b) The text of every document, including any appendix thereto, except a document permitted to be produced on 81 2- by 11-inch paper, shall be typeset in standard 11-point or larger type with 2-point or more leading between lines. The type size and face shall be no smaller than that con- tained in the United States Reports beginning with Volume 453. Type size and face shall be consistent throughout. No attempt should be made to reduce, compress, or condense the typeface in a manner that would increase the content of a document. Quotations in excess of three lines shall be indented. Footnotes shall appear in print as standard 9- point or larger type with 2-point or more leading between lines. The text of the document must appear on both sides of the page. (c) Every document, except one permitted to be produced on 81 2- by 11-inch paper, shall be produced on paper that is opaque, unglazed, 61 8 by 91 4 inches in size, and not less than 60 pounds in weight, and shall have margins of at least three- fourths of an inch on all sides. The text field, including foot- notes, should be approximately 41 8 by 71 8 inches. The docu- ment shall be bound firmly in at least two places along the 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1203 left margin (saddle stitch or perfect binding preferred) so as to permit easy opening, and no part of the text should be obscured by the binding. Spiral, plastic, metal, and string bindings may not be used. Copies of patent documents, ex- cept opinions, may be duplicated in such size as is necessary in a separate appendix. (d) Every document, except one permitted to be produced on 81 2- by 11-inch paper, shall comply with the page limits shown on the chart in subparagraph 1(g) of this Rule. The page limits do not include the pages containing the questions presented, the list of parties and corporate affiliates of the filing party, the table of contents, the table of cited authori- ties, or any appendix. Verbatim quotations required under Rule 14.1(f), if set out in the text of a brief rather than in the appendix, are also excluded. For good cause, the Court or a Justice may grant leave to file a document in excess of the page limits, but application for such leave is not favored. An application to exceed page limits shall comply with Rule 22 and must be received by the Clerk at least 15 days before the filing date of the document in question, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. (e) Every document, except one permitted to be produced on 81 2- by 11-inch paper, shall have a suitable cover consisting of 65-pound weight paper in the color indicated on the chart in subparagraph 1(g) of this Rule. If a separate appendix to any document is filed, the color of its cover shall be the same as that of the cover of the document it supports. The Clerk will furnish a color chart upon request. Counsel shall ensure that there is adequate contrast between the printing and the color of the cover. A document filed by the United States, or by any other federal party represented by the So- licitor General, shall have a gray cover. A joint appendix, answer to a bill of complaint, motion for leave to intervene, and any other document not listed in subparagraph 1(g) of this Rule shall have a tan cover. (f) Forty copies of a document prepared under this para- graph shall be filed. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1204 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (g) Page limits and cover colors for booklet-format docu- ments are as follows: Page Color of Type of Document Limits Cover (i) Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Rule 14); Mo- tion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint and Brief in Support (Rule 17.3); Jurisdictional Statement (Rule 18.3); Petition for an Extraor- dinary Writ (Rule 20.2) 30 white (ii) Brief in Opposition (Rule 15.3); Brief in Oppo- sition to Motion for Leave to File an Original Action (Rule 17.5); Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (Rule 18.6); Brief in Opposition to Mandamus or Prohibition (Rule 20.3(b)); Response to a Petition for Habeas Corpus (Rule 20.4) 30 orange (iii) Reply to Brief in Opposition (Rules 15.6 and 17.5); Brief Opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (Rule 18.8) 10 tan (iv) Supplemental Brief (Rules 15.8, 17, 18.10, and 25.5) 10 tan (v) Brief on the Merits for Petitioner or Appellant (Rule 24); Exceptions by Plaintiff to Report of Special Master (Rule 17) 50 light blue (vi) Brief on the Merits for Respondent or Appel- lee (Rule 24.2); Brief on the Merits for Re- spondent or Appellee Supporting Petitioner or Appellant (Rule 12.6); Exceptions by Party Other Than Plaintiff to Report of Special Mas- ter (Rule 17) 50 light red (vii) Reply Brief on the Merits (Rule 24.4) 20 yellow (viii) Reply to Plaintiff's Exceptions to Report of Special Master (Rule 17) 50 orange (ix) Reply to Exceptions by Party Other Than Plaintiff to Report of Special Master (Rule 17) 50 yellow (x) Brief for an Amicus Curiae at the Petition Stage (Rule 37.2) 20 cream (xi) Brief for an Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiff, Petitioner, or Appellant, or in Sup- port of Neither Party, on the Merits or in an Original Action at the Exceptions Stage light (Rule 37.3) 30 green (xii) Brief for an Amicus Curiae in Support of the Defendant, Respondent, or Appellee, on the Merits or in an Original Action at the Excep- dark tions Stage (Rule 37.3) 30 green (xiii) Petition for Rehearing (Rule 44) 10 tan 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1205 2. 81 2- by 11-Inch Paper Format: (a) The text of every document, including any appendix thereto, expressly permit- ted by these Rules to be presented to the Court on 81 2- by 11-inch paper shall appear double spaced, except for indented quotations, which shall be single spaced, on opaque, un- glazed, white paper. The document shall be stapled or bound at the upper left-hand corner. Copies, if required, shall be produced on the same type of paper and shall be legible. The original of any such document (except a motion to dismiss or affirm under Rule 18.6) shall be signed by the party proceeding pro se or by counsel of record who must be a member of the Bar of this Court or an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, see 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(d)(6), or under any other applicable federal statute. Subparagraph 1(g) of this Rule does not apply to documents prepared under this paragraph. (b) Page limits for documents presented on 81 2- by 11-inch paper are: 40 pages for a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, petition for an extraordinary writ, brief in opposition, or motion to dismiss or affirm; and 15 pages for a reply to a brief in opposition, brief opposing a motion to dismiss or affirm, supplemental brief, or petition for rehearing. The page exclusions specified in subpara- graph 1(d) of this Rule apply. Rule 34. Document Preparation: General Requirements Every document, whether prepared under Rule 33.1 or Rule 33.2, shall comply with the following provisions: 1. Each document shall bear on its cover, in the order indi- cated, from the top of the page: (a) the docket number of the case or, if there is none, a space for one; (b) the name of this Court; (c) the October Term in which the document is filed (see Rule 3); (d) the caption of the case as appropriate in this Court; (e) the nature of the proceeding and the name of the court from which the action is brought (e. g., "On Petition for Writ 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1206 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"; or, for a merits brief, "On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"); (f) the title of the document (e. g., "Petition for Writ of Certiorari," "Brief for Respondent," "Joint Appendix"); (g) the name of the attorney who is counsel of record for the party concerned (who must be a member of the Bar of this Court except as provided in Rule 33.2), and on whom service is to be made, with a notation directly thereunder identifying the attorney as counsel of record and setting out counsel's office address and telephone number. Only one counsel of record may be noted on a single document. The names of other members of the Bar of this Court or of the bar of the highest court of a State acting as counsel, and, if desired, their addresses, may be added, but counsel of record shall be clearly identified. Names of persons other than at- torneys admitted to a state bar may not be listed, unless the party is appearing pro se, in which case the party's name, address, and telephone number shall appear. The foregoing shall be displayed in an appropriate typographic manner and, except for the identification of counsel, may not be set in type smaller than standard 11-point, if the document is pre- pared as required by Rule 33.1. 2. Every document exceeding five pages (other than a joint appendix), whether prepared under Rule 33.1 or Rule 33.2, shall contain a table of contents and a table of cited authori- ties (i. e., cases alphabetically arranged, constitutional provi- sions, statutes, treatises, and other materials) with refer- ences to the pages in the document where such authorities are cited. 3. The body of every document shall bear at its close the name of counsel of record and such other counsel, identified on the cover of the document in conformity with subpara- graph 1(g) of this Rule, as may be desired. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1207 Rule 35. Death, Substitution, and Revivor; Public Officers 1. If a party dies after filing a petition for a writ of cer- tiorari to this Court, or after filing a notice of appeal, the authorized representative of the deceased party may appear and, on motion, be substituted as a party. If the representa- tive does not voluntarily become a party, any other party may suggest the death on the record and, on motion, seek an order requiring the representative to become a party within a designated time. If the representative then fails to be- come a party, the party so moving, if a respondent or appel- lee, is entitled to have the petition for a writ of certiorari or the appeal dismissed, and if a petitioner or appellant, is enti- tled to proceed as in any other case of nonappearance by a respondent or appellee. If the substitution of a representa- tive of the deceased is not made within six months after the death of the party, the case shall abate. 2. Whenever a case cannot be revived in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed, because the deceased party's authorized representative is not subject to that court's jurisdiction, proceedings will be conducted as this Court may direct. 3. When a public officer who is a party to a proceeding in this Court in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and any suc- cessor in office is automatically substituted as a party. The parties shall notify the Clerk in writing of any such succes- sions. Proceedings following the substitution shall be in the name of the substituted party, but any misnomer not affect- ing substantial rights of the parties will be disregarded. 4. A public officer who is a party to a proceeding in this Court in an official capacity may be described as a party by the officer's official title rather than by name, but the Court may require the name to be added. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1208 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule 36. Custody of Prisoners in Habeas Corpus Proceedings 1. Pending review in this Court of a decision in a habeas corpus proceeding commenced before a court, Justice, or judge of the United States, the person having custody of the prisoner may not transfer custody to another person unless the transfer is authorized under this Rule. 2. Upon application by a custodian, the court, Justice, or judge who entered the decision under review may authorize transfer and the substitution of a successor custodian as a party. 3. (a) Pending review of a decision failing or refusing to release a prisoner, the prisoner may be detained in the cus- tody from which release is sought or in other appropriate custody or may be enlarged on personal recognizance or bail, as may appear appropriate to the court, Justice, or judge who entered the decision, or to the court of appeals, this Court, or a judge or Justice of either court. (b) Pending review of a decision ordering release, the pris- oner shall be enlarged on personal recognizance or bail, un- less the court, Justice, or judge who entered the decision, or the court of appeals, this Court, or a judge or Justice of either court, orders otherwise. 4. An initial order respecting the custody or enlargement of the prisoner, and any recognizance or surety taken, shall continue in effect pending review in the court of appeals and in this Court unless for reasons shown to the court of ap- peals, this Court, or a judge or Justice of either court, the order is modified or an independent order respecting custody, enlargement, or surety is entered. Rule 37. Brief for an Amicus Curiae 1. An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its atten- tion by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose bur- dens the Court, and its filing is not favored. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1209 2. (a) An amicus curiae brief submitted before the Court's consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari, motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, may be filed if accompanied by the written consent of all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file under subparagraph 2(b) of this Rule. The brief shall be submitted within the time allowed for filing a brief in opposition or for filing a motion to dismiss or affirm. The amicus curiae brief shall specify whether consent was granted, and its cover shall identify the party supported. (b) When a party to the case has withheld consent, a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief before the Court's consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari, motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ may be pre- sented to the Court. The motion, prepared as required by Rule 33.1 and as one document with the brief sought to be filed, shall be submitted within the time allowed for filing an amicus curiae brief, and shall indicate the party or parties who have withheld consent and state the nature of the mov- ant's interest. Such a motion is not favored. 3. (a) An amicus curiae brief in a case before the Court for oral argument may be filed if accompanied by the written consent of all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file under subparagraph 3(b) of this Rule. The brief shall be submitted within the time allowed for filing the brief for the party supported, or if in support of neither party, within the time allowed for filing the petitioner's or appellant's brief. The amicus curiae brief shall specify whether consent was granted, and its cover shall identify the party supported or indicate whether it suggests affirmance or reversal. The Clerk will not file a reply brief for an amicus curiae, or a brief for an amicus curiae in support of, or in opposition to, a petition for rehearing. (b) When a party to a case before the Court for oral argu- ment has withheld consent, a motion for leave to file an ami- cus curiae brief may be presented to the Court. The mo- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1210 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT tion, prepared as required by Rule 33.1 and as one document with the brief sought to be filed, shall be submitted within the time allowed for filing an amicus curiae brief, and shall indicate the party or parties who have withheld consent and state the nature of the movant's interest. 4. No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of any agency of the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court when submitted by the agency's authorized legal representa- tive; on behalf of a State, Commonwealth, Territory, or Pos- session when submitted by its Attorney General; or on behalf of a city, county, town, or similar entity when submitted by its authorized law officer. 5. A brief or motion filed under this Rule shall be accom- panied by proof of service as required by Rule 29, and shall comply with the applicable provisions of Rules 21, 24, and 33.1 (except that it suffices to set out in the brief the interest of the amicus curiae, the summary of the argument, the ar- gument, and the conclusion). A motion for leave to file may not exceed five pages. A party served with the motion may file an objection thereto, stating concisely the reasons for withholding consent; the objection shall be prepared as re- quired by Rule 33.2. 6. Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae listed in Rule 37.4, a brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and shall identify every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief. The disclosure shall be made in the first footnote on the first page of text. Rule 38. Fees Under 28 U. S. C. § 1911, the fees charged by the Clerk are: (a) for docketing a case on a petition for a writ of certio- rari or on appeal or for docketing any other proceeding, ex- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1211 cept a certified question or a motion to docket and dismiss an appeal under Rule 18.5, $300; (b) for filing a petition for rehearing or a motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing, $200; (c) for reproducing and certifying any record or paper, $1 per page; and for comparing with the original thereof any photographic reproduction of any record or paper, when fur- nished by the person requesting its certification, $.50 per page; (d) for a certificate bearing the seal of the Court, $10; and (e) for a check paid to the Court, Clerk, or Marshal that is returned for lack of funds, $35. Rule 39. Proceedings In Forma Pauperis 1. A party seeking to proceed in forma pauperis shall file a motion for leave to do so, together with the party's nota- rized affidavit or declaration (in compliance with 28 U. S. C. § 1746) in the form prescribed by the Federal Rules of Appel- late Procedure, Form 4. The motion shall state whether leave to proceed in forma pauperis was sought in any other court and, if so, whether leave was granted. If the United States district court or the United States court of appeals has appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A, or under any other applicable federal statute, no affidavit or declaration is required, but the motion shall cite the statute under which counsel was appointed. 2. If leave to proceed in forma pauperis is sought for the purpose of filing a document, the motion, and an affidavit or declaration if required, shall be filed together with that document and shall comply in every respect with Rule 21. As provided in that Rule, it suffices to file an original and 10 copies, unless the party is an inmate confined in an institu- tion and is not represented by counsel, in which case the original, alone, suffices. A copy of the motion shall precede and be attached to each copy of the accompanying document. 3. Except when these Rules expressly provide that a docu- ment shall be prepared as required by Rule 33.1, every docu- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1212 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT ment presented by a party proceeding under this Rule shall be prepared as required by Rule 33.2 (unless such prepa- ration is impossible). Every document shall be legible. While making due allowance for any case presented under this Rule by a person appearing pro se, the Clerk will not file any document if it does not comply with the substance of these Rules or is jurisdictionally out of time. 4. When the documents required by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Rule are presented to the Clerk, accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29, they will be placed on the docket without the payment of a docket fee or any other fee.5. The respondent or appellee in a case filed in forma pau- peris shall respond in the same manner and within the same time as in any other case of the same nature, except that the filing of an original and 10 copies of a response prepared as required by Rule 33.2, with proof of service as required by Rule 29, suffices. The respondent or appellee may challenge the grounds for the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate document or in the response itself. 6. Whenever the Court appoints counsel for an indigent party in a case set for oral argument, the briefs on the merits submitted by that counsel, unless otherwise requested, shall be prepared under the Clerk's supervision. The Clerk also will reimburse appointed counsel for any necessary travel expenses to Washington, D. C., and return in connection with the argument. 7. In a case in which certiorari has been granted, probable jurisdiction noted, or consideration of jurisdiction postponed, this Court may appoint counsel to represent a party finan- cially unable to afford an attorney to the extent authorized by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A, or by any other applicable federal statute. 8. If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, juris- dictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1213 Rule 40. Veterans, Seamen, and Military Cases 1. A veteran suing to establish reemployment rights under any provision of law exempting veterans from the pay- ment of fees or court costs, may file a motion for leave to proceed on papers prepared as required by Rule 33.2. The motion shall ask leave to proceed as a veteran and be accom- panied by an affidavit or declaration setting out the moving party's veteran status. A copy of the motion shall precede and be attached to each copy of the petition for a writ of certiorari or other substantive document filed by the veteran. 2. A seaman suing under 28 U. S. C. § 1916 may proceed without prepayment of fees or costs or furnishing security therefor, but is not entitled to proceed under Rule 33.2, ex- cept as authorized by the Court on separate motion under Rule 39. 3. An accused person petitioning for a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces under 28 U. S. C. § 1259 may proceed with- out prepayment of fees or costs or furnishing security there- for and without filing an affidavit of indigency, but is not entitled to proceed on papers prepared as required by Rule 33.2, except as authorized by the Court on separate motion under Rule 39. PART VIII. DISPOSITION OF CASES Rule 41. Opinions of the Court Opinions of the Court will be released by the Clerk imme- diately upon their announcement from the bench, or as the Court otherwise directs. Thereafter, the Clerk will cause the opinions to be issued in slip form, and the Reporter of Decisions will prepare them for publication in the prelimi- nary prints and bound volumes of the United States Reports. Rule 42. Interest and Damages 1. If a judgment for money in a civil case is affirmed, any interest allowed by law is payable from the date the judg- 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1214 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT ment under review was entered. If a judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered below, the mandate will contain instructions with respect to the allowance of interest. Interest in cases aris- ing in a state court is allowed at the same rate that similar judgments bear interest in the courts of the State in which judgment is directed to be entered. Interest in cases aris- ing in a court of the United States is allowed at the interest rate authorized by law. 2. When a petition for a writ of certiorari, an appeal, or an application for other relief is frivolous, the Court may award the respondent or appellee just damages, and single or double costs under Rule 43. Damages or costs may be awarded against the petitioner, appellant, or applicant, against the party's counsel, or against both party and counsel. Rule 43. Costs 1. If the Court affirms a judgment, the petitioner or appel- lant shall pay costs unless the Court otherwise orders. 2. If the Court reverses or vacates a judgment, the re- spondent or appellee shall pay costs unless the Court other- wise orders. 3. The Clerk's fees and the cost of printing the joint ap- pendix are the only taxable items in this Court. The cost of the transcript of the record from the court below is also a taxable item, but shall be taxable in that court as costs in the case. The expenses of printing briefs, motions, petitions, or jurisdictional statements are not taxable. 4. In a case involving a certified question, costs are equally divided unless the Court otherwise orders, except that if the Court decides the whole matter in controversy, as permitted by Rule 19.2, costs are allowed as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Rule. 5. To the extent permitted by 28 U. S. C. § 2412, costs under this Rule are allowed for or against the United States or an officer or agent thereof, unless expressly waived or unless the Court otherwise orders. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1215 6. When costs are allowed in this Court, the Clerk will insert an itemization of the costs in the body of the mandate or judgment sent to the court below. The prevailing side may not submit a bill of costs. 7. In extraordinary circumstances the Court may adjudge double costs. Rule 44. Rehearing 1. Any petition for the rehearing of any judgment or deci- sion of the Court on the merits shall be filed within 25 days after entry of the judgment or decision, unless the Court or a Justice shortens or extends the time. The petitioner shall file 40 copies of the rehearing petition and shall pay the filing fee prescribed by Rule 38(b), except that a petitioner pro- ceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an in- mate of an institution, shall file the number of copies re- quired for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2. The petition shall state its grounds briefly and distinctly and shall be served as required by Rule 29. The petition shall be presented together with certification of counsel (or of a party unrepresented by counsel) that it is presented in good faith and not for delay; one copy of the certificate shall bear the signature of counsel (or of a party unrepresented by counsel). A copy of the certificate shall follow and be attached to each copy of the petition. A petition for rehear- ing is not subject to oral argument and will not be granted except by a majority of the Court, at the instance of a Justice who concurred in the judgment or decision. 2. Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial and shall comply with all the form and filing requirements of paragraph 1 of this Rule, including the payment of the filing fee if required, but its grounds shall be limited to intervening circumstances of a substantial or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not previously presented. The petition shall be presented together with certification of counsel (or of a party unrepresented by counsel) that it is 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1216 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT restricted to the grounds specified in this paragraph and that it is presented in good faith and not for delay; one copy of the certificate shall bear the signature of counsel (or of a party unrepresented by counsel). A copy of the certificate shall follow and be attached to each copy of the petition. The Clerk will not file a petition without a certificate. The petition is not subject to oral argument. 3. The Clerk will not file any response to a petition for rehearing unless the Court requests a response. In the ab- sence of extraordinary circumstances, the Court will not grant a petition for rehearing without first requesting a response. 4. The Clerk will not file consecutive petitions and peti- tions that are out of time under this Rule. 5. The Clerk will not file any brief for an amicus curiae in support of, or in opposition to, a petition for rehearing. Rule 45. Process; Mandates 1. All process of this Court issues in the name of the Presi- dent of the United States. 2. In a case on review from a state court, the mandate issues 25 days after entry of the judgment, unless the Court or a Justice shortens or extends the time, or unless the par- ties stipulate that it issue sooner. The filing of a petition for rehearing stays the mandate until disposition of the petition, unless the Court orders otherwise. If the petition is denied, the mandate issues forthwith. 3. In a case on review from any court of the United States, as defined by 28 U. S. C. § 451, a formal mandate does not issue unless specially directed; instead, the Clerk of this Court will send the clerk of the lower court a copy of the opinion or order of this Court and a certified copy of the judgment. The certified copy of the judgment, prepared and signed by this Court's Clerk, will provide for costs if any are awarded. In all other respects, the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Rule apply. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1217 Rule 46. Dismissing Cases 1. At any stage of the proceedings, whenever all parties file with the Clerk an agreement in writing that a case be dismissed, specifying the terms for payment of costs, and pay to the Clerk any fees then due, the Clerk, without further reference to the Court, will enter an order of dismissal. 2. (a) A petitioner or appellant may file a motion to dis- miss the case, with proof of service as required by Rule 29, tendering to the Clerk any fees due and costs payable. No more than 15 days after service thereof, an adverse party may file an objection, limited to the amount of damages and costs in this Court alleged to be payable or to showing that the moving party does not represent all petitioners or appel- lants. The Clerk will not file any objection not so limited. (b) When the objection asserts that the moving party does not represent all the petitioners or appellants, the party moving for dismissal may file a reply within 10 days, after which time the matter will be submitted to the Court for its determination. (c) If no objection is filed-or if upon objection going only to the amount of damages and costs in this Court, the party moving for dismissal tenders the additional damages and costs in full within 10 days of the demand therefor-the Clerk, without further reference to the Court, will enter an order of dismissal. If, after objection as to the amount of damages and costs in this Court, the moving party does not respond by a tender within 10 days, the Clerk will report the matter to the Court for its determination. 3. No mandate or other process will issue on a dismissal under this Rule without an order of the Court. PART IX. DEFINITIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE Rule 47. Reference to "State Court" and "State Law" The term "state court," when used in these Rules, includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See 28 U. S. C. 519US2rule 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1218 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT §§ 1257 and 1258. References in these Rules to the common law and statutes of a State include the common law and stat- utes of the District of Columbia and of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Rule 48. Effective Date of Rules 1. These Rules, adopted January 16, 1997, will be effective May 1, 1997. 2. The Rules govern all proceedings after their effective date except to the extent that, in the opinion of the Court, their application to a pending matter would not be feasible or would work an injustice, in which event the former proce- dure applies. 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1219 INDEX TO RULES Rule ABATEMENT-See Death ADMISSION TO BAR Application forms.......................................................... 5.2 Certificate of admission ............................................... 5.3, 5.6 Criminal Justice Act of 1964....................................... 9.1 Documents required ..................................................... 5.2 Duplicate certificate...................................................... 5.6 Fees.................................................................................. 5.5, 5.6 Oath or affirmation, form of........................................ 5.4 Open Court, admission in ............................................ 5.3 Qualifications.................................................................. 5.1 AFFIDAVIT In forma pauperis proceedings ................................. 39.1 Service by nonmember of Bar.................................... 29.5(c) AMICUS CURIAE Argument........................................................................ 28.7 Briefs at petition stage -Consent of parties to file ................................. 37.2 -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 33.1(f) -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(x) -Cover, identification of party supported ...... 37.2(a) -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Page limits.......................................................... 33.1(g)(x) -Preparation and submission costs, identi- fication of sources paying ............................ 37.6 -Purpose ............................................................... 37.1 -Service................................................................. 37.5 -Time to file ........................................................ 37.2 Briefs on merits -Consent of parties to file ................................. 37.3 -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 33.1(f) -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(xi), (xii) -Cover, identification of party supported ..... 37.2(a) -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Page limits.......................................................... 33.1(g)(xi), (xii) -Preparation and submission costs, identi- fication of sources paying ............................ 37.6 -Purpose ............................................................... 37.1 -Service................................................................. 37.5 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1220 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule AMICUS CURIAE-Continued -Time to file ......................................................... 37.3 Cities, counties, and towns.......................................... 37.4 Consent of parties -To argument ...................................................... 28.7 -To file brief ......................................................... 37.2, 37.3, 37.5 Motions for leave to file briefs -At petition stage ............................................... 37.2(b) -Objection to........................................................ 37.5 -On merits............................................................ 37.3(b) -Page limits ........................................................ 37.5 -Service ............................................................... 37.5 -Time to file ......................................................... 37.2(b), 37.3(b) -When unnecessary ............................................ 37.4 Rehearing ...................................................................... 37.3(a), 44.5 States, Commonwealths, Territories, and Posses- sions ............................................................................ 37.4 United States ................................................................. 37.4 APPEALS Affirm, motion to........................................................... 18.6, 21.2(b) Briefs opposing motion to dismiss or to affirm 18.8, 33.1(g)(iii), 33.2(b) Certification of record .................................................. 18.11, 18.12 Cross-appeals ................................................................. 18.4, 18.9 Dismissal -After docketing ................................................. 18.6, 21.2(b) -Before docketing .............................................. 18.5 -By agreement of parties .................................. 18.5, 46.1 -On death of party ............................................ 35 -On motion.......................................... 18.5, 18.6, 21.2(b), 33.1(g)(ii) Docketing, notice to appellees .................................... 18.3 Frivolous appeals, damages ....................................... 42.2 Joint appendix, preparation of.................................... 26 Jurisdictional statements -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 18.3 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(i) -Deficiencies, effect of ........................................ 18.13 -Distribution to Court ....................................... 18.5, 18.6, 21.2(b) -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Fee........................................................................ 18.3, 38(a) -Multiple judgments........................................... 18.2 -Page limits.......................................................... 33.1(g)(i), 33.2(b) -Service................................................................. 18.3, 29.3­29.5 -Supplemental briefs.......................................... 18.10, 33.1(g)(iv) 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1221 Rule APPEALS-Continued -Time to file ......................................................... 18.3, 30.2, 30.3 Jurisdiction noted or postponed ................................. 18.12 Notice of appeal -Clerk of district court, filed with................... 18.1 -Contents.............................................................. 18.1 -Response ............................................................. 18.6 -Service................................................................. 18.1 -Time to file ......................................................... 18.1 Parties to proceeding ................................................... 18.2 Record ............................................................................. 18.11, 18.12 Summary disposition .................................................... 18.12 APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL Certified cases .............................................................. 19.3 Notice of appearance, when required........................ 9 APPENDIX-See also Joint Appendix Briefs on merits............................................................. 24.3 Cover color ..................................................................... 33.1(e) Documents, format and general preparation re- quirements.................................................................. 33, 34 Jurisdictional statements............................................. 18.3 Petitions for writ of certiorari.................................... 14.1(i) APPLICATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES-See Justices ARGUMENT Absence of quorum, effect of ...................................... 4.2 Additional time, request for........................................ 28.3 Amicus curiae............................................................... 28.7 Calendar, call of............................................................. 27 Certified cases................................................................ 19.4 Combined cases ............................................................. 27.3 Content............................................................................ 28.1, 28.5 Counsel, notification of argument date ..................... 27.2 Cross-appeals ................................................................. 28.2 Cross-writs of certiorari .............................................. 28.2 Divided argument ........................................................ 28.4 Hearing lists................................................................... 27.2 Motions............................................................................ 21.3 Party for whom no brief has been filed.................... 28.6 Pro hac vice ................................................................... 6 Rehearing ....................................................................... 44.1, 44.2 Time allowed.................................................................. 28.3 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1222 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule ATTORNEYS-See also Admission to Bar; Criminal Justice Act of 1964 Appearance of counsel.................................................. 9 Appointment as counsel for indigent party ............. 39.6, 39.7 Argument pro hac vice ................................................ 6 Compensation -Criminal Justice Act of 1964........................... 39.7 -Travel expenses when representing indi- gent party....................................................... 39.6 Costs awarded against ................................................. 42.2 Counsel of record .......................................................... 9 Damages awarded against........................................... 42.2 Disbarment..................................................................... 8.1 Discipline of attorneys -Conduct unbecoming member of Bar............ 8.2 -Failure to comply with this Court's Rules 8.2 Employees of Court, prohibition against practice 7 Foreign attorneys, permission to argue ................... 6.2 Substitution of counsel................................................. 9.2 Suspension from practice............................................. 8.1 Use of Court's Library ............................................... 2.1 BAILApplications to individual Justices............................ 22.5 Habeas corpus proceedings ......................................... 36.3 BOND-See Stays BRIEFS-See Amicus Curiae; Appeals; Briefs on Merits; Certified Questions; Certiorari; Original Actions BRIEFS ON MERITS Abridgment of time to file ......................................... 25.4 Application to exceed page limits ............................. 33.1(d) Clerk, filed with ........................................................... 29.1, 29.2 Extension of time to file .............................................. 25.4, 30.4 Petitioners and appellants -Contents.............................................................. 24.1 -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 25.1, 33.1(f) -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(v) -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Page limits .................................................. 24.3, 33.1(d), 33.1(g)(v) -Time to file ......................................................... 25.1, 25.4 Proof of service requirement ..................................... 25.7 References to joint appendix or record ................... 24.5 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1223 Rule BRIEFS ON MERITS-Continued Reply briefs -Contents ............................................................ 24.4 -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 25.3 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(vii) -Documents, format and general require- ments .............................................................. 33, 34 -Page limits ............................................... 24.3, 33.1(d), 33.1(g)(vii) -Time to file ......................................................... 25.3, 25.4 Respondents and appellees -Contents ............................................................ 24.2 -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 25.2 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(vi) -Documents, format and general require- ments .............................................................. 33, 34 -Page limits.......................................................... 24.3, 33.1(g)(vi) -Time to file ......................................................... 25.2, 25.4 Service ........................................................................... 29.3­29.5 Striking by Court ........................................................ 24.6 Submission after argument ........................................ 25.6 Supplemental briefs -Contents ............................................................ 25.5 -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 25.5 -Cover color ........................................................ 33.1(g)(iv) -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Page limits ........................................................ 33.1(g)(iv) -Time to file ......................................................... 25.5 Table of authorities ...................................................... 24.1(c), 34.2 Table of contents .......................................................... 24.1(c), 34.2 CALENDAR Call of cases for argument .......................................... 27.1 Clerk, preparation by ................................................... 27.1 Combined cases ............................................................. 27.3 Hearing lists................................................................... 27.2 CAPITAL CASES Brief in opposition......................................................... 15.1 Habeas corpus proceedings ......................................... 20.4(b) Notation of...................................................................... 14.1(a) CERTIFIED QUESTIONS Appearance of counsel.................................................. 19.3 Appendix......................................................................... 19.4 Argument, setting case for ......................................... 19.4 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1224 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule CERTIFIED QUESTIONS-Continued Briefs on merits -Contents and specifications............................. 19.5, 24 -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Time to file ......................................................... 19.5, 25 Certificate, contents of................................................. 19.1 Costs, allowance of........................................................ 43.4 Record ............................................................................. 19.4 CERTIORARI Appendix to petition for writ ..................................... 14.1(i) Before judgment in court of appeals, petition filed 11 Briefs in opposition -Capital cases, mandatory in ........................... 15.1 -Contents.............................................................. 15.2 -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 15.3 -Cover color ........................................................ 33.1(g)(ii) -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Page limits ................................................. 15.2, 33.1(g)(ii), 33.2(b) -Time to file ......................................................... 15.3 Briefs in support of petition barred ......................... 14.2 Common-law writs ....................................................... 20.6 Constitutionality of statute, procedure when issue raised ........................................................................... 29.4(b), (c) Cross-petitions -Conditional, when permitted ......................... 12.5 -Contents.............................................................. 12.5, 14.1(e)(iii) -Distribution to Court ...................................... 15.7 -Fee ...................................................................... 12.5 -Notice to cross-respondents ............................ 12.5 -Service................................................................. 12.5 -Time to file ........................................................ 13.4 Denial, sufficient reasons for....................................... 14.4 Dismissal of petitions .................................................. 35.1 Disposition of petitions ............................................... 16 Distribution of papers to Court ................................ 15.5 Docketing -Fee........................................................................ 12.1, 38(a) -Notice to respondents ..................................... 12.3 Frivolous petitions, damages and costs ................... 42.2 Motion to dismiss petition barred.............................. 15.4 Multiple judgments, review of .................................. 12.4 Objections to jurisdiction ........................................... 15.4 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1225 Rule CERTIORARI-Continued Parties ............................................................................. 12.4, 12.6 Petitions for writ -Contents.............................................................. 14 -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 12.1, 12.2 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(i) -Deficiency, effect of .......................................... 14.5 -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Page limits .................................................. 14.3, 33.1(g)(i), 33.2(b) -Service ............................................................... 12.3 -Time to file ......................................................... 13, 29.2, 30.2, 30.3 Record, certification and transmission .................... 12.7 Rehearing, petitions for .............................................. 44.2 Reply briefs to briefs in opposition.................. 15.6, 33.1(g)(iii), 33.2(b) Respondents in support of petitioner ...................... 12.6 Stays pending review .................................................. 23.2, 23.4 Summary disposition .................................................... 16.1 Supplemental briefs...................................................... 15.8, 33.1(g)(iv) CLERK Announcement of absence of quorum ....................... 4.2 Announcement of recesses .......................................... 4.3 Argument calendar ....................................................... 27.1, 27.2 Authority to reject filings ........................................... 1.1 Costs, itemization in mandate .................................... 43.6 Custody of records and papers................................... 1.2 Diagrams, custody and disposition ............................ 32 Exhibits, custody and disposition .............................. 32 Fees as taxable items................................................... 43.3 Fees, table of.................................................................. 38 Filing documents with ................................................. 29.1, 29.2 Hearing lists, preparation of....................................... 27.2 In forma pauperis proceedings, docketing ............. 39.4 Models, custody and disposition ................................. 32 Noncompliance with Rules, return of papers .......... 14.5, 18.13 Office hours..................................................................... 1.3 Opinions of Court, disposition of................................ 41 Orders of dismissal ....................................................... 46.1, 46.2 Original records, when returned................................ 1.2 Record, request for....................................................... 12.7, 18.11, 18.12 Records and documents, maintenance of.................. 1.2 COMPUTATION OF TIME Method............................................................................. 30.1 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1226 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACT Procedure where United States or federal agency or employee not a party........................................... 29.4(b) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE Procedure where State or state agency or em- ployee not a party..................................................... 29.4(c) CORPORATIONS Listing parent companies and subsidiaries........... 14.1(b), 24.1(b), 29.6 COSTS-See also Fees Armed forces cases....................................................... 40.3 Certified cases................................................................ 43.4 Dismissal of appeal before docketing........................ 18.5 Double costs ................................................................... 43.7 Frivolous filings............................................................. 42.2 Joint appendix................................................................ 26.3 Judgment affirmed ........................................................ 43.1 Judgment reversed or vacated ................................... 43.2 Mandate, itemization in................................................ 43.6 Seamen cases.................................................................. 40.2 Stays ................................................................................ 23.4 Taxable items................................................................. 43.3 United States, allowed for or against ....................... 43.5 Veterans cases ............................................................... 40.1 COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES Documents, preparation requirements...................... 40.3 Fees and costs on review............................................. 40.3 COURTS OF APPEALS Certified questions........................................................ 19 Certiorari before judgment......................................... 11 Considerations governing review on certiorari ...... 10 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964 Appointment of counsel under .................................. 9, 39 Compensation of counsel for indigent party............ 39.7 CROSS-APPEALS-See Appeals CROSS-PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI-See Certiorari DAMAGES Frivolous filings............................................................. 42.2 Stays ................................................................................ 23.4 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1227 Rule DEATH Parties ............................................................................. 35.1­35.3 Public officers................................................................. 35.3 Revivor of case .............................................................. 35.2 DELAY Stay, damages for delay ............................................... 23.4 DIAGRAMS Custody of Clerk .......................................................... 32.1 Removal or other disposition .................................... 32.2 DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE-See Attorneys DISMISSAL Agreement of parties ................................................... 46.1 Appeals before docketing ............................................ 18.5 Death of party ............................................................... 35.1 Entry of order................................................................ 46.1 Motion by appellee........................................................ 18.6, 46.2 Objection to ................................................................... 46.2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-See State Courts DOCKETING CASES Appeals............................................................................ 18.3 Certified questions ....................................................... 19.3 Certiorari ....................................................................... 12.3 Cross-appeals ................................................................. 18.4 Cross-petitions for certiorari ...................................... 12.5 Extraordinary writs...................................................... 20.2 Fees.................................................................................. 38(a) In forma pauperis proceedings ................................. 39.4 Original actions ............................................................. 17.4 DOCUMENT PREPARATION Format and general requirements............................. 33, 34 EFFECTIVE DATE Revised Rules ................................................................ 48 EXHIBITS Briefs, reference in ....................................................... 24.5 Custody of Clerk ........................................................... 32.1 Inclusion in joint appendix.......................................... 26.6 Removal or other disposition...................................... 32.2 EXTENSION OF TIME Filing briefs on merits ................................................. 25.4 Filing jurisdictional statements ................................. 18.3, 30.2, 30.3 Filing papers or documents, generally ..................... 30.2­30.4 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1228 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule EXTENSION OF TIME-Continued Filing petitions for rehearing..................................... 30.3, 44.1 Filing petitions for writ of certiorari........................ 13.5, 30.2, 30.3 EXTRAORDINARY WRITS-See also Habeas Corpus Briefs in opposition -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 20.3(b) -Cover color ........................................................ 33.1(g)(ii) -Page limits.......................................................... 33.1(g)(ii) -Time to file ........................................................ 20.3(b) Considerations governing issuance .......................... 20.1 Petitions -Certiorari, common-law writ of...................... 20.6 -Contents ............................................................ 20.2 -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 20.2 -Cover color ........................................................ 33.1(g)(i) -Docketing............................................................ 20.2 -Documents, format and general require- ments ............................................................... 33, 34 -Habeas corpus, writ of ..................................... 20.4 -Mandamus, writ of ............................................ 20.3 -Page limits.......................................................... 33.1(g)(i), 33.2(b) -Prohibition, writ of ........................................... 20.3 -Service................................................................. 20.2, 29 Response to petitions for habeas corpus -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(ii) -Page limits ........................................................ 33.1(g)(ii) -When required .................................................. 20.4(b) FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE As guides to procedure in original actions .............. 17.2 FEES-See also Costs Admission to Bar........................................................... 5.5, 5.6 Armed forces cases....................................................... 40.3 In forma pauperis proceedings ................................. 39.4 Seamen cases.................................................................. 38 Table ................................................................................ 38 Taxable items ................................................................ 43.3 Veterans cases ............................................................... 40.1 HABEAS CORPUS-See also Extraordinary Writs Custody of prisoners..................................................... 36 Documents, format and general requirements........ 33, 34 Enlargement of prisoner on personal recognizance 36.3, 36.4 Order respecting custody of prisoners ..................... 36.4 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1229 Rule HABEAS CORPUS-Continued Petition for writ............................................................. 20.4(a) Response to petition .................................................... 20.4(b) IN FORMA PAUPERIS PROCEEDINGS Affidavit as to status.................................................... 39.1 Briefs, preparation of ................................................... 33.2 Counsel -Appointment....................................................... 39.7 -Compensation..................................................... 39.7 -Travel expenses................................................. 39.6 Denial of leave to proceed ........................................... 39.8 Docketing........................................................................ 39.4 Joint appendix................................................................ 26.3 Motions, form of ............................................................ 39.1 Responses ...................................................................... 39.5 Substantive documents ................................................ 39.2, 39.3 INTEREST Inclusion in amount of bond on stay pending review ......................................................................... 23.4 Money judgments in civil cases.................................. 42.1 JOINT APPENDIX Arrangement of contents............................................. 26.5, 26.6 Certified cases................................................................ 19.4 Contents ......................................................................... 26.1, 26.2 Copies, number to be filed........................................... 26.1 Cost of printing ............................................................. 26.3, 43.3 Cover color ..................................................................... 33.1(e) Deferred method ........................................................... 26.4 Designating parts of record to be printed ............... 26.2 Dispensing with appendix .......................................... 26.7 Exhibits, inclusion of .................................................... 26.6 Extraordinary writs...................................................... 20.6 In forma pauperis proceedings ................................. 26.2 References in briefs...................................................... 24.1(g), 24.5 Time to file................................................................... 26.1, 26.4, 26.8, 30.4 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT-See Appeals JUSTICES Applications to individual Justices -Clerk, filed with ............................................... 22.1 -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 22.2 -Disposition.......................................................... 22.4, 22.6 -Distribution ........................................................ 22.3 -Documents, format............................................ 22.2, 33.2 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1230 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule JUSTICES-Continued -Referral to full Court ...................................... 22.5 -Renewal ............................................................. 22.4 -Service................................................................. 22.2 Extensions of time to file -Documents and papers ..................................... 30.2­30.4 -Jurisdictional statements ............................... 18.3, 30.2, 30.3 -Petitions for rehearing..................................... 30.3 -Petitions for writ of certiorari........................ 13.5, 30.2, 30.3 -Reply briefs on merits .................................... 30.3 Habeas corpus proceedings ......................................... 36 Leave to file document in excess of page limits .... 33.1(d) Petitions for rehearing................................................. 44.1 Stays ................................................................................ 22.5, 23 LIBRARY Persons to whom open ................................................. 2.1 Removal of books .......................................................... 2.3 Schedule of hours .......................................................... 2.2 MANDAMUS-See Extraordinary Writs MANDATES Costs, inclusion of ......................................................... 43.6 Dismissal of cases ........................................................ 46.3 Federal-court cases....................................................... 45.3 Petition for rehearing, effect of.................................. 45.2 State-court cases ........................................................... 45.2 MARSHAL Announcement of recesses .......................................... 4.3 Bar admission fees, maintenance of fund ................. 5.5, 5.6 Returned check fees ..................................................... 38(e) MODELS Custody of Clerk ........................................................... 32.1 Removal or other disposition...................................... 32.2 MOTIONS Admission to Bar........................................................... 5.3, 21.3 Affirm appeals .............................................................. 18.6 Amicus curiae -Leave to argue................................................... 28.7 -Leave to file brief.............................................. 21.2(b), 37.2­37.4 Argument -Additional time .................................................. 28.3 -Consolidated ...................................................... 27.3 -Divided................................................................ 28.4 -Pro hac vice ....................................................... 6.3 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1231 Rule MOTIONS-Continued Briefs -Abridgment of time to file ............................. 25.4 -Leave to exceed page limits ........................... 33.1(d) Certified questions........................................................ 19.2 Clerk, filed with ........................................................... 29.1, 29.2 Contents.......................................................................... 21 Dismissal of cases -Appeals................................................................ 18.6, 21.2(b) -Death of party .................................................. 35.1 -Docket and dismiss .......................................... 18.5 -Mootness ............................................................. 21.2(b) -On request of petitioner or appellant ........... 46.2 -Voluntary dismissal........................................... 46.1 Documents, format and general requirements ....... 21.2(b), (c), 33, 34 In forma pauperis proceedings ................................ 39.1, 39.2 Joint appendix -Dispensed with ................................................. 26.7 -Record, excused from printing....................... 26.2 Oral argument, when permitted ............................... 21.3 Original actions ............................................................ 17.2, 17.3, 21.2(a) Party, substitution of.................................................... 35.1, 35.3 Responses, form and time of ..................................... 21.4 Service ........................................................................... 21.3, 29.3­29.5 Stays ................................................................................ 23 Veteran, leave to proceed as ...................................... 40.1 NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULES-See Rules NOTICE Appeals -Docketing of ....................................................... 18.3 -Filing with district court................................. 18.1 Certiorari, filing of petition for writ ......................... 12.3 Cross-petition for certiorari, docketing of .............. 12.5 Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari............ 16 Service............................................................................. 29.3­29.5 OPINIONS Publication in United States Reports by Reporter of Decisions................................................................. 41 Slip form ........................................................................ 41 When released ............................................................... 41 ORAL ARGUMENT-See Argument 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1232 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule ORIGINAL ACTIONS Briefs in opposition to motions for leave to file -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 17.5 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(ii) -Service ............................................................... 17.5 -Time to file ......................................................... 17.5 Distribution of documents to Court ......................... 17.5 Docketing........................................................................ 17.4 Documents, format and general requirements ....... 33, 34 Fee .................................................................................. 17.4, 38(a) Initial pleadings -Briefs in support of motions for leave to file 17.3 -Clerk, filed with................................................. 17.4 -Copies, number to be filed .............................. 17.3 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(i) -Leave to file ...................................................... 17.3 -Motions for leave to file ................................... 17.3 -Page limits ........................................................ 33.1(g)(i) -Service ............................................................... 17.3 Jurisdiction .................................................................... 17.1 Process against State, service of .............................. 17.7 Pleadings and motions, form of ................................. 17.2 Reply briefs ................................................................... 17.5 Summons ....................................................................... 17.6 PARENT COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES-See Corporations PARTIES Appeals............................................................................ 18.2 Certiorari........................................................................ 12.4, 12.6 Death, effect of .............................................................. 35.1­35.3 Listing, when required -Briefs on merits................................................. 24.1(b) -Petitions for writ of certiorari ...................... 14.1(b) Public officers -Description of ................................................... 35.4 -Effect of death or resignation ....................... 35.3 POSTPONING CONSIDERATION OF JURISDICTION-See Appeals PROCESS-See also Service Dismissal of cases.......................................................... 46.3 Form ............................................................................... 45.1 Original actions ............................................................. 17.7 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1233 Rule PROHIBITION-See Extraordinary Writs PROOF OF SERVICE-See Service PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES Costs allowed against................................................... 43.5 Description of................................................................. 35.4 Service on ....................................................................... 29.4 Substitution of ............................................................... 35.3 PUERTO RICO-See State Courts QUORUM Absence, effect of.......................................................... 4.2 Number to constitute .................................................. 4.2 RECESS-See Sessions of Court RECORDS Certification and transmission -Appeals .............................................................. 18.11, 18.12 -Certified questions............................................ 19.4 -Certiorari............................................................ 12.7 Diagrams......................................................................... 32 Exhibits........................................................................... 26.6, 32 Joint appendix -Costs, effect on allocation of........................... 26.3 -Inclusion of designated record ....... 26.1­26.3, 26.4(b), 26.5, 26.7 Models ............................................................................ 32 Original documents -On certiorari ..................................................... 12.7 -Return to lower courts ................................... 1.2 Original record, argument on .................................... 26.7 References -Briefs on merits................................................. 24.5 -Petitions for writ of certiorari........................ 14.1(g)(i) Translation of foreign language material................. 31 REHEARING Amicus curiae briefs .................................................. 37.3(a) Certificate of counsel.................................................... 44.1, 44.2 Consecutive petitions .................................................. 44.4 Judgment or decision on merits ................................ 44.1 Mandate, stay of ........................................................... 45.2 Oral argument .............................................................. 44.1, 44.2 Order denying petition for writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ .................................................... 44.2 Petitions -Contents.............................................................. 44.1, 44.2 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1234 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule REHEARING-Continued -Copies, number to be filed ............................. 44.1, 44.2 -Cover color ......................................................... 33.1(g)(xiii) -Documents, format and general specifi- cations ............................................................ 33, 34 -Fee........................................................................ 38(b) -Page limits ....................................................... 33.1(g)(xiii), 33.2(b) -Service................................................................. 44.1, 44.2 -Time to file....................................................... 30.3, 44.1, 44.2, 44.4 Responses to petitions ................................................ 44.3 REPORTER OF DECISIONS Publication of Court's opinions................................... 41 REVIVOR Revivor of cases ............................................................ 35.1­35.3 RULES Effective date................................................................. 48 Effect of noncompliance ............................................... 14.5, 18.13 SEAMEN Suits by ........................................................................... 40.2 SERVICE Procedure -Copies, number to be served .......................... 29.3 -Federal agency, officer, or employee ............. 29.4(a) -Governor and State Attorney General in original actions .............................................. 17.3 -Mail ..................................................................... 29.3 -Personal service................................................. 29.3 -Solicitor General where constitutionality of congressional act in issue ............................ 29.4(b) -Solicitor General where United States or federal agency, officer, or employee is party ................................................................ 29.4(a) -State Attorney General where constitution- ality of state statute in issue...................... 29.4(c) Proof of service, form ................................................. 29.5 When required -Amicus curiae briefs and motions ................ 37.5 -Appeals ........................................................... 18.1­18.5, 18.8, 18.10 -Applications to individual Justices ............... 22.2, 22.4 -Briefs on merits ............................................... 25.7 -Certiorari, petitions for writ of...................... 12.3, 12.5, 12.6 -Dismissal of cases ............................................ 46.2(a) -Extension of time, applications for ............... 30.3, 30.4 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1235 Rule SERVICE-Continued -Extraordinary writs.......................................... 20.2, 20.3(b) -In forma pauperis proceedings .................... 39.4 -Joint appendix ................................................... 26.1­26.4 -Motions, in general .......................................... 21.3 -Original actions ................................................. 17.3, 17.5­17.7 -Pro hac vice, motions to argue ...................... 6.3 -Rehearing ........................................................... 44.1, 44.2 -Reply briefs ....................................................... 15.6 -Supplemental briefs.......................................... 15.8 SESSIONS OF COURT Hours of open sessions ................................................. 4.1 Opening of Term ........................................................... 4.1 Recesses.......................................................................... 4.3 SOLICITOR GENERAL Amicus curiae brief for United States ................... 37.4 Documents, cover color ................................................ 33.1(e) Service on -When constitutionality of congressional act in issue............................................................. 29.4(b) -When United States or federal office, agency, officer, or employee is party......... 29.4(a) STATE COURTS Certiorari to review judgments of ............................ 10 District of Columbia Court of Appeals..................... 47 Habeas corpus, exhaustion of remedies .................. 20.4(a) Mandate, issuance of..................................................... 45.2 Puerto Rico Supreme Court ...................................... 47 STAYS Bond, supersedeas......................................................... 23.4 Considerations governing application ....................... 23.3 Judgment, enforcement of ........................................... 23.2 Justices -Authority to grant ............................................ 23.1 -Presentation to individual Justices................ 22.1 -Referral to Court .............................................. 22.5 Mandate -Pending rehearing............................................. 45.2 -Pending review.................................................. 23.4 STIPULATIONS Dismissal of appeal by parties.................................... 18.5 Mandate, issuance of..................................................... 45.2 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES 1236 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule SUBSIDIARIES OF CORPORATIONS-See Corporations SUBSTITUTIONS Counsel............................................................................ 9.2 Parties ............................................................................. 35.1, 35.3 Public officers ............................................................... 35.3 Successor custodians, habeas corpus proceedings .. 36.2 SUMMONS Form of process ............................................................. 45.1 Service in original action............................................. 17.6 SUPERSEDEAS BONDS Application to stay enforcement of judgment......... 23.4 TERM Call of cases for argument .......................................... 27 Cases pending on docket at end of Term................. 3 Commencement of......................................................... 3 TIME REQUIREMENTS Computation of time..................................................... 30.1 Documents filed with Clerk ....................................... 29.2 Oral argument .............................................................. 28.3 Substitution of parties ................................................ 35.1 Time to file -Amicus curiae briefs ...................................... 37.2, 37.3 -Appeals................................................................ 18.1 -Briefs on merits................................................. 25.1­25.5, 30.3 -Certified questions, briefs on merits............. 19.5 -Certiorari, petitions for writ of...................... 13, 30.2, 30.3 -Jurisdictional statements ................................ 18.3, 30.2, 30.3 -Motions to dismiss or to affirm appeal ......... 18.6 -Page limits, application to exceed.................. 33.1(d) -Rehearing, petitions for................................. 30.3, 44.1, 44.2, 44.4 -Requests for divided argument .................... 28.4 -Responses to motions....................................... 21.4 TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD-See also Records Cost.................................................................................. 43.3 TRANSLATIONS Foreign-language material in record ....................... 31 UNITED STATES Amicus curiae............................................................... 37.4 Briefs, cover color ......................................................... 33.1(e) Costs allowed for or against ...................................... 43.5 519US2indx 01-29-00 18:14:33 PGT * USRULES RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1237 Rule UNITED STATES-Continued Service -On federal agency, officer, or employee........ 29.4(a) -On Solicitor General ......................................... 29.4(a), (b) UNITED STATES REPORTS Publication of Court's opinions................................... 41 VETERANS Suits by .......................................................................... 40.1 WAIVER Brief in opposition, right to file ................................ 15.5 Costs allowed for or against United States ............ 43.5 Motion to dismiss appeal or affirm, right to file ..... 18.7 WRITS Certiorari........................................................................ 10­16 Common-law certiorari ................................................ 20.6 Extraordinary ................................................................ 20 Habeas corpus................................................................ 20.4 Mandamus....................................................................... 20.3 Prohibition...................................................................... 20.3 05-12-99 06:52:56 519BV$1301 Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 1301. The numbers between 1237 and 1301 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish in-chambers opinions with permanent page numbers, thus making the official citations available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 519US1ic1z 06-02-99 13:53:27 PAGES IC1301PGT OPINION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN CHAMBERS NETHERLAND, WARDEN v. GRAY on application to vacate stay of execution No. A­425. Decided December 23, 1996 Virginia's application to vacate the stay of execution in respondent Gray's case is denied. There appears to be no execution scheduled. Thus, it cannot be stayed, and there is nothing to be vacated. See Netherland v. Tuggle, 517 U. S. 1301. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice. The Commonwealth of Virginia has asked me to vacate the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's stay of execution in respondent Gray's case, noting that the court did not pur- port to follow the standard for such stays set out in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880 (1983). In Gray v. Netherland, 518 U. S. 152, 170­171 (1996), we remanded to the Court of Appeals Gray's claim that the Commonwealth had violated due process by misleading him about evidence it intended to use at sentencing. The court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Gray v. Netherland, 99 F. 3d 158, 166 (CA4 1996). The Court of Ap- peals therefore remanded Gray's case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss his habeas corpus petition but added, "[i]n view of the Supreme Court's opinion remanding the case to us, we think the respectful course is to stay both our mandate and [Gray's] execution until such time as the Supreme Court rules on any petition for certiorari." Ibid. We have repeatedly and recently stated that it is not ap- propriate for a court of appeals to grant a stay of execution to permit a death-row inmate to file a petition for a writ of certiorari without first conducting the Barefoot inquiry. 1301 519US1$ic1 06-02-99 13:53:27 PAGES IC1301PGT 1302 NETHERLAND v. GRAY Opinion in Chambers See Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951, 952 (1995). We have rejected the view that "a capital defendant as a matter of right [is] entitled to a stay of execution until he has filed a petition for certiorari in due course." Ibid. I nonetheless deny the Commonwealth's motion to vacate the stay of execution because, so far as I can tell, there is no execution scheduled. If there is no execution scheduled, it cannot be stayed, and there is nothing for me to vacate. See Netherland v. Tuggle, 517 U. S. 1301 (1996) (Rehnquist, C. J., Circuit Justice) (no stay of execution to vacate where Court of Appeals had only stayed its own mandate). 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) I N D E X ABORTIONS. See Constitutional Law, V. ALIENS. See Immigration and Nationality Act. ALLOTTED INDIAN LAND. See Constitutional Law, IX. APPEALS. See Constitutional Law, II; Jurisdiction, 1. APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. AUTOMOBILE PASSENGERS. See Constitutional Law, VII, 2. BANKING. See also Criminal Law, 1. Federally insured savings institutions-Officers and directors-Stand- ards of conduct.-State law sets standard of conduct for officers and direc- tors of federally insured savings institutions as long as state standard (such as simple negligence) is stricter than that of 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k), which sets a "gross negligence" floor as a substitute for more relaxed state standards. Atherton v. FDIC, p. 213. BUFFER ZONES AT ABORTION CLINICS. See Constitutional Law, V. CALIFORNIA. See Constitutional Law, VIII; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Habeas Corpus; Voting Rights Act of 1965. CAPITAL MURDER. See Constitutional Law, VI; Habeas Corpus; Stays. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. 1. Title VII-Covered employment-Number of employees.-For pur- poses of determining whether an employer has "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year," 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b), and is thus covered by Title VII, an employer "has" an employee on any working day on which it maintains an employment relationship with that employee, not only on working days on which employee is actually receiving compensa- tion. Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., p. 202. 1303 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1304 INDEX CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-Continued. 2. Title VII-Employees-Postemployment retaliation.-Because term "employees," as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, includes former employees, petitioner may sue his former employer for its alleged postemployment retaliation against him for filing a job discrimination charge. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., p. 337. COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I. COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT. Off-exchange transactions-Foreign currency.-Off-exchange transac- tions in foreign currency options are "transactions in foreign currency" that are exempt from Act and regulation by Commodity Futures Trading Commission pursuant to so-called "Treasury Amendment." Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, p. 465. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. I. Commerce Clause. Ohio tax law-Treatment of natural gas sales.-Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utilities and independent market- ers of natural gas does not violate Commerce Clause. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, p. 278. II. Due Process. Termination of parental rights-Indigent party.-Just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, Mississippi could not, consistent with due process and equal protection, deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review of sufficiency of evidence on which a trial court terminated her parental rights. M. L. B. v. S. L. J., p. 102. III. Equal Protection of the Laws. Ohio tax law-Treatment of natural gas sales.-Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utilities and independent mar- keters of natural gas does not violate Equal Protection Clause. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, p. 278. IV. Ex Post Facto Laws. Florida law-Early release credits.-Ex Post Facto Clause is violated by a Florida statute that retroactively cancels early release credits awarded to inmates when state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. Lynce v. Mathis, p. 433. V. Freedom of Speech. Abortion protestors-Clinic buffer zones.-Injunction provisions ex- cluding abortion protesters from "fixed buffer zones" around clinic door- 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1305 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued. ways, driveways, and driveway entrances are upheld, but provisions im- posing "floating buffer zones" around people entering and leaving clinics violate First Amendment. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., p. 357. VI. Right to Jury Trial. Death penalty case-Excusal for cause.-In affirming excusal for cause of jurors who expressed reservations about death penalty in a murder case, Georgia Supreme Court erred in interpreting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 426­430, to require it to defer to trial court's juror-bias findings. Greene v. Georgia, p. 145. VII. Searches and Seizures. 1. Lawfully seized defendant-Consent to search.-Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, p. 33. 2. Traffic stop-Ordering passengers out of automobiles.-Rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, that a police officer may as a mat- ter of course order driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, extends to passengers as well. Maryland v. Wilson, p. 408. VIII. States' Immunity from Suit. Litigation costs-Federal Government indemnification.-Fact that Federal Government has agreed to indemnify a state instrumentality against litigation costs, including adverse judgments, does not divest state agency of Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Re- gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, p. 425. IX. Taking of Property. Indian Land Consolidation Act-Escheat-to-tribe provision.-Section 207 of Act, which prohibits descent or devise of small fractional interests in allotted Indian property, effects a taking of private property without just compensation in violation of Fifth Amendment. Babbitt v. Youpee, p. 234. COURTS OF APPEALS. See Jurisdiction, 1. CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, VII; Federal Rules of Evidence; Stays. 1. False statement to a federally insured bank-Elements of crime.- Materiality of falsehood is not an element of crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank under 18 U. S. C. § 1014. United States v. Wells, p. 482. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1306 INDEX CRIMINAL LAW-Continued. 2. Sentencing-Consideration of conduct underlying charges of which defendants have been acquitted.-Ninth Circuit holdings that sentencing courts cannot consider conduct underlying other charges of which defend- ants were acquitted conflict with clear implications of 18 U. S. C. § 3661, United States Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court's decisions. United States v. Watts, p. 148. CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS. See Commodity Exchange Act. DEATH BENEFITS. See Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compen- sation Act. DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law, VI. DEPORTATION. See Immigration and Nationality Act. DEVISES OF INDIAN LAND. See Constitutional Law, IX. DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION. See Freedom of Information Act. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Con- stitutional Law, I. DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. DIVERSITY. See Jurisdiction, 2. DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II. EARLY RELEASE CREDITS. See Constitutional Law, IV. ELECTIONS. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VIII. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974. State prevailing wage law-Pre-emption.-A California law requiring a public works project contractor to pay its workers prevailing wage in project's locale, but authorizing lower pay for participants in a state- approved apprenticeship program, is not pre-empted by ERISA. Califor- nia Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., p. 316. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1307 EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Em- ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938; Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compen- sation Act. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See Constitutional Law, II; III. EQUITABLE TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS PERIODS. See Taxes, 1. ESCHEAT OF ALLOTTED INDIAN LAND. See Constitutional Law, IX. EVIDENCE. See Federal Rules of Evidence. EXECUTIONS. See Stays. EX POST FACTO LAWS. See Constitutional Law, IV. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938. Overtime pay-Public-sector employees.-"Salary basis" test for over- time pay exemptions reflects a permissibe reading of FLSA as applied to public-sector employees; test is reasonably interpreted to deny overtime to one whose pay may, "as a practical matter," be adjusted in ways incon- sistent with test. Auer v. Robbins, p. 452. FEDERAL COURTS. See Jurisdiction. FEDERALLY INSURED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. See Banking; Criminal Law, 1. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. Rule 403-Concession of a prior judgment.-A district court abuses its discretion under Rule 403-which makes evidence inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair preju- dice-if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede a prior judgment and admits full judgment record over his objection, when prior offense's name or nature raises risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations and when evidence's sole purpose is to prove a prior-conviction element. Old Chief v. United States, p. 172. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Banking; Constitutional Law, I; III; VIII; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Jurisdiction, 2. FEDERAL TAXES. See Taxes. FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, IX. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1308 INDEX FINAL ORDERS. See Jurisdiction, 1. FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, V. FIRST-DEGREE MURDER. See Habeas Corpus. FIXED BUFFER ZONES AT ABORTION CLINICS. See Constitu- tional Law, V. FLOATING BUFFER ZONES AT ABORTION CLINICS. See Consti- tutional Law, V. FLORIDA. See Constitutional Law, IV. FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS. See Commodity Ex- change Act. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II; III; VI. FOURTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VII. FRAUDULENT ACTS CONNECTED WITH IMMIGRATION. See Im- migration and Nationality Act. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. Disclosure of Government mailing list-Public interest served.-A Ninth Circuit judgment allowing grant of an FOIA request on basis of a perceived public interest in providing those on a Government mailing list with additional information is inconsistent with holding of Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U. S. 487, 496, that only relevant public interest is extent to which disclosure would shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their Government is up to. Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Assn., p. 355. FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, V. GEORGIA. See Constitutional Law, VI. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. GROSS INCOME. See Taxes, 2. HABEAS CORPUS. Harmless error-Trial error.-On habeas review of a state-court deter- mination, Ninth Circuit erred in not applying "harmless-error" standards of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432, to a "trial error" in jury instructions defining crime of first-degree murder. California v. Roy, p. 2. HARMLESS ERROR. See Habeas Corpus. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1309 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. Waiver of deportation-Fraudulent acts.-In deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a) (1)(H), Attorney General may take into account acts of fraud committed by alien in connection with his entry into United States. INS v. Yueh- Shaio Yang, p. 26. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Constitutional Law, VIII. INCOME TAXES. See Taxes. INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST LITIGATION COSTS. See Constitu- tional Law, VIII. INDIAN LAND CONSOLIDATION ACT. See Constitutional Law, IX. INDIGENT PARTIES. See Constitutional Law, II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS. See Supreme Court, 3. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. See Taxes. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. See Jurisdiction, 1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, I. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. JURISDICTION. 1. Federal courts of appeals-Ripeness-Internal Revenue Service summonses.-A District Court order enforcing two IRS summonses but requiring that IRS give respondent five days' notice before transferring summoned documents to a division other than its civil Examination Divi- sion was "final" under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and was therefore ripe for appeal. United States v. Jose, p. 54. 2. Federal district courts-Diversity-Improper removal.-A federal district court's error in failing to remand a case improperly removed from state court is not fatal to ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional re- quirements-here, diversity-are met at time judgment is entered. Cat- erpillar Inc. v. Lewis, p. 61. JUROR BIAS. See Constitutional Law, VI. JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, IX. LIMITATIONS PERIODS. See Taxes, 1. LITIGATION COSTS. See Constitutional Law, VIII. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1310 INDEX LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT. Death benefits-Predeath settlement-Proper respondent.-Before an injured worker's death, worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to com- pensation" for death benefits within meaning of § 33(g)(1) of Act and does not forfeit right to collect death benefits under Act for failure to obtain employer's approval of settlement entered into before worker's death; Di- rector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, is a proper appellate respondent. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, p. 248. MATERIAL FACTS AS ELEMENTS OF A CRIME. See Criminal Law, 1. MISSISSIPPI. See Constitutional Law, II. MURDER. See Constitutional Law, VI; Habeas Corpus; Stays. NATURAL GAS SALES. See Constitutional Law, I; III. OFF-EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS. See Commodity Exchange Act. OHIO. See Constitutional Law, I; III; VII, 1. OVERTIME PAY. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. PARENTAL RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, II. PASSENGERS ORDERED OUT OF AUTOMOBILES. See Constitu- tional Law, VII, 2. PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUITS. See Taxes, 2. POSTEMPLOYMENT RETALIATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2. PRECLEARANCE OF VOTING CHANGES. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. PREDEATH SETTLEMENTS. See Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. PRIOR CONVICTIONS. See Federal Rules of Evidence. PRISONERS' RIGHT TO EARLY RELEASE. See Constitutional Law, IV. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1311 PROPERTY RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, IX. PUBLIC INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION. See Free- dom of Information Act. PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. PUBLIC UTILITIES. See Constitutional Law, I; III. PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. PUNITIVE DAMAGES. See Taxes, 2. REFUND CLAIMS. See Taxes, 1. REMOVAL FROM STATE COURT. See Jurisdiction, 2. REPETITIOUS FILINGS. See Supreme Court, 3. RETROACTIVE CANCELLATION OF EARLY RELEASE CREDIT PROGRAM. See Constitutional Law, IV. RIGHT TO APPEAL. See Constitutional Law, II. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. See Constitutional Law, VI. "SALARY-BASIS" TEST FOR DETERMINING PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. SALES TAXES. See Constitutional Law, I, III. SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS. See Banking. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, VII. SENTENCING. See Criminal Law, 2. SIXTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VI. STATES' IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Constitutional Law, VIII. STATE TAXES. See Constitutional Law, I; III. STAYS. Stay of execution.-Virginia's motion to vacate a stay of execution is denied, since there appears to be no execution scheduled. Netherland v. Gray (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers), p. 1301. SUMMONSES. See Jurisdiction, 1. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1312 INDEX SUPREME COURT. 1. Presentation of Acting Solicitor General, p. v. 2. Rules of the Supreme Court, p. 1159. 3. In forma pauperis-Repetitious filings.-Abusive filer is barred from future in forma pauperis filings in noncriminal cases in this Court. In re Gaydos, p. 59. TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. See Constitutional Law, IX. TAXES. See also Constitutional Law, I; III. 1. Federal income taxes-Refund claims-Limitations period.-Con- gress did not intend "equitable tolling" doctrine to apply to time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in § 6511 of Internal Revenue Code of 1986. United States v. Brockamp, p. 347. 2. Federal income taxes-Taxable income-Inclusion of punitive dam- ages.-Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2)-which, as it read in 1988, ex- cluded from taxable "gross income" "any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness"-does not apply to punitive damages re- ceived by a plaintiff in a tort suit for personal injuries. O'Gilvie v. United States, p. 79. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, II. TITLE VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. TRIAL ERROR. See Habeas Corpus. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES. See Criminal Law, 2. UTILITIES. See Constitutional Law, I; III. VIRGINIA. See Stays. VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965. Judicial elections-Preclearance.-District Court erred in ordering re- spondent county to conduct judicial elections under a plan that had not been precleared pursuant to § 5 of Act. Lopez v. Monterey County, p. 9. WAIVER OF DEPORTATION. See Immigration and Nationality Act. WORDS AND PHRASES. 1. "Employees." § 704(a), Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­ 3a. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., p. 337. 2. "Fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." § 701(b), Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). Walters v. Metro- politan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., p. 202. 519ind$$bv 05-25-99 16:13:54 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1313 WORDS AND PHRASES-Continued. 3. "Person entitled to compensation." § 33(g)(1), Longshore and Har- bor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 933(g)(1). Ingalls Shipbuild- ing, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, p. 248. 4. "Relate to." § 514(a), Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). California Div. of Labor Standards Enforce- ment v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., p. 316. 5. "Transactions in foreign currency." Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2(ii). Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, p. 465.