516BV$spin 10-22-98 06:59:39 UNITED STATES REPORTS 516 OCT. TERM 1995 516bv$titl 10-23-98 06:44:09 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 516 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Beginning of Term October 2, 1995, Through March 19, 1996 Together With Opinion of Individual Justice in Chambers FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1998 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 516BV$$iii 10-22-98 07:02:00 PGT * frtbx n J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. DREW S. DAYS III, Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 516BV$$$iv 10-22-98 07:02:58 PGT * frtbx n SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1994 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. The opinion reported on page 1301 et seq. is that written in chambers by an individual Justice. Page A. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services . . . . . . . . 880 A.; New Mexico Dept. of Human Services v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 AAA Standard Service, Inc.; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Aaron v. Wichita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Aaron Smith Trucking Co. v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Abbo v. Rossi, McCreery & Associates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Abbott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 ABB Robotics Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 ABC­TV; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 Abdul-Wadood v. Waples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Abdul-Wadood v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Ablang v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Abner v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services . . . 1149 Abofreka v. South Carolina Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . . . 822 Abramajtys; Bout v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Abramajtys; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Abramajtys; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Abrams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Abril-Peralta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Abulkhair v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Acapulco Smoke Shop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Acme Cash Register Co. v. AT&T Global Information Solutions 906 Acosta v. Strack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Acosta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 AC Rochester; Wynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Action for Children's Television v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1072 Acuna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Adams; Becherer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Adams v. Braxton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 v 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) vi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Adams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Adams v. Coombe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Adams v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Adams v. Fort Worth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Adams; Leger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 912 Adams v. Perini Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Adams v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,857 Adams v. Ware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Adamson v. Armco, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Adderly v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Adedeji, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Adepegba v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 886 Adhiyappa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 1171 Adkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Administrator, GSA; 60 Key Centre, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services; Cully v. . . 881 Aeroquip Corp., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Aetna Finance Co.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Aetna Life Ins. Co.; Gulf South Medical & Surgical Institute v. . . 814 Aflleje v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Africa v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Africa; Philadelphia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 African Enterprise, Inc. v. Scholes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Agbongiague v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Aged Hawaiians; Hawaiian Homes Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.; Crisan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.; DiDonato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Agra; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Agribank, FCB; Burgmeier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Agribank, FCB; Gupman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1069 Agribank, FCB; Leedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1003 Agubata v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Aguiar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Aguilera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Aguirre v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Aguirre-Cerda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Ahlstrom Recovery; Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 864 Ahmad v. Ortiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Ahmad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Ahmed v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK) . . . . . . 1045 Ahysen; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Air Courier Conf. of America/Int'l Comm. v. Postal Service . . . . 1171 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED vii Page Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . 866 AIU Ins. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Company-Conn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Akers v. Fitzgerald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Akinrinade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Akins v. Zeneca, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Akpan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Akron; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Alabama v. Cochran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Alabama; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Alabama; Fortenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Alabama; Gospodareck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Alabama; Hellums v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Alabama; Horsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Alabama; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Alabama v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Alabama; Kimpel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Alabama; Manning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Alabama; McWilliams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Alabama; Rieber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Alabama; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Alabama v. Tucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Alabama; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1018 Alabama; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Alacare Home Health Services v. Gadsden Regional Medical Ctr. 807 Aladics v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Alaska; Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation & Outdoor Council v. 906 Alaska; Alaska State Legislature v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Alaska v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Alaska; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1004 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. California Dept. of Food and Agriculture 1009 Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation & Outdoor Council v. Alaska 906 Alaska State Legislature v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Alba v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Albert v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Alberto Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Albino; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Alcan Aluminum Corp., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Alcarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Alcede; Saucier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Alden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Ret. Plan Benefits Comm. . . . 1009 Aleem v. State Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Aletor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) viii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Alexander; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Alexander v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Alexander v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . 813 Alexander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,878,1166 Alexander; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Alf v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co. v. Britz, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Ali-Abdur'Rahman v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Allan & Allan Arts, Ltd. v. Rosenblum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Allegheny Beverage Corp.; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Allegheny County; Beddingfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Allegheny County Industrial Dev. Auth.; American Atlas Corp. v. 1116 Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Allen v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Allen v. Aurora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Allen v. Hadden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Allen v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Allen v. Memphis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Allen v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Allen v. PaineWebber, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Allender v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Alleyn v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Allgood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1091,1104 Allicock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Allied Investment Corp.; Primedical, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Allison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1002 All Saints Health System, Inc.; Houston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Allstate Ins. Co.; Arnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Allstate Ins. Co.; Corrigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Allstate Ins. Co.; Lehto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Allstate Ins. Co.; Quackenbush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Allstate Ins. Co.; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Allstate Life Ins. Co.; Siguel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Johnsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Allum v. Bank of America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Ally v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Alspaugh v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Alston v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Alton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Alvarado-Saldivar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ix Page Alvey; Whalen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Alzanki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Amaral v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank . . . . . . . . 848 Amarillo; Webster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1142 Amchem Products, Inc.; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 American Atlas Corp. v. Allegheny County Industrial Dev. Auth. 1116 American Basketball Assn., Inc.; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.; Sanjuan v. . . . . . . 1159 American Cyanamid Co. v. Gorton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 American Cyanamid Co.; McKnight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 American Dairy Queen Corp.; Neff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 American Fork Investors; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 American Geophysical Union; Texaco Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 American Home Assurance Co.; Flinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson . . . . . . . . . 1067 American International Adjustment Co.; Boyette v. . . . . . . . . . . . 989 American International Ins. Co.; Arvelo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 American Legion v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 American Life & Health Ins. Co.; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 American Life League, Inc. v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 American Medical International, Inc.; National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 American National Can Co.; Tokhtameshev v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 American Red Cross; Barton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,1002 American Telecast Corp.; BMMG, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Chester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Olszewski v. . . . . . . . . . 906,1004 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . 908 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Shepherd v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Amerson v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Ames; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Amezola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Ammons v. Poliak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Amos v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Amparo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 AMTRAK; Ahmed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 AMTRAK; Gresham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Amwest Surety Ins. Co.; Mikkilineni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Andalman; Klein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Andaverde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Anderson v. Buell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Anderson v. Cunard Line Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Anderson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) x TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Anderson; Kern County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Anderson v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Anderson v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Anderson v. Northern Telecom, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Anderson; Northern Telecom, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Anderson; Remington Rand Univac v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Anderson v. Unisys Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Anderson; Unisys Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1000,1119,1149 Anderson v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Andolina; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Andolsek v. Kirtland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Andress v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Andrino-Carillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Andrisani v. Wiscot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Angel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Angelone; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Angelone; Grimm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Angelone; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Angelone; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Angelone; Paquette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1004 Angelone; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Angelone; Strickler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Angelone; Torcasio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Angelone; Townes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Angoff; International Assn., Entrepreneurs of America Ben. Tr. v. 1072 Anheuser-Busch, Inc.; Berardi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Aniton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Anne Arundel County; Gertz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 ANR Pipeline Co. v. Oklahoma Bd. of Equalization . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Antonelli v. Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Antonelli v. Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Antonelli v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Antwine; Bowersox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Anzalone; WesTech Gear Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Apache Corp. v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co.; David v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Arafati v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Araiza-Tovar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Arango de Cadavid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Aravanis; Somerset County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Arcata Graphics Fairfield, Inc.; Keystone Sanitation Co. v. . . . . . 928 Arce v. Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Archdiocese of Milwaukee; Pritzlaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xi Page ARCO Products Co. v. Graham Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Arevalo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Arias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Arias-Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Arias Santa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Arizona; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Arizona; Hinchey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Arizona; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Arizona; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Arizona; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Arizona; Mance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Arizona v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1155 Arizona; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Arizona; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Arizona; Rossi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Arizona; Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. . . . . . . 868 Arizona; Sizemore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Arizona; Stokley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Arizona; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Arizona; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Arizona; Willoughby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Arkansas; Forehand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Arkansas; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Arkansas; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Arkansas State Bd. of Law Examiners; Partin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Arkansas State Highway Comm'n; Kissinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Arkwright-Boston Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co.; Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. . . 1140 Armco, Inc.; Adamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Armendarez v. Shanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Armontrout; Whitmill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Armstrong; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1007,1040,1091,1109 Arndt v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1185 Arndt v. Pennsylvania State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Arnette v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Arnold v. Boatmen's Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Arnold v. Ray's Advertising Specialties, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Arrellano Gonzalez; Saenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Arroyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Arteaga v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Arthur v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Artuz; Bentley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Arvelo v. American International Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Arvin-Thornton v. Philip Morris Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Asay v. Florida Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Aseltine; Bills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Ashe v. Styles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Ashland; Route 17 Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Ashland Engineering; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Ashley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Ashley Memorial Hospital; Schueller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Askew v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Askin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Association of Frigidaire Model Makers v. General Motors Corp. 860 Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . 812 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Locomotive Engineers v. . . . . . . . . . . 152 Atchley v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Atkins v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Atkins v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Atkins v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Atlantic Equipment Engineers; Van Belle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. 938 Atlantic Properties Group, Inc.; Diebler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Rebel Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 AT&T Communications, Inc.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Atteberry v. Maumelle Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 AT&T Global Information Solutions Co.; Acme Cash Register Co. v. 906 AT&T Global Information Solutions Co.; Sac-Co Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 906 Attorney General; Ablang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Attorney General; American Life League, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Attorney General; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1155 Attorney General; Blackston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Attorney General; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1185 Attorney General; Perales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Attorney General; Swint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1149 Attorney General of Ala.; Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. 1045 Attorney General of Cal.; Association of National Advertisers v. 812 Attorney General of Fla.; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,982 Attorney General of Fla.; Fica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Attorney General of Fla.; Macri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1018 Attorney General of La.; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Attorney General of Minn.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Attorney General of Minn.; Pourzandvakil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Attorney General of Mont. v. Fort Belknap Indian Community of Fort Belknap Indian Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Attorney General of Mont.; Fort Belknap Indian Community of Fort Belknap Indian Reservation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xiii Page Attorney General of Nev.; Beals v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1003 Attorney General of N. J.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Attorney General of N. Y.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Attorney General of N. M.; Baca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Attorney General of N. M.; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Attorney General of Ohio; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Attorney General of Okla.; Spybuck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Attorney General of S. C.; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Attorney General of Tex.; Spearman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1069 Attorney General of Tex.; Ventura v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Attorney General of Wis. v. Time Warner Cable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Attorney Grievance Bd. of Mich.; McWhorter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Supreme Court of Ill.; Betts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 AT&T Technologies, Inc.; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Attwood v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Attwood v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,935 Attwood v. Palm Beach Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Attwood v. Sands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Attwood v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297,838,846,853,1055,1110,1170 Attwood v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Attwood v. Sprouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Atwood & Cherny; Greco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 A. Uberti & C. v. Cordova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 A. Uberti & C. v. Superior Court of Ariz., Pima County . . . . . . . 906 Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 1086 Audi Aktiengesellschaft; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Audubon Ins. Co.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Auer v. Robbins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Aura Systems, Inc. v. Frankston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Aurelia N. v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Family Services . . . . . 1030 Aurispa v. Texas Dept. of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Aurora; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Austin; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Austin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1084 Austin v. Upshaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Automobile Club Ins. Associates; Elfakir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1185 Automobile Workers; Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. . . . . . . . 866 Automotive Rentals, Inc.; McAdams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Avery v. Brodeur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Avery; Whitmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Avila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Avitt v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Ayala v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Azar v. Hayter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Azubuko v. Massachusetts Comm'r of Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 B. v. J. S. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Babbitt; Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Babbitt; Douglas County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1185 Babbitt; Spiegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Babchik; Spremo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Babcock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. . . 1140 Baca v. Udall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Bachstein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Bacon v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co.; Hearthside Baking Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co.; Maurice Lenell Cooking Co. v. . . . . . . 1117 Baena-Gabriel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Bailey; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Va. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Bailey v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Bair v. Burlington Northern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Baird v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Baird v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Baker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Baker v. Bank of Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Baker v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,982 Baker v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Baker v. Kansas City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Baker; Labankoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Baker v. Larrimer & Larrimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Baker v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Baker; Pataki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Baker v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,872,1097,1182 Baker Hughes, Inc.; Blakeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Bakst; Hemmerle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Baldelli; Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Balderson v. Balderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Baldwin; Nefstad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Ball v. Garrett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Ball v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Ballard v. Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1069 Bally v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Balmaceda, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Baloney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Baltimore City Police Dept.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page Baltimore County; Security Management Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Banaszak; Spigelski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Banco Popular de Puerto Rico; Executive Leasing Corp. v. . . . . . 861 Banda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Bane; Kemp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Banfield v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Bankers Trust Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Bank of America; Kieffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Bank of America Corp.; Allum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Bank of Bartlett; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Bank of Cal., N. A. v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Bank of Israel v. Lewin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Bank of N. D.; Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . 264,911 Banks v. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Banks; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Banks v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Banks; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Bankston & Lobingier; Cadle Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Banque Internationale A. Luxembourg S. A.; Reebok Int'l v. . . . 908 Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Pan American Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . 824 Barajas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Barakett v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Barbarine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Barber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Barbour; Merrill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1086,1155 Barcus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Bardney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815,1002 Baritsky v. (Baritsky) Siegler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Barkauskas v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Barklee Realty Co. v. Michetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Barklee Realty Co. v. New York City Dept. of Finance . . . . . . . . 1146 Barkley; Greany v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Barkley; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Barksdale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Barley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Barnard v. Jackson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Barner v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Barnes v. AAA Standard Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Barnes v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Barnes v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Barnes v. Pottstown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Barnett v. Bonaventure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Barnett v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Barnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1034 Barnette v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Barona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Barquero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Barragan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Barrett v. Fieldhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1003 Barretto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Barrino v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Barrios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Barry; Spaulding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bartholomew; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,1018 Bartlett; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Bartlett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Barton v. American Red Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,1002 Barton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Barwick v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Bascope-Zurita v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Basey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Baskin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Bass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Bastida v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Bastine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Bates v. Scorza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Baton Rouge; Chatterjee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Batten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Battiste v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Battle v. Duke Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Battle v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1003 Baugh v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Baugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Bauldwin v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Bauman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Bautista-Chavarriaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Baxter v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Baxter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Baxter Healthcare Corp.; Spectramed, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Bayh; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xvii Page Bayham; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Bayron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082,1131 Beaird v. Cody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Beals v. Del Papa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1003 Bean; BIC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Bean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Bear v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Beard; Rauser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Beasley v. Commonwealth Edison Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Beasley v. Hand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Beasley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1111 Beason; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Beavers v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Becherer v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Beckwith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Beckwith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Beddingfield v. Allegheny County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Bedney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Bedsole; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Bedson v. Clegg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Bedson v. Hendrickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Beeler v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Behrens v. Pelletier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Behringer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Beideman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Bell v. Bilandic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Bell v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Bell v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Bell v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Bell v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Bell; Oklahoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Bell v. Roddy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,889,899 Bell Atlantic Corp.; National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. . . . 415,1004 Benally v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1018 Beneficial Reinsurance Co.; Lindsay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Bennett v. Bogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Bennett v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Bennett v. Court of Appeals of Tex., Fifth Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,982 Bennett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,883,999,1092 Bennett Enterprises, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Bennis v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442 Bensalem Township v. Blanche Road Associates, I . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Bensalem Township v. Blanche Road Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bensalem Township; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Bentley v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Bentley v. Scully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Benton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Benton; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Beo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Berardi v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Berend v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Berg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Berg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Bergen Record Corp.; Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1066 Berger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,927 Bergmann v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,887,1033 Berkeley v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Berkley; Common Council of Charleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Berkley v. Itoba Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Berkson v. Silverman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Bernard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1143 Bernard; Moss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Bernardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Bernas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Berry v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1097 Berry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135,1162 Bethancourt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Betts v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Su- preme Court of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Betts v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Beyer; Barrino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Beyer; Ducret v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Beyer; Kiett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Beyer; Prather v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Beyer v. Simmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Bhardwaj v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Bibbs v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 BIC Corp. v. Bean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Bienvenu; Lightfoot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Bierman; Lucien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd.; Versa Products Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Biggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Biggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Bilandic; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Bilandic; Brazil-Breashears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1003 Bilder v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix Page Biles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Billings, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1143 Billiot v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Bills v. Aseltine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Binnick v. Lancaster County Personnel Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1069 Bin Wu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Birges v. Nevada Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Bishop v. State Bar of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1003 Bishop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Biskup v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Bivins v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Black v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Black; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Black v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Blackburn; Rochon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Blackmon v. Essary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Blackmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Blackston v. Heffler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Blackston v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Blackwell Health Center for Women; Knoll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Blackwell Land Co.; Roden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Blair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Blake v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1016 Blakeney v. Baker Hughes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Blakeney v. Lomas Information Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Blalack; Hennessey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Blanche Road Associates, I; Bensalem Township v. . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Blanche Road Corp.; Bensalem Township v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Blankenship; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Bledsoe; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Bliss; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Blodgett; McGinnis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Blount v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Blue v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Va. v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic . . . 1184 Blum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Blumeyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Blythe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,950 BMMG, Inc. v. American Telecast Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Board of Bar Examiners of Nev.; Garen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, Los Angeles; Jackson v. . . . . . . 995 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Board of Comm'rs, Eagle County; Colorado Springs v. . . . . . . . . . 1008 Board of Comm'rs, Jay County; Pro-Eco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Board of County Comm'rs of Lake County; Romero v. . . . . . . . . . 1073 Board of Ed. of Talbot County; Fischbach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Board of Immigration Appeals; Gandarillas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Board of Immigration Appeals; Gandarillas-Zambrana v. . . . . . . . 806 Board of Immigration Appeals; Gandarillos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Board of Managers of Winston Towers No. 4 Condominium Assn.; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; Roselin v. . . . . . . . . 1097 Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; Wodkiewicz v. . . 1056,1185 Board of Supervisors, Prince William County v. United States . . 812 Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 2; Tytor v. . 862 Board of Trustees of N. C. Local Governmental Employees' Re- tirement System; Kestler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Boatmen's Trust Co.; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Bocook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Boeing Co.; Torreblanca de Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Bogan; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Bogan v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Bogle v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Bolden v. PRC, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Bollwage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bolt v. Singleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Bolton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Boltz; Citizens Assn. for Sound Energy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Bomengo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Bona v. GNAC, Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Bonar v. Bonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Bonar v. Moser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Bonaventure; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Bonavolante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Bond v. O'Dea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,972 Bonds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Bonifacio Amparo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Bonin v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1142,1143 Bonito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Bonner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1075,1165 Bonta, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1034 Bonty, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1019 Booker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,886 Bookert v. Roth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Boone; Shown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Boone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1137 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi Page Booth v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Borch v. Hluchaniuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Borelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Borelli McNeil v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority . . . . 864 Borg; Fain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1018 Borg; Hegler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Borg; Tillman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Borjesson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Borkins v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1185 Borkoski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Borland International, Inc.; Lotus Development Corp. v. . . . . . . . 233, 1007,1040,1167 Borough. See name of borough. Bosley; Tyus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Bosse; Fritz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Bostian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Botchie v. O'Dowd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Boudreau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Boughton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1038 Boulden v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Boulton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Bourque; Oryx Energy Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Bout v. Abramajtys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Bouters v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Boutros Ghali; Corrinet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Bowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Bowen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Bowersox v. Antwine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Bowersox; Arndt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1185 Bowersox; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Bowersox; Feltrop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Bowersox; Lanasa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Bowersox; LaRette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,984,1005 Bowersox; O'Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1020 Bowersox; Sidebottom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,983 Bowersox; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1142 Bowersox; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Bowersox; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Bowie v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Bowles v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Bowles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Bowman; Heller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Bowsher; Ramey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Box v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Boyd v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Boyd v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1000 Boyd v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Boyd County v. US Ecology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Boyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,982 Boyett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Boyette v. American International Adjustment Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Boyle v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Bradburn; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Bradley v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Bradley v. Cantley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Bradley v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Bradley Univ.; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Bradshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Bradshaw v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Brady v. Brady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Brady v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Braga v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Brake v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third Dist. . . . . . . . . . 1147 Bram v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1142 Brandley v. Keeshan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Brandt v. Weiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Brannson v. Ely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1069 Branson v. Fletcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Branson v. Nott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Bras; California Public Utilities Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Bras & Associates; California Public Utilities Comm'n v. . . . . . . . 1084 Brasher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Braswell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Braun v. Willard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Brawner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Braxton; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Bray v. Brewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Braziel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Brazil-Breashears v. Bilandic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1003 Breazeale v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Breedlove, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Breedlove v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Breedlove v. Hart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Breedlove v. Tysons Manor Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Breeland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxiii Page Brett v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Brewer; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Brewer v. McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Brewer v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Brewer v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1123 Brewer; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Brice v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Brickley; McPherson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Briddle v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1034 Bridewell; Cincinnati Reds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Brien; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Brien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Brigano; Pollock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Bright v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Bright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Brigman v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Brink v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Brinkley v. Skjonsberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1085 Brisbon v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.; Royce Laboratories, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1026,1067 Britt; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Britton v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Britz, Inc.; Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Broccoletti; MacLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Brock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Brocklebank v. English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Brockton; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Brockway v. East Central Mental Health Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . 1132 Brodeur; Avery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Broida v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Brooks v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Brooks; Parkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Brooks v. United Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Brooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Brooks v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Broome County Government; Escamilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1041,1110 Brown; American Legion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Brown v. Audubon Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Brown; Counts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Brown; Field v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Brown; Haywood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Brown; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Brown v. Kilgore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Brown v. Lensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Brown v. Maintenance & Industrial Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Brown v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Brown v. Mazzola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Brown v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Brown v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Brown; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Brown; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Brown v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Brown v. Odom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Brown; Osborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Brown; Polk County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Brown; Prenzler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1109 Brown; Roaquin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Brown v. Robey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Brown; Sheheed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Brown; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1033 Brown; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1086 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857, 878,883,917,942,990,1024,1032,1068,1083,1111,1132,1166 Brown v. Varner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,982 Brown v. Washington Redskins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1109 Brown; Zuspann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Brown Daltas & Associates v. Northbrook Excess Surplus Ins. Co. 822 Brownell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Browner; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Browner; Employers Ins. of Wausau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Browner; Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Brown Group, Inc.; Food and Commercial Workers v. . . . . . . . . 930,1091 Browning v. Fourteen Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Browning-Taylor v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Brownlow v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Brown Shoe Co.; Food and Commercial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . 930,1091 Broxmeyer; Elie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Brozek-Lukaszuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Bruce v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Bruckner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Bruno v. Mele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Brunson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,980 Brunswick Corp.; Carstensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Bryant, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,961,1089 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxv Page Bryant v. McDade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Bryant v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Bryant v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Bryant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Bryant; Sylvester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Bryant-Bey v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Buchanan; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Buchanan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,970 Buchbinder v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,1048 Buell; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Buena Vista Charter Township; Fairchild v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Buena Vista Charter Township; Fairchild Waste Control v. . . . . . 864 Buffalo Municipal Civil Service Comm'n; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Bui v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Bullard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Bullis v. Froehlich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Bumpass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Bunch; New Lebanon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Buntin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Buoscio v. Spade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Burch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1136 Burchard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Burchill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Burchill v. Steinberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Burden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Bureau of Prisons; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Burgess v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Burgess-SAIA, Inc.; Hoffman Controls Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Burgmeier v. Agribank, FCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Burk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Burkitt; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Burley v. Gulbranson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Burlington; Cleland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Burlington Air Express, Inc. v. Georgia Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . 989 Burlington Northern R. Co.; Bair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Burnett; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1018 Burnette v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Burns v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Burns; Leeco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Burns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1066 Burnside v. Lattimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Burnside v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Burpo v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Burr v. O'Boynik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Burris v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1064 Burroughs Wellcome Co.; Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Burroughs Wellcome Co.; Novopharm, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Burrus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Burton v. Economus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Burton v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Burton v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Burton v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Burton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Burton Berger & Associates; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Burtzloff; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1069 Busby v. Hollywood Ardmore Cooperative, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Buser v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Bush v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Bush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Bush v. Vera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Bustamante, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1089 Bustamante v. O'Connor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bustamante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Bustos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Butler v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Butterworth; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,982 Butterworth; Fica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Butterworth; Macri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1018 Buys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Byrd v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Byrd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Byron v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Caamano-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Cadle Co. v. Bankston & Lobingier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Cadotte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Caesar v. Marshal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Cain; Bastida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Cain; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Cain; Burnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cain v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Cain; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Cain; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Cain; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Cain; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Cain; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1155 Cain; Jason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii Page Cain; Macon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Cain; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Cain; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Cain; Whitmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Caldera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Calderon; Bonin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1142,1143 Calderon v. Douglas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Calderon; Irons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Calderon v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Calderon; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Calderon; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Caldwell v. American Basketball Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Calhoun v. Huskisson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Calhoun; Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 California; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 California; Aguirre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 California; Avitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 California; Ayala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 California; Beeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 California; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 California; Boulton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 California; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 California; Cain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 California; Caudle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 California; Champion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 California; Charash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 California; Chase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 California; Collier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1003 California; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 California; Crittenden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 California; Curtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 California; Czekaj v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 California; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 California; Dillier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 California; Downing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 California; Dubria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 California; Etemad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 California; Fleming v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 California; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 California; Galloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 California; Grajeda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 California; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 California; Iniguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 California; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page California; John R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 California; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 California; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 California; Mansori v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 California; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 California; Matian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 California; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 California; Mayfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 California; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 California; Mendizaval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 California; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 California; Newton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 California; Owen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 California; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 California; Ploneda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1143 California; Rodrigues v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 California; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 California; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 California; Sheffield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 California; Sipe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 California; Sneed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 California; Stansbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 California; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 California; Whisenand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 California; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 California; Wims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 California Circuit Judge; Labankoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 California Dept. of Corrections; Gerwig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 California Dept. of Food and Agriculture; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 1009 California Dept. of Motor Vehicles; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 California Dept. of Parks and Recreation; Castillo v. . . . . . . . . . . 887 California Federal Bank; Heimermann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 California Public Utilities Comm'n v. Bras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 California Public Utilities Comm'n v. J. Jack Bras & Associates . . 1084 California State Bar; Owen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 California State Univ. at Los Angeles; Verdugo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Callahan; Gilday v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Callahan v. Liacos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Callahan v. Simmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Calles; Marian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Calvi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Camboni v. Whiten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Cameron; Foti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1003 Cameron v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxix Page Campbell v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Campbell v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Campbell v. Florida Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Campbell; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Campbell; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Campbell v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,926,1063 Campbell; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Campos Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Campoy; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Camyn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1069 Canadian General Ins. Co. v. Domtar, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Canan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Canaveral Port Authority v. Longshoremen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Cancel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Candela v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Candelaria v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Cane; Worcester County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Canez v. Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Canizales-Satizabal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Cannady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1130 Cannon v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Cannon; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Cannon v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,979 Cantley; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Cantrell v. Norcal/San Bernardino, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Capaul; Crill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Capital Blue Cross; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Capital Wholesale Electric, Inc. v. McCarthy Construction Co. . . 816 Carbajal-Ceja v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Cardinal IG Co.; Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Carey v. St. Theresa School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1154 Cargill, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Carithers; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Carlow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Carlsbad v. Warren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Carlsbad Municipal School Dist. v. Daddow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Carlton; Cotham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Carlton; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Carman v. Saunders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Carmen-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Carmichael v. Riveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Carnahan; Judy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Carnahan; Pankey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1004 Carnahan; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Carpenter v. Condon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Carpenter; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Carpenter v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Carpenter; Waite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conf. Bd.; Pacesetter Constr. Co. v. 802 Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund-Detroit; CMK Constr., Inc. v. 866 Carper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Carr v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Carr v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Carr v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Carr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1182 Carrafa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Carreiro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Carriere v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Carriger; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Carrington v. Transport Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Carroll; Litton Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Carroll v. Lorson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Carson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1089 Carson; Kowalski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Carson v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Parole Division . . . . . 1012 Carson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Carson City Council; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Carter v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Carter v. Fenner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Carter; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Carter v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,896,1132 Carter v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Carton v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Cartwright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Carver; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Carver State Bank; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Casale; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Casalino, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Casalis-Noy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Casarotto; Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Casco Northern Bank, N. A.; Tobin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Casellas; Salas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Casey; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Casey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Casey, Gerry, Casey, Westbrook, Reed and Hughes; Squire v. . . . 1125 Cash v. Los Angeles County District Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Caspari; Koonce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Cassell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1169 Castanon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Castellano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Castillo v. California Dept. of Parks and Recreation . . . . . . . . . . 887 Castillo-Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Castor; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Castriotta v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Castro Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Caswell; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Caudle v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Causley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Cavan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1019 Cavin v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1012,1099 Cazey v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 CCC Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports . . 817 Celestine v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Cemaj v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Centeno-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Center for Humanities, Inc.; Gasperini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund v. Rheem Mfg. 1146 Century 21-Award Properties; Loken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Cerney; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Cerullo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Cetus Corp.; Sicor Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Chadima; National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1139 Champion v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Champion; Romo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Champion; Rushing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Champion; Spybuck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Chandler v. Circuit Court of Va., Va. Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Chandler v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Chang v. Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Chaparro v. Easton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Chapel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Chapleau; Cremeans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 516repp12a 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Chapleau; Stamper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Chapman v. Burton Berger & Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Chapman v. Currie Motors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Chapman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Charash v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Charles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Charleston v. Public Service Comm'n of W. Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Charleston v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Charlotte County Sheriff's Dept.; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Charlton v. Crandell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Charlton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Chartwell Financial Corp.; Neben & Starrett, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Char Yigh Marine (Panama) S. A., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Chase v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Chase Packaging Corp. v. Super Sack Mfg. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Chassin; Moss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Chater; Dumaguin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1143 Chater; Elias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Chater; Garchow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Chater; Henley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Chater; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Chater; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,971 Chater; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Chatfield, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Chatterjee v. Baton Rouge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Chauncey v. Chauncey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Chauvin International Ltd.; Goldwitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1068 Chaves v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Chavez v. Copper State Rubber of Ariz., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Chavez; Keat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1182 Chavez-Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Chavis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Cheatham v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Chemalali v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Chemical Bank; Woodcock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Chersin v. Machine Tool Finance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,973 Chesapeake B & M, Inc.; Harford County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va.; United States v. 415,1004 Cheshire Medical Center v. W. R. Grace & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Chesney; Hutchinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Chester v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page Chester; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Chevrolet Country, Inc.; Gross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Chia v. Motorola Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1142 Chia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1019 Chicago; Lucille v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Chicago; Pudlo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Chicago Police Dept.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., 6th Judicial Circuit; Harrison v. 926 Chief Justice, Probate and Family Court of Mass.; Greco v. . . . . . 1154 Chigbo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Childress v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098,1164 Childs v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Chiles; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Chirico v. Newtown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Choctaw; Pointon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Chong Yong v. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Southern Cal. . . . . . . . . . 1173 Choudhary v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Choudhary v. Vermont Dept. of Public Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Chow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Christensen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Christian v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Christman; Silvestri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Christmas Log Homes; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Christopher; Cuban American Bar Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Christunas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Christy v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Christy; Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Chronister v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Chrysler Corp.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Chrysler Corp. v. Lee Janssen Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Lee Janssen Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Chu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Chudnovsky, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Chudson v. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Chuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Chums, Ltd. v. Snugz/USA, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Chun; Woodruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Church v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Churchich; Ruckel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Chu Tay Thuong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Ciba-Geigy Corp., Research Dept.; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Cichon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Cimermancic v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Orangeburg Sausage Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1033 Cincinnati Reds v. Bridewell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Cinel v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Cintron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Circuit Court of Mich., Ingham County; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Circuit Court of Va., Va. Beach; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Circuit Court of Va., Va. Beach; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Circuit Judge, Craighead County; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1018 Cisneros; Federal Housing Partners IV v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Cisneros; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Cisneros; Snelling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Cisneros; Stuckey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Cisneros v. U. D. Registry, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Citibank, N. A.; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Citibank, N. A., Branch No. 11; Moretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Citibank (S. D.), N. A.; Smiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Citizens Assn. for Sound Energy v. Boltz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Citizens Bank; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . 807 Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Citizens Preserving America's Heritage, Inc. v. Harris . . . . . . . . 803 City. See name of city. C. J. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Claiborne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Claireayant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Clapp, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Clapp v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Clark v. Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Clark v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Clark v. Fancher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Clark v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Clark; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,968,1015,1058,1061,1064,1181 Clarke; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Clarke v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Clarke; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Clarkson; Carlos de Caceres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Class of 48+1 and Intervenor Plaintiffs v. Greenblatt . . . . . . . . . . 863 Class Plaintiffs in MDL­551; Public Utility Dist. No. 1, Snohomish County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Clawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1119 Clay v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Clay v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Clay County; Silver Rose Entertainment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page Clayton v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Clayton v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Cleary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Clegg; Bedson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Cleland v. Burlington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Clemente v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Clemmons v. Stotts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Clency v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Cleveland; Bram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Cleveland; Term Auto Sales, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Cleveland Industrial Square, Inc. v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1085 Clinton; Cossett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Clinton; Tsimbidaros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Cluck v. Osherow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 CMK Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund-Detroit 866 Coalition for Free and Open Elections v. McElderry . . . . . . . . . . 813 Coalter; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Coats; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Cobb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Cochran; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Cochran; McNamara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1085 Codario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Cody; Beaird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Cody; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Cody; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Coe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1018 Cofer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Coffey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Coffie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Coffin v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Coggeshall Development Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Cohen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Coker v. Redick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Colberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Coldwell Banker & Co.; DeMauro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Cole v. McVicar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Cole v. Milwaukee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1167 Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1163 Coleman v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Coleman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,980 Coleman v. Vacco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Colen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Collier v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1003 Collings v. Longview Fibre Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Collins; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Collins; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Collins v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Collins v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Collins v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Collins v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,898,1000,1060 Collins v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Colon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Colonel v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services . . . 967 Colon-Pizarro; Martinez-Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Colorado; Crouch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Colorado; Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1111 Colorado; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Colorado; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Colorado; Maruca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Colorado; Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Colorado; Wilczynski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Colorado Dept. of Corrections; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC . . . . 1036 Colorado Springs v. Board of County Comm'rs of Eagle County . 1008 Colorow v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Colton; Connecticut v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Columbia Convalescent Center v. Georgia Dept., Med. Assistance 1046 Columbia Forest Products, Inc.; Sargent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Slaughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Columbia Natural Resources, Inc.; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery . . . . . . . . 864 Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc.; Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. 938 Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc.; Darlak v. . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc.; Grimm v. . . . . . . . . . . 990 Colville; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Comanche Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hovis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Combs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Commissioner; Albertson's, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Commissioner; Berend v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Commissioner; Buchbinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,1048 Commissioner; DeMauro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,936 Commissioner; Droz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Commissioner; Erhard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Commissioner; Fair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Commissioner; Gehl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page Commissioner; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1068 Commissioner; Karim-Panahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Commissioner; Keogh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Commissioner v. Lundy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Commissioner; Mach-Tech, Ltd. Partnership v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Commissioner; McNeel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Commissioner; Nightengale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Commissioner; Parras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Commissioner; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Commissioner; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Commissioner; Rossman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Commissioner; Rushton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Commissioner; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Commissioner; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Commissioner; Twenty-Three Nineteen Creekside, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1154 Commissioner; Weissmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Commissioner, Minn. Dept. of Revenue; Boyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Commissioner, N. Y. State Dept. of Taxation and Finance; Ver- mont Information Processing, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks; Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks; Maresca v. . . . . . . . . . 1075 Commissioner of Social Services of New York City; McReynolds v. 1123 Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims Against Pow- erine Oil Co.; Koch Oil Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Common Council of Charleston v. Berkley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth Edison Co.; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Como v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Compact Video Services, Inc.; Theatrical and Stage Employees v. 987 Compagnie de Reassurance d'Ile de France v. New England Rein- surance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Comptroller General of U. S.; Ramey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Comptroller of Currency; First National Bank & Trust, Wibaux v. 1024 Comstock & Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 ConAgra, Inc. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Conaway v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Conboy v. T. Rowe Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Concept Design Electronics & Mfg., Inc.; Duplitronics, Inc. v. . . . 812 Concord; Martel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1003 Condon; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Coney v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Conference of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church v. Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church . . . . . 965 Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc.; Brach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Conklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Conlee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1018 Connally v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Connecticut; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Connecticut v. Colton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Connecticut; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Connecticut; Kirton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Connecticut; Ricketts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Connecticut; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Connecticut; Spears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Connecticut Dept. of Transportation; DeMilo & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 941 Connell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Connett v. Justus Cylinder-Technology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Connett v. Justus Enterprises of Kansas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Connick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Connors v. Sterling Milk Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Conoco, Inc.; Fransen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.; O'Connor v. . . . . . . . . 973,1040,1092 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Consolidation Coal Co.; Newman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Consolo; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Contel Cellular Inc. v. Leaf River Valley Cellular Telephone Co. 1145 Continental Oil Co.; Ruyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1004 Contra Costa County v. Visness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Conway; Sales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Coody v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Cook; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Cook v. Moyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Cook; Pankey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1004 Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1135 Cook v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1167 Cooke v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Coombe; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Coombe; Forman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Cooper; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Cooper v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Cooper v. Lombardi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Cooper; Nowicki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Cooper v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1007,1027 Cooper; Perlmutter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Cooper; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Cooper v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Cooper-Jolley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. . . . 913 Copeland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Copper State Rubber of Ariz., Inc.; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Corcoran; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Cordell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Cordova; A. Uberti & C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Cornish Shipping Ltd. v. International Nederlanden Bank N. V. . 867 Corpus Christi Independent School Dist.; Buser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Correa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Correll v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Correo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Corrigan v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Corrigan; Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Corrigan v. Newaygo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Corrinet v. Boutros Ghali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Cortez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Cosky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Cossett v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Cossey v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Costco Wholesale Group Benefits Program and Concept Adminis- trators, Inc.; Winters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Cotal-Crespo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Cotham v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Cotton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Cotton; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Couch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Coulter v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Country Fair; Young's Deli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Country Fair, Inc.; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Counts v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 County. See name of county. Courter; Solem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Court of Appeal of Cal., Second Appellate Dist.; Maxson v. . . . . . 1129 Court of Appeals. See also U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals of Tex., Fifth Dist.; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,982 Court of Civil Appeals of Ala.; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Cousins v. North Carolina Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Cousins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Covarrubia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Cover; Neighbour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Covillion v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Covington; District of Columbia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Cowan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Cox v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,991 Cozad v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 C & P Telephone Co.; Vincent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1069 Craig, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Craig v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Crandell; Charlton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Crandon v. Dunnick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Crane v. Snider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Craner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Crawford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Crawford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Crawford v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Crawford v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,982 Crawford v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1033 Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1065 Creative Tours Micronesia, Inc.; Islam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Cree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Creel; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Creese; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Cremeans v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Crepeau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Creque v. Creque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Crespo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,900 Crill v. Capaul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Crisan v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Crittenden v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Crittenden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,923 Crocker; Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Crocker; Union Security Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Cromwell v. Securities Service Network, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Cronn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Crosby; Rowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Cross v. Noles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Cross v. Superior Court of Cal., San Mateo County . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,955,1069,1139 Crossen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Crosson; Goetz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Crouch v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Crowder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Crowder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,937,1057 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Crowe v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Crowell v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 C. R. S. v. T. A. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Crucible, Inc.; Nobers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Cruise; Mueller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Crum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Crumpton v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Cruz v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 CSH­1 Hotel Ltd. Partnership; Janneh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Csorba v. Varo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1085 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Fritsch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 CSX Transportation, Inc.; Hester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Cuban American Bar Assn., Inc. v. Christopher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Cucciniello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Cuda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Cudjoe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Cuenca v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Cueto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Cuevas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Culbreath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Culkin v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Cullum; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1142 Cullum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Cully v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services . . . 881 Cully v. Sweeney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Culver City; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Cumming v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Cummings; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Cummings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,823 Cummins Atlantic, Inc.; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Cunard Line Ltd.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Cunningham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Cunningham v. Whittier Union High School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Cuomo; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1167 Curiale v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1004 Curiale v. Sedwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Curley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Currie Motors, Inc.; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Curry v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,949 Curtis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Curtis v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Curto; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Customer Co. v. Sacramento . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Czekaj v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Czekala v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 D. v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Daddow; Carlsbad Municipal School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Dade County; Neely v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Dade County Auto Tag Office; Gowin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Daggett v. Krebs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Dailey v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Dailey v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Dalberto v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1002 Daley; Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust; Porter-Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust v. Shadburne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust v. Shadburne-Vinton . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Dallas County; Timmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Dalton v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Dalton; Holbrook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474 Dalton; Posey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Daly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Dameron, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Damian v. Galayda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Damon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Damron; Herzog v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Damron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Damrow; Musser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Danger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Daniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1015,1134 Daniels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Danielson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd. v. Newcomb . . . . . . . . 1117 Danko, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1033 Dannenberg; Montgomery Securities v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 D'Antoni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Darlak v. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Daughenbaugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Daugherty v. El Paso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Daughtrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Daughtry v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Daughtry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Daves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page David v. Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Davidson v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Davila v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Davila v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Davis v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Davis v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Davis v. Britt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Davis v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Davis v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Davis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Davis v. Fandino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Davis v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,880 Davis v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Davis v. Hennepin County Dept. of Children & Family Services . 857 Davis v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Davis; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Davis v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Davis v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,896,925,971,1001 Dawdy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Dea v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Dean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082,1112,1184 DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn. . . . . . . . . . . 974 DeAngelis; El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . 974 DeBari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 DeBiasio; Illinois Central R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 DeBlasio; Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for West Amwell v. . . . . . . . 937 De Caceres v. Clarkson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Decker; Shackleford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Dedeaux; Lyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Dedes v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1019 Dedham District Court; Solimine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Deere, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1034 DeFranco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 De Galan; Ram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Degen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Deibler v. Atlantic Properties Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 DeJesus v. Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 DeJesus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Delamotte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Delaney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Delaware; Flamer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Delaware; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Delaware Dept. of Correction; Walls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Delco Development Co. v. Mechanics & Farmers Savings Bank . . 930 DeLeeuw; Stockenauer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 De Leon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Delgado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Delgado-Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 DeLoach v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Deloitte & Touche v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 DeLong; Kimberlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Del Oro Hills v. Oceanside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Del Papa; Beals v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1003 Delta Resources, Inc.; Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Delta Scientific Corp.; Nasatka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 DelVecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Demarey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 DeMauro v. Coldwell Banker & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 DeMauro v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,936 DeMay v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 De Mere v. Jain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 DeMilo & Co. v. Connecticut Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . 941 Demma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 DeMuth; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Denikov v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Denis-Lamarchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Denney v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Dennison v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Densmore v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Denver; Shafer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1069 Denver Area Ed. Telecom. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC . . . . . 973,1091,1104 Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Denvers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Department of Agriculture; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Department of Agriculture; Norinsberg Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Department of Army; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1142 Department of Army; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Department of Army; Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Department of Army; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Department of Commerce v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1035 Department of Defense; Germino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Department of Defense; Walmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Department of Ed.; Cuenca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Department of Health and Human Services; Raitport v. . . . . . . . . 969 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; Colonel v. . . . 967 Department of Housing and Urban Development; Ketchum v. . 898,1004 Department of Interior; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Department of Justice; Deutsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Department of Justice; Fazzini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Department of Justice; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Department of Justice; Manna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Department of Justice; Pollack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Department of Justice v. Rosenfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Department of Justice; Tsimbidaros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1069 Department of Justice; Zapon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Department of Labor; Stage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Department of Labor; Tamayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Department of Navy; Desmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Department of Navy; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Department of Navy; Kipen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Department of Navy; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Department of Transportation; Douglass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Department of Transportation; Hocker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration; Radio Assn. Defending Airwave Rights, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Department of Treasury; Blue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Department of Treasury; Stonehenge Insured Notes - I Ltd. Part- nership v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision v. Rapaport 1073 Department of Veterans Affairs; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Desir v. Jackson Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Desmond v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Desmond v. New Valley Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 DeSoto; Pryor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1185 DeSouza v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 DeTella; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 DeTella; Sutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Detroit Riverview Hospital; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Deutch; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Deutsch v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Deutsch v. Easterbrook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Deutsch; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 DeVault v. DeVault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Dever v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Devon v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 DeZaine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Diamond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Diamond Associates, Inc. v. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. 1045 Diaz v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Diaz v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Dick v. Peoples Bank of Bloomington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Dickerson v. United Parcel Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Dickey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Dickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Dickson County School Bd.; Settle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 DiDomenico; Regnante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 DiDonato v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Dieguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Diesslin; Saenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 DiFrisco v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 DiGirolamo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Dillehay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Dillier v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Dillon v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1019 Dingle v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Dinkins v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 DiNovo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. District Court. See also U. S. District Court. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fourth Dist.; Gilbertson v. . . . . 850 District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third Dist.; Brake v. . . . . . . . . . 1147 District Court of Cass County; Matuska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 District Court of N. D., Grand Forks County; Larson v. . . . . . . . . 859 District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District Judge for Jefferson County; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 District Justice, Dauphin County; Hoover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 District of Columbia; Chemalali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 District of Columbia v. Covington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 District of Columbia; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,982 District of Columbia; Irving v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 District of Columbia; Washington Service Contractors Coalition v. 1145 District of Columbia Court of Appeals; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . 988 Diversified Products Corp.; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Divine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Dixon v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,954 Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Dodds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Dodge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1061 Dodson; General Public Utilities Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Dodson; Sartin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Doe v. Harvard Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Doe v. Poritz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Doe; Portland Housing Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Doe v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Doe; Sikora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,951 Doe v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Dolenc v. Rollins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Dolenz v. Nationwide Indemnity Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1099 Dolphin v. Starkman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1142 Domanski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Domingo Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Domino's Pizza, Inc.; Bennett Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Domovich; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Domtar, Inc.; Canadian General Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Donahue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Donaldson Co. v. Nelson Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.; Mian v. . . . . . . . . 824 Donnelley Corp.; Lesko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Donnelley & Sons Co.; Mark I Marketing Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Dontzin; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Doolin Security Savings Bank, F. S. B. v. FDIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Doolittle v. National Credit Union Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Doria; Ryan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Dorman v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1018 Dormescore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Dorsey; Miles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Dorsey v. Ragans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Dorsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Dotson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1138 Dougherty County; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1085 Douglas; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Douglas County v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1185 Douglass v. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Dover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Dow; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Dowdy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Downey v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Downing v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Downs v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Doyle v. Time Warner Cable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Doyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Drago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Dragovich; Lumpkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Dread v. Maryland State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Drew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Drochner; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Droz v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Drummond Co.; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Dryden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Duarte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Dubisky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Dubois; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Dubria v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 DuCharme; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Duchi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Duckett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Duckworth; Glass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Duckworth; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1085 Ducret v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Duffy; Hockenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Duke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Dukes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Dukes; U. S. Healthcare, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Duke Univ.; Battle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Dumaguin v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1143 Dumas v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Duncan v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Duncan; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Duncan; Harju v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Duncan v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Duncan v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Duncan v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Dunker; Hopewell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Dunlap v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Dunn; Womack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Dunnick; Crandon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Duplitronics, Inc. v. Concept Design Electronics & Mfg., Inc. . . . . 812 Dupree v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Dupuy v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Duracraft Corp.; Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . 1067 Duran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Dusenbery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Duskin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Dutcher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Dutcher v. Sweeney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1143 Dutton v. Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Dutton; Villers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 D. W. Ferguson & Associates; Transportation Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. 823 Dwyer v. Millsaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1142 Dyke; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1002 Dynamic Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America . . . 864 Dynamics Research Corp.; Barbour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Eagleston v. Guido . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Eaglin v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Easley v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 East Brooks Books, Inc.; Memphis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 East Central Mental Health Services, Inc.; Brockway v. . . . . . . . 1132 Easter v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Easter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Easterbrook; Deutsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 East Hampden Assoc. Ltd. Partnership; Life Care Centers of Am. v. 1158 Easton; Chaparro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Eberhart, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1038 Ebershoff; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Echols, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1003 Echols v. American Fork Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Echols v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Eckankar; Geraci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Eckert v. Eckert's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Eckert's Estate; Eckert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Economus; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Edell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1089 Edelman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1038 Edelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Edge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Edina Realty, Inc.; Northwest Title & Escrow Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 809 Edinburg Hospital; Jeffrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Edmon v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Edmond v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Edmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,998 Educational Development Network Corp. v. United States . . . . . 818 Edwards; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Edwards v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Edwards v. Plant Guard Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Edwards & Sons, Inc.; Crisan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Edwards & Sons, Inc.; DiDonato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Egelhoff; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1109 Eglin v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ehrlich; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Eickleberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Einziger v. Jacobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Eisenstein v. Eisenstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Eke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Elagamy v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Elam v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 El-Attar v. Mississippi State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1185 El Dorado County; Misura v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Electrical Workers; Ghaemmaghami v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Electrical Workers; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Electrical Workers Local 58 Pension Trust Fund; Gregory v. . . . 916 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc.; Prince George's County v. . . . . 1010 1120 Central Condominiums Owners Assn. v. Seal Beach . . . . . . . 1047 Eley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Elfakir v. Automobile Club Ins. Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1185 El-Hawatky v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Eli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Elias v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Elias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Elie v. Broxmeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women; Knoll v. . . . . . . . . 1093 Elliott; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Elliott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Ellis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Ellisor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 El Paso; Daughtery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 El Paso; Woodall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 El Paso County Dept. of Social Services; L. G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn. v. DeAngelis . . . . . . . . . . 974 El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn.; DeAngelis v. . . . . . . . . . 974 Elramly; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Elred; Kentucky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 El Shahawy v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Elton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Ely; Brannson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1069 Embrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Emerson; Fernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Emerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Emery v. Merkel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Emmett v. Lawry's Restaurants, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Employers Resource Management Co. v. Shannon . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S. A. v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Eneria; Misano di Navigazione S. p. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Engelking v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Engle; Mauk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 English; Brocklebank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 English; VanSickle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Engstrom v. First National Bank of Eagle Lake . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Enis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Environmental Protection Agency; Chudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Epison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Epps; Spearman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Epstein; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 EEOC; Ghent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 EEOC v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 EEOC; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 EEOC; Steamship Clerks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Equicor, Inc. v. Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Erhard v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Erickson; Nicolaison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Erickson v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Ernst & Young v. Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection 975 Ervin v. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Escamilla v. Broome County Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Escareno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Escobedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Eslick v. Traughber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Eslinger, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Esparza v. Elliott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Espinal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Espinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Esqueda-Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Essary; Blackmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Esser v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Estache v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico; Rodriguez-Garcia v. . . . . 865 Estate. See name of estate. Estrada v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Estrada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1023,1065 E-Systems, Inc.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Etemad v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Etheridge v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Ethicon, Inc.; Luther v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Etim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Eubanks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Eubanks v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Evans v. Beason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Evans v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Evans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1065 Evatt; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1004 Evening Post Publishing Co.; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Everett v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Everhart, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Ewers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Executive Leasing Corp. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico . . . . . 861 Exxon Chemical Americas; Industrial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1091,1156 Exxon Corp. v. Youell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Eya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Eyerly; Mirin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 F. A. C. T. NET, Inc.; Religious Technology Center v. . . . . . . . . . 802 Fadem; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Fagley; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Failor v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Fain v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1018 Fair v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Fairchild v. Buena Vista Charter Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Fairchild Waste Control v. Buena Vista Charter Township . . . . . 864 Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc.; Merex A. G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Faison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1059 Fales v. Seinfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Falkoff v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Fancher; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Fandino; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Fanta v. Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1142 Fard v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Fares v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Farley; Meredith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Farm Credit Bank of Omaha; Tiffany v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Farmer v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Farmers Home Administration; Luft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Farmers Home Administration; Muirhead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Farr v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Farrell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1169 Farrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Farrington; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Farris v. Hallahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Faulhaber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Faulkner; Fulton Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Faulkner; Homesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Faulkner v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Faulkner; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Faulkner; Swanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Faust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Fausto-Rendon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Fautenberry v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Fazzini v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Fazzini v. Guzik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Fazzini v. Henman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Feaver v. LeClair's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Febre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Fechter v. Shiroky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Federal Aviation Administration; Sun Country Airlines, Inc. v. . . 1008 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Solimine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Federal Bureau of Prisons; Koff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 FCC; Action for Children's Television v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1072 FCC; Alliance for Community Media v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1091,1104 FCC; Denver Area Ed. Telecom. Consortium, Inc. v. . . . . 973,1091,1104 FCC; Levinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 FCC; National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 FCC; Pacifica Foundation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 FCC v. Radiofone, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,1301 FCC; Time Warner Entertainment Co., L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 FCC; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035,1110 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Chaves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Citizens Bank of Clovis v. . . . . . . . . . 807 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Doolin Security Savings Bank v. . . . . 973 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Gosbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Gurdon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Hanna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Mandel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Mears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Rice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 FEC; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. . . . . 1036 Federal Housing Partners IV v. Cisneros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Federal Land Bank of Spokane; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Federal Republic of Germany; Juels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Federation of Conn. Taxpayer Organizations v. Suggs . . . . . . . . . 976 Federick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Felder v. Montague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1069 Felici v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Feliciano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Felix-Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1033 Felker v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Felman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Felton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Feltrop v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Femia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Feminist Women's Health Center; Reali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Fenner; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Ferenc v. Reinosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1143 Ferguson v. Lamb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Ferguson; Prunty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,982 Ferguson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Ferguson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Ferguson & Associates; Transportation Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. . . . . 823 Fernandez v. Emerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Ferrante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Ferrari S. p. A.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Ferris v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Fica v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc.; Friedman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Ahysen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Fidel Santana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Field v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Field v. Mans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Fieldhouse; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1003 Fields v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Fields v. Brockton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Fields v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Fields v. McAnnally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Fields v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Fields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 15th Judicial District Court; Ledet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Filmservice Lab, Inc.; Jorgenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Finch v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Finch v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Fincher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Fine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Fink; Newkirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Finlay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Finnegan v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Finney v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Fioretti v. Massachusetts General Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 First Church of Christ, Scientist; Lundman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page First Gibraltar Bank, F. S. B.; Windham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 First Interstate Bank of Cal.; Weston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,934 First National Bank of Eagle Lake; Engstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 First National Bank of Md.; Kiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 First National Bank & Trust, Wibaux v. Comptroller of Currency 1024 First Pacific Bank v. Gilleran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Fischbach v. Board of Ed. of Talbot County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Fischbach & Moore, Inc.; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Fishell v. Soltow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Fisher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Fitten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Fitzgerald; Akers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Fitzgerald v. Bayham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Fitzgerald v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1165 Fitzgerald v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Fitzpatrick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Fitzpatrick; Greco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Flaherty v. National Marine Fisheries Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Flakes v. Norfolk Southern Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Flakt, Inc. v. Joy Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Flamer v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Flanagan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Fleming, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Fleming v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Fleming v. Greater St. Louis Area Major Case Squad . . . . . . . . . 819 Fleming v. United Parcel Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Flemmings v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Fletcher; Branson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Fletcher's Fine Foods, Ltd. v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Flick; McDaniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Flinn v. American Home Assurance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Flinn v. Plummer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Flint v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Florence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Flores v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Flores; Oklahoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Flores v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1179 Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,872 Flores-Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Flores-Peraza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Florida; Alf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Florida; Alspaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Florida; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,935 Florida; Barwick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Florida; Blount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Florida; Bogle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Florida; Bouters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Florida; Breedlove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Florida; Coney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Florida; Dailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Florida; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,880 Florida; Downey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Florida; Dupuy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Florida; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Florida; Finney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Florida; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Florida; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Florida; Gamble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Florida; Halstead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Florida; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Florida; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Florida; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Florida; Hildwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Florida; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Florida; Holly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Florida; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Florida; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Florida; Kolker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Florida; Koshel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Florida; Lockhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Florida; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Florida; Lowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Florida; Macri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Florida v. McLeod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Florida v. Miragaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Florida; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Florida; Pudder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Florida v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Florida; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Florida; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1052,1099,1142 Florida; Spaziano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Florida; T. B. D. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Florida; Vickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Florida; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Florida; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Florida; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Florida; Whitton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Florida; Windom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Florida Bar; Kohl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Florida Bar; Segal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Florida Comm'n on Ethics; Partin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services; Abner v. . . . 1149 Florida Parole Comm'n; Asay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Florida Parole Comm'n; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Florida Parole Comm'n; Treece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Florida Power & Light Co.; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Florio v. Skorepa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Flournoy v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Flowers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Floyd; Powers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 FMT Corp.; Nissei ASB Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Follette; Sam's Wholesale Club v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Follette; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Fondren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Fonseca-Machado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Fontanille v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Fontenot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . 930,1091 Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Shoe Co. . . . . . . . . . . 930,1091 Food and Commercial Workers; Gumbus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Food and Commercial Workers; Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods v. 1113 Food and Drug Administration; Schering Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 FoodScience Corp. v. Herschler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Ford v. Hoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Ford v. Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ford v. Rockford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Ford Life Ins. Co. v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Ford Motor Co.; Nesladek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Ford Motor Co.; Rothenbusch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Ford Motor Co. v. Tebbetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072,1154 Forehand v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Foren v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Forman v. Coombe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Fort Belknap Indian Community v. Mazurek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Fort Belknap Indian Community; Mazurek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Fortenberry v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Fort Myers v. Zipperer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Fort Myers; Zipperer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Fort Wayne National Corp. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue . . 913 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fort Worth; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Fossick; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Foster v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Foster v. Northwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Foti v. Cameron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1003 $405,089.23 in U. S. Currency; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1156 Fournier v. Magnusson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Fourteen Defendants; Browning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 40th Judicial Circuit Court; Hoyett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,982 Fowler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Fox v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Franchi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Francis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Francisco Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Franco-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co.; Zahran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Franklin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,929,1019 Franklin; Gibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Franklin v. Howes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Franklin v. Lawrimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801,1007 Franklin v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Franklin v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Franklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,840 Frankston; Aura Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Fransen v. Conoco, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Fraser v. Lintas: Campbell-Ewald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Fraser v. Pennsylvania System of Higher Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Frazier v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Frazier v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Fred v. Wackenhut Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,1019 Frederick v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Fred Lavery Porsche; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . 1111 Freehold Cogeneration Associates, L. P.; Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Freehold Cogeneration Associates, L. P.; New Jersey Division of Ratepayer Advocate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Freeman; Brigman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Freeman v. Dubois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Freeman v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Freeman; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Freeman v. Planning Bd. of West Boylston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Freeman; Planning Bd. of West Boylston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Freeman v. Simon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1002 516repp12b 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Freeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 French; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 French; Storer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Frey; Laswell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Fricker v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Friedman v. Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Friedman v. Grace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Friedman v. Grievance Committee for Southern Dist. of N. Y. . . . 1157 Friedman v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Friend; Kolodzieczak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Friend v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1157 Fritsch; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Fritz v. Bosse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Froehlich; Bullis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Fromal v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Fruit of the Loom v. Scearce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Fryar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Frye; Grubb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Fuentes v. Shanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1022,1029 Fuentes-Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Fuller v. Cummings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Fuller v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Fuller v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Fuller v. Wooten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Fulop v. Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Fulton County Bd. of Comm'rs; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Fultz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Furlong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Futrell v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 G. v. El Paso County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 G.; Hector M. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Gabovitch v. Shear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Gadsden Regional Medical Ctr.; Alacare Home Health Services v. 807 GAF Corp.; Janneh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Gafford; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Gaitan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Gajewski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1168 Galaviz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Galayda; Damian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Galindo v. Ingle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Galindo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Gallagher; Kailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gallaher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Gallego-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . 1132 Gallo-Chamorro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Galloway v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Galloway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,926 Gamble v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Gammon; Oswald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Gammon; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Gammon; Sales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Gandarillas v. Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . . . . 806 Gandarillos v. Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Gannett Outdoor Co. of Southern Cal.; Shin Chong Yong v. . . . . . 1173 Gan-Viejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Garchow v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Garcia; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Garcia v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Garcia-Rosell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Gardner v. Holden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Gardner v. Metropolitan Government Dept. of Codes . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Garen v. Board of Bar Examiners of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Garfield v. J. C. Nichols Real Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Garner v. Capital Blue Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Garner; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1033 Garner; DeLoach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Garner v. Hawaii Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Garner; Hickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Garner v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Garraghty; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Garrett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Garrett; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,998 Garvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Gary v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority . . . . . . 1011 Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Gaskins v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1003 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Gaster v. Parrott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Gaster v. State-Record Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Gaston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Gates; Fletcher's Fine Foods, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Gateway Playhouse v. Rosenblum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Gatewood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1001 Gaus; Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Gauthier, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Geddis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Gehl v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Gehrke v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 General Mills, Inc.; Ortaliza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 General Motors Acceptance Corp.; Winters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1004 General Motors Corp.; Association of Frigidaire Model Makers v. 860 General Motors Corp.; Cameron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 General Motors Corp. v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 General Motors Corp. v. Kansas City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 General Motors Corp.; Kilcrease v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 General Motors Corp.; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 General Public Utilities Corp. v. Dodson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. . . . . . . . . 1146 Genesee County; Wunderlich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Genetics Institute, Inc.; Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 907 Gensburg v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Gent v. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Gentry; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Gentry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Gentry v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 George v. Casale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 George v. Consolo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 George v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 George; Leggett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 George v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,953,1133,1135 George v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Georgia; Bright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Georgia; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Georgia; Cooper-Jolley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Georgia; Crowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Georgia; Dalton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Georgia; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Georgia; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Georgia; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Georgia; McMichen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Georgia; Mobley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Georgia; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Georgia; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Georgia; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Georgia; Wetta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Georgia Dept. of Corrections; Vining v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Georgia Dept. of Med. Assistance; Columbia Convalescent Ctr. v. 1046 Georgia Pacific Corp.; Burlington Air Express, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 989 Georgopapadakos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Geraci v. Eckankar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Gerdeman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gerken; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Germany; Juels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Germino v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Gersten v. Rundle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Gertz v. Anne Arundel County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Gerwig v. California Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Gesmundo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Gessa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Getty v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Getwell Bookmart and Airport Adult Theater; Memphis v. . . . . . 909 Ghaemmaghami v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Ghali v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ghanayem v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Ghazaleh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Ghazali v. Moran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Ghent v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Giampa, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Giampa v. Grievance Committee for Ninth Judicial Dist. of N. Y. 1009 Gibbs v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Gibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1000 Gibson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 G. I. Industries; Republic Waste Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Gil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Gilbert v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Gilbert v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Gilbert v. Spears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Gilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,923 Gilbertson v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fourth Dist. . . . . . 850 Gilbreath v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Gilchrist v. Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Gilday v. Callahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Giles v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Gilham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Gilkey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Gillard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Gilleran; First Pacific Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Gilmore; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Gilmore; Mallory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1069 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Gilmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Giovanni v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Giraldo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Girardi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Giseburt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Givan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Givens v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1003 Givens; Riggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Gizoni; Southwest Marine, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 G. K. A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Gladstone; Maloney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1003 Glant v. Glant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1128 Glant v. Lamb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,972 Glass v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Glass v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Glassman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Glaxo, Inc.; Novopharm Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Glickman; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Glover, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Glover v. Leonardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1068 Glover v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Glover v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Glover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Glover Bottled Gas Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 816 Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 GMFanuc Robotics Corp.; ABB Robotics Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 GNAC, Corp.; Bona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Goad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Gockley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Godinez; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Godinez; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Godinez; Whitlock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Godinez; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Goetz v. Crosson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Golden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Goldman v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . 838 Goldsmith; Mendenhall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Goldstock; Mansour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Goldwitz v. Chauvin International Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1068 Golini, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Gomez; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Gomez; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Gomez; Finch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gomez; Haverstock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Gomez; Lawrence Paper Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1060,1181 Gomez-Quinceno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Gomez-Villa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Gonnering; Stanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Gonzales v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Gonzales v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Gonzales v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Gonzalez v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Gonzalez v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Gonzalez; Saenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Gonzalez v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,900,902,924,927 Gonzalez v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Gonzalez Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Good; Arce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Goodall v. Stafford County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Gooding v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Goodman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Goodwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Gorby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Gordon; Gent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Gordon v. Peoria School Dist. 150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Gordon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,898,1016,1062 Gordon v. U. S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Gore; BMW of North America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Goris; Marian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1006 Gorman v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Gorton; American Cyanamid Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Gorwell v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Gosbee v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Gosier v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Gospodareck v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Gour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Government of Virgin Islands; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Government of Virgin Islands; Moncayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Governor of Cal. v. Voting Rights Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Governor of Fla.; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Governor of Ind.; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Governor of Mo.; Judy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Governor of Mo.; Pankey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1004 Governor of Mo.; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page Governor of Neb. v. Orr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Governor of N. Y. v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Governor of N. Y.; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Governor of N. C.; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Governor of N. C.; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Governor of Ohio v. Quilter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Governor of Tenn.; Rural West Tennessee African-American Af- fairs Council, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Governor of Tex. v. Vera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Governor of Virgin Islands; Kirnon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Govostis v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Gowin v. Dade County Auto Tag Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Grace; Friedman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Grace & Co.; Cheshire Medical Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Grace & Company-Conn.; AIU Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Graci; Spremo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Grady v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Graham v. Bayh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Graham v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Graham v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1033 Graham v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Graham v. Huebner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Graham v. Mengel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Graham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1183 Graham v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Graham Oil Co.; ARCO Products Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Grajeda v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Gramley; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Gramley; Miles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Granada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Granberry v. Heisner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Granberry v. Islay Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Grandlund v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Grant v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Grant; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Grantham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Granviel v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Grasmick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1019 Gray v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1037,1170 Gray v. New York Grievance Committee for Ninth Judicial Dist. 1044 Gray v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Gray; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1138 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Grayson; Densmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Grayson; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Grayson; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Greany v. Barkley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Great American Ins. Cos.; Walpole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Greater St. Louis Area Major Case Squad; Fleming v. . . . . . . . . . 819 Great State Beverages, Inc. v. Wenners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Greco v. Atwood & Cherny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Greco v. Fitzpatrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Green v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Green v. Carver State Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Green v. Citizens Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Green; Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Green; Oglesby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Green v. 25th Judicial Dist. Probation Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,882,924,1000,1098,1166 Green v. Ziegler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,982 Greenberg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1089 Greenberg v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Greenblatt; Class of 48+1 and Intervenor Plaintiffs v. . . . . . . . . . 863 Greenfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Greenwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Greer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Greer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Gregori v. Schwartz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Gregorio Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Gregory v. Electrical Workers Local 58 Pension Trust Fund . . . . 916 Gregory v. Thomas L. Jacobs & Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Grenell v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Gresham v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK) . . . . . 1045 Gresham v. Transportation Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Gresham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1065 Gribble v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Griego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Grievance Committee for Eastern Dist. of N. Y.; Jacobs v. . . . . . . 817 Grievance Committee for Ninth Judicial Dist. of N. Y.; Giampa v. 1009 Grievance Committee for Southern Dist. of N. Y.; Friedman v. . . 1157 Griffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Griffith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Grigsby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Grimm v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Grimm v. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Grisham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Griswold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Grogan v. Rocky Mountain Plateau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Grogan v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Groose; Brownlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Groose; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Groose; Hay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Groose; Schleeper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Groose; Shigemura v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Groose; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Groose; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Gross v. Chevrolet Country, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Grossi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,927,1004 Grubb v. Frye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Grubor v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Grunewald v. Katinsly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Grynberg v. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 GTE Cal. Inc.; Listerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1085 GTE Southwest Inc.; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Guerrero v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1000 Guess v. Gerken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Guess v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Guess v. Karnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Guess v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Guess v. Straight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Guess v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Guess v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Guest v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1154 Guey; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Guido; Eagleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Guido; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Guidry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Guillen-Garcia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . 1073 Gulbranson; Burley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Gulf South Medical & Surgical Institute v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. . . 814 Gulledge v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Gumbus v. Food & Commercial Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Gumm v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Gumport v. Sterling Press, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Gunderman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Gun Ho Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Gunn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,936 Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P. A.; Kanouse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Gunter; Heath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gunter v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Gupman v. Agribank, FCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1069 Gurdon v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Gurino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Gurley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Gust v. Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Guth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Guy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Guzik; Fazzini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Guzman Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 G. W. B. v. J. S. W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Haas v. U. S. Postal Service, c/o General Mail Facility, Pittsburgh 914 Haburn v. Wake County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Hackett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Hackett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Hadden; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Hager v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Hahn; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Haigler v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Hai Hai Vuong v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Hailey; Rutherford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1004 Hai Vuong v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Halderman; Lurie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1153 Hall; Clarke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Hall v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Hall; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Hall v. Paoli Orjales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Hall v. Savings of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Hall v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816,853,874,954,997 Hallahan; Farris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Halstead v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Ham v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1142 Ham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Hamamcy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Haman v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Hambrick v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hambrick v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Hamid v. Price Waterhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Hamilton; Fulop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Hamilton v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Hamilton v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Hammad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Hammond v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Hammoud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Hampton v. TransAmerica Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Hampton v. Valentine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Hamrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Hancock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Hand; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Hankins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Hanks; Higgason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Hanna v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Hanna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Hannigan; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1033 Hannigan; Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Hanrahan; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,984,1085 Hansel v. Town Court for Springfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Hansen v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1085 Hansen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Hansen; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Hansley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1014 Hanslmaier; Kalyon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc. v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Hardage Steering Committee; Jones-Blair Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Harder; Uhlrig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Hardester; Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Hardin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Hardy v. Orlando . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Hardy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Hare v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Harford County v. Chesapeake B & M, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Harford County v. Highway Craft, Gift & Book Store . . . . . . . . . 1010 Hargett; Edmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Hargett; Irving v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hargett; Mangum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hargett; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Hargett; Minor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Harju v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Harkins v. Scattered Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Harlem Men's Shelter; Holder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Harleston; Jeffries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Harper; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Harper v. Sutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Harper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Harper Woods; Woodpointe Inn Associates Ltd. Partnership v. . . 816 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Harpster, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Harrel v. University of Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813,1002 Harrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Harrelson v. Trippett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Harrington v. Fagley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Harris, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1019 Harris v. AT&T Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Harris v. Chicago Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Harris; Citizens Preserving America's Heritage, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 803 Harris v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Harris v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Harris; Joint School Dist. No. 241 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Harris v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Harris v. Missouri Dept. of Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Harris v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 878,896,899,924,1062,1120,1138,1165 Harris v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Harris County Outdoor Advertising Assn.; Houston v. . . . . . . . . . 822 Harrison; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Harrison; El Shahawy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Harrison v. Howard Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Harrison v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Harrison v. Ulmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Harrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,924 Hart; Breedlove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Hart v. Hart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1053 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.; Industrial Excess Landfill v. 819 Hartz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Harvard Univ.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Harvey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1006 Harvey v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County . . . . . . . . . . 838 Harvilchuck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Hasan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Hassan v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Hastings v. Small Business Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Hatboro; Mark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Hatcher; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Hatcher; Little v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Hatcher; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Hatcher; Roche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Hatchett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Hatten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Haughton v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Haversat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,1027 Haverstock v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Hawaiian Homes Comm'n v. Aged Hawaiians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Hawaii Dept. of Ed.; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Hawk; Irwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Hawk; Levi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Hawker Dayton Corp.; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Hawkins v. Abramajtys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Hawkins v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Hawkins v. Riveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1168 Hawks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Hawthorne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Hay v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Hayden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Hayes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Hayes v. Klincar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Hayes v. McVicar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,814 Haymond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Haynes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Hayter; Azar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Hayward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Haywood v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Haywood v. Veterans Administration Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . 885 Haywood County; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Hazel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Headley v. Tilghman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Healy Co.; Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . 1010 Hearthside Baking Co. v. Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Heater v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Heath, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1143 Heath v. Gunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Heath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Heatherly v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1018 Heavilin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Heckard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Hector M. v. Jessica G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Heffler; Blackston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Hegarty v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Hegler v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Heimermann v. California Federal Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Heirens v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Heise; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Heiser v. Umbehr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Heisner; Granberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Heller v. Bowman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Heller; Milton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Hellums v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Helton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Hemken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hemmerle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Hemmerle v. Bakst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Hemphill v. Housing Authority of Charleston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Henderson v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Henderson; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Henderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,983,1181 Hendricks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1089 Hendrickson; Bedson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Henley v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Henman; Fazzini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Henneberry; Herbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Hennepin County Dept. of Children & Family Services; Davis v. 857 Hennessey v. Blalack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Henniker; Homo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1099 Henry v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Henry v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Henry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Henry; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Hensley; Higdon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Henson; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Hepburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Herbert v. Henneberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Hercules, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Hereford v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Hern; Weil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hernandez v. Florida Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Hernandez v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hernandez v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Hernandez v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,954,1082,1158 Hernandez-Avalos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . 826 Hernandez-Nunez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Hernandez-Solis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Herrera-Isais v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Herschler; FoodScience Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Hersey; Lowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Herzog v. Damron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Hess v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Hester v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hewitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Hewlett v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,982 Hewlett-Packard; Witty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Hewlett-Packard Colo., Inc.; Witty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Hiatt v. Union Pacific R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hickman v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Hicks v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Hicks v. Superior Court of Cal., San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Hicks-Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Hickson v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Higdon v. Hensley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Higgason v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Higgins v. Cuomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1167 Higgins v. Ehrlich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Higgs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 High v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1154 Highland Falls-Ft. Montgomery Cent. School Dist. v. United States 820 Highlands v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Hightower; Suttles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Highway Craft, Gift & Book Store; Harford County v. . . . . . . . . 1010 Hildwin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Hiles; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 Hill v. Chester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Hill v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Hill v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hill v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,900,969,970,1065,1133 Hiller Systems, Inc. v. Servis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Hillis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hills, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Hillsborough County; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Hilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Hilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Hilton Davis Chemical Co.; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hilton Head Island; Long Cove Club Associates, L. P. v. . . . . . . 1029 Hiltz; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Hinchey v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Hindi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Hindo v. University of Health Sciences/Chicago Medical School . . 1114 Hines, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hines v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Hines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1064,1156 Hines v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hinton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Hirano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Hluchaniuk; Borch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Ho v. Illinois Power Co., Clinton Power Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Hoang, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1034 Hobbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Hochberg v. Howlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Hochschild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Hock v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Hock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Hockenberry v. Duffy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Hocker v. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Hodge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Hoeck v. Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Hofer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hoffman Controls Corp. v. Burgess-SAIA, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Hogan v. Lake Barrington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hoke; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Hoke; Todd Shipyards Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Ho Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Holbrook v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Holcomb, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1145 Holden; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Holder v. Harlem Men's Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Holiday Inn Arena; Janneh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. McNeely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Holland; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1069 Hollie; Korean Air Lines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Holliness v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Hollingsworth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Holloway v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Holloway; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Holloway v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Holloway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Holly v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Hollywood Ardmore Cooperative, Inc.; Busby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Holman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Holman v. Udall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Holmes; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Holmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,968 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Holsey v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Holston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Holt; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Holt v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Holt; Gilchrist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Holt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Holtzman; Knott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Holywell Corp., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Holywell Corp. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1154 Homesley v. Faulkner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Homestead Ins. Co. v. Zoppo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Hommerding v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Homo v. Henniker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1099 Homrich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Honda Motor Co. v. Satcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Honda Motor Co.; Satcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Honeywell, Inc.; Sahar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Honickman; G. K. A. Beverage Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Honn; R. J. Steichen & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Hood; National Enquirer, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Hood v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Hood v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hooker v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Hooker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Hooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Hooper v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Hooper v. Perrino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Hoover v. Yanich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Hopewell v. Dunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Hopewell Cogeneration Partnership v. Virginia Corp. Comm'n . . 817 Hopgood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Hopi Tribe; Navajo Nation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Hopkins; Krimmel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Hopkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Hoppmann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1038 Horn; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Horsley v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Horsley v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Horton v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Horton v. Monroe Systems for Business, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Hosea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Hospital San Rafael, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 927 Hotel Employees; Testa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1003 Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hourihan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 House of Representatives; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Housing Authority of Charleston; Hemphill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Housing Authority of Sac and Fox Nation v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Houston v. All Saints Health System, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Houston; Dutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Assn. . . . . . . . . . 822 Houston v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Houston v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Houston; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Houston Industries, Inc.; Norton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Hovis; Comanche Indian Tribe of Okla. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Howard; Dailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Howard; Huber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Howard; Sexton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Howard; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Howard Univ.; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Howe; Varity Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489,911 Howell v. Mauzy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Howell v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Howes; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Howlett; Hochberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Hoye v. Rickards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Hoyett v. 40th Judicial Circuit Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,982 Hoyte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Hubbard v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Hubbard v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Hubbard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1175 Huber v. Howard County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Hudgins v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Hudgins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Hudson v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Hudson; Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,890 Huebner; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Huebner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Huerta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Huerta Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Hueszel; Shannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Huet-Vaughn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Huff; Shumate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hughes v. Bedsole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Hughes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,904,1135 Hughes Aircraft Co.; Senter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Hughes, Hubbard & Reed v. Robbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hugley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Hull v. Sims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Hull v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Hume v. Sterling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Humphrey; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Humphrey; Pourzandvakil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Humphrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Hundley; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Hundley; Jeffries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Hunt v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Hunt v. Cody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hunt v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1142 Hunt v. Nuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Hunt; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Hunt; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Hunt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Hunt v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Hunter v. Citibank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Hunter v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Hunterdon County; Langdale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Hurley; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Hurtado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Huskisson; Calhoun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Hussain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Hussey; Portland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Huston v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Husz; Prihoda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hutchinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Hutchinson v. Chesney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Hutchison v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Hyde v. Office of Special Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Hypolite v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Hyundai Corp., U. S. A.; Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. v. . . . . . . 866 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. v. Hyundai Corp., U. S. A. . . . . . . 866 Hyung Su Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Ibrahim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Idaho; Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1018 Idaho; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Idaho; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Idaho v. Gafford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Idaho; Sivak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Id-din v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Idell S.; Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare v. . . . . . . . . . . 813 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Idrogo v. Mireles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Ieyoub; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Illinois; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Illinois; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Illinois; Barkauskas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Illinois; Betts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Illinois; Brisbon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Illinois; Burpo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Illinois; Byron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Illinois; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Illinois; Childs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Illinois; C. J. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Illinois v. Coats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Illinois; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,949 Illinois; Denikov v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Illinois; Enis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Illinois; Failor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Illinois; Gosier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Illinois; Guest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Illinois; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Illinois; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Illinois; Heirens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Illinois; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Illinois; Houston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Illinois; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Illinois v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Illinois; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Illinois; Mahaffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,977,1002 Illinois; Nwadiei v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Illinois v. Olivera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Illinois; Rice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Illinois; Rissley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Illinois; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Illinois; St. Pierre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Illinois; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Illinois; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Illinois; Wiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Illinois; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Illinois; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Illinois; Wunderlich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Illinois; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Illinois; Zebulon Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Illinois Antibiotics Co. v. Schering Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Illinois Central R. Co. v. DeBiasio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services; Shepherd v. . . . . . 1176 Illinois Dept. of Corrections; DelVecchio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Illinois Power Co., Clinton Power Station; Shee Ho v. . . . . . . . . . 896 Imagineering, Inc.; Van Klassens, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Adepegba v. . . . . . . . . . 886 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Adhiyappa v. . . . . . . . . 1171 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Cudjoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Elagamy v. . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Fares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Gallego-Sanchez v. . . . . 1132 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Guillen-Garcia v. . . . . . . 1073 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Hernandez-Avalos v. . . . 826 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1142 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Kharrat v. . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Malik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Mayorga-Perez v. . . . . . 1027 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Murton v. . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Okolo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Ralli-Rojas v. . . . . . . . . 839 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Robertson-Aikman v. . . 913 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang . . . . 1110 Indiana; Bivins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Indiana; Burris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1064 Indiana; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Indiana; Lowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Indiana; Searcy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Indiana; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Indiana; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Indiana County Transit Authority; Mikkilineni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Indiana Dept. of State Revenue; Fort Wayne National Corp. v. . . 913 Industrial Excess Landfill Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 819 Industrial Workers v. Exxon Chemical Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Infantino; TIG Ins. Group v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Ingham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Ingle; Galindo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Inglis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1089 Ingram v. Hillsborough County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Ingram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Ingrao v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Iniguez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 In re. See name of party. Insinger Machine Co. v. Philadelphia Tax Review Bd. . . . . . . . . . 915 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Insurance Co. of North America; Dynamic Construction Co. v. . . 864 Insurance Co. of West; Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. . . . 1011 Intermarine, U. S. A.; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1019 Internal Revenue Service; Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 141 Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Trust Fund v. . . . . . . . . 1049 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Assn., Entrepreneurs of America Ben. Tr. v. Angoff 1072 International Business Machines Corp.; Falkoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 International Business Machines Corp.; United States v. . . . . 1021,1041 International Business Machines Corp.; Weed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 International Law Students Assn.; Solimine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 International Nederlanden Bank N. V.; Cornish Shipping Ltd. v. 867 International Rectifier Corp. v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics 931 International Rectifier Corp.; SGS-Thomson Microelectronics v. 931 International Service Systems, Inc.; Omara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Interstate Brands Corp. v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Interstate Brands Corp., Merita Bread Division; Retail Workers v. 807 Interstate Commerce Comm'n; Seattle L. S. & E. R., Inc. v. . . . . 1084 Iowa; Amerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Iowa; Speller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Iowa; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Irons v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Irvin; Lucien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Irving v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Irving v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Irwin v. Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Irwin; Pudder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Isaacs v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002,1099 Isbell; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Ishmael v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1003 Islam v. Creative Tours Micronesia, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Islamic Republic of Iran v. McKesson Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Islay Investments; Granberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Itoba Ltd.; Berkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Itoba Ltd.; LEP Group PLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 ITT Financial Services; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Ives v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Ivory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Izard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp. . . 1028 J.; R. J. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 J. v. S. L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Jabe; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Jabe; Correll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Jabe; Marbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Jabe; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Jack Bras & Associates; California Public Utilities Comm'n v. . . . 1084 Jackson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Jackson v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs for Los Angeles . . . . . 995 Jackson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Jackson v. Circuit Court of Mich., Ingham County . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Jackson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Jackson; Fromal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Jackson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Jackson v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Jackson; Meadows v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Jackson v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1099 Jackson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Jackson; Scaife v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Jackson v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Jackson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Jackson; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852, 858, 899, 904, 923, 926, 927, 969, 970, 980, 1015, 1016, 1063, 1137, 1139,1150,1175 Jackson v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Jackson v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Jackson County; Barnard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Jackson Memorial Hospital; Desir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Jacksonville; Wishon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1003 Jacob v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Jacob v. Pacific Bell Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Jacobs; Einziger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Jacobs v. Grievance Committee for Eastern Dist. of N. Y. . . . . . . 817 Jacobs v. Guido . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Jacobs v. Ronollo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Jacobs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1148 Jacobs v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Jacobs & Associates; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Jae v. Creese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Jae v. Domovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Jaffee v. Redmond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1091 Jaffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1185 Jain; De Mere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 James v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1155 James v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1059 Jamhoury v. Matheis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Janek, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1086 Janis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Jankowski v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Janneh v. CSH­1 Hotel Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Janneh v. GAF Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Janneh v. Holiday Inn Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Janos; Titan Sports, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Janos; World Wrestling Federation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Janssen Motor Co.; Chrysler Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Janssen Motor Co.; Chrysler Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Janus Industries v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Jarratt; Mutch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Jarreau v. Port Arthur Towing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Jasinski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1090 Jaskolski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Jason v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Jayson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 J. C. Nichols Real Estate; Garfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Jeanise v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Jefferson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1135 Jefferson County; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1156,1167 Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Weems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Jefferson Smurfit Corp. (U. S.); Littles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Jeffrey v. Edinburg Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Jeffreys v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Jeffries v. Harleston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Jeffries v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1018 Jekot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Jelinek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Jelley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Jemerigbe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Jenkins v. Burtzloff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1069 Jenkins v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1085 Jenkins v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,977,1003,1069 Jenkins v. Maqueen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,1069 Jenkins v. McBride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1004 Jenkins v. McKune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1085 Jenkins v. Meetinghouse Cooperative Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Jenkins v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Jenkins v. New Mexico Securities Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Jenkins v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1085 Jenkins v. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1003 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Jenkins v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1050 Jennings; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Jennings v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Jensen v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1185 Jensen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Jernigan v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Jernigan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Jerold, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Jerome v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Jersey Central Power & Light v. Freehold Cogeneration Assoc. . 815 Jesse "The Body" Ventura; Titan Sports, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Jesse "The Body" Ventura; World Wrestling Federation v. . . . . . 1174 Jessica G.; Hector M. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Jewel Food Stores, Inc.; Serfecz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Jill V. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Jiminez v. Mary Washington College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Jiminez; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Jiminez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 J. Jack Bras & Associates; California Public Utilities Comm'n v. . 1084 Joelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 John R. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Johns v. Los Gatos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 John S.; Mark K. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Johns v. Ware County Bd. of Comm'rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Johnsen; Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1170 Johnson v. Abramajtys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Johnson; Abrams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Johnson; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Johnson; Behringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Johnson v. Cody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Johnson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1068 Johnson v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1004 Johnson; Finch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Johnson; Granviel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Johnson; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Johnson; Holliness v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Johnson; Houston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Johnson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Johnson; Lemon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Johnson; Linder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Johnson v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Johnson; Lucien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Johnson v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Johnson; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Johnson; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Johnson v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Johnson v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Johnson; Pinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Johnson; Randle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Johnson; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Johnson; Sekoian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Johnson v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Johnson; Sherman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Johnson v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Johnson; Steel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Johnson; Stephenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson v. Sublett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Johnson; Tedder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Johnson v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Johnson v. Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836, 847, 857, 880, 903, 936, 1003, 1014, 1032, 1039, 1059, 1061, 1082, 1094,1139,1148,1151,1153,1165 Johnson v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Johnson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Johnson v. Welby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Johnson v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Johnson & Johnson; American Home Products Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 1067 Joint School Dist. No. 241 v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Jolevski; Kostovski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Jones v. ABC­TV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 Jones v. Aetna Finance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Jones v. Baltimore City Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Jones; Barnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Jones v. Bliss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Jones; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Jones v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Jones; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Jones; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Jones; Dorman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1018 Jones v. Farrington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Jones v. Faulkner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Jones; Faulkner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Jones v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Jones v. Fulton County Bd. of Comm'rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Jones v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Jones; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Jones v. Humphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Jones v. ITT Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Jones v. Jennings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Jones; LaFountain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Jones v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Jones v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Jones; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Jones v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Jones v. Norfolk Southern Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Jones; Nwanze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Jones v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Jones v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Jones v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Jones v. Schleicher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Jones v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Jones v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Jones v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Jones v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Jones v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,875 Jones v. United States 841,857,899,902,904,970,1022,1061,1130,1153,1165 Jones v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Jones; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Jones v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Jones-Blair Co. v. Hardage Steering Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,895 Jorgenson v. Filmservice Lab, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Jory, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1034 Joseph v. Charlotte County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Joseph v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Joseph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,902 Joseph v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Joseph A.; New Mexico Dept. of Human Services v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Joy Technologies, Inc.; Flakt, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 J. S. W.; G. W. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., Fourth Judicial Circuit; Mundy v. . . 1061 Judge, Circuit Court of Jefferson County; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Judge, Circuit Court of Mich., Wayne County; Callahan v. . . . . . . 908 Judge, Circuit Court of Mo., Jackson County; Brannson v. . . . . 933,1069 516repp12c 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Judge, Court of Appeals of Utah; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Hocking County; Guess v. . . . . . . 941 Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Mahoning County; Burton v. . . . 1177 Judge, District Court of Appeal of Fla., First Dist.; Rodriguez v. 1178 Judge, District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fourth Dist.; Lowery v. 891 Judge, District Court of Kiowa County; Comanche Indian Tribe v. 916 Judge, District Court of Tex., Bexar County; Idrogo v. . . . . . . . . 827 Judge, N. C. Superior Court, 16B Dist.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Judge, 16th Judicial Dist.; Lightfoot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Judge, Supreme Court of N. Y.; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Judicial Qualification Comm'n of Ga.; O'Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1003 Judy v. Carnahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Juels v. Federal Republic of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Julia Saavedra Balmaceda, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Julien v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1033 Jumonville v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Junot; Maricopa County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Justus; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Justus Cylinder-Technology, Inc.; Connett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Justus Enterprises of Kansas, Inc.; Connett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 K. v. John S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Kahley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kaho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Kailey v. Gallagher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Kaiser; Polk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals; El-Hawatky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Kaliczynski v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Kalinsky v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Kallestad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Kalyon v. Hanslmaier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Kaneshiro v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Kano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Kanouse v. Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Kansas v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Kansas; Gulledge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Kansas; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,977,1003,1069 Kansas v. Kickapoo Nation in Kan., of Kickapoo Reserv. in Kan. 972 Kansas v. Kickapoo Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Kansas; McCloud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Kansas; Urban v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Kansas City; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Kansas City; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Morgan's Estate 1114 Kaplan; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Kapoor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Karnes; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Kast v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Kathy M. P. v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Katinsly; Grunewald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Kayes; Pacific Lumber Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Kaylo; McCormick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Keane; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Keane; Siao-Pao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1085 Kearney; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Kearns v. Chrysler Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Kearns v. Ferrari S. p. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kearns v. Fred Lavery Porsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kearns v. Toyota Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kearns v. United Technologies Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kearns v. Woods Motors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Keat v. Chavez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Keegan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Keenan; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Keeshan; Brandley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Keiser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Keithly; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Keles v. New York Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1068 Kelleher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Keller; Misek-Falkoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Keller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,890 Kelley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1144 Kelley; Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Kelley v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1069 Kelley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Kelley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kelley Co. v. Rite-Hite Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Kellner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Kellogg v. Shoemaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Kellogg; Shoemaker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Kellogg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Kelly; Curtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Kelly; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Kelly v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1142 Kelly; Kohler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Kelly v. Tree Farm Development Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1185 Kelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,969 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kelubai v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Kemna; Bally v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Kemp, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Kemp v. Bane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Kendall v. Tacoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1157 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Kennon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,982 Kent v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1033 Kentucky v. Eldred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Kentucky; Ghali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Kentucky; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Kentucky; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Kentucky; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Kentucky; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1004 Kentucky; Rowland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Kentucky; Sanborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 Kentucky; Skaggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Keogh v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Keohane; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Keohane; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Kernan v. Weston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Kern County v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Kerr; Mohamed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Kertesz v. Plotkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Keso v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Kestler v. Board of Trustees of N. C. Local Governmental Employ- ees' Retirement System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Ketchum v. Department of Housing and Urban Development . . 898,1004 Ketchum v. Roswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Key v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Keylin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Keystone Sanitation Co. v. Arcata Graphics Fairfield, Inc. . . . . . . 928 KFC Western, Inc.; Meghrig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479,1007,1040 Khalil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Kharrat v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Khoi Trong Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Kickapoo Nation in Kan., of Kickapoo Reserv. in Kan.; Kansas v. 972 Kickapoo Tribe; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Kidd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Kidston v. Stibbards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1034 Kieffer v. Bank of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Kiett v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Kight v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Kiker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Kilcrease v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Kiley v. First National Bank of Md. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Kilgore; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Kills on Top v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Kimberlin v. DeLong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Kimble v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Kimble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Kimbrough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Kim Ly Lim v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Kimpel v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Kinchen v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Kinder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Kinder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1137 King; Aaron Smith Trucking Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 King v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 King; Haman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1175 Kings County Hospital; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Kinlicheenie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Kinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1098 Kipen v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Kirby, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Kirby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Kirk, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Kirk; Mid America Title Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Kirk v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Kirk v. Raymark Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Kirnon v. Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Kirsh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Kirtland; Andolsek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Kirton v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Kish v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Kissi v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Kissinger v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Kitcheyan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Kitsos v. Review Bd., Ill. Atty. Regist. & Discip. Comm'n . . . . 921,1018 Klamath Tribe v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Klecan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Klein v. Andalman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Klein; Grynberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Klevenhagen; Queen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Klincar; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Kloehn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Kmart Corp. v. Laughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Kmart Corp.; Romero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Kmart Corp.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Kmart Discount Store No. 7061; Romero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Knapp v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Knapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Knight v. Court of Civil Appeals of Ala. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Knight v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Knight v. Intermarine, U. S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1019 Knight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Knighten v. Todd Electric, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Knoll v. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women . . . . . . . . 1093 Knott v. Holtzman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Knowles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1098 Knox County Bd. of Ed. v. Rynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Knuckles v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Koch; Ally v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Koch; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Koch Oil Co. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims Against Powerine Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Koff v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Kohl v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Kohler v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Kolesar; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Kolker v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Kolodzieczak v. Friend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Koniag, Inc. v. Stratman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Koon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1039,1070 Koonce v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Koopman v. Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson County . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Koopman; Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Korean Air Lines Co. v. Hollie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Korean Air Lines, Co.; Mahalek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Korean Air Lines Co. v. Zicherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Korean Air Lines Co.; Zicherman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Koshel v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Kostovski v. Jolevski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Kouba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Koukios v. Lite America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Koukios v. Marketing Dynamics Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Kowalski v. Carson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Kraebel v. Michetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Kraebel v. New York City Dept. of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Kramer v. Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Krause v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Krebs; Daggett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Krese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Kreuzhage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Krimmel v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Krout v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 KSFM 102 FM; Stolz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kubosh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Kuhns v. Meridian Bancorp, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Kupka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Kurtz v. North Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 K. W. Thompson Tool Co. v. Pumphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Kyle; Orellana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Labankoff v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Laborers; Canez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Labor Union. See name of trade. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Lacy; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Lacy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 LaFevers v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 LaFountain v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 LaFountain v. Simasko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 LaFuente v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Lai; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Lai v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1183 Laitram Machinery, Inc.; Skrmetta Machinery Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 822 Lake Barrington; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Lake Charles; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Lake County; Seagrave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Lakeside Properties; Stark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Lakram v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 LaMantia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Lamb; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Lamb; Glant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,972 Lamb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Lambert; Santa Ana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Lambros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Lamer; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Lamer; Timberlake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1185 Lamm, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Lanasa v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lancaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Lancaster County Personnel Bd.; Binnick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1069 Land, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1069 Landrum v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Landscape Properties, Inc. v. Vogel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Lane, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1034 Lane v. Pen a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Lane v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Lane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1137 Lang v. Bank of N. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Lang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Langdale v. Hunterdon County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Langella v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Langley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Lanier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Lanzon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1034 Lapsley v. Northern Ind. Public Service Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1033 LaRette v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,984,1005 Larrimer & Larrimer; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Larson v. District Court of N. D., Grand Forks County . . . . . . . . 859 LaSalle Bank Lake View v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 La Societe Generale Immobiliere v. Minneapolis Community De- velopment Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Laswell v. Frey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Lattimore; Burnside v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Lau v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Laughlin; Kmart Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Laury v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Lave v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Lavery Porsche; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Law v. Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Law Offices of Kelly, Lewis & Hardt; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Lawrence v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Lawrence v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Lawrence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Lawrence Industries, Inc. v. Sharp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Lawrence Paper Co. v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Lawrimore; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801,1007 Lawry's Restaurants, Inc.; Emmett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Lawson v. Blankenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Lawson v. Vera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Lawyer Complaint Service, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Lazo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1069 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Lea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1142 Leaf River Valley Cellular Telephone Co.; Contel Cellular Inc. v. 1145 Leaks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Leath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 LeBlanc; Mallett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 LeBlanc v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 LeBlanc; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae; Clapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 LeClair's Estate; Feaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 LeCureux; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 LeCureux; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 LeCureux; Weatherford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1018 Ledet v. 15th Judicial District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Lee, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Lee v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Lee; Gehrke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Lee v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Lee v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,895,908,950,1015 Lee v. Walton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Leeco, Inc. v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Leedy v. Agribank, FCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1003 Lee Janssen Motor Co.; Chrysler Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Lee Janssen Motor Co.; Chrysler Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Leger v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Leggett v. George . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Leggett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Lehman; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Lehto v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Leik v. Santiago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Leland v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 LeMaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Lemon v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Lemond Construction Co. v. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1146 Lemons v. O'Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Lend Lease Trucks, Inc.; Valerio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Lenell Cooking Co. v. Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Lenon v. Pung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Lensing; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Leon v. Supreme Court of Fla. and Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners . . 989 Leonard v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Leonard; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Leonardo; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1068 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Leon-Leon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 LEP Group PLC v. Itoba Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Lesko v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Leslie Resources, Inc.; Maggard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Lesure v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Letterlough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Levey v. State Developmental Center, Grafton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Levi v. Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Levinson v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Levy; Gust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Levy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Lewin; Bank of Israel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Lewin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Lewis; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Lewis v. Carriger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Lewis v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Lewis v. Circuit Court of Va., Va. Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Lewis v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Lewis v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Lewis; Housing Authority of Sac and Fox Nation v. . . . . . . . . . . 975 Lewis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Lewis v. McLees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Lewis v. North Carolina Employment Security Comm'n . . . . . . . 947 Lewis v. Palms Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Lewis v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Lewis; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Lewis v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1185 Lewis; Schaaf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,833,901,952,1088,1153 Lewis v. U. S. Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 L. G. v. El Paso County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 L'Ggrke v. Tulsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Liacos; Callahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Libby v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Liberatore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Liberty Cable Co. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. McAllister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Libretti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Life Care Centers of America v. East Hampden Assoc. Partnership 1158 Lighter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Lightfoot v. Bienvenu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Ret. Plan Benefits Comm.; Aldridge v. . . . 1009 Lim v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Linares-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv Page Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Hardester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Lindeman v. Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Linder v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Lindow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1004 Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Lindsley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Linn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Lintas: Campbell-Ewald; Fraser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Lipman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Lipscomb v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Lipscomb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Liquidation Comm'n for BCCI Ltd., Macau v. United States . . . . 1008 Lira-Espinosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Lisa A. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services . . . . 880 Lisenbee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Listerman v. GTE Cal. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1085 Lite America; Koukios v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Lite America; Scientific Information Systems v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Little v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Little v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Little Rock Family Planning Services; Dalton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474 Littles v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. (U. S.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Litton Systems, Inc. v. Carroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Litton Systems, Inc.; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Livecchi v. Xerox Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Livingston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 L. K. Comstock & Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . 862 Lloyd v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Lo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Lockett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Lockhart v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . 152 Logan v. Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Logan; Sturgis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Logan v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1109 Lohr; Medtronic, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1109 Loken v. Century 21-Award Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lomas Information Systems, Inc.; Blakeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Lombardi; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Lombardo; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 London v. Mac Corp. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lonewolf v. Orange County Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Long, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Long; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Long Beach Unified School Dist.; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Longbehn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Long Cove Club Associates, L. P. v. Hilton Head Island . . . . . . . 1029 Long Island R. Co.; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1004 Longs Drug Stores Corp.; Sebastian International, Inc. v. . . . . . . 914 Longshoremen; Canaveral Port Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Longview Fibre Co.; Collings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Longworth v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Loomis v. Rentie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Lopera-Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Lopes v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Lopez v. Monterey County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,870,890,991,1022,1064,1134 Lopez v. Vojvodich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Lopez Pineda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Lord v. Lord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Lordmann Enterprises, Inc.; Equicor, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Lorenz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,982,1170 Lorenz v. Lorenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Lorenzo; Tristani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Lorenzo Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Lorson; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Los Angeles County; Davila v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Los Angeles County; Martel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services; Lisa A. v. . . . . 880 Los Angeles County, Dept. of Public Works; Spinner v. . . . . . . 832,1003 Los Angeles County District Attorney; Cash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Los Gatos; Johns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Lostutter v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. . . . . . . . 233, 1007,1040,1167 Louisiana; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Louisiana; Cinel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Louisiana; Cossey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Louisiana; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Louisiana; Fontanille v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Louisiana; Givens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1003 Louisiana; Loyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Louisiana; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Louisiana v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,122,1026 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii Page Louisiana; Moran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Louisiana; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Louisiana; Scales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1142 Louisiana v. Schirmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development v. Poole . . . . 868 Louisiana Power & Light Co.; L. K. Comstock & Co. v. . . . . . . . . 862 Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners; Alexander v. . . . . . . . 813 Love; Jankowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Love; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Love; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Love; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Love v. Pepersack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Love v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Lovell v. Newell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1142 Lovell v. Planters Bank & Trust Co. of Claiborne Parish . . . . 1029,1142 Lovett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Lowe v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Lowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Lowery v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Lowery v. Hersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Lowery v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Lowery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Lowe's Markets, Inc. v. MacKillop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lowsley-Williams & Cos. v. Raytheon Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Loyd v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Lozano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Lubbock Independent School Dist.; Hassan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Lucciola v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Lucero v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Lucien v. Bierman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Lucien v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Lucien v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Lucille, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Lucille v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Luckett v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1086 Luckett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Lueth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Luft v. Farmers Home Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Luker v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Lumpkin v. Dragovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Luna v. Lacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Luna v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Luna v. Sutherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,972 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lundgren v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Lundis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Lundman v. First Church of Christ, Scientist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Lundman; McKown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Lundy; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Lungren; Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 812 Lurie v. Halderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Lussier v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Luther v. Ethicon, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Luther; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Lydon v. Malme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Lyle v. Dedeaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Lyle v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Ly Lim v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Lynch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1144 Lynch v. Bensalem Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Lynn; Murphey Favre, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Lyon v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Lyons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 M.; C. R. S. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 M. v. Jessica G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 M. v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Mac Corp. of America; London v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 MacDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 MacDraw, Inc. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 MacGuire v. Rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Machias Savings Bank; Ramsdell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Machine Tool Finance Corp.; Chersin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,973 Mach-Tech, Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Mac Industries; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Mack v. Buffalo Municipal Civil Service Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Mack v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Mack v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Mack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 MacKillop; Lowe's Markets, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 MacKillop; St. Helens Shop N' Kart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Maclean Hunter Market Reports; CCC Information Services v. . . 817 MacLeod v. Broccoletti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Macon v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Macri v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1018 Macri v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Maddox, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Madison v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Maduno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcix Page Magee, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Maggard v. Leslie Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Magluta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Magnusson; Fournier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Magurn; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Mahaffey v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,977,1002 Mahalek v. Korean Air Lines, Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Mahan v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Mahdavi v. Superior Court of Cal., San Diego County . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Maida, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1034 Maine; Spickler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Maine; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Maine Dept. of Human Services; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Maintenance & Industrial Services, Inc.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Maisonet v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1018 Malekzadeh v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Malik v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Malik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mallett v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Mallory v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1069 Mallory; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Mallory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Malme; Lydon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Malone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Maloney v. Gladstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1003 Malot v. Roy F. Weston, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Manarite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Mance v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Mandacina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Mandel v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Manes v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Mangrum v. Bledsoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Mangrum v. Holloway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Mangrum v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Mangum v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Manhard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. . . . . . . . 811 Manley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Mann v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Mann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Manna v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Manning v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Mans; Field v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) c TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mansfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Mansori v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Mansour v. Goldstock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Mapp; Olivo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Maqueen; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,1069 Marbury v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Marcantonio v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Marchant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Marcum v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Marcus, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Mares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Maresca v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks . . . . . . . . . 1075 Marian v. Calles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Marian v. Goris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1006 Marian v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Maric v. St. Agnes Hospital Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Maricopa County v. Junot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Mariette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Marin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Marino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,937 Maritime Overseas Corp.; Guevara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1154 Maritrans Operating Partners, L. P. v. M/V Balsa 37 . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Mark v. Hatboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Marketing Dynamics Inc.; Koukios v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Marketing Dynamics Inc.; Scientific Information Systems v. . . . . 815 Mark I Marketing Corp. v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. . . . . . . . . 1115 Mark K. v. John S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Markovitch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Marley; Southmark Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Maropulos, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Marrero Crespo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Marrone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Marshal; Caesar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Marshall v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Marshall; Kaneshiro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Marshall; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Marshall; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Marshall; Stow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1018 Marshall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Marshfield Clinic; Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. . . . 1184 Martel v. Concord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1003 Martel v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Martel v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1003 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ci Page Martin v. Drummond Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Martin v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Martin v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,998,1048 Martin v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Martinez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Martinez v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Martinez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Martinez; Oltarzewski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1167 Martinez v. Roth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1099 Martinez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,879,1001,1061,1065,1075 Martinez Estrada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Martinez-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Martinez Musquiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Martinez-Rodriguez v. Colon-Pizarro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Martini v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Maruca v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Marutz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Maryland; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Maryland; Booth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Maryland; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Maryland; Gorman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Maryland; Gorwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Maryland; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Maryland; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Maryland; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1069 Maryland; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Maryland; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Maryland; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Maryland; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Maryland; Whittlesey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Maryland State Police; Dread v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Mary Washington College; Jiminez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Mason v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Mason v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1051 Mason v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Massachusetts; Bui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Massachusetts; Power v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Massachusetts; Seguin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Massachusetts; Swist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Massachusetts Comm'r of Registry; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Massachusetts Comm'r of Revenue; Leger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Massachusetts Comm'r of Revenue v. Perini Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Massachusetts General Life Ins. Co.; Fioretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Massachusetts Trial Court; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Massad; Plowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Massaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Mata v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Matheis; Jamhoury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Matian v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Matlock; Weets v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Matson Plastering Co.; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 Matteson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Matthews; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Matthews; Kissi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Mattos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Matuska v. District Court of Cass County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Matzkin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Mauk v. Engle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Maumelle Co.; Atteberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Maurice Lenell Cooking Co. v. Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co. . . . . . . . 1117 Mauzy; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Maxim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Maxson v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Second Appellate Dist. . . . . . 1129 Maxwell v. E-Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 May v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 May v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mayer v. Spanel International, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Mayer; Van Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,993 Mayes v. Newberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Mayfield v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Maynard v. Norfolk & Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; Wiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Mayorga-Perez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . 1027 Mayor of Cleveland; Cleveland Industrial Square, Inc. v. . . . . . 986,1085 Mayor of District of Columbia; Spaulding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Mayor, St. Louis; Tyus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Mays; Wohlford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Mayweather v. Terrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Mazurek v. Fort Belknap Indian Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Mazurek; Fort Belknap Indian Community v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Mazurkiewicz; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Mazurkiewicz; Tyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Mazzola; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ciii Page McAdams v. Automotive Rentals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 McAdams v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1069 McAllister; Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 McAninch; O'Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 McAninch; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 McAninch; Schrock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 McAnnally; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 McAuliffe v. Sherwin Manor Nursing Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 McBane v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 McBrearty v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 879 McBride; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1004 McBride v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 McCall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 McCarthy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 McCarthy Construction Co.; Capital Wholesale Electric, Inc. v. . . 816 McCarty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 McCarver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 McCaughtry; Bergmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,887,1033 McCaughtry; Biskup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 McCaughtry; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 McCaughtry; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 McClain v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 McClain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 McClenton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 McCloskey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 McCloud v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 McClure v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 McConnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 McCormick v. Kaylo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 McCormick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 McCotter v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 McCoy v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 McCracken v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 McCray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1182 McCullar v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1085 McCulloch v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 McCullough v. Burnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1018 McDade; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 McDaniel; Moran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 McDaniel v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 McDaniels v. Flick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 McDermott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McDonald v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 McDonald v. Provident Indemnity Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 McDowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 McElderry; Coalition for Free and Open Elections v. . . . . . . . . . . 813 McElveen; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 McElveen v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 McFarland v. Prince George's County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 McFarland v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 McGahee v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 McGee v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 McGinley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 McGinley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 McGinnis v. Blodgett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 McGinnis; DeMay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 McGinnis; Shultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 McGinnis v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 McGlory, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090,1169 McGlothlin v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 McGore v. Stine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 McGrath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 McGregor v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 McGregor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 McIntyre v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 MCI Telecommunications Corp.; General Signal Corp. v. . . . . . . . 1146 McKay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 McKensley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 McKenzie v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 McKenzie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 McKesson Corp.; Islamic Republic of Iran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 McKibben v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 McKinna; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 McKinney; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 McKinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,901,1183 McKnight v. American Cyanamid Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 McKown v. Lundman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 McKoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 McKune; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1085 McLamb v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 McLaughlin v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 McLaughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 McLauren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 McLaurin; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 McLaurin v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 McLees; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cv Page McLeggan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 McLellan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 McLellan; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 McLenithan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1038 McLeod; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 McMichen v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 McMillan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 McMoore v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 McNamara v. Cochran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1085 McNaughton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 McNeel v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 McNeely; Holiday Inns, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 McNeil v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority . . . . . . . . . . 864 McPeters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 McPherson v. Brickley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 McPherson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 McQuay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 McQueen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 McReynolds v. Commissioner of Social Services of New York City 1123 McSween v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 McSwine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 McVicar; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 McVicar; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 McWhorter v. Attorney Grievance Bd. of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 McWilliams v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 McWilliams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Meadows v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Meadows v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,890,1151 Means v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,982 Mears v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Mechanics & Farmers Savings Bank; Delco Development Co. v. . . 930 Medical Univ. of S. C.; Traywick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Medlock v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Medrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1109 Medtronic, Inc.; Lohr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1109 Meetinghouse Cooperative Bank; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479,1007,1040 Mejia-Cendejas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Mekkam v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Mele; Bruno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Melendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Meling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Melkonian v. Truck Ins. Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Memphis; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Memphis v. East Brooks Books, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Memphis v. Getwell Bookmart and Airport Adult Theater . . . . . . 909 Mena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Mendenhall v. Goldsmith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Mendizaval v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Mendoza-Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Mengel; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Mengel; Rountree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Menna's Estate v. St. Agnes Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Mercedes-Benz of North America v. Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC . . 1044 Mercer County; Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Merchants Home Delivery Services; Prometheus Funding v. . . . . 964 Meredith v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Merex A. G. v. Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Merhi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Meridian Bancorp, Inc.; Kuhns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Futrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Roy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1004 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Waldau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Merkel; Emery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Merlos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Daubert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Merricks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Merrill v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1086,1155 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . 912 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Manhard v. . . . . . . . 811 Merritt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Metallo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Metcalf v. Rehabilitation Assn. of Va., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 MetroHealth Medical Center; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Metro-Mark, Inc.; Jeffries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1018 Metropolitan Dade County; Touron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,1068 Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc.; EEOC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc.; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Metropolitan Government Dept. of Codes; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . 1081 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Trident Associates Ltd. Partnership v. 869 Metropolitan Transit Authority; Nobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1167 Metu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Metzger v. Sebek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cvii Page Meyer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Meyer v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Miami; Lindeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. . . . . . . . . 824 Michael; Shiley, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Michetti; Barklee Realty Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Michetti; Kraebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Michigan; Bennis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442 Michigan; Esser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Michigan; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Michigan v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Michigan; Krause v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Michigan v. Mallory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Michigan; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Michigan v. Sanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Michigan Bell Telephone Co.; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Office & Professional Employees v. 1046 Michigan Dept. of Treasury; Nummer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Michon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Micou v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Middleton v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1004 Middleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Midwest Bank & Trust Co.; Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. . . . . . . 264,911 Miele v. Perini Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Mier v. Nauhaus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC; Mercedes-Benz of North America v. . 1044 Mikkilineni v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Mikkilineni v. Indiana County Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Milbrand v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Miles v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Miles v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Miller; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Miller; Deloitte & Touche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Miller v. DeMuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Miller; Ford Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Miller; Gensburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Miller v. Gentry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Miller v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Miller; Luker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Miller v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Miller v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Miller v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Miller v. Pezzani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Miller v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Miller v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1121,1132 Miller County Juvenile Court Center; Seastrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Mills v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Mills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Millsap v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Millsaps; Dwyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1142 Milton v. Heller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Milton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Milwaukee; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1167 Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. S. A. Healy Co. . . . . . 1010 Min-Ju Chang v. Pen a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Minneapolis Community Development Agency; La Societe Gener- ale Immobiliere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Minnesota; Bowles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Minnesota; Flournoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Minnesota; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Minnesota; McKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Minnesota; Rieck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.; Nippon Carbide Industries Co. v. 1184 Minor v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Minor v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Minor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,935 Minter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mione, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1038 Mir v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Miragaya; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Mireles; Idrogo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Mirin v. Eyerly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Misano di Navigazione S. p. A. v. Eneria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Misek-Falkoff v. Keller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mission Hills Bank, N. A.; Panis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Mississippi; Billiot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Mississippi; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Mississippi; Hansen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1085 Mississippi; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,122,1026 Mississippi; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Mississippi; Madison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Mississippi Cty. Community Coll. Bd. of Trustees; Viswanathan v. 815,1002 Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Secretary, La. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Mississippi State Univ.; El-Attar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1185 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cix Page Missouri; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Missouri; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Missouri; McBane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Missouri; Roussin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,990,1033,1085 Missouri; Shiyr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Missouri; Simms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Missouri Dept. of Conservation; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Missouri Dept. of Corrections; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Missouri Pacific R. Co.; Carton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Misura v. El Dorado County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Mitchell v. Keenan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Mitchell; Mullgrav v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Mitchell v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Mitchell v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Mitchelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1099 Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc.; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 M & J Coal Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Moats; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Mobley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Mobley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mocco v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Moench; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Mogensen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Mohamed v. Kerr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Mohammed v. Scheve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Mohanlal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Moncayo v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Moncrief, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1019 Monday v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Mondragon v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Monk v. Quality Electric Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Monroe v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Monroe v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Monroe v. McLaurin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Monroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Monroe Systems for Business, Inc.; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Montague; Felder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1069 Montana; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Montana v. Egelhoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1109 Montana; Friedman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Montana; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Montana; Kills on Top v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Montana; Wagner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Montano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Monterey County; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Montes-Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Montgomery; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Montgomery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082,1137 Montgomery Engineering Co.; Osborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1033 Montgomery Securities v. Dannenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Montoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,821 Montrose County School Dist. RE­1J; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Moody v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1085 Moore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Moore; Apache Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Moore; Battle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1003 Moore v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Moore v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Moore v. Christmas Log Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Moore; Crowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Moore v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Moore v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Moore; Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Moore v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Moore v. Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Moore; Slappy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1185 Moore v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Moore v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,879,893,1081,1082,1094 Moore v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Moore; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1033 Moose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Morales v. Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Morales; Spearman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1069 Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Morales; Ventura v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Moran; Ghazali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Moran v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Moran v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Morania Oil Tanker Corp.; Vencius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Morata v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Morchower, Luxton & Whaley; Nwanze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Moretti v. Citibank, N. A., Branch No. 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Morewitz; West of England Ship Owners Mut. Protection & In- demnity Assn. (Luxembourg) v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Morga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxi Page Morgan; Alleyn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Morgan v. Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Morgan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Morgan City v. Southern La. Electric Cooperative Assn. . . . . . . . 908 Morgan's Estate; Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. 1114 Morning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Morris v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Morris; Leland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Morris v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Morris v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1003 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1181 Morris v. Ylst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Morrison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1106 Morrison; Ervin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Mortimer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Morton; Flemmings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Morton; So-Fine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Morton; Terrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Morton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Mosavi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1099 Mosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Moseley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Moser; Bonar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Moses, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1110 Moses; VanDelft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Mosley v. Shelby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Mosley; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Moss v. Bernard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Moss v. Chassin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Moss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1151 Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church; Confer- ence of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. 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United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Multnomah County; Tilbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Mu'Min v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Mundy v. Carithers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1139 Muraca, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Muraski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Murcer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Murdock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1019 Murfreesboro; Outdoor Communications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Murillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Murph v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Murphey Favre, Inc. v. Lynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Murphy v. Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Murphy; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Murphy v. Diversified Products Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Murphy v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Murphy v. Justus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Murphy; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Murphy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1153 Murray v. Detroit Riverview Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Murray v. Montrose County School Dist. RE­1J . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Murray v. Stuckeys, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Murray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Murray v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Murray & Murray Co., L. P. A. Profit-Sharing Plan and Trust v. Performance Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Murray & Murray Co., L. P. A. Profit-Sharing Plan and Trust v. Superior Court of Ariz., Maricopa County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Murton v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Muschik; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Muscoreil v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Musquiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Musser v. Damrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Mustin v. Withrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1085 Mutch v. Jarratt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Mutual Trading Corp. v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Corp. . . . . . . . . 1115 Muzakkir v. Villasenor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 M/V Balsa 37; Maritrans Operating Partners, L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . 1073 Myers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1144 Myers v. Jiminez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Myers v. Massachusetts Trial Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 516repp12d 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxiii Page Myers; Ornelas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Myers; Seagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Myers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1033 Myers v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Myers & Associates, Ltd. v. Trinity Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 807 N. v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Family Services . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Nadal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Nagle; Baugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Nagle; Bogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Nagle; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Nagle; Clency v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Nagle; Ham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1142 Nagle; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Nagol v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Nail v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Najera-Rubio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Nanayakkara, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Nance v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Nance v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Nanni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Napert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Nassau County Dept. of Social Services; Papa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 National Auto Credit, Inc.; Quick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. . . . 415,1004 National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 National City v. Rattray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 National Commodity & Barter Assn. v. United States . . . . . . . . . 807 National Credit Union Administration; Doolittle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 National Engineering & Contracting Co. v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 National Enquirer, Inc. v. Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Chadima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 National Football League, Inc.; Stoutenborough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 National Labor Relations Bd.; Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. . . . . . 1086 National Labor Relations Bd.; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 National Labor Relations Bd.; Glover Bottled Gas Corp. v. . . . . . 816 National Labor Relations Bd.; Holly Farms Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . 963 National Labor Relations Bd.; Hospital San Rafael, Inc. v. . . . . . . 927 National Labor Relations Bd.; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 National Labor Relations Bd.; Plainville Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. 974 National Labor Relations Bd.; Plumbers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 National Labor Relations Bd.; Roofers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 National Labor Relations Bd.; Three Sisters Sportswear Co. v. . . 1093 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page National Labor Relations Bd. v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. . . 85 National Marine Fisheries Service; Flaherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK); Ahmed v. . . . . . 1045 National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK); Gresham v. . . . . 1045 National Refractories & Minerals Corp. v. Teamsters . . . . . . . . . 866 National Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh v. American Med. Int'l . . 984 National Utility Service, Inc.; Savannah Foods & Industries, Inc. v. 1047 NationsBank of Tex., N. A.; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Nationwide Indemnity Ins. Co.; Dolenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1099 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Nauhaus; Mier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Navajo Nation v. Hopi Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Naylor; Ross Yordy Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Neal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284,963 Neben & Starrett, Inc. v. Chartwell Financial Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Nebraska v. Rust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Nebraska v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Nebraska v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Nebraska v. Yelli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Neely v. Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Nefstad v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Negrette v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Neidenbach; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Neighbour v. Covert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Neill v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Nelson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1144 Nelson; Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1034 Nelson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Nelson v. Caswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Nelson v. Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Nelson v. McKinna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Nelson v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Nelson v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Nelson v. Orr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1061,1064 Nelson; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Nelson Industries, Inc.; Donaldson Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Netherland; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Netherland; Beavers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Netherland; Davidson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Netherland; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1037,1170 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxv Page Netherland; Tuggle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Nevada; Barner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Nevada; Castriotta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Nevada; Libby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Nevada Dept. of Prisons Staff; Britton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Nevada State Bar; Pipkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1019 Nevada Supreme Court; Birges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Newaygo; Corrigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Newberry; Mayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Newberry; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Newcomb; Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . 1117 Newell; Lovell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1142 New England Reinsurance Corp.; Compagnie de Reassurance d'Ile de France v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 New England Telephone Co.; Noone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 New Hampshire; Covillion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 New Hampshire; Martel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1003 New Jersey; Abulkhair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 New Jersey; DeSouza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 New Jersey; DiFrisco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 New Jersey; Grenell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 New Jersey; Martini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 New Jersey; Mocco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 New Jersey; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 New Jersey; Orzechowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 New Jersey; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 New Jersey v. Saez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 New Jersey; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 New Jersey; Sigman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 New Jersey Coalition Against War in Middle East; Short Hills Associates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 New Jersey Comm'r of Ins.; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. v. 1184 New Jersey Division of Ratepayer Advocate v. Freehold Cogener- ation Associates, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 New Jersey State Prison; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Newkirk v. Fink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 New Lebanon v. Bunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Newman v. Consolidation Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 New Mexico; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 New Mexico; Nagol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 New Mexico Dept. of Human Services v. Joseph A. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 New Mexico Securities Division; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page News Group Boston, Inc.; Rielly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Newsom v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Newsome v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Newsome; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Newton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Newton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1137 Newtown; Chirico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 New Valley Corp.; Desmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 New York v. Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 New York; Braga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 New York; Christian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 New York; Finnegan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 New York; Greenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 New York; Lakram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 New York; Lipscomb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 New York; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 New York; Maisonet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 New York; McLaurin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 New York; McMoore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 New York; Muscoreil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 New York; Panaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 New York; Quinniey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 New York; Schulz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 New York; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 New York v. Spencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 New York; Stiff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 New York; Suros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 New York; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 New York City; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 New York City; Department of Commerce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1035 New York City; Liberty Cable Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 New York City; Oklahoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1035 New York City; Wisconsin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1035 New York City Dept. of Finance; Barklee Realty Co. v. . . . . . . . . 1146 New York City Dept. of Finance; Kraebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 New York City Off Track Betting Corp.; Fricker v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 New York Grievance Committee for Ninth Judicial Dist.; Gray v. 1044 New York Univ.; Keles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1068 Nicholas v. Burkitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Nichols v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Nichols v. McElveen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Nichols v. Paulucci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Nichols; Romberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxvii Page Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Nichols Real Estate; Garfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Nicolaison v. Erickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 NICOR Exploration Co.; Scarth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Nielsen; Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Nieto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Nightengale v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Nintendo of America, Inc.; NTDEC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Nippon Carbide Industries Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. . 1184 Nissei ASB Co. v. FMT Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Nixon v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Nixon v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Njoku v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Nobers v. Crucible, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Noble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1142 Nobles v. Metropolitan Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1167 Noland; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1040 Noles; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nonnette v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Noone v. New England Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc.; Plumbers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Norcal/San Bernardino, Inc.; Cantrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Norfolk; Trimper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Norfolk Southern Corp.; Flakes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Norfolk Southern Corp.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Cerney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Hiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Luther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Norfolk & Western R. Co.; Maynard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Norfolk & Western R. Co.; Stover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Norfus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1164 Norinsberg Corp. v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Norris; Marcum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Norris; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Norris; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Norris; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Norris; Prince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Norris; See v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Norris v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Northbrook Excess Surplus Ins. Co.; Brown Daltas & Assoc. v. . . 822 North Carolina; Alston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 North Carolina; Bowie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 North Carolina; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 North Carolina; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page North Carolina; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 North Carolina; Conaway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 North Carolina; Daughtry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 North Carolina; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 North Carolina; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 North Carolina; Hood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 North Carolina; Hypolite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 North Carolina; McLaughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 North Carolina; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 North Carolina; Murph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 North Carolina; Nance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 North Carolina; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 North Carolina; Rouse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 North Carolina; Settenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 North Carolina; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 North Carolina; Solomon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 North Carolina; Spruill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 North Carolina; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 North Carolina; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1128 North Carolina Dept. of Correction; Cousins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 North Carolina Employment Security Comm'n; Lewis v. . . . . . . . 947 North Carolina Power v. North Carolina Utilities Comm'n . . . 804,1092 North Carolina Utilities Comm'n; North Carolina Power v. . . . 804,1092 Northern Ind. Public Service Co.; Lapsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1033 Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Northern Telecom, Inc.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Northlake; O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 North Miami; Kurtz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 North River Ins. Co.; Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp. v. . . . . . . . 1184 North River Ins. Co.; Underwriters and Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Northrup v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Northwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Northwest Power Planning Council; Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Northwest Title & Escrow Corp. v. Edina Realty, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 809 Northwood; Triomphe Investors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Norton v. Houston Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Nosrati v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Nott; Branson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Novak v. Novak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,982 Novopharm, Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Novopharm Ltd. v. Glaxo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Nowicki v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxix Page Noxon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 NTDEC v. Nintendo of America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Null; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Nummer v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Nunez Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Nuss v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Nuth; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Nwadiei v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Nwanze v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Nwanze v. Morchower, Luxton & Whaley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Nwanze v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Obermeyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1154 Obiukwu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 O'Boynik; Burr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 O'Brien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1058 Ocampo-Tello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Occupational Safety and Health Administration; Reemsnyder v. 967,1069 Oceanside; Del Oro Hills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 O'Connell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,982 O'Connor; Bustamante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. . . . . . . . . . 973,1040,1092 O'Dea; Bond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,972 Odom; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 O'Dowd; Botchie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Office of Disciplinary Counsel; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1099 Office of Personnel Management; Browning-Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Office of Personnel Management; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Office of Personnel Management; Nuss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Office of Personnel Management; Paderes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Office of Personnel Management; Tayag v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices; Riggin v. . . . . . . . . 1072 Office of Special Counsel; Hyde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Office of Thrift Supervision; Keating v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Office & Professional Employees v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections 1046 Officers for Justice; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Ogando v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1016 Ogea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Oglesby v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Ogontz Controls Co.; Pirkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,960 Ogrod v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Oguguo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1099 Ogundeko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. Northlake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Ohio; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ohio; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1097 Ohio; Bilder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Ohio; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Ohio; Bryant-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Ohio; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Ohio; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Ohio; Dever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Ohio; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Ohio; Dunlap v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Ohio; Fautenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Ohio; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Ohio; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Ohio; Gumm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ohio; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Ohio; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Ohio; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Ohio; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Ohio; Kirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Ohio; Kish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Ohio; Knuckles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Ohio; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Ohio; Lundgren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Ohio; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Ohio; McAdams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1069 Ohio v. Robinette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Ohio; Simko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Ohio; Slagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Ohio; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Ohio; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Ohio; Vom Baur v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Ohio; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Ohio; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Oil Workers; TNS, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Okafor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 O'Keefe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1169 Oklahoma v. Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Oklahoma; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Oklahoma; Clayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Oklahoma; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Oklahoma; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1007,1027 Oklahoma v. Flores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Oklahoma; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Oklahoma; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Oklahoma; Hooker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxi Page Oklahoma; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Oklahoma; LaFevers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Oklahoma; Mahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Oklahoma; McClain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Oklahoma; McCracken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Oklahoma; McGregor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Oklahoma; Medlock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Oklahoma; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Oklahoma; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Oklahoma; Nail v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Oklahoma; Neill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Oklahoma v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1035 Oklahoma; Okun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Oklahoma; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Oklahoma; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Oklahoma; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Oklahoma; Sellers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Oklahoma; Shown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Oklahoma; Spears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Oklahoma; Stiles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Oklahoma; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1020 Oklahoma; Valdez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Oklahoma; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Oklahoma; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Oklahoma; Wanless v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,982 Oklahoma; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Oklahoma Assn. for Equitable Taxation v. Oklahoma City . . . . . . 1029 Oklahoma Bd. of Equalization; ANR Pipeline Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Oklahoma City; Oklahoma Assn. for Equitable Taxation v. . . . . . 1029 Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority; Borelli McNeil v. . . . . 864 Okolo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Okolo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Okoro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1152 Okoronkwo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Okpala v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Okun v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Okwechime v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Olbres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Old Chief v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 O'Leary, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 O'Leary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Oliver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Oliver v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Olivera; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Olivo v. Mapp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Olmos-Esparza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Olsen v. Paley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,1020 Olsen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Olszewski v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . 906,1004 Oltarzewski v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1167 Olvera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Omaha; Sanitary and Improvement Dist. No. 210, Douglas Cty. v. 819 Omara v. International Service Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Omernick v. Steger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 O'Neal v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1020 O'Neal v. Judicial Qualification Comm'n of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1003 O'Neal v. McAninch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 O'Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 O'Neill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1058 Onyejekwe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1142 Onyekwuluje v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Insurance Co. of West . . . 1011 Orangeburg Sausage Co.; Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1033 Orange County Social Services; Lonewolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Orange County Social Services Agency; Jill V. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Ord & Norman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Oregon; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Oregon; Klamath Tribe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Oregon; Manes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Oregon; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Oregon; Tenbusch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; Read v. . . . . . 896 Oregon Dept. of Consumer and Business Services; United Em- ployer Benefit Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Oregon Dept. of Revenue; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Oregon Dept. of Revenue; Bank of Cal., N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Oregon Dept. of Revenue; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Oregon Health Sciences Univ.; Mekkam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Orellana v. Kyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Oriakhi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.; S. Diamond Associates v. 1045 Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Delta Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Orjales; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Orlander v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Orlando; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ornelas v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Ornelas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1008,1109 O'Rourke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxiii Page Orr; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Orr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Ortaliza v. General Mills, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Ortega v. Price City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Ortega-Acosta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Ortho McNeil Pharmaceutical; Solimine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 907 Ortiz; Ahmad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1061 Ortiz-Villegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Ortman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Oryx Energy Co. v. Bourque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Orzechowski v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Osborne v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Osborne v. Montgomery Engineering Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1033 Osborne Industries, Inc.; Stanfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Osburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.; ConAgra, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Osherow; Cluck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Osiris Flores v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Oslund v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Osoria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 O'Sullivan; Lemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 O'Sullivan; Padgett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Oswald v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Otto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Outdoor Communications, Inc. v. Murfreesboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Outlow v. Sobina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Overnite Transportation Co.; Buhrmaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Owen v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Owen v. California State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Owen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Owens v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Owens v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Owens-Ill. Corp. v. Rekdahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Owolabi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Oyairo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Ozar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Ozga Enterprises, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Resources . . . 1159 P. v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Paar, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Pabon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Pacesetter Constr. v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conf. Bd. . . 802 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pacheco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Pacifica Foundation v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . 1043 Pacific Bell Directory; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Pacific Lumber Co. v. Kayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Pacific Nw. Generating Coop. v. Northwest Power Planning Council 806 Pacific Telesis Group; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Paderes v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Padgett v. O'Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Pagar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Page; Dedes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1019 Pahlavi; Bank Melli Iran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 PaineWebber, Inc.; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Palacios-Bastida v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Palacios-Casquete v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Palermo v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Paley; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,1020 Palm Beach County v. West Peninsular Title Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1018 Palm Beach Post; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,923 Palmisano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Palms Associates; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Pan American Life Ins. Co.; Baptist Memorial Hospital v. . . . . . . 824 Panaro v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Panduit Corp.; Thomas & Betts Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Pankey v. Carnahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1004 Pankey v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1004 Paoli Orjales; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Papa v. Nassau County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Papaila v. Uniden America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Paquette v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1004 Parke; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Parke-Davis Division of Warner-Lambert Co.; Wright v. . . . . . . . 1123 Parker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Parker v. Evening Post Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Parker v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Parker v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,951 Parker v. University of Miss. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Parkerson v. Brooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Parks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,950,1098 Parnell v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Parra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Parras v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxv Page Parrott; Gaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Parry v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Parsa v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc.; United States ex rel. Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Partin v. Arkansas State Bd. of Law Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Partin v. Florida Comm'n on Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Pasquale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Passi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Pastor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Pataki v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Pataki; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Patch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1066 Patent & Trademark Office Bd. of Patent Appeals & Interferences; Wodkiewicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1185 Patrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Patterson v. NationsBank of Tex., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Patterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Paul v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Paulucci; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Payne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Payne v. Kaplan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Payne v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Payne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1165 Pazmino-Marquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Peacock v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349,911 Peart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,951 Peck, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Peck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Peganoff v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1099 Pelletier; Behrens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Pen a; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Pen a; Min-Ju Chang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Pendell; Van Wagner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Pendleton v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Pennsylvania v. Albino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Pennsylvania; Baird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Pennsylvania; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Pennsylvania; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Pennsylvania; Burchill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Pennsylvania; Christy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Pennsylvania; Dalberto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1002 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pennsylvania; Dennison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Pennsylvania; Grubor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Pennsylvania; Haughton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Pennsylvania; Hewlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,982 Pennsylvania; Highlands v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Pennsylvania; Huston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Pennsylvania; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Pennsylvania; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Pennsylvania; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Pennsylvania; Lucciola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Pennsylvania; McGahee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Pennsylvania; McGinley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Pennsylvania; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Pennsylvania; Ogrod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Pennsylvania; Peganoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1099 Pennsylvania; Rainey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Pennsylvania; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Pennsylvania; Santiago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1053 Pennsylvania; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Pennsylvania; Spinks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Pennsylvania; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Pennsylvania; Travaglia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pennsylvania; Tyler Shartle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Pennsylvania; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pennsylvania; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Pennsylvania; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Pennsylvania; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Pennsylvania Civil Service Comm'n; Replogle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, Potter County Assistance Office; Sheehy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation; Dea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare v. Idell S. . . . . . . . . . . 813 Pennsylvania State Dept. of Corrections; Troster v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Pennsylvania State Police; Arndt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Pennsylvania System of Higher Ed.; Fraser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Christy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Bd.; Pugliatti v. . . . . . . . 1160 Penny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1121 Penry v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1069 Peoples Bank of Bloomington; Dick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Peoria School Dist. 150; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Pepersack; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Perales v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Perales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxvii Page Peralta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Perdomo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Perdue v. Troutman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Perez v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Perez v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1051,1133 Perez-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1082 Perez-Valdez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Perez Zamora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Performance Industries, Inc.; Murray & Murray Plan and Trust v. 1146 Perini Corp.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Perini Corp.; Miele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Perkins v. Guey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Perkins v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Perkovic v. West Penn Abstract Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1018 Perlmutter v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Perna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Perrino; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Perry; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Perry v. House of Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Perry; M. Bianchi of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Perry; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Pertsoni v. Vasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1018 Peters v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Petersen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Peterson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Peterson v. American Life & Health Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Peterson v. Mac Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Petito v. Piffath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Petrarca; Things Remembered, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Peveler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Pezzani; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Pfeil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Pfingst v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Pfingst; Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Phelps v. Winchester Medical Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Philadelphia v. Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Philadelphia; Africa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp. v. North River Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . 1184 Philadelphia Tax Review Bd.; Insinger Machine Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 915 Philip Morris Products, Inc.; Arvin-Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Philippines v. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Phillip v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Phillips, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1070,1089 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Phillips; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Phillips v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Phillips; Hood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Phillips v. Law Offices of Kelly, Lewis & Hardt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Phillips; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Phillips v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Philyor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Phipps; Yurtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1069 Picciotti v. Sweeney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Crocker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Pierce v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Pierce v. Kearney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Pierce v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Pierce v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Pierce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Piffath; Petito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Pinder v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Pine v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Pineda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Pinella v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Pinkerton Tobacco Co.; Armendariz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Pinkston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Pinto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Piper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Nielsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Pipkins v. Nevada State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1019 Pippens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Pirkle v. Ogontz Controls Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,960 Pitofsky; Quinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Pitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Pitts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Plain Dealer Publishing Co.; Vail v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Plainville Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. 974 Plaisance v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1018 Planning Bd. of West Boylston v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Planning Bd. of West Boylston; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Planning Research Corp., Inc. v. Schwedt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Planning Research Corp., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Schwedt . . 1068 Planters Bank & Trust Co. of Claiborne Parish; Lovell v. . . . 1029,1142 Plant Guard Workers; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Plantier; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Plata v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Playboy Enterprises, Inc.; Dumas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxix Page Plescia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Ploneda v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1143 Plotkins; Kertesz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Plowman v. Massad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Plumbers v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Plumbers v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Plumlee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Plummer; Flinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Ply v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Podgurski v. Suffolk County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1142 Pointon v. Choctaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Polewsky v. Vermont Dept. of Social Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Poliak; Ammons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Polk v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Polk County v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pollack v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Pollard; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Polley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Pollock v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Pomranz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Pontiac Correctional Center; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Poole; Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development v. . . . 868 Poole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Pope v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Poritz; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Port Arthur Towing Co.; Jarreau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Porter v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Porter v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Porter-Cooper v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Porterfield v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Portland; Hoeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Portland v. Hussey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Portland Housing Authority v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Posey v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Postmaster General; Andress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Postmaster General; Gaskins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1003 Postmaster General; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Postmaster General; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1185 Postmaster General; Lussier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Postmaster General; Vincent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Postmaster General; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Potes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Pottstown; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pounds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Pourzandvakil v. Humphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Powell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1090 Powell v. Carnahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Powell v. DuCharme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Powell v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Powell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,991 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1026,1039,1070,1099 Power v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Powers v. Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Powers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Prather v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Pratt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 PRC, Inc.; Bolden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Prenzler v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 President of U. S.; Cossett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 President of U. S.; Tsimbidaros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Presley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Preston v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Prevot v. Prevot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Price, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Price v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Price; Rocha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Price City; Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Price Co.; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1003 Price Waterhouse; Hamid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Prichard; Scarbrough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1085 Prihoda v. Husz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Primedical, Inc. v. Allied Investment Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Prince v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Prince v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,998,1151 Prince George's County v. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. . . . . . 1010 Prince George's County; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Prince George's County v. Warwick Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Negrette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Pringle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y.; Schenck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Procter & Gamble Co.; Bankers Trust Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs of Jay County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Professional Golfers' Assn. of America; Seabury Management v. . 867 Pro Football, Inc.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1109 Prometheus Funding Corp. v. Merchants Home Delivery Services 964 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxi Page Propac-Mass, Inc. v. Ruthardt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Prosper v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Provident Indemnity Life Ins. Co.; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Prue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Pruitt v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1003 Prunty; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Prunty v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,982 Prunty; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Prunty; Nonnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Pryor v. DeSoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1185 Pryor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Pryor v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Public Service Comm'n of W. Va.; Charleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Public Util. Dist. 1, Snohomish Cty. v. Class Plaintiffs in MDL­551 822 Puckett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Pudder v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Pudder v. Irwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Pudlo v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Puentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Pugliatti v. Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Bd. . . . . . . . . 1160 Pujol v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Pummell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Pumphrey; K. W. Thompson Tool Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pumphrey; Thompson Center Arms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pung; Lenon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Purdy v. Superior Court of Ariz., Navajo County . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Purkett; Culkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Purkett; Townsend v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Purmort v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Putman v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1099 Qantas Airways Ltd. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Quality Electric Supply Co.; Monk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Qualls v. Regional Transportation Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Qualmann Marine Construction, Inc. v. San . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Queen v. Klevenhagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Quick v. National Auto Credit, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Quilter; Voinovich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Quinn v. Pitofsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Quinniey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Quipp Inc.; Ferag AG v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Quiroz-Gutirrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 R. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page RACC Industries, Inc.; Stun-Tech, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Racich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Radio Assn. Defending Airwave Rights, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Radiofone, Inc.; Federal Communications Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . 938,1301 Rafferty v. Youngstown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Ragans; Dorsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Rainey v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Raitport v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . 969 Raitport v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Raitport v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Ralli-Rojas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 839 Ralph-Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Ram v. De Galan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Ramey v. Bowsher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Ramey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Ramirez v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Ramiro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Ramon Dieguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Rampersad v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1018 Ramsdell v. Machias Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Randall v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Randle v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Randolph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Raney; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Rankin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Rankin County Correctional Facility; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Ranson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Rapaport; Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision v. 1073 Raphael v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Rash v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Rashid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Ratcliff, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Ratliff v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Ratnaweera v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1003 Rattray; National City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Rauckhorst v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Raulerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Rauser v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Ray v. Lehman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Ray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,894 Raymark Industries, Inc.; Kirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxiii Page Raymond; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Ray Qualmann Marine Construction, Inc. v. San . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Ray's Advertising Specialties, Inc.; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Raytech Corp. v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Raytheon Co.; Lowsley-Williams & Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Raytheon Co.; United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Read v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision . . . . . 896 Ready v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Reali v. Feminist Women's Health Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Rebel Oil Co.; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 ReBrook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Reddic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Redick; Coker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Redmond; Jaffee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1091 Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Banque Internationale A. Luxembourg . . . . 908 Reece v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Reed v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1142 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,845,897,999 Reemsnyder v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 967,1069 Rees v. Superintendent of Va. State Penitentiary . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Reeves, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Reeves v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Reeves v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Reeves; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Reeves v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Reeves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Reeves v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1004 Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Denney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Reggie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1090 Regional Transportation Dist.; Qualls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Regnante v. DiDomenico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Rehabilitation Assn. of Va., Inc.; Metcalf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Reich; Interstate Brands Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Reich; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1033 Reich; National Engineering & Contracting Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Reich; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Reiche v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Reid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1065 Reigle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Reinke; Stark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Reinosa; Ferenc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1143 Rekdahl; Owens-Ill. Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Religious Technology Center v. F. A. C. T. NET, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 802 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Remington Rand Univac v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Remington Rand Univac; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Renderman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Reno; Ablang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Reno; American Life League, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Reno; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1155 Reno; Blackston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Reno; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1185 Reno; Perales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Reno; Swint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1149 Rent-A-Center, Inc.; Luckett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1086 Rentie; Loomis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.; United States v. . . 1005, 1040,1156 Replogle v. Pennsylvania Civil Service Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Republic of Philippines v. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. . . . . 1047 Republic Waste Industries, Inc. v. G. I. Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Resolution Trust Corp.; Bauldwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Resolution Trust Corp.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Resolution Trust Corp.; Kaliczynski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Resolution Trust Corp.; Ratnaweera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1003 Resseau; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Restland Funeral Home, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Retail Workers v. Interstate Brands Corp., Merita Bread Division 807 Reuben H. Donnelley Corp.; Lesko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Review Bd., Ill. Atty. Regist. & Discip. Comm'n; Kitsos v. . . . . 921,1018 Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Reyes-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Reynolds v. Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Reynolds; Erickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Reynolds; Gilbreath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Reynolds v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Reynolds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Reynolds v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Reynolds v. Wagner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 RFE/RL, Inc.; Mahoney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Rheem Mfg.; Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund v. 1146 Rhode Island; Lopes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection; Ernst & Young v. 975 Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank; Amaral v. . . . . . . . . 848 Rhodes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1048 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.; Grady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Riascos, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Ricco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxv Page Rice v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Rice v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Rich; MacGuire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Rich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Richards, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1168 Richards v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Richards v. Jefferson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1156,1167 Richards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Richards v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1069 Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . 988 Richardson v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Richardson; Lyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Richardson; Parras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Richardson; Sebulsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Richardson; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Rickards; Hoye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Ricketts v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Rico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Rieber v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Rieck v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Rielly v. News Group Boston, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Riemer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Riggan v. Saint Paul, Saint Paul Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Riggi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices . . . . . . . . . 1072 Riggins v. Givens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Riggins v. Walter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Rijo-Montas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Riley; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Riley v. Plantier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Riley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Rison; Barrera-Echavarria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Rissley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Ristow v. South Carolina State Ports Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Rite-Hite Corp.; Kelley Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Riveland; Carmichael v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Riveland; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Rivera v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Rivera v. Long Island R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1004 Rivera v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1003 Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1081,1139 Riveros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Rivers; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Rivers v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rivers; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1003 Rivers v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Rivers; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1003 Rivers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 R. J. v. S. L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 R. J. Steichen & Co. v. Honn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 R. M. v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Roaquin v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Robbins; Auer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Robbs; Hughes, Hubbard & Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Roberson v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,971 Roberson v. Henson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Roberson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Roberson v. Raney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Roberson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Roberts v. Andolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Roberts; Everett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Roberts v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Roberts; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Roberts v. Kings County Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Roberts v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Roberts; McLamb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Roberts v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Roberts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1058 Robertson v. Moench . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Robertson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,873 Robertson-Aikman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . 913 Robey; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Robinette; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Robinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1170 Robinson v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Robinson v. Benton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Robinson; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Robinson v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137,953,1023,1076,1149 Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Roca Suarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Rocha v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Roche v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Rochell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Rochon v. Blackburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Rockford; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Rockwell International Rocketdyne; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1185 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxvii Page Rocky Mountain Plateau; Grogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Rodas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Roddy; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Roden v. Blackwell Land Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Rodenbaugh v. Curto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Rodrigues v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Rodriguez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1019 Rodriguez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1052,1099,1142 Rodriguez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . 848,893,952,969,1000,1032,1049,1166 Rodriguez v. Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Rodriguez-Garcia v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico . . . . . 865 Rodriguez-Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Rogers v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Rogers; Gunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Rogers v. Kolesar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Rogers v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Rogers v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Rogers; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Rogers v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Rogers; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Rohnert Park; Sime v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Rojo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Roller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Rollins; Dolenc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Roman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Romberg v. Nichols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Romero v. Board of County Comm'rs of Lake County . . . . . . . . . 1073 Romero v. Kmart Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Romero v. Kmart Discount Store No. 7061 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Romero Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Romo v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Romoff; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Ronollo; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Roofers v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Rosch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Co. of S. D. . . . . . . . 819 Roselin v. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences . . . . . . . . . 1097 Rosemeyer; Parry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Rosenblum, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Rosenblum; Allan & Allan Arts, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rosenblum; Gateway Playhouse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Rosendahl v. Seymour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Rosenfeld; Department of Justice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Rosengarden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Rosquete v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Ross, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Ross v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Ross v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Ross v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Ross v. Dontzin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Ross v. Rockwell International Rocketdyne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1185 Ross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1042,1153,1182 Rossi v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Rossi, McCreery & Associates, Inc.; Abbo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Rossman v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ross Yordy Construction Co. v. Naylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Roswell; Ketchum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Roth; Bookert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Roth; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1099 Rothenbusch v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Rountree v. Mengel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Rouse v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Roussin v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,990,1033,1085 Route 17 Corp. v. Ashland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Routt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Rowe v. Crosby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Rowland v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Rowser v. Teamsters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rowser v. Wayne Car Releasing Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1167 Roy v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Royal v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Roy Al Boat Management Corp.; Glynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Royce Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. . . . . . . 1026,1067 Roy F. Weston, Inc.; Malot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co.; Mark I Marketing Corp. v. . . . . . . . 1115 Rubidoux v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Rubin; Cozad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Rubin; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Rubin; Jumonville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Rubin; Sack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Rubin; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Ruckel v. Churchich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Rueben v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Ruffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxix Page Ruggiero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Ruggles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Rundle; Gersten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Runyon; Andress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Runyon; Gaskins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1003 Runyon; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Runyon; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1185 Runyon; Lussier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Runyon; Vincent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Runyon; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Rupert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs Council v. Sundquist . . 801 Rush; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Rush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Rushing v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Rushton v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Russell v. Hiltz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Russell; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Rust; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Rust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Rutgers, State Univ. of N. J.; Marcantonio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Ruthardt; Propac-Mass, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Rutherford v. Hailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1004 Rutherford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Rutledge, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Ruyle v. Continental Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1004 Ryan v. Doria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Ryan; Guerrero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Ryan; Zuckerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Rynes; Knox County Bd. of Ed. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 S.; Mark K. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 S.; Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 S. v. T. A. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Saadeh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Sabia v. Seminole County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Sac and Fox Nation; Willingham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Sac-Co Inc. v. AT&T Global Information Solutions Co. . . . . . . . . . 906 Sack, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Sack v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Sacramento; Customer Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Saenz v. Arrellano Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Saenz v. Diesslin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 516repp12e 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Saenz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Saez; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Saginaw County v. Whaley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Sahar v. Honeywell, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 S. A. Healy Co.; Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. . . . . . 1010 Sahhar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Saikaly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 St. Agnes Hospital Corp.; Maric v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 St. Agnes Medical Center; Menna's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 St. Helens Shop N' Kart v. MacKillop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, La., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . 1002 St. Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. . . 913 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Saint Paul, Saint Paul Island; Riggan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 St. Pierre v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 St. Theresa School; Carey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1154 Saiyed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Saka, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Salaam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Salas v. Casellas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Salas v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Salazar v. Price Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1003 Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Salb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Saleem v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1086 Salemo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Sales v. Conway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Sales v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Salinas v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Salinas-Galvan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Salt Lake City; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Salt Lake County v. Sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona . . . . . . . 868 Salzer v. Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Sample, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sam's Wholesale Club v. Follette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 San; Ray Qualmann Marine Construction, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 San Bernardino; Stubblefield Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Sanborn v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 Sanchez v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Sanchez v. School Dist. 9­R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Sanchez v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Sanchez v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxli Page Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,1139,1148 Sanchez-Cobarruvias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Sanchez-Montoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Sanders, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Sanders v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Sanders v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Sanders; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Sanders v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Sandhaus v. Weinreich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 San Diego County; Service Employees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 San Diego County; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Sandlin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Sands; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Sanford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Sanitary and Improvement Dist. No. 210, Douglas Cty. v. Omaha 819 San Jose; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. . . . . . . 1159 San Miguel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Santa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Santa Ana v. Lambert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Santa Ana; Shannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Santa Clara County Dept. of Family Services; Aurelia N. v. . . . . . 1030 Santana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,925 Santiago; Leik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Santiago v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1053 Santiago v. Workman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Santiago-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1156 Santos Urrutia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Sapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Sarabia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Sarandos v. Visalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Sarduy v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraphic, Inc. . . . . . . . 1044,1154 Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Sartin v. Dodson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Sasson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Satcher v. Honda Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Satcher; Honda Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Satizabal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Sauceda v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Saucier v. Alcede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Saunders v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Saunders; Carman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Saunders v. McAninch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Savage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Savannah Foods & Industries, Inc. v. National Utility Service 1047 Savings of America; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Savoy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1090 Scaife v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Scales v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1142 Scarbrough v. Prichard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1085 Scarth v. NICOR Exploration Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Scattered Corp.; Harkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Scearce; Fruit of the Loom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Scearce; Union Underwear Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Sceifers v. Trigg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1068 Schaaf v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Schamber v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Schering Corp. v. Food and Drug Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Schering Corp.; Illinois Antibiotics Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Scheve; Mohammed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Schirmer; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Schleeper v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Schleicher; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Schlicker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Schnabolk v. Securitron Magnalock Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Schneider; Kirnon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Schneider (Europe) AG; SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 990 Schoemer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Scholes; African Enterprise, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 School Committee of Falmouth; Curtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 School Dist. 9­R; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Schoonover v. Wild Injun Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Schouman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Schreiber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Schrock v. McAninch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Schueller v. Ashley Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Schultz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Schulz v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Schwartz; Gregori v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Schwartz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Schwedt; Planning Research Corp., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Scientific Information Systems v. Lite America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Scientific Information Systems v. Marketing Dynamics Inc. . . . . . 815 SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Schneider (Europe) AG . . . . . . . . . . 990 Scofield v. Zenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxliii Page Scorza; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Scott; Amos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Scott; Briddle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1034 Scott; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Scott v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Scott; Cazey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Scott; Celestine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Scott; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Scott; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Scott; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Scott; Elam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Scott; Estrada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Scott; Fard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Scott; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Scott; Hai Hai Vuong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Scott; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Scott; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Scott; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1085 Scott; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Scott v. Kmart Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Scott; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Scott; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Scott; Lyon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Scott; Marian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Scott; McCullar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1085 Scott; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Scott; McKibben v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Scott; Moody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1085 Scott v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Scott; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Scott; Parnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Scott; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Scott; Prosper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Scott; Randall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Scott; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Scott; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Scott v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Scott; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Scott; Sauceda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Scott v. Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Scott; Shipp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Scott; Spearman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Scott; Stafford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Scott; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Scott; Sterling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Scott; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,857,902,969,1136,1137 Scott; Valles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Scott; Vaughn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Scott; Waffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Scott; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Scott; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Scott; Wendt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Scott; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,879,948 Scrivner v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Scruggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Scully; Bentley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 S. Diamond Associates, Inc. v. Original Appalachian Artworks . . 1045 Seabolt v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Seabury Management v. Professional Golfers' Assn. of America . . 867 Seagle v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Seagrave v. Lake County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Seal Beach; 1120 Central Condominiums Owners Assn. v. . . . . . . 1047 Seals v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Seaman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Searcy v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. U. S. Philips Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Seastrong v. Miller County Juvenile Court Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Seattle; Fanta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1142 Seattle; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Seattle L. S. & E. R., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n . . . . . 1084 Sebastian International, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp. . . . . . . 914 Sebek; Metzger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Sebulsky v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Secretary, Department of HUD; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . 1140 Secretary-General of United Nations; Corrinet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Secretary, La. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation; Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Secretary, N. C. Dept. of Revenue; Homesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Secretary, N. C. Dept. of Revenue; Swanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Secretary of Agriculture; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Secretary of Army; Crumpton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Secretary of Army; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Secretary of Army; Tom Shaw, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Secretary of Army; Watkis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Secretary of Army; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,976 Secretary of Defense; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlv Page Secretary of Defense; M. Bianchi of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Secretary of Defense; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. 807 Secretary of Ed.; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Secretary of HHS; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Secretary of HHS; Edmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Secretary of HHS; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Secretary of HHS; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Secretary of HHS; Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. . . 930 Secretary of HHS; Jeffreys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Secretary of HHS; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Secretary of HHS; Kinchen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Secretary of HHS; Lau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Secretary of HHS; LTV Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Secretary of HHS; Northrup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Secretary of HHS; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1003 Secretary of HHS; Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. . . . . . 913 Secretary of HHS; Stern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Secretary of HHS; Tampa General Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Secretary of HHS; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Secretary of HUD; Federal Housing Partners IV v. . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Secretary of HUD; Snelling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Secretary of HUD; Stuckey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Secretary of Interior; Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Secretary of Interior; Douglas County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1185 Secretary of Interior; Spiegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Secretary of Labor; Interstate Brands Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Secretary of Labor; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1033 Secretary of Labor; National Engineering & Contracting Co. v. . 943 Secretary of Labor; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Secretary of Navy; Posey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Secretary of Revenue of N. C.; Fulton Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Secretary of State; Cuban American Bar Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 913 Secretary of State of Ill.; Guerrero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Secretary of Transportation; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Secretary of Transportation; Min-Ju Chang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Secretary of Treasury; Cozad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Secretary of Treasury; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Secretary of Treasury; Jumonville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Secretary of Treasury; Sack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Secretary of Treasury; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; American Legion v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Counts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Field v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Haywood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Osborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Prenzler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Roaquin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1033 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1086 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Zuspann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Securities Service Network, Inc.; Cromwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Securitron Magnalock Corp.; Schnabolk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Security Management Corp. v. Baltimore County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Sedwick; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 See v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Segal v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Segeada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Seguin v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Sehorn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Seinfeld; Fales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Sekoian v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Sellers v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Sellers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Seminole County; Sabia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Sena-Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Senkowski; Charleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Senkowski; Trottie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1185 Senter v. Hughes Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Service Employees v. San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Servis; Hiller Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Sessions; Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. . . . . . . . . 1045 Settenberg v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Settle v. Dickson County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 73rd Legislative of Tex.; Sweed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Sexton v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Seymour; Rosendahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc.; Ferris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. v. Int'l Rectifier Corp. . . . . . 931 SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc.; Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. . . . . . . 931 Shackelford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Shackleford v. Decker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Shadburne; Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Shadburne-Vinton; Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Shafer v. Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,1069 Shafer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Shah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlvii Page Shalala; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Shalala; Edmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Shalala; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Shalala; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Shalala; Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Shalala; Jeffreys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Shalala; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Shalala; Kinchen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Shalala; Lau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Shalala; LTV Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Shalala; Northrup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Shalala; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1003 Shalala; Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Shalala; Stern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Shalala; Tampa General Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Shalala; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Shanks; Armendarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Shanks; Fuentes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Shannon; Employers Resource Management Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Shannon v. Hueszel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Shannon v. Santa Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Shaper v. Tracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Shapiro, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1089 Shark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Sharp; Lawrence Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Shartle v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Shaw v. Hahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Shaw v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Shaw, Inc. v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Shea v. Shea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1003 Shear; Gabovitch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc.; Meyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Sheats v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Shee Ho v. Illinois Power Co., Clinton Power Station . . . . . . . . . 896 Sheehy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1033 Sheehy v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, Potter County Assistance Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 141 Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Trust Fund v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Sheets; Salt Lake County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Sheffey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Sheffield v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Sheheed v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Shelby; Mosley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Shepard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,955 Shephard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Shepherd, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1019 Shepherd v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Shepherd v. Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services . . . . . 1176 Sherlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Sherman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Sherman; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Sherwin Manor Nursing Center, Inc.; McAuliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Shieh v. Ebershoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Shieh v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Shieh v. U. S. Bankruptcy Court for Central Dist. of Cal. . . . . . . 842 Shifflett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Shigemura v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Shilaos; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Shiley, Inc. v. Michael . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Shillinger; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Shin Chong Yong v. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Southern Cal. . . . . . 1173 Shipp v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Shiroky; Fechter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Shivers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Shiyr v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Shoemaker v. Kellogg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Shoemaker; Kellogg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Shomorin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods v. Food and Commercial Workers 1113 Shores, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Shorter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Short Hills Assoc. v. N. J. Coalition Against Middle East War . . . 812 Shown v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Shown v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Shuey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Shultz v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Shulze v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Shumate v. Huff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Shumway v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Siao-Pao v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1085 Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Siddique v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Sidebottom v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,983 Siegler; Baritsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. v. Strausberg . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Sierra, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Sigman v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlix Page Signore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1089 Siguel v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Sikes; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Sikes; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Sikora v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Silverman; Berkson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Silver Rose Entertainment, Inc. v. Clay County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Silvestri, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Silvestri v. Christman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Simasko; LaFountain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Sime v. Rohnert Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Simko v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Simmons; Beyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Simmons; Callahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Simmons v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,888,900,1136 Simms v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Simon; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,1002 Simone v. Worcester County Institution for Savings . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Simpson v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Sims v. Barkley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Sims; Hull v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Sims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Singh v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Singh v. Reeves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Singh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Singletary; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Singletary; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Singletary; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297,838,846,853,1055,1110,1170 Singletary; Byrd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Singletary; Cooke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Singletary; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Singletary; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Singletary; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Singletary; Hickman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Singletary; Hock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Singletary; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Singletary; Kight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Singletary; Knapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Singletary; Rampersad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1018 Singletary; Salas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Singletary v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1140 Singletary; Stano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Singletary; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Singletary; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1017,1018 Singletary; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Singleton; Bolt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Singleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Sipe v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Sivak v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Sivaskandan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 60 Key Centre, Inc. v. Administrator, GSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Sizemore v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Skaggs v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Skandalakis; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Skandier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Skjonsberg; Brinkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1085 Skorepa; Florio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Skorniak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Skrmetta Machinery Corp. v. Laitram Machinery, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 822 Skyers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Skywark v. United States Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Sladon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Slagle v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Slain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Slappy v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1185 Slattery; Xin-Chang Zhang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Slaughter; Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Sligar v. Tulsa Regional Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 S. L. J.; R. J. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Sloan v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1142 Sloan v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Sloan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Small v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Small Business Administration; Hastings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Smiley v. Citibank (S. D.), N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . 805,942,961,973,984,1019,1069,1085,1089,1168 Smith v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Smith; Atchley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Smith; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Smith; Boyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Smith; Broida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Smith; Butler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Smith; Govostis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Smith v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Smith; Holsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Smith; Holywell Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1154 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cli Page Smith v. Keohane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Smith v. Lamer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Smith v. Leonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Smith; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Smith; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Smith; Mondragon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Smith v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Smith v. Parke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Smith v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Smith v. Rush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Smith; Singletary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1140 Smith v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Smith v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824, 864, 883,897, 898,900, 903,904, 926,935, 951,955, 969,999, 1001, 1059,1063,1098,1105,1136,1151,1166 Smith v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Smith v. Velasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Smith; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 SmithKline Beecham Corp.; DiBiase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc.; Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. 1044 Smithtown v. SSC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Smithtown; SSC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Smith Trucking Co. v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Sneed v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Snelling v. Cisneros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Snider; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Snugz/USA, Inc.; Chums, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Snyder; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Snyder v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Snyder; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Sobiecki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Sobin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Sobina; Outlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Sobina; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Socorro v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Sofec, Inc.; Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1091,1156 So-Fine v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Sokolow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Solem v. Courter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Soley v. Soley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1129 Solimine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1145 Solimine v. Dedham District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Solimine v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Solimine v. International Law Students Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Solimine v. Ortho McNeil Pharmaceutical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Solimine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Solliday v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Solomon v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Soltow; Fishell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Somerset County v. Aravanis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Son Van Hoang, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1034 South Carolina; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 South Carolina; Cavin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1012,1099 South Carolina; Dingle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 South Carolina; Dupree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 South Carolina v. Fossick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 South Carolina; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 South Carolina; Haigler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 South Carolina; Hudgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 South Carolina; Mann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 South Carolina; Nixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 South Carolina; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 South Carolina; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 South Carolina; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 South Carolina Bd. of Medical Examiners.; Abofreka v. . . . . . . . 822 South Carolina Dept. of Corrections; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 South Carolina State Ports Authority; Ristow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Southeastern Express Co. v. Triad Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Southeastern Express Systems; Southern Guaranty Ins. of Ga. v. 1044 Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . 918 Southern Bell Telephone Telegraphic, Inc.; Sarduy v. . . . . . . . 1044,1154 Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions . . . . . . . . 1045 Southern Guaranty Ins. of Ga. v. Southeastern Express Systems 1044 Southern La. Electric Cooperative Assn.; Morgan City v. . . . . . . 908 Southern Pacific Transportation Co.; Albert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Isbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Southmark Corp. v. Marley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Spade; Buoscio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Spaeni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Spagnoulo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Spain v. Virginia Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Spanel International, Ltd.; Mayer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Spaulding v. Barry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Spaziano v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cliii Page Speaker Pro Tem., Ohio House of Representatives; Voinovich v. . 801 Spearman v. Epps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Spearman v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1069 Spearman v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Spears v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Spears; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Spears v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Spears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Spectramed, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Speller v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Spence Chapin Adoption Agency; Velez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Spencer v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Spencer; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Spicer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Spickler v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Spickler v. York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Spiegel v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Spiegelman v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Spigelski v. Banaszak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Spiliotis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Spink; Lockheed Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Spinks v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Spinner v. Los Angeles County, Dept. of Public Works . . . . . . . 832,1003 Spirko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Spivey v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Spottedwolf v. Woods Petroleum Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Spradley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Sprecher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Spremo v. Babchik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Spremo v. Graci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Sprouse; Attwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Spruill v. Mozell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Spruill v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Spybuck v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Squire v. Casey, Gerry, Casey, Westbrook, Reed and Hughes . . . . 1125 SSC Corp. v. Smithtown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 SSC Corp.; Smithtown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Stack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Stafford v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Stafford County School Bd.; Goodall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Stage v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Stainer; Easter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Stalder; Giovanni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Stamper v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Stanford v. Times Mirror Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Stanley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Stanley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1121 Stano v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Stansbury v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Stanton v. Gonnering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Stapleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Stark v. Lakeside Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Stark v. Reinke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Starkes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Starkman; Dolphin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1142 Starks-El v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 State Bar of Cal.; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 State Bar of Ga.; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1003 State Developmental Center, Grafton; Levey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 State Employees; Aleem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Comm'r of Ins. . . . 1184 State-Record Co.; Gaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 State Univ. of N. Y. (Buffalo); Yoonessi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Steamship Clerks v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . 814 Steel v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Steele v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1085 Steen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Stegall; Wojnicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Steger; Omernick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Steichen & Co. v. Honn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Steinberg; Burchill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Stenzel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Stephen v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Stephens v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Stephens v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Stephenson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Sterling; Hume v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Sterling v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Sterling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105,1142 Sterling Milk Co.; Connors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Sterling Press, Inc.; Gumport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Stern v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Stevens v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clv Page Stevens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Stevenson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Stewart v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1033 Stewart v. Coalter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Stewart v. Lake Charles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,899,1117 Stibbards; Kidston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1034 Stiff v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Stigler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108,1169 Stiles v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Stillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Stine; McGore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Stinson; DeJesus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Stinson; Salzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Stites v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Stockenauer v. DeLeeuw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Stokely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Stokes v. Kiethly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Stokes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1066 Stokes v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Stokley v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Stone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Stonehenge Insured Notes - I Ltd. P'ship v. Dept. of Treasury . . 987 Stoneking v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Stonier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Storer v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Stotts; Clemmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Stovall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Stover v. Norfolk & Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Stow v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1018 Strack; Acosta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Straight; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Stratman; Koniag, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Strausberg; Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Stretcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Strickland v. Maine Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Strickland v. Pontiac Correctional Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Strickland v. Rankin County Correctional Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Strickland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Strickler v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Strumpf; Citizens Bank of Md. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Stuart; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1003 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stubblefield Construction Co. v. San Bernardino . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Stuckey v. Cisneros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Stuckey v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Stuckeys, Inc.; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Stump v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Stun-Tech, Inc. v. RACC Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Sturgis v. Logan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Sturgis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Stutson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Styles; Ashe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Suarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Sublett; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Suddard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1089 Suffolk County; Podgurski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1142 Suggs; Federation of Conn. Taxpayer Organizations v. . . . . . . . . . 976 Su Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Sullivan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Sumler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Sun Country Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration . . 1008 Sundquist; Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs Council v. . . 801 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See also name or title of superintendent. Superintendent of Va. State Penitentiary; Rees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Superior Court of Ariz., Maricopa County; Murray & Murray Co., L. P. A. Profit-Sharing Plan and Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Superior Court of Ariz., Navajo County; Purdy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Superior Court of Ariz., Pima County; A. Uberti & C. v. . . . . . . . 906 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Goldman v. . . . . . . . 838 Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . 838 Superior Court of Cal., San Diego County; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Superior Court of Cal., San Diego County; Mahdavi v. . . . . . . . . 1130 Superior Court of Cal., San Mateo County; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Superior Court of Cal., Solano County; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Super Sack Mfg. Corp.; Chase Packaging Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Supplee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Supreme Court of Fla. and Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners; Leon v. . . 989 Surface Transportation Bd.; Train Dispatchers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Suros v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Sutherland; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,972 Sutherland; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Sutherland v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Sutter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Suttles v. Hightower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Sutton v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clvii Page Sutton; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Sutton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1075 Swano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Swanson v. Faulkner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Swearengen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Sweed v. 73rd Legislative of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Sweeney; Cully v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Sweeney; Dutcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1143 Sweeney; Picciotti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Sweeney; Tap Electrical Contracting Service, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 812 Sweeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,934,1019,1129 Sweet v. Sutherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Sweeting, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Swint v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1149 Swist v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Pfingst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Sycuan Band of Mission Indians; Pfingst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Syed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Sylvan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Sylvester v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Tabas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1085 Tache, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Tacoma; Kendall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Tal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1145 Talbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Talley v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Talley v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority . . . . . . . . . . 918 T. A. M.; C. R. S. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Tamayo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1041 Tamayo v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Tamico, Inc.; Triem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,1003 Tampa General Hospital v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Tannehill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Tanner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Tanner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Tansy; Brady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Tansy; Candelaria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Tansy; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Tansy; Scrivner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Tap Electrical Contracting Service, Inc. v. Sweeney . . . . . . . . . . 812 Tapia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Tapia-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc.; Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1172 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Tatum v. Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Tatum v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Tatum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Tavares, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Tavares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Tax Comm'r of Ohio; Shaper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Tayag v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Tay Chu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Taylor v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Taylor v. Cummins Atlantic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Taylor; Grogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Taylor v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1066,1099,1105,1183 Taylor v. Walter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Tay Thuong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 T. B. D. v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Teamsters; National Refractories & Minerals Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . 866 Teamsters; Rowser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Tebbetts; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072,1154 Tedder v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Tellio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Tenbusch v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Tennessee; Ali-Abdur'Rahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Tennessee; Dillon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1019 Tennessee; Hutchison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Tennessee; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Tennessee; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Tennessee; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Tennessee; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Tennessee; Porterfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Tennessee; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Tepper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Term Auto Sales, Inc. v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Terrell; Mayweather v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Terrell v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Terrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,874 Territory. See name of Territory. Terry v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Testa v. Hotel Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1003 Testa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Texaco Inc. v. American Geophysical Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Texaco Inc.; Texans United Ed. Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clix Page Texaco Inc. v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Texans United Ed. Fund v. Texaco Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Texas; Alba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Texas; Askew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Texas; Barley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Texas; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Texas; Bruce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Texas; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Texas; Cimermancic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Texas; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Texas; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Texas; Davila v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Texas; Dinkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Texas; Downs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Texas; Etheridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Texas; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Texas; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Texas; Gribble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Texas; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Texas; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Texas; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Texas; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Texas; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Texas; Julien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1033 Texas; Kim Ly Lim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Texas; Lave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Texas; Malekzadeh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Texas; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Texas; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1051 Texas; Mata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Texas; McCulloch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Texas; McGinnis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Texas; McGlothlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Texas; Minor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Texas; Newsom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Texas; Norris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Texas; Osiris Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Texas; Penry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977,1069 Texas; Pine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Texas; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,991 Texas; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1142 Texas; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Texas; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Texas; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Texas; Salinas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Texas; Seabolt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Texas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Texas; Thacker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Texas; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Texas; Van Duren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Texas; Vitela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Texas; Willingham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Texas; Woodruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Texas; Yi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Texas Dept. of Commerce; Aurispa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice; Jernigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Parole Division; Carson v. . . . . . 1012 Thacker v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Thatcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Theatrical and Stage Employees v. Compact Video Services, Inc. 987 Thierman v. Thierman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1033 Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Thomas; Baxter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Thomas; Boulden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Thomas v. Carver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Thomas v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Thomas v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Thomas v. Drochner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Thomas; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Thomas; Felker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Thomas; Getty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Thomas; Hambrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Thomas v. Heise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Thomas; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Thomas; High v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1154 Thomas v. Holmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Thomas; Isaacs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002,1099 Thomas v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Thomas; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,875 Thomas; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Thomas v. Null . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Thomas v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1020 Thomas; Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Thomas; Peacock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349,911 Thomas v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Thomas; Putman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1099 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxi Page Thomas; Schamber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Thomas; Spivey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Thomas; Sutherland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Thomas v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Thomas v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Thomas v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . 814,884,885,892,903,933,971,1111,1166 Thomas v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Thomas; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,982 Thomas v. Whalen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Thomas v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Thomas L. Jacobs & Associates; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Thompson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Thompson; Breazeale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Thompson v. Buchanan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Thompson; Horsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Thompson v. Keohane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Thompson; Mu'Min v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Thompson; Oslund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Thompson v. San Jose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Thompson v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Thompson v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Thompson; Stuckey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Thompson v. Thompson's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,897,953,976,1068,1131 Thompson Center Arms v. Pumphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Thompson's Estate; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Thompson Tool Co. v. Pumphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Thomson Newspapers, Inc.; Coody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Thornton v. Lombardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Thornwell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Three Sisters Sportswear Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . 1093 Thrower, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Thuong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Thurman; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Thurman; Socorro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Tiffany v. Farm Credit Bank of Omaha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Tighe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 TIG Ins. Group v. Infantino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Tilbury v. Multnomah County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Tilghman; Headley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Tillman v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Timberlake v. Lamer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1185 Times Mirror Co.; Stanford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Time Warner Cable; Doyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Time Warner Entertainment Co., L. P. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Timmons v. Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Tines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Tingley v. Williams County Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . 1071 Tino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1160 Tinsley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Tinsley v. TRW Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Tinsley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1018 Titan Sports, Inc. v. Janos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Titan Sports, Inc. v. Jesse "The Body" Ventura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Titan Sports, Inc. v. Ventura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 TNS, Inc. v. Oil Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Tobin v. Casco Northern Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Tobin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Todd Electric, Inc.; Knighten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Hoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Tokhtameshev v. American National Can Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Tomlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Toms, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1168 Tom Shaw, Inc. v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Toney v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Tonquin Fisheries, Inc. v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Toombs; Trice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Torcasio v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Torreblanca de Aguilar v. Boeing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Torres-Barraza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Torres-Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Torres-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Torres-Saucedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Touron v. Metropolitan Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,1068 Town. See also name of town. Town & Country Electric, Inc.; NLRB v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Town Court for Springfield; Hansel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Townes v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Townes v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Townsend v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Toyota Motor Co.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Tracy; Shaper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Tracy v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Train Dispatchers v. Surface Transportation Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxiii Page TransAmerica Ins. Co.; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Transportation Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. D. W. Ferguson & Associates 823 Transportation Union; Gresham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Transport Workers; Carrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Traughber; Eslick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Traunig v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Travaglia v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Travelers Ins. Co.; Hommerding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Travelers Ins. Co.; Plaisance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1018 Travelers Ins. Co.; St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, La., Inc. v. . . . . . 1002 Travis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1060 Traynoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Traywick v. Medical Univ. of S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Treece v. Florida Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Tree Farm Development Corp.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1185 Trent; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Trepel; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Trevino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1016,1061 Triad Systems Corp.; Southeastern Express Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Tribe; Kramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Trice v. Toombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Trice v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1003 Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. Mercer County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Trident Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 869 Triem v. Tamico, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,1003 Trigalet v. Warrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Trigg; Sceifers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1068 Trigg; Tyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Trimper v. Norfolk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Trinity Industries, Inc.; Myers & Associates, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . 807 Triomphe Investors v. Northwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Tripati v. Agra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Trippett; Harrelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Tristani v. Lorenzo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Trondel-Pena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Trong Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Troster v. Pennsylvania State Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Trottie v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1185 Troublefield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Trout v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Troutman; Perdue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Troutman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 T. Rowe Price; Conboy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Truck Ins. Exchange; Melkonian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page TRW Inc.; Tinsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Tsimbidaros v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Tsimbidaros v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1069 Tucker; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Tucker v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Tucker v. New Jersey State Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Tucker v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Tuggle v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Tulsa; L'Ggrke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Tulsa Regional Medical Center; Sligar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Tunnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Turecamo of Savannah, Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp. . . . . . . . . 1066 Turner; Banfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Turner v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1086 Turner v. Campoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Turner v. Cullum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1142 Turner v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Turner v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1004 Turner v. Moats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Turner; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,935,951 Turner; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035,1110 Tursi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 25th Judicial Dist. Probation Dept.; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Twenty-Three Nineteen Creekside, Inc. v. Commissioner . . . . . . 1154 Tyler v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Tyler v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Tyler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Tyler Shartle v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Tyson v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Tyson v. Trigg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. WLR Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Tysons Manor Homeowners Assn.; Breedlove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Tytor v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 2 . . 862 Tyus v. Bosley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Uberti & C. v. Cordova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Uberti & C. v. Superior Court of Ariz., Pima County . . . . . . . . . 906 Udall; Baca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Udall; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 U. D. Registry, Inc.; Cisneros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Uhlrig v. Harder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxv Page Ullrich, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Ulmer; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Umbehr; Heiser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Underwriters and Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's v. North River Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Unemployment Appeals Comm'n; Kalinsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Uniden America Corp.; Papaila v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Pacific R. Co.; Hiatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Union Security Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Union Underwear Co. v. Scearce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co.; Sylla-Sawdon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Corp.; Mutual Trading Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 1115 Unisys Corp. v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Unisys Corp.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Airlines; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 United Employer Benefit Corp. v. Oregon Dept. of Consumer and Business Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 United Gas Pipe Line Co.; Eglin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 United Parcel Service; Dickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 United Parcel Service, Inc.; Fleming v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Attorney; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 U. S. Bankruptcy Court for Central Dist. of Cal.; Shieh v. . . . . . . 842 U. S. Court of Appeals; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 U. S. Court of Appeals; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 U. S. District Court; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 U. S. District Court; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 U. S. District Court; Clayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 U. S. District Court; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 U. S. District Court; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 U. S. District Court; Hambrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 U. S. District Court; MacDraw, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 U. S. District Court; Okpala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 U. S. District Court; Raitport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 U. S. District Court; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 U. S. District Court; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 U. S. District Court; Spiegelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 U. S. District Court; Tracy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 U. S. District Court; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 U. S. District Court; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 U. S. District Judge; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 U. S. District Judge v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page U. S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Dukes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 United States Lines, Inc.; Skywark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 U. S. Marshals Service; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Brice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Orlander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 U. S. Philips Corp.; Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. . . 1028 U. S. Philips Corp.; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 U. S. Postal Service; Air Courier Conf. of Am./Int'l Comm. v. . . . 1171 U. S. Postal Service; Borkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1185 U. S. Postal Service; Morata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 U. S. Postal Service; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 U. S. Postal Service; UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1171 U. S. Postal Service; Uske v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 U. S. Postal Service; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,982 U. S. Postal Service, c/o General Mail Facility, Pittsburgh; Haas v. 914 United Technologies Corp.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 University of Health Sciences/Chicago Medical School; United States ex rel. Hindo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 University of Houston; Harrel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813,1002 University of Miss.; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Upland Mortgage Corp.; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Upshaw; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . 1171 Urban v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Urrutia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Ursery; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1109,1156 US Ecology, Inc.; Boyd County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Usher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Uske v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 US West, Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Utah; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Utah; Colorow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Utah; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Utah State Tax Comm'n; CIG Exploration, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Uzowuru v. Williams Brothers Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 V. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Vacco; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Valdez v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Valdez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Valdez Andaverde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Valencia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Valentine; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 516repp12f 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxvii Page Valerio v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Valleperez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Valles v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Val-U Construction Co. of S. D.; Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. . . . . . . . 819 Van Belle v. Atlantic Equipment Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Van Blericom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Vance; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Vance; Easley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Vance v. Horn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Vance; Pendleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Vance; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1004 VanDelft v. Moses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Van Duren v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Vaneaton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Van Fripp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Van Hoang, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1034 Van Klassens, Inc. v. Imagineering, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Van Lee v. Mayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,993 Vannoy; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 VanSickle v. English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Van Wagner v. Pendell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Van Wagner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Vargas v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Vargas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Varity Corp. v. Howe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489,911 Varner; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,982 Varo, Inc.; Csorba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1085 Vasquez; Pertsoni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1018 Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Vaughan v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Vaughn; Devon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Vaughn; Giles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Vaughn; Glass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Vaughn; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Vaughn v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Vaughn; Seals v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Vaughn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Vaughn; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Vavricka; Wacek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Vega v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Vega v. Daley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Vega v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Vega-Soto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Velasquez; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Velasquez-Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Velez v. Spence Chapin Adoption Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Velez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Vencius v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Veneri v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Ventura v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Ventura; Titan Sports, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ventura; World Wrestling Federation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Vera; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Vera; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Vera; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Veras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Verdugo v. California State Univ. at Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Vergel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Vermont; Bacon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Vermont; Choudhary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Vermont; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Vermont; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Vermont Dept. of Public Service; Choudhary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Vermont Dept. of Social Welfare; Polewsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Vermont Info. Processing, Inc. v. Comm'r, N. Y. Dept. of Tax. . . . 989 Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Veterans Administration Medical Center; Haywood v. . . . . . . . . . 885 Vey v. Castor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Vey v. Colville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Vey v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Vey v. Romoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Vickson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Videa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Village. See name of village. Villalba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Villasenor; Muzakkir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Villers v. Dutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Vincent, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1018 Vincent v. C & P Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1069 Vincent v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Vining v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Virginia; Barakett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Virginia; Berkeley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Virginia; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Virginia; Coffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Virginia; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Virginia; Eubanks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxix Page Virginia; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Virginia; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Virginia; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Virginia; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Virginia; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Virginia; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Virginia; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Virginia; McCotter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Virginia; McElveen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Virginia; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Virginia; Ratliff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Virginia; Royal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Virginia; Townes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Virginia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1007,1040 Virginia; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1007,1040 Virginia; Vaughan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Virginia; Weeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Virginia; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Virginia Beach; Spain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Virginia Corp. Comm'n; Hopewell Cogeneration Ltd. Partnership v. 817 Virgin Islands; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Virgin Islands; Moncayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Visalia; Sarandos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Visness; Contra Costa County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Viswanathan v. Mississippi Cty. Community Coll. Bd. of Trustees 815,1002 Vitela v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Vogel; Landscape Properties, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Voinovich v. Quilter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Vojvodich; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Volkswagenwerk AG; Dykema v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1002 Volkswagenwerk AG; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Vom Baur v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. . . . . . . 1067 Voting Rights Coalition; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Voyager Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Whitson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Vuong v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 W.; G. W. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Wacek v. Vavricka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Wackenhut Corp.; Fred v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,1019 Wade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,901 Waffer v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Wagner v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Wagner; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Waite v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wake County; Haburn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Walcott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Waldau v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Waldron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Walker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,942,1019,1034 Walker v. Ames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Walker v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Walker v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Walker v. McLellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Walker v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Walker v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Walker v. Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,952,1002,1165 Walking Eagle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Wall v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Wall v. GTE Southwest Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Wallace v. Ieyoub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Wallace v. Newsome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Wallace v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Wallace v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Wallace v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Wallace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Walls v. Delaware Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Follette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Getter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Walmer v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Walpole v. Great American Ins. Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Walter; Riggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Walter; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Walter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc.; Republic of Philippines v. . . . . 1047 Walters v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Walton; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Walton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Wanless v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,982 Waples; Abdul-Wadood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Wapnick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ward; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1123 Ward v. Dyke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Ward v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Ward; Tonquin Fisheries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Ward v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Ward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxi Page Ward; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Warden. See also name of warden. Warden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Warden, Md. House of Correction; Nasim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ware; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Ware County Bd. of Comm'rs; Johns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Warner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Warren v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Warren; Carlsbad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Warrick; Trigalet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Wartski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Warwick Books; Prince George's County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Wash; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Washington v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1018 Washington v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Washington; Bear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Washington v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Washington; Brett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Washington v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Washington v. Creel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Washington; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Washington v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Washington; Foren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Washington; Gentry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Washington v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Washington v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Washington; Lostutter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Washington; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1085 Washington v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1033 Washington; Ply v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Washington v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Washington; Shumway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Washington; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Washington; Toney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Washington v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Washington; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Washington; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Gary v. . . . . . . 1011 Washington Redskins; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1109 Washington Service Contractors Coalition v. District of Columbia 1145 Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson County v. Koopman . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson County; Koopman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Waters v. Magurn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Waters v. Neidenbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Waters v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,982 Waters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Watkins v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Watkins v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Watkis v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Watroba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Watson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Watson v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Watson v. Trepel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Watt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Watts v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,976 Wayne Car Releasing Services, Inc.; Rowser v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1167 Weatherford v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1018 Weaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Webb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Webster v. Amarillo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1142 Weed v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Weeks v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Weems; Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Weets v. Matlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Weil v. Hern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Weiner; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Weinreich; Sandhaus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Weinstein v. Weinstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Weir v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Weisgerber, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1089 Weiss, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1144 Weissman v. 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United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Wesley v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 West, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 West; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxiii Page West; Crumpton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 West v. Hanrahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,984,1085 West; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 West; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 West v. 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First Interstate Bank of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,934 Weston; Kernan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Weston, Inc.; Malot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 West Peninsular Title Co.; Palm Beach County v. . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1018 West Penn Abstract Co.; Perkovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1018 Westview Instruments, Inc.; Markman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 West Virginia; Bradshaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 West Virginia; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 West Virginia; Nixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Wetta v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Whalen v. 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North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 White v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 White; Parsa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 White; Raytech Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page White v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1017,1018 White; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1152 White; Veneri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 White; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Whitehead v. Bradley Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Whitehead v. Deutch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Whitehead v. Deutsch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Whitehead v. Upland Mortgage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Whiten; Camboni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Whitfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Whitis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Whitley; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Whitley; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Whitlock v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Whitmill v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Whitmore v. Avery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Whitmore v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Whitmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Whitney v. Yarborough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Whiton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Whitson; Voyager Guaranty Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Whittaker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Whittier Union High School Dist.; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Whittlesey v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Whitton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Whren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Wichita; Aaron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Wiitala v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Wilcox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Wilczynski v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Wild Injun Products; Schoonover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Wiley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Wiley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Wilhike v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Wilkerson v. Mosley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Wilkinson; Guess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Wilkinson; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Willard; Braun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Willey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Williams; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Williams v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Williams v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxv Page Williams v. Ashland Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Williams v. Bradburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Williams v. Brewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Williams v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Williams; Cheatham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Williams v. Dow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Williams v. Garraghty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Williams v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Williams v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Williams v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Williams v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1167 Williams; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Williams; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Williams v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1128 Williams v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Williams v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Williams v. Pollard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Williams v. Resseau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Williams v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,879,948 Williams v. Skandalakis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Williams; Texaco Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Williams; Trice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1003 Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826, 846,849,866,894,900,927,997,1016,1032,1042,1083,1119,1120, 1139,1153,1182 Williams v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Williams v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,982 Williams v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Williams; Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Williams v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Williams v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Williams Brothers Construction Co.; Uzowuru v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Williams County Dept. of Human Services; Tingley v. . . . . . . . . . 1071 Williamson v. Haywood County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Williamson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Willingham v. Sac and Fox Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Willingham v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Willis v. Matson Plastering Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Willoughby v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Wilson; Abdul-Wadood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Wilson v. Akron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Wilson v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:24 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wilson v. Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Wilson v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Wilson v. Dougherty County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1085 Wilson v. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Wilson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Wilson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Wilson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Wilson v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Wilson v. Raymond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Wilson v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,945,1152,1181,1183 Wilson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Wilson v. Voting Rights Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Wilwright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Wimberly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Wims v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Winchester Medical Center, Inc.; Phelps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Windham v. First Gibraltar Bank, F. S. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Windom v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Winn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Winpenny v. Winpenny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Winstar Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Winters v. Costco Wholesale Group Benefits Program and Concept Administrators, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Winters v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1004 Wisconsin; Hereford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Wisconsin; Kathy M. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Wisconsin; Keso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Wisconsin; Landrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Wisconsin; Matteson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Wisconsin; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Wisconsin v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1035 Wisconsin; Wolverton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Resources; Ozga Enterprises, Inc. v. 1159 Wiscot; Andrisani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Wise v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Wise v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Wishon v. Jacksonville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1003 Witherspoon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1000 Withrow; Mustin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1085 Witkowski; Bibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Witkowski; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Witkowski; Heatherly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1018 Witty v. Hewlett-Packard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:24 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxvii Page Witty v. Hewlett-Packard Colo., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 WLR Foods, Inc.; Tyson Foods, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Wodkiewicz v. Patent & Trademark Office Bd. of Patent Appeals & Interferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1185 Wohlford v. Mays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Wohlgemuth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1019 Woiner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Wojnicz v. Stegall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Wolf; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Wolfe v. Allegheny Beverage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Wolfe v. Sobina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Wolfson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Wollman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1089 Wolverton v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Womack v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Wong v. Carson City Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Wong v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., Research Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Wong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Wood, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,982 Wood v. Bartholomew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,1018 Wood; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Wood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816,881 Wood v. Wash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Woodall v. El Paso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Woodbridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Woodcock v. Chemical Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Woodfolk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Woodfork v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Woodpointe Inn Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Harper Woods . . 816 Woodruff v. Chun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Woodruff v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Woods; Candela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Woods; Palermo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Woods; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1069 Woods v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Woods v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,998,1031 Woods Motors, Inc.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Woods Petroleum Corp.; Spottedwolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Woody v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Wooldridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Wooldridge v. Yarbrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Woosley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Wooten v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Wooten; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:24 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Worcester County v. Cane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Worcester County Institution for Savings; Simone v. . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Worelds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; McBrearty v. . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Workman; Santiago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 World Wrestling Federation v. Janos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 World Wrestling Federation v. Jesse "The Body" Ventura . . . . . . 1174 World Wrestling Federation v. Ventura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Worthy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 W. R. Grace & Co.; Cheshire Medical Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 W. R. Grace & Company-Conn.; AIU Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Wright; Hassan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Wright; Hegarty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Wright v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Wright; Kelubai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Wright; Longworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Wright v. MetroHealth Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Wright v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Wright v. Parke-Davis Division of Warner-Lambert Co. . . . . . . . 1123 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,923,1063,1164 Wright v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Wu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Wunderlich v. Genesee County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Wunderlich v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Wyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Wynn v. AC Rochester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Wynn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Wyoming; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Wyoming Dept. of Family Services; R. M. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Xerox Corp.; Livecchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Xerox Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Yanez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Yang; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Yanich; Hoover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Yarborough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Yarborough; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Yarbrough; Wooldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Yelli; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Yi v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Ylst; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Yong v. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Southern Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Yoonessi v. State Univ. of N. Y. (Buffalo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:24 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxix Page Yordy Construction Co. v. Naylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 York; Spickler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Youell; Exxon Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Young v. Country Fair, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Young v. Culver City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Young; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Young; Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Young v. Hansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Young v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Young; Njoku v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Young; Pryor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Young v. Salt Lake City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Young v. Shilaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Young v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Young v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Young; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Young v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Younger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Young's Deli v. Country Fair, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Youngstown; Rafferty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Yu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Yueh-Shaio Yang; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . 1110 Yurtis v. Phipps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1069 Yusufu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Zack, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Zahran v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Zajac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Zak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Zambrano-Gavadia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Zamora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Zapon v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Zavaras; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Zebulon Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Zeneca, Inc.; Akins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Zenon; Scofield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Zhang v. Slattery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Zicherman; Korean Air Lines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Ziegler; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,982 Zimmerman v. Officers for Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Zipperer v. Fort Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Zipperer; Fort Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Zoccola, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1025 Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for West Amwell v. DeBlasio . . . . . . . 937 516repp12g 11-09-98 14:06:24 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) clxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Zoppo; Homestead Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Zsofka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Zuckerman v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Zuno-Arce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Zurita-Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Zuspann v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 ZZ Top; La Cienega Music Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 516us1$$1z 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 WOOD, SUPERINTENDENT, WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY v. BARTHOLOMEW on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94­1419. Decided October 10, 1995 Respondent was convicted in a Washington state court of murder during a robbery. He admitted the robbery but claimed the victim was killed accidentally. When both his brother Rodney and Rodney's girlfriend testified that respondent had told them of his robbery plans and his intent to leave no witnesses, the defense suggested they were lying to downplay Rodney's participation in the crime. The prosecution never disclosed that the two had taken pretrial polygraph examinations and that the examiner had concluded that Rodney's responses to questions about the robbery and murder weapon indicated deception. Respond- ent later filed for federal habeas, claiming, inter alia, that because the polygraph results were material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, the prosecution's failure to disclose them justified setting aside the conviction. The District Court denied the writ, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the polygraph results, although inadmissible under Washington law, were material under Brady because, had re- spondent's counsel known of the results, he would have had a stronger reason to investigate Rodney's story and might have deposed Rodney and used the answers in Rodney's cross-examination. Held: The Ninth Circuit's decision is a misapplication of this Court's Brady jurisprudence. Evidence is material under Brady, and the fail- ure to disclose it justifies setting aside a conviction, only where there 1 516us1$$1z 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT 2 WOOD v. BARTHOLOMEW Per Curiam exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different. The polygraph results were not evidence at all, and their disclosure would have had no direct effect on the trial's outcome because respondent could have made no mention of them during argument or while questioning witnesses. The Ninth Circuit's judgment is based on mere speculation that disclosure might have led respondent's counsel to conduct additional discovery. Yet counsel's trial strategy did not involve deposing Rodney, and counsel candidly acknowledged that disclosure would not have affected the scope of his cross-examination. Since the case against respondent was over- whelming, even without Rodney's testimony, it should take more than supposition on respondent's weak premises to undermine a court's con- fidence in the trial's outcome. Certiorari granted; 34 F. 3d 870, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of habeas relief based on its specula- tion that the prosecution's failure to turn over the results of a polygraph examination of a key witness might have had an adverse effect on pretrial preparation by the defense. The Court of Appeals assumed, and the parties do not dispute, that the results were inadmissible under state law both for substantive purposes as well as for impeachment. The deci- sion below is a misapplication of our Brady jurisprudence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and we accord- ingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and re- mand for further proceedings. I On August 1, 1981, respondent Dwayne Bartholomew robbed a laundromat in Tacoma, Washington. In the course of the robbery, the laundromat attendant was shot and killed. Two shots were fired: One hit the attendant in the head; the second lodged in a counter near the victim's body. From the beginning, respondent admitted that he committed the robbery and that the shots came from his gun. 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 1 (1995) 3 Per Curiam The only issue at trial was whether respondent was guilty of aggravated first-degree murder, which requires proof of premeditation; or of first-degree (felony) murder, which does not. Respondent's defense was that the gun, a single action revolver (one that must be cocked manually before each shot), discharged by accident-twice. In addition to the physical evidence concerning the opera- tion of the gun, the prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of respondent's brother, Rodney Bartholomew, and of Rodney's girlfriend, Tracy Dormady. Both Rodney and Tracy testified that on the day of the crime they had gone to the laundromat in question to do their laundry, and that respondent was sitting in his car in the parking lot when they arrived. While waiting for their laundry, Rodney sat with his brother in the car. Rodney testified that respond- ent told him that he intended to rob the laundromat and "leave no witnesses." According to their testimony, Rodney and Tracy left the laundromat soon after the conversation and went to Tracy's house. Respondent arrived at the house a short time later, and when Tracy asked respondent if he had killed the attendant respondent said "he had put two bullets in the kid's head." Tracy also testified that she had heard respondent say that he intended to leave no wit- nesses. Both Rodney and Tracy's testimony was consistent with their pretrial statements to the police. State v. Bar- tholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 176­178, 654 P. 2d 1170, 1173­ 1174 (1982). Respondent testified in his own defense. He admitted threatening the victim with his gun and forcing him to lie down on the floor. Respondent said, however, that while he was removing money from the cash drawer his gun acci- dently fired, discharging a bullet into the victim's head. Re- spondent further claimed that the gun went off a second time while he was running away. Respondent denied telling Rodney or Tracy that he intended to leave no witnesses. According to his testimony, moreover, Rodney had assisted 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT 4 WOOD v. BARTHOLOMEW Per Curiam in the robbery by convincing the attendant to open the laun- dromat's door after it had closed for the night, although Rod- ney left before the crime was committed. Ibid. In closing argument the defense sought to discredit Rodney and Tra- cy's testimony by suggesting that they were lying about the extent of Rodney's participation in the crime. 34 F. 3d 870, 872 (CA9 1994). At the sentencing phase of the trial (respondent was sen- tenced to death but his sentence was overturned on appeal and he was resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole), the prosecution's first witness was respondent's cellmate, Stanley Bell. Bell testified that re- spondent told him that he made the victim lie on the floor, asked him his age, found out it was 17, replied "[t]oo bad," and shot him. See State v. Bartholomew, supra, at 178, 654 P. 2d, at 1174. Before trial, the prosecution requested that Rodney and Tracy submit to polygraph examinations. The answers of both witnesses to the questions asked by the polygraph ex- aminer were consistent with their testimony at trial. As part of the polygraph examination, the examiner asked Tracy whether she had helped respondent commit the robbery and whether she had ever handled the murder weapon. Tracy answered in the negative to both questions. The results of the testing as to these questions were inconclusive, but the examiner noted his personal opinion that her responses were truthful. The examiner also asked Rodney whether he had assisted his brother in the robbery and whether at any time he and his brother were in the laundromat together. Rod- ney responded in the negative to both questions, and the examiner concluded that the responses to the questions indi- cated deception. Neither examination was disclosed to the defense. After exhausting his state remedies, respondent filed a ha- beas action in the District Court for the Western District of Washington, raising, inter alia, a Brady claim based on the 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 1 (1995) 5 Per Curiam prosecution's failure to produce the polygraph examinations. The District Court denied the writ, concluding that respond- ent "fails . . . to show that evidence was withheld. The in- formation withheld only possibly could have led to some admissible evidence. He fails to show that disclosure of the results of the polygraph to defense counsel would have had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the verdict." App. to Pet. for Cert. B5 (emphasis in original). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 34 F. 3d 870 (1994). The Court of Appeals noted that under Washington law polygraphic examinations are inadmissible in evidence, even for impeachment purposes. See id., at 875 (citing State v. Ellison, 36 Wash. App. 564, 676 P. 2d 531 (1984)). The court nevertheless reversed the District Court's denial of the writ, concluding that although the results would have been inadmissible at trial, the information was material under Brady. The court reasoned that "[h]ad [respondent's] coun- sel known of the polygraph results, he would have had a stronger reason to pursue an investigation of Rodney's story"; that he "likely would have taken Rodney's deposi- tion" and that in that deposition "might well have succeeded in obtaining an admission that he was lying about his partici- pation in the crime" and "would likely have uncovered a vari- ety of conflicting statements which could have been used quite effectively in cross-examination at trial." 34 F. 3d, at 875­876. II If the prosecution's initial denial that polygraph examina- tions of the two witnesses existed were an intentional mis- statement, we would not hesitate to condemn that misrepre- sentation in the strongest terms. But as we reiterated just last Term, evidence is "material" under Brady, and the fail- ure to disclose it justifies setting aside a conviction, only where there exists a "reasonable probability" that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433­434 (1995); 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT 6 WOOD v. BARTHOLOMEW Per Curiam United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). To begin with, on the Court of Appeals' own assumption, the polygraph results were inad- missible under state law, even for impeachment purposes, absent a stipulation by the parties, see 34 F. 3d, at 875 (citing State v. Ellison, supra), and the parties do not contend oth- erwise. The information at issue here, then-the results of a polygraph examination of one of the witnesses-is not "evi- dence" at all. Disclosure of the polygraph results, then, could have had no direct effect on the outcome of trial, be- cause respondent could have made no mention of them either during argument or while questioning witnesses. To get around this problem, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the in- formation, had it been disclosed to the defense, might have led respondent's counsel to conduct additional discovery that might have led to some additional evidence that could have been utilized. See 34 F. 3d, at 875. Other than expressing a belief that in a deposition Rodney might have confessed to his involvement in the initial stages of the crime-a confes- sion that itself would have been in no way inconsistent with respondent's guilt-the Court of Appeals did not specify what particular evidence it had in mind. Its judgment is based on mere speculation, in violation of the standards we have established. At trial, respondent's strategy was to discredit Rodney's damaging testimony by suggesting that Rodney was lying in order to downplay his own involvement in the crime. Id., at 872. That strategy did not involve deposing Rodney. It is difficult to see, then, on what basis the Ninth Circuit con- cluded that respondent's counsel would have prepared in a different manner, or (more important) would have discovered some unspecified additional evidence, merely by disclosure of polygraph results that, as to two questions, were consistent with respondent's preestablished defense. 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 1 (1995) 7 Per Curiam In speculating that the undisclosed polygraph results might have affected trial counsel's preparation, and hence the result at trial, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with, or disre- garded, the view of respondent's own trial counsel. At the evidentiary hearing held in the Federal District Court in this habeas action, respondent's habeas counsel questioned trial counsel on the importance of the polygraph results: "Q: And you indicated that your cross-examination of Rodney was, I think, somewhat limited because of concern that- "A: It was limited in my own respect. Nobody tried to limit me. In my opinion, as a trial lawyer, that was a very dangerous witness to me, and I wanted to get as much as I could out of him without recalling the crystal words again. Leave no prisoners. "Q: Do you think it would have been any help to you in doing that, if you had known of specific questions re- garding the offense on which Mr. Rodney Bartholomew had failed a polygraph examination? Would that have perhaps affected the shape of your cross-examination of him? "A: I think in retrospect they're almost parallel. The questions that he failed were his contribution or impli- cation in the offense, the holdup, with Mr. Dwayne Bar- tholomew. I believe they were in gloves, so in retro- spect they wouldn't have affected it. I would have liked to have known it, Mr. Ford, but I don't think it would have affected the outcome of the case." Tr. 55­56. Trial counsel's strategic decision to limit his questioning of Rodney undermines the suggestion by the Court of Ap- peals that counsel might have chosen to depose Rodney had the polygraph results been disclosed. But of even greater importance was counsel's candid acknowledgment that disclosure would not have affected the scope of his cross- 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT 8 WOOD v. BARTHOLOMEW Per Curiam examination. That assessment is borne out by the best pos- sible proof: The Federal District Court below went so far as to permit respondent's habeas counsel, armed with the information about the polygraph examinations, to question Rodney under oath. Even though respondent's counsel was permitted to refer to the polygraph results themselves-ref- erence to which would not be permissible on retrial-counsel obtained no contradictions or admissions out of Rodney. See id., at 84­87. In short, it is not "reasonably likely" that disclosure of the polygraph results-inadmissible under state law-would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Even without Rodney's testimony, the case against respondent was over- whelming. To acquit of aggravated murder, the jury would have had to believe that respondent's single action revolver discharged accidently, not once but twice, by tragic coinci- dence depositing a bullet to the back of the victim's head, execution style, as the victim lay face down on the floor. In the face of this physical evidence, as well as Rodney and Tracy's testimony-to say nothing of the testimony by Bell that the State likely could introduce on retrial-it should take more than supposition on the weak premises offered by respondent to undermine a court's confidence in the outcome. Whenever a federal court grants habeas relief to a state prisoner the issuance of the writ exacts great costs to the State's legitimate interest in finality. And where, as here, retrial would occur 13 years later, those costs and burdens are compounded many times. Those costs may be justified where serious doubts about the reliability of a trial infested with constitutional error exist. But where, as in this case, a federal appellate court, second-guessing a convict's own trial counsel, grants habeas relief on the basis of little more than speculation with slight support, the proper delicate balance between the federal courts and the States is upset to a degree that requires correction. * * * 516us1$$1l 10-22-98 10:35:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 1 (1995) 9 Per Curiam The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The re- spondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer dissent from summary disposition of this case. 516us1$$2Z 09-08-97 16:49:21 PAGES OPINPGT 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus TUGGLE v. NETHERLAND, WARDEN on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 95­6016. Decided October 30, 1995 Petitioner was convicted of murder in Virginia state court. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of future dangerousness at his sentencing hearing, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances-"future dangerousness" and "vileness"- and sentenced him to death. This Court vacated the State Supreme Court's judgment affirming the conviction and remanded for further consideration in light of the holding in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, that, when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but found that the death sentence survived based on the vileness aggravator because, under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, a death sentence supported by multiple aggravating circumstances need not always be set aside if one aggravator is invalid. The Court of Appeals agreed with this analysis on federal habeas review, construing Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld on the basis of one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid. Held: The Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Zant holding is incor- rect. Even after elimination of the invalid aggravator, the death sen- tence in Zant rested on firm ground. Two unimpeachable aggravating factors remained, and there was no claim that inadmissible evidence was before the jury during its sentencing deliberations or that the defendant had been precluded from adducing mitigating evidence. The record here does not provide comparable support for the death sentence. The Ake error prevented petitioner from developing his own evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence and to enhance his defense in miti- gation. As a result, the Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence went un- challenged, which may have unfairly increased its persuasiveness in the jury's eyes and affected its decision to impose death rather than life imprisonment. Zant supports the conclusion that one aggravator's in- validation does not necessarily require that a death sentence be set 516us1$$2Z 09-08-97 16:49:21 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 10 (1995) 11 Per Curiam aside, not the quite different proposition that a valid aggravator's exist- ence always excuses a constitutional error in the admission or exclusion of evidence. Cf. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U. S. 578, 590. This Court does not customarily address in the first instance whether harmless- error analysis is applicable. Certiorari granted; 57 F. 3d 1356, vacated and remanded. Per Curiam. In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983), we held that a death sentence supported by multiple aggravating circum- stances need not always be set aside if one aggravator is found to be invalid. Id., at 886­888. We noted that our holding did not apply in States in which the jury is instructed to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating cir- cumstances in determining whether to impose the death pen- alty. Id., at 874, n. 12, 890. In this case, the Virginia Su- preme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld on the basis of one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for which another aggravating factor may have been found to be invalid. Because this interpretation of our holding in Zant is incorrect, we now grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari and vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Petitioner Tuggle was convicted of murder in Virginia state court. At his sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony that petitioner demonstrated " `a high probability of future dangerousness.' " Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 107, 334 S. E. 2d 838, 844 (1985), cert. denied, Tuggle v. Virginia, 478 U. S. 1010 (1986). After deliberations, the jury found that the Com- monwealth had established Virginia's two statutory aggra- vating circumstances, "future dangerousness" and "vileness"; 516us1$$2Z 09-08-97 16:49:21 PAGES OPINPGT 12 TUGGLE v. NETHERLAND Per Curiam it exercised its discretion to sentence petitioner to death.1 230 Va., at 108­109, 334 S. E. 2d, at 844­845. Shortly after the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed peti- tioner's conviction and sentence, Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S. E. 2d 539 (1984), we held in Ake v. Okla- homa, 470 U. S. 68 (1985), that when the prosecutor presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dan- gerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires that the State provide the defendant with the as- sistance of an independent psychiatrist. Id., at 83­84. Be- cause petitioner had been denied such assistance, we vacated the State Supreme Court's judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Ake. Tuggle v. Virginia, 471 U. S. 1096 (1985). On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating circumstance because of the Ake error. See Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va., at 108­111, 334 S. E. 2d, at 844­846. The court nevertheless reaffirmed petitioner's death sentence, reasoning that Zant permitted the sentence to survive on the basis of the vileness aggravator. 230 Va., at 110­111, 334 S. E. 2d, at 845­846. The Court of Appeals agreed with this analysis on federal habeas review, Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F. 3d 1356, 1362­1363 (CA4 1995), as it had in the past.2 Quoting the Virginia Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals stated: " `When a jury makes separate findings of specific statu- tory aggravating circumstances, any of which could sup- port a sentence of death, and one of the circumstances 1 Virginia's capital punishment statute involves a two-stage determina- tion. The jury first decides whether the prosecutor has established one or both of the statutory aggravating factors. Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2­ 264.4(C)­(D) (1995). If the jury finds neither aggravator satisfied, it must impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Ibid. If the jury finds one or both of the aggravators established, however, it has full discretion to im- pose either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment. Ibid. 2 See Smith v. Procunier, 769 F. 2d 170, 173 (CA4 1985). 516us1$$2Z 09-08-97 16:49:21 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 10 (1995) 13 Per Curiam subsequently is invalidated, the remaining valid circum- stance, or circumstances, will support the sentence.' " Id., at 1363 (quoting 230 Va., at 110, 334 S. E. 2d, at 845, and citing Zant, supra). II Our opinion in Zant stressed that the evidence offered to prove the invalid aggravator was "properly adduced at the sentencing hearing and was fully subject to explanation by the defendant." 462 U. S., at 887. As we explained: "[I]t is essential to keep in mind the sense in which [the stricken] aggravating circumstance is `invalid.' . . . [T]he invalid aggravating circumstance found by the jury in this case was struck down . . . because the Geor- gia Supreme Court concluded that it fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed. The under- lying evidence is nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase." Id., at 885­886 (internal citations omitted). Zant was thus predicated on the fact that even after elimina- tion of the invalid aggravator, the death sentence rested on firm ground. Two unimpeachable aggravating factors re- mained and there was no claim that inadmissible evidence was before the jury during its sentencing deliberations or that the defendant had been precluded from adducing rele- vant mitigating evidence. In this case, the record does not provide comparable sup- port for petitioner's death sentence. The Ake error pre- vented petitioner from developing his own psychiatric evi- dence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence and to enhance his defense in mitigation. As a result, the Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence went unchallenged, which may have un- fairly increased its persuasiveness in the eyes of the jury. 516us1$$2Z 09-08-97 16:49:21 PAGES OPINPGT 14 TUGGLE v. NETHERLAND Scalia, J., concurring We may assume, as the Virginia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals found, that petitioner's psychiatric evidence would not have influenced the jury's determination concern- ing vileness. Nevertheless, the absence of such evidence may well have affected the jury's ultimate decision, based on all of the evidence before it, to sentence petitioner to death rather than life imprisonment. Although our holding in Zant supports the conclusion that the invalidation of one aggravator does not necessarily re- quire that a death sentence be set aside, that holding does not support the quite different proposition that the existence of a valid aggravator always excuses a constitutional error in the admission or exclusion of evidence. The latter cir- cumstance is more akin to the situation in Johnson v. Mis- sissippi, 486 U. S. 578 (1988), in which we held that Zant does not apply to support a death sentence imposed by a jury that was allowed to consider materially inaccurate evidence, 486 U. S., at 590, than to Zant itself. Because the Court of Appeals misapplied Zant in this case, its judgment must be vacated. III Having found no need to remedy the Ake error in petition- er's sentencing, the Virginia Supreme Court did not consider whether, or by what procedures, the sentence might be sus- tained or reimposed; and neither the state court nor the Court of Appeals addressed whether harmless-error analysis is applicable to this case. Because this Court customarily does not address such an issue in the first instance, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring. This is a simple case and should be simply resolved. The jury that deliberated on petitioner's sentence had before it 516us1$$2Z 09-08-97 16:49:21 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 10 (1995) 15 Scalia, J., concurring evidence that should have been excluded in light of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68 (1985). The Virginia Supreme Court so concluded (in an opinion that is not before us) and, having so concluded, was obliged to determine whether there was reasonable doubt as to whether the constitutional error contributed to the jury's decision to impose the sentence of death. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U. S. 249, 256 (1988). Because it failed to perform that task, the habeas judgment at issue here cannot stand, and a remand is appropriate to allow the Fourth Circuit to review the case under the harmless-error standard appropriate to collateral review. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 637­638 (1993). When these proceedings were before the Virginia Su- preme Court after our first remand, petitioner managed to transform the simple question arising from the admission of constitutionally impermissible evidence ("might the constitu- tional error have affected the decision of the capital sentenc- ing jury?") into a question of seemingly greater moment ("can a death sentence based in part on an `invalid aggra- vating circumstance' still stand?"). The Virginia Supreme Court answered the second question, the wrong question, perhaps because it assumed that that could easily be re- solved by reference to Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983); and on federal habeas, the District Court and the Fourth Circuit understandably focused upon the consequences of the Virginia Supreme Court's position that the "future danger- ousness" aggravating circumstance was rendered "invalid" by the Ake error. The Court correctly demonstrates why Zant is not applicable here, but regrettably follows the Vir- ginia Supreme Court and the courts below in failing to strip the "invalid aggravating circumstance" camouflage that peti- tioner has added to a straightforward inadmissible-evidence case. 516us1$$3z 10-22-98 10:36:00 PAGES OPINPGT 16 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus CITIZENS BANK OF MARYLAND v. STRUMPF certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 94­1340. Argued October 3, 1995-Decided October 31, 1995 When respondent filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, he had a checking account with, and was in default on the remaining balance of a loan from, petitioner bank. Under the Code, a bankruptcy filing gives rise to an automatic stay of a creditor's "setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy case] against any claim against the debtor." 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(7). After respondent had filed in bankruptcy, petitioner placed an "administrative hold" on so much of respondent's account as it claimed was subject to setoff-that is, it refused to pay withdrawals that would reduce the ac- count balance below the sum it claimed to be due on the unpaid loan- and filed a "Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay and for Setoff" under § 362(d). In granting respondent's motion to hold petitioner in con- tempt, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that petitioner's "administra- tive hold" constituted a "setoff" in violation of § 362(a)(7). The District Court disagreed and reversed, but was in turn reversed by the Court of Appeals. Held:1. Petitioner's refusal to pay its debt to respondent upon the latter's demand was not a setoff within the meaning of § 362(a)(7), and hence did not violate the automatic stay. Petitioner refused to pay, not perma- nently and absolutely, but merely temporarily while it sought relief under § 362(d) from the automatic stay. The requirement of an intent permanently to settle accounts is implicit in the prevailing state-law rule that a setoff has not occurred until (i) a decision to effectuate it has been made, (ii) some action accomplishing it has been taken, and (iii) a recording of it has been entered. Even if state law were different, the question whether a setoff under § 362(a)(7) has occurred is a matter of federal law, and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as §§ 542(b) and 553(a) would lead this Court to embrace the same intent requirement. Pp. 18­20. 2. Petitioner's refusal to pay its debt to respondent also did not violate § 362(a)(3) or § 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. P. 21. 37 F. 3d 155, reversed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 516us1$$3z 10-22-98 10:36:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 16 (1995) 17 Opinion of the Court Irving E. Walker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James R. Eyler and Jefferson V. Wright. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Kent L. Jones, and Gary D. Gray. Roger Schlossberg argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John R. Owen, Jr., Brian R. Seeber, and Gregory P. Johnson.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We must decide whether the creditor of a debtor in bank- ruptcy may, in order to protect its setoff rights, temporarily withhold payment of a debt that it owes to the debtor in bankruptcy without violating the automatic stay imposed by 11 U. S. C. § 362(a). I On January 25, 1991, when respondent filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, he had a checking ac- count with petitioner, a bank conducting business in the State of Maryland. He also was in default on the remaining balance of a loan of $5,068.75 from the bank. Under 11 U. S. C. § 362(a), respondent's bankruptcy filing gave rise to an automatic stay of various types of activity by his credi- tors, including "the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy case] against any claim against the debtor." § 362(a)(7). On October 2, 1991, petitioner placed what it termed an "administrative hold" on so much of respondent's account as *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for BankAmerica Corp. by Harold R. Lichterman and Michael J. Halloran; and for the New York Clearing House Association et al. by Bruce E. Clark, Norman R. Nelson, John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, Leonard J. Rubin, John H. Culver III, and Charles P. Seibold. 516us1$$3k 10-22-98 10:36:00 PAGES OPINPGT 18 CITIZENS BANK OF MD. v. STRUMPF Opinion of the Court it claimed was subject to setoff-that is, the bank refused to pay withdrawals from the account that would reduce the balance below the sum that it claimed was due on respond- ent's loan. Five days later, petitioner filed in the Bank- ruptcy Court, under § 362(d), a "Motion for Relief from Auto- matic Stay and for Setoff." Respondent then filed a motion to hold petitioner in contempt, claiming that petitioner's ad- ministrative hold violated the automatic stay established by § 362(a). The Bankruptcy Court ruled on respondent's contempt motion first. It concluded that petitioner's "administrative hold" constituted a "setoff" in violation of § 362(a)(7) and sanctioned petitioner. Several weeks later, the Bankruptcy Court granted petitioner's motion for relief from the stay and authorized petitioner to set off respondent's remaining checking account balance against the unpaid loan. By that time, however, respondent had reduced the checking account balance to zero, so there was nothing to set off. The District Court reversed the judgment that petitioner had violated the automatic stay, concluding that the adminis- trative hold was not a violation of § 362(a). The Court of Appeals reversed. "[A]n administrative hold," it said, "is tantamount to the exercise of a right of setoff and thus vio- lates the automatic stay of § 362(a)(7)." 37 F. 3d 155, 158 (CA4 1994). We granted certiorari. 514 U. S. 1035 (1995). II The right of setoff (also called "offset") allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding "the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A." Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U. S. 523, 528 (1913). Although no federal right of setoff is created by the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 553(a) provides that, with certain exceptions, whatever right of setoff other- wise exists is preserved in bankruptcy. Here it is undis- puted that, prior to the bankruptcy filing, petitioner had the 516us1$$3k 10-22-98 10:36:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 16 (1995) 19 Opinion of the Court right under Maryland law to set off the defaulted loan against the balance in the checking account. It is also undis- puted that under § 362(a) respondent's bankruptcy filing stayed any exercise of that right by petitioner. The princi- pal question for decision is whether petitioner's refusal to pay its debt to respondent upon the latter's demand consti- tuted an exercise of the setoff right and hence violated the stay. In our view, petitioner's action was not a setoff within the meaning of § 362(a)(7). Petitioner refused to pay its debt, not permanently and absolutely, but only while it sought re- lief under § 362(d) from the automatic stay. Whether that temporary refusal was otherwise wrongful is a separate mat- ter-we do not consider, for example, respondent's conten- tion that the portion of the account subjected to the "admin- istrative hold" exceeded the amount properly subject to setoff. All that concerns us here is whether the refusal was a setoff. We think it was not, because-as evidenced by petitioner's "Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay and for Setoff"-petitioner did not purport permanently to reduce respondent's account balance by the amount of the defaulted loan. A requirement of such an intent is implicit in the rule followed by a majority of jurisdictions addressing the ques- tion, that a setoff has not occurred until three steps have been taken: (i) a decision to effectuate a setoff, (ii) some action accomplishing the setoff, and (iii) a recording of the setoff. See, e. g., Baker v. National City Bank of Cleve- land, 511 F. 2d 1016, 1018 (CA6 1975) (Ohio law); Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut Nat. Bank, 230 Conn. 486, 504­505, 646 A. 2d 1289, 1299 (1994). But even if state law were different, the question whether a setoff under § 362(a)(7) has occurred is a matter of federal law, and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would lead us to embrace the same requirement of an intent permanently to settle accounts. 516us1$$3k 10-22-98 10:36:00 PAGES OPINPGT 20 CITIZENS BANK OF MD. v. STRUMPF Opinion of the Court Section 542(b) of the Code, which concerns turnover of property to the estate, requires a bankrupt's debtors to "pay" to the trustee (or on his order) any "debt that is prop- erty of the estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order . . . except to the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of this title against a claim against the debtor." 11 U. S. C. § 542(b) (emphasis added). Section 553(a), in turn, sets forth a general rule, with certain exceptions, that any right of setoff that a creditor possessed prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy is not affected by the Bankruptcy Code. It would be an odd construction of § 362(a)(7) that required a creditor with a right of setoff to do immediately that which § 542(b) specifically excuses it from doing as a general matter: pay a claim to which a de- fense of setoff applies. Nor is our assessment of these provisions changed by the fact that § 553(a), in generally providing that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code affects creditors' prebankruptcy setoff rights, qualifies this rule with the phrase "[e]xcept as other- wise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363." This undoubtedly refers to § 362(a)(7), but we think it is most naturally read as merely recognizing that provision's restric- tion upon when an actual setoff may be effected-which is to say, not during the automatic stay. When this perfectly reasonable reading is available, it would be foolish to take the § 553(a) "except" clause as indicating that § 362(a)(7) re- quires immediate payment of a debt subject to setoff. That would render § 553(a)'s general rule that the Bankruptcy Code does not affect the right of setoff meaningless, for by forcing the creditor to pay its debt immediately, it would divest the creditor of the very thing that supports the right of setoff. Furthermore, it would, as we have stated, eviscer- ate § 542(b)'s exception to the duty to pay debts. It is an elementary rule of construction that "the act cannot be held to destroy itself." Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907). 516us1$$3k 10-22-98 10:36:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 16 (1995) 21 Opinion of the Court Finally, we are unpersuaded by respondent's additional contentions that the administrative hold violated §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6). Under these sections, a bankruptcy filing au- tomatically stays "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate," 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(3), and "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title," § 362(a)(6). Respondent's reliance on these provisions rests on the false premise that petitioner's ad- ministrative hold took something from respondent, or exer- cised dominion over property that belonged to respondent. That view of things might be arguable if a bank account con- sisted of money belonging to the depositor and held by the bank. In fact, however, it consists of nothing more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor, see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 101 (1966); Keller v. Frederickstown Sav. Institution, 193 Md. 292, 296, 66 A. 2d 924, 925 (1949); and petitioner's temporary refusal to pay was neither a taking of possession of respondent's property nor an exercising of control over it, but merely a refusal to perform its promise. In any event, we will not give § 362(a)(3) or § 362(a)(6) an interpretation that would proscribe what § 542(b)'s "except[ion]" and § 553(a)'s general rule were plainly intended to permit: the temporary refusal of a creditor to pay a debt that is subject to setoff against a debt owed by the bankrupt.* The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. *We decline to address respondent's contention, not raised below, that the confirmation of his Chapter 13 Plan under 11 U. S. C. § 1327 precluded petitioner's exercise of its setoff right. See Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 39 (1989). 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT 22 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus LOUISIANA v. MISSISSIPPI et al. on exceptions to report of special master No. 121, Orig. Argued October 3, 1995-Decided October 31, 1995 Louisiana's bill of complaint in this original action asks the Court, inter alia, to define the boundary between that State and Mississippi along a 7-mile stretch of the Mississippi River. The case is here on Louisiana's exceptions to the report of the Special Master appointed by the Court. Held: Louisiana's exceptions are overruled. The case is controlled by the island exception to the rule of the thalweg. The latter rule specifies that the river boundary between States lies along the main downstream navigational channel, or thalweg, and moves as the channel changes with the gradual processes of erosion and accretion. The island exception to that rule provides that if there is a divided river flow around an island, a boundary once established on one side of the island remains there, even though the main downstream navigation channel shifts to the is- land's other side. Pursuant to the island exception, the Special Master placed the boundary here at issue on the west side of the area here in dispute, thereby confirming Mississippi's sovereignty over the area. The Master took that action after finding that the area derived from Stack Island, which had originally been within Mississippi's boundary before the river's main navigational channel shifted to the east of the island, but which, through erosion on its east side and accretion on its west side, changed from its original location, next to the river's Missis- sippi bank, to its current location, abutting the Louisiana bank. The Master's findings and conclusions are carefully drawn and well docu- mented with compelling evidence, whereas Louisiana's theory of the case is not supported by the evidence. Pp. 24­28. Exceptions overruled, and Special Master's report and proposed decree adopted. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gary L. Keyser, Assistant Attorney General of Louisiana, argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the brief were Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Jack E. Yelverton, First Assistant Attorney General, and E. Kay Kirkpatrick, Assistant Attorney General. 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 22 (1995) 23 Opinion of the Court James W. McCartney argued the cause for defendant Houston Group. Robert R. Bailess argued the cause for defendant State of Mississippi. With them on the brief were Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Robert E. Sanders, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles Alan Wright. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Like the shifting river channel near the property in dis- pute, this litigation has traversed from one side of our docket to the other. We must first recount this procedural history. In an earlier action, Mississippi citizens sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to quiet title to the subject property. Certain Louisiana citi- zens were named as defendants. The parties asserted con- flicting ownership claims to an area of about 2,000 acres, stretching seven miles along the Louisiana bank of the Mis- sissippi River, near Lake Providence, Louisiana. The State of Louisiana and the Lake Providence Port Commission in- tervened in that action and filed a third-party complaint against the State of Mississippi. Concerned, however, with the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear its matter, Loui- siana took the further step of instituting an original action in this Court, and it filed a motion here for leave to file a bill of complaint. We denied the motion. Louisiana v. Missis- sippi, 488 U. S. 990 (1988). The District Court heard the case pending before it and, in an order by Judge Barbour, ruled in favor of Mississippi. Louisiana, however, prevailed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 937 F. 2d 247 (1991), and we granted Mississippi's petition for certiorari. 503 U. S. 935 (1992). After hearing oral argument on both substantive issues and jurisdiction, we resolved only the latter. We held that there was no jurisdiction in the District Court, or in the Court of Appeals, to grant any relief in the quiet title action 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT 24 LOUISIANA v. MISSISSIPPI Opinion of the Court to one State against the other, that authority being reserved for jurisdiction exclusive to this Court. Mississippi v. Loui- siana, 506 U. S. 73, 77­78 (1992); see also 28 U. S. C. § 1251(a). We remanded the case so the complaint filed by Louisiana could be dismissed in the District Court and for the Court of Appeals to determine what further proceedings were necessary with respect to the claims of the private parties. Upon remand, Louisiana asked the District Court to stay further action in the case to allow Louisiana once again to seek permission to file a bill of complaint in this Court. The District Court agreed, noting that our decision on the bound- ary issue would solve the District Court's choice-of-law prob- lem and would be the fairest method of resolving the funda- mental issue for all parties. Louisiana did file a renewed motion in our Court for leave to file a bill of complaint. We granted it, allowing leave to file against Mississippi and persons called the Houston Group, who asserted ownership to the disputed area and who supported Mississippi's position on the boundary issue. Louisiana asked us to define the boundary between the two States and cancel the Houston Group's claim of title. After granting leave to file, we appointed Vincent L. McKusick, former Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, as Special Master. The case is now before us on Louisiana's exceptions to his report, and there is no jurisdictional bar to our resolving the questions presented. We deem it necessary to do no more than give a brief summary of the law and of the Special Master's careful and well-documented findings and conclusions, for Louisiana's exceptions have little merit and must be rejected. The controlling legal principles are not in dispute. In all four of the prior cases that have involved the Mississippi River boundary between Louisiana and Mississippi, we have applied the rule of the thalweg. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U. S. 96, 99 (1984); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 384 U. S. 24, 25­26, reh'g denied, 384 U. S. 958 (1966); Louisiana v. 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 22 (1995) 25 Opinion of the Court Mississippi, 282 U. S. 458, 459 (1931); Louisiana v. Missis- sippi, 202 U. S. 1, 49 (1906). Though there are exceptions, the rule is that the river boundary between States lies along the main downstream navigational channel, or thalweg, and moves as the channel changes with the gradual processes of erosion and accretion. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U. S., at 99­101; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 397 U. S. 88, 89­90 (1970). There exists an island exception to the general rule, which provides that if there is a divided river flow around an island, a boundary once established on one side of the island remains there, even though the main downstream navigation channel shifts to the island's other side. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 508­509 (1890); Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall. 395, 401 (1871). The island exception serves to avoid disturbing a State's sovereignty over an island if there are changes in the main navigation channel. The Special Master found that the disputed area derived from an island, known as Stack Island, that had been within Mississippi's boundary before the river's main navigational channel shifted to the east of the island. The Special Master found that, through erosion on its east bank and accretion on its west bank, Stack Island changed from its original loca- tion, next to the Mississippi bank of the river, to its current location, abutting the Louisiana bank. Pursuant to the is- land exception, then, the Special Master placed the boundary on the west side of the disputed area, confirming Mississippi's sovereignty over it. Because the land is located in Missis- sippi, the Special Master found that Louisiana had no stand- ing to challenge the Houston Group's claim of title. Louisiana advances a different version of events. It con- cedes that there did exist a Stack Island in 1881 and that it was formed in Mississippi territory. In that year the land was surveyed for a federal land patent that was later granted to the Houston Group's predecessor in interest, Stephen Blackwell. Louisiana maintains that two years later, in 1883, Stack Island washed away and was replaced by mere 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT 26 LOUISIANA v. MISSISSIPPI Opinion of the Court alluvial deposits, which at various times over the last 100 years were not sufficient in size or stability to be deemed an island. Some of these alluvial deposits may or may not have gravitated to the disputed area; nonetheless, according to Louisiana, the disputed area was not formed from anything that can be said to be Stack Island but rather was formed by random accretion to the west bank of the river. The Special Master rejected Louisiana's theory as not sup- ported by the evidence, and we agree. The only evidence that Louisiana presented to support its theory of Stack Is- land's disappearance is a Mississippi River Commission map dated April 1883. The map was prepared in 1881, with hy- drographic data added in an overlay in 1883. Of particular interest is a solid green line labeled as the "present steam- boat channel" that runs over a portion of Stack Island as it was drawn in 1881. Louisiana's expert interpreted that green line to mean that Stack Island had disappeared by 1883. The Special Master questioned the authenticity of the doc- ument because testimony suggested that no such map had been published by the Mississippi River Commission and be- cause a different map published by the Commission the same month, April 1883, showed Stack Island in existence. Even if we assume the document's authenticity, however, it does not settle the question, for we agree with the Special Master that boats could have passed close enough to the island with- out the entire island having disappeared. Louisiana's read- ing of the document was contradicted, moreover, by the sworn testimony of Stephen Blackwell and two other wit- nesses given on May 5, 1885, stating that Blackwell and his family had lived on Stack Island continuously from April 2, 1882, to the date of the testimony and were cultivating 20 acres. Furthermore, in November 1883, six months after Stack Island was supposed to have vanished, the Mississippi River Commission, in reporting on its construction of dikes just north of Stack Island, stated that " `this work showed 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 22 (1995) 27 Opinion of the Court good results, forcing the main channel of the river to the right of the island and building a bar to the head of Stack Island, as shown by the high-water survey of April 1883.' " Report of Special Master 20. Like the Special Master, we are unconvinced that Stack Island disappeared in 1883. Louisiana alleges other disap- pearances, including one as recently as 1948. We find no credible evidence of these disappearances, but instead find compelling evidence of Stack Island's continued existence. We note first that the north portion of Stack Island has 70- year-old cottonwood trees growing on it and that long-time residents of the area report no disappearances of the island. The record, moreover, contains numerous maps of the region beginning with the 1881 patent survey and coming into the present era, and every one of them shows the existence of Stack Island. With the exception of a single exhibit, dated 1970, all of the maps and mosaics show a land mass that the mapmaker identifies by name as Stack Island, even for the years since 1954 when that land mass has no longer been insular in form. These maps show Stack Island's progres- sion from the Mississippi side of the river to the Louisiana side. When the maps are superimposed one over the other in chronological order, the successive maps show a land mass covering a significant portion of Stack Island shown on the preceding map. The maps satisfy us that Stack Island did not wash away and is now the disputed area. We need not delve into the proper definition of an island, as Louisiana would have us do, because the Special Master adopted Louisiana's rigorous test, and found that Stack Is- land satisfied it. Louisiana raises no exceptions to that portion of the Spe- cial Master's report finding that Louisiana lacked standing to challenge the Houston Group's claim of title. Louisiana requests a new trial of the supplemental hearing before the Special Master but offers no sound reason in support of that request, so we must deny it. 516us1$$4z 08-21-97 18:02:27 PAGES OPINPGT 28 LOUISIANA v. MISSISSIPPI Opinion of the Court We have considered Louisiana's other exceptions and find them insubstantial. The exceptions of Louisiana are over- ruled, and the Special Master's report and proposed decree are adopted. It is so ordered. 516us1$$5z 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 29 Syllabus LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 94­7427. Argued October 3, 1995-Decided November 7, 1995 During petitioner Libretti's trial on federal drug and related charges, he entered into a plea agreement with the Government, whereby, among other things, he pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U. S. C. § 848; agreed to surrender numerous items of his property to the Government under § 853, which provides for crimi- nal forfeiture of drug-tainted property; and waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. At the colloquy on the plea agreement, the trial judge explained the consequences of Libretti's waiver of the latter right, but did not expressly advise him as to the existence and scope of his right under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) to a jury determi- nation of forfeitability. After sentencing Libretti to imprisonment and other penalties, the judge entered a forfeiture order as to the property in question despite Libretti's objection to what he saw as a failure to find any factual basis for the entire forfeiture. The Court of Appeals rejected both of Libretti's challenges to the forfeiture order, ruling that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) does not require a district court to ascertain a factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets and that Libretti had waived his Rule 31(e) right to a jury determination of forfeitability. Held:1. Rule 11(f)-which forbids a court to enter judgment upon "a plea of guilty" without assuring that there is "a factual basis" for the plea-does not require a district court to inquire into the factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets embodied in a plea agreement. Pp. 37­48. (a) The Rule's plain language precludes its application to a forfeit- ure provision contained in a plea agreement. The Rule applies only to "a plea of guilty," which refers to a defendant's admission of guilt of a substantive criminal offense as charged in an indictment and his waiver of the right to a jury determination on that charge. See, e. g., United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 570. In contrast, forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following a plea of guilty, and thus falls outside Rule 11(f)'s scope. That forfeiture operates as punishment for criminal conduct, not as a separate substantive offense, is demonstrated by the 516us1$$5z 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 30 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Syllabus text of the relevant statutory provisions, see, e. g., §§ 848(a) and 853(a), by legislative history, and by this Court's precedents, see, e. g., Alex- ander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544, 558. Caplin & Drysdale, Char- tered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617, 628, n. 5, distinguished. In light of such weighty authority, the Court is not persuaded by Libretti's in- sistence that the forfeiture for which § 853 provides is, in essence, a hybrid that shares elements of both a substantive charge and a criminal punishment. Pp. 38­41. (b) Libretti's policy arguments for construing Rule 11(f) to reach asset forfeiture provisions of plea agreements-that the Rule's factual basis inquiry (1) is essential to ensuring that a forfeiture agreement is knowing and voluntary, (2) will protect against government overreach- ing, and (3) is necessary to ensure that the rights of third-party claim- ants are fully protected-are rejected. Pp. 41­44. (c) The District Court did not rest its forfeiture order solely on the stipulation contained in the plea agreement. There is ample evidence that the District Judge both understood the statutory requisites for criminal forfeiture and concluded that they were satisfied on the facts at the time the sentence was imposed. Pp. 44­48. 2. On the facts of this case, Libretti's waiver of a jury determination as to the forfeitability of his property under Rule 31(e)-which provides that, "[i]f the indictment . . . alleges that . . . property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the . . . property"-was plainly adequate. That waiver was accom- plished by the plea agreement, in which Libretti agreed to forfeiture and waived his right to a jury trial, together with the plea colloquy, which made it abundantly clear that the plea agreement would end any proceedings before the jury and would lead directly to sentencing by the court. Accordingly, Libretti cannot now complain that he did not receive the Rule 31(e) special verdict. The Court rejects his argument that the Rule 31(e) right to a jury determination of forfeitability has both a constitutional and a statutory foundation, and cannot be waived absent specific advice from the district court as to the existence and scope of this right and an express, written waiver. Given that the right, as an aspect of sentencing, does not fall within the Sixth Amend- ment right to a jury determination of guilt or innocence, see, e. g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 93, but is merely statutory in origin, the plea agreement need not make specific reference to Rule 31(e). Nor must the district court specifically advise a defendant that a guilty plea will result in waiver of the Rule 31(e) right, since that right is not among the information that must be communicated to a 516us1$$5z 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 31 Opinion of the Court defendant under Rule 11(c) in order to ensure that a guilty plea is valid. Pp. 48­51. 38 F. 3d 523, affirmed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and II­A of which were joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., Parts II­B and II­C of which were joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., and Parts III and IV of which were joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ. Souter, J., post, p. 52, and Ginsburg, J., post, p. 53, filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 54. Sara Sun Beale, by appointment of the Court, 514 U. S. 1095, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Paul K. Sun, Jr. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor Gen- eral Dreeben, and David S. Kris.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Joseph Libretti pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 84 Stat. 1265, 21 U. S. C. § 848 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), and agreed to forfeit numerous items of his property to the Government. We must decide whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) requires the District Court to determine whether a factual basis exists for a stipulated asset forfeiture embodied in a plea agreement, and whether the Federal Rule of Crimi- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Forfeiture Endangers American Rights Foundation by Brenda Grantland; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by David B. Smith and Richard J. Troberman. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Parts II­B and II­C of this opinion. Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join only Parts I and II. 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 32 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court nal Procedure 31(e) right to a special jury verdict on forfeit- ure can only be waived following specific advice from the District Court as to the existence and scope of this right and an express, written waiver. I In May 1992, Joseph Libretti was charged in a multicount superseding indictment with violations of various federal drug, firearms, and money-laundering laws. Included in the indictment was a count alleging that Libretti engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 848, by operating a cocaine and marijuana distri- bution organization in Wyoming and Colorado from 1984 to 1992. Conviction under § 848 subjects a defendant to, among other penalties, "the forfeiture prescribed in sec- tion 853." 1 21 U. S. C. § 848(a). Accordingly, the indict- 1 Section 853(a) provides for criminal forfeiture of drug-tainted property: "(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture. Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law- "(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; "(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such viola- tion; and "(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing crimi- nal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual rights afford- ing a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise. "The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 33 Opinion of the Court ment further alleged that the Government was entitled to forfeiture of property that was obtained from or used to facil- itate Libretti's drug offenses, including, but not limited to, various assets specified in the indictment. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(c)(2) ("No judgment of forfeiture may be en- tered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or prop- erty subject to forfeiture"). Trial began in September 1992. The Government pre- sented testimony from 18 witnesses, including several indi- viduals who had purchased cocaine or marijuana from Li- bretti, to establish Libretti's involvement in the possession and distribution of considerable amounts of narcotics. The testimony also reflected Libretti's purchase of a home, an automobile, and dozens of automatic and semiautomatic weapons during a time when he had only modest sources of legitimate income. Finally, the testimony revealed that Libretti stored large amounts of money and drugs in safety deposit boxes and storage facilities away from his home. Following four days of testimony, Libretti and the Govern- ment entered into a plea agreement, by the terms of which Libretti agreed to plead guilty to the CCE count of the in- dictment (count 6). The Government in return agreed not to pursue additional charges against Libretti and to recom- mend that he be sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 20 years' imprisonment. Paragraph 10 of the plea agreement provided that Libretti would "transfer his right, title, and interest in all of his assets to the Division of Criminal Investigation of the Wyo- offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds." In addition, § 853(p) provides that, when property subject to forfeiture under subsection (a) cannot be recovered for various reasons, "the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of" the forfeitable but unrecoverable assets. 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 34 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ming Attorney General including, but not limited to: all real estate; all personal property, including guns, the computer, and every other item now in the possession of the United States; all bank accounts, investments, retirement accounts, cash, cashier's checks, travelers checks and funds of any kind." Two other paragraphs of the plea agreement also made refer- ence to the contemplated forfeiture. Paragraph 2 described the maximum statutory penalty for the offense to which Li- bretti agreed to plead guilty, which included "forfeiture of all known assets as prescribed in 21 U. S. C. § 853 and assets which are discovered at any later time up to $1,500,000." In paragraph 9, Libretti agreed to "identify all assets that were used to facilitate his criminal activity" and to "provide com- plete financial disclosure forms requiring the listing of assets and financial interests." Finally, Libretti acknowledged in the agreement "that by pleading guilty to Count Six of the Indictment, he waive[d] various constitutional rights, includ- ing the right to a jury trial." It is beyond dispute that Libretti received a favorable plea agreement. The Gov- ernment recommended that Libretti receive the minimum sentence for conviction under § 848, and agreed to drop all other counts in the indictment. One of those counts charged Libretti with use of a firearm equipped with a silencer during the commission of a drug offense, which mandates a 30-year sentence consecutive to the term of imprisonment on the underlying drug offense. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). Li- bretti also faced a potential fine of up to $2 million. 21 U. S. C. §§ 848(a), 853(a). At the subsequent hearing on the plea agreement, the trial judge advised Libretti of his rights, including his right to a jury trial. The court also clarified the consequences of Libretti's plea, including the facts that a plea of guilty would mean "the end of this trial," that "the jury [would] not . . . decide whether [he's] guilty or not," and that "all the prop- erty that's described in . . . Count 6 could be forfeited to 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 35 Opinion of the Court the United States." App. 87, 88. Libretti was then placed under oath. He admitted that his plea was voluntary and indicated that he had read and understood the significance of the indictment and the plea agreement, including the fact that "all of [his] property could be forfeited, the property that is owned by [him] by reason of any drug transaction." Id., at 100. Libretti's only question about the plea agree- ment pertained to paragraph 2, which provided for future forfeiture of assets up to $1,500,000. The District Court as- sured Libretti that future forfeiture would be limited to sub- sequently discovered drug-tainted assets, and that his future legitimate income would not be forfeited. Id., at 88­89. After a lengthy exchange, in which the court reviewed each subparagraph describing the violations that composed the CCE charge and Libretti acknowledged each factual allega- tion, the District Court found that the guilty plea was volun- tary and factually based. Id., at 121. Following preparation of a presentence report, the District Court held a sentencing hearing, at which Libretti was sen- tenced to 20 years' imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine as well as a mandatory $50 assessment and to perform 500 hours of community service. The Government filed a motion for forfeiture of Libretti's assets, in keeping with the plea agree- ment. Libretti's counsel offered no objection at the sentenc- ing hearing, declaring that the forfeiture statute was "a harsh law" and "a bitter pill dealt by Congress," but conced- ing that it was "a pill we must swallow." Id., at 149. At the conclusion of the hearing, however, Libretti stated on the record that he "would just like to object to what [he saw] as a failure to find any factual basis for the whole forfeiture." Id., at 154. The District Judge noted the objection, but re- plied that "the evidence that I heard before me in the two [sic] days of trial I think is sufficient to warrant the granting of forfeiture. I think I have no alternative." Ibid. On December 23, 1992, the District Court entered an order 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 36 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court of forfeiture pursuant to 21 U. S. C. § 853. The order listed specific property to be forfeited, including a parcel of real property in Wyoming, two condominiums, two automobiles, a mobile home, a diamond ring, various firearms, cash, sev- eral bank accounts, and a number of cashier's and traveler's checks. App. 155­164. One check was forfeited as a substi- tute asset. Id., at 162. Libretti filed an appeal from the order of forfeiture. While this appeal was pending, the District Court enter- tained third-party claims to some of the property ordered forfeited. See 21 U. S. C. § 853(n). Following a March 1993 hearing, the court amended its forfeiture order to return cer- tain property to the third-party claimants. The court also modified its order with respect to Libretti, stating that "it may be unjust to enforce the specific forfeiture provisions in the plea agreement" and reasoning that Libretti's concession to forfeiture in the plea agreement provided insufficient basis for the order of forfeiture. App. 309. The court ordered a Magistrate to conduct a hearing at which Libretti would be given the opportunity to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any portion of his property was not subject to forfeiture. Upon motion by the Government, the District Court stayed the proceedings before the Magistrate Judge pending resolution of Libretti's appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected both of Libretti's challenges to the forfeiture order. 38 F. 3d 523 (1994). The court ruled first that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Libretti's claims to the property or- dered forfeited at the third-party hearing, because Libretti had filed a notice of appeal. After noting the divergence in the Courts of Appeals regarding the applicability of Rule 11(f) to forfeiture provisions in plea agreements, the court rejected Libretti's contention that Rule 11(f) requires a dis- trict court to ascertain a factual basis for a stipulated forfeit- ure of assets. This conclusion, the Court of Appeals rea- soned, follows from the fact that forfeiture "is a part of the 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 37 Opinion of the Court sentence, not a part of the substantive offense." Id., at 528. The Court of Appeals also determined that Libretti had waived his Rule 31(e) right to a jury determination of forfeit- ability, despite the fact that the District Court did not ex- pressly advise Libretti of the existence and scope of that right during his plea colloquy. Id., at 530­531. We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among the Circuits as to the applicability of Rule 11(f) to asset forfeiture provisions contained in plea agreements 2 and the requisites for waiver of the right to a jury determination of forfeitability under Rule 31(e).3 514 U. S. 1035 (1995). II Libretti insists that the District Court's forfeiture order must be set aside (or at least modified), because the court neglected to establish a "factual basis" for forfeiture of the 2 Compare United States v. Reckmeyer, 786 F. 2d 1216, 1222 (CA4) (Rule 11(f) applies to forfeiture provisions in plea agreements), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 850 (1986), and United States v. Roberts, 749 F. 2d 404, 409 (CA7 1984) (same), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1058 (1985), with United States v. Boatner, 966 F. 2d 1575, 1581 (CA11 1992) (Rule 11(f) does not apply to stipulated forfeiture provisions in plea agreements), United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F. 2d 722, 730­731 (CA5 1991) (Rule 11(f) does not apply to forfeiture provisions, but a forfeiture order will be upheld only if the record provides a factual basis for forfeiture), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 850 (1992), and 38 F. 3d 523, 528 (CA10 1994) (case below). 3 Compare, e. g., id., at 531 ("specific reference to" the Rule 31(e) right to a special jury verdict is not required when a defendant's "unambiguous plea agreement" and "knowing and voluntary plea" establish waiver); United States v. Robinson, 8 F. 3d 418, 421 (CA7 1993) ("[A] defendant's waiver of his statutory right [under Rule 31(e)] to have a jury determine which portion of his property is subject to forfeiture is only valid if know- ingly and voluntarily made"); United States v. Garrett, 727 F. 2d 1003, 1012 (CA11 1984) (a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial to determine forfeitability; waiver of that right must be in writing), aff'd on other grounds, 471 U. S. 773 (1985); United States v. Zang, 703 F. 2d 1186, 1194­1195 (CA10 1982) ("The parties can waive their right to a special verdict [under Rule 31(e)] by not making a timely request"), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 828 (1983). 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 38 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court property covered by the order under Federal Rule of Crimi- nal Procedure 11(f). Absent such a finding, Libretti argues, even his concession to forfeiture in the plea agreement can- not authorize the forfeiture. A Libretti's first claim is that the Rule by its very terms applies to a forfeiture provision contained in a plea agree- ment. Accordingly, our analysis must begin with the text of Rule 11(f): "Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." By its plain terms, the Rule applies only to a "plea of guilty." Our precedent makes clear that this language refers to a defendant's admission of guilt of a substantive criminal of- fense as charged in an indictment and his waiver of the right to a jury determination on that charge. See, e. g., United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 570 (1989) ("By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime"); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 32 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969). With this definition in mind, we have held that a district judge satisfies the requirements of Rule 11(f) when he "de- termine[s] `that the conduct which the defendant admits con- stitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.' " Id., at 467 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 730). A forfeiture provision embodied in a plea agreement is of an entirely different nature. Forfeiture is an element of the 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 39 Opinion of the Court sentence imposed following conviction or, as here, a plea of guilty, and thus falls outside the scope of Rule 11(f). The text of the relevant statutory provisions makes clear that Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment for the com- mission of various drug and racketeering crimes. A person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise "shall be sentenced . . . to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853." 21 U. S. C. § 848(a) (emphasis added). Forfeiture is imposed "in addition to any other sentence." 21 U. S. C. § 853(a) (emphasis added). See also 18 U. S. C. § 1963 (for- feiture is imposed "in addition to any other sentence" for a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO)). The legislative history of the Compre- hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98­473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976, also characterizes criminal forfeiture as pun- ishment. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 98­225, p. 193 (1983) (crimi- nal forfeiture "is imposed as a sanction against the defendant upon his conviction"). Congress plainly intended forfeiture of assets to operate as punishment for criminal conduct in violation of the federal drug and racketeering laws, not as a separate substantive offense. Our precedents have likewise characterized criminal for- feiture as an aspect of punishment imposed following convic- tion of a substantive criminal offense. In Alexander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544 (1993), we observed that the criminal forfeiture authorized by the RICO forfeiture statute "is clearly a form of monetary punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional `fine.' " Id., at 558. Similarly, in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983), we recognized that a "criminal proceeding . . . may often include forfeiture as part of the sentence." Id., at 567. And in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), we con- cluded that even the in rem civil forfeiture authorized by 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is punitive in nature, so that forfeiture imposed under those subsections is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 40 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Clause. 509 U. S., at 619­622. Libretti himself conceded below that criminal forfeiture "is a part of the sentence, not a part of the substantive offense." 38 F. 3d, at 528. It is true, as Libretti points out, that we said in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617 (1989), that "forfeiture is a substantive charge in the indictment against a defendant." Id., at 628, n. 5. That statement re- sponded to the defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel "for his defense" could be transformed into a defense to a forfeiture count in the indictment. We in- tended only to suggest that a defendant cannot escape an otherwise appropriate forfeiture sanction by pointing to his need for counsel to represent him on the underlying charges. Elsewhere in that opinion we recognized that forfeiture is a "criminal sanction," id., at 634, and is imposed as a sentence under § 853, id., at 620, n. 1. Libretti nonetheless insists that the criminal forfeiture for which § 853 provides is not "simply" an aspect of sentencing, but is, in essence, a hybrid that shares elements of both a substantive charge and a punishment imposed for criminal activity. In support of this contention, Libretti points to three Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that, according to him, treat forfeiture as a substantive criminal charge. Rule 7(c)(2) provides that "[n]o judgment of forfeiture may be en- tered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or prop- erty subject to forfeiture." If the indictment or information alleges that a defendant's property is subject to forfeiture, "a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 31(e). And a finding of forfeitability must be embodied in a judgment. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(d)(2) ("When a verdict contains a finding of criminal forfeiture, the judgment must authorize the Attorney General to seize the interest or property subject to forfeiture on terms that the court considers proper"). 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 41 Opinion of the Court Although the procedural safeguards generated by these Rules are unique in the realm of sentencing, they do not change the fundamental nature of criminal forfeiture. The fact that the Rules attach heightened procedural protections to imposition of criminal forfeiture as punishment for certain types of criminal conduct cannot alter the simple fact that forfeiture is precisely that: punishment. The Advisory Committee's "assumption" that "the amount of the interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to be alleged and proved," Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 31, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 786, does not persuade us otherwise. The Committee's assump- tion runs counter to the weighty authority discussed above, all of which indicates that criminal forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed for a violation of certain drug and racketeering laws. Moreover, even supposing that the Com- mittee's assumption is authoritative evidence with respect to the amendments to Rules 7, 31, and 32, it has no bearing on the proper construction of Rule 11. Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150 (1995), is not to the contrary. The Tome plural- ity treated the Advisory Committee's Notes on Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as relevant evidence of the drafters' intent as to the meaning of that Rule. 513 U. S., at 160­ 163. In contrast, Libretti seeks to use the Note appended to Rule 31 to elucidate the meaning of an entirely distinct Rule. We cannot agree that the Advisory Committee's Notes on the 1972 amendment to Rule 31(e) shed any particu- lar light on the meaning of the language of Rule 11(f), which was added by amendment to Rule 11 in 1966. B Libretti next advances three policy arguments for con- struing Rule 11(f) to reach asset forfeiture provisions of plea agreements. First, he claims, Rule 11(f)'s factual basis in- quiry is essential to ensuring that a forfeiture agreement is knowing and voluntary. Next, Libretti declares that a Rule 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 42 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 11(f) inquiry will protect against Government overreaching. And lastly, Libretti insists that a factual basis inquiry is nec- essary to ensure that the rights of third-party claimants are fully protected. We consider these contentions in turn. We are unpersuaded that the Rule 11(f) inquiry is neces- sary to guarantee that a forfeiture agreement is knowing and voluntary. Whether a stipulated asset forfeiture is "factu- ally based" is a distinct inquiry from the question whether the defendant entered an agreement to forfeit assets know- ingly and voluntarily. Libretti correctly points out that Rule 11(f) is intended to ensure that a defendant's "plea of guilty" is knowing and voluntary. McCarthy, 394 U. S., at 472 (the Rule 11 inquiry is "designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of [a] plea"); Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 730 (Rule 11(f) protects defendants who do not "realiz[e] that [their] conduct does not actually fall within the charge"). But a "plea of guilty" and a forfeiture provi- sion contained in a plea agreement are different matters altogether. Forfeiture, as we have said, is a part of the sentence. If the voluntariness of a defendant's concession to imposition of a particular sentence is questionable, the relevant inquiry is whether the sentencing stipulation was informed and uncoerced on the part of the defendant, not whether it is factually sound. Libretti's second argument-that a Rule 11(f) factual basis inquiry is necessary to prevent prosecutorial overreaching- proves equally unavailing. As Libretti properly observes, § 853 limits forfeiture by establishing a factual nexus re- quirement: Only drug-tainted assets may be forfeited. Li- bretti suggests that failure to ensure, by means of a Rule 11(f) inquiry, that this factual nexus exists will open the door to voluntary forfeiture agreements that exceed the forfeiture authorized by statute, particularly in light of the Govern- ment's direct financial interest in forfeiture as a source of revenue and the disparity in bargaining power between the 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 43 Opinion of the Court Government and a defendant. We recognized in Caplin & Drysdale that the broad forfeiture provisions carry the po- tential for Government abuse and "can be devastating when used unjustly." 491 U. S., at 634. Nonetheless, we con- cluded that "[c]ases involving particular abuses can be dealt with individually by the lower courts, when (and if) any such cases arise." Id., at 635. However valid Libretti's concern about prosecutorial overreaching may be, Rule 11(f) simply does not, on its face, address it. We do not mean to suggest that a district court must simply accept a defendant's agreement to forfeit property, particularly when that agreement is not accompanied by a stipulation of facts supporting forfeiture, or when the trial judge for other reasons finds the agreement problematic. In this regard, we note that the Department of Justice recently issued a Revised Policy Regarding Forfeiture by Settlement and Plea Bargaining in Civil and Criminal Actions, Directive 94­7 (Nov. 1994), to instruct that, among the procedures necessary to ensure a valid forfeiture agreement, "[t]he set- tlement to forfeit property must be in writing and the de- fendant must concede facts supporting the forfeiture." Id., at 13. In this case, however, we need not determine the precise scope of a district court's independent obligation, if any, to inquire into the propriety of a stipulated asset forfeit- ure embodied in a plea agreement. We note that the Sen- tencing Guidelines direct only that a district court "may" ac- cept an agreement reached by the parties as to a specific, appropriate sentence, as long as the sentence is within the applicable guideline range or departs from that range "for justifiable reasons." United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 6B1.2(c)(2) (Nov. 1993). Libretti's plea agreement correctly recognized that the District Court was not bound by the parties' agreement as to the appropriate sentence: "[T]he sentencing judge is neither a party to nor bound by this plea agreement and is free to impose whatever sentence he feels is justified." App. 81, ¶ 11. 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 44 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Libretti finally argues that a Rule 11(f) factual basis in- quiry is essential to preserving third-party claimants' rights. A defendant who has no interest in particular assets, the argument goes, will have little if any incentive to resist for- feiture of those assets, even if there is no statutory basis for their forfeiture. Once the Government has secured a stipu- lation as to forfeitability, third-party claimants can establish their entitlement to return of the assets only by means of the hearing afforded under 21 U. S. C. § 853(n). This hearing, Libretti claims, is inadequate to safeguard third-party rights, since the entry of a forfeiture order deprives third- party claimants of the right to a jury trial and reverses the burden of proof. He concludes that insisting on a factual basis inquiry before entry of the forfeiture order will lessen the need for third-party hearings following a broad-ranging forfeiture agreement, and may even result in the conserva- tion of scarce judicial resources. Whatever the merits of this argument as a matter of policy, Congress has deter- mined that § 853(n), rather than Rule 11(f), provides the means by which third-party rights must be vindicated. Third-party claimants are not party to Rule 11(f) proceed- ings, and Libretti's assertion that their interests are best protected therein fits poorly within our adversary system of justice. C Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, post, at 57, the District Court did not rest its forfeiture order on nothing more than Libretti's stipulation that certain assets were for- feitable. In fact, there is ample evidence that the District Court both understood the statutory requisites for criminal forfeiture and concluded that they were satisfied on the facts of this case at the time the sentence was imposed. First, the District Judge correctly recognized the factual nexus requirement established by § 853. App. 89 (change-of-plea hearing) ("[I]t has to be the product of a drug transaction to be forfeited"). Count 6 of the indictment specified numerous 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 45 Opinion of the Court items of property alleged to be subject to forfeiture under that statute, including a parcel of real property in Wyoming; two automobiles; over $100,000 in cash proceeds from drug transactions; $12,000 in cash that Libretti had stored inside a paint can at his home; a diamond ring; "[a]ll United States currency and travelers checks" recovered from Libretti's storage lockers, safes, home, and person; a mobile home; a computer system; four bank accounts; two GNMA invest- ment certificates; bonds; three cashier's checks; and the con- tents of two safe deposit boxes. Additional property was identified in a bill of particulars and a restraining order is- sued, and subsequently amended, by the District Court pur- suant to 21 U. S. C. § 853(e) ("Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order . . . to pre- serve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture under this section"). After one week of trial, the parties submitted to the court an agree- ment which set out, in detail, specific items of property to be forfeited following Libretti's plea of guilty, including "all real estate; all personal property, including guns, the computer, and every other item now in the possession of the United States; all bank accounts, investments, retirement accounts, cash, cashier's checks, travelers checks and funds of any kind." App. 81. The plea agreement also explained that the maximum penalty for the offense to which Libretti agreed to plead guilty included "forfeiture of all known assets as prescribed in 21 U. S. C. § 853 and assets which are discovered at any later time up to $1,500,000." App. 79. Before issuing the order of forfeiture, the trial judge lis- tened to four days of testimony, in which Government wit- nesses detailed numerous drug transactions with Libretti. See, e. g., 2 Tr. 124­126, 137­139; 3 id., at 271­272; 4 id., at 495­501; 5 id., at 946­949. One witness recounted Libretti's purchase of a home in 1985 with a $100,000 down payment, at a time during which he was earning an annual salary of approximately $20,000. 2 id., at 179­180, 210­216; App. 123 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 46 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court (Presentence Report, Prosecutor's Statement ¶ 6); Presen- tence Report ¶ 37. Another told of Libretti's purchase of a sports car with a check for $19,114. 5 Tr. 907­913. Other witnesses described Libretti's possession, in his capacity as a federal firearms dealer, of numerous automatic and semi- automatic firearms, later determined to be worth at least $243,000. See, e. g., 2 id., at 140­141, 156­162; 5 id., at 844­ 853; App. 123 (Presentence Report, Prosecutor's Statement ¶ 9). One witness testified that Libretti admitted having "quite a bit of money stashed away" in safe deposit boxes, 5 Tr. 834, and on at least one occasion had "a couple thou- sand" dollars in cash "sitting around," id., at 835. Other witnesses established that Libretti often stored cash and drugs in safe deposit boxes and storage facilities away from his home. See, e. g., 2 id., at 155­156; 4 id., at 718­720, 738­ 743. One of Libretti's drug customers testified that he broke into a storage facility at which Libretti had rented a storage locker and discovered a briefcase containing a large amount of cash (later estimated in the presentence report to be approximately $150,000), a large block of cocaine, and five large trash bags, at least one of which was filled with mari- juana. Id., at 558­566, 588­589. Prior to sentencing, the court received the presentence in- vestigation report, which contained, among other things, a summary of Libretti's legitimate income during the relevant time periods. During 1985 and 1986, Libretti worked as a restaurant and grocery store manager, earning approxi- mately $20,000 per year. In early 1987, he was employed as a temporary stock broker and was paid on commission only. Later that year, he managed a Tenneco thrift store. In 1989, Libretti reported an income of approximately $50,000 from his firearms business. During 1988 and 1989, Libretti also owned a partnership interest in two condominiums; he reported that the rental income did not meet his expenses and thus he did not earn a profit. Between June 1989 and his arrest in December 1991, Libretti worked as a full-time 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 47 Opinion of the Court accounting supervisor, earning a salary of approximately $40,000 per year. Presentence Report ¶¶ 35­37. Included in the presentence report was a prosecutor's statement detailing the amounts of cocaine and marijuana involved in Libretti's drug operation and various sums of money Libretti earned from his drug dealing. App. 122­ 135. The statement described Libretti's substantial expend- itures, including the $100,000 cash deposit on a house in 1985 ($72,000 of which was derived from Libretti's sale of drugs) and the purchase of a $20,000 mortgage in 1986 (again, alleg- edly with proceeds from his distribution of drugs). Id., at 123. Paragraph 12 reported that Libretti had opened a safe deposit box in 1987 in which he placed $48,000 in cash. On another occasion, Libretti placed approximately $10,000 into an account bearing his brother's name. Id., at 124­125. The statement described Libretti's practice of storing large amounts of cash and drugs in safes, storage lockers, and safe deposit boxes. Id., at 124, 129. Libretti also stored drugs, a weapon, and a cashier's check for $65,000 in his personal locker at his place of employment. Id., at 129. The state- ment related Libretti's investment of at least $243,000 in nu- merous firearms. Id., at 123­124. These funds again re- portedly derived from Libretti's drug distribution activities; the statement indicated that "Libretti's gun business was used to launder drug proceeds" and served as a means by which Libretti could "justify his income since [he] was not working at times during the conspiracy and, when he was working, was not bringing in the money that would pay for the Lakewood house and other investments." Id., at 127. Finally, the statement suggested that substantial sums of cash derived from Libretti's drug activities were never re- covered by law enforcement authorities. Id., at 134. De- fense counsel conceded at the sentencing hearing that "the [presentence] report of Mr. Libretti's background, education, financial circumstances are [sic] accurate." Id., at 138. In light of these facts, defense counsel acknowledged that "the 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 48 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court forfeiture is going to take regular money and illegal money under the substitute assets" provision of § 853. Id., at 149. In view of the plea agreement, the indictment, and the amended restraining order, the trial judge issued an order forfeiting to the Government the Wyoming lot, both condo- miniums, both automobiles, $8,000 in cash proceeds of Libret- ti's drug transactions, the diamond ring, the mobile home, all firearms, an IRA account, three bank accounts, bonds, two GNMA certificates, and several cashier's and traveler's checks. One check was ordered forfeited as a substitute asset "for assets dissipated and otherwise expended by Li- bretti." Id., at 162. It is not, as Libretti maintains, implausible that the court concluded on the record before it that the forfeiture order was appropriate. Following Libretti's objection to the for- feiture order for lack of factual foundation, the trial judge replied that "the evidence that I heard before me in the two [sic] days of trial I think is sufficient to warrant the granting of forfeiture." Id., at 154. We cannot say that the District Judge, despite his subsequent uncertainty, erred in issuing the forfeiture order on the facts before him. III Libretti also challenges the adequacy of his waiver of a jury determination as to the forfeitability of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e). The right, he argues, has both a constitutional and a statutory founda- tion, and cannot be waived absent specific advice from the district court as to the nature and scope of this right and an express, written agreement to forgo the jury determination on forfeitability. We disagree. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) provides that, "[i]f the indictment or the information alleges that an inter- est or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." Libretti would have 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 49 Opinion of the Court us equate this statutory right to a jury determination of for- feitability with the familiar Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 511 (1995) ("The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged"). Without disparaging the importance of the right provided by Rule 31(e), our analysis of the nature of criminal forfeiture as an aspect of sentencing compels the conclusion that the right to a jury verdict on forfeitability does not fall within the Sixth Amendment's constitutional protection. Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant does not enjoy a constitutional right to a jury determination as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed. See, e. g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 93 (1986) ("[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact"); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376, 385 (1986) ("The decision whether a particular punishment . . . is appropriate in any given case is not one that we have ever required to be made by a jury"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 459 (1984) (no right to a jury determination as to the imposition of the death penalty). Given that the right to a jury determination of forfeitabil- ity is merely statutory in origin, we do not accept Libretti's suggestion that the plea agreement must make specific refer- ence to Rule 31(e). Nor must the district court specifically advise a defendant that a plea of guilty will result in waiver of the Rule 31(e) right. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) details the information a district court must communi- cate to a defendant in order to ensure that a guilty plea is valid. Advisory Committee's Notes on 1974 Amendment of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c), 18 U. S. C. App., p. 731 (the Rule "codifies . . . the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 . . . (1969), which held that a defendant must be apprised of the fact that he relinquishes certain constitu- 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 50 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court tional rights by pleading guilty") (emphasis added). Spe- cific advice regarding the Rule 31(e) right is not among the Rule 11(c) safeguards, and we decline Libretti's invitation to expand upon the required plea colloquy. That is not to say, however, that a trial judge may not mention the nature and scope of the Rule 31(e) right during a plea colloquy. In fact, the Advisory Committee's Notes make plain that "a judge is free to" inform a defendant about specific conse- quences that might follow from a plea of guilty if the judge "feels a consequence of a plea of guilty in a particular case is likely to be of real significance to the defendant." Advisory Committee's Notes on 1974 Amendment of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 731. On these facts, Libretti's waiver of a jury determination as to the scope of forfeiture was plainly adequate. In the plea agreement, Libretti "acknowledge[d] that by pleading guilty to Count Six of the Indictment, he waive[d] various constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial and a speedy trial." App. 80. He stipulated to the forfeiture of specific assets. Id., at 80­81. The District Court engaged Libretti in an extensive colloquy at his change-of-plea hear- ing, during which the court reviewed with Libretti the con- sequences of his guilty plea, including the fact that the plea would result in dismissal of the jury. Libretti's responses made clear that he fully understood the nature and conse- quences of his guilty plea and was prepared to be sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, neither Libretti nor his counsel specifically objected to resolution of forfeiture issues by the court without a jury. See, e. g., id., at 150, 154. In addition, Libretti was represented by counsel at all stages of trial and sentencing. Apart from the small class of rights that require specific advice from the court under Rule 11(c), it is the responsibility of defense counsel to inform a defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement and the attendant statutory and con- 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 51 Opinion of the Court stitutional rights that a guilty plea would forgo. Libretti has made no claim of ineffectiveness of counsel before this Court. As we noted in Broce, "[a] failure by counsel to pro- vide advice may form the basis of a claim of ineffective as- sistance of counsel, but absent such a claim it cannot serve as the predicate for setting aside a valid plea." 488 U. S., at 574. Of course, a district judge must not mislead a defendant regarding the procedures to be followed in determining whether the forfeiture contemplated in a plea agreement will be imposed, nor should the court permit a defendant's obvi- ous confusion about those procedures to stand uncorrected. On this record, however, we find no hint that Libretti labored under any misapprehension. Although the District Judge did not spell out for Libretti that, had he declined to enter a plea of guilty, and had the trial gone forward, the jury would eventually have been required to determine which of Libret- ti's assets were forfeitable, when viewed in its entirety, the plea colloquy made it abundantly clear that the plea agree- ment would end any proceedings before the jury and would lead directly to sentencing by the court. As the Court of Appeals observed, "there is no evidence at [the change-of- plea] hearing that [Libretti] wanted a jury trial on the for- feiture issue, or thought he was going to have one." 38 F. 3d, at 531. Taken together, the plea agreement and the plea colloquy waived Libretti's right to insist on a jury deter- mination of forfeitability under Rule 31(e). IV For these reasons, we reject Libretti's challenges to the District Court's forfeiture order. Under the plain language of Rule 11(f), the District Court is not obliged to inquire into the factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets embod- ied in a plea agreement. And because Libretti agreed to this forfeiture and waived his "right to a jury trial," he can- not now complain that he did not receive the special jury 516us1$$5J 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 52 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Souter, J. verdict on forfeitability for which Rule 31(e) provides. Ac- cordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join in the judgment and Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I would not reach the question of a Sixth Amend- ment right to trial by jury on the scope of forfeiture or whether the Constitution obliges a trial court to advise a defendant of whatever jury trial right he may have. In cases like this one, any such right to instruction will be satis- fied by the court's obligatory advice to the defendant of the right to jury trial generally. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3) ("Before accepting a plea of guilty . . . the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant under- stands, . . . that the defendant has . . . the right to be tried by a jury"). It is reasonable to understand the scope of the right as covering all matters charged in the indictment, which under Rule 7(c)(2) will include the forfeiture claim. Since a defendant will have been provided a copy of the in- dictment, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10 ("The defendant shall be given a copy of the indictment or information before being called upon to plead"), and will have heard it read or summa- rized, see ibid. ("Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of reading the indictment or informa- tion to the defendant or stating to the defendant the sub- stance of the charge"), he will naturally understand that his right to jury trial covers a verdict on the forfeiture claim. If, in speaking to the defendant or in other statements within his hearing, the court should affirmatively say or sug- gest that the right to jury trial would not extend to the for- feiture, that would be error under the current law, whatever the constitutional status of that right may be. While there is some reason to argue that the court's colloquy with the 516us1$$5M 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 53 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. defendant in this case was misleading, see App. 87 ("[I]f you plead guilty . . . . the jury is not going to decide whether you're guilty or not"), I think Justice Ginsburg is right to conclude otherwise, for the reasons given in her separate opinion. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Rule 11(f), I agree for reasons the Court states, does not impose on district courts an obligation to find a "factual basis" for asset forfeitures stipulated in a plea agreement. I therefore join in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment. But the jury-trial right for which Rule 31(e) provides, as I see it, must be known in order to be given up voluntarily. I therefore set out briefly my view of the second issue the Court decides. At the plea hearing, the District Court carefully and com- prehensively informed Libretti that his guilty plea would waive his right to jury trial on the crimes charged in the indictment. The court did not then refer to the unusual jury-trial right on criminal forfeiture provided by Rule 31(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "If the indictment or the information alleges that an in- terest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." See also Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(c)(2) ("No judgment of for- feiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture"); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1) (court must address defendant personally in open court and inform him of "the nature of the charge" when plea of guilty is offered). Just as intelligent waiver of trial by jury on the underlying offense requires that the defendant be advised of the right, 516us1$$5P 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 54 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Stevens, J., dissenting so waiver of the extraordinary jury-trial right on forfeiture should turn on the defendant's awareness of the right his plea will override. That right, uncommon as it is, may not be brought home to a defendant through a bare reading of the forfeiture clause in the indictment. Clarity, however, is easily achieved. In cases like Libretti's, trial judges can readily avoid unknowing relinquishment of the procedural right to a jury verdict on forfeiture by routinely apprising defendants, at plea hearings, of Rule 31(e)'s atypical special- verdict requirement. Failure to mention Rule 31(e) at Libretti's plea hearing is not cause for revisiting the forfeiture of his property, how- ever, because at least two pretrial references were made to Rule 31(e)'s requirement. First, there was a brief exchange between court and counsel on the need for a special-verdict form. 1 Tr. 8. Second, and more informative, the trial judge explained to the jurors during voir dire that the indict- ment included "a provision for a forfeiture of all property of any kind constituting or derived from proceeds that Mr. Libretti received directly or indirectly from engaging in said continuing criminal enterprise. And that's a subject matter on which the jury will be required at the end of the case to answer a specific question relating to it." Id., at 188. In view of this statement to the lay triers-telling them in Libretti's presence that they would be called upon specifi- cally to decide the matter of forfeiture-Libretti cannot persuasively plead ignorance of the special-verdict right Rule 31(e) prescribes. Justice Stevens, dissenting. While I agree with the Court's conclusions (1) that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) does not create a duty to determine that there is a factual basis for a forfeiture of 516us1$$5I 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 55 Stevens, J., dissenting assets pursuant to 21 U. S. C. § 853 and (2) that the record in this case does establish a factual basis for forfeiting the assets described in Count 6 of the indictment, I believe it important to emphasize the underlying proposition that the law-rather than any agreement between the parties- defines the limits on the district court's authority to forfeit a defendant's property. Moreover, entirely apart from Rule 11(f), the district court has a legal obligation to determine that there is a factual basis for the judgment entered upon a guilty plea. For that reason, the Court of Appeals was plainly wrong in holding that simply because the defendant unequivocally agreed to " `forfeit all property,' " the law au- thorized the forfeiture of all of his assets. 38 F. 3d 523, 526 (CA10 1994). The facts of this case well illustrate the particular need for the district court to determine independently that a fac- tual basis supports forfeiture judgments that it enters pursu- ant to plea agreements. As the Court correctly notes, this defendant received a favorable plea agreement. The record demonstrates that the facts would have supported a much longer term of imprisonment than was actually imposed. In such circumstance, it is not unthinkable that a wealthy de- fendant might bargain for a light sentence by voluntarily "forfeiting" property to which the government had no statu- tory entitlement. This, of course, is not the law. No matter what a defendant may be willing to pay for a favorable sen- tence, the law defines the outer boundaries of a permissible forfeiture. A court is not free to exceed those boundaries solely because a defendant has agreed to permit it to do so. As Judge Cudahy aptly put it, "[t]he mere fact that the de- fendant has agreed that an item is forfeitable, in a plea agree- ment, does not make it so." United States v. Roberts, 749 F. 2d 404, 409 (CA7 1984). The proposition that the law alone defines the limits of a court's power to enter a judgment can be traced to this Court's early precedents. In Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339 516us1$$5I 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 56 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Stevens, J., dissenting (1870), the Court explained that a court "transcend[s] its ju- risdiction" when it orders the forfeiture of property beyond that authorized by statute. Id., at 351. In a similar vein, Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), concluded that a judg- ment imposing punishment in excess of statutory authoriza- tion is not merely voidable, but "void." Id., at 178. Pre- cisely because extrastatutory punishments implicate the very power of a court to act, the district court must, entirely apart from the specific procedure mandated by Rule 11(f), satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for any judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea that threatens to exceed statutory bounds.1 Were a court to do otherwise, it would permit the parties to define the limits of its power. In sum, Rule 11(f) does not create a substantive right. Instead, it prescribes a procedure that is intended to pro- tect every defendant's pre-existing right not to receive any sentence beyond statutorily prescribed limits. Rule 11(f) states that if there is no factual basis for the guilty plea, the court has no power to "enter a judgment upon such plea . . . ." In so stating, the Rule does not impliedly authorize courts to impose sentences upon a plea of guilty greater than the maximum prescribed for the admitted offense. The pre-existing substantive limits on the court's power to im- pose a judgment upon a plea of guilty, which apply to the forfeiture aspect of the judgment as well as to the finding of guilt, preclude such a result. Nothing in the Rule suggests otherwise. Because the foregoing thoughts are implicit in this Court's independent examination of the record to assure itself that there is indeed a factual basis for the forfeiture of the prop- erty described in Count 6, and for the further conclusion that the forfeiture order does not extend beyond the line that the law has drawn, I endorse almost all of the Court's opinion. 1 Of course, the court's power to act is not similarly implicated when it imposes a sentence that is arguably erroneous but nonetheless within the range authorized by statute. 516us1$$5I 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 29 (1995) 57 Stevens, J., dissenting Nevertheless, I do not agree with the Court's disposition of the case because I believe the opinion of the Court of Ap- peals can fairly be read to approve of the forfeiture of all petitioner's property, rather than just the assets described in Count 6.2 Although the majority marshals ample support for much of the forfeiture authorized here, the record simply does not provide a factual basis for the whole of it. For example, nothing in the Court's opinion provides a basis for concluding that the small bank account that petitioner opened while a young boy, and which had not been augmented since 1975, should be subject to forfeiture. Nor can all of his assets necessarily be deemed subject to forfeiture as "substitute assets." As the Court recognizes, the District Court deter- mined that only one check was subject to forfeiture on that basis. Ante, at 48. The sole basis for the wholesale forfeiture affirmed here stems from one paragraph in the defendant's plea agreement which states his willingness to "transfer his right, title, and interest in all of his assets to the Division of Criminal Inves- tigation of the Wyoming Attorney General." 3 App. 81. As I have explained, however, a defendant's bare stipulation does not determine what property a court may forfeit. The district court must independently make that determination. Here, the record reveals that the District Court had not de- termined that a factual basis existed for the sweeping for- feiture it ordered. Indeed, the District Court subsequently sought to hold a hearing for the very purpose of determining whether a factual basis existed. The District Court was precluded from undertaking that necessary inquiry only be- cause this pro se petitioner filed an early notice of appeal 2 Moreover, I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the jury trial right that Rule 31(e) provides must be known in order to be given up voluntarily. 3 The record does not make clear why the property would be transferred to state, rather than federal, law enforcement authorities. 516us1$$5I 10-22-98 10:36:31 PAGES OPINPGT 58 LIBRETTI v. UNITED STATES Stevens, J., dissenting that divested the court of jurisdiction. However, that juris- dictional bar did not, and could not, relieve the District Court of its prior duty to find a factual basis for its forfeiture judgment. Because the District Court had not assured itself that its judgment fell within the bounds established by law, and be- cause the record does not support the conclusion that it did, I would vacate and remand for further proceedings consist- ent with this opinion. 516us1$$6z 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 59 Syllabus FIELD et al. v. MANS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit No. 94­967. Argued October 2, 1995-Decided November 28, 1995 After respondent Mans filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, petitioners William and Norinne Field alleged, in effect, that let- ters Mans had written to them constituted fraudulent representations on which they relied in continuing to extend credit to a corporation controlled by Mans, and that, accordingly, Mans's obligation to them as guarantor of the corporation's debt should be excepted from discharge under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A) as a debt resulting from fraud. The Bankruptcy Court found that Mans's letters constituted false represen- tations, but followed Circuit precedent in requiring that the Fields show their reasonable reliance on the letters. Finding the Fields unreason- able in relying without further enquiry on Mans's misrepresentations, the court held Mans's debt dischargeable. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The standard for excepting a debt from discharge as a fraudulent representation within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(A) is not reasonable reliance but the less demanding one of justifiable reliance on the repre- sentation. Pp. 64­77. (a) Section 523(a)(2)(A) had an antecedent in the 1903 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and has changed only slightly since 1903, from "false pretenses or false representations" to "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement re- specting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition." Section 523(a)(2)(B), which applies to false financial statements in writing, also grew out of a 1903 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but it changed more significantly over the years. One of these changes occurred in 1978, when Congress added a new element of reasonable reliance. Pp. 64­66. (b) The text of § 523(a)(2)(A) does not mention the level of reliance required, and the Court rejects as unsound the argument that the addi- tion of reasonable reliance to § 523(a)(2)(B) alone supports an inference that, in § 523(a)(2)(A), Congress did not intend to require reasonable reliance. That argument relies on the apparent negative pregnant, under the rule of construction that an express statutory requirement in one place, contrasted with statutory silence in another, shows an intent 516us1$$6z 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 60 FIELD v. MANS Syllabus to confine the requirement to the specified instance. Assuming this argument to be sound, it would prove at most that the reasonableness standard was not intended, but would not reveal the correct standard. Here, however, there is reason to reject the negative pregnant argu- ment even as far as it goes. If the argument proves anything here, it proves too much: this reasoning would also strip § 523(a)(2)(A) of any requirement to establish causation and scienter, an odd result that defies common sense. Moreover, the argument ignores the fact that § 523(a)(2)(A) refers to common-law torts and § 523(a)(2)(B) does not. The terms used in paragraph (A) imply elements that the common law has defined them to include, whereas the terms in paragraph (B) are statutory creations. Pp. 66­69. (c) This Court has an established practice of finding Congress's mean- ing in the generally shared common law where, as here, common-law terms are used without further specification. Since the District Court treated Mans's conduct as amounting to fraud, the enquiry here is into the common-law understanding of "actual fraud" in 1978, when it was added to § 523(a)(2)(A). The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that justifiable, rather than reasonable, reliance is the applicable standard. The Restatement rejects a general, reasonable person standard in favor of an individual standard that turns on the particular circumstances, and it provides that a person is justified in relying on a factual representa- tion without conducting an investigation, so long as the falsity of the representation would not be patent upon cursory examination. Schol- arly treatises on torts, as well as state cases, similarly applied a justifi- able reliance standard. The foregoing analysis does not relegate the negative pregnant to the rubbish heap, but merely indicates that its force is weakest when it suggests foolish results at odds with other textual pointers. The Court's reading also does not leave reasonable- ness irrelevant, for the greater the distance between the reliance claimed and the limits of the reasonable, the greater the doubt about reliance in fact. Pp. 69­76. (d) It may be asked whether it makes sense to protect creditors who were not quite reasonable in relying on a fraudulent representation, but to apply a different rule when fraud is carried to the point of a written financial statement. This ostensible anomaly may be explained by Con- gress's apparent concerns about creditors' misuse of financial state- ments. Pp. 76­77. (e) The Bankruptcy Court's reasonable person test entailing a duty to investigate clearly exceeds the demands of the justifiable reliance standard that applies under § 523(a)(2)(A). P. 77. 36 F. 3d 1089, vacated and remanded. 516us1$$6z 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 61 Opinion of the Court Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 78. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 79. Christopher J. Seufert argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was William J. Schultz. Alan Jenkins argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Dep- uty Solicitor General Bender, William Kanter, and Bruce G. Forrest. W. E. Whittington IV, by appointment of the Court, 515 U. S. 1156, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Geoffrey J. Vitt.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The Bankruptcy Code's provisions for discharge stop short of certain debts resulting from "false pretenses, a false rep- resentation, or actual fraud." 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A). In this case we consider the level of a creditor's reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation necessary to place a debt thus beyond release. While the Court of Appeals followed a rule requiring reasonable reliance on the statement, we hold the standard to be the less demanding one of justifiable reliance and accordingly vacate and remand. I In June 1987, petitioners William and Norinne Field sold real estate for $462,500 to a corporation controlled by re- spondent Philip W. Mans, who supplied $275,000 toward the purchase price and personally guaranteed a promissory note for $187,500 secured by a second mortgage on the property. The mortgage deed had a clause calling for the Fields' con- *Gary Klein filed a brief for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 62 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court sent to any conveyance of the encumbered real estate during the term of the secured indebtedness, failing which the en- tire unpaid balance on the note would become payable upon a sale unauthorized. On October 8, 1987, Mans's corporation triggered applica- tion of the clause by conveying the property to a newly formed partnership without the Fields' knowledge or con- sent. The next day, Mans wrote to the Fields asking them not for consent to the conveyance but for a waiver of their rights under the due-on-sale clause, saying that he sought to avoid any claim that the clause might apply to arrangements to add a new principal to his land development organiza- tion. The letter failed to mention that Mans had already caused the property to be conveyed. The Fields responded with an offer to waive if Mans paid them $10,500. Mans an- swered with a lower bid, to pay only $500, and again failed to disclose the conveyance. There were no further written communications. The ensuing years brought a precipitous drop in real es- tate prices, and on December 10, 1990, Mans petitioned the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On the following February 6, the Fields learned of the October 1987 conveyance, which their lawyer had dis- covered at the registry of deeds. In their subsequent com- plaint in the bankruptcy proceeding, they argued that some $150,000 had become due upon the 1987 conveyance for which Mans had become liable as guarantor, and that his obligation should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A), as a debt result- ing from fraud.1 The Bankruptcy Court found that Mans's letters consti- tuted false representations on which petitioners had relied 1 Although we observe the distinction between Mans and his corpora- tions, the record before us does not indicate that the parties thought any- thing should turn on treating them separately. As the case comes to us, Mans is presented as the originator of both debt and misrepresentation. 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 63 Opinion of the Court to their detriment in extending credit.2 The court followed Circuit precedent, however, see In re Burgess, 955 F. 2d 134 (CA1 1992), in requiring the Fields to make a further show- ing of reasonable reliance, defined as "what would be reason- able for a prudent man to do under those circumstances." App. 43­44. The court held that a reasonable person would have checked for any conveyance after the exchange of letters, and that the Fields had unreasonably ignored further reason to investigate in 1988, when Mr. Field's boss told him of a third party claiming to be the owner of the property.3 Having found the Fields unreasonable in relying without further enquiry on Mans's implicit misrepresenta- tion about the state of the title, the court held Mans's debt dischargeable. The District Court affirmed, likewise following Circuit precedent in holding that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires reasonable reliance to exempt a debt from discharge, and finding the Bankruptcy Court's judgment supported by adequate indica- tion in the record that the Fields had relied without sufficient reason. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed judgment for the Bankruptcy Court's reasons. Judgt. order reported at 36 F. 3d 1089 (1994). We granted certiorari, 514 U. S. 1095 (1995), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the level of reliance that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires a creditor to demonstrate.4 2 Here, Mans argues that neither he nor his corporation obtained any extension of credit at the time of the alleged fraud or thereafter. Since this issue was never raised previously and is not fairly subsumed within the question on which we granted certiorari, we do not reach it. 3 Mr. Field testified in the Bankruptcy Court proceeding that he asked Mans in 1988 about the report of a conveyance and that Mans indicated he had not conveyed the property, App. 14­15, but Mr. Field later testified that he had not confronted Mans on the issue, id., at 26­27. The Bank- ruptcy Court made no finding about any such conversation. 4 Compare In re Ophaug, 827 F. 2d 340 (CA8 1987); In re Mayer, 51 F. 3d 670 (CA7 1995); In re Allison, 960 F. 2d 481 (CA5 1992), with In re Burgess, 955 F. 2d 134 (CA1 1992); In re Mullet, 817 F. 2d 677 (CA10 1987). 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 64 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court II The provisions for discharge of a bankrupt's debts, 11 U. S. C. §§ 727, 1141, 1228, and 1328(b), are subject to excep- tion under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a), which carries 16 subsections setting out categories of nondischargeable debts. Two of these are debts traceable to falsity or fraud or to a materially false financial statement, as set out in § 523(a)(2): "(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- . . . . . "(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by- "(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; [or] "(B) use of a statement in writing- "(i) that is materially false; "(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; "(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is lia- ble for such money, property, services, or credit reason- ably relied; and "(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive." These provisions were not innovations in their most recent codification, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Act), Pub. L. 95­598, 92 Stat. 2590, but had obvious antecedents in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act), as amended, 30 Stat. 544. The precursor to § 523(a)(2)(A) was created when § 17(a)(2) of the 1898 Act was modified by an amendment in 1903, which provided that debts that were "liabilities for obtaining prop- erty by false pretenses or false representations" would not be affected by any discharge granted to a bankrupt, who 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 65 Opinion of the Court would still be required to pay them. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 798. This language inserted in § 17(a)(2) was changed only slightly between 1903 and 1978,5 at which time the section was recodified as § 523(a)(2)(A) and amended to read as quoted above. Thus, since 1903 the statutory lan- guage at issue here merely progressed from "false pretenses or false representations" to "false pretenses, a false repre- sentation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition." Section 523(a)(2)(B), however, is the product of more active evolution. The germ of its presently relevant language was also inserted into the 1898 Act by a 1903 amendment, which barred any discharge by a bankrupt who obtained property by use of a materially false statement in writing made for the purpose of obtaining the credit. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797­798. The provision did not explicitly require an intent to deceive or set any level of reliance, but Congress modified its language in 1960 by adding the re- quirements that the debtor intend to deceive the creditor and that the creditor rely on the false statement, and by limiting its application to false financial statements. Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. 86­621, 74 Stat. 409.6 In 1978, Con- 5 The one intervening change to the quoted language was that "obtaining property" became "obtaining money or property." Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 851. 6 The 1960 amendments also transferred the language on false financial statements by individuals from § 14 (where it barred any discharge) to § 17(a)(2) (where it barred discharge of only the specific debt incurred as a result of the false financial statement). Thus, as of 1960 the relevant por- tion of § 17(a)(2) provided that discharge would not release a bankrupt from debts that "are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false state- ment in writing respecting [the bankrupt's] financial condition made or published or caused to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive." Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. 86­621, 74 Stat. 409. 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 66 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court gress rewrote the provision as set out above and recodified it as § 523(a)(2)(B). Though the forms of the 1960 and 1978 provisions are quite different, the only distinction relevant here is that the 1978 version added a new element of reason- able reliance. The sum of all this history is two close statutory compan- ions barring discharge. One applies expressly when the debt follows a transfer of value or extension of credit induced by falsity or fraud (not going to financial condition), the other when the debt follows a transfer or extension induced by a materially false and intentionally deceptive written state- ment of financial condition upon which the creditor reason- ably relied. III The question here is what, if any, level of justification a creditor needs to show above mere reliance in fact in order to exempt the debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). The text that we have just reviewed does not say in so many words. While § 523(a)(2)(A) speaks of debt for value "ob- tained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud," it does not define those terms or so much as mention the creditor's reliance as such, let alone the level of reliance required. No one, of course, doubts that some degree of re- liance is required to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase "obtained by," but the Government, as amicus curiae (like petitioners in a portion of their brief), submits that the minimum level will do. It argues that when § 523(a)(2)(A) is understood in its statutory context, it re- quires mere reliance in fact, not reliance that is reasonable under the circumstances. Both petitioners and the Govern- ment note that § 523(a)(2)(B) expressly requires reasonable reliance, while § 523(a)(2)(A) does not. They emphasize that the precursors to §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) lacked any reason- ableness requirement, and that Congress added an element of reasonable reliance to § 523(a)(2)(B) in 1978, but not to § 523(a)(2)(A). They contend that the addition to § 523(a) 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 67 Opinion of the Court (2)(B) alone supports an inference that, in § 523(a)(2)(A), Con- gress did not intend to require reasonable reliance, over and above actual reliance. But this argument is unsound. The argument relies on the apparent negative pregnant, under the rule of construction that an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 404 (1991) (" `[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983)). Thus the failure of § 523(a)(2)(A) to require the reasonableness of reliance demanded by § 523(a)(2)(B) shows that (A) lacks such a requirement. Without more, the in- ference might be a helpful one. But there is more here, showing why the negative pregnant argument should not be elevated to the level of interpretive trump card. First, assuming the argument to be sound, the most it would prove is that the reasonableness standard was not intended. But our job does not end with rejecting reason- ableness as the standard. We have to discover the correct standard, and where there are multiple contenders remain- ing (as there are here), the inference from the negative preg- nant does not finish the job. There is, however, a more fundamental objection to de- pending on a negative pregnant argument here, for in the present circumstances there is reason to reject its soundness even as far as it goes. Quite simply, if it proves anything here, it proves too much. If the negative pregnant is the reason that § 523(a)(2)(A) has no reasonableness require- ment, then the same reasoning will strip paragraph (A) of any requirement to establish a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the transfer of value or extension of credit, and it will eliminate scienter from the very notion 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 68 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court of fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(B) expressly requires not only reasonable reliance but also reliance itself; and not only a representation but also one that is material; and not only one that is material but also one that is meant to deceive. Sec- tion 523(a)(2)(A) speaks in the language neither of reliance nor of materiality nor of intentionality. If the contrast is enough to preclude a reasonableness requirement, it will do as well to show that the debtor need not have misrepre- sented intentionally, the statement need not have been mate- rial, and the creditor need not have relied. But common sense would balk.7 If Congress really had wished to bar discharge to a debtor who made unintentional and wholly immaterial misrepresentations having no effect on a credi- tor's decision, it could have provided that. It would, how- ever, take a very clear provision to convince anyone of any- thing so odd, and nothing so odd has ever been apparent to the courts that have previously construed this statute, routinely requiring intent, reliance, and materiality before applying § 523(a)(2)(A). See, e. g., In re Phillips, 804 F. 2d 930 (CA6 1986); In re Martin, 963 F. 2d 809 (CA5 1992); In re Menna, 16 F. 3d 7 (CA1 1994). The attempt to draw an inference from the inclusion of reasonable reliance in § 523(a)(2)(B), moreover, ignores the significance of a historically persistent textual difference be- 7 The fact that § 523(a)(2) uses the term "obtained by" does not avoid this problem, for two reasons. First, "obtained by" applies to both §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B); if it supplies the elements of materiality, intent to deceive, and actual reliance it renders § 523(a)(2)(B)'s inclusion of material- ity and intent to deceive redundant. More to the point, it renders Con- gress's addition of the requirements of actual reliance and intent to deceive to the precursor of § 523(a)(2)(B) (§ 17(a)(2) of the 1898 Act) in 1960 nonsen- sical, since that provision also had the "obtained by" language. Second, it seems impossible to construe "obtained by" as encompassing a require- ment of intent to deceive; one can obtain credit by a misrepresentation even if one has no intention of doing so (for example, by unintentionally writing that one has an annual income of $100,000, rather than $10,000, in applying for a loan). 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 69 Opinion of the Court tween the substantive terms in §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B): the former refer to common-law torts, and the latter do not. The principal phrase in the predecessor of § 523(a)(2)(B) was "obtained property . . . upon a materially false statement in writing," Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797; in the current § 523(a)(2)(B) it is value "obtained by . . . use of a statement in writing." Neither phrase is apparently trace- able to another context where it might have been construed to include elements that need not be set out separately. If other elements are to be added to "statement in writing," the statutory language must add them (and of course it would need to add them to keep this exception to discharge- ability from swallowing most of the rule). The operative terms in § 523(a)(2)(A), on the other hand, "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud," carry the acquired meaning of terms of art. They are common-law terms, and, as we will shortly see in the case of "actual fraud," which concerns us here, they imply elements that the common law has defined them to include. See Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306, 312 (1896); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 121 (1927). Congress could have enumerated their elements, but Congress's contrary drafting choice did not deprive them of a significance richer than the bare statement of their terms. IV "It is . . . well established that `[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.' " Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 739 (1989) (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 329 (1981)); see also Nation- wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 322 (1992). In this case, neither the structure of § 523(a)(2) nor any explicit statement in § 523(a)(2)(A) reveals, let alone dictates, the 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 70 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court particular level of reliance required by § 523(a)(2)(A), and there is no reason to doubt Congress's intent to adopt a common-law understanding of the terms it used. Since the District Court treated Mans's conduct as amounting to fraud, we will look to the concept of "actual fraud" as it was understood in 1978 when that language was added to § 523(a)(2)(A).8 Then, as now, the most widely ac- cepted distillation of the common law of torts 9 was the Re- statement (Second) of Torts (1976), published shortly before Congress passed the Act. The section on point dealing with fraudulent misrepresentation states that both actual and "justifiable" reliance are required. Id., § 537. The Restate- ment expounds upon justifiable reliance by explaining that a person is justified in relying on a representation of fact "al- though he might have ascertained the falsity of the represen- tation had he made an investigation." Id., § 540. Signifi- cantly for our purposes, the illustration is given of a seller of land who says it is free of encumbrances; according to the Restatement, a buyer's reliance on this factual representa- tion is justifiable, even if he could have "walk[ed] across the street to the office of the register of deeds in the courthouse" and easily have learned of an unsatisfied mortgage. Id., § 540, Illustration 1. The point is otherwise made in a later section noting that contributory negligence is no bar to re- covery because fraudulent misrepresentation is an inten- tional tort. Here a contrast between a justifiable and rea- sonable reliance is clear: "Although the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation must be justifiable . . . this does not 8 Although we do not mean to suggest that the requisite level of reliance would differ if there should be a case of false pretense or representation but not of fraud, there is no need to settle that here. 9 We construe the terms in § 523(a)(2)(A) to incorporate the general com- mon law of torts, the dominant consensus of common-law jurisdictions, rather than the law of any particular State. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 323, n. 3 (1992); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 740 (1989). 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 71 Opinion of the Court mean that his conduct must conform to the standard of the reasonable man. Justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the cir- cumstances of the particular case, rather than of the appli- cation of a community standard of conduct to all cases." Id., § 545A, Comment b. Justifiability is not without some limits, however. As a comment to § 541 explains, a person is "required to use his senses, and cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make a cursory examination or investi- gation. Thus, if one induces another to buy a horse by representing it to be sound, the purchaser cannot re- cover even though the horse has but one eye, if the horse is shown to the purchaser before he buys it and the slightest inspection would have disclosed the defect. On the other hand, the rule stated in this Section applies only when the recipient of the misrepresentation is capa- ble of appreciating its falsity at the time by the use of his senses. Thus a defect that any experienced horseman would at once recognize at first glance may not be patent to a person who has had no experience with horses." Id., § 541, Comment a. A missing eye in a "sound" horse is one thing; long teeth in a "young" one, perhaps, another. Similarly, the edition of Prosser's Law of Torts available in 1978 (as well as its current successor) states that justifiable reliance is the standard applicable to a victim's conduct in cases of alleged misrepresentation and that "[i]t is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that he is required to make an investigation of his own." W. Prosser, Law of 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 72 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court Torts § 108, p. 718 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted); accord, W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 108, p. 752 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton). Prosser represents common-law authority as re- jecting the reasonable person standard here, stating that "the matter seems to turn upon an individual standard of the plaintiff's own capacity and the knowledge which he has, or which may fairly be charged against him from the facts within his observation in the light of his individual case." Prosser, supra, § 108, at 717; accord, Prosser & Keeton § 108, at 751; see also 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 7.12, pp. 581­583 (1956) (rejecting reasonableness standard in mis- representation cases in favor of justifiability and stating that "by the distinct tendency of modern cases, the plaintiff is entitled to rely upon representations of fact of such a charac- ter as to require some kind of investigation or examination on his part to discover their falsity, and a defendant who has been guilty of conscious misrepresentation can not offer as a defense the plaintiff's failure to make the investigation or examination to verify the same") (footnote omitted); accord, 2 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 7.12, pp. 455­458 (2d ed. 1986). These authoritative syntheses surely spoke (and speak today) for the prevailing view of the American common- law courts. Of the 46 States that, as of November 6, 1978 (the day the Act became law), had articulated the required level of reliance in a common-law fraud action, 5 required reasonable reliance,10 5 required mere re- 10 See Polansky v. Orlove, 252 Md. 619, 624­625, 251 A. 2d 201, 204 (1969) (stating that purchaser must show reasonable reliance); Cudemo v. Al and Lou Construction Co., 54 App. Div. 2d 995, 996, 387 N. Y. S. 2d 929, 930 (1976) (referring to justifiable reliance but imposing duty to inves- tigate); Works v. Wyche, 344 S. W. 2d 193, 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (requir- ing reasonable reliance); Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 382, 423 P. 2d 659, 662 (1967) (requiring reasonable reliance); Horner v. Ahern, 207 Va. 860, 863­864, 153 S. E. 2d 216, 219 (1967) (stating that, if purchaser 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 73 Opinion of the Court liance in fact,11 and 36 required an intermediate level of reliance, most frequently referred to as justifiable reli- ance.12 Following our established practice of finding Con- is given information that would excite suspicions of reasonably prudent man, he has a duty to investigate). 11 See Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, Inc., 556 P. 2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. App. 1976) (requiring actual reliance only); Campanelli v. Vescera, 75 R. I. 71, 74­75, 63 A. 2d 722, 724 (1949) (stating that actual reliance is sufficient, notwithstanding relying party's failure to investigate or verify); Negyessy v. Strong, 136 Vt. 193, 194­195, 388 A. 2d 383, 385 (1978) (stating that actual reliance is sufficient, even if plaintiff might have discovered the wrong but for his own neglect); Horton v. Tyree, 104 W. Va. 238, 242, 139 S. E. 737, 738 (1927) (holding that one to whom a representation is made has the right to rely without any further inquiry); Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P. 2d 867, 872 (Wyo. 1975) (requiring actual reliance only). 12 See Franklin v. Nunnelley, 242 Ala. 87, 89, 5 So. 2d 99, 101 (1941) (stating that there is no duty to investigate in absence of anything that would arouse suspicion); Thomson v. Wheeler Construction Co., 385 P. 2d 111, 113 (Alaska 1963) (stating that justifiable reliance is the appropriate standard); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480, 544 P. 2d 694, 697 (1976) (holding that purchaser had no duty to investigate); Fausett & Co. v. Bullard, 217 Ark. 176, 179­180, 229 S. W. 2d 490, 491­492 (1950) (relying on Restatement of Torts § 540 (1938) (hereinafter Restatement (First)), which applies the same rule as in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540 (1976)); Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 414­415, 115 P. 2d 977, 980­981 (1941) (relying on Restatement (First) and W. Prosser, Law of Torts (1941)); Monte Verde v. Moore, 539 P. 2d 1362, 1365 (Colo. App. 1975) (re- quiring justifiable reliance and distinguishing it from reasonable reliance); Ford v. H. W. Dubiskie & Co., 105 Conn. 572, 577­578, 136 A. 560, 562­563 (1927) (stating that no investigation is necessary for reliance to be justi- fied); Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 24 Del. Ch. 11, 28­29, 3 A. 2d 768, 776­777 (1939) (holding that buyer had right to rely without investigating); Board of Public Instruction v. Everett W. Martin & Son, Inc., 97 So. 2d 21, 26­27 (Fla. 1957) (holding that purchaser had no duty to investigate where seller made clear factual representation); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 770, 208 S. E. 2d 794, 797 (1974) (requiring justifiable reliance); Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 715, 571 P. 2d 769, 776 (1977) (stating that neither purchasers' lack of caution in believing a factual misrepresentation nor their failure to make an inde- pendent investigation is a defense to their fraud action); Roda v. Berko, 401 Ill. 335, 342, 81 N. E. 2d 912, 916 (1948) ("[I]f it appears that one party 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 74 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court gress's meaning in the generally shared common law when common-law terms are used without further specification, we hold that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable, but not reason- has been guilty of an intentional and deliberate fraud, the doctrine is well settled that he cannot defend against such fraud by saying that the same might have been discovered had the party whom he deceived exercised reasonable diligence and care"); Gonderman v. State Exchange Bank, 166 Ind. App. 181, 190, 334 N. E. 2d 724, 729 (1975) (stating that level of re- quired prudence depends on whether the recipient of a representation is unwary); Sutton v. Greiner, 177 Iowa 532, 540­541, 159 N. W. 268, 271­272 (1916) (same as Illinois); Prather v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 218 Kan. 111, 119, 542 P. 2d 297, 304 (1975) (finding no duty to investigate); Sanford Construction Co. v. S. & H. Contractors, Inc., 443 S. W. 2d 227, 233­234 (Ky. App. 1969) (indicating that level of reliance depends on sophistication of parties); Horner v. Flynn, 334 A. 2d 194, 205 (Me. 1975) (stating that a person who commits intentional misrepresentation cannot excuse himself based on the foolishness of the hearer in believing the representation); Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 372­374, 124 N. E. 2d 912, 915­916 (1955) (relying on Restatement (First)); Boss v. Tomaras, 241 Mich. 540, 542, 217 N. W. 783 (1928) (finding right to rely without investigation); Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 351, 240 N. W. 2d 507, 512 (1976) (rejecting reasonable person standard and applying subjective test based on intelligence and experience of aggrieved person); First Mobile Home Corp. v. Little, 298 So. 2d 676, 679 (Miss. 1974) (requiring justifiable reli- ance); Tietjens v. General Motors Corp., 418 S. W. 2d 75, 81­83 (Mo. 1967) (stating that reliance required depends on the positions of the parties, and that there is no duty to investigate); Bails v. Gar, 171 Mont. 342, 348­349, 558 P. 2d 458, 462­463 (1976) (stating that requirement depends on experi- ence and resourcefulness of relying party); Growney v. C M H Real Estate Co., 195 Neb. 398, 400­401, 238 N. W. 2d 240, 242 (1976) (requiring justifi- able reliance); Sanguinetti v. Strecker, 94 Nev. 200, 206, 577 P. 2d 404, 408 (1978) (requiring justifiable reliance); Smith v. Pope, 103 N. H. 555, 559­ 560, 176 A. 2d 321, 324­325 (1961) (relying on Restatement (First)); Na- tional Premium Budget Plan Corp. v. National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford, 97 N. J. Super. 149, 209­211, 234 A. 2d 683, 716­718 (1967) (rely- ing on Restatement (First) and W. Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955), including example of one-eyed horse, in finding that justifiable reliance is appropriate standard), aff'd, 106 N. J. Super. 238, 254 A. 2d 819 (1969); Jones v. Friedman, 57 N. M. 361, 367­368, 258 P. 2d 1131, 1134­1135 (1953) (requiring justifiable reliance and no general duty to investigate); Johnson 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 75 Opinion of the Court able, reliance. See In re Vann, 67 F. 3d 277 (CA11 1995); In re Kirsh, 973 F. 2d 1454 (CA9 1992). It should go without saying that our analysis does not rele- gate all reasoning from a negative pregnant to the rubbish heap, or render the reasonableness of reliance wholly irrele- vant under § 523(a)(2)(A). As for the rule of construction, of course it is not illegitimate, but merely limited. The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger the infer- ence, as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory sec- tions originally enacted simultaneously in relevant respects, see Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S., at 404 (noting that a single enactment created provisions with language that differed). Even then, of course, it may go no further than ruling out one of several possible readings as the wrong one. The rule is weakest when it suggests results strangely at odds with other textual pointers, like the common-law lan- v. Owens, 263 N. C. 754, 758­759, 140 S. E. 2d 311, 314 (1965) (referring to reasonable reliance, but applying standard as preventing seller from say- ing that buyer ought not to have been so gullible as to trust him, unless the circumstances are such that buyer appears to have known the truth); Steiner v. Roberts, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 396, 131 N. E. 2d 238, 242 (App. 1955) (applying standard from Restatement (First)); Furtado v. Gemmell, 242 Ore. 177, 182, 408 P. 2d 733, 735 (1965) (holding that a representee has some duty, although less than a duty to exercise reasonable care, to protect his interest); Emery v. Third National Bank of Pittsburgh, 314 Pa. 544, 547­548, 171 A. 881, 882 (1934) (stating that a representee must be " `justi- fied in relying' " on the misrepresentation); Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S. C. 461, 466­467, 141 S. E. 2d 129, 132 (1965) (referring to reasonable prudence and diligence, but defining it as depending on intelligence, age, experience, mental and physical condition of the parties, their respective knowledge, and their means of knowledge); Scherf v. Myers, 258 N. W. 2d 831, 835 (S. D. 1977) (stating that justifiable reliance applies in analogous situation of indemnity based on fraud); Chiles v. Kail, 34 Wash. 2d 600, 606, 208 P. 2d 1198, 1201­1202 (1949) (stating that test is not what a reason- able and prudent man would have done but whether plaintiff, in the condi- tion he was in, had a right to rely); First National Bank in Oshkosh v. Scieszinski, 25 Wis. 2d 569, 575­576, 131 N. W. 2d 308, 312 (1964) (requir- ing justifiable reliance with no general duty to investigate). 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 76 FIELD v. MANS Opinion of the Court guage at work in the statute here. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678, 690­691 (1987). As for the reasonableness of reliance, our reading of the Act does not leave reasonableness irrelevant, for the greater the distance between the reliance claimed and the limits of the reasonable, the greater the doubt about reliance in fact. Naifs may recover, at common law and in bankruptcy, but lots of creditors are not at all naive. The subjectiveness of justifiability cuts both ways, and reasonableness goes to the probability of actual reliance. V There remains a fair question that ought to be faced. It makes sense to protect a creditor even if he was not quite reasonable in relying on a fraudulent representation; fraudu- lence weakens the debtor's claim to consideration. And yet, why should the rule be different when fraud is carried to the point of a written financial statement? Does it not count against our reading of the statute that a debtor who makes a misrepresentation with the formality of a written financial statement may have less to bear than the debtor who com- mits his fraud by a statement, perhaps oral, about something other than his bank balance? One could answer that the question does have its force, but counter it by returning to the statutory history and asking why Congress failed to place a requirement of reasonable reliance in § 523(a)(2)(A) if it meant all debtors to be in the same boat. But there may be a better answer, tied to the peculiar potential of financial statements to be misused not just by debtors, but by credi- tors who know their bankruptcy law. The House Report on the Act suggests that Congress wanted to moderate the bur- den on individuals who submitted false financial statements, not because lies about financial condition are less blame- worthy than others, but because the relative equities might be affected by practices of consumer finance companies, which sometimes have encouraged such falsity by their borrowers 516us1$$6M 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 77 Opinion of the Court for the very purpose of insulating their own claims from discharge.13 The answer softens the ostensible anomaly. VI In this case, the Bankruptcy Court applied a reason- able person test entailing a duty to investigate. The court stated that "the case law establishes an objective test, and that is what would be reasonable for a prudent man to do under those circumstances. At a minimum, a prudent man, I think, would have asked his attorney, could he transfer it without my consent? And the answer would have to be yes, and then the next question would be, well, let's see if he's done it? And those questions simply were not asked, and I don't think on balance that was reason- able reliance." App. 43­44. Because the Bankruptcy Court's requirement of reasonable- ness clearly exceeds the demand of justifiable reliance that we hold to apply under § 523(a)(2)(A), we vacate the judg- ment and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.14 It is so ordered. 13 "It is a frequent practice for consumer finance companies to take a list from each loan applicant of other loans or debts that the applicant has outstanding. While the consumer finance companies use these state- ments in evaluating the credit risk, very often the statements are used as a basis for a false financial statement exception to discharge. The forms that the applicant fills out often have too little space for a complete list of debts. Frequently, a loan applicant is instructed by a loan officer to list only a few or only the most important of his debts. Then, at the bottom of the form, the phrase `I have no other debts' is either printed on the form, or the applicant is instructed to write the phrase in his own hand- writing." H. R. Rep. No. 95­595, pp. 130­131 (1977) (footnote omitted). 14 Justice Breyer would not remand, for essentially two reasons: in substance the Bankruptcy Court applied the right standard, looking to the individual capacity of Mr. Field in testing whether the Fields relied at all; and the Fields do not deserve a remand, having failed to get their own 516us1$$6P 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 78 FIELD v. MANS Ginsburg, J., concurring Justice Ginsburg, concurring. I concur in the Court's opinion and write separately to highlight a causation issue still open for determination on remand: Was the debt in question, as the statute expressly requires, "obtained by" the alleged fraud? See 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A); ante, at 63, n. 3. Mans ultimately urges that the promissory note to the Fields is, in any event, a dis- chargeable debt because it was not "obtained by" the alleg- edly fraudulent letters Mans's attorney wrote to the Fields' attorney months after the debt was incurred. The Fields maintain that they relied on the letters to their detriment, in effect according Mans an extension of credit instead of invoking the due-on-sale clause. Mans prevailed on the reliance issue before the bank- ruptcy, district, and appellate courts on the basis of then- governing Circuit precedent. See In re Burgess, 955 F. 2d 134, 140 (CA1 1992) (creditor required to prove that its reli- ance was reasonable). With the Circuit law on reliance sol- idly in his favor, Mans understandably did not advance in the lower courts the argument that the debt was not "obtained by" fraud. When the "reliance must be reasonable" rule solid in the Circuit was challenged in this Court, however, Mans raised the causation point as an alternate justification for the judgment in his favor. See Brief for Respondent 32­33 (argument heading V. reads: "Since the credit here was not `obtained by' the alleged fraud, petitioners have failed to meet the [causation] requirement of 523(a)(2)(A)"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 ("[U]nder the clear language of the statute, there terminology right below and having no real prospect of anything but need- less expense even if there is a remand. The first reason takes a bit of kind reading, since the Bankruptcy Judge spoke in terms of an objective standard and expressly found that the Fields had in fact relied, however imprudently. The second may indicate that we would have been justified in denying certiorari, but after taking the case and declaring the correct standard in response to the Fields' argument in this Court, we think they are entitled to decide how Pyrrhic a victory to declare. 516us1$$6P 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 79 Breyer, J., dissenting has to be an extension of credit in connection with the fraud. It has to be obtained by the fraud . . . .").* At oral argument, the following exchange between the Court and the Fields' attorney occurred: "QUESTION: . . . Suppose the debtor here had simply transferred th[e] property without saying one word to the creditor. . . . [W]ould [the debt] then be discharge- able? There would be no representation at all, just in violation of the agreement the debtor sells the property . . . . Dischargeable, right? "MR. SEUFERT: While [those are] not the facts of this case, I would agree with you, it would be discharge- able." Id., at 8­9. It bears consideration whether a debt that would have been dischargeable had the debtor simply transferred the prop- erty, in violation of the due-on-sale clause with never a word to the creditor, nonetheless should survive bankruptcy be- cause the debtor wrote to the creditor of the prospect, albeit not the actuality, of the transfer. Because this Court is not positioned to provide a first view on questions of this order, I express no opinion on the appropriate resolution of the un- settled causation ("obtained by") issue. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting. I agree with the Court's holding that "actual fraud" under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A) incorporates the common-law ele- ments of intentional misrepresentation. I also agree that to recover under a common-law fraud theory, plaintiffs must do more than show that they actually relied upon the defend- ant's misrepresentation-they must show that the reliance was "justifiable" in the circumstances, but they need not go so far as to show that a "reasonably prudent" person would *Mans appeared pro se in the lower courts; he was represented by coun- sel in this Court. 516us1$$6Q 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 80 FIELD v. MANS Breyer, J., dissenting have relied upon it similarly. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 108, pp. 749­753 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton). And, I agree that the Bankruptcy Court used the wrong words when it described the "reliance" standard as "an objective test" that asks "what would be reasonable for a prudent man to do under [the] circumstances." App. 43­44. I disagree, however, with the Court's result in this case. First, the Bankruptcy Court, while using the wrong words, did the right thing. That court essentially found that in mid-1987, Mr. Field and his wife sold their inn for about $500,000 to Mr. Mans, a developer. To secure the $187,000 that Mans still owed them, the Fields kept a mortgage, which had a term that accelerated the debt should Mans transfer the property to anyone else without their permission. A few months later, Mans wrote to the Fields saying that he wanted to transfer the inn to a development partnership which Mans had formed with a new partner, Mr. De Felice. Mans observed that because the Fields had transferred the inn to a corporation, the stock of which was wholly owned by Mans, Mans could effectively accomplish the transfer to the new partnership by simply conveying the stock of the holding company to the partnership, thereby avoiding the "debt acceleration" clause. But, Mans said, he would prefer to transfer the inn outright, and therefore was seeking their permission to do so without accelerating the debt. The Fields did not give permission. Mans transferred the inn anyway. Nothing more was heard of the matter until 1991, when real estate values fell, Mans went bankrupt, and the Fields brought this lawsuit in an effort to prevent the $150,000 they were then owed from disappearing in the bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Judge found that Mans' mid-1987 letters implied that he had not yet transferred the inn to the part- nership as of the time he wrote the letters. But this impli- 516us1$$6Q 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 81 Breyer, J., dissenting cation was false, for Mans had transferred the inn at least a few days earlier. Still, the Bankruptcy Court asked whether that false implication had made any difference, i. e., whether the Fields, during the next few years, had relied upon this false implication in not accelerating the debt (and obtaining their money before Mans' bankruptcy). The judge very much doubted any actual reliance. But, in any event, Mr. Field had visited the property fairly regularly to check on the progress of the development, he had seen Mans there fairly often, and he had been told that De Felice had been on the premises, claiming to be "the new owner." And, that being so, the judge held that at some point over the course of the next 31/2 years-during which time Mr. Field was "accepting mortgage payments and looking at drawings and discussing the project with Mans"-Mr. Field should simply have asked Mans, "What's the deal here? Who owns this thing?" Id., at 42­43. (Or, the Fields could "have simply checked the title in the . . . County Registry of Deeds which Mr. Field has demonstrated he knows very well is up in North Haverhill." Id., at 42.) To hold this is, in my view, to apply the commentators' "justifiable reliance" standard. The court focused upon the individual circumstances and capacity of the plaintiff, Mr. Field. See Prosser & Keeton § 108, at 751. The court found that Mr. Field should have looked into the matter, not because of any general "duty to investigate," but because, in the particular circumstances, he "discovered something which should serve as a warning that he [was] being de- ceived." Id., § 108, at 752. That is, the court did not use the "objective" test as an improper search for "contributory negligence"-i. e., to deny recovery to one also at fault for failing to exercise "the care of a reasonably prudent person for his own protection." Id., § 108, at 750. Rather, the court viewed the failure to investigate, in light of the clear warnings of deception, as a means of testing whether there was "some objective corroboration to plaintiff's claim that 516us1$$6Q 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 82 FIELD v. MANS Breyer, J., dissenting he did rely," a primary purpose of the "justifiable reliance" requirement. See id., § 108, at 750­751. Second, the Bankruptcy Court's use of what turned out to be the wrong words ("reasonable" and "prudent man" rather than "justifiable") is not grounds for reversal, for no one brought the "correct" terminology to the lower courts' atten- tion. The Fields did not argue in the Bankruptcy Court, or in their briefs to the District Court or the Court of Appeals, or in their petition for certiorari, that there was any differ- ence between "reasonable reliance" and "justifiable reliance." To the contrary, the Fields took the view (which the Court now unanimously rejects) that actual reliance alone- whether or not it meets any objective standard-is sufficient for recovery. Indeed, it appears that the Fields did not even mention the word "justifiable" below, but, rather, used the term "reasonable" throughout to refer to any kind of objec- tive standard. The first time the word "justifiable" appears in this case seems to be in the Fields' brief on the merits in this Court where they point to the Restatement's use of the term "justifiable," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540 (1976), and argue that "[j]ustifiable reliance does not require that the recipient of misrepresentation investigate the un- derlying assertion." Brief for Petitioners 20 (emphasis in original). But see Prosser & Keeton § 108, at 752. Third, the "correct" terminology would not have appeared obvious to a judge, certainly not to a judge who was not a special expert in the common law of misrepresentation. Prior case law was not neat in its use of the terminology. The commentaries do not refer to the old prudent person standard as a "reasonable reliance" standard, but, instead, distinguish between the "justifiable reliance" standard as it has been understood in cases now disapproved, and the "jus- tifiable reliance" standard as it is applied in most modern cases. See id., § 108; 2 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 7.12, pp. 455­464 (2d ed. 1986). Indeed, the major- ity's footnotes distinguish between cases in which a court (1) 516us1$$6Q 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 59 (1995) 83 Breyer, J., dissenting used a "prudent person" standard or imposed a general duty to investigate, and (2) used a plaintiff-specific standard while disavowing a general duty to investigate. Ante, at 72­75, nn. 10­12. But, courts in the first category did not always use the words "reasonable reliance" to describe their stand- ard. See, e. g., Horner v. Ahern, 207 Va. 860, 863­864, 153 S. E. 2d 216, 219 (1967). Indeed, sometimes they used the word "justifiable." See, e. g., Cudemo v. Al & Lou Con- struction Co., 54 App. Div. 2d 995, 996, 387 N. Y. S. 2d 929, 930 (1976). Nor did courts in the second category always use the words "justifiable reliance" to describe their stand- ard. See, e. g., Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480, 544 P. 2d 694, 697 (1976). Indeed, sometimes they used the words "reasonable reliance." See, e. g., Johnson v. Owens, 263 N. C. 754, 758­759, 140 S. E. 2d 311, 314 (1965). The relevant historical controversy in the law of fraud has fo- cused not so much on labels as on the nature of the duty to investigate (e. g., whether the duty is applicable normally or only in special, suspicious circumstances) and on the extent to which the law looks to the circumstances and capacities of a particular plaintiff. See Prosser & Keeton § 108. The Bankruptcy Court, as I have just pointed out, followed mod- ern fraud law in both respects. Fourth, while I understand that sometimes this Court might appropriately announce a legal standard and remand the case to the lower courts for application of the chosen standard, I do not agree that it should do so here. The rec- ord below is brief (87 pages of transcript plus exhibits). The Bankruptcy Judge's findings are reasonably clear. And, fur- ther litigation is expensive. Mr. Mans is bankrupt, repre- senting himself until this Court appointed a lawyer for him; the Fields are not wealthy and should not be encouraged to pursue what is, in my view, the impossible dream of eventu- ally recovering the $150,000 (minus legal fees). And, the ex- ample this Court sets by not looking more closely into the details of the case is not a happy one-particularly if it sug- 516us1$$6Q 11-02-98 14:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 84 FIELD v. MANS Breyer, J., dissenting gests that appellate courts can, or should, insist that lower courts use commentator-approved technical terminology when the parties have not argued for its use and when that use seems most unlikely to have made any difference. Doing so simply generates unnecessary appeals, creating additional delay and expense in a system that could use less of both. For these reasons, I dissent. 516us1$$7z 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 85 Syllabus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELECTRIC, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 94­947. Argued October 10, 1995-Decided November 28, 1995 In the course of holding that respondent company committed "unfair labor practices" when it refused to interview or retain 11 job applicants be- cause of their union membership, the National Labor Relations Board determined that all of the applicants were protected "employee[s]" as that word is defined in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(3), even though they intended to try to organize the company if they were hired and would have been paid by the union while they set about their organizing. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the statutory word "employee" does not cover (and therefore the Act does not protect from antiunion discrimination) those who work for a com- pany while a union simultaneously pays them to organize that company. Held: A worker may be a company's "employee," within the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, even if, at the same time, a union pays that worker to help the union organize the company. Pp. 88­98. (a) The Board may lawfully interpret § 152(3)'s language-i. e., "[t]he term `employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise"-to include company workers who are also paid union organizers. The Board's broad, literal reading of "employee" is entitled to considerable deference as the interpretation of the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. See, e. g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 891. Moreover, several strong general arguments favor the Board's position. First, the Board's decision is consistent with the Act's language, particularly the "any employee" phrase, which is broad enough to include, under the ordinary dictionary definitions of "em- ployee," those company workers whom a union also pays for organizing. Second, the Board's interpretation is consistent with several of the Act's purposes-such as protecting employees' right to organize for mutual aid without employer interference and encouraging and protecting the collective-bargaining process-and with the legislative history. Third, the Board's reading is consistent with this Court's decisions. See, e. g., ibid. Finally, § 186(c)(1) also seems specifically to contemplate the possibility that a company's employee might also work for a union. Pp. 88­92. 516us1$$7z 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 86 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Syllabus (b) Respondent company's agency law argument-that a paid union organizer is controlled by the union and therefore must be considered the servant (i. e., the "employee") of the union alone-fails because the Board's interpretation of "employee" is consistent with the common law of agency, which recognizes that a person may be the servant of two masters at one time as to one act. The company's practical argument- that Congress could not have meant to include paid union organizers as "employees" under the Act in light of the potential for harm to an employer that such workers might pose-suffers from several serious problems and is thus unconvincing. Pp. 92­98. 34 F. 3d 625, vacated and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Paul A. Engelmayer, Linda Sher, Norton J. Come, Peter Winkler, and John Emad Arbab. James K. Pease, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Town & Country Elec- tric, Inc., was Douglas E. Witte. Stephen D. Gordon, Lau- rence Gold, Laurence J. Cohen, Marsha S. Berzon, Mary Lynne Werlwas, and Scott A. Kronland filed briefs for respondent union.* *Steven R. Shapiro and Alan Hyde filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Associated Build- ers and Contractors, Inc., et al. by Maurice Baskin, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the Associated General Contractors of America by Joe F. Canterbury, Jr., Frederic Gover, and Michael E. Kennedy; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Marshall B. Babson, Stanley R. Strauss, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Mona C. Zeiberg; and for the Labor Policy Association by Robert E. Williams and Daniel V. Yager. Michael T. Manley, G. Gordon Atcheson, John J. Blake, and Michael J. Stapp filed a brief for the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL­CIO, CFL, as amicus curiae. 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 85 (1995) 87 Opinion of the Court Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Can a worker be a company's "employee," within the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., if, at the same time, a union pays that worker to help the union organize the company? We agree with the National Labor Relations Board that the answer is "yes." I The relevant background is the following: Town & Country Electric, Inc., a nonunion electrical contractor, wanted to hire several licensed Minnesota electricians for construction work in Minnesota. Town & Country (through an employ- ment agency) advertised for job applicants, but it refused to interview 10 of 11 union applicants (including two profes- sional union staff) who responded to the advertisement. Its employment agency hired the one union applicant whom Town & Country interviewed, but he was dismissed after only a few days on the job. The members of the International Brotherhood of Electri- cal Workers, Locals 292 and 343 (Union), filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country and the employment agency had refused to interview (or retain) them because of their union member- ship. See National Labor Relations Act (Act) §§ 8(a)(1) and (3), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3) (1988 ed.). An Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Union members, and the Board affirmed that rul- ing. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N. L. R. B. 1250, 1258 (1992). In the course of its decision, the Board determined that all 11 job applicants (including the two Union officials and the one member briefly hired) were "employees" as the Act de- fines that word. Ibid. The Board recognized that under well-established law, it made no difference that the 10 mem- bers who were simply applicants were never hired. See 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 88 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Opinion of the Court Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 185­186 (1941) (statutory word "employee" includes job applicants, for oth- erwise the Act's prohibition of " `discrimination in regard to hire' " would "serve no function"). Neither, in the Board's view, did it matter (with respect to the meaning of the word "employee") that the Union members intended to try to orga- nize the company if they secured the advertised jobs, nor that the Union would pay them while they set about their organizing. The Board then rejected the company's fact- based explanations for its refusals to interview or to retain these 11 "employees" and held that the company had com- mitted "unfair labor practices" by discriminating on the basis of union membership. Town & Country Elec., supra, at 1250, n. 3, 1256, 1258. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board. It held that the Board had incorrectly interpreted the statutory word "employee." In the court's view, that key word does not cover (and therefore the Act does not protect from antiunion discrimination) those who work for a company while a union simultaneously pays them to organize that company. 34 F. 3d 625, 629 (1994). See also H. B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA4 1989). For this threshold reason the court refused to enforce the Board's order. Because other Circuits have interpreted the word "em- ployee" differently, see, e. g., Willmar Elec. Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F. 2d 1327, 1330­1331 (CADC 1992) (paid union organizers can be "employees" protected by the Act), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 909 (1993); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F. 2d 26, 30 (CA2 1979) (same), we granted certiorari. We now resolve the conflict in the Board's favor. II The Act seeks to improve labor relations ("eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce," 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1988 ed.)) in large part by granting specific sets of rights to employers and to employ- 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 85 (1995) 89 Opinion of the Court ees. This case grows out of a controversy about rights that the Act grants to "employees," namely, rights "to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." § 157. We granted certiorari to decide only that part of the controversy that focuses upon the meaning of the word "employee," a key term in the stat- ute, since these rights belong only to those workers who qualify as "employees" as that term is defined in the Act. See, e. g., § 158(a)(1) ("unfair labor practice" to "interfere with . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title") (emphasis added). The relevant statutory language is the following: "The term `employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other- wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural la- borer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an in- dependent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined." § 152(3) (emphasis added). We must specifically decide whether the Board may lawfully interpret this language to include company workers who are also paid union organizers. We put the question in terms of the Board's lawful author- ity because this Court's decisions recognize that the Board 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 90 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Opinion of the Court often possesses a degree of legal leeway when it interprets its governing statute, particularly where Congress likely in- tended an understanding of labor relations to guide the Act's application. See, e. g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 891 (1984) (interpretations of the Board, the agency that Congress " `created . . . to administer the Act,' " will be up- held if "reasonably defensible") (internal citation omitted); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U. S. 775, 786 (1990) (Congress delegated to the Board "primary responsi- bility for developing and applying national labor policy"); ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U. S. 317, 324 (1994) (the Board's views are entitled to "the greatest deference"). See also Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842­843 (1984). We add, how- ever, that the Board needs very little legal leeway here to convince us of the correctness of its decision. Several strong general arguments favor the Board's posi- tion. For one thing, the Board's decision is consistent with the broad language of the Act itself-language that is broad enough to include those company workers whom a union also pays for organizing. The ordinary dictionary definition of "employee" includes any "person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation." American Her- itage Dictionary 604 (3d ed. 1992). See also Black's Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990) (an employee is a "person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed"). The phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of the ordinary dictionary definition, for it says "[t]he term `employee' shall include any employee." 29 U. S. C. § 152(3) (1988 ed.) (em- phasis added). Of course, the Act's definition also contains a list of exceptions, for example, for independent contractors, agricultural laborers, domestic workers, and employees sub- 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 85 (1995) 91 Opinion of the Court ject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; but no exception applies here. For another thing, the Board's broad, literal interpretation of the word "employee" is consistent with several of the Act's purposes, such as protecting "the right of employees to orga- nize for mutual aid without employer interference," Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 798 (1945); see also 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1988 ed.); and "encouraging and pro- tecting the collective-bargaining process." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at 892. And, insofar as one can infer purpose from congressional reports and floor statements, those sources too are consistent with the Board's broad interpreta- tion of the word. It is fairly easy to find statements to the effect that an "employee" simply "means someone who works for another for hire," H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947), and includes "every man on a payroll," 79 Cong. Rec. 9686 (1935) (colloquy between Reps. Taylor and Connery). See also S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1935) (referring to an employee as a "worker"); H. R. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1935) (same); H. R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1935) (same); H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935) (same). At the same time, contrary statements, suggesting a narrow or qualified view of the word, are scarce, or nonexistent-except, of course, those made in respect to the specific (here inapplica- ble) exclusions written into the statute. Further, a broad, literal reading of the statute is consistent with cases in this Court such as, say, Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, supra (the Act covers undocumented aliens), where the Court wrote that the "breadth of § 2(3)'s definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to `any employee.' " 467 U. S., at 891. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U. S. 170, 189­190 (1981) (certain "confidential employees" fall within the definition of "em- ployees"); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S., at 185­186 (job applicants are "employees"). Cf. Chemical Workers v. 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 92 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Opinion of the Court Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 166 (1971) (retired persons are not "employees" because they do not "work for another for hire"). See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131­132 (1944) (independent contractor- like newsboys are "employees"); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 488­490 (1947) (company foremen are "employees"). But see 61 Stat. 137­138, 29 U. S. C. § 152(3) (1988 ed.) (amending Act to overrule Hearst and Packard by explicitly excluding independent contractors and supervi- sory employees). Finally, at least one other provision of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act seems specifically to contemplate the possibility that a company's employee might also work for a union. This provision forbids an employer (say, the company) to make payments to a person employed by a union, but simultaneously exempts from that ban wages paid by the company to "any . . . employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee" of the company. 29 U. S. C. § 186(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). If Town & Country is right, there would not seem to be many (or any) human beings to which this last phrase could apply. III Town & Country believes that it can overcome these gen- eral considerations, favoring a broad, literal interpretation of the Act, through an argument that rests primarily upon the common law of agency. It first argues that our prior decisions resort to common-law principles in defining the term "employee." See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 323 (1992) (using common-law test to distin- guish between "employee" and "independent contractor" under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.); Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 739­740 (1989) (using common-law test to distinguish between "employee" and "independent contractor" under Copyright Act of 1976, 17 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 85 (1995) 93 Opinion of the Court U. S. C. § 101 et seq.); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U. S. 254, 256 (1968) (using common-law test to distin- guish between "employee" and "independent contractor" under NLRA). And it also points out that the Board itself, in its decision, found "no bar to applying common law agency principles to the determination whether a paid union orga- nizer is an `employee,' " Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N. L. R. B., at 1254. Town & Country goes on to argue that application of common-law agency principles requires an interpretation of "employee" that excludes paid union organizers. It points to a section of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (dealing with respondeat superior liability for torts), which says: "Since . . . the relation of master and servant is depend- ent upon the right of the master to control the conduct of the servant in the performance of the service, giving service to two masters at the same time normally in- volves a breach of duty by the servant to one or both of them . . . . [A person] cannot be a servant of two mas- ters in doing an act as to which an intent to serve one necessarily excludes an intent to serve the other." Re- statement (Second) of Agency § 226, Comment a, p. 499 (1957). It argues that, when the paid union organizer serves the union-at least at certain times in certain ways-the orga- nizer is acting adversely to the company. Indeed, it says, the organizer may stand ready to desert the company upon request by the union, in which case, the union, not the com- pany, would have "the right . . . to control the conduct of the servant." Ibid. Thus, it concludes, the worker must be the servant (i. e., the "employee") of the union alone. See id., § 1, and Comment a, p. 8 ("agent" is one who agrees to act "subject to [a principal's] control"). As Town & Country correctly notes, in the context of re- viewing lower courts' interpretations of statutory terms, we 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 94 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Opinion of the Court have said on several occasions that when Congress uses the term "employee" in a statute that does not define the term, courts interpreting the statute " `must infer, unless the stat- ute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of th[at] ter[m] . . . . In the past, when Congress has used the term "employee" without defin- ing it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.' " Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, supra, at 322­323 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, supra, at 739­740). At the same time, when reviewing the Board's interpretation of the term "employee" as it is used in the Act, we have repeat- edly said that "[s]ince the task of defining the term `em- ployee' is one that `has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,' . . . the Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable def- erence . . . ." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S., at 891 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., supra, at 130); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U. S., at 177­190. In some cases, there may be a ques- tion about whether the Board's departure from the common law of agency with respect to particular questions and in a particular statutory context, renders its interpretation un- reasonable. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., supra, at 256 ("independent contractor" exclusion). But no such question is presented here since the Board's interpretation of the term "employee" is consistent with the common law. Town & Country's common-law argument fails, quite sim- ply, because, in our view, the Board correctly found that it lacks sufficient support in common law. The Restatement's hornbook rule (to which the quoted commentary is ap- pended) says that a "person may be the servant of two masters . . . at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 85 (1995) 95 Opinion of the Court abandonment of the service to the other." Restate- ment (Second) of Agency § 226, at 498 (emphasis added). The Board, in quoting this rule, concluded that service to the union for pay does not "involve abandonment of . . . service" to the company. 309 N. L. R. B., at 1254. And, that conclusion seems correct. Common sense sug- gests that as a worker goes about his or her ordinary tasks during a working day, say, wiring sockets or laying cable, he or she is subject to the control of the company employer, whether or not the union also pays the worker. The com- pany, the worker, the union, all would expect that to be so. And, that being so, that union and company interests or con- trol might sometimes differ should make no difference. As Prof. Seavey pointed out many years ago, "[o]ne can be a servant of one person for some acts and the servant of an- other person for other acts, even when done at the same time," for example, where "a city detective, in search of clues, finds employment as a waiter and, while serving the meals, searches the customer's pockets." W. Seavey, Hand- book of the Law of Agency § 85, p. 146 (1964). The detective is the servant both "of the restaurateur" (as to the table waiting) and "of the city" (as to the pocket searching). Ibid. How does it differ from Prof. Seavey's example for the com- pany to pay the worker for electrical work, and the union to pay him for organizing? Moreover, union organizers may limit their organizing to nonwork hours. See, e. g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945); Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 492­493 (1978). If so, union organizing, when done for pay but during nonwork hours, would seem equivalent to simple moonlighting, a prac- tice wholly consistent with a company's control over its workers as to their assigned duties. Town & Country's "abandonment" argument is yet weaker insofar as the activity that constitutes an "abandonment," i. e., ordinary union organizing activity, is itself specifically protected by the Act. See, e. g., ibid. (employer restrictions 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 96 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Opinion of the Court on union solicitation during nonworking time in nonworking areas are presumptively invalid under the Act). This is true even if a company perceives those protected activities as dis- loyal. After all, the employer has no legal right to require that, as part of his or her service to the company, a worker refrain from engaging in protected activity. Neither are we convinced by the practical considerations that Town & Country adds to its agency law argument. The company refers to a Union resolution permitting members to work for nonunion firms, which, the company says, reflects a union effort to "salt" nonunion companies with union mem- bers seeking to organize them. Supported by amici curiae, it argues that "salts" might try to harm the company, per- haps quitting when the company needs them, perhaps dispar- aging the company to others, perhaps even sabotaging the firm or its products. Therefore, the company concludes, Congress could not have meant paid union organizers to have been included as "employees" under the Act. This practical argument suffers from several serious prob- lems. For one thing, nothing in this record suggests that such acts of disloyalty were present, in kind or degree, to the point where the company might lose control over the worker's normal workplace tasks. Certainly the Union's resolution contains nothing that suggests, requires, encourages, or con- dones impermissible or unlawful activity. App. 256­258. For another thing, the argument proves too much. If a paid union organizer might quit, leaving a company employer in the lurch, so too might an unpaid organizer, or a worker who has found a better job, or one whose family wants to move elsewhere. And if an overly zealous union organizer might hurt the company through unlawful acts, so might another unpaid zealot (who may know less about the law), or a dissat- isfied worker (who may lack an outlet for his or her griev- ances). This does not mean they are not "employees." Further, the law offers alternative remedies for Town & Country's concerns, short of excluding paid or unpaid union 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 85 (1995) 97 Opinion of the Court organizers from all protection under the Act. For example, a company disturbed by legal but undesirable activity, such as quitting without notice, can offer its employees fixed-term contracts, rather than hiring them "at will" as in the case before us; or it can negotiate with its workers for a notice period. A company faced with unlawful (or possibly unlaw- ful) activity can discipline or dismiss the worker, file a com- plaint with the Board, or notify law enforcement authorities. See, e. g., NLRB v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464, 472­478 (1953); Willmar Elec. Service v. NLRB, 968 F. 2d, at 1330 (arsonist who is also union member is still an "employee," but may be discharged). See also Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F. 2d 86, 89­90 (CA3 1943) (worker who was intoxicated while on duty, "came to work when he chose and . . . left the plant and his shift as he pleased," and utterly failed to per- form his assigned duties is still an "employee" protected under the Act), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 778 (1944). And, of course, an employer may as a rule limit the access of nonem- ployee union organizers to company property. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 538 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956). This is not to say that the law treats paid union organizers like other company employees in every labor law context. For instance, the Board states that, at least sometimes, a paid organizer may not share a sufficient "community of in- terest" with other employees (as to wages, hours, and work- ing conditions) to warrant inclusion in the same bargaining unit. Brief for National Labor Relations Board 33, n. 14. See, e. g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Member- ship Corp., 454 U. S., at 190 (some confidential workers, al- though "employees," may be excluded from bargaining unit). We need not decide this matter. Nor do we express any view about any of the other matters Town & Country raised before the Court of Appeals, such as whether or not Town & Country's conduct (in refusing to interview, or to retain, "em- ployees" who were on the union's payroll) amounted to an 516us1$$7Q 10-22-98 10:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 98 NLRB v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELEC., INC. Opinion of the Court unfair labor practice. See 34 F. 3d, at 629. We hold only that the Board's construction of the word "employee" is law- ful; that term does not exclude paid union organizers. IV For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 516us1$$8z 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 99 Syllabus THOMPSON v. KEOHANE, WARDEN, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94­6615. Argued October 11, 1995-Decided November 29, 1995 During a two-hour, tape-recorded session at Alaska state trooper head- quarters, petitioner Thompson confessed he had killed his former wife. Thompson maintained that the troopers gained his confession without according him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. The Alaska trial court denied his motion to suppress the confes- sion, however, ruling that he was not "in custody" for Miranda pur- poses, therefore the troopers were not required to inform him of his Miranda rights. After a trial at which the prosecution played the tape-recorded confession, the jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree murder, and the Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed his conviction. The Federal District Court denied Thompson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Both courts held that a state court's ruling that a defendant was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes qualifies as a "fact" determination entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Held: State-court "in custody" rulings, made to determine whether Mi- randa warnings are due, do not qualify for a presumption of correct- ness under § 2254(d). Such rulings do not resolve "a factual issue." Instead, they resolve mixed questions of law and fact and therefore warrant independent review by the federal habeas court. Pp. 107­116. (a) Section 2254(d) declares that, in a federal habeas proceeding insti- tuted by a person in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment, the state court's determination of "a factual issue" ordinarily "shall be pre- sumed to be correct." This Court has held that "basic, primary, or his- torical facts" are the "factual issue[s]" to which the statutory presump- tion of correctness dominantly relates. See, e. g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 112. Nonetheless, the proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery. Two lines of decisions com- pose the Court's § 2254(d) law/fact jurisprudence. In several cases, the Court has classified as "factual issues" within § 2254(d)'s compass ques- tions extending beyond the determination of "what happened." The resolution of the issues involved in these cases, notably competency to stand trial and juror impartiality, depends heavily on the trial court's superior ability to appraise witness credibility and demeanor. On the 516us1$$8z 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 100 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Syllabus other hand, the Court has recognized the "uniquely legal dimension" presented by issues such as the voluntariness of a confession and the effectiveness of counsel's assistance and has ranked these as questions of law for § 2254(d) purposes. "What happened" determinations in these cases warrant a presumption of correctness, but "the ulti- mate question," the Court has declared, remains outside § 2254(d)'s do- main and is "a matter for independent federal determination." Ibid. Pp. 107­112. (b) The ultimate "in custody" determination for Miranda purposes fits within the latter class of cases. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination whether there was "a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125. The first inquiry-i. e., what circumstances surrounded the interrogation-is distinctly factual and state-court findings in response to that inquiry attract a presump- tion of correctness under § 2254(d). The second inquiry-i. e., would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave-calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts and thus presents a "mixed question of law and fact" qualifying for independent review. The practical consid- erations that have prompted the Court to type questions like juror bias and competency to stand trial as "factual issue[s]" do not dominate "in custody" inquiries. In such inquiries, the trial court's superior capacity to resolve credibility issues is not the foremost factor. Notably absent from the trial court's purview is any first-person vantage on whether a defendant, when interrogated, was so situated as to be "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Thus, once the historical facts are resolved, the state court is not in an appreciably better position than the federal ha- beas court to make the ultimate determination of the consistency of the law enforcement officer's conduct with the federal Miranda warning requirement. Furthermore, classifying "in custody" as a determination qualifying for independent review should serve legitimate law enforce- ment interests as effectively as it serves to ensure protection of the right against self-incrimination. As the Court's decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law. Pp. 112­116. 34 F. 3d 1073, vacated and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 116. 516us1$$8z 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 101 Opinion of the Court Julie R. O'Sullivan, by appointment of the Court, 513 U. S. 1137, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Cynthia M. Hora, Assistant Attorney General of Alaska, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, pro se.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. During a two-hour, tape-recorded session at Alaska state trooper headquarters, petitioner Carl Thompson confessed that he killed his former wife. Thompson's confession was placed in evidence at the ensuing Alaska state-court trial, *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady, Attorney General of Dela- ware, Margery S. Bronster, Attorney General of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer, Attorney Gen- eral of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attor- ney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Missis- sippi, Jerimiah W. "Jay" Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz, At- torney General of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Drew Edmondson, Attorney Gen- eral of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark Bar- nette, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Jan Gra- ham, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General of Virginia, and Chris- tine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger. 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 102 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court and he was convicted of first-degree murder. Challenging his conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, Thomp- son maintained that the Alaska troopers gained his confes- sion without according him the warnings Miranda v. Ari- zona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), requires: that he could remain silent; that anything he said could be used against him in court; and that he was entitled to an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interro- gated by the police is "in custody." The state trial and ap- pellate courts determined that Thompson was not "in cus- tody" when he confessed. The statute governing federal habeas corpus proceedings, 28 U. S. C. § 2254, directs that, ordinarily, state-court fact findings "shall be presumed to be correct." § 2254(d). The question before this Court is whether the state-court determination that Thompson was not "in custody" when he confessed is a finding of fact war- ranting a presumption of correctness, or a matter of law call- ing for independent review in federal court. We hold that the issue whether a suspect is "in custody," and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings, presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review. I On September 10, 1986, two moose hunters discovered the body of a dead woman floating in a gravel pit lake on the outskirts of Fairbanks, Alaska. The woman had been stabbed 29 times. Notified by the hunters, the Alaska state troopers issued a press release seeking assistance in iden- tifying the body. Thompson called the troopers on Septem- ber 11 to inform them that his former wife, Dixie Thompson, fit the description in the press release and that she had been missing for about a month. Through a dental examina- tion, the troopers conclusively established that the corpse was Dixie Thompson. On September 15, a trooper called 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 103 Opinion of the Court Thompson and asked him to come to headquarters, pur- portedly to identify personal items the troopers thought belonged to Dixie Thompson. It is now undisputed, how- ever, that the trooper's primary reason for contacting Thompson was to question him about the murder. Thompson drove to the troopers' headquarters in his pickup truck and, upon arriving, immediately identified the items as Dixie's. He remained at headquarters, however, for two more hours while two unarmed troopers continuously questioned him in a small interview room and tape-recorded the exchange. The troopers did not inform Thompson of his Miranda rights. Although they constantly assured Thomp- son he was free to leave, they also told him repeatedly that they knew he had killed his former wife. Informing Thomp- son that execution of a search warrant was underway at his home, and that his truck was about to be searched pursuant to another warrant, the troopers asked questions that invited a confession. App. 43­79.1 Eventually, Thompson told the troopers he killed Dixie. 1 These passages from the transcript of the tape-recorded interrogation indicate the tenor of the questioning: "Q Do you know-of course, I don't mean to take up a lot of your time, you-you can leave any time that you want to, if you've got something else going on. "A Oh no (indiscernible) around here, no. "Q I know we called you and probably woke you up and. . . . "A No, I was just laying there. "Q Okay. But you know, you can go any time you want to. We got a-you know, we're trying to-trying to crack on this thing, and I-I don't imagine it's any secret to you that there are some of your-your friends or associates who have been kind of calling up and saying, you know, they've been pointing at you. . . . "A Yeah, that (indiscernible) guy you know and we've been friends for ten years, you know, and this guy is starting to say stuff that I never even said. . . ." App. 44­45. "Q . . . And I'm willing to work with you on this thing to make the best of a bad situation. I can't tell you that this isn't a bad situation. I mean 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 104 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court As promised, the troopers permitted Thompson to leave, but impounded his truck. Left without transportation, Thompson accepted the troopers' offer of a ride to his friend's you're free to get up and walk out of here now and-and never talk to me again. But what I'm telling you now is this is probably the last chance we'll have to-for you to say something that other people are gonna be- lieve because let's just-let's just say that there's enough (indiscernible) here already that we can-we can prove conclusively beyond a reasonable doubt that-that you were responsible for this thing-this thing. Well really there's a lot that she's responsible for, but you're the guy that's stuck with the problem. . . . "A I've already told you the story. "Q . . . Well you haven't told me the critical part and you haven't told me the part about where Dixie gets killed. "A And I don't know about that. That's your guys' job. You're sup- posed to know that. "Q Well like I told you, we know the who, the where, the when, the how. The thing we don't know is the why. And that's-that's the thing we've got to kind of get straight here today between you and I. See I know that you did this thing. There's-there's no question in my mind about that. I can see it. I can see it when I'm looking at you. And I know that you care about Dixie. I mean this isn't something that you wanted to happen. . . . . . . . . "Q . . . I think that now it's the time for you to come honest about this thing, because if you turn around later and try to. . . . "A I am being honest about it. "Q No, you haven't. You told part of the truth and you told a lot of it, but you haven't told all of it. . . . I mean your-you're not probably lying directly to me, but you're lying by omission . . . . I can tell you that right now there's a search warrant being served out at [your home] and a search warrant for your truck is gonna be served and we've got a forensic expert up from-from Anchorage . . . . "A Huh. "Q . . . And I don't believe that you're a bad person. I really don't. . . . [W]hat happened here was never planned, what happened here was one of these things that just happen. . . . And when it happened you're stuck with this-I mean you're stuck with a hell of a mess now. She's got-she's finally got you into more trouble than she can possibly imagine. I mean she's brought this thing on you. She causes that. . . . I mean I don't know whether she started the thing by grabbing the knife and saying she was 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 105 Opinion of the Court house. Some two hours later, the troopers arrested Thomp- son and charged him with first-degree murder. The Alaska trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, denied Thompson's motion to suppress his Septem- ber 15 statements. Tr. 118 (Dec. 12, 1986); Tr. 142 (Mar. 18, 1987). Deciding the motion on the papers submitted, the trial court ruled that Thompson was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, therefore the troopers had no obligation to inform him of his Miranda rights. App. 8­9.2 Applying an objective test to resolve the "in custody" question, the court asked whether " `a reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off police questioning.' " Id., at 7 (quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P. 2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). These features, the court indicated, were key: Thompson ar- rived at the station in response to a trooper's request; two unarmed troopers in plain clothes questioned him; Thompson was told he was free to go at any time; and he was not arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation. App. 7­8. Although the trial court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, it also observed that the troopers' subsequent actions-releasing and shortly thereafter arresting Thomp- son-rendered the question "very close." Id., at 8­9. After a trial, at which the prosecution played the tape- recorded confession, the jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence. The Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed Thompson's conviction, concluding, among other things, that the troopers had not placed Thompson "in custody," and therefore had no obliga- tion to give him Miranda warnings. Thompson v. State, gonna (indiscernible) at you and it got turned around or just what hap- pened. I mean I don't know those things. . . ." Id., at 49­51. 2 The trial court also rejected Thompson's contention that his confession was involuntary. On both direct and habeas review, Thompson unsuccess- fully asserted the involuntariness of his confession. His petition to this Court, however, does not present that issue. 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 106 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court 768 P. 2d 127, 131 (Alaska App. 1989).3 The Alaska Supreme Court denied discretionary review. App. 24. Thompson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The District Court denied the writ, according a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) to the state court's conclusion that, when Thompson confessed, he was not yet "in custody" for Miranda purposes. App. 37. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed without publishing an opinion. 34 F. 3d 1073 (1994). Based on Circuit prece- dent,4 the court held that "a state court's determination that a defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda is a question of fact entitled to the presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)." App. 41. Federal Courts of Appeals disagree on the issue Thompson asks us to resolve: whether state-court "in custody" determi- nations are matters of fact entitled to a presumption of cor- rectness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), or mixed questions of law and fact warranting independent review by the federal habeas court. Compare Feltrop v. Delo, 46 F. 3d 766, 773 (CA8 1995) (applying presumption of correctness), with Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F. 2d 1282, 1291 (CA11 1992) (con- ducting independent review). Because uniformity among federal courts is important on questions of this order, we granted certiorari to end the division of authority. 513 U. S. 3 It is unclear in this case what deference the Alaska appellate court accorded to the trial court's conclusion that petitioner was not "in cus- tody"; in later decisions, the Alaska Court of Appeals reviewed the trial courts' "in custody" determinations for "clear error." See Higgins v. State, 887 P. 2d 966, 971 (Alaska App. 1994); McKillop v. State, 857 P. 2d 358, 361 (Alaska App. 1993). 4 The panel relied on Krantz v. Briggs, 983 F. 2d 961, 964 (CA9 1993), which held that state-court "in custody" determinations warrant a pre- sumption of correctness under § 2254(d) if the state court made factfind- ings after a hearing on the merits. 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 107 Opinion of the Court 1126 (1995). We now hold that the 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) pre- sumption does not apply to "in custody" rulings; accordingly, we vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment. II "[I]n-custody interrogation[s]," this Court recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, place "inherently compelling pres- sures" on the persons interrogated. 384 U. S., at 467. To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court held, suspects interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation. Id., at 444. The Court de- fined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Ibid.; see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (duty to give Miranda warnings is triggered "only where there has been such a re- striction on a person's freedom as to render him `in cus- tody' ") (quoted in Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam)). Our task in petitioner Thompson's case is to identify the standard governing federal habeas courts' review of state-court "in custody" determinations.5 A Section 2254 governs federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. In such proceedings, § 2254(d) declares, 5 Claims that state courts have incorrectly decided Miranda issues, as Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680 (1993), confirms, are appropriately considered in federal habeas review. 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 108 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court state-court determinations of "a factual issue" "shall be pre- sumed to be correct" absent one of the enumerated excep- tions.6 This provision, added in a 1966 amendment, Act of 6 Section 2254(d) lists eight exceptions to the presumption of correct- ness. In full, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) reads: "In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit- "(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing; "(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; "(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing; "(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding; "(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in depriva- tion of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding; "(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or "(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; "(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record: "And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, other- wise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court con- cludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the rec- ord in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 109 Opinion of the Court Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89­711, 80 Stat. 1105­1106, received the Court's close attention in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104 (1985). As the Miller Court observed, § 2254(d) "was an al- most verbatim codification of the standards delineated in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), for determining when a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing before act- ing on a habeas petition." Miller, 474 U. S., at 111.7 Town- send counseled that, if the habeas petitioner has had in state court "a full and fair hearing . . . resulting in reliable find- ings," the federal court "ordinarily should . . . accept the facts as found" by the state tribunal. 372 U. S., at 318. Sec- tion 2254(d) essentially "elevated [the Townsend Court's] exhortation into a mandatory presumption of correctness." Miller, 474 U. S., at 111­112; see also id., at 112 (emphasizing respect appropriately accorded "a coequal state judiciary" and citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 605 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). Just as Townsend's instruction on the respect appropri- ately accorded state-court factfindings is now captured in the § 2254(d) presumption, so we have adhered to Townsend's definition of the § 2254(d) term "factual issue." 8 The Town- send Court explained that by " `issues of fact,' " it meant support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the appli- cant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous." 7 The list of circumstances warranting an evidentiary hearing in a fed- eral habeas proceeding set out in H. R. Rep. No. 1384, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1964), is similar to the list set out in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 313 (1963). The legislative history further indicates that the House Judi- ciary Committee, in framing its recommendations, was mindful of the Court's recent precedent, including Townsend. H. R. Rep. No. 1384, supra, at 24­25. See also 1 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal Habeas Cor- pus Practice and Procedure § 20.1a, pp. 537­538 (2d ed. 1994) (description of interplay between habeas statute and Townsend). 8 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1 (1992), partially overruled Town- send on a point not relevant here; Keeney held that a "cause-and- prejudice" standard, rather than the "deliberate by-pass" standard, is the correct standard for excusing a habeas petitioner's failure to develop a material fact in state-court proceedings. 504 U. S., at 5­6. 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 110 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court "basic, primary, or historical facts: facts `in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narra- tors . . . .' " 372 U. S., at 309, n. 6 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). "So- called mixed questions of fact and law, which require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determi- nations," the Townsend Court added, "are not facts in this sense." 372 U. S., at 309, n. 6.9 In applying § 2254(d), we have reaffirmed that "basic, primary, or historical facts" are the "factual issue[s]" to which the statutory presumption of correctness dominantly relates. See, e. g., Miller, 474 U. S., at 112 ("[S]ubsidiary factual questions" in alleged involuntar- iness of confession cases are subject to the § 2254(d) pre- sumption, but "the ultimate question"-requiring a "totality of the circumstances" assessment-"is a matter for inde- pendent federal determination."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342 (1980) ("mixed determination[s] of law and fact" generally are not subject to the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness). It must be acknowledged, however, "that the Court has not charted an entirely clear course in this area." Miller, 474 U. S., at 113. In regard to § 2254(d), as in other con- texts,10 the proper characterization of a question as one of 9 See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frank- furter, J.) ("Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not dis- pose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal significance of such facts, the District Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.") (citation omitted). 10 See, e. g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 401 (1990) (observing in regard to appellate review of sanctions imposed under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11: "The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguish- ing between legal and factual issues."); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 288 (1982) (acknowledging, in relation to appellate review of intent determinations in Title VII cases, "the vexing nature of the distinc- tion between questions of fact and questions of law"). 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 111 Opinion of the Court fact or law is sometimes slippery. See ibid.; Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 429 (1985) ("It will not always be easy to separate questions of `fact' from `mixed questions of law and fact' for § 2254(d) purposes . . . ."). Two lines of decisions compose the Court's § 2254(d) law/fact jurisprudence. In several cases, the Court has classified as "factual issues" within § 2254(d)'s compass questions extending beyond the determination of "what happened." This category notably includes: competency to stand trial (e. g., Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam)); and juror impartiality (e. g., Witt, 469 U. S., at 429; Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025, 1036 (1984); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U. S. 114, 120 (1983)). While these issues encompass more than "basic, primary, or historical facts," their resolution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor. See, e. g., Witt, 469 U. S., at 429 (Although the trial court is "applying some kind of legal standard to what [it] sees and hears," its "predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily dis- cerned from an appellate record."). This Court has rea- soned that a trial court is better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and has therefore accorded the judgment of the jurist-observer "presumptive weight." Miller, 474 U. S., at 114 (when an "issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court"). On the other hand, the Court has ranked as issues of law for § 2254(d) purposes: the voluntariness of a confession (Miller, 474 U. S., at 116); the effectiveness of counsel's assistance (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 698 (1984)); and the potential conflict of interest arising out of an attorney's representation of multiple defendants (Cuyler, 446 U. S., at 341­342). "What happened" issues in these cases warranted a presumption of correctness, but the Court declared "the ultimate question" outside § 2254(d)'s domain 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 112 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court because of its "uniquely legal dimension." Miller, 474 U. S., at 116; see also Sumner v. Mata, 455 U. S. 591, 597 (1982) (per curiam) ("[T]he constitutionality of the pretrial iden- tification procedures used in this case is a mixed question of law and fact that is not governed by § 2254(d)."); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 397, and n. 4, 403­404 (1977) (waiver of Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is not a question of historical fact, but rather requires applica- tion of constitutional principles to facts). B The ultimate "in custody" determination for Miranda pur- poses, we are persuaded, fits within the latter class of cases. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interro- gation; and second, given those circumstances,11 would a rea- sonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to ter- minate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve "the ultimate inquiry": "[was] there a `formal arrest or restraint on free- dom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U. S., at 495). The first inquiry, all agree, is distinctly factual. State-court findings on these scene- and action-setting questions attract a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The second inquiry, however, calls for application of the con- trolling legal standard to the historical facts. This ultimate 11 The "totality of the circumstances" cast of the "in custody" determi- nation, contrary to respondents' suggestions, does not mean deferential review is in order. See, e. g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 117 (1985) (state-court determination "whether, under the totality of the circum- stances, the confession was obtained in a manner consistent with the Constitution" qualifies for independent review by federal habeas court). 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 113 Opinion of the Court determination, we hold, presents a "mixed question of law and fact" qualifying for independent review. The practical considerations that have prompted the Court to type questions like juror bias and competency as "factual issue[s]," and therefore governed by § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness, are not dominant here. As this case illus- trates, the trial court's superior capacity to resolve cred- ibility issues is not dispositive of the "in custody" inquiry.12 Credibility determinations, as in the case of the alleged involuntariness of a confession, see Miller, 474 U. S., at 112, may sometimes contribute to the establishment of the histor- ical facts and thus to identification of the "totality of the circumstances." But the crucial question entails an evalu- ation made after determination of those circumstances: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda? 13 12 As earlier observed, see supra, at 105, the trial court decided Thomp- son's motion to suppress his September 15 statements on the papers sub- mitted without holding an evidentiary hearing. 13 Respondents observe that "reasonable person" assessments, most prominently to gauge negligence in personal injury litigation, fall within the province of fact triers. See, e. g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U. S., at 402 (negligence determinations "generally reviewed deferentially"); McAllis- ter v. United States, 348 U. S. 19, 20­23 (1954) (District Court finding of negligence was not "clearly erroneous"); 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures § 2590 (2d ed. 1995). Traditionally, our legal sys- tem has entrusted negligence questions to jurors, inviting them to apply community standards. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 37, pp. 235­237 (5th ed. 1984). For that reason, "[t]he question usually is said to be one of fact," although "it should be apparent that the function of the jury in fixing the standard differs from that of the judge only in that it cannot be reduced to anything approaching a definite rule." Id., at 237. Judges alone make "in custody" assessments for Miranda purposes, and they do so with a view to identifying recurrent patterns, and advancing uniform outcomes. If they cannot supply "a definite rule," they nonethe- less can reduce the area of uncertainty. See, e. g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U. S. 292, 296 (1990) (Miranda warnings not required prior to questioning of incarcerated individual by undercover agent because suspect, unaware 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 114 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Opinion of the Court See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 442 (1984) (court must assess "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation"); cf. Miller, 474 U. S., at 116­117 ("[A]ssessments of credibility and demeanor are not crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of `voluntariness.' "). Unlike the voir dire of a juror, Patton, 467 U. S., at 1038, or the determination of a defendant's competency, Maggio, 462 U. S., at 117, which "take[s] place in open court on a full record," Miller, 474 U. S., at 117, the trial court does not have a first-person vantage on whether a defendant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See 474 U. S., at 117 (police interrogations yielding confessions ordinarily occur, not in court, but in an "inherently more coercive environment"). Furthermore, in fathoming the state of mind of a potential juror or a defendant in order to answer the questions, "Is she free of bias?," "Is he competent to stand trial?," the trial court makes an individual-specific decision, one unlikely to have precedential value.14 In contrast, "in custody" deter- minations do guide future decisions.15 We thus conclude of police presence, is not coerced); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 436­439 (1984) (nature of suspected offense is irrelevant to duty to admin- ister Miranda warnings); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495­496 (1977) (per curiam) (fact that interrogation occurs at police station does not, in itself, require Miranda warnings). 14 In other contexts, we have similarly concluded that the likely absence of precedential value cuts against requiring plenary appellate review of a district court's determination. For example, in Cooter & Gell v. Hart- marx Corp., a decision confirming that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 11, we observed that plenary review would likely " `fail to produce the normal law-clarifying benefits that come from an appellate decision on a question of law . . . .' " 496 U. S., at 404 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 561 (1988)). 15 See, e. g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 322­324 (1994) (per curiam) (review of precedent demonstrated a "well settled" principle: officer's undisclosed, subjective belief that person questioned is a suspect is irrelevant to objective "in custody" determination); Pennsylvania 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 115 Opinion of the Court that once the historical facts are resolved, the state court is not "in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to make [the ultimate] determination" of the consis- tency of the law enforcement officer's conduct with the fed- eral Miranda warning requirement. See 474 U. S., at 117. Notably, we have treated the "in custody" question as one of law when States complained that their courts had errone- ously expanded the meaning of "custodial interrogation." See Beheler, 463 U. S., at 1121­1125 (summarily reversing California Court of Appeal's judgment that respondent was "in custody"); Mathiason, 429 U. S., at 494­496 (summarily reversing Oregon Supreme Court's determination that re- spondent was "in custody"); cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] State may not impose . . . greater restrictions [on police activity] as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them."). It would be anomalous to type the question differently when an individual complains that the state courts had errone- ously constricted the circumstances that add up to an "in custody" conclusion. Classifying "in custody" as a determination qualifying for independent review should serve legitimate law enforcement interests as effectively as it serves to ensure protection of the right against self-incrimination. As our decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of independent review poten- tially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law. See, e. g., Berkemer, 468 U. S., at 436­439 (routine traf- fic stop-typically temporary, brief, and public-does not place driver "in custody" for Miranda warning purposes); see also Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 273­276 (1985) ("norm elaboration occurs best when the Court has power to consider fully a series of closely v. Bruder, 488 U. S. 9, 11 (1988) (per curiam) (summary reversal appro- priate because state-court decision was contrary to rule of Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (1984), that ordinary traffic stops do not involve "custody" for purposes of Miranda). 516us1$$8P 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 116 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Thomas, J., dissenting related situations"; case-by-case elaboration when a constitu- tional right is implicated may more accurately be described as law declaration than as law application). * * * Applying § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to the Alaska court's "in custody" determination, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Thompson was not "in custody" and thus not entitled to Miranda warnings. Because we conclude that state-court "in custody" determi- nations warrant independent review by a federal habeas court, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting. Carl Thompson murdered his ex-wife, stabbing her 29 times. He then wrapped her body in chains and a bedspread and tossed the corpse into a water-filled gravel pit. As part of their investigation, police officers in Fairbanks, Alaska, questioned Thompson about his role in the murder, and Thompson confessed. Thompson was repeatedly told that he could leave the interview and was, in fact, permitted to leave at the close of questioning. I believe that the Alaska trial judge-who first decided this question almost a decade ago-was in a far better position than a federal habeas court to determine whether Thompson was "in custody" for pur- poses of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). So long as that judgment finds fair support in the record, I would presume that it is correct. I dissent. To determine whether a person is "in custody" under Miranda, "a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but `the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a "formal arrest or restraint on 516us1$$8N 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 117 Thomas, J., dissenting freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' " Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 322 (1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam), quoting in turn Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). " `[T]he only relevant in- quiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.' " 511 U. S., at 324 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 442 (1984)). I agree with the majority that a legal standard must be applied by a state trial judge in making the Miranda custody inquiry. In light of our more recent decisions applying § 2254(d), however, I do not agree that the standards articu- lated in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 5 (1992), for distinguishing factual issues from mixed questions of law and fact, dictate a result either way in this case. See, e. g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 429 (1985) (juror bias de- termination is a question of fact, even though "[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"); Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025, 1037, n. 12 (1984) (juror bias is a question of fact although "[t]here are, of course, factual and legal questions to be con- sidered in deciding whether a juror is qualified"). Because the Miranda custody issue "falls somewhere between a pris- tine legal standard and a simple historical fact," we must decide, "as a matter of the sound administration of justice, [which] judicial actor is better positioned . . . to decide the issue in question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114 (1985). The state trial judge is, in my estimation, the best- positioned judicial actor to decide the relatively straightfor- ward and fact-laden question of Miranda custody. See Cali- fornia v. Beheler, supra, at 1128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (state "courts are far better equipped than we are to assess the police practices that are highly relevant to the determi- nation whether particular circumstances amount to custodial 516us1$$8N 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 118 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Thomas, J., dissenting interrogation"). In making the custody determination, the state trial judge must consider a complex of diverse and case-specific factors in an effort to gain an overall sense of the defendant's situation at the time of the interrogation. These factors include, at a minimum, the location, timing, and length of the interview, the nature and tone of the question- ing, whether the defendant came to the place of questioning voluntarily, the use of physical contact or physical restraint, and the demeanor of all of the key players, both during the interview and in any proceedings held in court. In assess- ing all of these facts, the state trial judge will often take live testimony, consider documentary evidence, and listen to audiotapes or watch videotapes of the interrogation. Assess- ments of credibility and demeanor are crucial to the ultimate determination, for the trial judge will often have to weigh conflicting accounts of what transpired. The trial judge is also likely to draw inferences, which are similarly entitled to deference, from "physical or documentary evidence or . . . other facts." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574 (1985). The Miranda custody inquiry is thus often a matter of "shades and degrees," Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 712 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that requires the state trial judge to make any number of " `fact-intensive, close calls.' " Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 404 (1990) (citation omitted). The majority is quite right that the test contains an objec- tive component-how a "reasonable man in the suspect's po- sition would have understood his situation," Stansbury v. California, supra, at 324-but this alone cannot be disposi- tive of whether the determination should be reviewed defer- entially. See, e. g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., supra, at 402 (Rule 11 and negligence determinations, both of which involve objective tests, are subject to deferential review). "[T]he line between pure facts . . . and . . . the application to them of a legal standard that is as non-technical-as com- monsensical-as reasonableness is a faint one." United 516us1$$8N 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 119 Thomas, J., dissenting States v. Humphrey, 34 F. 3d 551, 559 (CA7 1994) (Posner, C. J., concurring). It distorts reality to say that all of the subtle, factbound assessments that go into determining what it was like to be in the suspect's shoes simply go out the window when it comes time for the "ultimate inquiry," ante, at 112, of how a reasonable person would have assessed the situation. "The state trial court [is] in the unique position, after observing [the defendant] and listening to the evidence presented at trial, to determine whether a reasonable person in [defendant's] position would have felt free to leave the po- lice station." Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F. 2d 1413, 1419 (CA11 1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 940 (1992). It is only in light of these case-specific determinations that the reasonable person test can be meaningfully applied. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., supra, at 402 ("Familiar with the issues and litigants, the [trial] court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact- dependent legal standard"). For these reasons, I have no doubt that the state trier of fact is best situated to put himself in the suspect's shoes, and consequently is in a better position to determine what it would have been like for a reasonable man to be in the sus- pect's shoes. Federal habeas courts, often reviewing the cold record as much as a decade after the initial determina- tion, are in an inferior position to make this assessment. Though some of the state court's factual determinations may, perhaps, be reflected on the record, many of the case-specific assessments that underlie the state trial judge's ultimate de- termination are subtle, difficult to reduce to writing, and un- likely to be preserved in any meaningful way for review on appeal. "State courts are fully qualified to identify constitu- tional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 636 (1993). "Absent indication to the contrary, state courts should be presumed to have ap- plied federal law as faithfully as federal courts." Withrow v. Williams, supra, at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 516us1$$8N 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT 120 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE Thomas, J., dissenting dissenting in part). We insult our colleagues in the States when we imply, as we do today, that state judges are not sufficiently competent and reliable to make a decision as straightforward as whether a person was in custody for pur- poses of Miranda. See 507 U. S., at 714 (O'Connor, J., con- curring in part and dissenting in part) ("We can depend on law enforcement officials to administer [Miranda] warnings in the first instance and the state courts to provide a remedy when law enforcement officers err").1 I also see no reason to remand this case to the Ninth Cir- cuit for further analysis. There is no dispute that Thompson came to the police station voluntarily. There is no dispute that he was repeatedly told he could leave the police station at any time. And it is also clear that he left the police sta- tion freely at the end of the interrogation. In California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam), we held that a person is not in custody if "the suspect is not placed under arrest, voluntarily comes to the police station, and is allowed to leave unhindered by police after a brief interview." Ibid. And in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per cu- riam), we found it "clear" that the defendant was not in Miranda custody where he "came voluntarily to the police 1 The majority believes that federal oversight of state-court custody judgments is necessary to "advanc[e] uniform outcomes," and when that cannot be achieved, to "reduce the area of uncertainty." Ante, at 113, n. 13. While uniformity of outcome is a virtue worth pursuing generally, we determined in a line of cases beginning with Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), that on habeas, uniformity must give way to concerns of comity and finality. See id., at 310 ("The `costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus . . . generally far outweigh the benefits of this application' ") (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)). Federal habeas review is not the time for fine-tuning con- stitutional rules of criminal procedure at the expense of valid state convic- tions based on reasonable applications of then-existing law. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 414 (1990) ("The `new rule' principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts"). 516us1$$8N 10-22-98 11:00:09 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995) 121 Thomas, J., dissenting station, . . . was immediately informed that he was not under arrest," and "[a]t the close of a 1 2-hour interview . . . did in fact leave the police station without hindrance." Id., at 495; see also ibid. ("Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect"). Because Thompson cannot establish a Miranda violation even under de novo review, I would resolve that question now, and avoid putting the State of Alaska to the uncertainty and expense of defending for the sixth time in nine years an eminently reasonable judgment secured against a confessed murderer.2 I respectfully dissent. 2 To the extent Thompson's claim has any merit at all, it seems certain that relief is barred by our decision in Teague v. Lane, supra, at 301, 310 (plurality opinion), and its progeny. "The interests in finality, predictabil- ity, and comity underlying our new rule jurisprudence may be undermined to an equal degree by the invocation of a rule that was not dictated by precedent as by the application of an old rule in a manner that was not dictated by precedent." Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228 (1992). In this case, it is clear that "granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby ex- tending the precedent." Ibid. In light of Beheler and Mathiason, the State's judgment was, at the very least, reasonable. And "Teague insu- lates on habeas review the state courts' ` "reasonable, good-faith interpre- tations of existing precedents." ' " Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 292, n. 8 (1992) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234 (1990), quoting in turn Butler v. McKellar, supra, at 414). 516us1$$9z 09-04-97 18:43:57 PAGES OPINPGT 122 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Decree LOUISIANA v. MISSISSIPPI et al. on bill of complaint No. 121, Orig. Decided October 31, 1995-Decree entered December 4, 1995 Decree entered. Opinion reported: Ante, p. 22. DECREE This cause having come on to be heard on the Report of the Special Master heretofore appointed by the Court, and the exceptions filed thereto, and having been argued by counsel for the several parties, and this Court having stated its conclusions in its opinion announced on October 31, 1995, ante, p. 22, and having considered the positions of the respective parties as to the terms of the decree, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 1. The boundary between the State of Louisiana and the State of Mississippi along the Mississippi River between North Latitude 32° 49* 259 and North Latitude 32° 44* lies along the line described as follows: Beginning at Pt. 1 at North Latitude 32° 49* 259 and West Longitude 91° 09* 279; thence to Pt. 2, Latitude 32° 49* and Longitude 91° 09* 349; thence to Pt. 3, Latitude 32° 49* 479 and Longitude 91° 09* 379; thence to Pt. 4, Latitude 32° 48* 309 and Longitude 91° 09* 399; thence to Pt. 5, Latitude 32° 48* and Longitude 91° 09* 479; thence to Pt. 6, Latitude 32° 47* 189 and Longitude 91° 09* 519; thence to Pt. 7, Latitude 32° 47* 69 and Longi- tude 91° 09* 549; thence to Pt. 8, Latitude 32° 47* and Longitude 91° 09* 599; thence to Pt. 9, Latitude 32° 46* 509 and Longitude 91° 10* 79; thence to Pt. 10, Latitude 32° 46* 359 and Longitude 91° 10* 149; thence to Pt. 11, Latitude 32° 46* 209 and Longitude 91° 10* 169; thence 516us1$$9z 09-04-97 18:43:57 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 122 (1995) 123 Decree to Pt. 12, Latitude 32° 46* and Longitude 91° 10* 189; thence to Pt. 13, Latitude 32° 45* 459 and Longitude 91° 10* 209; thence to Pt. 14, Latitude 32° 45* 309 and Longi- tude 91° 10* 189; thence to Pt. 15, Latitude 32° 45* 159 and Longitude 91° 10* 129; thence to Pt. 16, Latitude 32° 45* and Longitude 91° 10* 019; thence to Pt. 17, Latitude 32° 44* 459 and Longitude 91° 09* 499; thence to Pt. 18, Latitude 32° 44* 309 and Longitude 91° 09* 389; thence to Pt. 19, Latitude 32° 44* 239 and Longitude 91° 09* 309; thence to Pt. 20, Latitude 32° 44* 159 and Longitude 91° 09* 189; thence to Pt. 21, Latitude 32° 44* 079 and Lon- gitude 91° 09*; thence to Pt. 22, Latitude 32° 44* and Longitude 91° 08* 449. 2. The State of Louisiana's prayer that the claim of title by defendants Julia Donelson Houston, et al., in and to the lands and water bottoms lying between the Mississippi River on the east and the Louisiana-Mississippi boundary line as fixed in the preceding paragraph on the west be canceled and forever held for naught is DENIED. 3. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders and issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to this decree or to effectuate the rights of the parties in the premises. 516us1$10z 10-22-98 11:02:54 PAGES OPINPGT 124 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 94­1530. Argued October 2, 1995-Decided December 5, 1995 Respondent commenced this action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc., under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's per- formance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bank- ruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, petitioner here, removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1452(a), and the general federal removal statute, § 1441(a). The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper, and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and, in effect, remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely under §§ 1441(a) and 1452(a) and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked juris- diction. The Sixth Circuit dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b) barred appellate review of the District Court's remand order. Held: If an order remands a removed bankruptcy case to state court be- cause of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the order under § 1447(d). That section, a provision of the general removal statute, bars appellate review of any "order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed." Under Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 345­346, § 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on the grounds recognized by § 1447(c), i. e., a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, are immune from review under § 1447(d). Section 1447(d) bars review here, since the District Court's order remanded the case to "the State court from which it was re- moved," and untimely removal is precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c). The same conclusion pertains regardless of whether the case was removed under § 1441(a) or § 1452(a). Section 1447(d) applies "not only to remand[s] . . . under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes." United States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 752 (emphasis added). Moreover, there is no indication that Congress intended § 1452 to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remands in bank- ruptcy or to exclude bankruptcy cases from § 1447(d)'s coverage. Al- 516us1$10z 10-22-98 11:02:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995) 125 Opinion of the Court though § 1452(b) expressly precludes review of certain remand decisions in bankruptcy cases, there is no reason §§ 1447(d) and 1452 cannot com- fortably coexist in the bankruptcy context. The court must, therefore, give effect to both. Pp. 127­129. 65 F. 3d 169, affirmed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 129. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 131. Steven D. Cundra argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Patricia L. Taylor, Dean D. Gamin, and Mark A. Gamin. John C. Weisensell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Andrew R. Duff and Jack Morrison, Jr.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide in this case whether a federal court of appeals may review a district court order remanding a bankruptcy case to state court on grounds of untimely removal. I Respondent commenced this action in March 1992 by filing a four-count complaint against Child World, Inc., and Cole National Corporation in the Court of Common Pleas in Sum- mit County, Ohio. The state action charged Child World with failure to pay rent under two commercial leases. The complaint also sought to enforce Cole's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. Petitioner is Cole's successor in interest. On May 6, 1992, Child World filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis- *G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., filed a brief for the Connecticut Bar Association, Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 516us1$10n 10-22-98 11:02:54 PAGES OPINPGT 126 THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA Opinion of the Court trict of New York. On September 25, 1992, petitioner filed notices of removal in both the United States District and Bankruptcy Courts for the Northern District of Ohio. Peti- tioner based its removal on the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1452(a),1 as well as the general federal removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). Petitioner also filed a motion in the District Court to transfer venue to the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York, so that respond- ent's guaranty claims could be resolved in the same forum as the underlying lease claims against Child World. Respond- ent countered by filing motions to remand in the District Court on October 23, 1992, and in the Bankruptcy Court on November 25, 1992. The District Court consolidated all proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court on March 25, 1993. The Bankruptcy Court held that petitioner's removal was untimely under 28 U. S. C. § 1452(a) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9027 but that the action had been timely removed under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441 and 1446. The court concluded that removal was proper and that it had jurisdiction over the removed case. The court then granted petitioner's motion to transfer venue to the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York. Respondent appealed to the District Court in the North- ern District of Ohio. The District Court found removal under both §§ 1441(a) and 1452(a) to be untimely and held that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. 1 Section 1452 provides: "(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action . . . to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title. "(b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals . . . or by the Supreme Court . . . ." 516us1$10n 10-22-98 11:02:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995) 127 Opinion of the Court The District Court reversed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court and remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the District Court's opinion.2 Petitioner appealed the District Court's order to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In an unpublished disposi- tion, the Sixth Circuit held that §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b) barred appellate review of the District Court's remand order. The Court of Appeals then dismissed the appeal for lack of juris- diction. Judgt. order reported at 65 F. 3d 169 (1994). We granted certiorari, 514 U. S. 1095 (1995), and now affirm. II Congress has placed broad restrictions on the power of federal appellate courts to review district court orders re- manding removed cases to state court. The general statu- tory provision governing the reviewability of remand orders is 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d). That section provides: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise." As we explained in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermans- dorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), § 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d). Id., at 345­346. As long as a district court's re- mand is based on a timely raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction-the grounds for re- mand recognized by § 1447(c)-a court of appeals lacks juris- 2 The District Court's order left the Bankruptcy Court with no option but to remand the case to state court. The parties and the Court of Ap- peals for the Sixth Circuit are in agreement that the District Court's order in this case was equivalent to a remand to state court. 516us1$10n 10-22-98 11:02:54 PAGES OPINPGT 128 THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA Opinion of the Court diction to entertain an appeal of the remand order under § 1447(d). Section 1447(d) bars appellate review of the remand order in this case. As noted, § 1447(d) precludes appellate review of any order "remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed." The parties do not dispute that the Dis- trict Court's order remanded this case to the Ohio state court from which it came. There is also no dispute that the District Court remanded this case on grounds of untimely removal, precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c).3 Section 1447(d) thus compels the conclusion that the District Court's order is "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." See Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U. S. 723 (1977) (per curiam). We reach the same conclusion regardless of whether re- moval was effected pursuant to § 1441(a) or § 1452(a). Sec- tion 1447(d) applies "not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes, as well." United States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 752 (1946) (emphasis added).4 Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, we assume that Congress is "aware of the universality of th[e] practice" of denying appellate review of remand orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal. Ibid. 3 Section 1447(c) requires that a motion to remand for a defect in re- moval procedure be filed within 30 days of removal. Petitioner removed this case to federal court on September 25, 1992. Respondent filed mo- tions to remand in the District Court on October 23, 1992, and in the Bankruptcy Court on November 25, 1992. Respondent's motion to re- mand filed in the District Court was sufficient to bring this case within the coverage of § 1447(c). 4 Rice interpreted the predecessor statute to § 1447(d). The current version of § 1447(d) is a recodification of the provision reviewed in Rice and is "intended to restate the prior law with respect to remand orders and their reviewability." Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 349­350 (1976). 516us1$10n 10-22-98 11:02:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995) 129 Kennedy, J., concurring There is no express indication in § 1452 that Congress in- tended that statute to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy. Nor is there any rea- son to infer from § 1447(d) that Congress intended to exclude bankruptcy cases from its coverage. The fact that § 1452 contains its own provision governing certain types of re- mands in bankruptcy, see § 1452(b) (authorizing remand on "any equitable ground" and precluding appellate review of any decision to remand or not to remand on this basis), does not change our conclusion. There is no reason §§ 1447(d) and 1452 cannot comfortably coexist in the bankruptcy context. We must, therefore, give effect to both. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). If an order remands a bankruptcy case to state court be- cause of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, then a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review that order under § 1447(d), regardless of whether the case was removed under § 1441(a) or § 1452(a). The remand at issue falls squarely within § 1447(d), and the order is not reviewable on appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring. I join the Court's opinion but write to point out that Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), has itself been limited by our later decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343 (1988). As I understand the opinion we issue today, our reliance on Thermtron to hold that 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) prohibits appel- late review of this remand pursuant to § 1447(c) (whether or not removal was effected pursuant to § 1441(a) or § 1452(a)) is not intended to bear upon the reviewability of Cohill orders. 516us1$10l 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT 130 THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA Kennedy, J., concurring In Thermtron, we held that a District Court had exceeded its authority when it remanded a case on grounds not permit- ted by § 1447(c). 423 U. S., at 345. We further held that the prohibition of appellate review in § 1447(d) does not bar re- view of orders outside the authority of subsection (c), reason- ing that subsections (c) and (d) were to be given a parallel construction. Id., at 345­350. We observed that a remand order other than the orders specified in subsection (c) had "no warrant in the law" and could be reviewed by mandamus. Id., at 353. In Cohill, supra, we qualified the first holding of Therm- tron. We held that, notwithstanding lack of express statu- tory authorization, a district court may remand to state court a case in which the sole federal claim had been elimi- nated and only pendent state-law claims remained. We did not find it necessary to decide whether subsection (d) would bar review of a remand on these grounds, for we affirmed the denial of mandamus by the Court of Appeals. 484 U. S., at 357. Despite the broad sweep of § 1447(d), which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise," various Courts of Appeals have relied on Thermtron to hold that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of § 1447(c) remands but not remands ordered under Cohill. See, e. g., Bogle v. Phil- lips Petroleum Co., 24 F. 3d 758, 761 (CA5 1994); In re Prai- rie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F. 3d 302, 304 (CA8 1994) (per curiam); Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co., 4 F. 3d 319, 322­ 323 (CA4 1993) (dicta); In re Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plas- tics & Allied Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 173, 983 F. 2d 725, 727 (CA6 1993); Rothner v. Chicago, 879 F. 2d 1402, 1406 (CA7 1989); cf. In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F. 2d 706, 708 (CA7 1992) ("Thermtron holds that § 1447(d) does not mean what it says . . ."). The issues raised by those decisions are not before us. 516us1$10p 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995) 131 Ginsburg, J., concurring Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring. Congress, as I read its measures, twice made the remand order here at issue "not reviewable by appeal." Congress did so first in the prescription generally governing orders "remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed," 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d); Congress did so again in § 1452(b) when it authorized the remand of claims related to bankruptcy cases "on any equitable ground." Section 1452(b) is most sensibly read largely to supple- ment, and generally not to displace, the rules governing cases removed from state courts set out in 28 U. S. C. § 1447. Section 1447(d) encompassingly prescribes that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was re- moved is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, [excepting only orders remanding civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1443]." The Court persuasively explains why § 1452 does not negate the application of § 1447(d) to bank- ruptcy cases. Accordingly, the Court holds § 1447(d) dis- positive, and I agree with that conclusion. But I am also convinced that § 1452(b) independently warrants the judg- ment that remand orders in bankruptcy cases are not re- viewable. I write separately to state my reasons for that conviction. Section 1452(b) broadly provides for district court remand of claims related to bankruptcy cases "on any equitable ground," and declares that the remanding order is "not reviewable by appeal or otherwise." 1 Congress, when it 1 This case concerns, and I address in this opinion, only orders remand- ing claims "related to" bankruptcy cases. Section 1452(b) also encom- passes decisions "to not remand" claims related to bankruptcy cases. The § 1452(b) coverage of decisions "to not remand" resembles a prescrip- tion in 28 U. S. C. § 1334, the root jurisdictional provision governing "Bankruptcy cases and proceedings." Section 1334(c)(2) renders unre- viewable district court decisions "to abstain or not to abstain" from adjudi- 516us1$10p 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT 132 THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA Ginsburg, J., concurring added § 1452 to the Judicial Code chapter on removal of cases from state courts-a chapter now comprising 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441­1452-meant to enlarge, not to rein in, federal trial court removal/remand authority for claims related to bank- ruptcy cases. The drafters, it bears emphasis, expressly contemplated that remand orders for claims related to bank- ruptcy cases "would not be appealable"; in particular, they reported that bankruptcy forum remands would be unre- viewable "in the same manner that an order of the United States district court remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." H. R. Rep. No. 95­595, p. 51 (1977) (emphasis added).2 The lawmakers chose the capacious words "any equitable ground" with no hint whatever that they meant by their word choice to recall premerger distinctions between law cating state-law claims merely "related to" a bankruptcy case, i. e., claims that do not independently qualify for federal-court jurisdiction. Of course, every federal court, whether trial or appellate, is obliged to notice want of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion. See, e. g., Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884). An interlocutory decision "to not remand," therefore, although not per se re- viewable, would leave open for eventual appellate consideration-also and earlier for district court reconsideration-any question of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e. g., Sykes v. Texas Air Corp., 834 F. 2d 488, 492, n. 16 (CA5 1987) ("When the district court decides to retain a case in the face of arguments that it lacks jurisdiction, the decision itself is technically unreviewable; but of course the appellate court reviewing any other aspect of the case must remand for dismissal if the refusal to remand was wrong, i. e., if there is no federal jurisdiction over the case.") (emphasis in original). 2 After the Court held inconsonant with Article III the Bankruptcy Act's broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 87 (1982), Congress transferred supervisory jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases to Article III courts and retained for the district courts the broad removal/remand au- thority the Act initially gave to bankruptcy courts. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98­353, 98 Stat. 333. 516us1$10p 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995) 133 Ginsburg, J., concurring and equity, and thereby to render reviewable bankruptcy case remand orders based on "law." In legal systems that never separated pleadings and procedure along law/equity lines, and not infrequently in our own long-merged system, "equitable" signals that which is reasonable, fair, or appro- priate. Dictionary definitions of "equitable" notably include among appropriate meanings: "just and impartial," American Heritage Dictionary 622 (3d ed. 1992); also "dealing fairly and equally with all concerned," Webster's Ninth New Colle- giate Dictionary 421 (1983). As Circuit Judge Easterbrook observed: "[T]he distinction between law and equity was abolished long ago in federal cases. Nothing in the history of the bankruptcy code suggests that Congress wanted to re- suscitate it. Courts must separate `legal' from `equita- ble' grounds in 1789 on command of the seventh amend- ment. This task has little but the sanction of history to recommend it and is possible only because law versus equity was an intelligible line in the eighteenth century. In 1978, when Congress enacted the predecessor to § 1452, there was no law-equity distinction. `Equitable' in § 1452(b) makes more sense if it means `appropriate.' " Hernandez v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942 F. 2d 1223, 1226 (CA7 1991). Cf., e. g., Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F. 3d 1512, 1521 (CA Fed. 1995) ("The term `equitable' can have many meanings. . . . [I]n doctrine of equivalents cases, this court's allusions to equity invoke equity in its broadest sense-equity as general fairness."); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S. A., 46 F. 3d 1185, 1189, 1190 (CADC 1995) (rejecting the argument that Congress used the expression "legal right, title, or interest" in 18 U. S. C. § 1963(l)(6)(A) "to draw the ancient, but largely ig- nored, distinction between technically legal and techni- 516us1$10p 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT 134 THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA Ginsburg, J., concurring cally equitable claims in forfeiture challenges") (emphasis in original). It seems to me entirely appropriate-and, in that sense, equitable-to remand a case for failure promptly to remove. Indeed, counsel for petitioner recognized the potential for manipulation inherent in his proffered distinction between statutory time limits ("legal" limits) on the one hand and, on the other, court-made determinations that a procedural move is untimely because pursued without due expedition ("equi- table" assessments). At oral argument, the following ex- change occurred: "QUESTION: Suppose the judge in this case said, I'm not 100 percent sure about strict time limit, but I think you should have come here sooner, so for equitable rea- sons I'm remanding this because I think you dawdled- an equitable notion like laches . . .-that would not be reviewable, right? "MR. CUNDRA: That is correct. "QUESTION: So it's the judge's label, what he wants to put on it. He can make it immune from review if he says, laches. "MR. CUNDRA: Yes. "QUESTION: But it's reviewable if he says, time bar under the statute. "MR. CUNDRA: Yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 15­16. As Circuit Judge Gee remarked in relation to this very issue, it "make[s] little sense" to rest reviewability vel non on the tag the trial court elects to place on its ruling. Sykes v. Texas Air Corp., 834 F. 2d 488, 492 (CA5 1987). Interpreting § 1452(b) as fully in sync with § 1447(d) on the nonreviewability of remand orders, we stress, secures the uniform treatment of all remands, regardless of the party initiating the removal or the court from which the case is removed. Cf. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F. 2d 984, 991­992 516us1$10p 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995) 135 Ginsburg, J., concurring (CA3 1984) (refusing to apply § 1447(d) in bankruptcy cases because, inter alia, removals under §§ 1441­1447 may be ini- tiated only by defendants and are from state courts only, while § 1452 authorizes removals by "a party" and applies to cases originally filed in federal as well as state tribunals). A restrictive definition of what is "equitable" could invite wasteful controversy over the reviewability of bankruptcy case remand orders that are not reached by § 1447 and rest on grounds a common-law pleader might type "legal." It would show little respect for the legislature were courts to suppose that the lawmakers meant to enact an irrational scheme. Cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86, 94­95 (1993) (Court's ex- amination of statutory language is "guided not by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[s] to the provi- sions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. De- deaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987)); Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993) (It is a "fundamental principle of statu- tory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used."). Moreover, even if jurisdictional and procedural defects were excluded from the "equitable ground" category, that would not force a construction of § 1452(b) calling for differ- ent results depending on the party initiating the removal or the court from which a claim is removed. The phrase "any equitable ground" in § 1452(b) sensibly can be read to relate not to the basis for the district court's refusal to entertain a case (as my discussion up to now has assumed), but rather to the basis for remanding. Ordinarily, a district court un- able to hear a claim, because of lack of jurisdiction or some other legal hindrance, has no choice but to dismiss. Section 1452(b), under the construction advanced in this paragraph, provides an alternative to dismissal (as well as an alternative 516us1$10p 10-22-98 11:02:55 PAGES OPINPGT 136 THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA Ginsburg, J., concurring to proceeding with the case though all the legal requirements are met), by authorizing remands as fairness warrants, i. e., when a remand would be "equitable." In sum, a "strong congressional policy against review of remand orders," Sykes, 834 F. 2d, at 490, underlies §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b). Courts serve the legislature's purpose best by reading § 1452(b) to make sense and avoid nonsense, and to fit harmoniously within a set of provisions composing a coherent chapter of the Judicial Procedure part of the United States Code. Cf. United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) (statutory term "that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme," for example, when "only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law") (citations omitted). Thus the Sixth Circuit, I conclude, correctly ruled that neither § 1452(b) nor § 1447(d) permits the assertion of appellate jurisdiction in this case. 516us1$11Z 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 137 Syllabus BAILEY v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 94­7448. Argued October 30, 1995-Decided December 6, 1995* Petitioners Bailey and Robinson were each convicted of federal drug of- fenses and of violating 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a prison term upon a person who "during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm." Bailey's § 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol that the police found inside a bag in his locked car trunk after they arrested him for posses- sion of cocaine revealed by a search of the car's passenger compartment. The unloaded, holstered firearm that provided the basis for Robinson's § 924(c)(1) conviction was found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet after she was arrested for a number of drug-related offenses. There was no evidence in either case that the defendant actively employed the firearm in any way. In consolidating the cases and affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals sitting en banc applied an "accessibil- ity and proximity" test to determine "use" within § 924(c)(1)'s meaning, holding, in both cases, that the gun was sufficiently accessible and proxi- mate to the drugs or drug proceeds that the jury could properly infer that the defendant had placed the gun in order to further the drug offenses or to protect the possession of the drugs. Held:1. Section 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active em- ployment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. Evidence of the proximity and accessibility of the firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is not alone sufficient to support a conviction for "use" under the statute. Pp. 142­151. (a) Although the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "use" must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who com- mits a drug offense, the court's accessibility and proximity standard ren- ders "use" virtually synonymous with "possession" and makes any role for the statutory word "carries" superfluous. Section 924(c)(1)'s lan- guage instead indicates that Congress intended "use" in the active sense of "to avail oneself of." Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 228­229. This reading receives further support from § 924(c)(1)'s context within *Together with No. 94­7492, Robinson v. United States, also on certio- rari to the same court. 516us1$11Z 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 138 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the statutory scheme, and neither the section's amendment history nor Smith, supra, at 236, is to the contrary. Thus, to sustain a conviction under the "use" prong of § 924(c)(1), the Government must show that the defendant actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime. Under this reading, "use" includes the acts of brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and firing or attempt- ing to fire a firearm, as well as the making of a reference to a firearm in a defendant's possession. It does not include mere placement of a firearm for protection at or near the site of a drug crime or its proceeds or paraphernalia, nor the nearby concealment of a gun to be at the ready for an imminent confrontation. Pp. 142­150. (b) The evidence was insufficient to support either Bailey's or Robinson's § 924(c)(1) conviction for "use" under the active-employment reading of that word. Pp. 150­151. 2. However, because the Court of Appeals did not consider liability under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1) as a basis for upholding these convictions, the cases must be remanded. P. 151. 36 F. 3d 106, reversed and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alan E. Untereiner argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were David B. Smith and Roy T. Englert, Jr. Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, James A. Feldman, and John F. De Pue. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated petitions each challenge a conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). In relevant part, that section imposes a 5-year minimum term of imprisonment upon a per- son who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm." We are asked to decide whether evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is alone Edward H. Sisson and Daniel A. Rezneck filed a brief for James Doe as amicus curiae urging reversal. 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 139 Opinion of the Court sufficient to support a conviction for "use" of a firearm dur- ing and in relation to a drug trafficking offense under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). I In May 1989, petitioner Roland Bailey was stopped by police officers after they noticed that his car lacked a front license plate and an inspection sticker. When Bailey failed to produce a driver's license, the officers ordered him out of the car. As he stepped out, the officers saw Bailey push something between the seat and the front console. A search of the passenger compartment revealed one round of ammu- nition and 27 plastic bags containing a total of 30 grams of cocaine. After arresting Bailey, the officers searched the trunk of his car where they found, among a number of items, a large amount of cash and a bag containing a loaded 9-mm. pistol. Bailey was charged on several counts, including using and carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). A prosecution expert testified at trial that drug dealers fre- quently carry a firearm to protect their drugs and money as well as themselves. Bailey was convicted by the jury on all charges, and his sentence included a consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment on the § 924(c)(1) conviction. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected Bailey's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under § 924(c)(1). United States v. Bailey, 995 F. 2d 1113 (CADC 1993). The court held that Bailey could be convicted for "using" a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime if the jury could rea- sonably infer that the gun facilitated Bailey's commission of a drug offense. Id., at 1119. In Bailey's case, the court ex- plained, the trier of fact could reasonably infer that Bailey had used the gun in the trunk to protect his drugs and drug proceeds and to facilitate sales. Judge Douglas H. Gins- burg, dissenting in part, argued that prior Circuit precedent required reversal of Bailey's conviction. 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 140 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court In June 1991, an undercover officer made a controlled buy of crack cocaine from petitioner Candisha Robinson. The officer observed Robinson retrieve the drugs from the bedroom of her one-bedroom apartment. After a second controlled buy, the police executed a search warrant of the apartment. Inside a locked trunk in the bedroom closet, the police found, among other things, an unloaded, holstered .22-caliber Derringer, papers and a tax return belonging to Robinson, 10.88 grams of crack cocaine, and a marked $20 bill from the first controlled buy. Robinson was indicted on a number of counts, including using or carrying a firearm in violation of § 924(c)(1). A prosecution expert testified that the Derringer was a "sec- ond gun," i. e., a type of gun a drug dealer might hide on his or her person for use until reaching a "real gun." The ex- pert also testified that drug dealers generally use guns to protect themselves from other dealers, the police, and their own employees. Robinson was convicted on all counts, in- cluding the § 924(c)(1) count, for which she received a 60- month term of imprisonment. The District Court denied Robinson's motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to the "using or carrying" conviction and ruled that the evi- dence was sufficient to establish a violation of § 924(c)(1). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Robin- son's conviction on the § 924(c)(1) count. United States v. Robinson, 997 F. 2d 884 (CADC 1993). The court deter- mined, "[g]iven the way section 924(c)(1) is drafted, even if an individual intends to use a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, the conduct of that individual is not reached by the statute unless the individual actually uses the firearm for that purpose." Id., at 887. The court held that Robinson's possession of an unloaded .22-caliber Derringer in a locked trunk in a bedroom closet fell significantly short of the type of evidence the court had previously held neces- sary to establish actual use under § 924(c)(1). The mere proximity of the gun to the drugs was held insufficient to 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 141 Opinion of the Court support the conviction. Judge Henderson dissented, ar- guing, among other things, that the firearm facilitated Rob- inson's distribution of drugs because it protected Robinson and the drugs during sales. In order to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in its deci- sions applying § 924(c)(1), the Court of Appeals for the Dis- trict of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases and re- heard them en banc. In a divided opinion, a majority of the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that each defendant had used a firearm in relation to a drug traf- ficking offense and affirmed the § 924(c)(1) conviction in each case. 36 F. 3d 106 (CADC 1994) (en banc). The majority rejected a multifactor weighing approach to determine sufficiency of the evidence to support a § 924(c)(1) conviction. The District of Columbia Circuit had previously applied a nonexclusive set of factors, including: accessibility of the gun, its proximity to drugs, whether or not it was loaded, what type of weapon was involved, and whether ex- pert testimony supported the Government's theory of "use." The majority explained that this approach invited the re- viewing court to reweigh the evidence and make its own finding with respect to an ultimate fact, a function properly left to the jury; had produced widely divergent and contra- dictory results; and was out of step with the broader defini- tion of "use" employed by other Circuits. The court replaced the multifactor test with an "accessibil- ity and proximity" test. "[W]e hold that one uses a gun, i. e., avails oneself of a gun, and therefore violates [§ 924(c)(1)], whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime." Id., at 115. The court applied this new standard and affirmed the convictions of both Bailey and Robinson. In both cases, the court deter- mined that the gun was sufficiently accessible and proximate to the drugs or drug proceeds that the jury could properly infer that the defendant had placed the gun in order to fur- 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 142 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ther the drug offenses or to protect the possession of the drugs. Judge Wald, in dissent, argued that the court's previous multifactor test provided a better standard for appellate review of § 924(c)(1) convictions. Judge Williams, joined by Judges Silberman and Buckley, also dissented. He explained his understanding that "use" under § 924(c)(1) denoted active employment of the firearm "rather than pos- session with a contingent intent to use." Id., at 121. "[B]y articulating a `proximity' plus `accessibility' test, however, the court has in effect diluted `use' to mean simply possession with a floating intent to use." Ibid. As the debate within the District of Columbia Circuit illus- trates, § 924(c)(1) has been the source of much perplexity in the courts. The Circuits are in conflict both in the standards they have articulated, compare United States v. Torres- Rodriguez, 930 F. 2d 1375, 1385 (CA9 1991) (mere possession sufficient to satisfy § 924(c)), with United States v. Castro- Lara, 970 F. 2d 976, 983 (CA1 1992) (mere possession insuffi- cient), cert. denied sub nom. Sarraff v. United States, 508 U. S. 962 (1993); and in the results they have reached, com- pare United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F. 2d 250, 254 (CA2 1988) (presence of gun in dresser drawer in apartment with drugs, drug proceeds, and paraphernalia insufficient to meet § 924(c)(1)), with United States v. McFadden, 13 F. 3d 463, 465 (CA1 1994) (evidence of gun hidden under mattress with money, near drugs, was sufficient to show "use"), and United States v. Hager, 969 F. 2d 883, 889 (CA10) (gun in boots in living room near drugs was "used"), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 964 (1992). We granted certiorari to clarify the meaning of "use" under § 924(c)(1). 514 U. S. 1062 (1995). II Section 924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified penal- ties if the defendant, "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . , uses or carries a 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 143 Opinion of the Court firearm." Petitioners argue that "use" signifies active em- ployment of a firearm. The Government opposes that defi- nition and defends the proximity and accessibility test adopted by the Court of Appeals. We agree with petition- ers, and hold that § 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. This action is not the first one in which the Court has grap- pled with the proper understanding of "use" in § 924(c)(1). In Smith, we faced the question whether the barter of a gun for drugs was a "use," and concluded that it was. Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223 (1993). As the debate in Smith illustrated, the word "use" poses some interpretational diffi- culties because of the different meanings attributable to it. Consider the paradoxical statement: "I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it." "Use" draws mean- ing from its context, and we will look not only to the word itself, but also to the statute and the sentencing scheme, to determine the meaning Congress intended. We agree with the majority below that "use" must con- note more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense. See 36 F. 3d, at 109; accord, United States v. Castro-Lara, supra, at 983; United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F. 2d 587, 597­598 (CA3 1989); United States v. Wilson, 884 F. 2d 174, 177 (CA5 1989). Had Con- gress intended possession alone to trigger liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily could have so provided. This obvious conclusion is supported by the frequent use of the term "pos- sess" in the gun-crime statutes to describe prohibited gun- related conduct. See, e. g., §§ 922(g), 922(j), 922(k), 922(o)(1), 930(a), 930(b). Where the Court of Appeals erred was not in its conclusion that "use" means more than mere possession, but in its standard for evaluating whether the involvement of a firearm amounted to something more than mere possession. Its 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 144 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court proximity and accessibility standard provides almost no limi- tation on the kind of possession that would be criminalized; in practice, nearly every possession of a firearm by a person engaged in drug trafficking would satisfy the standard, "thereby eras[ing] the line that the statutes, and the courts, have tried to draw." United States v. McFadden, supra, at 469 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). Rather than requiring actual use, the District of Columbia Circuit would criminalize "sim- pl[e] possession with a floating intent to use." 36 F. 3d, at 121 (Williams, J., dissenting). The shortcomings of this test are succinctly explained in Judge Williams' dissent: "While the majority attempts to fine-tune the concept of facilitation (and thereby, use) through its twin guide- posts of proximity and accessibility, the ultimate result is that possession amounts to `use' because possession enhances the defendant's confidence. Had Congress in- tended that, all it need have mentioned is possession. In this regard, the majority's test is either so broad as to assure automatic affirmance of any jury conviction or, if not so broad, is unlikely to produce a clear guideline." Id., at 124­125 (citations omitted). An evidentiary standard for finding "use" that is satisfied in almost every case by evidence of mere possession does not adhere to the obvious congressional intent to require more than possession to trigger the statute's application. This conclusion-that a conviction for "use" of a firearm under § 924(c)(1) requires more than a showing of mere pos- session-requires us to answer a more difficult question. What must the Government show, beyond mere possession, to establish "use" for the purposes of the statute? We con- clude that the language, context, and history of § 924(c)(1) indicate that the Government must show active employment of the firearm. We start, as we must, with the language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 145 Opinion of the Court 235, 241 (1989). The word "use" in the statute must be given its "ordinary or natural" meaning, a meaning variously defined as "[t]o convert to one's service," "to employ," "to avail oneself of," and "to carry out a purpose or action by means of." Smith, supra, at 228­229 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Webster's New International Diction- ary of English Language 2806 (2d ed. 1949) and Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990)). These various definitions of "use" imply action and implementation. See also Mc- Fadden, 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting) ("[T]he ordinary meanings of the words `use and `carry' . . . connote activity beyond simple possession"). We consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. " `[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.' " Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991)). Looking past the word "use" itself, we read § 924(c)(1) with the assumption that Congress intended each of its terms to have meaning. "Judges should hesitate . . . to treat [as surplusage] statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140­141 (1994). Here, Congress has specified two types of conduct with a firearm: "uses" or "carries." Under the Government's reading of § 924(c)(1), "use" in- cludes even the action of a defendant who puts a gun into place to protect drugs or to embolden himself. This reading is of such breadth that no role remains for "carry." The Government admits that the meanings of "use" and "carry" converge under its interpretation, but maintains that this overlap is a product of the particular history of § 924(c)(1). Therefore, the Government argues, the canon of construction that instructs that "a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words," Platt v. Union Pacific R. Co., 99 U. S. 48, 58 (1879), is inapplicable. Brief for United States 24­25. 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 146 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court We disagree. Nothing here indicates that Congress, when it provided these two terms, intended that they be under- stood to be redundant. We assume that Congress used two terms because it in- tended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous mean- ing. While a broad reading of "use" undermines virtually any function for "carry," a more limited, active interpreta- tion of "use" preserves a meaningful role for "carries" as an alternative basis for a charge. Under the interpretation we enunciate today, a firearm can be used without being carried, e. g., when an offender has a gun on display during a trans- action, or barters with a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be carried without being used, e. g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug transaction. This reading receives further support from the context of § 924(c)(1). As we observed in Smith, "using a firearm" should not have a "different meaning in § 924(c)(1) than it does in § 924(d)." 508 U. S., at 235. See also United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) ("A provision that may seem ambig- uous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme"). Section 924(d)(1) provides for the for- feiture of any firearm that is "used" or "intended to be used" in certain crimes. In that provision, Congress recognized a distinction between firearms "used" in commission of a crime and those "intended to be used," and provided for forfeiture of a weapon even before it had been "used." In § 924(c)(1), however, liability attaches only to cases of actual use, not intended use, as when an offender places a firearm with the intent to use it later if necessary. The difference between the two provisions demonstrates that, had Congress meant to broaden application of the statute beyond actual "use," Congress could and would have so specified, as it did in § 924(d)(1). 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 147 Opinion of the Court The amendment history of § 924(c) casts further light on Congress' intended meaning. The original version, passed in 1968, read: "(c) Whoever- "(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or "(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commis- sion of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 10 years." § 102, 82 Stat. 1224. The phrase "uses a firearm to commit" indicates that Con- gress originally intended to reach the situation where the firearm was actively employed during commission of the crime. This original language would not have stretched so far as to cover a firearm that played no detectable role in the crime's commission. For example, a defendant who stored a gun in a nearby closet for retrieval in case the deal went sour would not have "use[d] a firearm to commit" a crime. This version also shows that "use" and "carry" were em- ployed with distinctly different meanings. Congress' 1984 amendment to § 924(c) altered the scope of predicate offenses from "any felony" to "any crime of violence," removed the "unlawfully" requirement, merged the "uses" and "carries" prongs, substituted "during and in relation to" the predicate crimes for the earlier provi- sions linking the firearm to the predicate crimes, and raised the minimum sentence to five years. § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138­2139. The Government argues that this amendment stripped "uses" and "carries" of the qualifications ("to com- mit" and "unlawfully during") that originally gave them dis- tinct meanings, so that the terms should now be understood to overlap. Of course, in Smith we recognized that Con- 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 148 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court gress' subsequent amendments to § 924(c) employed "use" ex- pansively, to cover both use as a weapon and use as an item of barter. See Smith, 508 U. S., at 236. But there is no evidence to indicate that Congress intended to expand the meaning of "use" so far as to swallow up any significance for "carry." If Congress had intended to deprive "use" of its active connotations, it could have simply substituted a more appropriate term-"possession"-to cover the conduct it wished to reach. The Government nonetheless argues that our observation in Smith that "§ 924(c)(1)'s language sweeps broadly," 508 U. S., at 229, precludes limiting "use" to active employment. But our decision today is not inconsistent with Smith. Al- though there we declined to limit "use" to the meaning "use as a weapon," our interpretation of § 924(c)(1) nonetheless adhered to an active meaning of the term. In Smith, it was clear that the defendant had "used" the gun; the question was whether that particular use (bartering) came within the meaning of § 924(c)(1). Smith did not address the question we face today of what evidence is required to permit a jury to find that a firearm had been used at all. To illustrate the activities that fall within the definition of "use" provided here, we briefly describe some of the activi- ties that fall within "active employment" of a firearm, and those that do not. The active-employment understanding of "use" certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. We note that this reading compels the conclusion that even an offender's reference to a firearm in his possession could satisfy § 924(c)(1). Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a "use," just as the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a "use." The example given above-"I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it"-shows that "use" takes 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 149 Opinion of the Court on different meanings depending on context. In the first phrase of the example, "use" refers to an ongoing, inactive function fulfilled by a firearm. It is this sense of "use" that underlies the Government's contention that "placement for protection"-i. e., placement of a firearm to provide a sense of security or to embolden-constitutes a "use." It follows, according to this argument, that a gun placed in a closet is "used," because its mere presence emboldens or protects its owner. We disagree. Under this reading, mere possession of a firearm by a drug offender, at or near the site of a drug crime or its proceeds or paraphernalia, is a "use" by the offender, because its availability for intimidation, attack, or defense would always, presumably, embolden or comfort the offender. But the inert presence of a firearm, without more, is not enough to trigger § 924(c)(1). Perhaps the nonactive nature of this asserted "use" is clearer if a synonym is used: storage. A defendant cannot be charged under § 924(c)(1) merely for storing a weapon near drugs or drug proceeds. Storage of a firearm, without its more active employment, is not reasonably distinguishable from possession. A possibly more difficult question arises where an offender conceals a gun nearby to be at the ready for an imminent confrontation. Cf. 36 F. 3d, at 119 (Wald, J., dissenting) (dis- cussing distinction between firearm's accessibility to drugs or drug proceeds and its accessibility to defendant). Some might argue that the offender has "actively employed" the gun by hiding it where he can grab and use it if necessary. In our view, "use" cannot extend to encompass this action. If the gun is not disclosed or mentioned by the offender, it is not actively employed, and it is not "used." To conclude otherwise would distort the language of the statute as well as create an impossible line-drawing problem. How "at the ready" was the firearm? Within arm's reach? In the room? In the house? How long before the confrontation did he place it there? Five minutes or 24 hours? Placement for later active use does not constitute "use." An alternative 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT 150 BAILEY v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court rationale for why "placement at the ready" is a "use"- that such placement is made with the intent to put the fire- arm to a future active use-also fails. As discussed above, § 924(d)(1) demonstrates that Congress knew how to draft a statute to reach a firearm that was "intended to be used." In § 924(c)(1), it chose not to include that term, but instead established the 5-year mandatory minimum only for those defendants who actually "use" the firearm. While it is undeniable that the active-employment reading of "use" restricts the scope of § 924(c)(1), the Government often has other means available to charge offenders who mix guns and drugs. The "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1), for exam- ple, brings some offenders who would not satisfy the "use" prong within the reach of the statute. And Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides an enhancement for a per- son convicted of certain drug-trafficking offenses if a firearm was possessed during the offense. United States Sentenc- ing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 1994). But the word "use" in § 924(c)(1) cannot support the extended applications that prosecutors have sometimes placed on it, in order to penalize drug-trafficking offenders for firearms possession. The test set forth by the Court of Appeals renders "use" virtually synonymous with "possession" and makes any role for "carry" superfluous. The language of § 924(c)(1), sup- ported by its history and context, compels the conclusion that Congress intended "use" in the active sense of "to avail oneself of." To sustain a conviction under the "use" prong of § 924(c)(1), the Government must show that the defendant actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime. III Having determined that "use" denotes active employment, we must conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sup- port either Bailey's or Robinson's conviction for "use" under § 924(c)(1). 516us1$11J 10-22-98 11:07:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995) 151 Opinion of the Court The police stopped Bailey for a traffic offense and arrested him after finding cocaine in the driver's compartment of his car. The police then found a firearm inside a bag in the locked car trunk. There was no evidence that Bailey ac- tively employed the firearm in any way. In Robinson's case, the unloaded, holstered firearm that provided the basis for her § 924(c)(1) conviction was found locked in a footlocker in a bedroom closet. No evidence showed that Robinson had actively employed the firearm. We reverse both judgments. Bailey and Robinson were each charged under both the "use" and "carry" prongs of § 924(c)(1). Because the Court of Appeals did not consider liability under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1) for Bailey or Robinson, we remand for consider- ation of that basis for upholding the convictions. It is so ordered. 516us1$12Z 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT 152 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et al. v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD CO. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 94­1592. Argued October 30, 1995-Decided January 8, 1996 The Hours of Service Act (HSA), 49 U. S. C. § 21101 et seq., limits the number of hours that train crew employees can remain on duty. At times a train cannot reach a crew change point within the allotted time, however, so the railroad must stop the train in order that a new crew can replace the first, or "outlawed," crew. Transportation of the new crew to the train and the outlawed crew back to the terminal is called "deadhead transportation." Under § 21103(b)(4), "[t]ime spent in dead- head transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent in deadhead transportation from a duty assignment to the place of final release is neither time on duty nor time off duty." The latter time is commonly termed "limbo time." After the Federal Railroad Adminis- tration, which administers the HSA, announced that it would follow a Ninth Circuit ruling that the time spent waiting for deadhead transpor- tation from a duty site is on-duty time, respondent railroads filed this suit seeking direct review. The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, re- jected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that time spent wait- ing for deadhead transportation from a duty site is limbo time. Held: The HSA's text, structure, and purposes demonstrate Congress' in- tent that time spent waiting for deadhead transportation from a duty site should be limbo time. As a matter of common usage, § 21103(b)(4)'s phrase "time spent in deadhead transportation" can be read to include the time spent waiting for such transportation. That this is so is also established by the HSA's provisions classifying given periods as on duty or off duty. When those provisions are considered in light of the HSA's purpose of promoting train safety, they reveal that on-duty time typi- cally includes those hours that contribute to an employee's fatigue dur- ing his 12-hour shift. Thus, time spent waiting for deadhead transpor- tation to a duty site should be classified as on-duty time because, along with the time spent in the transportation itself, it contributes to em- ployee fatigue during the work assignment. But time spent waiting for deadhead transportation away from a duty site does not cause the fa- tigue that implicates safety concerns and so, like the deadhead transpor- tation which follows it, the waiting time must be deemed limbo time. 516us1$12Z 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996) 153 Opinion of the Court Finally, classification of the time at issue here as on-duty time would impose on railroads the very scheduling problems that Congress sought to avoid when it created limbo time as a compromise during the 1969 HSA amendment process. Petitioner unions' attempts to treat the time at issue as on-duty time under §§ 21103(b)(5), 21103(b)(1), and 21103(b)(3) are unpersuasive, as are the cases that they cite, all of which were decided before the 1969 amendments. Pp. 156­162. 44 F. 3d 437, affirmed. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Lawrence M. Mann argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Harold A. Ross and Clinton J. Miller III. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal re- spondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, John F. Daly, Paul M. Geier, and Daniel Carey Smith. Ronald M. Johnson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company et al.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to resolve a division between two Courts of Appeals regarding the correct statutory classifi- cation, under the Hours of Service Act, 49 U. S. C. § 21101 et seq., of the time that train employees spend waiting for transportation at the end of their shift. I Congress enacted the Hours of Service Act (HSA) in 1907. Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, § 1, 34 Stat. 1415. The HSA's purpose is to promote railroad safety by limiting the number of hours a train crew may remain on duty and by requiring *John H. Broadley, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Robert W. Blanchette, and James C. Schultz filed a brief for the Association of American Railroads as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT 154 LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court railroads to provide crew members with a certain number of off-duty hours for rest between shifts. Ibid.; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 197, 199 (1918). In particular, the HSA provides that train employees may not remain on duty for more than 12 consecutive hours, and, having worked for that period, must be given at least 10 consecutive hours off duty. 49 U. S. C. § 21103(a). To comply with the HSA, railroads must schedule opera- tions and crew assignments with some precision, for if opera- tions require the crew to be on duty for more than 12 hours, the railroads may incur substantial penalties. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) administers the HSA, and it is authorized to impose a fine of between $500 and $10,000 for each violation of the statute. § 21303(a)(2). For each crew member on duty longer than the statutory maximum there is a separate violation. Missouri, K., & T. R. Co. of Tex. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112, 118­119 (1913); 48 CFR pt. 228, App. A, p. 244 (1994). The statute provides certain exceptions to the rules in cases of emergency. 49 U. S. C. § 21103(c). At times, of course, a train cannot reach the scheduled crew change point, or even a convenient change point, within the 12 hours. To avoid violating the HSA, the railroad must stop the train so that a new crew can replace the first crew, now called the "outlawed crew." Transportation of the new crew to the train and the outlawed crew back to the terminal is called "deadhead transportation." The HSA provides dif- ferent treatment for the time spent in deadhead transporta- tion, depending on whether the transportation is taking a replacement crew to the train or taking the outlawed crew from the train. The statute provides that time spent in deadhead transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, while time spent in deadhead transportation from a duty assignment to the place of final release is neither time on duty nor time off duty. § 21103(b)(4). Time that is nei- ther on duty nor off duty is referred to in the industry as 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996) 155 Opinion of the Court "limbo time." At oral argument, the Court was advised that train employees are paid for limbo time. We thus know how to treat the time the employee spends in the deadhead vehicle. The issue is how to classify the time the outlawed crew spends waiting for the deadhead transportation to arrive. Petitioners, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the United Transportation Union, claim the waiting time is on-duty time that counts against the 12-hour limit. Save for a short-lived period when it changed its policy to acquiesce in a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that we shall recount, the FRA for many years has taken the contrary position. In its view, so long as crew members are not required to perform duties for the railroad while they wait, time spent waiting for deadhead transportation from a duty site is to be treated in the same way as the time in the deadhead trans- portation itself-that is, as limbo time. 58 Fed. Reg. 18163, 18164 (1993). The railroads, who are respondents along with the Secretary of Transportation, agree with the FRA's position. In 1990 petitioners brought suit in California and Oregon, challenging the FRA's position. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the time spent wait- ing for deadhead transportation from a duty site is time on duty. The court concluded that the time was so defined be- fore Congress amended the HSA in 1969 and that the 1969 amendments disclose no intent to change that result. United Transportation Union v. Skinner, 975 F. 2d 1421, 1426­1428 (1992). For the sake of uniformity, the FRA decided to apply the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the HSA on a nationwide basis. It announced the policy change in an October 28, 1992, letter to Robert W. Blanchette, Vice President of the Association of American Railroads, App. 73, and later pub- lished notice in the Federal Register, 58 Fed. Reg. 18163 (1993). In response, nine major railroads instituted the 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT 156 LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court present action, seeking direct review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of the FRA's order changing its interpretation. A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the FRA's order, see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Pen a, 29 F. 3d 324 (1994), but that opinion was superseded when the Seventh Circuit took the case en banc, 44 F. 3d 437 (1994). The en banc court rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that time spent waiting for deadhead transportation is limbo time. Because of the importance of uniform nationwide applica- tion of the HSA's regulatory scheme, we granted certiorari. 515 U. S. 1141 (1995). II In determining how time spent waiting for deadhead transportation should be classified, we begin with the text and design of the statute. As first enacted, the HSA divided all time into two categories-on duty and off duty-but it did not define either term. Congress amended the HSA in 1969, reducing the number of permissible on-duty hours and providing some specific rules for determining if a given pe- riod of time should be considered on duty or off duty. These statutory provisions are the controlling guide in the case be- fore us, and are as follows: "(1) Time on duty begins when the employee reports for duty and ends when the employee is finally released from duty. "(2) Time the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty. "(3) Time spent performing any other service for the railroad carrier during a 24-hour period in which the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty. "(4) Time spent in deadhead transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent in deadhead 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996) 157 Opinion of the Court transportation from a duty assignment to the place of final release is neither time on duty nor time off duty. "(5) An interim period available for rest at a place other than a designated terminal is time on duty. "(6) An interim period available for less than 4 hours rest at a designated terminal is time on duty. "(7) An interim period available for at least 4 hours rest at a place with suitable facilities for food and lodg- ing is not time on duty when the employee is prevented from getting to the employee's designated terminal by any of the following: "(A) a casualty "(B) a track obstruction "(C) an act of God "(D) a derailment or major equipment failure result- ing from a cause that was unknown and unforeseeable to the railroad carrier or its officer or agent in charge of that employee when that employee left the designated terminal." 49 U. S. C. § 21103(b). Although these provisions do not specify time spent wait- ing for deadhead transportation as a separate category, § 21103(b)(4) does classify the "time spent in deadhead trans- portation." That phrase, as a matter of common usage, can be read to include the time spent waiting for the deadhead transportation, but we need not confine our examination to those words alone. When we consider the question in light of the purpose of the HSA and all the quoted provisions, we conclude that the time spent waiting for deadhead transpor- tation is of the same character as the time spent in the dead- head transportation itself. The purpose of the HSA is to promote the safe operation of trains, and the statutory classification must be understood in accord with that objective. The statute, in effect, makes the determination that a train employee who remains on duty for more than 12 consecutive hours will be too fatigued to operate a train in a safe manner. In consequence, the 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT 158 LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court provisions delineate as on-duty time those hours which will contribute to an employee's fatigue during his or her work assignment. In some instances, the relationship between the time at issue and the employee's fatigue is apparent, for example, the command of § 21103(b)(2) that the "[t]ime the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty." The classification of other time periods is not quite as straightforward, but we think still apparent from the statu- tory design. What if a train employee is permitted to take a lengthy break between periods of work? If the train em- ployee is not working at all during this time, is it time off duty? The statute answers the question by reference to the likelihood of employee fatigue in the ensuing period of work without the mandated rest interval. The statute specifies that an "interim period available for less than 4 hours rest at a designated terminal," § 21103(b)(6), and an "interim period available for rest at a place other than a designated termi- nal," § 21103(b)(5), are to be considered on-duty hours. It follows from the statutory scheme that these rest periods are not sufficient to alleviate fatigue. The treatment of deadhead transportation follows the same scheme. Section 21103(b)(4) provides that "[t]ime spent in deadhead transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent in deadhead transportation from a duty assignment to the place of final release is neither time on duty nor time off duty." The distinction between trans- portation to a duty assignment and transportation from a duty assignment makes perfect sense, given the statute's purpose of promoting train safety. Time spent deadheading to a duty site contributes to the fatigue that a train employee is likely to have during the 12-hour shift. By defining the time spent deadheading to a duty assignment as on-duty time, Congress ensured that an employee will not operate a train more than 12 hours after reporting for duty. The time employees spend deadheading from the duty site does not 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996) 159 Opinion of the Court give rise to these safety concerns, for no matter how much time the employees must spend deadheading away from the duty site, they will still receive the requisite off-duty rest time once they reach the terminal and before beginning a new shift involving train operations. The same reasoning applies to the time spent waiting for deadhead transportation. Time spent waiting for deadhead transportation to a duty site should be classified as on-duty time because, along with the time spent in the transportation itself, it contributes to employee fatigue during the work as- signment. Time spent waiting for deadhead transportation away from a duty site does not cause the fatigue that impli- cates these safety concerns and so, like the deadhead trans- portation which the wait precedes, the waiting time must be deemed limbo time to effect the statutory design. It is common ground, moreover, that at the beginning of a shift, the wait for transportation and the transportation it- self are treated alike; that is, the time spent waiting for dead- head transportation after reporting for duty at the required hour and the time spent in the deadhead transportation itself are both on-duty time. A consistent interpretation of the statute requires that the parallelism between the wait and the transportation when the shift begins carry over to the wait and the transportation when it ends. Finally, the concerns that surfaced during the 1969 amend- ment process lend additional support to our conclusion. As noted, before the 1969 amendments time under the HSA fell into one of two categories-on duty or off duty. The binary scheme created a problem, however. The hours spent dead- heading from the duty site to the terminal counted as off- duty rest time, see United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 285 F. 152, 153 (CA9 1922), and, as a consequence, employees often spent much of their off-duty time not resting, but dead- heading to the terminal. S. Rep. No. 91­604, p. 7 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91­469, p. 7 (1969). The railroad unions re- sponded to the problem during the amendment process by 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT 160 LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court advocating that all time spent deadheading be classified as time on duty, and the original bill proposed in the House so provided. Ibid. The railroad industry opposed the change, however, particularly with respect to time spent deadhead- ing from the duty site because of the operating difficulties that would result. Hearings on H. R. 8449, H. R. 84, and H. R. 9515 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 134­135 (1969). If time spent deadheading from a duty site were to be on-duty time, railroads would have to calculate the approximate deadheading time and stop the train early enough to take account of that interval. Any miscalculation would lead to a violation of the HSA. The enacted statute reflects a compromise in the treat- ment of deadhead transportation: on-duty time at the shift's beginning, limbo time at its end. The creation of limbo time solved the problem of the employee who was forced to spend much of his or her off-duty rest time in deadhead transporta- tion, but it did so without imposing scheduling difficulties on the railroads. If we were now to classify the waiting time as on-duty, as petitioners request, we would impose on rail- roads the same scheduling problems that Congress sought to avoid. Petitioners try to escape the force of the argument by at- tempting to fit the time at issue here within other HSA pro- visions. For instance, because an "interim period available for rest at a place other than a designated terminal is time on duty," 49 U. S. C. § 21103(b)(5), petitioners reason that all waiting time at a place other than a designated terminal must be time on duty. But, as we have said, interim periods available for rest occur, by definition, between periods of service for the railroad. Because the employee must return to work immediately after an interim rest period, Congress had to determine whether such a rest period would be suffi- cient to alleviate fatigue. Its conclusions on that score have no bearing when the time spent waiting for deadhead trans- 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996) 161 Opinion of the Court portation is followed not by renewed service but by the stat- utory off-duty rest time. Petitioners next argue that be- cause the HSA provides that "[t]ime on duty begins when the employee reports for duty and ends when the employee is finally released from duty," § 21103(b)(1), time on duty must always continue until the employee reaches his desig- nated terminal. But that cannot be, for the HSA is express in providing that deadhead transportation from a duty site is limbo time, § 21103(b)(4). Petitioners also point to § 21103(b)(3), which classifies as on duty any "[t]ime spent performing any other service for the railroad carrier during the 24-hour period in which the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train." They say that because employees may be required to perform services for the railroad while they wait for the deadhead transportation to arrive, waiting time must be con- sidered time on duty pursuant to § 21103(b)(3). Petitioners' argument begs the question, however. If employees are re- quired to perform services covered by § 21103(b)(3), the time is on-duty time by definition. The question presented here, however, is how to treat the time spent waiting for deadhead transportation when no additional services are required, and § 21103(b)(3) cannot answer that question. Petitioners, like the Ninth Circuit in United Transporta- tion Union v. Skinner, 975 F. 2d, at 1426, point to numerous cases, most of them decided during the early part of this century, that they believe support their interpretation of the statute. See Missouri, K., & T. R. Co. of Tex. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112 (1913); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 220 F. 108 (CA9 1915); United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 F. 722 (CA9 1917); United States v. Pennsyl- vania R. Co., 275 F. Supp. 345 (WD Pa. 1967); United States v. Chicago, M. & P. S. R. Co., 195 F. 783 (WD Wash. 1912). We need not determine whether the Ninth Circuit's reading of these cases was the correct one, cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Pen a, 44 F. 3d 437, 444 (CA7 1994) (opinion below) 516us1$12L 10-22-98 11:10:25 PAGES OPINPGT 162 LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court (distinguishing the above cases because they addressed "the categorization of time spent by a railroad crew waiting for repairs to be made or for some other delay before resuming its duties of operating the train"), because they were all de- cided before Congress amended the HSA. Thus, even if the time at issue here had been treated as on-duty time before 1969, that conclusion would have no bearing on how the time should now be defined because the 1969 amendments ad- dressed this question. For these reasons, we reject petitioners' construction of the HSA. The text, structure, and purposes of the statute persuade us that Congress intended that time spent waiting for deadhead transportation from a duty site should be limbo time. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 516us1$13z 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 163 Syllabus LAWRENCE, guardian and next friend on behalf of LAWRENCE, a minor v. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 94­9323. Decided January 8, 1996 Petitioner Lawrence asserts an entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependent unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. The Social Security Act (Act) requires that paternity be decided by state law. Lawrence acknowledges that the relevant North Carolina law ap- pears to defeat her claim, but argues that its proof of paternity require- ments are unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit upheld the denial of her benefits, accepting the Government's argument that a state pater- nity law's constitutionality need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits. Since Lawrence filed this certiorari petition, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. Thus, the Solicitor General has invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) for the Fourth Circuit to decide the case, or remand it to the Commissioner for recon- sideration, in light of the new interpretation. Held:1. Insofar as Congress, through 28 U.S.C. §2106, appears to have conferred upon this Court a broad power to GVR, the Court has the power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue which is properly before it in its appellate capacity. Over the past 50 years the GVR has become an integral part of this Court's practice. It has the virtues of conserving the Court's scarce resources, assisting the court below by flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully considered, procuring the benefit of the lower court's insight before this Court rules on the merits, and alleviating the potential for unequal treatment inherent in this Court's inability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues. Where intervening developments, or recent developments that the court below is unlikely to have considered, reveal a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given 516us1$13z 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 164 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Per Curiam the opportunity, and where it appears that a redetermination may deter- mine the litigation's ultimate outcome, a GVR is potentially appropriate. Whether it is ultimately appropriate depends on a case's equities. All Members of the Court agree that a wide range of intervening develop- ments may justify a GVR order but that the GVR power should be used sparingly. Thus, this Court has the power to issue a GVR order, and such an order is an appropriate exercise of the Court's discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. 2. Subject to the equities, the SSA's new interpretation of the Act makes a GVR order appropriate here. There is a reasonable probabil- ity that the Fourth Circuit would conclude that the timing of the agency's interpretation does not preclude the deference that it would otherwise receive, and that it may be outcome determinative in this case. The equities also favor a GVR. That disposition has the Govern- ment's express support. Since the Government has indicated its inten- tion to apply the new interpretation to future cases nationwide, giving Lawrence a chance to benefit from it furthers fairness by treating her like other future benefits applicants. The general concern that a post- litigation interpretation may be the product of unfair or manipulative Government litigation strategies does not deprive Lawrence of the ben- efit of a favorable reinterpretation in these particular circumstances. Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded. Per Curiam. Under the Social Security Act, the unmarried minor "child" of a deceased individual who was insured under the Act may receive survivors' benefits if she was "dependent upon such individual" prior to his death. 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (1988 ed.). In order to determine whether a claimant is, for these purposes, the "child" of the deceased, and, as such, eligible to receive bene- fits, the Commissioner of Social Security "shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which [the] insured individual . . . was domiciled at the time of his death." 42 U. S. C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1988 ed.). The petitioner in this case, Lawrence, asserts an entitle- ment to benefits under these provisions. In so doing, she acknowledges that the relevant state law, that of North Car- 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 165 Per Curiam olina, appears on its face to defeat her claim by imposing procedural requirements on proof of paternity (which it re- quires as a prerequisite for intestate succession) that she cannot meet. She contends, however, that these difficulties can be overcome in her case as they were in Handley v. Schweiker, 697 F. 2d 999 (1983). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that state-law require- ments of proof of paternity can only be applied against a claimant for benefits under § 416(h)(2)(A) insofar as they are constitutional, and that an Alabama law similar to the North Carolina law involved here was unconstitutional. In con- trast, in the case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council's denial of benefits to Lawrence. The Court of Appeals expressly adopted the rationale for reject- ing her claim that the Government advanced in its brief to that court: that the constitutionality of a state paternity law need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to benefits under the federal statutory scheme. Lawrence petitioned for certiorari to review that decision. In his response, the Solicitor General advises us that the "Social Security Administration has re-examined" the role of state paternity and intestacy laws in the federal benefits scheme, and now interprets the Social Security Act as "re- quir[ing] a determination, at least in some circumstances, of whether the state intestacy statute is constitutional." Brief for Respondent 8. He also correctly notes that the Act di- rects the Commissioner of Social Security-not, in the first instance, the courts-to "apply such law as would be applied . . . by the courts of the State" concerned. § 416(h)(2)(A). Without conceding Lawrence's ultimate entitlement to bene- fits, he invites us to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) so that the Court of Ap- peals may either decide it in light of the Commissioner's new statutory interpretation or remand the case to the Commis- sioner for reconsideration in light of that interpretation. 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 166 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Per Curiam We conclude both that we have the power to issue a GVR order, and that such an order is an appropriate exercise of our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2106 appears on its face to confer upon this Court a broad power to GVR: "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . vacate . . . any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and . . . re- quire such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." In his dissent issued today in this case and in Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193, another case in which we issue a GVR order, Justice Scalia con- tends that "traditional practice" and "the Constitution and laws of the United States" impose "implicit limitations" on this power. Post, at 178. We respectfully disagree. We perceive no textual basis for such limitations. The Constitu- tion limits our "appellate Jurisdiction" to issues of "[federal] Law and Fact," see Art. III, § 2, but leaves to Congress the power to "ordain and establish . . . inferior Courts," Art. III, § 1, and to make "Exceptions" and "Regulations" limiting and controlling our appellate jurisdiction. Insofar as Congress appears to have authorized such action, we believe that this Court has the power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue that is properly before us in our appellate capacity. Our past practice affirms this conclusion. Although, as Justice Scalia's dissent explains, post, at 179­183, the exercise of our GVR power was, until recent times, rare, its infrequent early use may be explained in large part by the smaller size of our certiorari docket in earlier times. Re- gardless of its earlier history, however, the GVR order has, over the past 50 years, become an integral part of this Court's practice, accepted and employed by all sitting and recent Justices. We have GVR'd in light of a wide range of developments, including our own decisions, see post, at 180 (Scalia, J., dissenting), State Supreme Court decisions, see, 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 167 Per Curiam e. g., Conner v. Simler, 367 U. S. 486 (1961), new federal stat- utes, see, e. g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 329 U. S. 685 (1946), administrative reinterpretations of federal statutes, see, e. g., Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994), new state statutes, see, e. g., Louisiana v. Hays, 512 U. S. 1230 (1994), changed factual circumstances, see, e. g., NLRB v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 325 U. S. 838 (1945) (demilitariza- tion of employees), and confessions of error or other positions newly taken by the Solicitor General, see, e. g., Wells v. United States, 511 U. S. 1050 (1994); Reed v. United States, 510 U. S. 1188 (1994); Ramirez v. United States, 510 U. S. 1103 (1994); Chappell v. United States, 494 U. S. 1075 (1990); Polsky v. Wetherill, 403 U. S. 916 (1971), and state attorneys general, see, e. g., Cuffle v. Avenenti, 498 U. S. 996 (1990); Nicholson v. Boles, 375 U. S. 25 (1963). This practice has some virtues. In an appropriate case, a GVR order conserves the scarce resources of this Court that might otherwise be expended on plenary consideration, as- sists the court below by flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully considered, assists this Court by procuring the benefit of the lower court's insight before we rule on the merits, and alleviates the "[p]otential for un- equal treatment" that is inherent in our inability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues, see United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 556, n. 16 (1982); cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 323 (1987) ("[W]e fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final"). Where intervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation, a GVR order is, we be- lieve, potentially appropriate. Whether a GVR order is ulti- 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 168 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Per Curiam mately appropriate depends further on the equities of the case: If it appears that the intervening development, such as a confession of error in some, but not all, aspects of the deci- sion below, is part of an unfair or manipulative litigation strategy, or if the delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the potential benefits of further consider- ation by the lower court, a GVR order is inappropriate. This approach is similar in its flexibility to this Court's long- standing approach to applications for stays and other sum- mary remedies granted without determining the merits of the case under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. See, e. g., Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U. S. 1328 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (staying a District Court order pending the de- cision on the merits of the Court of Appeals). (Naturally, because GVR orders are premised on matters that we have reason to believe the court below did not fully consider, and because they require only further consideration, the stand- ard that we apply in deciding whether to GVR is somewhat more liberal than the All Writs Act standard, under which relief is granted only upon a showing that a grant of certio- rari and eventual reversal are probable, see id., at 1330.) Used in accordance with this approach, the GVR order can improve the fairness and accuracy of judicial outcomes while at the same time serving as a cautious and deferential alter- native to summary reversal in cases whose precedential sig- nificance does not merit our plenary review. Justice Scalia's dissent would confine GVR's to three categories of cases: "(1) where an intervening factor has arisen that has a legal bearing upon the decision, (2) where, in a context not governed by Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), clarification of the opinion below is needed to assure our jurisdiction, and (3) . . . where the respondent or appel- lee confesses error in the judgment below." Post, at 191­192. 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 169 Per Curiam While a large proportion of this Court's GVR orders fall within these categories, we find that, especially as the dis- sent construes them, they are too narrow to account for the full extent of our actual practice. We find two aspects in particular of the dissent's approach too restrictive. First, the dissent would insist that only matters that the lower court had no "opportunity" to consider can be the basis for GVR orders. Second, it would impose special restrictions as to when the Court may GVR in light of changes of position by litigants. Justice Scalia's dissent concedes-correctly, we be- lieve-that its first category-"intervening factor[s]"- must be extended to include at least Supreme Court decisions ren- dered so shortly before the lower court's decision that the lower court had no "opportunity" to apply them. Post, at 181. The dissent does not explain, however, why what the lower court had an "opportunity" to consider should be deci- sive, or how its "opportunity" is to be assessed. In Robin- son v. Story, 469 U. S. 1081 (1984), we GVR'd for further consideration in light of a Supreme Court decision rendered almost three months before the summary affirmance by the Court of Appeals that was the subject of the petition for certiorari. Were those three months sufficient "opportu- nity" for the court to apprise itself (or be apprised by the parties) of the new, potentially relevant Supreme Court deci- sion? If Robinson was properly GVR'd, we have difficulty understanding the dissent's objection to our GVR order today in Stutson, where, as in Robinson, the Court of Ap- peals wrote no opinion to show whether or how it considered a precedent of ours that the District Court had had no oppor- tunity to consider. In both cases, the Court of Appeals "might (or might not) have relied on a standard [nonapplica- tion of the prior Supreme Court decision] that might (or might not) be wrong [and] that might (or might not) have affected the outcome." Post, at 185 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only pertinent difference that we can discern between 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 170 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Per Curiam the two cases is that the recent Supreme Court precedent was briefed to the Court of Appeals in Stutson, but we have never held lower court briefing to bar our review and vacatur where the lower court's order shows no sign of having ap- plied the precedents that were briefed. Compare post, at 185­186 (asserting that "we have no power" to vacate and remand in Stutson after relevant briefing and a summary order below), with, e. g., Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995) (per curiam) (vacating Court of Appeals' summary order staying execution for probable failure to apply a 12- year-old Supreme Court precedent that the parties briefed to the Court of Appeals; this Court itself granted a stay a week later, applying that precedent, see Tuggle v. Nether- land, 515 U. S. 1188 (1995)). As the prevalence of summary dispositions by the Courts of Appeals continues to increase with the burgeoning federal docket-in 1994, over 11% of Court of Appeals decisions on the merits,1 and many more procedural decisions, were summary-such cases will, no doubt, arise more frequently. In this context, it is impor- tant that the meaningful exercise of this Court's appellate powers not be precluded by uncertainty as to what the court below "might . . . have relied on." And we are well aware, as are Supreme Court practitioners and lower courts, that while not immune from our plenary review, ambiguous sum- mary dispositions below tend, by their very nature, to lack the precedential significance that we generally look for in deciding whether to exercise our discretion to grant plenary review. We are therefore more ready than the dissent to issue a GVR order in cases in which recent events have cast substantial doubt on the correctness of the lower court's summary disposition. With regard to confessions of error and other changes of position by litigants, we agree on several points. All Mem- 1 See Administrative Office of United States Courts, Reports of Proceed- ings of Judicial Conference of the United States, 1994, table S­3 (3,080 out of 27,219 decisions on the merits). 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 171 Per Curiam bers of the Court are agreed that we "should [not] mechani- cally accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error," Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). And the dissent acknowledges as "well entrenched," post, at 183 (opinion of Scalia, J.), our practice of GVR'ing in light of plausible confessions of error without determining their merits. Moreover, the dissent is ready in principle to GVR in light of a new agency interpretation of a statute that is entitled to deference under the rule of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Post, at 186­187. In other respects, however, our approaches to changes of position by litigants diverge. Justice Scalia's dissent disapproves (although it acknowledges) this Court's well- established practice of GVR'ing based on confessions of error that do not purport to concede the whole case. Post, at 183, 184­185; cf., e. g., Moore v. United States, 429 U. S. 20 (1976) (GVR'ing based on the Solicitor General's confession of error, notwithstanding the Solicitor General's unresolved claim that the error was harmless). The dissent would apparently insist that such GVR's be confined to cases in which the con- fession of error concerns a "legal point on which the lower court explicitly relied," or on which we otherwise "know" for certain that the lower court's judgment rested. Post, at 185. But, given the legitimacy of GVR's on the basis of confessions of error without determining the merits, we do not understand why a reasonable probability that the lower court relied on the point at issue should not suffice. As we have explained, supra, at 167, we have GVR'd on the basis of a reasonable probability of a change in result in nonconfes- sion of error cases, see, e. g., Robinson v. Story, supra. We see no special reason why, in a confession of error case, a certainty that the lower court relied on the point in question should be necessary before we may GVR on the basis of a 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 172 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Per Curiam reasonable probability that giving the lower court the op- portunity to consider that point anew will alter the result. Similarly, we reject Justice Scalia's dissent's other requirement of certainty for GVR's founded on a change of position by the Government. The dissent accepts in princi- ple that a new interpretation of a statute adopted by the agency charged with implementing it may be entitled to def- erence in the context of litigation to which the Government is a party. But the dissent would require that before such new interpretation may be the basis for a GVR order, we must be "certain that the change in position is legally cogni- zable," post, at 187 (emphasis added), in the sense that it is "entitled to deference," post, at 188, despite its timing, in that particular case. This requirement, too, appears to be confined to cases in which the event on which the GVR is based is a change of position by the Government, see post, at 187; we do not, for example, understand the dissent to contend that a similar requirement of "lega[l] cognizab[ility]" should apply to GVR's in habeas corpus cases in which the procedural bar that we recognized in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), might apply. Again, we do not understand the rationale for imposing such special requirements on GVR's based on a change of position. If it appears reason- ably probable that a confession of error reveals a genuine and potentially determinative error by the court below, a GVR may be appropriate; similarly, we believe that if an agency interpretation is reasonably probably entitled to def- erence and potentially determinative, we may GVR in light of it. It is precisely because of uncertainty that we GVR. We do not see why uncertainty as to the "lega[l] cognizab[il- ity]" of an agency interpretation in a particular case should be treated differently from uncertainty as to its application in that case. Indeed, to determine on the merits whether deference is owed to the agency interpretation, based on a circumstance-i. e., its timing with respect to the case at hand-that will not be present in any other case brought 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 173 Per Curiam under the statute at issue, when the Court of Appeals has had no "opportunity" to consider the new agency interpre- tation, appears to us to defeat the purpose of GVR'ing. Rather, we think it appropriate to apply our normal "reason- able probability" test, and to defer any special concerns about strategic litigating behavior that are raised by changes in the Government's position to consideration of the equities. Under our approach, neither uncertainty as to whether the Government's change of position, if accepted, would be out- come determinative, nor uncertainty as to the "lega[l] cog- nizab[ility]" of an administrative interpretation, preclude a GVR if the overall probabilities and equities support the GVR order. Indeed, we issued just such a GVR order last Term, without recorded dissent. See Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994) (GVR on the basis of the Solicitor General's representation that "[a]fter further examination of the regu- lation and its application in the present case, . . . the Depart- ment of Agriculture has determined that petitioners' lease- back/buyback application should be reconsidered without respect to the good faith requirement," Brief for Respondent in Schmidt v. Espy, O. T. 1994, No. 93­1707, p. 7; see also id., at 10, n. 5 (maintaining that other obstacles to petitioners' application might remain)). Our differences with Justice Scalia's dissent should not overshadow the substantial level of agreement shared by all Members of this Court. On the one hand, all are agreed that a wide range of intervening developments, including confessions of error, may justify a GVR order. On the other hand, all are agreed that our GVR power should be exercised sparingly. This Court should not just GVR a case "because it finds the opinion, though arguably correct, incomplete and unworkmanlike; or because it observes that there has been a postjudgment change in the personnel of the state supreme court, and wishes to give the new state justices a shot at the case." Post, at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord, Alva- rado v. United States, 497 U. S. 543, 545 (1990) (Rehnquist, 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 174 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Per Curiam C. J., dissenting). Respect for lower courts, the public inter- est in finality of judgments, and concern about our own ex- panding certiorari docket all counsel against undisciplined GVR'ing. It remains to apply these principles to the facts of this case. The feature of this case that, in our view, makes a GVR order appropriate is the new interpretation of the Social Security Act that the Solicitor General informs us that the Social Security Administration, the agency charged with implementing that Act, has adopted. As Justice Scalia's dissent notes, post, at 187, we have not settled whether and to what extent deference is due to an administrative interpre- ation-its "lega[l] cognizab[ility]"-in a case that has already reached the appeal or certiorari stage when that interpreta- tion is adopted. But in our view, see supra, at 172­173, such uncertainty does not preclude a GVR. Indeed, it is pre- cisely because we are uncertain, without undertaking ple- nary analysis, of the legal impact of a new development, es- pecially one, such as the present, which the lower court has had no opportunity to consider, that we GVR. Here, as in Schmidt, supra, the Solicitor General has recommended judi- cial reconsideration of the merits, while not conceding the petitioner's ultimate entitlement to statutory benefits, based on a new statutory interpretation that will apparently be applied, and will probably be entitled to deference, in future cases nationwide. Here, as in Schmidt, our summary re- view leads us to the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals would conclude that the timing of the agency's interpretation does not preclude the deference that it would otherwise receive, and that it may be outcome determinative in this case. A GVR order is, therefore, appropriate, subject to the equities. As to the equities, it seems clear that they favor a GVR order here. That disposition has the Government's express support, notwithstanding that its purpose is to give the Court of Appeals the opportunity to consider an administra- tive interpretation that appears contrary to the Govern- 516us1$13J 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 175 Stevens, J., concurring ment's narrow self-interest. And the Government has in- formed us that it intends to apply that interpretation to future cases nationwide. Giving Lawrence a chance to ben- efit from it furthers fairness by treating Lawrence like other future benefits applicants. We acknowledge the dissent's concern that postlitigation interpretations may be the product of unfair or manipulative Government litigating strategies, see post, at 187, and we therefore view late changes of position by the Government with some skepti- cism. That general concern does not, however, appear to us to require that we deprive Lawrence of the benefit of a favorable administrative reinterpretation in these partic- ular circumstances. We believe, therefore, that the equities and legal uncertainties of this case together merit a GVR order.2 Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the position taken in the brief for respondent filed by the Solicitor General, August 17, 1995. Justice Stevens, concurring.* The Court persuasively explains why we have "the power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue that is properly before us in our appellate capacity." Ante, at 166. That conclusion comports with a primary characteristic-and, I believe, virtue-of our discretionary authority to manage our certiorari docket: our ability to 2 In a letter filed on October 24, 1995, the Solicitor General advised this Court of a July 1995 amendment to the North Carolina paternity statute, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 49­14(c). We find it unnecessary to decide whether this development independently justifies our GVR order. The Court of Appeals is free to consider its significance on remand. *[This opinion applies also to No. 94­8988, Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193.] 516us1$13I 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 176 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. apply the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach that Justice Scalia finds objectionable. Post, at 191. The Court's wise disposition of these petitions falls squarely within the best traditions of its administration of that docket. I therefore join the Court's opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in No. 94­9323 and dissenting in No. 94­8988, post, p. 193. I agree, for the reasons given by Justice Scalia, that the Court is mistaken in vacating the judgment in No. 94­8988, Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193. I also agree with much of the rest of Justice Scalia's dissent, but I do not agree with that portion, post, at 179, dealing with what he describes as "situations calling forth the special deference owed to state law and state courts in our system of federal- ism." Of the three cases that he cites for this proposition, one, Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126 (1927), came to this Court on writ of error and therefore was required to be decided on the merits. The second, State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154 (1945), came to us on appeal from a State Supreme Court, and was thus also required to be decided on the mer- its. The third, Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232 (1944), was a case in which certiorari had already been granted, and the case argued on the merits. None of them, then, involved a choice between denying certiorari, on the one hand, and simply vacating the judgment of the lower court without any opinion, on the other. Vacating a judgment without expla- nation when the alternative is to simply deny certiorari in- volves at best the correction of perceived error made by the lower courts. In this connection, we would do well to bear in mind the admonition of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, one of the architects of the Certiorari Act of 1925, as described by his biographer: "It was vital, he said in opening his drive for the Judges' bill, that cases before the Court be reduced without lim- 516us1$13H 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 177 Scalia, J., dissenting iting the function of pronouncing `the last word on every important issue under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States.' A Supreme Court, on the other hand, should not be a tribunal obligated to weigh justice among contesting parties. " `They have had all they have a right to claim,' Taft said, `when they have had two courts in which to have adjudicated their controversy.' " 2 H. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 997­998 (1939). I agree with the decision announced in the per curiam to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in No. 94­9323, Lawrence v. Chater. Whether or not the change of position by the Social Security Administration is "cognizable," in the words of Justice Scalia, post, at 187, it is perfectly reasonable to request the Court of Appeals to answer that question in the first instance. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.* I dissent because I believe that the dispositions in both No. 94­8988, post, p. 193, and No. 94­9323, ante, p. 163, are improper extensions of our limited power to vacate without first finding error below. It sometimes occurs that, after having considered the lower court decision and found error, an appellate court merely reverses or vacates and then remands-that is, it sets the judgment aside and sends the case back to the lower court for further proceedings, rather than entering or direct- ing entry of judgment for the appellant or petitioner. That is the appropriate course whenever the finding of error does not automatically entitle the appellant or petitioner to judg- ment, and the appellate court cannot conduct (or chooses not to conduct) the further inquiry necessary to resolve the ques- *[This opinion applies also to No. 94­8988, Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193.] 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 178 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting tions remaining in the litigation. Our books are full of such cases, from Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6 (1794), and Clarke v. Russel, 3 Dall. 415 (1799), to Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 (1995), and Tuggle v. Netherland, ante, p. 10. What is at issue here, however, is a different sort of crea- ture, which might be called "no-fault V&R": vacation of a judgment and remand without any determination of error in the judgment below. In our discretionary certiorari system of review, such an order has acquired the acronym "GVR"- for the Court grants certiorari, vacates the judgment below, and remands for further proceedings.1 The question pre- sented by today's cases is whether there is any limitation (other than the mandate "do what is fair") upon this practice. The Court's per curiam opinions answer "no"; I disagree. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2106 provides that "[t]he Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, mod- ify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appro- priate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circum- stances." This facially unlimited statutory text is subject to the implicit limitations imposed by traditional practice and by the nature of the appellate system created by the Consti- tution and laws of the United States. The inferior federal courts (to say nothing of state courts) are not the creatures 1 I emphasize that what is at issue here is our power to set aside a valid judgment-not, as Justice Stevens' concurrence would have it, "our dis- cretionary authority to manage our certiorari docket." Ante, at 175. We do the latter by accepting or declining review. But "[w]henever this Court grants certiorari and vacates a court of appeals judgment in order to allow that court to reconsider its decision . . . , the Court is acting on the merits." Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 25­26 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, today's orders go far beyond what Justice Stevens now refers to as "administration of [our certiorari] docket." Ante, at 176. 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 179 Scalia, J., dissenting and agents of this body-as are masters, whose work we may reject and send back for redoing at our own pleasure. Inferior courts are separately authorized in the Constitution, see Art. I, § 8; Art. III, § 1, created by Acts of Congress, see, e. g., Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73; Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, and staffed by judges whose manner of appointment and tenure of office are the same as our own, see U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2; Art. III, § 1; 28 U. S. C. §§ 44, 133, 134. Despite the unqualified language of § 2106, we can- not, for example, "reverse" a judgment of one of these courts "and direct the entry" of a different judgment whenever we disagree with what has been done, but only when we can identify a controlling error of law. And I think we cannot "vacate" and "remand" in the circumstances here. The Court today seeks to portray our no-fault V&R prac- tice as traditionally covering a kaleidoscopic diversity of situ- ations. See Lawrence v. Chater, ante, at 166­167. That is in my view a misportrayal; the practice has always been lim- ited to a few discrete categories of cases. It began, appar- ently, in situations calling forth the special deference owed to state law and state courts in our system of federalism. In Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126 (1927), for example, rather than find error on the basis of the federal constitutional claims raised, this Court set aside the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings so that it could consider the meaning and effect of a state statute that had been enacted after its judgment had been entered. We reasoned that "[w]hile this Court may decide these [state-law] questions, it is not obliged to do so, and in view of their nature, we deem it appropriate to refer the determination to the state court." Id., at 131. In other words, we left it to the state court to decide the effect of the intervening event, rather than follow our usual practice of deciding that question for ourselves, see, e. g., Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 456­458 (1865). See generally United 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 180 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801) ("If, sub- sequent to the judgment [entered by a lower court], and be- fore the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied."). Later cases took the same deferential approach to state courts when the interven- ing event consisted of one of our own opinions. See, e. g., State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511 (1939). By 1945, we could state that it was "[a] customary procedure" for the Court "to vacate the judgment of [a] state court where there has been a supervening event since its rendition which alters the basis upon which the judgment rests, and to remand the case so that the court from which it came might reconsider the question in light of the changed circum- stances." State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 161 (1945). Similarly, where a federal court of ap- peals' decision on a point of state law had been cast in doubt by an intervening state supreme court decision, it became our practice to vacate and remand so that the question could be decided by judges "familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law and practice." Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237 (1944). The "intervening event" branch of our no-fault V&R prac- tice has been extended to the seemingly analogous situation (though not one implicating the special needs of federalism) in which an intervening event (ordinarily a postjudgment de- cision of this Court) has cast doubt on the judgment ren- dered by a lower federal court or a state court concerning a federal question. See, e. g., Amer v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Los Angeles, 334 U. S. 813 (1948); Goldbaum v. United States, 348 U. S. 905 (1955); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U. S. 776 (1964). This is undoubtedly the largest category of "GVRs" that now exists. See, e. g., Exxon Corp. v. Youell, post, p. 801; Kapoor v. United States, post, p. 801; Edmond v. United States, post, p. 802; Pacesetter Constr. Co. v. Carpenters 46 Northern Cal. Ctys. Conference Bd., post, p. 802; Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U. S. 1129 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 181 Scalia, J., dissenting (1995); Calamia v. Singletary, 514 U. S. 1124 (1995). We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue as a case on which certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted in order that (if appropriate) they may be "GVR'd" when the case is decided. More recently, we have indulged in the practice of vacating and remanding in light of a decision of ours that preceded the judgment in question, but by so little time that the lower court might have been unaware of it. See, e. g., Grier v. United States, 419 U. S. 989 (1974). These applications of no-fault V&R have noth- ing to do with federalism, but they are appropriate to pre- serve the operational premise of a multitiered judicial sys- tem (viz., that lower courts will have the first opportunity to apply the governing law to the facts) and to avoid the unseemliness of holding judgments to be in error on the basis of law that did not exist when the judgments were rendered below. They thus serve the interests of efficiency and of concern for the dignity of state and lower federal tribunals. An entirely separate branch of our no-fault V&R jurispru- dence, but again one that originates in the special needs of federalism, pertains to decisions of state supreme courts that are ambiguous as to whether they rest on state-law or federal-law grounds. Rather than run the risk of improp- erly reversing a judgment based on state law, we adopted the practice of vacating and remanding so that the state court could make the reasons for its judgment clear. See, e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 (1940); Department of Mental Hygiene of Cal. v. Kirchner, 380 U. S. 194 (1965).2 2 In Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), we largely supplanted this policy with the rule that state-court decisions discussing federal law will be presumed to be based on federal law unless the contrary is clear from the face of the opinion. Id., at 1037­1044; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 6­9 (1995) (reaffirming this approach). But cf. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 466 U. S. 378 (1984) (post-Long decision vacating and remanding for clarification of state supreme court decision rendered with- out opinion). 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 182 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting We have GVR'd with increasing frequency in recent years on the basis of suggestions or representations made by the Solicitor General. Some of these cases are nothing more than examples of the "intervening-event GVR" discussed above, the Solicitor General pointing out that a case or stat- ute has intervened since the judgment below. See, e. g., Woods v. Durr, 336 U. S. 941 (1949); Altiere v. United States, 382 U. S. 367 (1966). We have also announced no-fault GVR's, however, when there has been no intervening de- velopment other than the Solicitor General's confession of error in the judgment. That is a relatively new practice. As recently as 1942 a unanimous Court (two Justices not participating) wrote the following: "The public trust reposed in the law enforcement offi- cers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent. But such a confession does not relieve this Court of the per- formance of the judicial function. The considered judg- ment of the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed is entitled to great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to examine inde- pendently the errors confessed. . . . Furthermore, our judgments are precedents, and the proper administra- tion of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of the parties. . . ." Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257, 258­259 (1942). Cf. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18 (1994) (setting aside of a valid judicial judgment should not turn upon agreement of the parties). Many of the early GVR's based upon the Government's confession of error appear not to have been no-fault V&R's at all, but rather summary decisions on the merits, with remand for further proceedings. See, e. g., Chiarella v. United States, 341 U. S. 946 (1951) ("[u]pon consideration of the record and 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 183 Scalia, J., dissenting the confession of error by the Solicitor General," remanding to the District Court for resentencing) (emphasis added); Penner v. United States, 399 U. S. 522 (1970) ("[o]n the basis of a confession of error by the Solicitor General and of an independent review of the record," remanding to the District Court "with instructions to dismiss the indictment"). Our recent practice, however, has been to remand in light of the confession of error without determining the merits, leaving it to the lower court to decide if the confession is correct. As late as 1981, the current Chief Justice, joined by Justice White, objected to this practice. See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 407 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I harbor serious doubt that our adversary sys- tem of justice is well served by . . . routinely vacating judg- ments which the Solicitor General questions without any in- dependent examination of the merits on our own"). I agree with that position. The practice is by now well entrenched, however. See, e. g., Reed v. United States, 510 U. S. 1188 (1994); Ramirez v. United States, 510 U. S. 1103 (1994). It may be considered a separate category of no-fault V&R. Finally (and most questionably) we have in very recent years GVR'd where the Solicitor General has not conceded error in the judgment below, but has merely acknowledged that the ground, or one of the grounds, on which the lower court relied was mistaken. See, e. g., Alvarado v. United States, 497 U. S. 543 (1990); Chappell v. United States, 494 U. S. 1075 (1990). That is in my view a mistaken practice, since we should not assume that a court of appeals has adopted a legal position only because the Government sup- ported it. Four Justices now sitting on the Court have disapproved this sort of GVR. See Alvarado, supra, at 545 (Rehnquist, C. J., joined by O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).3 3 The Court misdescribes my position when it states that I would limit GVR's "based on confessions of error that do not purport to concede the whole case" to "cases in which the confession of error concerns a `legal 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 184 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting Today's cases come within none of these categories of no- fault V&R, not even the questionable last one. In Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193, the decision "in light of" which we vacate the judgment and remand, Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380 (1993), had been on the books for well more than a year before the Eleventh Circuit announced the judgment under review, and for almost two years before that court denied rehearing. Moreover, the parties specifically argued to the Court of Appeals the question whether Pioneer estab- lished the standard applicable to petitioner's claim of "excus- able neglect" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), with the United States disagreeing with petitioner and taking the position that Pioneer was not controlling. The Eleventh Circuit ruled against petitioner on the merits of his claim; its one-sentence order contained neither a reference to Pioneer nor any suggestion that the court viewed the case as turning on which party's proffered standard was applied. The United States has now revised its legal position and- though it makes no suggestion that the Court of Appeals' judgment was incorrect-is of the view that Pioneer does establish the standard governing petitioner's claim. But the fact that the party who won below repudiates on certiorari its position on a particular point of law does not give rise to any "intervening," postjudgment factor that must be consid- ered. The law is the law, whatever the parties, including the United States, may have argued. As described above, point on which the lower court explicitly relied.' " Ante, at 171 (quoting infra, at 185). Both the text above and the sentence immediately follow- ing the phrase that the Court quotes from my dissent, see ibid., make my position clear. The line of distinction I would draw-and the one long established in our practice-is between a respondent's concession of error in the lower court's judgment and a respondent's concession of error that goes not to the judgment but merely to an aspect of the reasoning below or of respondent's argument below. 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 185 Scalia, J., dissenting we have sometimes GVR'd where the Government has, while still supporting the judgment in its favor, conceded the error of a legal point on which the lower court explicitly relied. As I have explained, see supra, at 183, in my view even that practice denies valid judgments the respect to which they are entitled. But the GVR in the present case goes still further. We do not know in this case whether the Eleventh Circuit even agreed with the Government's position that has now been repudiated; for all we know, the court applied Pio- neer and found against petitioner under that standard. The judgment is declared invalid because the Eleventh Circuit might (or might not) have relied on a standard (non-Pioneer) that might (or might not) be wrong, that might (or might not) have affected the outcome, and that the Eleventh Circuit might (or might not) abandon (whether or not it is wrong) because the Government has now abandoned it. This seems to me beyond all reason. The Court justifies its setting aside of the judgment on the ground that "we [do not] place an excessive burden on [the Eleventh Circuit], relative to [petitioner's] liberty and due process interests, by inviting it to clarify its ambiguous rul- ing." Stutson, post, at 196. Vacating for ambiguity may be justifiable, as I have noted, when the ambiguity calls into question our very power to take and decide the case, see supra, at 181, and n. 2. But where that power is (as it is here) beyond doubt, it seems to me quite improper to vacate merely in order to get a better idea of whether the case is "worth" granting full review. If this is appropriate with re- spect to court of appeals' summary dispositions of criminal cases, I see no reason why it is not appropriate with respect to criminal dispositions accompanied by opinions as well. Or, for that matter, why it is not appropriate for civil cases. "GVR'd for clarification of ­­­" should become a common form of order, drastically altering the role of this Court. In my view we have no power to make such a tutelary remand, 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 186 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting as to a schoolboy made to do his homework again.4 The Court insists that declining to remand for clarification would risk "immunizing summary dispositions . . . from our review," Stutson, post, at 196. That is not so. It is fully within our power to review this case, and any other case summarily decided below, by granting certiorari and proceeding to consider the merits; or indeed, where the circumstances warrant, to summarily reverse. Cf. Hellman, "Granted, Va- cated, and Remanded"-Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court Practice, 67 Judicature 389, 391­392 (1984) (noting that in the 1970's as the Court's GVR practice "in- creased far beyond what it had been in earlier years," its use of summary reversal based on intervening precedents decreased dramatically). In No. 94­9323, the Court again GVR's because the Gov- ernment has changed a legal position: The Commissioner of Social Security informs us that she now agrees with peti- tioner on a preliminary point of law that the Court of Ap- peals found in the Government's favor. And here again, re- spondent does not concede that the judgment below was in error, for she "ha[s] not . . . reached a firm conclusion" as to her position on the subsequent point of law that will (if her recantation on the preliminary point is accepted) control the outcome of the case. Brief for Respondent in No. 94­9323, p. 13.5 There is, however, a special factor in this second case: Respondent is an agency head, whose view on the legal point in question is in some circumstances entitled to defer- 4 Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995), upon which the Court relies, see ante, at 170, is not to the contrary. That was not a "no-fault V&R," but a reversal of the lower court for abuse of discretion in its entry of a stay order. 5 Because the Commissioner is not prepared to say that she disagrees with petitioner as to the proper disposition of this case, it is questionable whether any case or controversy subsists. Quite apart from the other difficulties with the course the Court has chosen, it seems to me we should not permit the Commissioner to trouble the Fourth Circuit again until she makes up her mind on this issue. 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 187 Scalia, J., dissenting ence, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If it were clear that re- spondent's change in position were entitled to deference, I would have no problem with the GVR; the new position would then constitute an intervening postjudgment factor whose effect the Court of Appeals should be allowed to con- sider. But even if we allow deference to an agency view first expressed in pending litigation (as some think we should not, see Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. Reg. 1, 60­61 (1990); cf. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 1023 (1992)), surely a decent concern for those litigating against the Government and for our lower court judges should induce us to disregard, for Chevron purposes, a litigating position first expressed at the certiorari stage. The United States is the most frequent, and hence the most calculating, of our litigants. If we accord deference in the circumstances here, we can expect the Government to take full advantage of the opportunity to wash out, on certiorari, disadvantageous positions it has embraced below; and we can expect it to focus less of its energy upon getting its position "right" in the courts of appeals. The Court, however, thinks it unnecessary to decide the deference question. It is enough, as the Court sees it, that its summary review has led it to "believe that [the] agency interpretation is reasonably probably entitled to deference and potentially determinative." Ante, at 172. I do not agree. It seems to me our "intervening-event GVR's" should not be extended to the situation where (1) the inter- vening event consists of a party's going back on what it ar- gued to the court of appeals, and (2) it is not even certain that the change in position is legally cognizable. That seems to me to accord inadequate respect to the work of our col- leagues below. Moreover, it is not clear to me that the ques- tion before us (should an agency change of position at the certiorari stage be accorded deference?) can even be reached 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 188 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting by the Court of Appeals. Surely we do not expect the Court of Appeals to declare our vacation and remand invalid. Thus, the Court of Appeals will have before it the somewhat different question whether the agency change of position be- fore it is entitled to deference. I suppose it may conclude that, since a change of position on certiorari is not entitled to deference, a change of position on a remand triggered by change of position on certiorari is not entitled to deference- but that would assuredly be a convoluted holding. The question of what is permissible on certiorari seems to me peculiarly within the domain of this Court. Since we are in doubt on the deference point in the present case, we should either deny the petition, or grant it and have the deference point argued. The Court's failure to comprehend why it should make any difference that the Government's changed litigating position may not be entitled to deference, see ante, at 172­173, displays a lamentable lack of appreciation of the concept of adding insult to injury. It is disrespectful enough of a lower court to set its considered judgment aside because the Government has altered the playing field on appeal; it is downright insulting to do so when the Government's bait- and-switch performance has not for a certainty altered any factor relevant to the decision. In that situation, at least, we should let the Government live with the consequences of its fickleness or inattention. The Court claims that it would "defeat the purpose of GVR'ing" to determine the deference issue on the merits, since that issue is "based on a circum- stance . . . that will not be present in any other case brought under the statute at issue." Ibid. That is true enough (barring the unlikely event that the Government in a later case under this very statute again switches its position at the certiorari stage). But the issue of whether Chevron def- erence should be accorded to a certiorari-stage switch of liti- gating position is not at all unique to the individual case or bound up with the underlying statute. It always arises, of 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 189 Scalia, J., dissenting course, in an individual case involving a particular statute, as do most questions of law. But the issue itself is thor- oughly generalizable, and of general importance. In any event, I do not urge that we determine the deference issue on the merits; my vote in these cases is to deny the petitions. Finally, I must remark upon the Court's assertion that we issued "just such a GVR order last Term, without recorded dissent," ante, at 173, citing Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994): It is not customary, but quite rare, to record dissents from grants of certiorari, including GVR's. It would be wrong to conclude from the unsigned order in Schmidt that the vote to GVR was unanimous, or even close to unanimous. Thus, Schmidt does not demonstrate that bait-and-switch- deference GVR's are an accepted practice; but the fact that Schmidt was apparently the first-ever such GVR, combined with the fact that the Government is back one Term later for another helping, demonstrates the accuracy of my predic- tion that the Solicitor General will be quick to take advan- tage of this new indulgence. What is more momentous than the Court's judgments in the particular cases before us-each of which extends our prior practice just a little bit-is its expansive expression of the authority that supports those judgments. It acknowl- edges, to begin with, no constitutional limitation on our power to vacate lower court orders properly brought before us. Ante, at 166. This presumably means that the consti- tutional grant of "appellate Jurisdiction" over "Cases . . . arising under [the] Constitution [and] Laws of the United States," Art. III, § 2, empowers the Court to vacate a state supreme court judgment, and remand the case, because it finds the opinion, though arguably correct, incomplete and unworkmanlike; or because it observes that there has been a postjudgment change in the personnel of the state supreme court, and wishes to give the new state justices a shot at the case. I think that is not so. When the Constitution divides our jurisdiction into "original Jurisdiction" and "appellate 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 190 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting Jurisdiction," I think it conveys, with respect to the latter, the traditional accoutrements of appellate power. There doubtless is room for some innovation, particularly such as may be necessary to adapt to a novel system of federalism; but the innovation cannot be limitless without altering the nature of the power conferred. Not only does the Court reject any constitutional limita- tion upon its power to vacate; it is unwilling to submit to any prudential constraint as well. Even while acknowledging the potential for "unfair[ness] or manipulat[ion]" and profess- ing to agree that "our GVR power should be exercised spar- ingly," ante, at 168, 173, the Court commits to no standard that will control that power, other than that cloak for all excesses, "the equities," ante, at 168; see ante, at 173, 174, 175; post, at 196. We may, as the Court now pronounces, set aside valid judgments not merely when they are wrong, not merely when intervening events require that someone (either the lower court or we) reconsider them on new facts or under new legal criteria, not merely when it is ambiguous whether we have power to review them, not merely when the United States concedes that the judgment below (or one of the points of law relied upon below, or even one of the points of law possibly relied upon below) is wrong; but when- ever there is "a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration." Ante, at 167. The power to "revis[e] and correc[t]" for error, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175 (1803), has become a power to void for suspicion. Comparing the modest origins of the Court's no-fault V&R policy with today's expansive de´nouement should make even the most Polly- annish reformer believe in camel's noses, wedges, and slip- pery slopes. The Court justifies its approach on the ground that it "alle- viates the potential for unequal treatment that is inherent in our inability to grant plenary review of all pending cases 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996) 191 Scalia, J., dissenting raising similar issues." Ante, at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted). I do not see how it can promote equal treatment to announce a practice that we cannot possibly pursue in every case. If we were to plumb the "equities" and ponder the "errors" for all the petitions that come before us-if we were to conduct, for example, in all cases involving summary decisions, today's balancing of the "burden" to the Court of Appeals against the litigant's "interests" in having clarification of the ruling, see Stutson, post, at 196, or today's calculation of "the overall probabilities and equities," ante, at 173-we would have no time left for the cases we grant to consider on the merits. Of course we do not purport to conduct such inquiries, not even the basic one of whether the decision below is probably in "error"-which is why we insist that our denial of certiorari does not suggest a view on the merits, see, e. g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 296 (1989); Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 942 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari). More- over, even if we tried applying the Court's "totality-of-the- circumstances" evaluation to all the petitions coming before us, we would be unlikely to achieve equal treatment. Such a plastic criterion is liable to produce inconsistent results in any series of decisions; it is virtually guaranteed to do so in a series of decisions made without benefit of adversary presentation (whether we should GVR is rarely briefed, much less argued-as it has not been here) and announced without accompaniment of a judicial opinion (we almost never give reasons as the Court has done today). The need to afford equal treatment argues precisely against the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach embraced by the Court, and in favor of a more modest but standardized GVR practice. Henceforth, I shall vote for an order granting certiorari, vacating the judgment below without determination of the merits, and remanding for further consideration, only (1) where an intervening factor has arisen that has a legal bear- 516us1$13K 10-22-98 11:15:07 PAGES OPINPGT 192 LAWRENCE v. CHATER Scalia, J., dissenting ing upon the decision, (2) where, in a context not governed by Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), clarification of the opinion below is needed to assure our jurisdiction, and (3) (in acknowledgment of established practice, though not necessarily in agreement with its validity) where the re- spondent or appellee confesses error in the judgment below. (I shall not necessarily note my dissent from GVR's where those conditions do not exist.) As I have discussed, neither of the present cases meets these standards. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from today's orders and would deny both petitions. 516us1$14z 10-22-98 11:16:14 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 193 Syllabus STUTSON v. UNITED STATES on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 94­8988. Decided January 8, 1996 The District Court held that petitioner Stutson's untimely appeal from his federal conviction and prison sentence was not the result of excusable neglect within the meaning of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) because his lawyer's office mailed his notice of appeal so that it arrived one working day late and at the Court of Appeals rather than at the District Court. The court's opinion did not advert to this Court's hold- ing in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380, that, in some circumstances, a party's inad- vertent failure to file a proof of claim in a timely manner in bankruptcy proceedings is excusable neglect under the bankruptcy rules. On ap- peal, the Government argued that Pioneer did not apply to the Rule 4(b) criminal appeal context, and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal without hearing oral argument or writing an opinion. In re- sponse to Stutson's certiorari petition, the Government has reversed its position, adopting the view of six Courts of Appeals that the Pioneer standard applies in Rule 4 cases. Held: Using the analysis set forth in Lawrence v. Chater, ante, p. 163 (per curiam), the particularities of this case merit an order granting the petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment below, and remanding the case (GVR). There appears to be a reasonable probability that the Eleventh Circuit will reach a different conclusion on remand, and the equities clearly favor a GVR order. The exceptional combination of circumstances here-the Government has repudiated the position that it advanced below; the only opinion below did not consider the import of a recent Supreme Court precedent which both parties now agree applies; the Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed that decision; all six Courts of Appeals that have addressed the applicability of Pioneer have concluded that it applies to Rule 4 cases; and Stutson is in jail having, through no fault of his own, had no plenary consideration of his appeal- presents ample justification for the order. Here, as in Lawrence, a GVR order guarantees Stutson full and fair consideration of his rights in light of all pertinent considerations, and is also satisfactory to the Government. The order both promotes fairness and respects the Elev- enth Circuit's dignity by enabling it to consider potentially relevant deci- sions and arguments that were not previously before it. Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded. 516us1$14J 10-22-98 11:16:14 PAGES OPINPGT 194 STUTSON v. UNITED STATES Per Curiam Per Curiam. Our per curiam opinion issued today in a civil case, Law- rence v. Chater, ante, p. 163; contains a general discussion of the considerations that properly influence this Court in deciding whether to grant a petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) for further consideration in light of potentially pertinent matters which it appears that the lower court may not have considered. Here, we apply that analysis to a criminal case, again finding that the particularities of the case before us merit a GVR. Stutson, the petitioner in this case, is currently serving a federal prison sentence of 292 months for cocaine possession. He has had no appellate review of his legal arguments against conviction and sentence. The District Court held that his appeal was untimely and that the untimeliness was not the result of "excusable neglect" within the meaning of Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, be- cause his lawyer's office mailed his notice of appeal so that it arrived one working day late for the 10-day deadline, and at the Court of Appeals, when it should have been sent to the District Court. The District Court's opinion did not advert to our decision in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380 (1993), rendered one day before Stutson's brief was due in the Dis- trict Court and not cited in the briefs before that court. In Pioneer, we held that a party could in some circumstances rely on his attorney's inadvertent failure to file a proof of claim in a timely manner in bankruptcy proceedings as "ex- cusable neglect" under the bankruptcy rules. Stutson appealed the District Court's ruling. In their briefs to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the parties disputed the applicability of Pioneer's liberal under- standing of "excusable neglect" to the Rule 4(b) criminal appeal context, the Government contending that it applied only in bankruptcy cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court and dismissed Stutson's appeal without 516us1$14J 10-22-98 11:16:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 193 (1996) 195 Per Curiam hearing oral argument or writing an opinion. Now, in his response to Stutson's petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General has reversed the Government's position. This change of position follows the unanimous view of the six Courts of Appeals that, unlike the Eleventh Circuit in this case, have expressly addressed this new and important issue, and have held that the Pioneer standard applies in Rule 4 cases. See United States v. Clark, 51 F. 3d 42, 44 (CA5 1995) (Rule 4(b)); United States v. Hooper, 9 F. 3d 257, 259 (CA2 1993) (same); Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F. 3d 1041, 1045­1046 (CA10 1994) (Rule 4(a)(5)), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1191 (1995); Fink v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 65 F. 3d 722 (CA8 1995) (same); Reynolds v. Wagner, 55 F. 3d 1426, 1429 (CA9) (same), cert. denied, post, p. 932; Virella-Nieves v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 53 F. 3d 451, 454, n. 3 (CA1 1995) (same).* In sum, this is a case where (1) the prevailing party below, the Government, has now repudiated the legal position that it advanced below; (2) the only opinion below did not consider the import of a recent Supreme Court precedent that both parties now agree applies; (3) the Court of Appeals sum- marily affirmed that decision; (4) all six Courts of Appeals that have addressed the applicability of the Supreme Court decision that the District Court did not apply in this case have concluded that it applies to Rule 4 cases; and (5) the petitioner is in jail having, through no fault of his own, had no plenary consideration of his appeal. While "we `should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error,' " Law- rence, ante, at 171 (quoting Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), this excep- *Clark, Fink, Reynolds, and Virella-Nieves were decided after the Court of Appeals in this case denied Stutson's petition for rehearing. Chanute and Hooper were decided after the District Court's decision in this case but before that of the Court of Appeals. 516us1$14J 10-22-98 11:16:14 PAGES OPINPGT 196 STUTSON v. UNITED STATES Per Curiam tional combination of circumstances presents ample justifi- cation for a GVR order. It appears to us that there is at least a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals will reach a different conclusion on remand, and the equities clearly favor a GVR order. If the Court of Appeals here, in its summary affirmance, did not rely on the Government's primary argument and the lower court's basic premise-that Pioneer did not apply-it does not seem to us that we place an excessive burden on it, relative to Stutson's liberty and due process interests, by inviting it to clarify its ambiguous ruling. A contrary ap- proach would risk effectively immunizing summary disposi- tions by courts of appeals from our review, since it is rare that their basis for decision is entirely unambiguous. See Lawrence, ante, at 170 (discussing Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995)). If, on the other hand, the Court of Ap- peals did not fully consider the applicability of Pioneer, or if it concluded that Pioneer does not apply under Rule 4, it might well conclude that while "[t]he law is the law," ante, at 184 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the combination of the Gov- ernment's change of position and the subsequent contrary decisions of four other Courts of Appeals shed light on the law applicable to this case. If it continues to conclude that Pioneer does not apply, it will be useful for us to have the benefit of its views so that we may resolve the resulting con- flict between the Circuits. Finally, it is not insignificant that this is a criminal case. When a litigant is subject to the continuing coercive power of the Government in the form of imprisonment, our legal traditions reflect a certain solicitude for his rights, to which the important public interests in judicial efficiency and final- ity must occasionally be accommodated. We have pre- viously refused to allow technicalities that caused no preju- dice to the prosecution to preclude a remand under 28 U. S. C. § 2106 (1988 ed.) "in the interests of justice." Wood 516us1$14J 10-22-98 11:16:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 193 (1996) 197 Per Curiam v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981). And procedural accommodations to prisoners are a familiar aspect of our ju- risprudence. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1988 ed.) (habeas review in spite of an adverse final appellate decision); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985) (relief for ineffective assistance of retained counsel on appeal); Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 63­64 (1970) (unlike in civil cases, time limits for petitions for certiorari in criminal cases are not jurisdic- tional). To the extent that the dissent suggests that it is inconsistent with our "traditional practice," ante, at 178 (opinion of Scalia, J.), to call upon a Court of Appeals to reconsider its dismissal of a prisoner's appeal because his lawyer filed it one day late, in circumstances where the Court of Appeals' decision may have been premised on the assump- tion, unanimously rejected by other Courts of Appeals, that more stringent rules as to filing deadlines apply to prisoners than to creditors filing claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, we must respectfully disagree. Judicial efficiency and finality are important values, and our GVR power should not be exercised for "[m]ere conven- ience," cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 (1942). "But dry formalism should not sterilize procedural resources which Congress has made available to the federal courts." Ibid. In this case, as in Lawrence v. Chater, a GVR order guarantees to the petitioner full and fair consideration of his rights in light of all pertinent consid- erations, and is also satisfactory to the Government. In this case, as in Lawrence, a GVR order both promotes fairness and respects the dignity of the Court of Appeals by enabling it to consider potentially relevant decisions and arguments that were not previously before it. Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for 516us1$14J 10-22-98 11:16:14 PAGES OPINPGT 198 STUTSON v. UNITED STATES Per Curiam further consideration in light of Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380 (1993). [For concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, see ante, p. 175; for dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice, see ante, p. 176; for dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, see ante, p. 177.] 516us1$15Z 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 199 Syllabus YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A., et al. v. CALHOUN et al., individually and as administrators of the ESTATE OF CALHOUN, DECEASED certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 94­1387. Argued October 31, 1995-Decided January 9, 1996 Twelve-year-old Natalie Calhoun was killed in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a jet ski manufactured and distrib- uted by petitioners Yamaha. Natalie's parents, respondents Calhoun, filed this federal diversity and admiralty action for damages against Yamaha, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes. The District Court agreed with Yamaha that the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, controlled to the exclusion of state law. In its order presenting the matter for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), the District Court certified questions of law concerning the recoverability of particular items of damages under Moragne. The Third Circuit granted interlocutory review, but the panel to which the appeal was assigned did not reach the questions presented in the certified order. Instead, the panel addressed and re- solved an anterior issue; it held that state remedies remain applicable in accident cases of this type and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne. Held:1. Section 1292(b) provides that "[w]hen a district judge, in making . . . an order not otherwise appealable . . . , shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate ap- peal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order," and specifies that "the Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order" (emphasis added). As that text indicates, the court of appeals can exercise interlocutory jurisdiction over any question fairly included within the order certified by the dis- trict court, and is not limited to the particular questions of law therein formulated. Pp. 204­205. 2. In maritime wrongful-death cases in which no federal statute speci- fies the appropriate relief and the decedent was not a seaman, longshore 516us1$15Z 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT 200 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Syllabus worker, or person otherwise engaged in a maritime trade, state reme- dies remain applicable and have not been displaced by the wrongful- death action recognized in Moragne. Pp. 206­216. (a) In The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, this Court ruled that the gen- eral maritime law (a species of judge-made federal common law) did not afford a cause of action for wrongful death. Federal admiralty courts, prior to Moragne, tempered the harshness of The Harrisburg's rule by allowing recovery under state wrongful-death and survival statutes in maritime accident cases. See, e. g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233. Such state laws proved an adequate supplement to federal maritime law, until a series of this Court's decisions transformed the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness into a rule making shipowners strictly liable to seamen injured by the owners' failure to supply safe ships. See, e. g., Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96. By the time Moragne was decided, claims premised on unseaworthiness had become "the principal vehicle for recovery" by seamen and other mari- time workers injured or killed in the course of their employment. 398 U. S., at 399. The disparity between the unseaworthiness doctrine's strict liability standard and negligence-based state wrongful-death stat- utes prompted the Moragne Court, id., at 409, to overrule The Harris- burg and hold that an action "lie[s] under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties." Pp. 206­209. (b) This Court rejects Yamaha's argument that Moragne's wrongful-death action covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorial waters, and ousting all state remedies previously available to supplement general maritime law. The uniformity concerns that prompted the Moragne Court to overrule The Harrisburg related to ships and the workers who serve them, and to the frequent unavailability of unseaworthiness, a distinctively maritime substantive concept, as a basis of liability under state law. See 398 U. S., at 395­396. The concerns underly- ing Moragne were of a different order than those invoked by Yamaha. Notably, Yamaha seeks the contraction of remedies, not the extension of relief in light of the "humane and liberal" character of admiralty pro- ceedings recognized in Moragne. See id., at 387. The Moragne Court tied its petitioner's unseaworthiness plea to a federal right-of-action an- chor, but left in place the negligence claim she had stated under Flori- da's law, and thus showed no hostility to concurrent application of state wrongful-death statutes that might provide a more generous remedy. Cf. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U. S. 715, 724. No congression- ally prescribed, comprehensive tort recovery regime prevents such en- largement of damages here. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 30­36. The only relevant congressional disposition, the Death on 516us1$15Z 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 201 Opinion of the Court the High Seas Act (DOHSA), states that "[t]he provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter." 46 U. S. C. App. § 767. This state- ment, by its terms, simply stops DOHSA from displacing state law in territorial waters. See, e. g., Miles, supra, at 25. Taking into account what Congress sought to achieve, however, the Court preserves the application of state statutes to deaths within territorial waters. Pp. 209­216. 40 F. 3d 622, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James W. Bartlett III argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jonathan Dryer, William R. Hoffman, and Francis P. Manchisi. Paul A. Engelmayer argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, David V. Hutchinson, and Edward Himmelfarb. Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were William J. Taylor and Timothy R. Chapin.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Twelve-year-old Natalie Calhoun was killed in a jet ski accident on July 6, 1989. At the time of her death, she was vacationing with family friends at a beach-front resort in Puerto Rico. Alleging that the jet ski was defectively de- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc., et al. by Michael F. Sturley; for the Maritime Law Association of the United States by Warren J. Marwedel, Dennis Minichello, and Chester D. Hooper; and for the National Marine Manufacturers Association by George J. Koelzer and Joshua S. Force. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Ross Diamond III and Pamela Liapakis; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT 202 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court signed or made, Natalie's parents sought to recover from the manufacturer pursuant to state survival and wrongful-death statutes. The manufacturer contended that state remedies could not be applied because Natalie died on navigable wa- ters; federal, judge-declared maritime law, the manufacturer urged, controlled to the exclusion of state law. Traditionally, state remedies have been applied in accident cases of this order-maritime wrongful-death cases in which no federal statute specifies the appropriate relief and the de- cedent was not a seaman, longshore worker, or person other- wise engaged in a maritime trade. We hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that state remedies remain applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970). I Natalie Calhoun, the 12-year-old daughter of respondents Lucien and Robin Calhoun, died in a tragic accident on July 6, 1989. On vacation with family friends at a resort hotel in Puerto Rico, Natalie had rented a "WaveJammer" jet ski manufactured by Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., and distrib- uted by Yamaha Motor Corporation, U. S. A. (collectively, Yamaha), the petitioners in this case. While riding the WaveJammer, Natalie slammed into a vessel anchored in the waters off the hotel frontage, and was killed. The Calhouns, individually and in their capacities as ad- ministrators of their daughter's estate, sued Yamaha in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8301­8302 (1982 and Supp. 1995), the Calhouns asserted several bases for recov- ery (including negligence, strict liability, and breach of im- plied warranties), and sought damages for lost future earn- ings, loss of society, loss of support and services, and funeral expenses, as well as punitive damages. They grounded fed- 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 203 Opinion of the Court eral jurisdiction on both diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332,1 and admiralty, 28 U. S. C. § 1333. Yamaha moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the federal maritime wrongful-death action this Court recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970), provided the exclusive basis for recovery, dis- placing all remedies afforded by state law. Under Moragne, Yamaha contended, the Calhouns could recover as damages only Natalie's funeral expenses. The District Court agreed with Yamaha that Moragne's maritime death action dis- placed state remedies; the court held, however, that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable under Moragne. Both sides asked the District Court to present questions for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). The District Court granted the parties' requests, and in its § 1292(b) certifying order stated: "Natalie Calhoun, the minor child of plaintiffs Lucien B. Calhoun and Robin L. Calhoun, who are Pennsylvania residents, was killed in an accident not far off shore in Puerto Rico, in the territorial waters of the United States. Plaintiffs have brought a diversity suit against, inter alia, defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U. S. A. and Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. The counts of the complaint directed against the Yamaha defendants allege that the accident was caused by a defect or de- fects in a Yamaha jet ski which Natalie Calhoun had rented and was using at the time of the fatal accident. Those counts sound in negligence, in strict liability, and in implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. The district court has concluded that admiralty jurisdic- tion attaches to these several counts and that they 1 The Calhouns are citizens of Pennsylvania. Yamaha Motor Corpora- tion, U. S. A., is incorporated and has its principal place of business in California; Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., is incorporated and has its prin- cipal place of business in Japan. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT 204 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court constitute a federal maritime cause of action. The questions of law certified to the Court of Appeals are whether, pursuant to such a maritime cause of action, plaintiffs may seek to recover (1) damages for the loss of the society of their deceased minor child, (2) damages for the loss of their child's future earnings, and (3) puni- tive damages." App. to Pet. for Cert. A­78. Although the Court of Appeals granted the interlocutory review petition, the panel to which the appeal was assigned did not reach the questions presented in the certified order, for it determined that an anterior issue was pivotal. The District Court, as just recounted, had concluded that any damages the Calhouns might recover from Yamaha would be governed exclusively by federal maritime law. But the Third Circuit panel questioned that conclusion and inquired whether state wrongful-death and survival statutes supplied the remedial prescriptions for the Calhouns' complaint. The appellate panel asked whether the state remedies endured or were "displaced by a federal maritime rule of decision." 40 F. 3d 622, 624 (1994). Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled that state-law remedies apply in this case. Id., at 644. II In our order granting certiorari, we asked the parties to brief a preliminary question: "Under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), can the courts of appeals exercise jurisdiction over any question that is included within the order that contains the controlling question of law identified by the district court?" 514 U. S. 1126 (1995). The answer to that question, we are satisfied, is yes. Section 1292(b) provides, in pertinent part: "When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 205 Opinion of the Court for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate ter- mination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order." (Emphasis added.) As the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction ap- plies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court. The court of appeals may not reach beyond the certi- fied order to address other orders made in the case. United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669, 677 (1987). But the appel- late court may address any issue fairly included within the certified order because "it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court." 9 J. Moore & B. Ward, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 110.25[1], p. 300 (2d ed. 1995). See also 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & E. Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3929, pp. 144­145 (1977) ("[T]he court of appeals may re- view the entire order, either to consider a question different than the one certified as controlling or to decide the case despite the lack of any identified controlling question."); Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), 88 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 628­629 (1975) ("scope of review [includes] all issues material to the order in question"). We therefore proceed to the issue on which certiorari was granted: Does the federal maritime claim for wrongful death recognized in Moragne supply the exclusive remedy in cases involving the deaths of nonseafarers 2 in territorial waters? 2 By "nonseafarers," we mean persons who are neither seamen covered by the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688 (1988 ed.), nor longshore workers covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT 206 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court III Because this case involves a watercraft collision on naviga- ble waters, it falls within admiralty's domain. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 361­367 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668, 677 (1982). "With admiralty jurisdiction," we have often said, "comes the application of substantive admiralty law." East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986). The exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, however, "does not result in automatic displacement of state law." Jerome B. Gru- bart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U. S. 527, 545 (1995). Indeed, prior to Moragne, federal admiralty courts routinely applied state wrongful-death and survival statutes in maritime accident cases.3 The question before us is whether Moragne should be read to stop that practice. Our review of maritime wrongful-death law begins with The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886), where we held that the general maritime law (a species of judge-made federal common law) did not afford a cause of action for wrongful death. The Harrisburg Court said that wrongful-death ac- tions are statutory and may not be created by judicial decree. The Court did not question the soundness of this view, or examine the historical justifications that account for it. In- stead, the Court merely noted that common law in the United States, like the common law of England, did not allow recovery "for an injury which results in death," id., at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that no country had "adopted a different rule on this subject for the sea from that which it maintains on the land," id., at 213. The Court did not consider itself free to chart a different course by crafting a judge-made wrongful-death action under our maritime law. Federal admiralty courts tempered the harshness of The Harrisburg's rule by allowing recovery under state 3 Throughout this opinion, for economy, we use the term wrongful-death remedies or statutes to include survival statutes. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 207 Opinion of the Court wrongful-death statutes. See, e. g., The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (1907); The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98 (SDNY 1893).4 We reaffirmed this practice in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921), by holding that California's wrongful- death statute governed a suit brought by the widow of a maritime worker killed in that State's territorial waters. Though we had generally refused to give effect to state laws regarded as inconsonant with the substance of federal mari- time law, we concluded that extending state wrongful-death statutes to fatal accidents in territorial waters was compati- ble with substantive maritime policies: "The subject is mari- time and local in character and the specified modification of or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty courts . . . will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." Id., at 242.5 On similar reasoning, we also held that state survival statutes may be applied in cases arising out of accidents in territorial waters. See Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383, 391­392 (1941). State wrongful-death statutes proved an adequate supple- ment to federal maritime law, until a series of this Court's 4 Congress also mitigated the impact of The Harrisburg by enacting two statutes affording recovery for wrongful death. In 1920, Congress passed the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U. S. C. App. § 761 et seq. (1988 ed.), which provides a federal claim for wrongful death occurring more than three nautical miles from the shore of any State or Territory. In that same year, Congress also passed the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688 (1988 ed.), which provides a wrongful-death claim to the survivors of seamen killed in the course of their employment, whether on the high seas or in territorial waters. 5 Indeed, years before The Harrisburg, this Court rendered a pathmark- ing decision, Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522 (1873). In Steamboat, the Court upheld, under the "saving-to-suitors" proviso of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (surviving currently in 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1)), a state court's application of the State's wrongful-death statute to a fatality caused by a collision in territorial waters between defendants' steamboat and a sailboat in which plaintiff's decedent was passing. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:14 PAGES OPINPGT 208 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court decisions transformed the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi- ness into a strict-liability rule. Prior to 1944, unseaworthi- ness "was an obscure and relatively little used" liability standard, largely because "a shipowner's duty at that time was only to use due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 25 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Moragne, 398 U. S., at 398­399. Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944), however, notably expanded a shipowner's liability to injured seamen by imposing a nondelegable duty "to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539, 550 (1960). The duty imposed was absolute; failure to supply a safe ship resulted in liability "irrespective of fault and irrespective of the intervening negligence of crew members." Miles, 498 U. S., at 25. The unseaworthiness doctrine thus became a "species of liability without fault," Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 94 (1946), and soon eclipsed ordinary negligence as the primary basis of recovery when a seafarer was injured or killed. Miles, 498 U. S., at 25­26.6 The disparity between the unseaworthiness doctrine's strict-liability standard and negligence-based state wrongful-death statutes figured prominently in our land- mark Moragne decision. Petsonella Moragne, the widow of a longshore worker killed in Florida's territorial waters, brought suit under Florida's wrongful-death and survival statutes, alleging both negligence and unseaworthiness. 6 The Court extended the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, once owed only to seamen, to longshore workers in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946). Congress effectively overruled this extension in its 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. See § 905(b). We have thus far declined to extend the duty further. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan- tique, 358 U. S. 625, 629 (1959) (unseaworthiness doctrine inapplicable to invitee aboard vessel). 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:15 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 209 Opinion of the Court The District Court dismissed the claim for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness, citing this Court's decision in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588 (1959). There, a sharply divided Court held that "when admiralty adopts a State's right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an integrated whole, with whatever conditions and limita- tions the creating State has attached." Id., at 592. Thus, in wrongful-death actions involving fatalities in territorial waters, state statutes provided the standard of liability as well as the remedial regime. Because the Florida Su- preme Court had previously held that Florida's wrongful- death statute did not encompass unseaworthiness as a basis of liability, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Moragne's unseaworthiness claim. See Moragne, 398 U. S., at 377. The Court acknowledged in Moragne that The Tungus had led to considerable uncertainty over the role state law should play in remedying deaths in territorial waters, but concluded that "the primary source of the confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The Harrisburg." 398 U. S., at 378. Upon reexamining the soundness of The Harrisburg, we de- cided that its holding, "somewhat dubious even when ren- dered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the present mari- time law that it should no longer be followed." 398 U. S., at 378. Accordingly, the Court overruled The Harrisburg and held that an action "lie[s] under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties." 398 U. S., at 409. IV Yamaha argues that Moragne-despite its focus on "mari- time duties" owed to maritime workers-covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorial waters, and ousting all pre- viously available state remedies. In Yamaha's view, state remedies can no longer supplement general maritime law 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:15 PAGES OPINPGT 210 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court (as they routinely did before Moragne), because Moragne launched a solitary federal scheme.7 Yamaha's reading of Moragne is not without force; in several contexts, we have recognized that vindication of maritime policies demanded uniform adherence to a federal rule of decision, with no lee- way for variation or supplementation by state law. See, e. g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 742 (1961) (federal maritime rule validating oral contracts precluded application of state Statute of Frauds); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 409 (1953) (admiralty's comparative negligence rule barred application of state contributory neg- ligence rule); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 248­249 (1942) (federal maritime rule allocating burden of proof displaced conflicting state rule).8 In addition, Ya- 7 If Moragne's wrongful-death action did not extend to nonseafarers like Natalie, one could hardly argue that Moragne displaced the state-law remedies the Calhouns seek. Lower courts have held that Moragne's wrongful-death action extends to nonseafarers. See, e. g., Sutton v. Earles, 26 F. 3d 903 (CA9 1994) (recreational boater); Wahlstrom v. Kawa- saki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 4 F. 3d 1084 (CA2 1993) (jet skier), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1114 (1994). We assume, for purposes of this decision, the correctness of that position. Similarly, as in prior encounters, we as- sume without deciding that Moragne also provides a survival action. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 34 (1990). The question we confront is not what Moragne added to the remedial arsenal in maritime cases, but what, if anything, it removed from admiralty's stock. 8 The federal cast of admiralty law, we have observed, means that "state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope." Romero v. International Terminal Op- erating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 373 (1959). Our precedent does not precisely delineate that scope. As we recently acknowledged, "[i]t would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence." Ameri- can Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 452 (1994). We attempt no grand synthesis or reconciliation of our precedent today, but confine our inquiry to the modest question whether it was Moragne's design to termi- nate recourse to state remedies when nonseafarers meet death in territo- rial waters. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:15 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 211 Opinion of the Court maha correctly points out that uniformity concerns informed our decision in Moragne. The uniformity concerns that prompted us to overrule The Harrisburg, however, were of a different order than those invoked by Yamaha. Moragne did not reexamine the sound- ness of The Harrisburg out of concern that state monetary awards in maritime wrongful-death cases were excessive, or that variations in the remedies afforded by the States threat- ened to interfere with the harmonious operation of maritime law. Variations of this sort had long been deemed compati- ble with federal maritime interests. See Western Fuel, 257 U. S., at 242. The uniformity concern that drove our deci- sion in Moragne related, instead, to the availability of unsea- worthiness as a basis of liability. By 1970, when Moragne was decided, claims premised on unseaworthiness had become "the principal vehicle for re- covery" by seamen and other maritime workers injured or killed in the course of their employment. Moragne, 398 U. S., at 399. But with The Harrisburg in place, troubling anomalies had developed that many times precluded the sur- vivors of maritime workers from recovering for deaths caused by an unseaworthy vessel. The Moragne Court identified three anomalies and concluded they could no longer be tolerated. First, the Court noted that "within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed." 398 U. S., at 395. This occurred because in nonfatal injury cases, state substantive liability standards were superseded by federal maritime law, see Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Trans- atlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 628 (1959); Pope & Talbot, 346 U. S., at 409, which provided for maritime worker recovery based on unseaworthiness. But if the same worker met death in the territorial waters of a State whose wrongful- death statute did not encompass unseaworthiness (as was the 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:15 PAGES OPINPGT 212 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court case in Moragne itself), the survivors could not proceed under that generous standard of liability. See The Tungus, 358 U. S., at 592­593. Second, we explained in Moragne that "identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit . . . but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims." 398 U. S., at 395. This occurred because survivors of a maritime worker killed on the high seas could sue for wrongful death under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U. S. C. App. § 761 et seq. (1988 ed.), which encompasses unseaworthiness as a basis of liability. Moragne, 398 U. S., at 395 (citing Kernan v. Amer- ican Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 430, n. 4 (1958)). Finally, we pointed out that "a true seaman [a member of a ship's company] . . . is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a long- shoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute." 398 U. S., at 395­396. This anomaly stemmed from the Court's rulings in Lindgren v. United States, 281 U. S. 38 (1930), and Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148 (1964), that the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688 (1988 ed.), which provides only a negligence-based claim for the wrongful death of seamen, precludes any state remedy, even one accommodating unseaworthiness. As a result, at the time Moragne was decided, the survivors of a longshore worker killed in the territorial waters of a State whose wrongful-death statute incorporated unseaworthiness could sue under that theory, but the survivors of a similarly situ- ated seaman could not.9 9 As noted earlier, unseaworthiness recovery by longshore workers was terminated by Congress in its 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. See § 905(b). 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:15 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 213 Opinion of the Court The anomalies described in Moragne relate to ships and the workers who serve them, and to a distinctly maritime substantive concept-the unseaworthiness doctrine. The Court surely meant to "assure uniform vindication of federal policies," 398 U. S., at 401, with respect to the matters it examined. The law as it developed under The Harrisburg had forced on the States more than they could bear-the task of "provid[ing] the sole remedy" in cases that did not involve "traditional common-law concepts," but "concepts peculiar to maritime law." 398 U. S., at 401, n. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Discarding The Harrisburg and declaring a wrongful-death right of action under general maritime law, the Court concluded, would "remov[e] the tensions and discrepancies" occasioned by the need "to ac- commodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts." 398 U. S., at 401.10 Moragne, in sum, centered on the extension of relief, not on the contraction of remedies. The decision recalled that " `it better becomes the humane and liberal character of pro- ceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules.' " Id., at 387 (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (No. 12,578) (CC Md. 1865) (Chase, C. J.)). The Court tied Petsonella Moragne's plea based on the unseaworthiness 10 The Court might have simply overruled The Tungus, see supra, at 209, thus permitting plaintiffs to rely on federal liability standards to ob- tain state wrongful-death remedies. The petitioner in Moragne, widow of a longshore worker, had urged that course when she sought certiorari. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 378, n. 1 (1970). But training Moragne solely on The Tungus would have left untouched the survivors of seamen, who remain blocked by the Jones Act from pursu- ing state wrongful-death claims-whether under a theory of negligence or unseaworthiness. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148, 154­155 (1964). Thus, nothing short of a federal maritime right of action for wrongful death could have achieved uniform access by seafarers to the unseaworthiness doctrine, the Court's driving concern in Moragne. See 398 U. S., at 396, n. 12. 516us1$15P 10-22-98 11:19:15 PAGES OPINPGT 214 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court of the vessel to a federal right-of-action anchor,11 but not- ably left in place the negligence claim she had stated under Florida's law. See 398 U. S., at 376­377.12 Our understanding of Moragne accords with that of the Third Circuit, which Judge Becker set out as follows: "Moragne . . . showed no hostility to concurrent applica- tion of state wrongful-death statutes. Indeed, to read into Moragne the idea that it was placing a ceiling on recovery for wrongful death, rather than a floor, is some- what ahistorical. The Moragne cause of action was in many respects a gap-filling measure to ensure that sea- men (and their survivors) would all be treated alike. The `humane and liberal' purpose underlying the general maritime remedy of Moragne was driven by the idea that survivors of seamen killed in state territorial wa- ters should not have been barred from recovery simply because the tort system of the particular state in which a seaman died did not incorporate special maritime doc- trines. It is difficult to see how this purpose can be taken as an intent to preclude the operation of state laws that do supply a remedy." 40 F. 3d, at 641­642 (cita- tion omitted). We have reasoned similarly in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsyl- vania, 447 U. S. 715 (1980), where we held that a State may apply its workers' compensation scheme to land-based inju- ries that fall within the compass of the Longshore and Har- 11 While unseaworthiness was the doctrine immediately at stake in Moragne, the right of action, as stated in the Court's opinion, is "for death caused by violation of maritime duties." Id., at 409. See East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 865 (1986) (mari- time law incorporates strict product liability); Kermarec, 358 U. S., at 630 (negligence). See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 368 (2d ed. 1975). 12 Moragne was entertained by the Court of Appeals pursuant to a 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) certification directed to the District Court's order dis- missing the unseaworthiness claim. See 398 U. S., at 376. 516US1 Unit: $U15 [05-25-00 06:59:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 516 U. S. 199 (1996) 215 Opinion of the Court bor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. See Sun Ship, 447 U. S., at 724 (a State's remedial scheme might be "more generous than federal law" but nevertheless could apply because Congress indicated no concern "about a dis- parity between adequate federal benefits and superior state benefits") (emphasis in original).13 When Congress has prescribed a comprehensive tort re- covery regime to be uniformly applied, there is, we have gen- erally recognized, no cause for enlargement of the damages statutorily provided. See Miles, 498 U. S., at 30­36 (Jones Act, rather than general maritime law, determines damages recoverable in action for wrongful death of seamen); Off- shore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 232 (1986) (DOHSA, which limits damages to pecuniary losses, may not be supplemented by nonpecuniary damages under a state wrongful-death statute); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 624­625 (1978) (DOHSA precludes damages for loss of society under general maritime law). But Congress has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful deaths of non- seafarers in territorial waters. See Miles, 498 U. S., at 31. There is, however, a relevant congressional disposition. Sec- tion 7 of DOHSA states: "The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death 13 Federal maritime law has long accommodated the States' interest in regulating maritime affairs within their territorial waters. See, e. g., Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383, 390 (1941) ("maritime law [is] not a complete and perfect system"; "a considerable body of municipal law . . . underlies . . . its administration"). States have thus traditionally contributed to the provision of environmental and safety standards for maritime activities. See, e. g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S. 325 (1973) (oil pollution); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960) (air pollution); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1 (1937) (safety inspection); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadel- phia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852) (pilot- age regulation). Permissible state regulation, we have recognized, must be consistent with federal maritime principles and policies. See Romero, 358 U. S., at 373­374. 516US1 Unit: $U15 [05-25-00 06:59:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 216 YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., U. S. A. v. CALHOUN Opinion of the Court shall not be affected by this chapter." 46 U. S. C. App. § 767. This statement, by its terms, simply stops DOHSA from dis- placing state law in territorial waters. See Miles, 498 U. S., at 25; Tallentire, 477 U. S., at 224­225; Moragne, 398 U. S., at 397­398. Taking into account what Congress sought to achieve, we preserve the application of state statutes to deaths within territorial waters. * * * For the reasons stated, we hold that the damages available for the jet ski death of Natalie Calhoun are properly gov- erned by state law.14 The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is accordingly Affirmed. 14 The Third Circuit left for initial consideration by the District Court the question whether Pennsylvania's wrongful-death remedies or Puerto Rico's apply. 40 F. 3d 622, 644 (1994). The Court of Appeals also left open, as do we, the source-federal or state-of the standards governing liability, as distinguished from the rules on remedies. We thus reserve for another day reconciliation of the maritime personal injury deci- sions that rejected state substantive liability standards, and the mari- time wrongful-death cases in which state law has held sway. Compare Kermarec, 358 U. S., at 628 (personal injury); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 409 (1953) (same), with Hess v. United States, 361 U. S. 314, 319 (1960) (wrongful death); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588, 592­ 594 (1959) (same). 516us2$16Z 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 217 Syllabus ZICHERMAN, individually and as executrix of the ESTATE OF KOLE, et al. v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO., LTD. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 94­1361. Argued November 7, 1995-Decided January 16, 1996* In a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governing international air transportation, petitioners Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages for the death of their mutual relative who was a passenger on respondent Korean Air Lines' Flight KE007 when it was shot down over the Sea of Japan. The Second Circuit set aside the award, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The court concluded that Mahalek had not established dependent status and remanded for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a dependent of the decedent. Held: In a suit brought under Article 17, a plaintiff may not recover loss-of-society damages for the death of a relative in a plane crash on the high seas, within the meaning of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Pp. 221­232. (a) Article 17 permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leaves the specification of what harm is legally cognizable to the domestic law applicable under the forum's choice-of-law rules. That the Convention does not itself resolve the issue of what harm is compensable is shown by the text of Articles 17 and 24, the Convention's negotiating and drafting history, the contracting states' postratification understand- ing of the Convention, and the virtually unanimous view of expert com- mentators. Pp. 221­228. (b) Having concluded that compensable harm is to be determined by domestic law, the next logical question would be that of which sover- eign's domestic law. In this case, the Court need not engage in this inquiry, because the parties have agreed that if the issue of compensable harm is unresolved by the Warsaw Convention, it is governed in the *Together with No. 94­1477, Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Zicherman, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Kole, et al., also on certio- rari to the same court. 516us2$16Z 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 218 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court present case by the law of the United States. The final unresolved question is then which particular United States law applies. The death that occurred here falls within the literal terms of DOHSA § 761, and it is well established that those terms apply to airplane crashes. Since recovery in a § 761 suit is limited to pecuniary damages, § 762, peti- tioners cannot recover for loss of society under DOHSA. Moreover, where DOHSA applies, neither state law nor general maritime law can provide a basis for recovery of loss-of-society damages. Because petitioners are not entitled to recover loss-of-society damages under DOHSA, this Court need not reach the question whether, under general maritime law, dependency is a prerequisite for loss-of-society damages. Pp. 228­232. 43 F. 3d 18, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. W. Paul Needham argued the cause for petitioners in No. 94­1361 and respondents in No. 94­1477. With him on the briefs was Kevin M. Hensley. Andrew J. Harakas argued the cause for Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., in both cases. With him on the briefs was George N. Tompkins, Jr. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This action presents the question whether, in a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention govern- ing international air transportation, Convention for the Uni- fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor- tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934) (reprinted in note following 49 U. S. C. App. § 1502 (1988 Juanita M. Madole, Donald W. Madole, George E. Farrell, Milton G. Sincoff, and Steven R. Pounian filed a brief for Philomena Dooley et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for Pan American World Airways, Inc., by Richard M. Sharp and Frederick C. Schafrick; and for the Plain- tiffs' Committee in In re Air Crash Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, by Lee S. Kreindler, Steven R. Pounian, James P. Kreindler, Paul S. Edel- man, Frank H. Granito, Jr., Frank H. Granito III, and Michel F. Baumeister. 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 219 Opinion of the Court ed.)), a plaintiff may recover damages for loss of society resulting from the death of a relative in a plane crash on the high seas. I On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight KE007, en route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea, strayed into air space of the Soviet Union and was shot down over the Sea of Japan. All 269 persons on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Petitioners Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother, respectively, sued respondent Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. (KAL), in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Petitioners' final amended complaint contained three counts, entitled, respectively, "Warsaw Convention," "Death on the High Seas Act," and "Conscious Pain and Suffering." At issue here is only the Warsaw Convention count, in which petitioners sought "judgment against KAL for their pecuni- ary damages, for their grief and mental anguish, for the loss of the decedent's society and companionship, and for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering." App. 29. Along with other federal-court actions arising out of the KAL crash, petitioners' case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for consoli- dated proceedings on common issues of liability. There, a jury found that the destruction of Flight KE007 was proxi- mately caused by "willful misconduct" of the flight crew, thus lifting the Warsaw Convention's $75,000 cap on damages. See Warsaw Convention, Art. 25, 49 Stat. 3020; Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, re- printed in note following 49 U. S. C. App. § 1502 (1988 ed.). The jury awarded $50 million in punitive damages against KAL. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the finding of "willful misconduct," but va- cated the punitive damages award, holding that the Warsaw Convention does not permit the recovery of punitive dam- 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 220 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court ages. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F. 2d 1475, 1479­1481, 1484­1490, cert. denied, 502 U. S. 994 (1991). The individual cases were then remanded by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the original transferor courts for trial of compensatory damages issues. At petitioners' damages trial in the Southern District of New York, KAL moved for determination that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. App. § 761 et seq. (1988 ed.), prescribed the proper claimants and the recoverable damages, and that it did not permit damages for loss of society. The District Court denied the motion and held, inter alia, that petitioners could recover for loss of "love, affection, and companionship." In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1086­1088 (1992). The jury awarded loss-of-society damages in the amount of $70,000 to Zicherman and $28,000 to Mahalek.1 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside this award. Applying its prior decisions in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F. 2d 1267, 1278­1279 (Lockerbie I), cert. denied sub nom. Rein v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 502 U. S. 920 (1991), and In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F. 3d 804 (1994) (Lockerbie II), cert. denied sub nom. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 513 U. S. 1126 (1995), it held that general maritime law supplied the sub- stantive law of compensatory damages to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention. 43 F. 3d 18, 21­22 (1994). Then, following its decision in Lockerbie II, it held that, under general maritime law, a plaintiff is entitled to recover loss-of-society damages, but only if he was a depend- 1 The jury also awarded petitioners $161,000 in survivors' grief, $16,000 to Zicherman for loss of support and inheritance and $100,000 to Zicher- man for the decedent's pain and suffering. The Second Circuit has set aside the award of grief damages and has remanded for further proceed- ings on the award for loss of support and inheritance. None of these awards is at issue here. 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 221 Opinion of the Court ent of the decedent at the time of death. 43 F. 3d, at 22. The court concluded that as a matter of law Mahalek had not established that status, and therefore vacated her award; it remanded to the District Court for determination of whether Zicherman was a dependent of Kole. Ibid. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners contended that under general maritime law dependency is not a requirement for recovering loss-of-society damages. In a cross-petition, KAL contended that the Warsaw Convention does not allow loss-of-society damages in this case, regardless of depend- ency. We granted certiorari. 514 U. S. 1062 (1995). II Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as set forth in the official American translation of the governing French text, provides as follows: "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the acci- dent which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera- tions of embarking or disembarking." 49 Stat. 3018 (emphasis added). The first and principal question before us is whether loss of society of a relative is made recoverable by this provision. It is obvious that the English word "damage" or "harm"- or in the official text of the Convention, the French word "dommage" 2-can be applied to an extremely wide range of phenomena, from the medical expenses incurred as a result 2 The French text of Article 17 reads: "Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre le´sion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a cause´ le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'ae´ronef ou au cours de toutes ope´rations d'embarquement et de de´barquement." 49 Stat. 3005. 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 222 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court of Kole's injuries (for which every legal system would pro- vide tort compensation) to the mental distress of some stranger who reads about Kole's death in the paper (for which no legal system would provide tort compensation). It cannot seriously be maintained that Article 17 uses the term in this broadest sense, thus exploding tort liability beyond what any legal system in the world allows, to the farthest reaches of what could be denominated "harm." We there- fore reject petitioners' initial proposal that we simply look to English dictionary definitions of "damage" and apply that term's "plain meaning." Brief for Petitioners 7­9. There are only two thinkable alternatives to that. First, what petitioners ultimately suggest: that "dommage" means what French law, in 1929, recognized as legally cognizable harm, which petitioners assert included not only "dommage mate´riel" (pecuniary harm of various sorts) but also "dom- mage moral" (nonpecuniary harm of various sorts, including loss of society). In support of that approach, petitioners point out that in a prior case involving Article 17 we were guided by French legal usage: Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392 (1985) (interpreting the term "accident"). See also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U. S. 530 (1991) (inter- preting the Article 17 term "le´sion corporelle"). What is at issue here, however, is not simply whether we will be guided by French legal usage vel non. Because, as earlier dis- cussed, the dictionary meaning of the term "dommage" em- braces harms that no legal system would compensate, it must be acknowledged that the term is to be understood in its distinctively legal sense-that is, to mean only legally cogni- zable harm. The nicer question, and the critical one here, is whether the word "dommage" establishes as the content of the concept "legally cognizable harm" what French law accepted as such in 1929. No case of ours provides prece- dent for the adoption of French law in such detail. In Floyd, we looked to French law to determine whether "le´- sion corporelle" indeed meant (as it had been translated) 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 223 Opinion of the Court "bodily injury"-not to determine the subsequent question (equivalent to the question at issue here) whether "bodily injury" encompassed psychic injury. See id., at 536­540. And in Saks, once we had determined that in French legal terminology the word "accident" referred to an unforeseen event, we did not further inquire whether French courts would consider the event at issue in the case unforeseen; we made that judgment for ourselves. See 470 U. S., at 405­407. It is particularly implausible that "the shared expectations of the contracting parties," id., at 399, were that their mere use of the French language would effect adoption of the pre- cise rule applied in France as to what constitutes legally cog- nizable harm. Those involved in the negotiation and adop- tion of the Convention could not have been ignorant of the fact that the law on this point varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even from statute to statute within a sin- gle jurisdiction. Just as we found it "unlikely" in Floyd that Convention signatories would have understood the general term "le´sion corporelle" to confer a cause of action available under French law but unrecognized in many other nations, see 499 U. S., at 540, so also in the present case we find it unlikely that they would have understood Article 17's use of the general term "dommage" to require compensation for elements of harm recognized in France but unrecognized elsewhere, or to forbid compensation for elements of harm unrecognized in France but recognized elsewhere. Many signatory nations, including Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ger- many, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and Sweden, did not, even many years after the Warsaw Convention, rec- ognize a cause of action for nonpecuniary harm resulting from wrongful death. See 11 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law: Torts, ch. 9, pp. 15­18 (A. Tunc ed. 1972); Floyd, supra, at 544­545, n. 10. The other alternative, and the only one we think realistic, is to believe that "dommage" means (as it does in French 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 224 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court legal usage) "legally cognizable harm," but that Article 17 leaves it to adjudicating courts to specify what harm is cogni- zable. That is not an unusual disposition. Even within our domestic law, many statutes that provide generally for "dam- ages," or for reimbursement of "injury," leave it to the courts to decide what sorts of harms are compensable. See, e. g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32 (1990) (Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688 (1988 ed.), which provides "action for damages" to "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal in- jury," permits compensation only for pecuniary loss); Michi- gan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 71 (1913) (Em- ployers' Liability Act of Apr. 22, 1908, which makes employer "liable in damages . . . for . . . injury or death," permits compensation only for pecuniary loss); Broan Mfg. v. Associ- ated Distributors, Inc., 923 F. 2d 1232, 1235­1236 (CA6 1991) (Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1117(a), which pro- vides for recovery of "any damages sustained," permits com- pensation for future lost profits); Phelps v. White, 645 So. 2d 698, 703 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (specifying elements of compensation allowable under La. Civ. Code Ann. § 2315.2 (West Supp. 1995), providing for recovery of "damages . . . sustained as a result" of wrongful death); Department of Ed. v. Blevins, 707 S. W. 2d 782, 783 (Ky. 1986) (Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.130 (Michie 1992), which provides that "dam- ages may be recovered" for wrongful death, does not permit compensation for emotional distress). That this is the proper interpretation is confirmed by an- other provision of the Convention. Article 17 is expressly limited by Article 24, which as translated provides: "(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any ac- tion for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention. "(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without preju- dice to the questions as to who are the persons who have 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 225 Opinion of the Court the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights." 49 Stat. 3020 (emphasis added).3 The most natural reading of this Article is that, in an action brought under Article 17, the law of the Convention does not affect the substantive questions of who may bring suit and what they may be compensated for. Those questions are to be answered by the domestic law selected by the courts of the contracting states. Petitioners contend that, because Article 24 refers to the parties' "respective rights," this pro- vision defers to domestic law only on the "procedural" issues of who has standing to sue and how the proceeds of a dam- ages award under Article 17 should be divided among eligi- ble claimants. It does not seem to us that the question of who is entitled to a damages award is procedural; and in any event limiting Article 24 to procedural issues would render it superfluous, since Article 28(2) provides that "[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted." 49 Stat. 3021. More impor- tantly, petitioners' reading of Article 24(2) would produce a strange regime in which 1929 French law (embodied in the Convention) determines what harms arising out of interna- tional air accidents must be indemnified, while current do- mestic law determines who is entitled to the indemnity and how it is to be divided among claimants. When presented with an equally plausible reading of Article 24 that leads to a more comprehensible result-that the Convention left to domestic law the questions of who may recover and what compensatory damages are available to them-we decline to 3 The governing French text of Article 24 provides: "(1) Dans les cas pre´vus aux articles 18 et 19 toute action en responsabi- lite´, a quelque titre que ce soit, ne peut e tre exerce´e que dans les condi- tions et limites pre´vues par la pre´sente Convention. "(2) Dans les cas pre´vus a l'article 17, s'appliquent e´galement les disposi- tions de l'aline´a pre´ce´dent, sans pre´judice de la de´termination des person- nes qui ont le droit d'agir et de leurs droits respectifs." 49 Stat. 3006. 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 226 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court embrace a reading that would produce the me´lange of French and domestic law proposed by petitioners. Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, see U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, but also an agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux pre´paratoires) and the postratifi- cation understanding of the contracting parties. Both of these sources confirm that the compensable injury is to be determined by domestic law. In the drafting history, the only statements we know of that directly discuss the point were made by the Comite´ International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Ae´riens (CITEJA), which did the preparatory work for the two Conferences (1925 in Paris, 1929 in War- saw) that produced the Warsaw Convention. In its report of May 15, 1928, the Committee stated: "It was asked whether it would not be possible, in this respect, to determine the category of damages subject to reparations. "Although this question seemed very interesting, it was not possible to find a satisfactory solution before knowing exactly the legislation of the various countries. It was understood that the question would be studied later on, when the issue of knowing which are the persons, who according to the various national laws, have the right to take action against the carrier, will have been elucidated." Report of the Third Session of CITEJA by Henry de Vos, reprinted in International Technical Committee of Legal Experts on Air Questions 106 (May 1928). To the same effect is the following passage from the CITEJA Report accompanying the 1929 draft: "The question was asked of knowing if one could de- termine who the persons upon whom the action devolves in the case of death are, and what are the damages sub- 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 227 Opinion of the Court ject to reparation. It was not possible to find a satisfac- tory solution to this double problem, and the CITEJA esteemed that this question of private international law should be regulated independantly [sic] from the present Convention." Report of the Third Session of CITEJA by Henry de Vos (Sept. 25, 1928), reprinted in Second International Conference on Private Aeronau- tical Law Minutes, Warsaw 1929, p. 255 (R. Horner & D. Legrez transl. 1975). Both these statements make clear that the questions of who may recover, and what compensatory damages they may re- ceive, were regarded as intertwined; and that both were un- resolved by the Convention and left to "private international law"-i. e., to the area of jurisprudence we call "conflict of laws," dealing with the application of varying domestic laws to disputes that have an interstate or international component. We are unpersuaded by petitioners' reliance on the com- ment of French delegate Georges Ripert, asserting, as one basis for rejecting application of domestic law to the issue of carriers' vicarious liability, that it would be "the first time that application of national law is required." Id., at 66. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2­3. Not only does this remark not have the authority of submissions by the drafting committee, but it is a generalization rather than a statement focused specifically upon the issue here: what law governs the "category of damages subject to reparations." And the generalization is demonstrably wrong to boot, since it is incontrovertible that Article 24 of the Convention requires the application of national law to some issues. The postratification conduct of the contracting parties displays the same understanding that the damages recover- able-so long as they consist of compensation for harm in- curred (dommage survenu)-are to be determined by do- mestic law. Some countries, including England, Germany and the Netherlands, have adopted domestic legislation to 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 228 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court govern the types of damages recoverable in a Convention case. See Haanappel, The right to sue in death cases under the Warsaw Convention, 6 Air Law 66, 72, 74 (1981); E. Giemulla, R. Schmid, & P. Ehlers, Warsaw Convention 39, n. 5 (1992); German Law Concerning Air Navigation (Luft VG) of Jan. 10, 1959, Arts. 35­36, 38, reprinted in 1 Senate Committee on Commerce, Air Laws and Treaties of the World, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 766­768 (Comm. Print 1965); R. Mankiewicz, The Liability Regime of the International Air Carrier ¶ 187, pp. 160­161 (1981). Canada has adopted legislation setting forth who may bring suit under Article 24(2), but has left the question of what types of damages are recoverable to provincial law. Haanappel, supra, at 70­71. The Court of Appeals of Quebec has rejected the argument that Article 17 permits damages unrecoverable under domes- tic Quebec law. Dame Surprenant v. Air Canada, [1973] C. A. 107, 117­118, 126­127 (opinion of Desche nes, J.). But see Preston v. Hunting Air Transport Ltd., [1956] 1 Q. B. 454, 461­462 (granting damages under Convention, but with- out considering Article 24). Finally, the expert commen- tators are virtually unanimous that the type of harm com- pensable is to be determined by domestic law. See, e. g., H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law ¶ 111, pp. 125­126 (1954); Giemulla, Schmid, & Ehlers, supra, at 33; D. Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention 269 (1937); Mankiewicz, supra, ¶ 187, at 160­161; G. Miller, Liability in International Air Transport: The War- saw System in Municipal Courts 125 (1977); see also Cha, The Air Carrier's Liability to Passengers in International Law, 7 Air L. Rev. 25, 56­57 (1936). III Having concluded that compensable harm is to be deter- mined by domestic law, the next question to which we would logically turn is that of which sovereign's domestic law. That is the "private international law" issue alluded to in the last-quoted excerpt from the CITEJA Report. Choice of 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 229 Opinion of the Court law is, of course, determined by the forum jurisdiction, see E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.56 (1982), and would normally be a question confronting us here. We have been spared that inquiry, however, because both parties agree that if the issue of compensable harm is (as we have determined) unresolved by the Convention itself, it is governed in the present case by the law of the United States. That leaves a final question unresolved: Which particular law of the United States provides the governing rule? The Second Circuit, moved by the need to "maintain a uniform law under the Warsaw Convention," held that general mari- time law governs causes of action under the Convention, whether the accident out of which they arise occurs on land or on the high seas. 43 F. 3d, at 21­22. We think not. As we have discussed, the Convention itself contains no rule of law governing the present question; nor does it empower us to develop some common-law rule-under cover of general admiralty law or otherwise-that will supersede the normal federal disposition. Congress may choose to enact special provisions applicable to Warsaw Convention cases, as some countries have done. See supra, at 227­228. Absent such legislation, however, Articles 17 and 24(2) provide nothing more than a pass-through, authorizing us to apply the law that would govern in absence of the Warsaw Convention. There is little doubt what that law is in this case. Section 761 of DOHSA provides: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal rep- resentative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 230 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court have been liable if death had not ensued." 46 U. S. C. App. § 761 (1988 ed.). The death that occurred here falls within the literal terms of this provision, and it is well established that those literal terms apply to airplane crashes. See Executive Jet Avia- tion, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 263­264 (1972). Section 762 of DOHSA provides that the recovery in a suit under § 761 "shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought." 46 U. S. C. App. § 762. Thus, petition- ers cannot recover loss-of-society damages under DOHSA. Moreover, where DOHSA applies, neither state law, see Off- shore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 232­233 (1986), nor general maritime law, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625­626 (1978), can provide a basis for recovery of loss-of-society damages.4 Petitioners argue that DOHSA should not apply to this cause of action because of the concern expressed by the Sec- ond Circuit: that "a uniform law should govern Warsaw Con- vention cases." 43 F. 3d, at 21. They urge that, if we must look to domestic law, we should craft a federal rule of dam- ages that will be applicable in all suits brought under the Convention. Undoubtedly it was a primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in the law of inter- national air travel, see Floyd, 499 U. S., at 552, but as our discussion above has made clear, this is not an area in which the imposition of uniformity was found feasible. See supra, at 226­227. The Convention neither adopted any uniform 4 We need not consider whether § 761 of DOHSA calls into question the District Court's determination that the decedent's mother is a proper party to this suit, or its grant of a jury trial, see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 371, n. 28 (1959), and whether § 762 contradicts the District Court's allowance of pain and suffering damages, see Offshore Logistics, Inc., 477 U. S., at 215, n. 1. KAL challenged none of these rulings in its petition for certiorari. 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 217 (1996) 231 Opinion of the Court rule of its own nor authorized national courts to pursue uniformity in derogation of otherwise applicable law. Peti- tioners argue, in effect, that the Convention contains an im- plicit authorization for national courts to create uniformity between overland and oversea accidents governed by their respective domestic laws, even though it leaves the vast discrepancies among the various domestic laws untouched. That is most unlikely. Finally, petitioners contend that DOHSA cannot supply the substantive law of damages, because this would result in an unintended "double cap." They argue that the Warsaw Convention's $75,000 per passenger limit on liability (except in cases of willful misconduct), when combined with a DOHSA rule prohibiting compensation for nonpecuniary harm, will not sufficiently deter willful misconduct. We are unpersuaded. The Convention unquestionably envisions the application of domestic law; it is the function of Congress, and not of this Court, to decide that domestic law, alone or in combination with the Convention, provides inadequate deterrence. * * * We conclude that Articles 17 and 24(2) of the Warsaw Con- vention permit compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leave the specification of what harm is legally cog- nizable to the domestic law applicable under the forum's choice-of-law rules. Where, as here, an airplane crash oc- curs on the high seas, DOHSA supplies the substantive United States law. Because DOHSA permits only pecu- niary damages, petitioners are not entitled to recover for loss of society. We therefore need not reach the question whether, under general maritime law, dependency is a pre- requisite for loss-of-society damages. Accordingly, that portion of the Second Circuit judgment permitting Zicherman to recover loss-of-society damages if she can establish her dependency on the decedent is re- 516us2$16K 10-22-98 12:12:54 PAGES OPINPGT 232 ZICHERMAN v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO. Opinion of the Court versed, and that portion of the judgment vacating the award of loss-of-society damages to Mahalek is affirmed. It is so ordered. 516us2$17z 10-15-97 19:01:03 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 233 Per Curiam LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL, INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit No. 94­2003. Argued January 8, 1996-Decided January 16, 1996 49 F. 3d 807, affirmed by an equally divided Court. Henry B. Gutman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kerry L. Konrad, Jeffrey E. Ostrow, Arthur R. Miller, Neal D. Goldman, and Donald J. Rosenberg. Gary L. Reback argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael Barclay, Susan A. Creighton, and Katherine L. Parks.* Per Curiam. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court. *Morton David Goldberg, June M. Besek, Davis O. Carson, and Jesse M. Feder filed a brief for Digital Equipment Corp. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Altai, Inc., by Susan Gertrude Braden; for the American Committee for Interoperable Systems et al. by Peter M. C. Choy and Paul Goldstein; for Computer Scientists by Ron Kilgard and Karl M. Tilleman; for the League for Programming Freedom by Eben Moglen and Pamela S. Karlan; for the Software Forum by Diane Marie O'Malley; for the Software Industry Coalition et al. by Thomas F. Villeneuve; for the Software Protection Committee of the Minnesota Intellectual Property Law Association by Steven W. Lundberg, Daniel J. Kluth, and Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr.; for Copyright Law Professors by Pamela Samuelson; and for Peter S. Menell et al. by Mr. Menell, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Don W. Martens, Baila H. Celedonia, and Charles L. Gholz; for Economics Professors and Scholars by Joshua R. Floum; for Users Groups by Rex S. Heinke; and for Howard C. Anawalt, pro se. 516us2$17H 10-15-97 19:01:03 PAGES OPINPGT 234 LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL, INC. Per Curiam Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 516us2$18Z 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 235 Syllabus COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LUNDY certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 94­1785. Argued November 6, 1995-Decided January 17, 1996 Respondent Lundy and his wife withheld from their 1987 wages substan- tially more in federal income taxes than they actually owed for that year, but they did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the succeeding 21/2 years. On September 26, 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Some three months later, the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes, and Lundy filed a timely peti- tion in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed defi- ciency and a refund. The Tax Court held that where, as here, a tax- payer has not filed a tax return by the time a notice of deficiency is mailed, and the notice is mailed more than two years after the date on which the taxes are paid, a 2-year "look-back" period applies under 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B), and the court lacks jurisdiction to award a re- fund. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the applicable look- back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund. Held: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund of taxes paid more than two years prior to the date on which the Commissioner mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, if, on the date that the notice was mailed, the taxpayer had not yet filed a return. In these circum- stances, the applicable look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B) is two years. Pp. 239­253. (a) Section 6512(b)(3)(B) forbids the Tax Court to award a refund un- less it first determines that the taxes were paid "within the [look-back] period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2) . . . if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim [for refund] had been filed." Section 6511(b)(2)(A) in turn instructs the court to apply a 3-year look-back period if a refund claim is filed, as required by § 6511(a), "within 3 years from the time the return was filed," while § 6511(b)(2)(B) specifies a 2-year look-back period if the refund claim is not filed within that 3-year period. The Tax Court properly applied the 2-year look- back period to Lundy's case because, as of September 26, 1990 (the date the notice of deficiency was mailed), Lundy had not filed a tax return, 516us2$18Z 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 236 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Syllabus and, consequently, a claim filed on that date would not be filed within the 3-year period described in § 6511(a). Lundy's taxes were withheld from his wages, so they are deemed paid on the date his 1987 tax return was due (April 15, 1988), which is more than two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. Lundy is therefore seeking a re- fund of taxes paid outside the applicable look-back period, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. Pp. 239­245. (b) Lundy suggests two alternative interpretations of § 6512(b)(3)(B), neither of which is persuasive. Lundy first adopts the Fourth Circuit's view, which is that the applicable look-back period is determined by reference to the date that the taxpayer actually filed a claim for refund, and argues that he is entitled to a 3-year look-back period because his late-filed 1987 tax return contained a refund claim that was filed within three years from the filing of the return itself. This interpretation is contrary to the requirements of the statute and leads to a result that Congress could not have intended, as it in some circumstances subjects a timely filer of a return to a shorter limitations period in Tax Court than a delinquent filer. Lundy's second argument, that the "claim" con- templated by § 6512(b)(3)(B) can only be a claim filed on a tax return, such that a uniform 3-year look-back period applies under that section, is similarly contrary to the language of the statute. Pp. 245­250. (c) This Court is bound by § 6512(b)(3)(B)'s language as it is written, and even if the Court were persuaded by Lundy's policy-based argu- ments for applying a 3-year look-back period, the Court is not free to rewrite the statute simply because its effects might be susceptible of improvement. Pp. 250­253. 45 F. 3d 856, reversed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 253. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 253. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attor- ney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Richard Farber, and Regina S. Moriarty. Glenn P. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Lawrence J. Ross.* *David M. Kirsch, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 237 Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we consider the "look-back" period for obtain- ing a refund of overpaid taxes in the United States Tax Court under 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B), and decide whether the Tax Court can award a refund of taxes paid more than two years prior to the date on which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, when, on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed, the taxpayer had not yet filed a return. We hold that in these circumstances the 2-year look-back period set forth in § 6512(b)(3)(B) applies, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. I During 1987, respondent Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than the $6,594 the Lundys actually owed in taxes for that year, but the Lundys did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the succeeding 21/2 years. On September 26, 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency, informing him that he owed $7,672 in additional taxes and interest for 1987 and that he was liable for sub- stantial penalties for delinquent filing and negligent under- payment of taxes. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6653(1). Lundy and his wife mailed their joint tax return for 1987 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on December 22, 1990. This return indicated that the Lundys had overpaid their income taxes for 1987 by $3,537 and claimed a refund in that amount. Six days after the return was mailed, Lundy filed a timely petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund of the couple's over- paid taxes. The Commissioner filed an answer generally denying the allegations in Lundy's petition. Thereafter, the parties negotiated towards a settlement of the claimed defi- ciency and refund claim. On March 17, 1992, the Commis- 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 238 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court sioner filed an amended answer acknowledging that Lundy had filed a tax return and that Lundy claimed to have over- paid his 1987 taxes by $3,537. The Commissioner contended in this amended pleading that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund. The Commissioner argued that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the tax- payer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. See 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B). Under the Commissioner's interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B), the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund because Lundy's withheld taxes were deemed paid on the date that his 1987 tax return was due (April 15, 1988), see § 6513(b)(1), which is more than two years before the date the notice was mailed (September 26, 1990). The Tax Court agreed with the position taken by the Commissioner and denied Lundy's refund claim. Citing an unbroken line of Tax Court cases adopting a similar interpre- tation of § 6512(b)(3)(B), e. g., Allen v. Commissioner, 99 T. C. 475, 479­480 (1992); Galuska v. Commissioner, 98 T. C. 661, 665 (1992); Berry v. Commissioner, 97 T. C. 339, 344­345 (1991); White v. Commissioner, 72 T. C. 1126, 1131­1133 (1979) (renumbered statute); Hosking v. Commissioner, 62 T. C. 635, 642­643 (1974) (renumbered statute), the Tax Court held that if a taxpayer has not filed a tax return by the time the notice of deficiency is mailed, and the notice is mailed more than two years after the date on which the taxes are paid, the look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B) is two years and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. 65 TCM 3011, 3014­3015 (1993), ¶ 93,278 RIA Memo TC. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the applicable look-back period in these circum- stances is three years and that the Tax Court had juris- 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 239 Opinion of the Court diction to award Lundy a refund. 45 F. 3d 856, 861 (1995). Every other Court of Appeals to have addressed the question has affirmed the Tax Court's interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B). See Davison v. Commissioner, 9 F. 3d 1538 (CA2 1993) (judgt. order); Allen v. Commissioner, 23 F. 3d 406 (CA6 1994) (judgt. order); Galuska v. Commissioner, 5 F. 3d 195, 196 (CA7 1993); Richards v. Commissioner, 37 F. 3d 587, 589 (CA10 1994); see also Rossman v. Commis- sioner, 46 F. 3d 1144 (CA9 1995) (judgt. order) (aff'g on other grounds). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 515 U. S. 1102 (1995), and now reverse. II A taxpayer seeking a refund of overpaid taxes ordinarily must file a timely claim for a refund with the IRS under 26 U. S. C. § 6511.1 That section contains two separate provi- 1 In relevant part, § 6511 provides: "(a) Period of limitation on filing claim "Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. Claim for credit or refund of an overpay- ment of any tax imposed by this title which is required to be paid by means of a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the tax was paid. "(b) Limitation on allowance of credits and refunds "(1) Filing of claim within prescribed period "No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) for the filing of a claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer within such period. "(2) Limit on amount of credit or refund "(A) Limit where claim filed within 3-year period "If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period pre- scribed in subsection (a), the amount of the credit or refund shall not ex- ceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 240 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court sions for determining the timeliness of a refund claim. It first establishes a filing deadline: The taxpayer must file a claim for a refund "within 3 years from the time the re- turn was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid." § 6511(b)(1) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). It also defines two "look-back" periods: If the claim is filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed," ibid., then the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of "the portion of the tax paid within the 3 years immediately pre- ceding the filing of the claim." § 6511(b)(2)(A) (incorporat- ing by reference § 6511(a)). If the claim is not filed within that 3-year period, then the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of only that "portion of the tax paid during the 2 years im- mediately preceding the filing of the claim." § 6511(b)(2)(B) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). Unlike the provisions governing refund suits in United States District Court or the United States Court of Federal Claims, which make timely filing of a refund claim a jurisdic- tional prerequisite to bringing suit, see 26 U. S. C. § 7422(a); Martin v. United States, 833 F. 2d 655, 658­659 (CA7 1987), the restrictions governing the Tax Court's authority to award a refund of overpaid taxes incorporate only the look- back period and not the filing deadline from § 6511. See 26 time for filing the return. If the tax was required to be paid by means of a stamp, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the 3 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim. "(B) Limit where claim not filed within 3-year period "If the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim. "(C) Limit if no claim filed "If no claim was filed, the credit or refund shall not exceed the amount which would be allowable under subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be, if claim was filed on the date the credit or refund is allowed." 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 241 Opinion of the Court U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3).2 Consequently, a taxpayer who seeks a refund in the Tax Court, like respondent, does not need to actually file a claim for refund with the IRS; the taxpayer need only show that the tax to be refunded was paid during the applicable look-back period. In this case, the applicable look-back period is set forth in § 6512(b)(3)(B), which provides that the Tax Court cannot award a refund of any overpaid taxes unless it first deter- mines that the taxes were paid: "within the period which would be applicable under sec- tion 6511(b)(2) . . . if on the date of the mailing of the 2 In relevant part, § 6512(b) provides: "(1) Jurisdiction to determine "Except as provided by paragraph (3) and by section 7463, if the Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and further finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of income tax for the same taxable year . . . in respect of which the Secretary determined the deficiency, or finds that there is a deficiency but that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of such tax, the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to determine the amount of such overpayment, and such amount shall, when the decision of the Tax Court has become final, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer. . . . . . "(3) Limit on amount of credit or refund "No such credit or refund shall be allowed or made of any portion of the tax unless the Tax Court determines as part of its decision that such portion was paid- "(A) after the mailing of the notice of deficiency, "(B) within the period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2), (c), or (d), if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed (whether or not filed) stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment, or "(C) within the period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2), (c), or (d), in respect of any claim for refund filed within the applicable period specified in section 6511 and before the date of the mail- ing of the notice of deficiency- "(i) which had not been disallowed before that date, "(ii) which had been disallowed before that date and in respect of which a timely suit for refund could have been commenced as of that date, or "(iii) in respect of which a suit for refund had been commenced before that date and within the period specified in section 6532." 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 242 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court notice of deficiency a claim had been filed (whether or not filed) stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment." The analysis dictated by § 6512(b)(3)(B) is not elegant, but it is straightforward. Though some courts have adverted to the filing of a "deemed claim," see Galuska, 5 F. 3d, at 196; Richards, 37 F. 3d, at 589, all that matters for the proper application of § 6512(b)(3)(B) is that the "claim" contemplated in that section be treated as the only mechanism for deter- mining whether a taxpayer can recover a refund. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) defines the look-back period that applies in Tax Court by incorporating the look-back provisions from § 6511(b)(2), and directs the Tax Court to determine the ap- plicable period by inquiring into the timeliness of a hypothet- ical claim for refund filed "on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency." To this end, § 6512(b)(3)(B) directs the Tax Court's at- tention to § 6511(b)(2), which in turn instructs the court to apply either a 3-year or a 2-year look-back period. See §§ 6511(b)(2)(A) and (B) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)); see supra, at 240. To decide which of these look- back periods to apply, the Tax Court must consult the filing provisions of § 6511(a) and ask whether the claim described by § 6512(b)(3)(B)-a claim filed "on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency"-would be filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed." See § 6511(b)(2)(A) (in- corporating by reference § 6511(a)). If a claim filed on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency would be filed within that 3-year period, then the look-back period is also three years and the Tax Court has jurisdiction to award a refund of any taxes paid within three years prior to the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. §§ 6511(b)(2)(A) and 6512(b)(3)(B). If the claim would not be filed within that 3-year period, then the period for awarding a refund is only two years. §§ 6511(b)(2)(B) and 6512(b)(3)(B). 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 243 Opinion of the Court In this case, we must determine which of these two look- back periods to apply when the taxpayer fails to file a tax return when it is due, and the Commissioner mails the tax- payer a notice of deficiency before the taxpayer gets around to filing a late return. The Fourth Circuit held that a tax- payer in this situation is entitled to a 3-year look-back period if the taxpayer actually files a timely claim at some point in the litigation, see infra, at 246, and respondent offers ad- ditional reasons for applying a 3-year look-back period, see infra, at 249­252. We think the proper application of § 6512(b)(3)(B) instead requires that a 2-year look-back period be applied. We reach this conclusion by following the instructions set out in § 6512(b)(3)(B). The operative question is whether a claim filed "on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency" would be filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed." See § 6512(b)(3)(B) (incorporating §§ 6511(b)(2) and 6511(a)). In the case of a taxpayer who does not file a return before the notice of deficiency is mailed, the claim described in § 6512(b)(3)(B) could not be filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed." No return having been filed, there is no date from which to measure the 3-year filing period described in § 6511(a). Consequently, the claim contemplated in § 6512(b)(3)(B) would not be filed within the 3-year window described in § 6511(a), and the 3-year look-back period set out in § 6511(b)(2)(A) would not apply. The applicable look-back period is instead the default 2-year period described in § 6511(b)(2)(B), which is measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency, see § 6512(b)(3)(B). The taxpayer is entitled to a refund of any taxes paid within two years prior to the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Special rules might apply in some cases, see, e. g., § 6511(c) (extension of time by agreement); § 6511(d) (special limita- 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 244 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court tions periods for designated items), but in the case where the taxpayer has filed a timely tax return and the IRS is claiming a deficiency in taxes from that return, the interplay of §§ 6512(b)(3)(B) and 6511(b)(2) generally ensures that the taxpayer can obtain a refund of any taxes against which the IRS is asserting a deficiency. In most cases, the notice of deficiency must be mailed within three years from the date the tax return is filed. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6501(a) and 6503(a)(1); Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U. S. 386, 389, 392 (1984). Therefore, if the taxpayer has already filed a return (albeit perhaps a faulty one), any claim filed "on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency" would neces- sarily be filed within three years from the date the return is filed. In these circumstances, the applicable look-back pe- riod under § 6512(b)(3)(B) would be the 3-year period defined in § 6511(b)(2)(A), and the Tax Court would have jurisdiction to award a refund. Therefore, in the case of a taxpayer who files a timely tax return, § 6512(b)(3)(B) usually operates to toll the filing pe- riod that might otherwise deprive the taxpayer of the oppor- tunity to seek a refund. If a taxpayer contesting the accu- racy of a previously filed tax return in Tax Court discovers for the first time during the course of litigation that he is entitled to a refund, the taxpayer can obtain a refund from the Tax Court without first filing a timely claim for refund with the IRS. It does not matter, as it would in district court, see § 7422 (incorporating § 6511), that the taxpayer has discovered the entitlement to a refund well after the period for filing a timely refund claim with the IRS has passed, be- cause § 6512(b)(3)(B) applies "whether or not [a claim is] filed," and the look-back period is measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Ibid. Nor does it matter, as it might in a refund suit, see 26 CFR § 301.6402­ 2(b)(1) (1995), whether the taxpayer has previously apprised the IRS of the precise basis for the refund claim, because 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B) posits the filing of a hypothetical claim 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 245 Opinion of the Court "stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment." Section 6512(b)(3)(B) treats delinquent filers of income tax returns less charitably. Whereas timely filers are virtually assured the opportunity to seek a refund in the event they are drawn into Tax Court litigation, a delinquent filer's enti- tlement to a refund in Tax Court depends on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) tolls the limitations period, in that it directs the Tax Court to measure the look-back period from the date on which the notice of deficiency is mailed and not the date on which the taxpayer actually files a claim for refund. But in the case of delinquent filers, § 6512(b)(3)(B) establishes only a 2-year look-back period, so the delinquent filer is not assured the opportunity to seek a refund in Tax Court: If the notice of deficiency is mailed more than two years after the taxes were paid, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award the tax- payer a refund. The Tax Court properly applied this 2-year look-back pe- riod to Lundy's case. As of September 26, 1990 (the date the notice was mailed), Lundy had not filed a tax return. Consequently, a claim filed on that date would not be filed within the 3-year period described in § 6511(a), and the 2- year period from § 6511(b)(2)(B) applies. Lundy's taxes were withheld from his wages, so they are deemed paid on the date his 1987 tax return was due (April 15, 1988), see § 6513(b)(1), which is more than two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed (September 26, 1990). Lundy is therefore seeking a refund of taxes paid outside the applicable look-back period, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdic- tion to award such a refund. III In deciding Lundy's case, the Fourth Circuit adopted a dif- ferent approach to interpreting § 6512(b)(3)(B) and applied a 3-year look-back period. Respondent supports the Fourth 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 246 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court Circuit's rationale, but also offers an argument for applying a uniform 3-year look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B). We find neither position persuasive. The Fourth Circuit held: "[T]he Tax Court, when applying the limitation provi- sion of § 6511(b)(2) in light of § 6512(b)(3)(B), should sub- stitute the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency for the date on which the taxpayer filed the claim for refund, but only for the purpose of determining the benchmark date for measuring the limitation period and not for the purpose of determining whether the two- year or three-year limitation period applies." 45 F. 3d, at 861. In other words, the Fourth Circuit held that the look-back period is measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency (i. e., the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of any taxes paid within either two or three years prior to that date), but that that date is irrelevant in calculating the length of the look-back period itself. The look-back period, the Fourth Circuit held, must be defined in terms of the date that the taxpayer actually filed a claim for refund. Ibid. ("[T]he three-year limitation period applies because Lundy filed his claim for refund . . . within three years of filing his tax return"). Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's view, Lundy was entitled to a 3-year look-back period because Lundy's late-filed 1987 tax return contained a claim for refund, and that claim was filed within three years from the filing of the return. Ibid. (taxpayer entitled to same look-back period that would apply in district court). Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, the fact that Lundy actually filed a claim for a refund after the date on which the Commissioner mailed the notice of deficiency has no bearing in determining whether the Tax Court has jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund. See supra, at 240­ 241. Once a taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 247 Opinion of the Court the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of a deficiency or to award a refund, see 26 U. S. C. § 6512(a), and the Tax Court's jurisdiction to award a refund is limited to those circumstances delineated in § 6512(b)(3). Section 6512(b)(3)(C) is the only provision that measures the look-back period based on a refund claim that is actually filed by the taxpayer, and that provision is inapplicable here be- cause it only applies to refund claims filed "before the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency." § 6512(b)(3)(C). Under § 6512(b)(3)(B), which is the provision that does apply, the Tax Court is instructed to consider only the timeliness of a claim filed "on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency," not the timeliness of any claim that the taxpayer might actually file. The Fourth Circuit's rule also leads to a result that Con- gress could not have intended, in that it subjects the timely, not the delinquent, filer to a shorter limitations period in Tax Court. Under the Fourth Circuit's rule, the availability of a refund turns entirely on whether the taxpayer has in fact filed a claim for refund with the IRS, because it is the date of actual filing that determines the applicable look-back period under § 6511(b)(2) (and, by incorporation, § 6512(b)(3)(B)). See 45 F. 3d, at 861; supra, at 246. This rule might "elimi- nat[e] the inequities resulting" from adhering to the 2-year look-back period, 45 F. 3d, at 863, but it creates an even greater inequity in the case of a taxpayer who dutifully files a tax return when it is due, but does not initially claim a refund. We think our interpretation of the statute achieves an appropriate and reasonable result in this case: The tax- payer who files a timely income tax return could obtain a refund in the Tax Court under § 6512(b)(3)(B), without re- gard to whether the taxpayer has actually filed a timely claim for refund. See supra, at 244­245. If it is the actual filing of a refund claim that determines the length of the look-back period, as the Fourth Circuit held, the filer of a timely income tax return might be out of 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 248 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court luck. If the taxpayer does not file a claim for refund with his tax return, and the notice of deficiency arrives shortly before the 3-year period for filing a timely claim expires, see §§ 6511(a) and (b)(1), the taxpayer might not discover his entitlement to a refund until well after the commence- ment of litigation in the Tax Court. But having filed a timely return, the taxpayer would be precluded by the passage of time from filing an actual claim for refund "within 3 years from the time the return was filed," as § 6511(b) (2)(A) requires. § 6511(b)(2)(A) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). The taxpayer would therefore be entitled only to a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the mailing of the notice of deficiency. See § 6511(b)(2)(B); 45 F. 3d, at 861­862 (taxpayer entitled to same look-back period as would apply in district court, and look-back period is deter- mined based on date of actual filing). It is unlikely that Congress intended for a taxpayer in Tax Court to be worse off for having filed a timely return, but that result would be compelled under the Fourth Circuit's approach. Lundy offers an alternative reading of the statute that avoids this unreasonable result, but Lundy's approach is sim- ilarly defective. The main thrust of Lundy's argument is that the "claim" contemplated in § 6512(b)(3)(B) could be filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed," such that the applicable look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B) would be three years, if the claim were itself filed on a tax return. Lundy in fact argues that Congress must have in- tended the claim described in § 6512(b)(3)(B) to be a claim filed on a return, because there is no other way to file a claim for refund with the IRS. Brief for Respondent 28, 30 (citing 26 CFR § 301.6402­3(a)(1) (1995)). Lundy therefore argues that § 6512(b)(3)(B) incorporates a uniform 3-year look-back period for Tax Court cases: If the taxpayer files a timely return, the notice of deficiency (and the "claim" under § 6512(b)(3)(B)) will necessarily be filed within three years of the return and the look-back period is three years; if the 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 249 Opinion of the Court taxpayer does not file a return, then the claim contemplated in § 6512(b)(3)(B) is deemed to be a claim filed with, and thus within three years of, a return and the look-back period is again three years. Like the Fourth Circuit's approach, Lundy's reading of the statute has the convenient effect of ensuring that taxpayers in Lundy's position can almost always obtain a refund if they file in Tax Court, but we are bound by the terms Congress chose to use when it drafted the statute, and we do not think that the term "claim" as it is used in § 6512(b)(3)(B) is suscep- tible of the interpretation Lundy has given it. The Internal Revenue Code does not define the term "claim for refund" as it is used in § 6512(b)(3)(B), cf. 26 U. S. C. § 6696(e)(2) ("For purposes of sections 6694 and 6695 . . . [t]he term `claim for refund' means a claim for refund of, or credit against, any tax imposed by subtitle A"), but it is apparent from the lan- guage of § 6512(b)(3)(B) and the statute as a whole that a claim for refund can be filed separately from a return. Sec- tion 6512(b)(3)(B) provides that the Tax Court has jurisdic- tion to award a refund to the extent the taxpayer would be entitled to a refund "if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed." (Emphasis added.) It does not state, as Lundy would have it, that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund if on that date "a claim and a return had been filed." Perhaps the most compelling evidence that Congress did not intend the term "claim" in § 6512 to mean a "claim filed on a return" is the parallel use of the term "claim" in § 6511(a). Section 6511(a) indicates that a claim for refund is timely if it is "filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed," and it plainly contemplates that a claim can be filed even "if no return was filed." If a claim could only be filed with a return, as Lundy contends, these provisions of the statute would be senseless, cf. 26 U. S. C. § 6696 (separately defining "claim for refund" and "return"), and we have been given no reason to believe that Congress 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 250 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court meant the term "claim" to mean one thing in § 6511 but to mean something else altogether in the very next section of the statute. The interrelationship and close proximity of these provisions of the statute "presents a classic case for application of the `normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.' " Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The regulation Lundy cites in support of his interpreta- tion, 26 CFR § 301.6402­3(a)(1) (1995), is consistent with our interpretation of the statute. That regulation states only that a claim must "[i]n general" be filed on a return, ibid., inviting the obvious conclusion that there are some circum- stances in which a claim and a return can be filed separately. We have previously recognized that even a claim that does not comply with federal regulations might suffice to toll the limitations periods under the Tax Code, see, e. g., United States v. Kales, 314 U. S. 186, 194 (1941) ("notice fairly advis- ing the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer's claim" tolls the limitations period, even if "it does not comply with formal requirements of the statute and regulations"), and we must assume that if Congress had intended to require that the "claim" described in § 6512(b)(3)(B) be a "claim filed on a return," it would have said so explicitly. IV Lundy offers two policy-based arguments for applying a 3-year look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B). He argues that the application of a 2-year period is contrary to Con- gress' broad intent in drafting § 6512(b)(3)(B), which was to preserve, not defeat, a taxpayer's claim to a refund in Tax Court, and he claims that our interpretation creates an in- congruity between the limitations period that applies in Tax Court litigation and the period that would apply in a refund 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 251 Opinion of the Court suit filed in district court or the Court of Federal Claims. Even if we were inclined to depart from the plain language of the statute, we would find neither of these arguments persuasive. Lundy correctly argues that Congress intended § 6512(b) (3)(B) to permit taxpayers to seek a refund in Tax Court in circumstances in which they might otherwise be barred from filing an administrative claim for refund with the IRS. This is in fact the way § 6512(b)(3)(B) operates in a large number of cases. See supra, at 244­245. But that does not mean that Congress intended that § 6512(b)(3)(B) would always preserve taxpayers' ability to seek a refund. Indeed, it is apparent from the face of the statute that Congress also in- tended § 6512(b)(3)(B) to act sometimes as a bar to recovery. To this end, the section incorporates both the 2-year and the 3-year look-back periods from § 6511(b)(2), and we must assume (contrary to Lundy's reading, which provides a uni- form 3-year period, see supra, at 248­249) that Congress in- tended for both those look-back periods to have some effect. Cf. Badaracco, 464 U. S., at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the correct standard for construing a statute of limitations . . . surely the presumption ought to be that some limitations period is applicable"). (Emphasis deleted.) Lundy also suggests that our interpretation of the statute creates a disparity between the limitations period that ap- plies in Tax Court and the periods that apply in refund suits filed in district court or the Court of Federal Claims. In this regard, Lundy argues that the claim for refund he filed with his tax return on December 28 would have been timely for purposes of district court litigation because it was filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed," § 6511(b)(1) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)); see also Rev. Rul. 76­511, 1976­2 Cum. Bull. 428, and within the 3- year look-back period that would apply under § 6511(b)(2)(A). Petitioner disagrees that there is any disparity, arguing that Lundy's interpretation of the statute is wrong and that 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 252 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Opinion of the Court Lundy's claim for refund would not have been considered timely in district court. See Brief for Petitioner 12, 29­30, and n. 11 (citing Miller v. United States, 38 F. 3d 473, 475 (CA9 1994)). We assume without deciding that Lundy is correct, and that a different limitations period would apply in district court, but nonetheless find in this disparity no excuse to change the limitations scheme that Congress has crafted. The rules governing litigation in Tax Court differ in many ways from the rules governing litigation in the district court and the Court of Federal Claims. Some of these differences might make the Tax Court a more favorable forum, while others may not. Compare 26 U. S. C. § 6213(a) (taxpayer can seek relief in Tax Court without first paying an assessment of taxes) with Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 177 (1960) (28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) requires full payment of the tax assessment before taxpayer can file a refund suit in dis- trict court); and compare 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B) (Tax Court must assume that the taxpayer has filed a claim "stat- ing the grounds upon which the Tax Court" intends to award a refund) with 26 CFR § 301.6402­2(b)(1) (1995) (claim for refund in district court must state grounds for refund with specificity). To the extent our interpretation of § 6512(b) (3)(B) reveals a further distinction between the rules that apply in these forums, it is a distinction compelled by the statutory language, and it is a distinction Congress could ra- tionally make. As our discussion of § 6512(b)(3)(B) demon- strates, see supra, at 244­245, all a taxpayer need do to pre- serve the ability to seek a refund in the Tax Court is comply with the law and file a timely return. We are bound by the language of the statute as it is written, and even if the rule Lundy advocates might "accor[d] with good policy," we are not at liberty "to rewrite [the] statute because [we] might deem its effects susceptible of improvement." Badaracco, supra, at 398. Applying § 6512(b)(3)(B) as Congress drafted it, we find that 516us2$18J 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 253 Thomas, J., dissenting the applicable look-back period in this case is two years, measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of de- ficiency. Accordingly, we find that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund of his overwithheld taxes. The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. Justice Thomas has cogently explained why the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. I there- fore join his opinion. Because one point warrants further emphasis, I add this additional comment. In my view the Commissioner's position, and that of the majority, misses the forest by focusing on the trees. The predecessor to 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b) was amended to protect the interests of a taxpayer who receives a notice of deficiency from the IRS and later determines that the asserted underpayment was in fact an overpayment. Post, at 261­262. Congress ex- pressly intended to guard against the possibility that the time for claiming a refund might lapse before the taxpayer in these circumstances realizes that he is entitled to claim a refund. As Justice Thomas has demonstrated, there is no need to read § 6512(b)(3)(B)-a provision designed to benefit the taxpayer who receives an unexpected deficiency notice- as giving the IRS an arbitrary right to shorten the taxpay- er's period for claiming a refund if that taxpayer has not yet filed a return. The Court's reading of the statute converts an intended benefit into a handicap. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. Under the Internal Revenue Service's longstanding inter- pretation of 26 U. S. C. §§ 6511(a) and (b), Lundy would have collected a refund if he had filed suit in district court. The majority assumes, and I am prepared to hold, that that in- terpretation of § 6511 is correct. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) in- 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 254 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Thomas, J., dissenting corporates the look-back periods of § 6511 for proceedings to recover a refund in Tax Court. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) also contains some language that permits a taxpayer in certain circumstances to collect a refund although he has not actually filed an administrative claim (or has not filed one in what would be a timely fashion under § 6511(a)). Because in my opinion nothing in § 6512(b)(3)(B) suggests that Congress in- tended to shorten the look-back period in a proceeding in Tax Court, I would hold that Lundy is entitled to his refund. I Since 1976, the Service has taken the position that if a taxpayer files a delinquent return containing an accurate claim 1 for a refund within three years after the date on which the tax is deemed to have been overwithheld from his pay, then he can obtain a refund of that tax. See Rev. Rul. 76­511, 1976­2 Cum. Bull. 428 (construing 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a)). This is because "[a] return shall be a claim for refund if it contains a statement setting forth the amount determined as an overpayment and advising that such amount shall be refunded to the taxpayer," Rev. Rul. 76­511, 1976­2 Cum. Bull., at 428, and because a claim filed simulta- neously with a return is filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed" under 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a). The net ef- fect of the interpretation of §§ 6511(a) and (b) adopted in Rev- enue Ruling 76­511 is that "if (i) a return is filed more than two but less than three years after it is due and (ii) a refund claim is filed contemporaneously or subsequently, `the refund would [be] allowable since the overpayment would have been made within the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the claim.' " Brief for Petitioner 29, n. 11 (quoting 1 I use the term "accurate claim" throughout to describe a claim for refund that (1) states the legally sufficient ground upon which the tax- payer eventually attempts to recover, and (2) contains enough detail to allow the taxpayer to obtain a refund in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims under 26 CFR § 301.6402­2(b)(1) (1995). 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 255 Thomas, J., dissenting Rev. Rul. 76­511, 1976­2 Cum. Bull., at 429). The majority assumes that this interpretation of § 6511 is correct. See ante, at 251­252. Under this reading of § 6511, Lundy would have received a 3-year look-back period and a refund if he had filed a suit in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims, rather than filing a petition in the Tax Court.2 The harder step is determining whether the Service's in- terpretation of § 6511 itself is correct. Arguably, § 6511(a) is ambiguous as to what point in time is relevant in determin- ing whether "no return was filed." The Ninth Circuit has held in Miller v. United States, 38 F. 3d 473, 475 (1994), that "[t]he point at which one must determine whether a return has or has not been filed [for purposes of § 6511(a)] must be two years after payment" of the taxes. Congress' intent on this issue is difficult to discern. There is reason to think that Congress simply did not con- sider how being delinquent in filing a return would affect a taxpayer's right to recover a refund-in any forum. It ap- pears that Congress chose the 3-year limitation period in § 6511(a) to correspond with the amount of time the Govern- ment has to make an assessment. See S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 98­99 (1958). As construed by the Service in Revenue Ruling 76­511, subsection (a) of § 6511 does cre- ate a limitation period for any taxpayer that will correspond with the period for assessment: the taxpayer has three years from the time he files his return to file a claim, and the Gov- ernment usually has three years from the time the taxpayer files a return, for assessment. However, in cases where the taxpayer does not timely file his return, subsection (b) takes back the symmetry that subsection (a) bestows. In those 2 The Commissioner concedes that Lundy's actual return constituted a claim for refund, see 26 CFR § 301.6402­3(a)(5) (1995); Rev. Rul. 76­511, 1976­2 Cum. Bull. 428, and "provided a sufficient basis for the determina- tion of [his] correct liability," Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 6. The Commis- sioner also agrees that if Lundy receives a 3-year look-back period meas- ured from the date of his actual return, then he will receive his refund. 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 256 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Thomas, J., dissenting cases, the taxpayer may only recover a refund of tax that was paid within the three years prior to his claim, yet the 3-year statute of limitation on assessments is triggered by the filing of the return.3 These facts suggest that in enact- ing § 6511, Congress quite likely was simply not thinking about the effects on delinquent filers. Or, to put it another way, Congress may have had no intent regarding whether §§ 6511(a) and (b) would permit a taxpayer to take advantage of a 3-year look-back period where the taxpayer's return is not filed on time, and where the 3-year period thus cannot correlate with the Government's assessment period. Nevertheless, in light of the language of § 6511(a), the ab- sence of any reason to think that Congress affirmatively in- tended to prevent taxpayers who file their returns more than two years late (but less than three years late) from collecting refunds, and the Service's 20-year interpretation of § 6511 in its Revenue Ruling, I would interpret § 6511 in conform- ity with the Revenue Ruling. II Section 6512(b), rather than § 6511, directly governs the amount of a tax refund that may be awarded in the Tax Court. The most striking aspect of § 6512(b)(3)(B), however, is that it incorporates the look-back provisions of § 6511-it directs the Tax Court to determine what portion of tax was paid "within the period which would be applicable under sec- tion 6511(b)(2)." To my mind, then, the question is whether the additional language in § 6512(b)(3)(B) (that directing the Tax Court to pretend that "on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed"), the statute's 3 For example, if the taxpayer's return is due on April 15, 1990, he is deemed to pay on that date any tax previously withheld. If he files his return on April 16, 1990, he must still file his claim by April 15, 1993, but the Government will have until April 16, 1993, for assessment. The more delinquent the return is, the greater the disparity between the taxpayer's time for filing a claim and the Government's time for assessment. 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 257 Thomas, J., dissenting legislative history, or other related statutory provisions indi- cate that Congress meant to prevent a taxpayer from receiv- ing his refund from the Tax Court, even though the other courts could have ordered the refund. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) does not merely incorporate § 6511, of course. Instead, § 6512(b)(3)(B) provides that the Tax Court is to determine what portion of tax was paid "within the period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2) . . . , if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed." (Emphasis added.) The question is whether the addition of this language somehow prevents a taxpayer in Lundy's situation from collecting a refund in Tax Court. In asserting that § 6512(b)(3)(B) does not permit recovery here, the Commissioner must tacitly rely upon one of two theories of interpreting that provision- that adopted by the Tax Court or that adopted by the majority. Under the Tax Court's interpretation in this case, "section 6512(b)(3)(B) directs us to focus on the situation as it would have been on a specified date-the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency." 65 TCM 3011, 3014 (1993), ¶ 93,278 RIA Memo TC. According to the Tax Court, § 6512(b)(3)(B) "requires us to `take a snapshot' of the situation" on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. Ibid. Hence, the appli- cable look-back period is the period that would have been applicable under § 6511(b)(2), if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed and if a determination as to the appropriate look-back period had also been made at that time-that is, without the benefit of the information that a real claim was ultimately filed less than three years after the tax was paid. The majority's in- terpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B) is only slightly different-in a way that does not help Lundy. Under that interpretation, "the `claim' contemplated in that section [is to be] treated as the only mechanism for determining whether a taxpayer can recover a refund." Ante, at 242 (emphasis added). 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 258 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Thomas, J., dissenting Section 6512(b)(3)(B), does not, however, require the Tax Court to limit its consideration to events that occurred on or before the notice of deficiency was mailed. Indeed, if any- thing, the variance in tenses ("would be applicable . . . if . . . a claim had been filed") suggests that the Tax Court should determine the proper look-back period in the same way that courts normally determine the applicability of statutes of limitation-with whatever information it has at the time that it rules. Nor does the language of § 6512(b)(3)(B) make clear any intent that the deemed claim of § 6512(b)(3)(B) be treated as the only mechanism for determining whether a taxpayer can recover a refund. The statute incorporates the look-back periods of § 6511 and then explicitly tells the Tax Court that, in applying § 6511, it should pretend that an event happened "whether or not" it actually did happen; 4 it does not tell the Tax Court to ignore events that did happen.5 If Congress 4 Lundy argues that his actual claim superseded any claim "deemed" by § 6512(b)(3)(B) to have been filed on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed, and there is no reason to believe that a claim that would invoke the 3-year look-back period could not supersede a premature claim (i. e., a claim that preceded a return) and thereby give the claimant the benefit of the full 3-year look-back period. Indeed, the Commissioner apparently agreed at oral argument that a taxpayer who files a nonreturn claim before filing a return, then actually files a district court suit, then dismisses that suit, then files a return containing an accurate claim, and finally files an- other suit in district court asserting this ground would be in the same position as one who had never filed the first premature claim. That is, assuming that Revenue Ruling 76­511 is a correct interpretation of a tax- payer's right to recover in district court, the taxpayer in this hypothetical would be permitted to recover if the return was filed within three years from the time the tax was paid. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25­26. 5 I think it odd that the majority, like the Commissioner, reads § 6512(b)(3)(B) as taking into account one real fact that the subsection does not explicitly tell the courts to consider in determining the look-back pe- riod (the fact that no real return had been filed at the time the notice of deficiency was mailed), but as not taking into account another real fact 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 259 Thomas, J., dissenting had meant to say what the majority thinks it said, it could have added the words "no other claim is to be given effect." Or it might have directed the Tax Court to determine if the tax was paid "within the period which would be applicable under § 6511(b)(2) with respect to a claim filed on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed." Cf. n. 6, infra (26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(C) uses the phrase "period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2) . . . in respect of [a] claim" when denoting the period applicable to a particular claim). The Commissioner notes that § 6512(b)(3)(C) provides for the situation in which "a refund claim had actually been filed `before the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency' " and argues that § 6512(b) does not provide any "additional" jurisdiction in the Tax Court for refund claims made "after" the notice of deficiency is issued. Reply Brief for Petitioner 3­4 (emphasis in original).6 But Lundy does not argue for "additional" jurisdiction; he asks only that § 6512(b)(3)(B), which appears to incorporate the look-back periods applica- ble in district court, not be construed as cutting off in the Tax Court a right to obtain a refund that he would have had in district court. The Commissioner is perhaps making an expressio unius argument based upon the existence of § 6512(b)(3)(C). It is true that my interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B)-which per- mits a taxpayer to rely upon real claims as well as the deemed claim-might render § 6512(b)(3)(C) unnecessary. (the fact that the taxpayer has filed a real return that also contains an accurate claim less than three years after the tax was paid). 6 Section 6512(b)(3)(C) provides that the Tax Court may award tax paid "within the period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2) . . . in respect of any claim for refund filed within the applicable period speci- fied in section 6511 and before the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency," provided that the claim was still viable at the time the notice of deficiency was mailed. 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 260 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Thomas, J., dissenting But it appears that § 6512(b)(3)(C) was not added to carve out an exception to some supposed implicit requirement in § 6512(b)(3)(B) that the only recognizable claim in the Tax Court be the hypothetical one. Rather, it was meant to clar- ify that a certain application of § 6512(b)(3)(B) was permissi- ble. The Senate Report that accompanied the 1962 amend- ment to § 6512(b), which added what is now § 6512(b)(3)(C), explained: "Since the 1954 enactment, . . . the Internal Revenue Service has in practice interpreted the law [i. e., § 6512(b)(3)(B)] as permitting the refund of amounts where valid claims have been timely filed, as well as where these claims could have been filed on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. "Your committee believes it is desirable to amend the language of present law (sec. 6512(b)([3])) to make it clear that the statute conforms with the interpretation of this section followed by the Service since the enact- ment of the 1954 Code." S. Rep. No. 2273, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1962). Rather than demonstrating that § 6512(b)(3)(B) was meant to prohibit recognition of "real" claims, this Report, and the Service's pre-1962 interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B) described therein, suggest the opposite: that subsection (b)(3)(B) did and does recognize "real" claims that would be recognized under § 6511. Congress likely failed to state specifically in § 6512(b) whether a subsequently filed claim should be considered in Tax Court because it simply did not consider how that stat- ute would be applied to the taxpayer who failed to file a timely return-just as it likely did not consider how § 6511 itself would be applied to the delinquent filer. Although Congress' intent, if any, as to how these statutes should apply where a late return is filed is obscure, its intent on two more general issues is more discernible. 516US2 Unit: $U18 [05-25-00 07:00:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 261 Thomas, J., dissenting First, Congress meant as a general matter to incorporate the look-back periods of § 6511(b)(2) into § 6512(b)(3)(B).7 If Congress had intended the Commissioner's construction of § 6512(b)(3)(B), there would have been no reason to refer to § 6511; instead, it could have stated the look-back periods much more simply and clearly, e. g., by specifying that a 3-year look-back period should apply if the taxpayer filed a return before the notice of deficiency was mailed, and that otherwise a 2-year look-back period should apply. Al- though, as noted below, Congress clearly intended to aug- ment the taxpayer's ability to recover a refund in Tax Court proceedings in certain circumstances, there is no evidence of any intent to prevent the taxpayer from recovering in Tax Court a refund that he could have obtained in a suit in district court. Second, by adding the "if" clause in § 6512(b)(3)(B), Con- gress clearly did mean to favor a taxpayer who is notified that he owes the Government money, is effectively forced to go to court to contest the deficiency, and is required to put together his records and possibly litigate against the Govern- ment, only to discover during that litigation that it is he who has provided a loan to the Government. The deemed claim of § 6512(b)(3)(B) is intended to protect the filer of a timely return who receives a notice of deficiency in the mail too late to gather his wits, review his papers more carefully, and file an accurate claim for a refund (or an accurate assertion of a right to a refund in a Tax Court petition) prior to the expi- ration of the 3-year period. When Congress amended 26 7 The Fourth Circuit apparently held that, if a taxpayer files a return prior to or simultaneously with filing his Tax Court petition, he will always get the benefit of a 3-year look-back period ending on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. See 45 F. 3d 856, 868 (1995). This interpreta- tion would protect a taxpayer who, unlike Lundy, filed a return more than three years after the tax was paid. The issue need not be decided in this case. Lundy did file a return containing an accurate claim for refund within three years of the time his tax was paid, and he would have re- ceived a refund if he had sued in district court. 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT 262 COMMISSIONER v. LUNDY Thomas, J., dissenting U. S. C. § 322(d), the predecessor of § 6512(b), in 1942, the House Report explained: "In order to give the taxpayer the privilege to claim an overpayment before the [Tax Court] by such amend- ments to his petitions as may be allowed under the rules of the [Tax Court], without the period of limitations run- ning against the refund of such overpayment after the notice of deficiency is mailed, [§ 322(d) is amended] to provide that the period of limitations which determines the portion of the tax which may be credited or refunded is measured from the date the notice of deficiency is mailed, rather than from the date the petition is filed." H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 121 (1942).8 Because § 6512(b)(3)(B) incorporates the look-back periods of § 6511(b) and because it appears that the variance in the Tax Court statute was meant to be more protective of the taxpayer litigating in the Tax Court in certain circum- stances, I would hold that Lundy may recover his refund. III Lundy argues that he was no more negligent for failing to file his return within three years than he was for failing to file it within two years, and that it would be irrational for Congress to forfeit Lundy's refund simply because the Serv- ice "beat him to the punch" in sending him a deficiency no- tice. I disagree. Allowing a delinquent taxpayer a shorter period of time within which to file his claim would not be 8 The majority reads the Fourth Circuit's opinion as barring a taxpayer's reliance upon the deemed claim in meeting § 6511's requirements to obtain the 3-year look-back period (and as thus preventing a taxpayer who filed a timely return but filed a real claim more than three years later from recovering his refund in Tax Court). Ante, at 247­248. If that was in- deed the Fourth Circuit's ruling, then it clearly was incorrect. Under my interpretation, either the deemed claim or a real claim can enable a tax- payer to recover his refund in the Tax Court. 516us2$18N 10-22-98 12:19:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996) 263 Thomas, J., dissenting irrational, nor would giving a taxpayer an incentive to sub- mit his return before the Service calculates his tax obliga- tion, locates him, and sends him a deficiency notice. Thus, for example, Congress might well have provided that if the notice of deficiency is sent prior to the taxpayer's filing his return, the taxpayer will have only a 2-year look-back period in any forum. What would not make much sense to me, however, would be deliberately to adopt this scheme only in Tax Court pro- ceedings-i. e., to punish only the taxpayer whose cash re- serves make it impossible for him to provide the Government a still larger loan in any amount it demands while the tax- payer pursues relief in the district court or Court of Federal Claims, the taxpayer who is too unsophisticated to realize that a suit in district court could preserve his right to a re- fund, and the taxpayer whose expected refund is too small in relation to attorney's fees and other costs to justify a suit in district court. Obviously Congress could constitutionally have adopted such a strange scheme, but I will not simply presume that it has done so. Indeed, the Commissioner does not suggest any reason why Congress would have in- tended to do this; rather, it merely notes that there are many (generally unrelated) differences between Tax Court and dis- trict court proceedings and insists that the plain language of §§ 6511 and 6512(b)(3)(B) mandates this result. As noted previously, the harder step for me is the anteced- ent one of determining that § 6511 itself permits a refund in these circumstances, because it does not appear to me that either § 6511 or § 6512(b) was written with delinquent filers in mind. Once that hurdle is cleared, however, it makes no sense to bar the taxpayer's recovery in the Tax Court alone, when the language of § 6512(b)(3)(B) does not mandate this result and when there is no reason to think that Congress intended it. 516us2$19Z 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 264 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 94­1175. Argued November 28, 1995-Decided January 17, 1996 Petitioner Bank One sued respondent Midwest Bank, alleging that, in dis- honoring a check Bank One had submitted for collection, Midwest failed to meet its obligations under a regulation prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the Ex- pedited Funds Availability Act (Act), 12 U. S. C. §§ 4001­4010. The Dis- trict Court entered summary judgment for Bank One, but the Seventh Circuit vacated that judgment and ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court focused on three of § 4010's civil liability provisions: § 4010(a) renders "any depository insti- tution which fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this [Act or its implementing regulations] with respect to any person other than another depository institution . . . liable [in damages] to such per- son"; § 4010(f) empowers the Board to "impose on or allocate among [banks] the risks of loss and liability in connection with any aspect of the [check] payment system"; § 4010(d) provides for concurrent federal- court and state-court jurisdiction over "[a]ny action under this section." These provisions, the court concluded, demonstrate that the Act author- izes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a "person other than [a] depository institution" sues a "depository institution," § 4010(a), i. e., principally, when a depositor sues a bank. Interbank disputes, the court said, are to be "handled administratively" before the Board or perhaps in state court. Held: The Act provides for federal-court jurisdiction not only in suits between customers and banks, but also in cases initiated by one bank against another bank. Section 4010's language, reinforced by its title and drafting history, impel reading both subsection (a), which makes banks liable to "any person other than another depository institution," and subsection (f), which governs banks' liability inter se, as authorizing claims for relief enforceable in federal court as prescribed in subsection (d). Section 4010 is entitled "Civil liability"; its purpose is to afford private parties a claim for relief based on violations of the Act and its implementing regulations. Both subsections (a) and (f) impose civil lia- bility for such violations. Though the two prescriptions are not paral- 516us2$19Z 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 265 Syllabus lel-most prominently, subsection (f) vests the Board with authority to establish the governing liability standards-they serve the same key purpose: Both permit recovery of damages caused by a regulated party's failure to comply with the Act. Section 4010's drafting history suggests that interbank liability rules were to be developed administratively be- cause Congress recognized that interbank disputes arising out of the check payment system may be more complex than those involving banks and depositors, not because Congress intended to create remedies that would be adjudicated in different forums. It is implausible that Con- gress directed the Board to handle such disputes administratively, for § 4010 does not explicitly confer adjudicatory authority on the Board, nor set forth the relevant procedures for resolution of private disputes. See, e. g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U. S. 219; Coit Inde- pendence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 574. The interpreta- tion of § 4010 offered by Bank One and the United States is sensible because it allows all check-related claims arising out of the same trans- action to be brought in a single federal or state court. The Seventh Circuit's reading, in contrast, would yield an incoherent jurisdictional scheme, whereby bank-depositor claims would be adjudicated in one such court, interbank claims under the Act would originate before the Board, and interbank claims under state law would presumably have to be raised in a separate state-court proceeding. Pp. 270­276. 30 F. 3d 64, reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined in part. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 276. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 279. Robert A. Long, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Mark A. Weiss and Jeffrey S. Blumenthal. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Mark B. Stern, and Douglas B. Jordan. 516us2$19Z 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 266 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of the Court Robert G. Epsteen argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Alan H. Zenoff and A. J. Zenoff.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 4001­4010, a 1987 law designed to accelerate the availability of funds to bank depositors and to improve the Nation's check payment system. We confront a jurisdic- tional question regarding the Act's civil liability provisions, in particular §§ 4010(a), (d), and (f): Is federal-court subject- matter jurisdiction under those provisions confined to suits initiated by bank customers against banks, as the Court of Appeals held, or do federal courts have jurisdiction, as well, over suits brought by one bank against another depository institution? We hold that the Act provides for federal-court jurisdiction not only in suits between customers and banks, but also in cases initiated by one bank against another bank. I Historically, the Nation's check payment system has been controlled primarily by state law, particularly, in recent dec- ades, by articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Although federal regulations have long supple- mented state law in this area, see most notably Regulation J, 12 CFR pt. 210 (1995), the UCC has supplied the basic legal framework for bank deposits and check collections. But despite UCC controls, the check-clearing process too often lagged, taking days or even weeks to complete. To protect themselves against the risk that a deposited check would be returned unpaid, banks typically placed lengthy "holds" on deposited funds. Bank customers, encountering long holds, complained that delayed access to deposited funds *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Electronic Check Clearing House Organization by Robert G. Ballen, Gilbert T. Schwartz, and Dina J. Moskowitz; and for the New York Clearing House Association by Philip L. Graham, Jr., and Norman R. Nelson. 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 267 Opinion of the Court impeded the expeditious use of their checking accounts. See S. Rep. No. 100­19, pp. 25­26 (1987). In 1987, Congress responded by passing the Expedited Funds Availability Act (EFA Act or Act), 101 Stat. 635, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §§ 4001­4010. The Act requires banks 1 to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods, subject to stated exceptions. See §§ 4002, 4003. To reduce banks' risk of nonpayment, the Act grants the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- tem (Federal Reserve Board or Board) broad authority to prescribe regulations expediting the collection and return of checks. § 4008. The Board and other banking agencies are authorized to enforce the Act's provisions administratively, by issuing cease-and-desist orders and imposing other civil sanctions. See § 4009(a) (incorporating administrative en- forcement provisions of 12 U. S. C. § 1818). The Act's final section contains civil liability provisions, which are the focus of this case. See § 4010. Subsection 4010(a) addresses a bank's liability to persons other than an- other depository institution. It provides, in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, any de- pository institution which fails to comply with any re- quirement imposed under this chapter or any regulation prescribed under this chapter with respect to any per- son other than another depository institution is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of [a specified measure of damages]." Subsection 4010(f) governs a bank's liability to another bank for violation of the Act's provisions. It states: "The Board is authorized to impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks of loss and liabil- ity in connection with any aspect of the [check] payment 1 The EFA Act applies to "depository institution[s]," as that term is defined in 12 U. S. C. § 461(b)(1)(A). See 12 U. S. C. § 4001(12). For sim- plicity, we often use the term "bank" instead. 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 268 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of the Court system . . . . Liability under this subsection shall not exceed the amount of the check giving rise to the loss or liability, and, where there is bad faith, other damages, if any, suffered as a proximate consequence of any act or omission giving rise to the loss or liability." Subsection 4010(d) provides for concurrent federal-court and state-court jurisdiction over civil liability suits: "Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year after the date of the occurrence of the violation involved." The Federal Reserve Board has implemented the EFA Act through Regulation CC, 12 CFR pt. 229 (1995). Sub- part C of Regulation CC contains rules to expedite the collection and return of checks. It requires banks, among other things, to return checks "in an expeditious manner," § 229.30(a); provide prompt notice of nonpayment of certain checks, § 229.33(a); and include in the notice the reason for nonpayment, § 229.33(b)(8). Section 229.38 states standards governing interbank liability. It instructs banks to "exer- cise ordinary care and act in good faith in complying with the requirements of [Subpart C]," and further prescribes (in relevant part): "A bank that fails to exercise ordinary care or act in good faith . . . may be liable to" other depository institutions. § 229.38(a). Section 229.38 repeats the juris- dictional provision Congress placed in 12 U. S. C. § 4010(d), i. e., the regulation provides for concurrent federal-court and state-court jurisdiction over "[a]ny action under this subpart." 12 CFR § 229.38(g) (1995). II This controversy stems from an interbank dispute regard- ing a dishonored check. Petitioner Bank One Chicago sued respondent Midwest Bank & Trust Co. in Federal District Court, alleging that Midwest had failed to comply with its 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 269 Opinion of the Court obligations under Regulation CC. The facts underlying the suit are uncontested. A customer of Bank One deposited a check for $64,294.27 drawn on an account at Midwest. Bank One forwarded the check through the Federal Reserve Sys- tem for collection, but Midwest returned it unpaid because Bank One's endorsement stamp was illegible. Bank One properly endorsed the check, resubmitted it for collection, and made the funds available to the Bank One customer. Midwest again returned the check unpaid, this time stating that the payor's account lacked sufficient funds to cover the check. By then, however, Bank One's customer had with- drawn most of the funds from its account. Bank One sought to recover the amount it paid out to its customer against funds that remain uncollected. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for Bank One. That court centrally deter- mined: "Midwest did not act with ordinary care [when it] return[ed] the check for guarantee of endorsement without first checking the sufficiency of the funds in support of the check." App. to Pet. for Cert. 12. To satisfy the payor bank's obligation under 12 CFR § 229.38(a) (1995), the court explained, Midwest should have notified Bank One of the in- sufficient funds problem the first time Midwest returned the check. By failing to do so, the court concluded, Midwest had caused Bank One to lose $43,912.06. The court accordingly entered judgment for Bank One in that amount. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15. Midwest appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not reach the merits of the appeal. Instead, the appellate court raised at oral argument, on its own motion, a threshold question of subject-matter jurisdiction. After affording the parties an opportunity to file memoranda, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment for Bank One and ordered the District Court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. 3d 64, 65 (1994). 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 270 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of the Court Examining the civil liability provisions of 12 U. S. C. § 4010, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EFA Act provides for federal-court jurisdiction only when a "person other than [a] depository institution" sues a "depository insti- tution," see 12 U. S. C. § 4010(a), i. e., principally, when a de- positor sues a bank. 30 F. 3d, at 65. "Disputes such as [Bank One's complaint against Midwest], between members of the Federal Reserve System," the Seventh Circuit stated, "are to be handled administratively before the Board of Gov- ernors of the Federal Reserve System . . . (or perhaps in state court)." Ibid. The court added, in response to a sub- mission by the Federal Reserve Board: "Although the Board of Governors has informed us that no mechanism is currently available for administrative resolution of such [interbank] disputes, the Board's differing interpretation of this statute cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court." Ibid. We granted certiorari. 515 U. S. 1157 (1995). Satisfied that the District Court had adjudicatory authority in this case, we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. III The Court of Appeals and the parties advance diverse readings of 12 U. S. C. § 4010. According to the Seventh Cir- cuit, § 4010 authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only in actions between a bank and a person other than a bank. Subsection 4010(a) alone, in the Court of Appeals' view, pro- vides for rights immediately enforceable in federal court, and that subsection excludes interbank suits, for it applies only to "disputes between `any depository institution' and `any person other than another depository institution.' " 30 F. 3d, at 65 (quoting § 4010(a)). Although § 4010(f) provides for interbank liability, the Court of Appeals read that subsection to authorize only administrative adjudication. In the Sev- enth Circuit's words: "The purpose of the [EFA] Act is to require banks to make funds available to depositors quickly. Thus the 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 271 Opinion of the Court depositors have rights, enforceable in court, while the banks have obligations, which the Federal Reserve Board may establish by regulation and enforce in admin- istrative proceedings." Ibid. The Court of Appeals did not say whether its reading of the statute encompassed an ultimate role for federal courts, as judicial reviewers of the Board's administrative adjudications. Midwest agrees with the Seventh Circuit that § 4010(a) alone describes court-enforceable EFA Act rights-rights that depositors can assert against banks. But unlike the Court of Appeals, Midwest is uncertain whether § 4010(f) au- thorizes administrative adjudication by the Federal Reserve Board. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33­34. Remaining neutral on the Board's competence as a forum for resolving controver- sies between private parties, Midwest urges that the issue before this Court "is not whether the Board may adjudicate the interbank dispute between petitioner and respondent," but whether "the EFA Act confers on the federal district court jurisdiction to decide this dispute." Brief for Re- spondent 23. In Midwest's view, Congress intended inter- bank disputes to be resolved primarily in state rather than federal courts. Id., at 5­6.2 Both Bank One and the United States, as amicus curiae, agree with Midwest that state courts have jurisdiction over interbank check payment disputes. But Bank One and the United States maintain that § 4010(f), by providing for inter- bank "liability" up to the amount of the check as well as "other damages" in certain cases, authorizes interbank ac- tions for violations of liability regulations prescribed by the 2 Midwest observes that UCC § 4­103, 2B U. L. A. § 4­103 (1991), treats Federal Reserve Board regulations as "agreements" between participants in the check payment system; damages for violation of the terms of such agreements, Midwest further asserts, would be recoverable as a matter of state law. See, e. g., United Postal Savings Assn. v. Royal Bank Mid- County, 784 S. W. 2d 906 (Mo. App. 1990). 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 272 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of the Court Federal Reserve Board. And they regard § 4010(d), which speaks of "[a]ny action under [§ 4010]," as instructing that suits under § 4010(f), as well as those under § 4010(a), "may be brought in any United States district court." We hold that the District Court, in the instant case, cor- rectly comprehended its adjudicatory authority, and that the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered dismissal of the ac- tion for lack of jurisdiction. The language of § 4010, rein- forced by the title of the provision and its drafting history, impel reading both subsections (a) and (f) as authorizing claims for relief enforceable in federal court as prescribed in subsection (d). IV Section 4010 is entitled "Civil liability"; its purpose is to afford private parties a claim for relief based on violations of the statute and its implementing regulations. Subsection (a) affords a claim for relief by making banks liable to "any person other than another depository institution." It refers to both individual and class actions, and specifies the meas- ure of damages recoverable in such actions. All agree that suits described in subsection (a) may be brought in federal court under § 4010(d). Subsection (f) governs the area of liability not covered by subsection (a): banks' liability inter se. It authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to "impose on or allocate among de- pository institutions the risks of loss and liability in connec- tion with any aspect of the [check] payment system," and states that "[l]iability under this subsection" shall be limited to the amount of the check, except in cases involving bad faith. In our view, subsection (f), like subsection (a), pro- vides a statutory basis for claims for relief cognizable in fed- eral court under § 4010(d). Both subsections impose civil li- ability for violation of the EFA Act and its implementing regulations. Though the two prescriptions are not paral- lel-most prominently, subsection (f) vests the Board with authority to establish the governing liability standards- 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 273 Opinion of the Court they serve the same key purpose: Both permit recovery of damages caused by a regulated party's failure to comply with the Act. The drafting history of § 4010 casts some light on the dis- crete composition and separate placement of subsections (a) and (f). Under the versions of the statute originally passed by each House of Congress, subsection (a) encompassed ac- tions between banks and persons other than banks, as well as interbank actions. The Conference Committee narrowed subsection (a) by excluding interbank actions, but simultane- ously inserted, still under the section heading "Civil liabil- ity," a new subsection (f). Compare H. R. Rep. No. 100­52, p. 10 (1987), and S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1987), with H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 100­261, pp. 105­106 (1987). These changes reflect recognition that interbank disputes arising out of the check payment system may be more com- plex than those involving banks and depositors; such dis- putes, therefore, may warrant regulatory standards, set by an expert agency, to fill statutory interstices. Thus, in sub- section (f), Congress delegated to the Federal Reserve Board authority to establish rules allocating among depository institutions "the risks of loss and liability" relating to the payment and collection of checks. 12 U. S. C. § 4010(f). Having conferred this authority on the Board, Congress sensibly consolidated in subsection (f) aspects of § 4010 that relate to interbank disputes-liability limits as well as rule- making authority. Congress no doubt intended rules regarding interbank losses and liability to be developed administratively. But nothing in § 4010(f)'s text suggests that Congress meant the Federal Reserve Board to function as both regulator and adjudicator in interbank controversies. Rather, subsections (f) and (d) fit a familiar pattern: agency regulates, court adju- dicates. See, e. g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77j(c) (mandating compliance with disclosure requirements estab- lished by Securities and Exchange Commission); § 77k (creat- 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 274 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of the Court ing right of action in "any court of competent jurisdiction" for violation of those requirements). As the United States persuasively contends: "Congress left it to the Board to de- termine the liability standards for losses in the inter-bank payment system because of the greater complexity of that subject, and not because Congress intended to create reme- dies that would be adjudicated in different fora." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. We find implausible the Court of Appeals' interpretation of § 4010, under which interbank disputes would be "handled administratively" before the Federal Reserve Board. See 30 F. 3d, at 65. Our cases have not been quick to infer agency authority to adjudicate private claims. In Coit Inde- pendence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561 (1989), for example, we held that the Federal Savings and Loan Insur- ance Corporation (FSLIC) lacked statutory authority to ad- judicate creditors' claims against insolvent savings and loan associations. Id., at 572. We observed in Coit, after exam- ining the relevant statutory provisions, that "when Congress meant to confer adjudicatory authority on FSLIC it did so explicitly and set forth the relevant procedures in consider- able detail." Id., at 574. Similarly, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U. S. 219 (1995), we rejected American Airlines' argument that Congress intended the Department of Transportation (DOT) to serve as the exclusive adjudicator of air carrier contract disputes. Id., at 230­232. We noted that the DOT had "neither the authority nor the apparatus required to superin- tend a contract dispute resolution regime," id., at 232, and accordingly declined to "foist on the DOT work Congress has neither instructed nor funded the Department to do." Id., at 234. As in Coit and Wolens, we find no secure signal here that Congress intended to assign to the Federal Reserve Board responsibility for the adjudication of private claims. The 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 275 Opinion of the Court EFA Act's civil liability section, 12 U. S. C. § 4010, does not explicitly confer adjudicatory authority on the Board, nor "set forth the relevant procedures" for resolution of private disputes. See Coit, 489 U. S., at 574.3 Section 4010, we stress, contrasts conspicuously with statutes in which Con- gress has given the Board adjudicatory authority. See, e. g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U. S. C. § 1843(c)(8) (authorizing Board to determine whether bank holding com- pany may acquire shares in nonbanking entity); § 1848 (providing for judicial review of such determinations); cf. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 18 (specifying detailed procedures governing adjudication of private disputes by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). Finally, we note that the interpretation of § 4010 offered by Bank One and the United States is a sensible one. All check-related claims arising out of the same transaction may be brought in a single forum-either in federal court (which would have supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, see 28 U. S. C. § 1367), or in state court. The reading of the statute proposed by the Seventh Circuit, in contrast, would yield an incoherent jurisdictional scheme. Bank-depositor claims would be adjudicated in one forum (state or federal court), while interbank claims under the EFA Act would originate in another (before the Federal Reserve Board). And interbank claims under state law would presumably have to be raised in a separate state-court proceeding. Even if the text of § 4010 could plausibly be read to create 3 The Court of Appeals cited 12 U. S. C. § 4009(c)(1) as a potential source of the Board's authority to adjudicate private disputes. First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. 3d 64, 65 (CA7 1994). But as the United States points out, that section merely authorizes the Board to use traditional administrative enforcement tools in securing com- pliance with the EFA Act. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. Section 4009(c) "does not create any mechanism for the adjudication of inter-bank civil liability claims." Id., at 19­20. 516us2$19P 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 276 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Stevens, J., concurring this decidedly inefficient jurisdictional scheme, we would hesitate to attribute such a design to Congress.4 * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, concurring. Given the fact that the Expedited Funds Availability Act was a measure that easily passed both Houses of Congress,1 Justice Scalia is quite right that it is unlikely that more than a handful of legislators were aware of the Act's drafting history. He is quite wrong, however, to conclude from that observation that the drafting history is not useful to consci- entious and disinterested judges trying to understand the statute's meaning. Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute such as the Expedited Funds Availability Act has bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the views of the committee members in casting their votes. In such circumstances, since most Members are con- tent to endorse the views of the responsible committees, the 4 Bank One and amicus New York Clearing House Association contend that 28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides an independent basis for federal-court ju- risdiction here. Satisfied that Bank One properly relied on 12 U. S. C. § 4010, we need not and do not pass on this contention. 1 The House passed the Act by a vote of 382 to 12. 133 Cong. Rec. 22110 (1987). The Senate approved the measure 96 to 2. Id., at 22181. 516us2$19I 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 277 Stevens, J., concurring intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress. In this case, as the Court and Justice Scalia agree, ante, at 273­274, post, at 282, the statutory text of § 4010 supports petitioner's construction of the Act. However, the place- ment of the authorization for interbank litigation in subsec- tion (f) rather than subsection (a) lends some support to the Court of Appeals' interpretation. When Congress creates a cause of action, the provisions describing the new substan- tive rights and liabilities typically precede the provisions describing enforcement procedures; subsection (f) does not conform to this pattern. The drafting history, however, provides a completely satisfactory explanation for this appar- ent anomaly in the text. Justice Scalia nevertheless views the Court's reference to this history as unwise. As he correctly notes, the simul- taneous removal of the provision for interbank liability from subsection (a) and the addition of a new subsection (f) support another inference favoring the Court of Appeals' construction of the statute: that the drafters intended to relegate the resolution of interbank disputes to a different tribunal. Justice Scalia is mistaken, however, in believ- ing that this inference provides the "most plausible explana- tion" for the change, ibid. In my judgment the Court has correctly concluded that the most logical explanation for the change is a decision to consolidate the aspects of § 4010 that relate to interbank disputes-liability limits and rulemaking authority-in the same subsection. Ante, at 273. Thus, the net result of the inquiry into drafting history is to find the answer to an otherwise puzzling aspect of the statutory text. I must also take exception to Justice Scalia's psycho- analysis of judges who examine legislative history when con- struing statutes. He confidently asserts that we use such history as a makeweight after reaching a conclusion on the 516us2$19I 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 278 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Stevens, J., concurring basis of other factors. I have been performing this type of work for more than 25 years and have never proceeded in the manner Justice Scalia suggests. It is quite true that I have often formed a tentative opinion about the meaning of a statute and thereafter examined the statute's drafting history to see whether the history supported my provisional conclusion or provided a basis for revising it. In my judg- ment, a reference to history in the Court's opinion in such a case cannot properly be described as a "makeweight." That the history could have altered my opinion is evidenced by the fact that there are significant cases, such as Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504 (1989), in which the study of history did alter my original analysis. In any event, I see no reason why conscientious judges should not feel free to examine all public records that may shed light on the meaning of a statute. Finally, I would like to suggest that Justice Scalia may be guilty of the transgression that he ascribes to the Court. He has confidently asserted that the legislative history in this case and in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597 (1991), supports a result opposite to that reached by the Court. While I do not wish to reargue the Mortier case, I will say that I remain convinced that a disinterested study of the entire legislative history supports the conclusion reached by the eight-Member majority of the Court. Even if his analysis in both cases is plausible, it is possible that Justice Scalia's review of the history in Mortier and in this case may have been influenced by his zealous opposition to any reliance on legislative history in any case. In this case, as in Mortier, his opinion is a fine example of the work product of a brilliant advocate.2 It is the Court's opinion, 2 Justice Jackson, whose opinion in United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U. S. 295 (1953), Justice Scalia cites, was also a brilliant advocate. Like Justice Scalia, he recognized the danger of indiscriminate use of legislative history, but unlike Justice Scalia he also recognized that it can be helpful in appropriate cases. See Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 395­396 (1951). 516us2$19I 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 279 Opinion of Scalia, J. however, that best sets forth the reasons for reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Breyer has authorized me to say that he agrees with the foregoing views. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court's opinion, except that portion of it which enters into a discussion of "[t]he drafting history of § 4010." Ante, at 273. In my view a law means what its text most appropriately conveys, whatever the Congress that enacted it might have "intended." The law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it. See United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U. S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Moreover, even if sub- jective intent rather than textually expressed intent were the touchstone, it is a fiction of Jack-and-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of those Senators and Members of the House who voted for the final version of the Expedited Funds Availability Act, and the President who signed it, were, when they took those actions, aware of the drafting evolution that the Court describes; and if they were, that their actions in voting for or signing the final bill show that they had the same "intent" which that evolution suggests was in the minds of the drafters. Justice Stevens acknowledges that this is so, but asserts that the intent of a few committee members is nonetheless dispositive because legislators are "busy people," and "most Members [of Congress] are content to endorse the views of the responsible committees." Ante, at 276. I do not know the factual basis for that assurance. Many congressional committees tend not to be representative of the full House, but are disproportionately populated by Members whose constituents have a particular stake in the subject matter- agriculture, merchant marine and fisheries, science and tech- nology, etc. I think it quite unlikely that the House of Rep- 516us2$19K 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 280 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of Scalia, J. resentatives would be "content to endorse the views" that its Agriculture Committee would come up with if that com- mittee knew (as it knows in drafting committee reports) that those views need not be moderated to survive a floor vote. And even more unlikely that the Senate would be "content to endorse the views" of the House Agriculture Committee. But assuming Justice Stevens is right about this desire to leave details to the committees, the very first provision of the Constitution forbids it. Article I, § 1, provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con- gress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." It has always been assumed that these powers are nondelegable-or, as John Locke put it, that legislative power consists of the power "to make laws, . . . not to make legislators." J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government 87 (R. Cox ed. 1982). No one would think that the House of Representatives could operate in such fashion that only the broad outlines of bills would be adopted by vote of the full House, leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and voted upon only by the cognizant committees. Thus, if legislation consists of forming an "in- tent" rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do not agree), Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent to a small band of its number, but must, as the Consti- tution says, form an intent of the Congress. There is no escaping the point: Legislative history that does not repre- sent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful. Our opinions using legislative history are often curiously casual, sometimes even careless, in their analysis of what "intent" the legislative history shows. See Wisconsin Pub- lic Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 617­620 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Perhaps that is because legislative history is in any event a makeweight; the Court really makes up its mind on the basis of other factors. Or perhaps it is 516us2$19K 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 281 Opinion of Scalia, J. simply hard to maintain a rigorously analytical attitude, when the point of departure for the inquiry is the fairyland in which legislative history reflects what was in "the Con- gress's mind." In any case, it seems to me that if legislative history is capable of injecting into a statute an "intent" that its text alone does not express, the drafting history alluded to in today's opinion should have sufficed to win this case for re- spondent. It shows that interbank liability was not merely omitted from subsection (a), entitled "Civil liability." It was removed from that subsection, simultaneously with the ad- dition of subsection (f), 12 U. S. C. § 4010(f), which gave the Federal Reserve Board power to "impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks of loss and liability in connection with any aspect of the payment system" (lan- guage that is at least as compatible with adjudication as with rulemaking). Now if the only function of this new subsec- tion (f) had been to give the Board rulemaking power, there would have been no logical reason to eliminate interbank dis- putes from the "Civil liability" subsection, whose basic pre- scription (banks are civilly liable for violations of the statute or of rules issued under the statute 1) applies no less in the interbank than in the bank-customer context. Nor can the removal of interbank disputes from subsection (a) be ex- plained on the ground that Congress had decided to apply different damages limits to those disputes. The former sub- section (a), in both House and Senate versions, already pro- vided varying damages limits for individual suits and class actions, see S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1987); H. R. Rep. No. 100­52, pp. 10­11 (1987), and it would have been logical to set forth the newly desired interbank varia- tion there as well, leaving to the new subsection (f) only 1 The Senate version of subsection (a) did not refer to violations of rules, see S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1987), but it was the House version of subsection (a), see H. R. Rep. No. 100­52, p. 10 (1987), which did specifically mention rules, that was retained. 516us2$19K 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT 282 BANK ONE CHICAGO, N. A. v. MIDWEST BANK & TRUST CO. Opinion of Scalia, J. the conferral of rulemaking authority. Or, if it were thought essential to "consolidate" all the details of interbank disputes in subsection (f), it would still not have been necessary to specifically exclude interbank disputes from the general "civil liability" pronouncement of subsection (a). The pro- logue of that subsection, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section," would have made it clear that interbank civil liability was limited as set forth in subsection (f). The most plausible explanation for specifically excluding interbank dis- putes from the "Civil liability" subsection when subsection (f) was added-and for avoiding any reference to "civil liabil- ity" in subsection (f) itself-is an intent to commit those dis- putes to a totally different regime, i. e., to Board adjudication rather than the normal civil-liability regime of the law courts.2 Today's opinion does not consider this argument, but none- theless refutes it (in my view) conclusively. After recount- ing the drafting history, the Court states that "nothing in § 4010(f)'s text suggests that Congress meant the Federal Reserve Board to function as both regulator and adjudicator 2 I have explained why the "consolidation" explanation developed by Justice Stevens, ante, at 277, does not ring true. Even if it did, how- ever, it would not be accurate to say that the legislative history thus pro- vides "the answer to an otherwise puzzling aspect of the statutory text," ibid. What Justice Stevens calls "the answer" (viz., the wish to consol- idate all the interbank provisions in one section) is no more evident from the legislative history than it is from the face of the statute itself. Noth- ing in the legislative history says "we will consolidate interbank matters in a new subsection (f)"; Justice Stevens simply surmises, from the fact that the final text contains such consolidation, that consolidation was the reason for excluding interbank disputes from subsection (a). What inves- tigation of legislative history has produced, in other words, is not an an- swer (that, if there is one, is in the text), but rather the puzzlement to which an answer is necessary: Why were interbank disputes eliminated from subsection (a) when subsection (f) was adopted? Being innocent of legislative history, I would not have known of that curious excision if the Court's opinion had not told me. Thus, legislative history has produced what it usually produces: more questions rather than more answers. 516us2$19K 10-24-98 18:12:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996) 283 Opinion of Scalia, J. in interbank controversies." Ante, at 273 (emphasis added). Quite so. The text's the thing. We should therefore ignore drafting history without discussing it, instead of after dis- cussing it. 516us2$20Z 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 284 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus NEAL v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 94­9088. Argued December 4, 1995-Decided January 22, 1996 When the District Court first sentenced petitioner Neal on two plea- bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to dis- tribute, the amount of LSD sold by a drug trafficker was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper or other carrier medium containing the drug. Because the combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams, the court ruled, among other things, that he was subject to 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of traffick- ing in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a de- tectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guide- lines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of § 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guide- lines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court followed Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 468, in holding, inter alia, that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, the en banc Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this. Held: Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the Sentencing Guidelines require a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance. The Court rejects petitioner's contentions that the revised Guidelines are entitled to deference as a construction of § 841(b)(1) and that those Guidelines require reconsidera- tion of the method used to determine statutory minimum sentences. While the Commission's expertise and the Guidelines' design may be of potential weight and relevance in other contexts, the Commission's choice of an alternative methodology for weighing LSD does not alter 516us2$20Z 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 284 (1996) 285 Opinion of the Court Chapman's interpretation of the statute. In any event, stare decisis requires that the Court adhere to Chapman in the absence of interven- ing statutory changes casting doubt on the case's interpretation. It is doubtful that the Commission intended the Guidelines to displace Chap- man's actual-weight method for statutory minimum sentences, since the Commission's authoritative Guidelines commentary indicates that the new method is not an interpretation of the statute, but an independent calculation, and suggests that the statute controls if it conflicts with the Guidelines. Moreover, the Commission's dose-based method cannot be squared with Chapman. In these circumstances, this Court need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the Commission in order to reject its contrary interpretation. Once the Court has determined a statute's meaning, it adheres to its ruling under stare decisis and assesses an agency's later interpretation of the statute against that settled law. It is the responsibility of Congress, not this Court, to change statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair. Pp. 288­296. 46 F. 3d 1405, affirmed. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald Thomas Bergerson, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 963, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Michael J. Costello. Paul R. Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The policy of sentencing drug offenders based on the amount of drugs involved, straightforward enough in its simplest formulation, gives rise to complexities, requiring us again to address the methods for calculating the weight of LSD sold by a drug trafficker. We reject petitioner's contention that the revised system for determining LSD amounts under the United States Sentencing Guidelines requires reconsideration of the method used to determine *Peter Goldberger and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the Na- tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 286 NEAL v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court statutory minimum sentences, and we adhere to our former decision on the subject. I LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) is such a powerful nar- cotic that the average dose contains only 0.05 milligrams of the pure drug. The per-dose amount is so minute that in most instances LSD is transferred to a carrier medium and sold at retail by the dose, not by weight. In the typical case, pure LSD is dissolved in alcohol or other solvent, and the resulting solution is applied to paper or gelatin. The solvent evaporates; the LSD remains. The dealer cuts the paper or gel into single-dose squares for sale on the street. Users ingest the LSD by swallowing or licking the squares or drinking a beverage into which the squares have been mixed. In 1988, petitioner Meirl Neal was arrested for selling 11,456 doses of LSD on blotter paper. The combined weight of the LSD and the paper was 109.51 grams. Following a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Cen- tral District of Illinois, petitioner was convicted of one count of possession of LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841, and one count of conspiracy to possess LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. At the initial sentencing, the method for determining the weight of the illegal mixture or substance was the same under the Guidelines and the statute directing minimum sen- tences. The determinative amount was the whole weight of the blotter paper containing the drug. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, n. * (Nov. 1987) (1987 USSG). Because the total weight of the LSD and blotter paper exceeded 10 grams, the District Court found petitioner subject to the 10- year mandatory minimum sentence specified in 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). Under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, the indicated sentence was even greater than the statutory minimum: The quantity of the 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 284 (1996) 287 Opinion of the Court drugs and petitioner's prior convictions resulted in a Guide- lines sentencing range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment, even after an adjustment for petitioner's acceptance of re- sponsibility for the crime. The District Court imposed con- current sentences of 192 months' imprisonment on each count, to be followed by five years of supervised release. In November 1993, the United States Sentencing Commis- sion revised the method of calculating the weight of LSD in the Sentencing Guidelines. United States Sentencing Com- mission, Guidelines Manual, App. C., Amdt. 488 (Nov. 1995) (1995 USSG). Departing from its former approach of weigh- ing the entire mixture or substance containing LSD, the amended Guideline instructed courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight of 0.4 milligrams. Id., § 2D1.1(c), n. (H). The revised Guideline was retroactive, id., App. C, Amdt. 502, and one month later petitioner filed a motion to modify his sentence, see 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(2). He contended that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guide- lines was 4.58 grams (11,456 doses × 0.4 milligrams). For that amount, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines would be 70 to 87 months of imprisonment. The 10-year statutory minimum of § 841(b)(1)(A)(v) was no bar to a reduced sentence, petitioner argued, because the presumptive-weight method of the Guidelines should also control the mandatory minimum calculation. The 4.58 grams attributable to him by the Guidelines method would be well short of the 10 grams necessitating a 10-year mini- mum sentence. The District Court, following our recent decision in Chap- man v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991), ruled that the blotter paper must be weighed in determining whether peti- tioner crossed the 10-gram threshold of § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). It held that the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years still applied to petitioner notwithstanding the sentencing range under the Guidelines. Since the Guidelines no longer au- 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 288 NEAL v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court thorized a sentence above the statutory minimum, the Dis- trict Court reduced petitioner's sentence to 120 months on each count. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this, and it affirmed petitioner's sentence. 46 F. 3d 1405 (1995). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether the revised Guideline governs the calculation of the weight of LSD for purposes of § 841(b)(1). 515 U. S. 1141 (1995). Compare United States v. Muschik, 49 F. 3d 512, 518 (CA9 1995) (Guideline method should be used under § 841(b)(1)), cert. pending, No. 95­156, with United States v. Boot, 25 F. 3d 52, 55 (CA1 1994); United States v. Kinder, 64 F. 3d 757, 759 (CA2 1995), cert. pending, No. 95­6746; United States v. Hanlin, 48 F. 3d 121, 124 (CA3 1995); United States v. Pardue, 36 F. 3d 429, 431 (CA5 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1113 (1995); United States v. Andress, 47 F. 3d 839, 840 (CA6 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Stoneking, 60 F. 3d 399, 402 (CA8 1995) (en banc), cert. pend- ing, No. 95­5410; United States v. Mueller, 27 F. 3d 494, 496­ 497 (CA10 1994); United States v. Pope, 58 F. 3d 1567, 1570 (CA11 1995). II Congress has tried different punishment schemes to com- bat the menace of drug trafficking. Under the Comprehen- sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91­513, 84 Stat. 1236, penalties depended upon whether or not a drug was classified as a narcotic. Chagrined by the resulting sentencing disparities, Congress amended the narcotics laws in 1984 to calculate penalties by the weight of the pure drug involved. See Chapman, 500 U. S., at 460­ 461. Focusing on the pure drug, however, often allowed re- tail traffickers, who supplied street markets with mixed or diluted drugs ready for consumption, to receive sentences 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 284 (1996) 289 Opinion of the Court lighter than what Congress deemed necessary. Id., at 461. In passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99­570, 100 Stat. 3207, "Congress adopted a `market-oriented' ap- proach to punishing drug trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence." Chapman, supra, at 461; H. R. Rep. No. 99­ 845, pt. 1, pp. 11­12, 17 (1986). The Act provided for mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of various controlled substances, including LSD. 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i)­(viii) and (B)(i)­(viii). Trafficking in 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing LSD earns the offender at least 10 years in prison. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). In Chapman, we interpreted the provision of the Act that provided a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for trafficking in an LSD "mixture or substance" that weighed one gram or more, see § 841(b)(1)(B)(v). We construed "mix- ture" and "substance" to have their ordinary meaning, observing that the terms had not been defined in the stat- ute or the Sentencing Guidelines and had no distinctive common-law meaning. 500 U. S., at 461­462. Reasoning that the "LSD is diffused among the fibers of the paper . . . [and] cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it," id., at 462, we held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, is determinative under the statute, id., at 468. Petitioner contends that the method approved in Chap- man is no longer appropriate. In his view, the Commission intended its dose-based method to supplant the actual- weight method used in Chapman, and we should not pre- sume that the Commission would recognize two inconsistent schemes for sentencing LSD traffickers, cf. 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., backg'd (stating purposes of making of- fense levels in § 2D1.1 "proportional to the levels established 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 290 NEAL v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court by statute" and providing "a logical sentencing structure for drug offenses"). Petitioner concedes, as he must, that the Commission does not have the authority to amend the stat- ute we construed in Chapman. He argues, nonetheless, that the Commission is the agency charged with interpreta- tion of penalty statutes and expert in sentencing matters, so its construction of § 841(b)(1) should be given deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Congress intended the Commission's rulemaking to respond to judicial decisions in developing a coherent sentencing regime, see Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. 344, 348 (1991), so, petitioner con- tends, deference is appropriate even though the Commis- sion's interpretation postdated Chapman. In the alterna- tive, he urges that we reassess Chapman in light of the Commission's revised method, which was formed from care- ful study of retail drug markets. Although Chapman estab- lished that the weight of the blotter paper must be taken into account, it did not address how courts should do so. The Commission has filled the gap, petitioner maintains, by as- signing a constructive weight to the LSD and carrier for each dose. While acknowledging that the Commission's expertise and the design of the Guidelines may be of potential weight and relevance in other contexts, we conclude that the Commis- sion's choice of an alternative methodology for weighing LSD does not alter our interpretation of the statute in Chapman. In any event, principles of stare decisis require that we ad- here to our earlier decision. The Commission was born of congressional disenchant- ment with the vagaries of federal sentencing and of the pa- role system. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 366 (1989) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its legislative history). The Commission is directed to "estab- lish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system" that meet congressional goals set forth in 18 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 284 (1996) 291 Opinion of the Court U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2) and that, within a regime of individual- ized sentencing, eliminate unwarranted disparities in punish- ment of similar defendants who commit similar crimes. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 991(b)(1)(A)­(B). Congress also charged the Commission with the duty to measure and monitor the effec- tiveness of various sentencing, penal, and correctional prac- tices. § 991(b)(2). In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission has the authority to promulgate, review, and revise binding guidelines to "establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors, among others." Mistretta, supra, at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(a), (b), (c), and (o). Like 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1), the Sentencing Guidelines cali- brate the punishment of drug traffickers according to the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. From their incep- tion in 1987, the Guidelines have used a detailed Drug Quan- tity Table as a first step in determining the sentence. See 1995 USSG § 2D1.1(c); 1987 USSG § 2D1.1. The current Table has 17 tiers, each with specified weight ranges for dif- ferent controlled substances. The weight ranges reflect the Commission's assessment of equivalent culpability among defendants who traffic in different types of drugs, and so all defendants in the same tier are assigned the same base offense level. See 1995 USSG § 2D1.1(c). Once the base offense level is adjusted for other factors, it yields a specific sentencing range depending on the defendant's criminal his- tory. See 1995 USSG § 1B1.1. Although the mandatory-minimum statute and the Guide- lines both turn upon drug quantities, the Commission itself has noted that "mandatory minimums are both structurally and functionally at odds with sentencing guidelines and the goals the guidelines seek to achieve." United States Sen- tencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 26 (Aug. 1991). 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 292 NEAL v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court "The sentencing guidelines system is essentially a sys- tem of finely calibrated sentences. For example, as the quantity of drugs increases, there is a proportional in- crease in the sentence. In marked contrast, the manda- tory minimums are essentially a flat, tariff-like approach to sentencing. Whereas guidelines seek a smooth con- tinuum, mandatory minimums result in `cliffs.' The `cliffs' that result from mandatory minimums compro- mise proportionality, a fundamental premise for just punishment, and a primary goal of the Sentencing Re- form Act." Id., at iii. Despite incongruities between the Guidelines and the man- datory sentencing statute, the Commission has sought to make the Guidelines parallel to the scheme of § 841(b)(1) in most instances. See 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., n. 10 ("The Commission has used the sentences provided in, and equivalences derived from, the statute (21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)), as the primary basis for the guideline sen- tences"). As a general rule, the Commission adopts the same approach to weighing drugs as the statute does: "Un- less otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mix- ture or substance containing a detectable amount of the con- trolled substance." 1995 USSG § 2D1.1(c), n. (A); see also 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., n. 1 (" `Mixture or substance' as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U. S. C. § 841, except as expressly provided"); 1987 USSG § 2D1.1, n. * (weighing rule intended to be "[c]onsistent with the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act"). For most nar- cotics, there will be no inconsistency in the calculations of drug quantities. After study of the LSD trade, however, the Commission in 1993 decided it could no longer follow that general rule for LSD offenses and fulfill the statutory directive to pro- mote proportionate sentencing. The Commission deter- mined that "[b]ecause the weights of LSD carrier media vary 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 284 (1996) 293 Opinion of the Court widely and typically far exceed the weight of the controlled substance itself, . . . basing offense levels on the entire weight of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwarranted disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of actual LSD (but different carrier weights), as well as sen- tences disproportionate to those for other, more dangerous controlled substances, such as PCP." 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., backg'd. To remedy the problem, the Commis- sion revised its Guideline to provide: "In the case of LSD on a carrier medium (e. g., a sheet of blotter paper), do not use the weight of the LSD/carrier medium. Instead, treat each dose of LSD on the carrier medium as equal to 0.4 mg of LSD for the purposes of the Drug Quantity Table." 1995 USSG § 2D1.1(c), n. (H). Under the amendment, a court determines the defendant's base offense level in the Drug Quantity Table by multiplying the number of doses of LSD involved by 0.4 milligrams. The Commission submitted the amendment to Congress, which did not disapprove it in the 180 days allotted by stat- ute. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(p). The amended Guideline took effect on November 1, 1993, and was in force when petitioner was resentenced. As a threshold matter, it is doubtful that the Commission intended the constructive-weight method of the Guidelines to displace the actual-weight method that Chapman requires for statutory minimum sentences. The commentary, which is the authoritative construction of the Guidelines absent plain inconsistency or statutory or constitutional infirmity, Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 38 (1993), states that the new method is to be used "for purposes of determining the base offense level." 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., backg'd. The next paragraph of the commentary repeats the point: The new method will make "the offense level for LSD on a carrier medium . . . [less than] that for the same 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 294 NEAL v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court number of doses of PCP," "harmonize offense levels for LSD offenses with those for other controlled substances," and "avoid an undue influence of varied carrier weight on the applicable offense level." Ibid. This would be obscure language to choose if the Commission were attempting an interpretation of the statute as well as a revision of the Guidelines, for offense levels are not relevant to the mandatory-minimum calculation. Furthermore, after a catalog of reasons for adopting the dose-based method, the Commission ends with the observa- tion that "[n]onetheless, this approach does not override the applicability of `mixture or substance' for the purpose of applying any mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman; § 5G1.1(b))." Ibid. The citation of Chapman in tandem with § 5G1.1(b), which advises that "[w]here a statutorily re- quired minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required mini- mum sentence shall be the guideline sentence," suggests that the Guidelines calculation is independent of the statutory calculation, and that the statute controls if they conflict. The Commission seems to do no more than acknowledge that, whether or not its method would be preferable for the stat- ute and Guideline alike, it has no authority to override the statute as we have construed it. Were we, for argument's sake, to adopt petitioner's view that the Commission intended the commentary as an inter- pretation of § 841(b)(1), and that the last sentence of the com- mentary states the Commission's view that the dose-based method is consistent with the term "mixture or substance" in the statute, he still would not prevail. The Commission's dose-based method cannot be squared with Chapman. The Guideline does take into account some of the weight of the carrier medium (because the average weight of an LSD dose is 0.05 milligrams, 0.35 of the Commission's constructive weight per dose of 0.4 milligrams is attributable to the me- dium, see 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., backg'd), but we 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 284 (1996) 295 Opinion of the Court held in Chapman that § 841(b)(1) requires "the entire mix- ture or substance . . . to be weighed when calculating the sentence." 500 U. S., at 459. In these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the Commis- sion in order to reject its alleged contrary interpretation. Once we have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of the statute against that settled law. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 536­537 (1992); Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990). Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the Ju- diciary to Congress. One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is that "Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736 (1977). We have overruled our precedents when the inter- vening development of the law has "removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989) (citations omitted). Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original intent, NLRB v. Longshore- men, 473 U. S. 61, 84 (1985), our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes. Entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, the Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed a more desirable "approach" to calculating LSD quantities, cf. 1995 USSG § 2D1.1, comment., backg'd. We, however, do not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a statute. True, there may be little in logic to defend the statute's treatment of LSD; it results in significant disparity of punishment meted out to LSD offenders relative to other narcotics traffickers. (Although the number of doses peti- 516us2$20L 10-22-98 12:32:35 PAGES OPINPGT 296 NEAL v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court tioner sold seems high, the quantities of other narcotics a defendant would have to sell to receive a comparable sen- tence under the statute yield far more doses, see United States v. Marshall, 908 F. 2d 1312, 1334 (CA7 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991).) Even so, Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct stat- utes that are thought to be unwise or unfair. Like Chapman, this case involves a petitioner who sold LSD on blotter paper, the "carrier of choice" involved in "the vast majority of cases." 500 U. S., at 466. Just as we de- clined in Chapman to entertain "hypothetical cases . . . in- volving very heavy carriers and very little LSD" in resolving a due process challenge, ibid., we do not address how § 841(b)(1) should be applied in those cases. We hold that § 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the Sentencing Guidelines require a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 516us2$21z 10-22-98 12:33:06 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 297 Per Curiam ATTWOOD v. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 95­6710. Decided January 22, 1996 In November 1995, this Court twice invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner Attwood in forma pauperis status. All seven petitions he had filed at that time and the two he has filed since were patently frivolous and were denied without recorded dissent. Held: For the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, Attwood is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant case, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from him in noncriminal matters unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compli- ance with this Court's Rule 33. This order will not prevent Attwood from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him, but it will allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused the certiorari process. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Robert Attwood requests leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Attwood is al- lowed until February 12, 1996, within which to pay the dock- eting fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Attwood in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compli- ance with Rule 33. Attwood has abused this Court's certiorari process. In November 1995, we twice invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Attwood in forma pauperis status. See Attwood v. Smith and Att- wood v. Palm Beach Post, post, p. 963. At that time, Att- wood had filed seven petitions in this Court during the prior 516us2$21H 10-22-98 12:33:06 PAGES OPINPGT 298 ATTWOOD v. SINGLETARY Stevens, J., dissenting year, and he has filed two since. All were patently frivolous and were denied without recorded dissent. We enter the order barring prospective filings for the rea- sons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Attwood's abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will not prevent Attwood from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of peti- tioners who have not abused our certiorari process. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. Because experience with the administration of orders like the one the Court is entering in this case today has merely reinforced my conviction that our "limited resources" would be used more effectively by simply denying petitions that are manifestly frivolous, I respectfully dissent. Perhaps one day reflection will persuade my colleagues to return to "the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court's history prior to its unprecedented decisions in In re McDon- ald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989) (per curiam), and In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam)." See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Ste- vens, J., dissenting). 516us2$22z 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 299 Syllabus BEHRENS v. PELLETIER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94­1244. Argued November 7, 1995-Decided February 21, 1996 Respondent was fired as provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association after petitioner, the federal official responsible for monitoring Pioneer's operations, recommended such action because respondent was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution. Respondent filed this suit, seeking, inter alia, damages for alleged constitutional wrongs under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. In par- tially denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the Bivens claims, the Dis- trict Court rejected petitioner's asserted defense of qualified immunity from suit. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final" decision under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, but also stated, in dictum, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal. Ultimately, the court affirmed the District Court's rejection of petitioner's qualified-immunity defense, based on the allegations made in respondent's complaint. On remand and after further proceedings, the District Court denied petitioner's mo- tion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. Petitioner's appeal from that denial, his second pretrial appeal based on a rejection of the qualified-immunity defense, was summarily dismissed by the Ninth Circuit "for lack of jurisdiction." Held: A defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified- immunity ruling on a motion to dismiss does not deprive the court of ap- peals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immu- nity, immediately following denial of summary judgment. Pp. 305­314. (a) The Ninth Circuit's one-interlocutory-appeal rule is rejected. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530, this Court held that a district court's denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Mitchell plainly con- templated that a government officer could raise the qualified-immunity defense at both the motion-to-dismiss and the summary-judgment stage, see 472 U. S., at 526, and clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense at either stage is a "final" judgment subject to immediate ap- peal. An unsuccessful appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss cannot possibly render the later denial of a motion for summary judgment any 516us2$22z 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 300 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Syllabus less "final" than it would be absent the prior decision. It follows that petitioner's appeal seeks review of a "final decision" within § 1291 and that its dismissal by the Court of Appeals was improper. The Ninth Circuit's proposition that no more than one judiciously timed appeal should be necessary to safeguard a defendant's right to qualified immu- nity is unsound, because the factors determinative of the qualified- immunity question will be different on summary judgment, where the court looks to the uncontested evidence, than on an earlier motion to dismiss, where it merely looks to the allegations of the complaint. Pp. 305­311. (b) Respondent's additional arguments as to why dismissal was proper-(1) that the order denying qualified immunity could not be said to be "final" under Cohen since, even if it were to be reversed, petitioner would nonetheless be required to endure discovery and trial on other matters, and (2) that, under Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, the denial of summary judgment is not immediately appealable because it rests on the determination that a genuine dispute exists as to material issues of fact-are also rejected. Pp. 311­313. Reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 314. Lenard G. Weiss argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Christine A. Murphy. Cornelia T. L. Pillard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Barbara L. Herwig, and Richard A. Olderman. Samuel T. Rees, by appointment of the Court, 515 U. S. 1101, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Michael J. White.* *Louise H. Renne, Dennis Aftergut, G. Scott Emblidge, Ronald R. Ball, David J. Erwin, J. Kenneth Brown, Norman Herring, Edward J. Foley, Charles J. Williams, James K. Hahn, Katherine J. Hamilton, Gregory P. Priamos, Edward J. Cooper, Rene Auguste Chouteau, Mark G. Sellers, David B. Brearley, and Robert E. Murphy filed a brief for the City and County of San Francisco as amicus curiae urging reversal. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 301 Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), we held that a district court's rejection of a defendant's qualified-immunity defense is a "final decision" subject to immediate appeal under the general appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The question presented in this case is whether a defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified- immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of sum- mary judgment. I In 1983, South Coast Savings and Loan Association, a new institution, applied to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB or Board) for the approval necessary to obtain ac- count insurance from the Federal Savings and Loan Insur- ance Corporation (FSLIC).1 Under FHLBB regulations, approval of new institutions was to be withheld if their "fi- nancial policies or management" were found to be "unsafe" for any of various reasons, including "character of the man- agement." 12 CFR § 571.6(b) (1986). Accordingly, when FHLBB approved South Coast for FSLIC insurance in March 1984, it imposed a number of requirements, including the condition that South Coast "provide for employment of a qualified full-time executive managing officer, subject to approval by the Principal Supervisory Agent"-FHLBB's term for the president of the regional Home Loan Bank when operating in his oversight capacity on behalf of FHLBB. Record, Exh. B, Resolution No. 84­164, ¶ 10(p) (Mar. 29, 1984). The Board's resolution also required that, for a period of three years, any change in South Coast's chief management position be approved by FHLBB. Ibid. 1 FHLBB, FSLIC, and the regulatory scheme described in this opinion no longer exist, having been eliminated by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 183. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 302 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Opinion of the Court Shortly after obtaining FHLBB's conditional approval, South Coast was succeeded in interest by Pioneer Savings and Loan Association, another new institution. Pioneer named respondent Pelletier as its managing officer, subject to FHLBB consent, which Pioneer sought in mid-May 1985. Only a few weeks earlier, however, on April 23, 1985, FHLBB had declared insolvent Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association, where respondent had at one time held a senior executive position. An inquiry by FSLIC pointed to potential misconduct by high-level management of the failed institution, which ultimately became the subject of an FSLIC lawsuit against several Beverly Hills officers, in- cluding respondent. The FSLIC suit had not yet been filed at the time Pioneer sought the Board's consent to hire respondent; but FSLIC's pending investigation into Beverly Hills' collapse caused petitioner Behrens, the FHLBB "Supervisory Agent" then responsible for monitoring Pioneer's operations, to write Pi- oneer on May 8, 1986, withholding approval and advising that respondent be replaced. On receipt of the letter Pioneer asked respondent to resign and, when he refused, fired him. Three years later, in 1989, respondent brought suit in fed- eral court, naming petitioner as defendant in a complaint that included Bivens damages claims for two alleged consti- tutional wrongs. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcot- ics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Respondent charged, first, that petitioner's action in writing a letter that had effectively discharged him from his post at Pioneer, in summary fashion and without notice or opportunity to be heard, violated his right to procedural due process. Second, he claimed that he had been deprived of substantive due process by petitioner's alleged interference with his "clearly established and Consti- tutionally protected property and liberty rights . . . to spe- cific employment and to pursue his profession free from undue governmental interference." First Amended Com- plaint ¶ 38, reprinted in App. 7, 16. The complaint alleged 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 303 Opinion of the Court that petitioner's letter, along with other, continuing efforts to harm respondent's reputation, had cost respondent not only his position at Pioneer, but also his livelihood within the savings and loan industry. The complaint also contained other claims-against petitioner and against the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (petitioner's immediate employer), FHLBB, and the United States; none of these is relevant to the present appeal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. With regard to the Bivens claims, he asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions, taken in a governmental capacity, "d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). The District Court ruled in favor of petitioner on the statute-of-limitations ground and therefore dismissed the procedural due process Bivens claim, and the substantive due process Bivens claim to the extent it related to petitioner's letter and respondent's loss of employment at Pioneer. It refused, however, to dis- miss respondent's suit "to the extent [it was] based on other alleged subsequent acts of defendan[t] preventing and contin- uing to prevent [respondent] from securing employment." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. CV 89­969 (CD Cal., Oct. 5, 1989), reprinted in App. 27­28. The court also denied petitioner's summary judgment mo- tion, without prejudice, on the ground that it was premature given the lack of discovery. Petitioner immediately appealed the District Court's im- plicit denial of his qualified-immunity defense regarding the remaining Bivens claim. The Court of Appeals entertained the appeal, notwithstanding its interlocutory nature, holding that "a denial of qualified immunity is an appealable `final' order under the test set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949) . . . , regardless of whether that denial takes the form of a refusal to grant a defendant's 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 304 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Opinion of the Court motion to dismiss or a denial of summary judgment." Pelle- tier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F. 2d 865, 870 (CA9 1992). It said in dictum, however, that a de- fendant claiming qualified immunity could not "take advan- tage of the several opportunities for immediate appeal af- forded him by bringing repeated pretrial appeals," and that "[o]ne such interlocutory appeal is all that a government of- ficial is entitled to and all that we will entertain." Id., at 870­871. On the merits of the appeal, the court rejected the argument that petitioner enjoyed qualified immunity be- cause he had not violated any "clearly established right." It said that the question whether respondent had a constitu- tionally protected property interest in his Pioneer employ- ment (subject, as it was, to regulatory approval) was not properly before the court, since the claims relating specifi- cally to his discharge had been dismissed as time barred. Id., at 871­872. (The Court of Appeals noted in dictum, however, id., at 869, n. 6, that the District Court had applied an unduly short limitations period.) With respect to the claimed deprivation of post-Pioneer employment, the court held that the "nebulous theories of conspiracy" set out in respondent's complaint-although "insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment"-made out a proper Bivens claim. 968 F. 2d, at 872­873. Upon remand, the District Court reversed its earlier statute-of-limitations ruling in light of the Court of Appeals' dictum, and reinstated the claims relating to employment at Pioneer. After discovery, petitioner moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, contending that his actions had not violated any "clearly established" right of respondent regarding his employment at Pioneer or else- where. The District Court denied the motion with the un- adorned statement that "[m]aterial issues of fact remain as to defendant Behrens on the Bivens claim." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. CV 89­0969 (CD Cal., Sept. 6, 1994), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 305 Opinion of the Court 5a. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which, on respond- ent's motion, the District Court certified as frivolous. In an unpublished order, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal "for lack of jurisdiction." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. 94­56507 (CA9, Nov. 17, 1994), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a. We granted certio- rari, 514 U. S. 1035 (1995). II Section 1291 of Title 28, U. S. C., gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over "all final decisions" of district courts, except those for which appeal is to be had to this Court. The requirement of finality precludes consideration of decisions that are subject to revision, and even of "fully consummated decisions [that] are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). It does not, however, bar review of all prejudgment orders. In Cohen, we de- scribed a "small class" of district court decisions that, though short of final judgment, are immediately appealable because they "finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Ibid. See also Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 142­145 (1993) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)). The issue in the present case is the extent to which orders denying governmental officers' assertions of qualified immunity come within the Cohen category of appealable decisions. As set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982), the qualified-immunity defense "shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their con- duct does not violate clearly established statutory or consti- tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," id., at 818 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 306 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Opinion of the Court 555, 565 (1978)). Harlow adopted this criterion of "objective legal reasonableness," rather than good faith, precisely in order to "permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial." 457 U. S., at 819, 813. Unsurprisingly, then, we later found the immunity to be "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, condi- tioned on the resolution of the essentially legal [immunity] question." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S., at 526. And, as with district-court rejection of claims to other such entitle- ments distinct from the merits, see, e. g., Puerto Rico Aque- duct, supra, at 145­146 (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 662 (1977) (right not to be subjected to double jeopardy), we held that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final deci- sion' within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 notwithstand- ing the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell, supra, at 530. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 311­312 (1995). While Mitchell did not say that a defendant could appeal from denial of a qualified-immunity defense more than once,2 it clearly contemplated that he could raise the defense at successive stages: "Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of vio- lation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evi- 2 Interestingly, however, Mitchell itself dealt with the second of two interlocutory appeals on immunity claims. See 472 U. S., at 515­519. Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court assigned any significance to the successive aspect of the second appeal. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 307 Opinion of the Court dence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts." 472 U. S., at 526 (citation omitted). Thus, Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a "final" judgment subject to immediate appeal. Since an unsuccessful appeal from a denial of dismissal cannot possibly render the later denial of a motion for summary judgment any less "final," it follows that petitioner's appeal falls within § 1291 and dismissal was improper. Indeed, it is easier to argue that the denial of summary judgment-the order sought to be appealed here-is the more "final" of the two orders. That is the reasoning the First Circuit adopted in holding that denial of a motion to dismiss on absolute-immunity grounds was not "final" where the defendant had stated that, if unsuccessful, he would later seek summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds: "Since the district court has not yet determined whether [the defendant] has qualified immunity, and that he will have to stand trial, its decision is not an appealable collateral order." Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F. 2d 704, 707 (1988). The problem with this approach, however, is that it would logically bar any appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage where there is a possibility of presenting an immunity defense on summary judgment; that possibility would cause the motion-to-dismiss decision to be not "final" as to the defendant's right not to stand trial. The First Circuit sought to avoid this difficulty by saying that the defendant could render the motion-to- dismiss denial final by waiving his right to appeal the sum- mary judgment denial. See id., at 708. But quite obvi- ously, eliminating the ability to appeal the second order does not eliminate the possibility that the second order will vindi- cate the defendant's right not to stand trial, and therefore 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 308 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Opinion of the Court does not eliminate the supposed reason for declaring the first order nonfinal. The source of the First Circuit's confusion was its mis- taken conception of the scope of protection afforded by quali- fied immunity. Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid "standing trial," but also to avoid the bur- dens of "such pretrial matters as discovery . . . , as `[i]nquir- ies of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.' " Mitchell, supra, at 526 (emphasis added) (quoting from Harlow, supra, at 817). Whether or not a later summary judgment motion is granted, denial of a mo- tion to dismiss is conclusive as to this right. We would have thought that these and other statements from Mitchell and Harlow had settled the point, questioned by Justice Breyer, see post, at 317, that this right is important enough to support an immediate appeal. If it were not, however, the consequence would be, not that only one pretrial appeal could be had in a given case, as Justice Breyer proposes, but rather, that there could be no immediate appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss but only from denial of summary judgment. That conclusion is foreclosed by Mitchell, which unmistakably envisioned immediate appeal of "[t]he denial of a defendant's motion for dismissal or summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity." 472 U. S., at 527. The Court of Appeals in the present case, in the first of its two decisions, rested its "one-appeal" pronouncement upon the proposition that resolving the question of entitlement to qualified immunity "should not require more than one judi- ciously timed appeal." Pelletier, 968 F. 2d, at 871. It did not explain how this proposition pertains to the question of finality, but we suppose it could be argued that a category of appeals thought to be needless or superfluous does not raise a claim of right "too important to be denied review," as our Cohen finality jurisprudence requires, see 337 U. S., at 546. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 309 Opinion of the Court In any event, the proposition is not sound. That one appeal on the immunity issue may not be enough is illustrated by the history of respondent's claims for loss of employment at Pioneer in the present case. Because these claims had ini- tially been dismissed as time barred, the Court of Appeals refused to decide (and thus evidently regarded as an open question) whether one who holds his job subject to regula- tory approval can assert a constitutionally cognizable expec- tation of continued employment. See Pelletier, supra, at 871­872. Thus, the question whether petitioner was enti- tled to immunity on these claims was not presented to any court until petitioner's summary judgment motion-and, by operation of the Ninth Circuit's one-appeal rule, has never been addressed by an appellate court. That is assuredly an unusual set of circumstances, but even in a case proceeding in a more normal fashion resolution of the immunity question may "require more than one judi- ciously timed appeal," because the legally relevant factors bearing upon the Harlow question will be different on sum- mary judgment than on an earlier motion to dismiss. At that earlier stage, it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for "objective legal reason- ableness." On summary judgment, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting the Harlow inquiry. It is no more true that the defendant who has un- successfully appealed denial of a motion to dismiss has no need to appeal denial of a motion for summary judgment, than it is that the defendant who has unsuccessfully made a motion to dismiss has no need to make a motion for sum- mary judgment.3 3 Justice Breyer suggests that the second of two pretrial qualified- immunity appeals does not come within Cohen's class of immediately ap- 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 310 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals expressed concern that a second ap- peal would tend to have the illegitimate purpose of delaying the proceedings. See 968 F. 2d, at 870­871. Undeniably, the availability of a second appeal affords an opportunity for abuse, but we have no reason to believe that abuse has often occurred. To the contrary, successive pretrial assertions of immunity seem to be a rare occurrence.4 Moreover, if and when abuse does occur, as we observed in the analogous con- text of interlocutory appeals on the issue of double jeopardy, "[i]t is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims." Abney, 431 U. S., at 662, n. 8. In the present case, for example, the District Court appro- priately certified petitioner's immunity appeal as "frivolous" in light of the Court of Appeals' (unfortunately erroneous) one-appeal precedent. This practice, which has been em- braced by several Circuits, enables the district court to re- pealable final orders because it is insufficiently "separable" from the claim raised on the first appeal, see post, at 316. But the Cohen "separability" component asks whether the question to be resolved on appeal is "concep- tually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim." Mitchell v. For- syth, 472 U. S. 511, 527 (1985). The appropriate comparison, then, is be- tween the decision sought to be reviewed and the claim underlying the action itself-not between the decision and any previous appeal, as Jus- tice Breyer suggests. And again, Mitchell clearly states that a denial of qualified immunity, whether on a motion for dismissal or summary judg- ment, is an "appealable `final decision.' " Id., at 530. 4 We are aware of only five reported cases-Mitchell itself, Nelson v. Silverman, 999 F. 2d 417 (CA9 1993), Abel v. Miller, 904 F. 2d 394 (CA7 1990), Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F. 2d 43 (CA2 1989), and the present case-in which Courts of Appeals have been twice asked to review succes- sive pretrial assertions of immunity. See Abel, supra, at 396 ("Paucity of precedent [on successive interlocutory appeals] must reflect the forbear- ance of public officials rather than lack of opportunity"); Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F. 2d 704, 706 (CA1 1988) ("[I]n every case we have found which per- mitted interlocutory review of an immunity ruling, the defendant's entire claim to immunity was raised in a single proceeding"). 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 311 Opinion of the Court tain jurisdiction pending summary disposition of the appeal, and thereby minimizes disruption of the ongoing proceed- ings. See, e. g., Chuman v. Wright, 960 F. 2d 104, 105 (CA9 1992); Yates v. Cleveland, 941 F. 2d 444, 448­449 (CA6 1991); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F. 2d 572, 576­577 (CA10 1990); Apos- tol v. Gallion, 870 F. 2d 1335, 1339 (CA7 1989). In any event, the question before us here-whether there is juris- diction over the appeal, as opposed to whether the appeal is frivolous-must be determined by focusing upon the cate- gory of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order. "Appeal rights can- not depend on the facts of a particular case." Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 405 (1957). See also Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994). As we have said, an order denying qualified immu- nity, to the extent it turns on an "issue of law," Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 530, is immediately appealable. III Our rejection of the one-interlocutory-appeal rule does not dispose of this case. Respondent proposes two other rea- sons why appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available. First, he argues that no appeal is available where, even if the District Court's qualified-immunity ruling is reversed, the defendant will be required to endure discov- ery and trial on matters separate from the claims against which immunity was asserted. Respondent reasons that a ruling which does not reach all the claims does not "conclu- sively determin[e] the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial," id., at 527, and thus the order denying immunity can- not be said to be "final" within the meaning of Cohen. It is far from clear that, given the procedural posture of the present case, respondent would be entitled to the benefit of the proposition for which he argues; but we will address the proposition on its merits. The Courts of Appeals have 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 312 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Opinion of the Court almost unanimously rejected it,5 and so do we. The Harlow right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in general; when immunity with respect to those claims has been finally denied, appeal must be available, and cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition of other claims to the suit. Making appealability depend upon such a factor, particular to the case at hand, would vio- late the principle discussed above, that appealability deter- minations are made for classes of decisions, not individual orders in specific cases. Apart from these objections in principle, the practical effect of respondent's proposal would be intolerable. If the district court rules erroneously, the qualified-immunity right not to be subjected to pretrial pro- ceedings will be eliminated, so long as the plaintiff has al- leged (with or without evidence to back it up) violation of one "clearly established" right; and both that and the further right not to be subjected to trial itself will be eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive relief (for which no "clearly established" right need be alleged). Second, respondent asserts that appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available because the de- nial rested on the ground that "[m]aterial issues of fact re- main." This, he contends, renders the denial unappealable under last Term's decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S., at 313­318. That is a misreading of the case. Denial of sum- mary judgment often includes a determination that there are controverted issues of material fact, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5 See, e. g., McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F. 3d 944, 949 (CA6 1995); Green v. Brantley, 941 F. 2d 1146, 1148­1151 (CA11 1991) (en banc); Di Martini v. Ferrin, 889 F. 2d 922, 924­925 (CA9 1989), cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1204 (1991); Young v. Lynch, 846 F. 2d 960, 961­963 (CA4 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger Silas Mason Co., 844 F. 2d 714, 717­718 (CA10 1988); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F. 2d 736, 742, n. 1 (CA2 1988); Scott v. Lacy, 811 F. 2d 1153, 1153­1154 (CA7 1987); De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F. 2d 1187, 1188­1190 (CA1 1986); Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 F. 2d 401, 403­404 (CA8 1984). Only the Third Circuit holds otherwise. See Prisco v. United States Dept. of Justice, 851 F. 2d 93, 95­96, cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1089 (1989). 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 313 Opinion of the Court 56, and Johnson surely does not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable. Johnson held, sim- ply, that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at sum- mary judgment are not immediately appealable merely be- cause they happen to arise in a qualified-immunity case; if what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly "separable" from the plaintiff's claim, and hence there is no "final decision" under Cohen and Mitchell. See 515 U. S., at 313­318. Johnson reaffirmed that summary judgment de- terminations are appealable when they resolve a dispute con- cerning an "abstract issu[e] of law" relating to qualified immunity, id., at 317-typically, the issue whether the fed- eral right allegedly infringed was "clearly established," see, e. g., Mitchell, supra, at 530­535; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 190­193 (1984). Here the District Court's denial of petitioner's summary judgment motion necessarily determined that certain con- duct attributed to petitioner (which was controverted) con- stituted a violation of clearly established law. Johnson per- mits petitioner to claim on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow standard of "objective legal reasonableness." This argument was pre- sented by petitioner in the trial court, and there is no appar- ent impediment to its being raised on appeal. And while the District Court, in denying petitioner's summary judgment motion, did not identify the particular charged conduct that it deemed adequately supported, Johnson recognizes that under such circumstances "a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed." Johnson, supra, at 319. That is the task now facing the Court of Appeals in this case. 516us2$22k 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 314 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Breyer, J., dissenting The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. I do not agree with the Court's holding that those assert- ing a defense of qualified immunity are entitled, as a matter of course, to more than one interlocutory appeal. Rather, in my view, the law normally permits a single interlocutory ap- peal, and not more than one such appeal, from denials of a defendant's pretrial motions to dismiss a case on grounds of qualified immunity. The "collateral order" doctrine's basic rationale, this Court's precedents, and several practical con- siderations lead to this conclusion. I This Court's basic rationale for permitting an interlocutory appeal of a "collateral order" recognizes that interlocutory appeals are the exception, not the rule. Congress, with statutory exceptions not directly relevant here, has author- ized appeals from "final" orders. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. In that way, "Congress . . . , by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single contro- versy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administra- tion [and] . . . the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a suc- cession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 325 (1940). Judges have nonetheless created what is, in effect, a non- statutory exception, authorizing a special set of interlocutory 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 315 Breyer, J., dissenting appeals, where a trial court's interlocutory order is a "collat- eral order" that satisfies the statutory term "final" for pur- poses of § 1291. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545­547 (1949). The trial court's inter- locutory order is "collateral" (and "final"), however, only where it meets certain requirements. It must (1) "conclu- sively determine [a] disputed question," (2) "resolve an im- portant issue completely separate from the merits of the ac- tion," and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978). These requirements explain why the courts have created the "collateral order" exception. The "effective unreview- ability" requirement means that failure to review the order on appeal now may cause a litigant permanent harm. The "conclusive determination" requirement means that appel- late review now is likely needed to avoid that harm. The "separability" requirement means that review now will not likely force an appellate court to consider the same (or quite similar) questions more than once. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 311 (1995). Taken together, these requirements, as set forth in the Court's cases, see, e. g., ibid.; Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U. S. 794, 799 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 276 (1988), help pick out a class of orders where the error-correcting benefits of immediate appeal likely out- weigh the costs, delays, diminished litigation coherence, and waste of appellate court time potentially associated with multiple appeals. See, e. g., Johnson, supra, at 309­311; R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 585­587 (4th ed. 1992). In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), the Court ap- plied this rationale to a District Court order denying a claim of qualified immunity. The Court concluded that the Dis- trict Court order, by sending the case to trial, could cause the litigant what (in terms of the immunity doctrine's basic trial-avoiding purpose) would amount to an important harm. 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 316 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Breyer, J., dissenting See id., at 526­527. Post-trial appellate review would come too late to avoid that harm. Ibid. And, the legal issue (where purely legal, see Johnson, supra, at 313­318) would often prove "separate" enough from the more basic substan- tive issues in the case to avoid significant duplication of ap- pellate court time and effort. See 472 U. S., at 527­529; but see id., at 545­550 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Hence, the "collateral order" doctrine's basic rationale supported inter- locutory appeal. That same rationale, however, does not support two pre- trial interlocutory appeals, the first from a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint, the second from a later, postappeal, denial of a motion for summary judgment. Consider the "separability" requirement. Both orders satisfy the literal terms of that requirement because the qualified immunity issues they resolve are both "separate," in equal measure, from the merits of the plaintiff's claim. See ante, at 309­ 310, n. 3. But the reasoned principles and purposes underly- ing the "separability" requirement are not served by a rule that permits both orders to be appealed because the issues they raise are not normally "separate" one from the other. Rather, they will often involve quite similar issues, likely presented to different appellate court panels, thereby risking the very duplication and waste of appellate resources that the courts intended the "separability" requirement to avoid. See 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3911, pp. 333­334 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Similarly, given the law's promise of one pretrial interlocu- tory appeal, a litigant's need for a second is much less press- ing. The single interlocutory appeal can avoid much of, though not all of, the harm that Mitchell found. And, the remaining harm, as I shall next discuss, is not of a kind that the law considers important enough to justify an interlocu- tory appeal. 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 317 Breyer, J., dissenting II This Court's precedents justify one interlocutory appeal, but not more, in the ordinary qualified immunity case. When it initially set forth the "collateral order" exception, the Court said that it applied to "that small class" of orders that determine claims of right "too important to be denied [immediate] review." Cohen, supra, at 546 (emphasis added). In subsequent cases, and again today, the Court has reiterated that, to qualify for interlocutory appeal, the inter- est being asserted must be an important one. See, e. g., ante, at 308; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 878­879 (1994) (Cohen inquiry "simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement"); Coopers & Lybrand, supra, at 468 (disputed question must "resolve an important issue"); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 436 (1985); see also Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 502 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The importance of the right asserted has always been a significant part of our col- lateral order doctrine"). Because one pretrial appeal would normally prove sufficient to protect a government defend- ant's qualified immunity interest in not standing trial, the right to take multiple interlocutory appeals will normally protect only the defendant's additional interest in avoiding such pretrial burdens as discovery. Thus, the question, as Justice Scalia has pointed out, is whether this antidiscov- ery interest is "sufficiently important to overcome the poli- cies militating against interlocutory appeals." Id., at 503 (emphasis added). The relevant precedent indicates that, in the context of qualified immunity, it is not. For one thing, the Court, when considering the kinds of orders that warrant interlocutory appeal, has identified as "sufficiently important" interests that are considerably more important than the ordinary interest in avoiding discovery. 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 318 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Breyer, J., dissenting See, e. g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951) (interest in avoid- ing imprisonment; Excessive Bail Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 8); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) (interest in avoiding trial; Double Jeopardy Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 5); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979) (interest in avoiding trial; Speech or Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Met- calf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993) (interest in avoiding trial; Eleventh Amendment immunity, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11).For another thing, the Court has often said that the trou- ble, expense, and possible embarrassment associated with unnecessary litigation (interests rather like the qualified im- munity antidiscovery interest) do not justify interlocutory appeal. See, e. g., Digital Equipment Corp., supra, at 881­ 882 (no interlocutory review of orders refusing to enforce a settlement agreement); Lauro Lines, supra, at 499 (no inter- locutory review of orders refusing to enforce a forum selec- tion clause); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 524 (1988) (no interlocutory review of orders refusing to dismiss a civil suit on grounds of immunity from civil process or forum non conveniens). Further, until now litigants have not been able routinely to vindicate, through immediate appeal, a legal right to avoid discovery, 15B Wright & Miller § 3914.23, at 123­130, even where the Constitution provides that antidiscovery right, see, e. g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 458­461 (1975) (no interlocutory appeal of order refusing to quash subpoena for materials that arguably violated subpoenaed party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Although a litigant can sometimes appeal an adverse discovery ruling, to do so, the litigant typically must disobey the discovery order and then appeal a resulting citation for contempt of court. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Maness, supra, at 460­461; United 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 319 Breyer, J., dissenting States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 532­533 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S., at 326­330; 15B Wright & Miller § 3914.23, at 140­155. But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 691 (1974) (allowing President Nixon to appeal from a discovery order without first incurring a contempt citation, because "traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal" would be "peculiarly inappropriate"). This "disobe- dience and contempt" requirement (somewhat analogous to a one-appeal limitation here) works, in part, because it "en- courages reconsideration both by the party resisting discov- ery and by the party seeking discovery, and in part because it tends to limit appeals to issues that are both important and reasonably likely to lead to reversal." 15B Wright & Miller § 3914.23, at 154; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 50, n. 8 (1987) (disobedience and contempt procedure "rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the sig- nificance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings"). It seems highly anomalous for the law to deny a routine interlocutory appeal where the Constitution of the United States protects an antidiscovery interest, but to permit a routine appeal where the legal doctrine of qualified immunity protects a similar interest. Yet, today's holding will either create just such an anomaly, or, as is more likely, it will generate many new interlocutory appeals as lower courts apply its principle wherever the Constitution, or other important legal doctrine, offers a litigant special anti- discovery protection. The majority suggests that the importance of the anti- discovery interest protected by qualified immunity has al- ready been "settled" by such precedents as Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). See ante, at 308. These cases do say that the qualified immunity defense, in its modern formulation, 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:54 PAGES OPINPGT 320 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Breyer, J., dissenting was meant, in part, "to protect public officials from the `broad-ranging discovery' that can be `peculiarly disruptive of effective government.' " Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 646, n. 6 (1987) (quoting Harlow, supra, at 817). But the Court's decision in Mitchell (that district court or- ders denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable) was concerned primarily with preserving defendants' immu- nity from trial, not discovery. See 472 U. S., at 525 ("At the heart of the issue before us is the question whether qualified immunity . . . is in fact an entitlement not to stand trial"); see also Van Cauwenberghe, supra, at 524 ("The critical question, following Mitchell, is whether `the essence' of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial"). The Court has never before suggested, much less "settled," that the govern- ment defendant's antidiscovery interest-independent of his interest in avoiding trial-is so important that it must be safeguarded by interlocutory appellate review. Finally, this Court and its individual Members have, in recent years, cautioned against expanding the class of orders eligible for interlocutory appeal. See, e. g., Digital Equip- ment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S., at 868 (opinion of Souter, J.) ("[T]he `narrow' exception should stay that way and never be allowed to swallow the general rule"); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S., at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The Court's] finality juris- prudence is sorely in need of further limiting principles, so that Cohen appeals will be, as we originally announced they would be, a `small class [of decisions] . . . too important to be denied review' "); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S., at 440 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("[W]e decline to `transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291' ") (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 378 (1981)). Caution would seem especially appropriate where the Court is considering not one interlocutory appeal in a single case, but two. 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 321 Breyer, J., dissenting III Several important practical considerations also favor limit- ing the number of interlocutory qualified immunity appeals to one. The majority finds the necessary special harm in the fact that the qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials against discovery as well as trial; and it finds "sepa- rability" in the fact that a postdiscovery summary judgment motion likely asks a legal question that is conceptually dis- tinct from the legal question posed by a prediscovery motion to dismiss a complaint. But, given this rationale, can one limit the number of appeals to just one or two? Would it not, in principle, justify several appeals where discovery, proceeding in stages, continuously turns up new facts, or where, after the close of the plaintiff's case, an immediate appeal would avoid the litigation burden of presenting an entire defense case. Still, even two pretrial appeals risk what Justice Story called "very great delays, and oppressive expenses," Canter v. American Ins. Co., 3 Pet. 307, 318 (1830), which can "ossify civil rights litigation," Abel v. Miller, 904 F. 2d 394, 396 (CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J.). The defendant in the present case, for example, so far has spent more than four years (of seven since the complaint's filing) fighting, through interlocutory appeal, a case that he might well have won more quickly and easily either in the trial court or on appeal from an initially adverse judgment on the merits. Cf. Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F. 2d 865, 872­873 (CA9 1992) (expressing doubt that plaintiff's complaint could survive a summary judgment motion). I concede that every added interlocutory appeal will serve the interests that un- derlie qualified immunity to some extent, for each will help a government defendant terminate meritless litigation. But each added appeal likely would serve those interests to an ever-diminishing degree while posing an ever-increasing threat to the appearance of evenhanded justice in civil rights cases. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S., at 476 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:54 PAGES OPINPGT 322 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Breyer, J., dissenting (no immediate appeal of prejudgment order denying class certification, in part because such appeals would "operat[e] only in favor of plaintiffs"). Further, as mentioned above, the majority's rationale threatens added appeals, not simply in qualified immunity cases, but wherever an immunity-type doctrine (or any other important legal rule) seeks to protect litigants from trial. See, e. g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993) (Eleventh Amend- ment immunity); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy guarantee against successive prose- cutions). It thereby threatens busy appellate courts with added numbers of essentially similar, if not repetitive, appeals, at a time when overloaded dockets threaten the federal appellate system. See Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F. R. D. 256, 257 (Apr. 30, 1992) ("One of the chief needs of our generation is to deal with the current appellate capac- ity crisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals. Few could argue about the existence of such a crisis, born of spiraling federal filings and an increased tendency to appeal District Court decisions"); Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 132 (Dec. 1995) ("[I]f conditions seriously deteriorate in the courts of ap- peals, it may be necessary to consider some limitations on the right to appeal"). See generally T. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U. S. Courts of Appeals 31­51 (1994). Finally, as a practical matter, where the benefits of imme- diate appellate review predominate in an individual case, a party still can seek court leave to appeal immediately under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) (permitting immediate review of nonfinal orders that involve a controlling and controversial question of law, the appellate resolution of which "may materially 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 299 (1996) 323 Breyer, J., dissenting advance the ultimate termination of the litigation"). This Court has frequently observed that the availability of § 1292(b) review counsels against expanding other judicial exceptions to the rule against piecemeal appeals. See, e. g., Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U. S. 35, 45­47 (1995); Digital Equipment Corp., 511 U. S., at 883; Van Cau- wenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S., at 529­530; Richardson- Merrell Inc., 472 U. S., at 435; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U. S., at 378, n. 13; Coopers & Lybrand, supra, at 474­ 475, and n. 27; see also Parkinson v. April Industries, Inc., 520 F. 2d 650, 658­660 (CA2 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring). We should be especially reluctant to identify new categories of "collateral orders" now that Congress has, by adding 28 U. S. C. § 2072(c) to the Rules Enabling Act, "designat[ed] . . . the rulemaking process as the way to define or refine when a district court ruling is `final' and when an interlocutory order is appealable." Swint, supra, at 48. IV In sum, purpose, precedent, and practicality all argue for one interlocutory qualified immunity appeal per case and no more. I believe that the Court, following Mitchell, should simply hold that qualified immunity interests, while impor- tant enough to justify one interlocutory appeal, are not im- portant enough to justify two. It is not necessary to argue about whether the defendant "waived" a second appeal, see Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F. 2d 704, 708 (CA1 1988); nor, since the matter turns on "importance," not conclusiveness, need the Court decide just how the timing of an interlocutory appeal affects the "finality" of the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint. See ante, at 307­308. Rather, a defendant asserting qualified immunity would re- main free, as at present, to appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, or the defendant could wait, move for summary judgment, and appeal the motion's denial, but he could not do both-either because the interest asserted 516us2$22q 10-22-98 12:37:54 PAGES OPINPGT 324 BEHRENS v. PELLETIER Breyer, J., dissenting in a first pretrial appeal is insufficiently important if the pos- sibility remains of a second pretrial appeal, or because the interest asserted in a second pretrial appeal is insufficiently important if there has already been a first pretrial appeal. As I said, precedent permits this result because, under that precedent, the importance of the interest (an interlocu- tory appeal is needed to protect) is one necessary require- ment for application of the technical legal labels "final" or "collateral order." More importantly, meaning in law de- pends upon an understanding of purpose. Law's words, however technical they may sound, are not magic formulas; they must be read in light of their purposes, if we are to avoid essentially arbitrary applications and harmful results. For the reasons I have set forth, precedent, read in this way, does more than permit-it requires-a single interlocutory appeal. I therefore dissent. 516us2$23Z 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 325 Syllabus FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER, SECRETARY OF REVENUE OF NORTH CAROLINA certiorari to the supreme court of north carolina No. 94­1239. Argued October 31, 1995-Decided February 21, 1996 During the period in question here, North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state resi- dents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax. Petitioner Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against respondent State Secretary of Reve- nue, seeking a declaratory judgment that this tax violated the Com- merce Clause and a refund of the 1990 tax it had paid on stock it owned in out-of-state corporations that did only part or none of their business in the State. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but the Court of Appeals reversed. In reversing the Court of Appeals, the North Caro- lina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid com- pensatory tax under Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390. It thus rejected Fulton's contention that Darnell had been overruled by this Court's more recent decisions and found that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce. Held: North Carolina's intangibles tax discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Pp. 330­347. (a) State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are "virtually per se invalid." Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. De- partment of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99. How- ever, a facially discriminatory tax may survive Commerce Clause scru- tiny if it is a truly " `compensatory tax' designed simply to make interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate com- merce." Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 647. The tax at issue is clearly facially discriminatory, and therefore it must meet three conditions to be considered a valid compensatory tax, see Oregon Waste, supra, at 103. The Secretary has failed to show that the tax satisfies any of the requirements. Pp. 330­334. (b) To meet the first condition, a State must identify the intrastate tax burden for which it is attempting to compensate, Oregon Waste, supra, at 103, and the intrastate tax must serve some purpose for which the State may otherwise impose a burden on interstate commerce. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 759. The Secretary claims that the intangibles tax compensates for the burden of the general corporate 516us2$23Z 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 326 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Syllabus income tax paid by corporations doing business in North Carolina and that the state service supported by the corporate income tax is the maintenance of an intrastate capital market. This Court, however, has recognized the danger of treating general revenue measures as relevant intrastate burdens for purposes of the compensatory tax doctrine. Ore- gon Waste, supra, at 105, n. 8. Moreover, it can reasonably be assumed that the State's blue sky laws, not its general corporate income tax, provide for the capital market's upkeep. Thus, the Secretary has pointed to no in-state activity or benefit that justifies the compensatory levy. Pp. 334­336. (c) The second condition requires that the tax on interstate commerce approximate, but not exceed, the tax on intrastate commerce. Oregon Waste, supra, at 103. The relevant comparison-between the size of the intangibles tax and that of the corporate income tax component that purportedly funds the capital market-is for practical purposes impossi- ble. The corporate income tax is a general form of taxation, not as- sessed according to the taxpayer's use of particular services, and before its revenues are earmarked for particular purposes they have been com- mingled with funds from other sources. Hence, the Secretary cannot show what proportion of that tax goes to support the capital market, or whether that proportion represents a burden greater than the one the intangibles tax imposes on interstate commerce. Pp. 336­338. (d) The third condition requires the compensating taxes to fall on sub- stantially equivalent events. The purpose of this requirement is to en- sure that the actual payers of each tax are members of the same class, so that the effect of the compensating tax is to enable in-state and out- of-state businesses to compete on a footing of equality. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577. Evaluating whether this requirement has been met will ordinarily require an analysis of the economic inci- dence of the respective taxes, an issue usually unsuited for judicial reso- lution. Here there are reasons to doubt that the relevant taxes have the same incidences, and while it is unlikely that a State can ever show that two taxes are equivalent outside the limited confines of sales and use taxes, it is enough to say here that no such showing has been made. Pp. 338­344. (e) Darnell, supra, does not dictate a different result. That case ap- pears to have evaluated a compensatory tax scheme under the rational basis standard generally employed under the Equal Protection Clause. In that respect, Darnell, along with Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, has been bypassed by later Commerce Clause decisions, which require discriminatory restrictions on commerce to pass the strictest scrutiny. Pp. 344­346. 516us2$23Z 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 327 Opinion of the Court (f) The state courts should determine in the first instance the proper remedy and whether Fulton has complied with the procedural require- ments of the State's tax refund statute. Pp. 346­347. 338 N. C. 472, 450 S. E. 2d 728, reversed and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 348. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Charles Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Marilyn R. Mudge, Assistant Attorney General, and Laurie R. Rubenstein.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we decide whether North Carolina's "intangi- bles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax violates the Commerce Clause. We hold that it does. I During the period in question here, North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on the fair market value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents or having a "busi- ness, commercial, or taxable situs" in the State. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 105­203 (1992).1 Although the tax was assessed at *Jennifer Sartor Smart filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Revenue Cabinet, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 1 The intangibles tax has subsequently been repealed. See 1995 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 41. Because the repeal has no retroactive effect, however, it does not affect the tax years at issue in this litigation. This case accord- ingly remains a justiciable controversy. See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 498­500 (1969) (holding that the obviation of the petitioner's claim for injunctive relief did not render the whole case moot, when a damages claim for backpay remained). 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 328 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court a stated rate of one quarter of one percent, residents were entitled to calculate their tax liability by taking a taxable percentage deduction equal to the fraction of the issuing cor- poration's income subject to tax in North Carolina. Ibid. This figure was set by applying a corporate income tax apportionment formula averaging the portion of the issu- ing corporation's sales, payroll, and property located in the State. See § 105­130.4(i). Thus, a corporation doing all of its business within the State would pay corporate income tax on 100% of its income, and the taxable percentage deduction allowed to resident owners of that corporation's stock under the intangibles tax would likewise be 100%. Stock in a corporation doing no business in North Carolina, on the other hand, would be tax- able on 100% of its value. For the intermediate cases, hold- ers of stock were able to look up the taxable percentage for a large number of corporations as determined and published annually by the North Carolina Secretary of Revenue (Secre- tary). In 1990, for example, the Secretary determined the appropriate taxable percentage of IBM stock to be 95%, meaning that IBM did 5% of its business in North Carolina, with its stock held by North Carolina residents being taxable on 95% of its value. N. C. Dept. of Revenue, Stock and Bond Values as of December 31, 1990, p. 39. Petitioner Fulton Corporation is a North Carolina com- pany owning stock in other corporations that do business out of state. In the 1990 tax year, at issue in this case, Fulton owned shares in six corporations, five of which did no busi- ness or earned no income in North Carolina and therefore were not subject to the State's corporate income tax. Ful- ton's stock in these corporations was accordingly subject to the intangibles tax on 100% of its value. Fulton also owned stock in Food Lion, Inc., which did 46% of its business in North Carolina, with the result that its stock was subject to the intangibles tax on 54% of its value. App. 11. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 329 Opinion of the Court Fulton's intangibles tax liability for the 1990 tax year amounted to $10,884. It paid the tax and brought this ac- tion in state court under Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment that the scheme based on the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Fulton also sought a refund under the terms of the appropriate state statute, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 105­267 (1992), and attorney's fees under Rev. Stat. § 722, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the state trial court ruled in favor of the Secretary. On appeal, North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 110 N. C. App. 493, 430 S. E. 2d 494 (1993). The Court of Appeals saw a facial discrimination against shareholders in out-of-state cor- porations in forcing them to pay tax on a higher percentage of share value than shareholders of corporations operating solely in North Carolina. Id., at 499, 430 S. E. 2d, at 498. The court rejected the Secretary's contention that the intan- gibles tax amounted to a valid "compensating tax" designed to place a burden on interstate commerce equal to what in- trastate commerce already carried under the corporate in- come tax. Id., at 499­501, 430 S. E. 2d, at 498­499. Finally, the Court of Appeals distinguished this Court's decision in Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390 (1912), which held that In- diana could tax the stock of foreign corporations to the ex- tent that those corporations were not subject to the State's tax on in-state property. Because the tax regime in Darnell was constructed to avoid the double taxation of corporate property values, a result not accomplished by North Caro- lina's intangibles tax, the Court of Appeals did not view Dar- nell as being on point. 110 N. C. App., at 501­504, 430 S. E. 2d, at 499­501. The court refused Fulton any retrospective relief, however, and held the proper remedy to be elimination 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 330 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court of the percentage deduction provision from the intangibles tax scheme. Id., at 504­505, 430 S. E. 2d, at 501­502. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court of North Car- olina, which reversed. Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 338 N. C. 472, 450 S. E. 2d 728 (1994). Without addressing whether the intangibles tax was facially discriminatory, the court read Darnell to compel a conclusion that the scheme here imposed a valid compensating tax, 338 N. C., at 477­480, 450 S. E. 2d, at 731­734, and it rejected Fulton's contention that Darnell had been overruled implicitly by this Court's more recent decisions on interstate taxation. 338 N. C., at 480­ 482, 450 S. E. 2d, at 734­735. The court reasoned, moreover, that corporate income is generally related to the value of corporate stock, and that in practice, the burden on inter- state commerce imposed by the intangibles tax was less than that placed on intrastate commerce by the corporate income tax. Id., at 479­480, 450 S. E. 2d, at 733­734. We granted certiorari, 514 U. S. 1062 (1995), and now reverse. II The constitutional provision of power "[t]o regulate Com- merce . . . among the several States," U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, has long been seen as a limitation on state regula- tory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of congressional authority. See, e. g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179­180 (1995); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.) (dictum). In its negative aspect, the Commerce Clause "prohibits economic protec- tionism-that is, `regulatory measures designed to benefit in- state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competi- tors.' " Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 647 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 273­274 (1988)). This reading effectuates the Framers' purpose to "preven[t] a State from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 331 Opinion of the Court as a whole, as it would do if it were free to place burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear." Jefferson Lines, supra, at 180. In evaluating state regulatory measures under the dor- mant Commerce Clause, we have held that "the first step . . . is to determine whether it `regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.' " Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99 (1994) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 336 (1979)). With respect to state taxation, one element of the protocol summarized in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), treats a law as discriminatory if it " `tax[es] a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.' " Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S. 334, 342 (1992) (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984)); see also Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 332, n. 12 (1977) (noting that a State "may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element"). State laws discrimi- nating against interstate commerce on their face are "virtu- ally per se invalid." Oregon Waste, supra, at 99; see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 624 (1978). We have also recognized, however, that a facially discrimi- natory tax may still survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if it is a truly " `compensatory tax' designed simply to make interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intra- state commerce." Associated Industries, supra, at 647.2 2 We use the terms "compensatory" tax and "complementary" tax as two ways of describing the same phenomenon: a tax on interstate commerce "complements" a tax on intrastate commerce to the extent that it "com- pensates" for the burdens imposed on intrastate commerce by imposing a similar burden on interstate commerce. We have also described taxes 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 332 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court Thus, in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937), we upheld the State of Washington's tax on the privilege of using any article of tangible personal property within the State. The statute exempted the use of any article that had already been subjected to a sales tax equal to the use tax or greater, so that the use tax effectively applied only to goods purchased out of state. Although the use tax was itself fa- cially discriminatory, we held that the combined effect of the sales and use taxes was to subject intrastate and interstate commerce to equivalent burdens. " `There is no demand in . . . [the] Constitution that the State shall put its require- ments in any one statute,' " we said; rather, " `[i]t may dis- tribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its totality, is within the State's constitutional power.' " Id., at 584 (quoting Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 480 (1932)). As Justice Cardozo explained for the Court, the complementary arrangement assures that "[w]hen the ac- count is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed." 300 U. S., at 584. Since Silas Mason, our cases have distilled three condi- tions necessary for a valid compensatory tax. First, "a State must, as a threshold matter, `identif[y] . . . the [intra- state tax] burden for which the State is attempting to com- pensate.' " Oregon Waste, supra, at 103 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 758 (1981)). Second, "the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to approxi- mate-but not exceed-the amount of the tax on intrastate on interstate commerce as being imposed "in lieu" of taxes on intrastate commerce. See, e. g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U. S. 434, 436 (1959); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 700 (1895). This last class of cases, however, has involved taxes which were at least arguably not facially discriminatory, and we have evaluated these cases under a somewhat different standard. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 333 Opinion of the Court commerce." Oregon Waste, 511 U. S., at 103. "Finally, the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are im- posed must be `substantially equivalent'; that is, they must be sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually ex- clusive `prox[ies]' for each other." Ibid. (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, supra, at 643). III There is no doubt that the intangibles tax facially discrimi- nates against interstate commerce. A regime that taxes stock only to the degree that its issuing corporation partici- pates in interstate commerce favors domestic corporations over their foreign competitors in raising capital among North Carolina residents and tends, at least, to discourage domestic corporations from plying their trades in interstate com- merce. The Secretary practically concedes as much, and relies instead on the compensatory tax defense.3 The only 3 Although the Secretary does suggest that the tax is so small in amount as to have no practical impact at all, we have never recognized a "de minimis" defense to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the Com- merce Clause. See, e. g., Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 650 (1994) ("[A]ctual discrimination, wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the discrimination have no bearing on the determinative question whether discrimination has oc- curred"); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 760 (1981) ("We need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates"). We likewise reject the Secretary's speculation that the most likely effect, if any, of the taxable percentage deduction is to encour- age out-of-state firms to compete in the North Carolina market so that their North Carolina shareholders may take advantage of the deduction. As we explain further, supra, at 330­331, such promotion of in-state mar- kets at the expense of out-of-state ones furthers the "economic Balkaniza- tion" that our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has long sought to prevent. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325­326 (1979); see also Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72 (1963) (a State may not impose "a tax which is discriminatory in favor of the local merchant" so as to "encourag[e] an out-of-state operator to become a resi- dent in order to compete on equal terms") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 334 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court issue, then, is whether the taxable percentage deduction can be sustained as compensatory. A As we have said, a State that invokes the compensatory tax defense must identify the intrastate tax for which it seeks to compensate, see supra, at 332, and it should go with- out saying that this intrastate tax must serve some purpose for which the State may otherwise impose a burden on inter- state commerce. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725 (1981), for example, we rejected Louisiana's argument that, because it imposed a severance tax on natural resources ex- tracted from its own soil, it could impose a compensating "first use" tax on resources produced out of state but used within Louisiana. Because "Louisiana has no sovereign in- terest in being compensated for the severance of resources from the federally owned [Outer Continental Shelf] land," we held that "[t]he two events are not comparable in the same fashion as a use tax complements a sales tax." Id., at 759. In this case, the Secretary suggests that the intangibles tax, with its taxable percentage deduction, compensates for the burden of the general corporate income tax paid by cor- porations doing business in North Carolina. But because North Carolina has no general sovereign interest in taxing income earned out of state, Maryland v. Louisiana teaches that the Secretary must identify some in-state activity or benefit in order to justify the compensatory levy. Indeed, we have repeatedly held that "no state tax may be sustained unless the tax . . . has a substantial nexus with the State . . . [and] is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Id., at 754; see also Jefferson Lines, 514 U. S., at 183­184; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S., at 279. The Secretary does not disagree, but rather insists that North Carolina may impose a compensatory tax upon foreign corpo- 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 335 Opinion of the Court rations because they may avail themselves of access to North Carolina's capital markets. The Secretary's theory is that one of the services provided by the State, and supported through its general corporate income tax, is the maintenance of a capital market for corpo- rations wishing to sell stock to North Carolina residents. Since those corporations escape North Carolina's income tax to the extent those corporations do business in other States, the Secretary says, the State may require those companies to pay for the privilege of access to the State's capital mar- kets by a tax on the value of the shares sold. So, the Secre- tary concludes, the intangibles tax "rests squarely on `the settled principle that interstate commerce may be made to pay its way.' " Brief for Respondent 18 (quoting Oregon Waste, 511 U. S., at 102). The argument is unconvincing, and we rejected a counter- part of it in Oregon Waste, where we held that Oregon could not charge an increased fee for disposal of waste generated out of state on the theory that in-state waste generators sup- ported the cost of waste disposal facilities through general income taxes. Although we relied primarily upon the con- clusion that earning income and disposing of waste are not "substantially equivalent taxable events," id., at 105, we also spoke of the danger of treating general revenue measures as relevant intrastate burdens for purposes of the compensa- tory tax doctrine. "[P]ermitting discriminatory taxes on in- terstate commerce to compensate for charges purportedly included in general forms of intrastate taxation would allow a state to tax interstate commerce more heavily than in-state commerce anytime the entities involved in interstate com- merce happened to use facilities supported by general state tax funds." Id., at 105, n. 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We declined then, as we do now, "to open such an expansive loophole in our carefully confined compen- satory tax jurisprudence." Ibid. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 336 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court Even shutting our eyes to that loophole, we are unper- suaded that North Carolina's corporate income tax is de- signed to support the maintenance of an intrastate capital market. North Carolina, like most States, regulates access to its capital markets by means of blue sky laws, see gener- ally N. C. Gen. Stat. ch. 78A (1994), and their accompanying regulations, which prescribe who may sell securities in North Carolina, the procedures that must be followed to do so, and the fees imposed for the privilege. See, e. g., N. C. Gen. Stat. § 78A­28 (1994) (registration procedures and fees); 18 N. C. Admin. Code § 6.1304 (1990) (same). Absent probative evidence to the contrary, which the Secretary has not supplied, we can reasonably assume that North Carolina has provided for the upkeep of its capital market through these provisions, not through the general corporate income tax.4 If the corporate income tax does not support the mainte- nance of North Carolina's capital market, then the State has not justified imposition of a compensating levy on the owner- ship of shares in corporations not subject to the income tax. While we need not hold that a State may never justify a compensatory tax by an intrastate burden included in a gen- eral form of taxation, the linkage in this case between the intrastate burden and the benefit shared by out-of-staters is far too tenuous to overcome the risk posed by recognizing a general levy as a complementary twin. B The second prong of our analysis requires that "the tax on interstate commerce . . . be shown roughly to approximate- but not exceed-the amount of the tax on intrastate com- merce." Oregon Waste, supra, at 103. The Secretary ar- 4 Our skepticism regarding the Secretary's capital markets argument is reinforced by the fact that the Secretary did not advance it to the state courts. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 337 Opinion of the Court gues that the relative magnitudes of the corporate income tax and the intangibles tax can be evaluated best by refer- ence to the price/earnings (P/E) ratios of taxpayer firms. This ratio represents the relationship of the value of a corpo- ration's stock, the target of the intangibles tax, to the corpo- ration's earnings, which are subjected to the income tax. See 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance 176 (1992). North Carolina taxes corporate income and owner- ship of stock at rates of 7.75% and .25%, respectively. Given these rates, the State Supreme Court found that "a North Carolina corporation need only have a P/E ratio less than 31 (7.75/.25) in order to have the tax against its income exceed the intangibles tax against the stockholders of a comparable corporation doing business only in [other States] and having all its shareholders in North Carolina. Since P/E ratios are only rarely greater than 31, most out-of-state corporations will in fact be paying less taxes to North Carolina . . . than a similar North Carolina corporation." 338 N. C., at 480, 450 S. E. 2d, at 733 (footnotes omitted). The math is fine, but even leaving aside the issue of who is really paying the taxes, the example compares apples to oranges. When a corporation doing business in a State pays its general corporate income tax, it pays for a wide range of things: construction and maintenance of a transportation network, institutions that educate the work force, local police and fire protection, and so on. The Secretary's justification for the intangibles tax, however, rests on only one of the many services funded by the corporate income tax, the main- tenance of a capital market for the shares of both foreign and domestic corporations. To the extent that corporations do their business outside North Carolina, after all, they get lit- tle else from the State. Even, then, if we suppressed our suspicion that North Carolina actually funds its capital mar- ket through its blue sky fees, not its general corporate taxa- tion, the relevant comparison for our analysis has to be between the size of the intangibles tax and that of the cor- 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 338 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court porate income taxes component that purportedly funds the capital market. That comparison, of course, is for the present practical purpose impossible. The corporate income tax is a general form of taxation, not assessed according to the taxpayer's use of particular services, and before its revenues are ear- marked for particular purposes they have been commingled with funds from other sources. As a result, the Secretary cannot tell us what proportion of the corporate income tax goes to support the capital market, or whether that propor- tion represents a burden greater than the one imposed on interstate commerce by the intangibles tax. True, it is not inconceivable, however unlikely, that a capital markets com- ponent of the corporate income tax exceeds the intangibles tax in magnitude, but the Secretary cannot carry her burden of demonstrating this on the record in front of us. This difficulty simply confirms our general unwillingness to "permi[t] discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce to compensate for charges purportedly included in general forms of intrastate taxation." Oregon Waste, 511 U. S., at 105, n. 8. Where general forms of taxation are involved, we ordinarily cannot even begin to make the sorts of quanti- tative assessments that the compensatory tax doctrine re- quires. See infra, at 341­343. C The tax, finally, fails even the third prong of compensatory tax analysis, which requires the compensating taxes to fall on substantially equivalent events. Although we found such equivalence in the sales/use tax combination at issue in Silas Mason, our more recent cases have shown extreme reluc- tance to recognize new compensatory categories. In Oregon Waste, we even pointed out that "use taxes on products pur- chased out of state are the only taxes we have upheld in recent memory under the compensatory tax doctrine." 511 U. S., at 105. On the other hand, we have rejected equiva- lence arguments for pairing taxes upon the earning of in- 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 339 Opinion of the Court come and the disposing of waste, ibid., the severance of natu- ral resources from the soil and the use of resources imported from other States, Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S., at 759, and the manufacturing and wholesaling of tangible goods, Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 244 (1987); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S., at 642. In each case, we held that the paired activities were not "sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive prox[ies] for each other." Oregon Waste, supra, at 103 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the face of this trend, the Secretary argues that North Carolina has assured substantial equivalence by employing the same apportionment formula to tie the percentage of share value subject to the intangibles tax directly to the per- centage of income earned within the State. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 105­130.4(i) (1992). The Secretary further contends that the intangibles tax and the corporate income tax fall on substantially equivalent "events" because they fall on eco- nomically equivalent "values": the value of a corporation's stock and the value of a corporation's income, respectively. Even assuming the truth of both these assertions, however, we find that the intangibles tax is not functionally equivalent to the corporate income tax. By equivalence of value, the Secretary means that the value reached by the intangibles tax reflects that targeted by the income tax to a substantial degree because of the influence of corporate earnings on the price of stock. While that may be true enough,5 it does not explain away the fact 5 It is generally well accepted that corporate income will ordinarily be a good indicator of the stock's value. See, e. g., J. Weston & E. Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance 254­257 (10th ed. 1993). While there may be cases in which other factors will play a more significant role, and while the past corporate earnings that the income tax reaches may be an imperfect proxy for the anticipated future earnings upon which stock price is actually based, we are willing to accept the Secretary's judgment that the taxed values correspond for purposes of this case. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 340 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court that the taxes are apparently different (quite apart from stated rates) in a number of obvious respects, including the parties ostensibly taxed. Something more than mere influ- ence of the one stated tax base on the value of the other would therefore be necessary before we could conclude that equivalent events (or "values") are taxed. The nature of that something more flows from the objective of the equivalent-event requirement, which is to enable in-state and out-of-state businesses to compete on a footing of equality. In Silas Mason, for example, we observed that "[t]he practi- cal effect" of Washington's sales/use tax regime "must be that retail sellers in Washington will be helped to compete upon terms of equality with retail dealers in other states who are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding burden." 300 U. S., at 581; see also Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70 (1963) ("[E]qual treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state"). This equality of treat- ment does not appear when the allegedly compensating taxes fall respectively on taxpayers who are differently described, as, for example, resident shareholders and corporations doing business out of state. A State defending such a scheme as one of complementary taxation, therefore, has the burden of showing that the actual incidences of the two tax burdens are different enough from their nominal incidences so that the real taxpayers are within the same class, and that therefore a finding of combined neutrality on interstate competition would at least be possible.6 6 Silas Mason makes clear that actual incidence upon the same class of taxpayers is a necessary condition for a finding that two taxes are comple- mentary. Our analysis has sometimes focused upon other factors, how- ever, see, e. g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 643 (1984), and we need not decide today whether identity of tax incidence is sufficient to compel the conclusion that two taxes fall upon substantially equivalent events. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 341 Opinion of the Court In principle, the door may be open for such an argument. It is well established that "the ultimate distribution of the burden of taxes [may] be quite different from the distribution of statutory liability," McLure, Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court: An Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 69, 72 (1982), with such divergence occurring when the nominal taxpayer can pass it through to other parties, like consumers. The Secretary's equivalence argument might work in the present case, then, if we could find that the economic impact of North Carolina's corporate income tax is passed through to shareholders of corporations doing business in state in a way that offsets the disincentive imposed by the intangibles tax to buying stock in corporations doing business out of state. But there is a problem with this line of argument, and it lies in the frequently extreme complexity of economic inci- dence analysis. The actual incidence of a tax may depend on elasticities of supply and demand, the ability of producers and consumers to substitute one product for another, the structure of the relevant market, the timeframe over which the tax is imposed and evaluated, and so on. See, e. g., Com- monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 619, n. 8 (1981) (determining "whether the tax burden is shifted out of State, rather than borne by in-state producers and con- sumers, would require complex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of demand for the product and alterna- tive sources of supply").7 We declined to shoulder any such analysis in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 7 Other factors may also be important, depending on the particular case. These include "whether (1) the taxed product is a final or intermediate good, (2) the tax is large or small, (3) prices are rising or falling, (4) the costs of the taxed enterprise are increasing or decreasing, (5) the factors of production are mobile, (6) the taxed industry is subject to government regulation, and (7) in the federal system, the state imposing the tax domi- nates the market for the taxed good or service." Hellerstein, Comple- mentary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 Tax Lawyer 405, 439 (1986). 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 342 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 589­590, and nn. 12­14 (1983), noting that "courts as institutions are poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of taxation. The complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error, and courts have little familiarity with the process of evaluat- ing the relative economic burden of taxes" (footnote omitted). We were likewise unwilling to "plunge . . . into the morass of weighing comparative tax burdens by comparing taxes on dissimilar events" in Oregon Waste. 511 U. S., at 105 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the general difficulty of comparing the economic incidence of state taxes paid by different taxpayers upon different transactions goes a long way toward explaining why we have so seldom recognized a valid compensatory tax outside the context of sales and use taxes.8 See Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 Tax Law- 8 The only exception of which we are aware is Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 (1869). In that case, we upheld an Alabama tax on each gallon of liquor imported into the State on the ground that it complemented a tax of equal magnitude on each gallon of liquor distilled in the State. We noted that this tax scheme was "necessary to make the tax equal on all liquors sold in the State," id., at 153, a rationale consistent with our conclu- sion that the compensatory tax doctrine is fundamentally concerned with equalizing competition between in-staters and out-of-staters. Indeed, we cited Hinson in support of a similar proposition in Silas Mason. See Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U. S. 577, 585 (1937). In determining that a tax on importers and distillers would actually equalize competition in the liquor market, the Hinson Court made a good commonsense estimate of the likely incidence of the two taxes. Simply because modern economic tools may indicate that the incidence question is more complex, moreover, does not undermine the basic principle of equal competition established in Hinson. By the same token, however, Hinson does not alter our conclu- sion today that courts will ordinarily be unable to evaluate the economic equivalence of allegedly complementary tax schemes that go beyond tradi- tional sales/use taxes. See supra, at 337­338, this page and 343. So much for Hinson in theory; for Hinson in practice, compare it with Armco, supra. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 343 Opinion of the Court yer 405, 434, n. 197, 458 (1986) (noting that sales and use taxes require no economic incidence analysis because they are strict functional equivalents for one another). In this case, not only has the State failed to proffer any analysis addressing the complexity of its burden, but we have particular reason to doubt the Secretary's suggestion that domestic corporate income taxes are so reflected in the stock values of corporations doing business in state as to offset the effects of the intangibles tax. Because corpora- tions operating in North Carolina do not exhaust the market for investment opportunities, investors are free to look else- where if North Carolina's corporate income tax has the effect of depressing the value of shares in corporations doing busi- ness in the State. Hence, the impact of the income tax will be reflected in the purchase price of these shares, investors will presumably earn a market return on a lower outlay, and the actual burden of the tax will be borne by other parties, such as the consumers of the corporations' products. See McClure, supra, at 82; see also McClure, The Elusive Inci- dence of the Corporate Income Tax: The State Case, 9 Pub. Finance Q. 395, 401 (1981). But because North Carolina in- vestors make up a relatively small proportion of the partici- pants in national capital markets, it is unlikely that the stock price of corporations doing business outside the State will reflect the impact of the intangibles tax. The economic inci- dence of this tax is thus likely to fall squarely on the share- holder. All other things being equal, then, a North Carolina investor will probably favor investment in corporations doing business within the State, and the intangibles tax will have worked an impermissible result. See Halliburton, 373 U. S., at 72 (States may not impose discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce in the hopes of encouraging firms to do business within the State); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 356 (1951) (observing that the creation of "prefer- ential trade areas" is "destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause"). 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 344 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court All other things, of course, are rarely equal, and investors may wish to invest in corporations doing business in North Carolina for any number of reasons, perhaps affecting the degree to which the corporate income tax is or is not passed through to shareholders. Our point, however, is simply that there are reasons to doubt the Secretary's contention that the corporate income tax amounts to a clear equivalent for the burden on shareholding imposed by the intangibles tax, and these doubts are dispositive. After all, "the concept of the compensatory tax . . . is merely a specific way of justify- ing a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscrimi- natory means." Oregon Waste, supra, at 102. As with any other defense of a facially discriminatory tax, the State has the burden to show that the requirements of the compen- satory tax doctrine are clearly met. Cf. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S., at 342­343 (noting that " `facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose' ") (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 337 (1979)). While we doubt that such a showing can ever be made outside the limited confines of sales and use taxes, it is enough to say here that no such showing has been made. IV Our finding that North Carolina has failed to show that its intangibles tax satisfies any of the three requirements for a valid compensatory tax leaves the tax unconstitutional as facially discriminatory under our modern tests. The Secre- tary argues, however, that our decision in Darnell v. Indi- ana, 226 U. S. 390 (1912), compels us to sustain the North Carolina statute. The statutory scheme at issue in Darnell taxed all shares in foreign corporations owned by Indiana residents as well as all shares in domestic corporations to the extent that the issuing corporations' property was not subject to Indiana's general property tax. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes found that "[t]he only difference of 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 345 Opinion of the Court treatment . . . that concerns the defendants is that the State taxes the property of domestic corporations and the stock of foreign ones in similar cases." Id., at 398. This arrange- ment, he concluded, "is consistent with substantial equality notwithstanding the technical differences." Ibid.9 Justice Holmes has been praised for the lucidity of his rea- soning, as having been "wrong clearly" even where he erred, see Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958), but the opinion in Darnell does not exemplify his customary merit. He gives no explanation for the conclusion quoted, commenting only that the discrimi- nation issue "was decided in Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 732 [(1903)]." 226 U. S., at 398. Kidd, however, was de- cided under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and emphasized "the large latitude allowed to the States for classification upon any reasonable basis." 188 U. S., at 733 (citations omitted). The exclusive reliance upon Kidd in Darnell thus indicates that the latter case should be viewed primarily as one of equal protection, despite the fact that Indiana's shareholder tax was challenged under both the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses. To the extent that Darnell evaluated a discriminatory state tax under the Equal Protection Clause, time simply has passed it by. While we continue to measure the equal protection of economic legislation by a "rational basis" test, see, e. g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993), we now understand the dormant Commerce Clause to require "justifications for discriminatory restric- tions on commerce [to] pass the `strictest scrutiny.' " Ore- gon Waste, 511 U. S., at 101 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, at 337); see also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 9 The Court did recognize as problematic the Indiana statute's failure to exempt shares of foreign corporations to the extent that those corpora- tions owned, and were taxed upon, property within the State. Justice Holmes noted, however, that the petitioners lacked standing to raise that claim. 226 U. S., at 398. 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 346 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Opinion of the Court v. Hunt, supra, at 342­343; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 624 (1978).10 Hence, while cases like Kidd and Darnell may still be authorities under the Equal Protection Clause, they are no longer good law under the Commerce Clause. Cf. Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S., at 652 (holding that, although a prior case applied a more lenient equal protection analysis to a Commerce Clause challenge, it had been "bypassed by later decisions"). North Carolina's intangibles tax cannot pass muster under modern compensatory tax cases, and Darnell cannot save it. V North Carolina's intangibles tax facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it fails justification as a valid compensatory tax, and, accordingly, it cannot stand. At the same time, of course, it is true that "a State found to have imposed an impermissibly discriminatory tax retains flexi- bility in responding to this determination." McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 39­40 (1990). In McKesson, for example, we said that a State might refund the additional taxes imposed upon the victims of its discrimi- nation or, to the extent consistent with other constitutional provisions (notably due process), retroactively impose equal burdens on the tax's former beneficiaries. A State may also combine these two approaches. Ibid. These options are available because the Constitution requires only that "the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax 10 Cf., e. g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528 (1959) ("[I]t has long been settled that a [tax] classification, though discrimina- tory, is not . . . violative of the Equal Protection Clause . . . if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it"). One commenta- tor has observed that, "[b]ecause the states enjoy extremely broad leeway under the equal protection clause in drawing lines for tax purposes, they normally have no need to defend a discriminatory tax classification on the ground that a `complementary' levy is imposed on other taxpayers." Hellerstein, 39 Tax Lawyer, at 428 (footnote omitted). 516us2$23m 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996) 347 Opinion of the Court period reflec[t] a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce." Id., at 41.11 In this case, that choice may well be dictated by the sever- ability clause enacted as part of the intangibles tax statute. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 105­215 (1992). That issue, however, as well as the question whether Fulton has properly complied with the procedural requirements of North Carolina's tax re- fund statute, § 105­267, ought to come before the state courts in the first instance. Cf. Swanson v. State, 335 N. C. 674, 680­681, 441 S. E. 2d 537, 541 (noting that "[f]ailure to com- ply with the requirements in section 105­267 bars a taxpay- er's action against the State for a refund of taxes"), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1056 (1994).12 Where "the federal constitu- tional issues involved [in the remedial determination] may well be intertwined with, or their consideration obviated by, issues of state law," our practice is to leave the remedy for the state supreme court to fashion on remand. Bacchus Im- ports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 277 (1984); see also Tyler Pipe Industries v. Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S., at 252; Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 28 (1985). We do that here. The judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 11 We have also suggested that a " `meaningful opportunity for taxpayers to withhold contested tax assessments and to challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing' is itself sufficient to satisfy constitutional con- cerns." Associated Industries, 511 U. S., at 656 (quoting McKesson, 496 U. S., at 38, n. 21). The Secretary has not asserted that such an opportu- nity was afforded to Fulton under North Carolina's remedial scheme. 12 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in this case did address the severability clause, holding that it required that the intangibles tax con- tinue in effect without the taxable percentage deduction. Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 110 N. C. App. 493, 504, 430 S. E. 2d 494, 501 (1993). Because the North Carolina Supreme Court found the tax to be valid, however, it did not reach this question. 516us2$23h 10-22-98 12:42:45 PAGES OPINPGT 348 FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER Rehnquist, C. J., concurring Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring. Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390 (1912), required that tax- ation of interstate transactions be "consistent with substan- tial equality notwithstanding the technical differences." Id., at 398. Whether or not North Carolina's intangibles tax would satisfy Darnell's "substantial equality" requirement, I agree that the tax is not consistent with this Court's more recent requirement that there be "substantial equivalence" between an in-state taxable event and the interstate event on which a State levies a compensatory tax. Ante, at 345­ 346. I have expressed in dissent my belief that the "sub- stantial equivalence" test deviates from the principle articu- lated in earlier cases that " `equality for the purposes of competition and the flow of commerce' " should be " `meas- ured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions,' " Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 647 (1984) (quoting Hallibur- ton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70 (1963)), and it might be argued accordingly that Darnell is more "re- alistic," 467 U. S., at 648. However, my view has not pre- vailed, and Darnell simply cannot be reconciled with the compensatory-tax decisions cited in the Court's opinion, ante, at 345­346. I therefore join the opinion of the Court. 516us2$24Z 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 349 Syllabus PEACOCK v. THOMAS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 94­1453. Argued November 6, 1995-Decided February 21, 1996 Respondent Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer, Tru-Tech, Inc., and petitioner Peacock, a Tru-Tech officer and shareholder, alleging that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administer- ing Tru-Tech's pension benefits plan, and seeking benefits due under the plan. The District Court entered a money judgment against Tru-Tech upon finding that it had breached its fiduciary duties, but ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary. Thomas did not execute the judgment while the case was on appeal and, during that time, Peacock settled many of Tru-Tech's accounts with favored creditors, including himself. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and attempts to col- lect it from Tru-Tech proved unsuccessful, Thomas sued Peacock in fed- eral court, asserting, inter alia, a claim for "Piercing the Corporate Veil Under ERISA and Applicable Federal Law." The District Court ultimately agreed to pierce the corporate veil and entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit. Held: The District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas' subsequent suit. Pp. 352­360. (a) Neither ERISA's jurisdictional provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U. S. C. § 1331 supplied the District Court with subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit. The Court rejects Thomas' suggestion that the suit arose under 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3), which authorizes civil ac- tions for "appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress [any] violations . . . of [ERISA] or the terms of [an ERISA] plan." Because Thomas' com- plaint in this lawsuit alleged no such violations, he failed to allege a claim for equitable relief. Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, such piercing is not itself an independent ERISA cause of action and cannot independently support federal jurisdiction. The District Court erred in finding that he had properly stated such a claim, since ERISA does not provide for imposing liability for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. Pp. 352­354. (b) Federal courts do not possess ancillary jurisdiction over new ac- tions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for 516us2$24Z 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 350 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Syllabus a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment. Although ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised (1) to permit disposi- tion by a single court of factually interdependent claims, and (2) to en- able a court to function successfully by effectuating its decrees, Thomas has not carried his burden of demonstrating that this suit falls within either category. First, because a federal court sitting in a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal juris- diction, claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in the earlier suit will not support federal jurisdiction over the subsequent suit. In any event, there is insufficient factual or logical interdependence between the claims raised in Thomas' first and second suits. Second, cases in which this Court has approved the exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over attachment, gar- nishment, and other supplementary proceedings involving third parties are inapposite. This case is governed by H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U. S. 497, in which the Court refused to authorize the exercise of ancil- lary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment. As long as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sufficiently protect a judgment creditor's ability to execute on a judgment, ancillary jurisdiction should not be exercised over proceedings, such as the pres- ent, that are new actions based on different theories of relief than the prior decree. Pp. 354­359. 39 F. 3d 493, reversed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 360. David L. Freeman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were J. Theodore Gentry, Carter G. Phil- lips, and Richard D. Bernstein. J. Kendall Few argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John C. Few, Margaret A. Chamber- lain, and James R. Gilreath. Richard P. Bress argued the cause for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor 516us2$24Z 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 349 (1996) 351 Opinion of the Court General Kneedler, Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Edward D. Sieger.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue whether federal courts pos- sess ancillary jurisdiction over new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judg- ment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment. We hold that they do not. I Respondent Jack L. Thomas is a former employee of Tru- Tech, Inc. In 1987, Thomas filed an ERISA class action in federal court against Tru-Tech and petitioner D. Grant Pea- cock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech, for benefits due under the corporation's pension benefits plan. Thomas al- leged primarily that Tru-Tech and Peacock breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering the plan. The District Court found that Tru-Tech had breached its fidu- ciary duties, but ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary. On November 28, 1988, the District Court entered judgment in the amount of $187,628.93 against Tru-Tech only. Thomas v. Tru-Tech, Inc., No. 87­2243­3 (D. S. C.). On April 3, 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 900 F. 2d 256. Thomas did not exe- *Robert P. Davis and Kenneth S. Geller filed a brief for the National Association of Real Estate Investment Managers as amicus curiae urg- ing reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. by Steven S. Zaleznick, Mary Ellen Signorille, Jeffrey Lewis, and Ronald Dean; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Virginia A. Seitz, David M. Silberman, and Laurence Gold; for the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund by Ira R. Mitzner and Woody N. Pe- terson; for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare and Pension Fund by Thomas C. Nyhan, Terrence C. Craig, and James P. Condon; and for the National Coordinating Committee for Multi- employer Plans by Diana L. S. Peters. 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 352 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court cute the judgment while the case was on appeal and, during that time, Peacock settled many of Tru-Tech's accounts with favored creditors, including himself. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, Thomas unsuccessfully attempted to collect the judgment from Tru-Tech. Thomas then sued Peacock in federal court, claiming that Peacock had entered into a civil conspiracy to siphon assets from Tru-Tech to prevent satisfaction of the ERISA judgment.1 Thomas also claimed that Peacock fraudulently conveyed Tru-Tech's assets in violation of South Carolina and Pennsylvania law. Thomas later amended his complaint to assert a claim for "Piercing the Corporate Veil Under ERISA and Applicable Federal Law." App. 49. The District Court ultimately agreed to pierce the corporate veil and entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of $187,628.93-the precise amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech-plus interest and fees, notwithstanding the fact that Peacock's alleged fraudulent transfers totaled no more than $80,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit. 39 F. 3d 493 (CA4 1994). We granted certiorari to determine whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.2 514 U. S. 1126 (1995). We now reverse. II Thomas relies on the Employee Retirement Income Se- curity Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 1 Peacock's attorney was also named as a defendant in the suit, but the District Court rejected the claim against him. 2 Compare 39 F. 3d 493 (CA4 1994) (case below), Argento v. Melrose Park, 838 F. 2d 1483 (CA7 1988), Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810 F. 2d 378 (CA3) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U. S. 1029 (1987), and Blackburn Truck Lines, Inc. v. Francis, 723 F. 2d 730 (CA9 1984), with Sandlin v. Corporate Inte- riors Inc., 972 F. 2d 1212 (CA10 1992), and Berry v. McLemore, 795 F. 2d 452 (CA5 1986). 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 349 (1996) 353 Opinion of the Court U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., as the source of federal jurisdiction for this suit. The District Court did not expressly rule on subject-matter jurisdiction, but found that Thomas had prop- erly stated a claim under ERISA for piercing the corporate veil. We disagree. We are not aware of, and Thomas does not point to, any provision of ERISA that provides for im- posing liability for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 833 (1988) ("ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judg- ments . . ."). We reject Thomas' suggestion, not made in the District Court, that this subsequent suit arose under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which authorizes civil actions for "appropriate eq- uitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA or the terms of an ERISA plan. 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3). Thomas' com- plaint in this lawsuit alleged no violation of ERISA or of the plan. The wrongdoing alleged in the complaint occurred in 1989 and 1990, some four to five years after Tru-Tech's ERISA plan was terminated, and Thomas did not-indeed, could not-allege that Peacock was a fiduciary to the ter- minated plan.3 Thomas further concedes that Peacock's alleged wrongdoing "did not occur with respect to the admin- istration or operation of the plan." Brief for Respondent 11. Under the circumstances, we think Thomas failed to allege a claim under § 502(a)(3) for equitable relief. Section 502(a)(3) "does not, after all, authorize `appropriate equitable relief' at large, but only `appropriate equitable relief' for the pur- pose of `redress[ing any] violations or . . . enforc[ing] any provisions' of ERISA or an ERISA plan." Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 253 (1993) (emphasis and modifications in original). Moreover, Thomas' veil-piercing claim does not state a cause of action under ERISA and cannot independently sup- 3 The District Court in the original ERISA suit ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary to Tru-Tech's plan. 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 354 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court port federal jurisdiction. Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil to reach a defendant not other- wise subject to suit under ERISA, Thomas could invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts only by independently alleg- ing a violation of an ERISA provision or term of the plan.4 Piercing the corporate veil is not itself an independent ERISA cause of action, "but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action." 1 C. Keating & G. O'Gradney, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corpo- rations § 41, p. 603 (perm. ed. 1990). Because Thomas al- leged no "underlying" violation of any provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan, neither ERISA's jurisdictional provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U. S. C. § 1331 supplied the Dis- trict Court with subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit. III Thomas also contends that this lawsuit is ancillary to the original ERISA suit.5 We have recognized that a federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction "(1) to permit dispo- sition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceed- ings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U. S. 375, 379­380 (1994) (citations omitted). Thomas has not carried his bur- den of demonstrating that this suit falls within either cate- 4 This case is not at all like Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349 (1944), cited by Thomas' amici, in which the receiver of a federal bank, having obtained a judgment against the bank, then sued the bank's shareholders to hold them liable for the judgment. In Anderson, federal jurisdiction was founded upon a federal law, 12 U. S. C. §§ 63, 64 (repealed), which specifically made shareholders of an undercapitalized federal bank liable up to the par value of their stock, regardless of the amount actually invested. 5 Congress codified much of the common-law doctrine of ancillary juris- diction as part of "supplemental jurisdiction" in 28 U. S. C. § 1367. 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 349 (1996) 355 Opinion of the Court gory. See id., at 377 (burden rests on party asserting jurisdiction). A "[A]ncillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a de- fending party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court." Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365, 376 (1978). Ancillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual and logical dependence on "the primary lawsuit," ibid., but that primary lawsuit must contain an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdic- tion over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdic- tion over ancillary claims. See Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). In a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal court lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction. See Kokkonen, supra, at 380­381; H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U. S. 497, 498­499 (1910). Consequently, claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in an earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal jurisdic- tion over a subsequent lawsuit. The basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is the practical need "to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit." Kroger, 437 U. S., at 377. But once judgment was entered in the original ERISA suit, the ability to resolve simultaneously factually intertwined issues vanished. As in Kroger, "neither the convenience of litigants nor considera- tions of judicial economy" can justify the extension of ancil- lary jurisdiction over Thomas' claims in this subsequent pro- ceeding. Ibid. In any event, there is insufficient factual dependence be- tween the claims raised in Thomas' first and second suits to justify the extension of ancillary jurisdiction. Thomas' 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 356 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court factual allegations in this suit are independent from those asserted in the ERISA suit, which involved Peacock's and Tru-Tech's status as plan fiduciaries and their alleged wrong- doing in the administration of the plan. The facts relevant to this complaint are limited to allegations that Peacock shielded Tru-Tech's assets from the ERISA judgment long after Tru-Tech's plan had been terminated. The claims in these cases have little or no factual or logical interdepend- ence, and, under these circumstances, no greater efficiencies would be created by the exercise of federal jurisdiction over them. See Kokkonen, supra, at 380. B The focus of Thomas' argument is that his suit to extend liability for payment of the ERISA judgment from Tru-Tech to Peacock fell under the District Court's ancillary enforce- ment jurisdiction. We have reserved the use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of a federal court's inherent power to enforce its judgments. Without jurisdiction to enforce a judgment entered by a fed- eral court, "the judicial power would be incomplete and en- tirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution." Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 187 (1868). In defining that power, we have approved the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection and enforcement of federal judgments- including attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the pre- judgment avoidance of fraudulent conveyances. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S., at 834, n. 10 (garnishment); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U. S. 684, 690­ 692 (1950) (prejudgment attachment of property); Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U. S. 329, 332­333 (1887) (prejudgment voidance of fraudulent transfers); Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U. S. 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 349 (1996) 357 Opinion of the Court 217, 221­225 (1884) (mandamus to compel public officials in their official capacity to levy tax to enforce judgment against township); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 282­285 (1884) (prejudgment dispute over attached property); Riggs, supra, at 187­188 (mandamus to compel public officials in their official capacity to levy tax to enforce judgment against county).6 Our recognition of these supplementary proceedings has not, however, extended beyond attempts to execute, or to guarantee eventual executability of, a federal judgment. We have never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdic- tion in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment. Indeed, we rejected an attempt to do so in H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U. S. 497 (1910). In Beecher, the plaintiff obtained a judgment in federal court against a corporation that had infringed its patent. When the plaintiff could not collect on the judgment, it sued the individual directors of the defendant corporation, alleging that, during the pendency of the original suit, they had au- 6 The United States, as amicus curiae for Thomas, suggests that the proceeding below was jurisdictionally indistinguishable from Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U. S. 684 (1950), Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U. S. 329 (1887), Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217 (1884), and Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (1868), because it was intended merely as a supplemental bill to preserve and force payment of the ERISA judgment by voiding fraudulent transfers of Tru-Tech's assets. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9­18. We decline to address this argu- ment, because, even if Thomas could have sought to force payment by mandamus or to void postjudgment transfers, neither Thomas nor the courts below characterized this suit that way. Indeed, Thomas expressly rejects that characterization of his lawsuit. Brief for Respondent 4 ("This action . . . is not one to collect a judgment, but one to establish liability on the part of the Petitioner") (emphasis in original); see id., at 11. In any event, the United States agrees that the alleged fraudulent transfers totaled no more than $80,000, far less than the judgment actually imposed on Peacock. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3. 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 358 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court thorized continuing sales of the infringing product and know- ingly permitted the corporation to become insolvent. We agreed with the Circuit Court's characterization of the suit as "an attempt to make the defendants answerable for the judgment already obtained" and affirmed the court's decision that the suit was not "ancillary to the judgment in the former suit." Id., at 498­499. Beecher governs this case and per- suades us that Thomas' attempt to make Peacock answerable for the ERISA judgment is not ancillary to that judgment. Labette County Comm'rs and Riggs are not to the con- trary. In those cases, we permitted a judgment creditor to mandamus county officials to force them to levy a tax for payment of an existing judgment. Labette County Comm'rs, supra, at 221­225; Riggs, supra, at 187­188. The order in each case merely required compliance with the ex- isting judgment by the persons with authority to comply. We did not authorize the shifting of liability for payment of the judgment from the judgment debtor to the county offi- cials, as Thomas attempts to do here. In determining the reach of the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction, we have cautioned against the exercise of juris- diction over proceedings that are " `entirely new and origi- nal,' " Krippendorf v. Hyde, supra, at 285 (quoting Minne- sota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 633 (1865)), or where "the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on a different principle" than that of the prior decree. Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414, 428 (1937). These principles sug- gest that ancillary jurisdiction could not properly be exer- cised in this case. This action is founded not only upon dif- ferent facts than the ERISA suit, but also upon entirely new theories of liability. In this suit, Thomas alleged civil con- spiracy and fraudulent transfer of Tru-Tech's assets, but, as we have noted, no substantive ERISA violation. The al- leged wrongdoing in this case occurred after the ERISA judgment was entered, and Thomas' claims-civil conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and "veil piercing"-all involved new 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 349 (1996) 359 Opinion of the Court theories of liability not asserted in the ERISA suit. Other than the existence of the ERISA judgment itself, this suit has little connection to the ERISA case. This is a new ac- tion based on theories of relief that did not exist, and could not have existed, at the time the court entered judgment in the ERISA case. Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is, at its core, a creature of necessity. See Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 380; Riggs, 6 Wall., at 187. When a party has obtained a valid federal judg- ment, only extraordinary circumstances, if any, can justify ancillary jurisdiction over a subsequent suit like this. To protect and aid the collection of a federal judgment, the Fed- eral Rules of Civil Procedure provide fast and effective mechanisms for execution.7 In the event a stay is entered pending appeal, the Rules require the district court to en- sure that the judgment creditor's position is secured, ordi- narily by a supersedeas bond.8 The Rules cannot guarantee payment of every federal judgment. But as long as they protect a judgment creditor's ability to execute on a judg- ment, the district court's authority is adequately preserved, and ancillary jurisdiction is not justified over a new lawsuit to impose liability for a judgment on a third party. Con- trary to Thomas' suggestion otherwise, we think these pro- cedural safeguards are sufficient to prevent wholesale fraud upon the district courts of the United States. 7 Rule 69(a), for instance, permits judgment creditors to use any execu- tion method consistent with the practice and procedure of the State in which the district court sits. Rule 62(a) further protects judgment credi- tors by permitting execution on a judgment at any time more than 10 days after the judgment is entered. 8 The district court may only stay execution of the judgment pending the disposition of certain post-trial motions or appeal if the court provides for the security of the judgment creditor. Rule 62(b) (stay pending post- trial motions "on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper"); Rule 62(d) (stay pending appeal "by giving a supersedeas bond"). 516us2$24n 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 360 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Stevens, J., dissenting IV For these reasons, we hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas' subsequent suit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Stevens, dissenting. The conflict between the views of the judges on the Court of Appeals and the District Court, on the one hand, and those of my eight colleagues, on the other, demonstrates that this is not an easy case. I believe its outcome should be deter- mined by a proper application of the principle, first an- nounced by Chief Justice Marshall, that a federal court's ju- risdiction "is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied." Way- man v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 23 (1825). In my opinion that jurisdiction encompasses a claim by a judgment creditor that a party in control of the judgment debtor has fraudulently exercised that control to defeat satisfaction of the judgment. In substance the Court so held in Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (1868), and in Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217 (1884). In each of those cases a judgment against the county was unsat- isfied because the county commissioners refused to levy a tax to raise the funds needed to pay the judgment, and in each this Court held that the federal court had jurisdiction to compel the commissioners to take the action necessary to enable the county to satisfy the judgment. It is true, as the Court notes today, that the "order in each case merely re- quired compliance with the existing judgment by the persons with authority to comply." Ante, at 358. But the Court fails to explain why the District Court would not have had juris- diction to enter a comparable order in this case-one that would have directed petitioner to restore to the judgment 516us2$24i 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 349 (1996) 361 Stevens, J., dissenting debtor the assets that he allegedly transferred to himself to prevent satisfaction of the judgment.* It is true that the order that was actually entered against petitioner did more than that-it ordered him to satisfy the original judgment in full, rather than merely to restore the fraudulent transfers. For that reason, I agree that the relief was excessive and should be modified. Nevertheless, the Court's central holding that the District Court had no power to grant any relief against petitioner is inconsistent with Riggs and Labette. I am also persuaded that the Court's reliance on H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U. S. 497 (1910), is misplaced. The theory of the complaint against the directors of the judgment debtor in that case was that they were "joint trespassers," equally liable for the patent infringement. That theory was compa- rable to the claim against this petitioner that was asserted and rejected in the original ERISA action. It depended on proof that the directors' prejudgment conduct should subject them to the same liability as the judgment debtor. See id., *Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court acknowledged that respondent brought this action to preserve the initial Employee Retire- ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) judgment. See 39 F. 3d 493, 502 (CA4 1994) (describing action as "an equitable attempt to satisfy a previous judgment entered against a fiduciary"); Civ. Action No. 7:91­ 3843­21 (D. S. C., June 24, 1992), p. 5, App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a ("[T]he present action is an attempt to satisfy a former judgment properly ren- dered by the District Court"). Petitioner recognized the same. See Brief for Appellant in No. 92­2524 (CA4), p. 15 ("Plaintiff has . . . consist- ently characterized this lawsuit as an action for the collection of a judg- ment"). Although one passage in respondent's brief to this Court sug- gests that the suit was not a collection action, it is clear that respondent meant only to rebut the notion that the proceeding was wholly independ- ent of the earlier suit. The remainder of the brief confirms the lower courts' understanding of the nature of the action, see Brief for Respondent 17­24, and respondent expressly stated the same at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26­27 (agreeing with the District Court's statement that the action before it was "an attempt to satisfy the former judgment"). 516us2$24i 10-24-98 18:14:07 PAGES OPINPGT 362 PEACOCK v. THOMAS Stevens, J., dissenting at 498. What is at issue now, however, is whether petition- er's postjudgment conduct which frustrated satisfaction of the judgment was subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court that entered that judgment. To that question Beecher does not speak. In sum, I am persuaded that it is the reasoning in Riggs and Labette, rather than Beecher, that should resolve the jurisdictional issue. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 516us2$25z 10-22-98 13:00:19 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 363 Per Curiam JONES v. ABC­TV et al. on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 95­7186. Decided February 26, 1996 When this Court first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner Jones in forma pauperis status in October 1992, he had filed over 25 petitions in the Court, all of which were patently frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. Since then, this Court has invoked Rule 39.8 five times to deny him in forma pauperis status. Held: For the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, Jones is denied leave to proceed in forma pau- peris in the instant case, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from him in noncriminal matters unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compli- ance with this Court's Rule 33.1. This order will not prevent Jones from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him, but it will allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused the certiorari process. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Sylvester Jones requests leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Jones is allowed until March 18, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Jones in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee re- quired by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. Jones has abused this Court's certiorari process. In Octo- ber 1992, we first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Jones in forma pauperis status in two petitions for certiorari. See Jones v. Wright, 506 U. S. 810; In re Jones, 506 U. S. 810. At that time, Jones had filed over 25 petitions in this Court, all of which were patently frivolous and had been denied without 516us2$25h 10-22-98 13:00:19 PAGES OPINPGT 364 JONES v. ABC­TV Stevens, J., dissenting recorded dissent. And since October 1992, we have invoked Rule 39.8 five times to deny Jones in forma pauperis status. See Jones v. Schulze, 513 U. S. 805 (1994); In re Jones, 510 U. S. 963 (1993); Jones v. Jackson, 510 U. S. 808 (1993); Jones v. Suter, 508 U. S. 949 (1993); Jones v. Jackson, 506 U. S. 1047 (1993). Currently, Jones has at least two more petitions for certiorari pending. We enter the order barring prospective filings for the rea- sons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Jones' abuse of the writ of cer- tiorari has been in noncriminal cases and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will not prevent Jones from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of peti- tioners who have not abused our certiorari process. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. Justice Stevens, dissenting. For the reasons I have previously expressed, I respectfully dissent. See Attwood v. Singletary, ante, p. 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zatko v. California, 502 U. S. 16, 18 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 516us2$26z 10-21-97 16:50:57 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 365 Supplemental Decree UNITED STATES v. MAINE et al. (MASSA- CHUSETTS BOUNDARY CASE) on motion for entry of supplemental decree No. 35, Orig. Decided March 17, 1975-Decree entered October 6, 1975- Supplemental decree entered June 15, 1981-Decided February 19, 1985- Supplemental decree entered April 29, 1985-Decided February 25, 1986- Supplemental decree entered February 26, 1996 Supplemental decree entered. Opinion reported: 420 U. S. 515; decree reported: 423 U. S. 1; supplemental decree reported: 452 U. S. 429; opinion reported: 469 U. S. 504; supple- mental decree reported: 471 U. S. 375; opinion reported: 475 U. S. 89. The joint motion for entry of a supplemental decree is granted. SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE The Court having, by its decision of February 25, 1986, adopted the recommendation of its Special Master that Vine- yard Sound constitutes historic inland waters and overruled the exception of Massachusetts to the Report of its Special Master herein insofar as it challenged the Master's determi- nation that the whole of Nantucket Sound does not constitute historic or ancient inland waters, and having, to this extent, adopted the Master's recommendations and confirmed his Report: IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 1. For the purposes of the Court's Decree herein dated October 6, 1975, 423 U. S. 1 (affirming the title of the United States to the seabed more than three geographic miles sea- ward of the coastline, and of the States to the seabed within the three geographic mile zone), the coastline of the Com- monwealth of Massachusetts shall be determined on the basis that the whole of Vineyard Sound constitutes state inland waters and Nantucket Sound (with the exception of 516us2$26h 10-21-97 16:50:57 PAGES OPINPGT 366 UNITED STATES v. MAINE Supplemental Decree interior indentations which are described in paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e) below) is made up of territorial seas and high seas. 2. For purposes of said Decree of October 6, 1975, the coastline of Massachusetts includes the following straight lines:(a) A line from a point on Gay Head on Martha's Vine- yard (approximately 41°21*109N, 70°50*079W) to the southwestern point of Cuttyhunk Island (ap- proximately 41°24*399N, 70°56*349W); (b) A line from a point on East Chop (approximately 41°28*159N, 70°34*059W) to a point on Cape Cod (approximately 41°33*109N, 70°29*309W); (c) A line from a point southeast of East Chop (ap- proximately 41°27*309N, 70°33*189W) to a point west of Cape Pogue (approximately 41°25*069N, 70°27*569W) on the island of Martha's Vineyard; (d) A line from a point on Point Gammon on Cape Cod (approximately 41°36*369N, 70°15*409W) to the southwestern-most point of Monomoy Island (approximately 41°33*029N, 70°00*599W); and (e) A line from a point on the west coast of Great Island (approximately 41°37*089N, 70°16*159W) to a point on Hyannis Point on Cape Cod (approxi- mately 41°37*279N, 70°17*349W). 3. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from time to time may be deemed necessary or advisable to effec- tuate and supplement the decree and the rights of the re- spective parties. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and supplemental decree. 516us2$27z 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 367 Syllabus MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., et al. v. EPSTEIN et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94­1809. Argued November 27, 1995-Decided February 27, 1996 A tender offer resulting in petitioner Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.'s acquisition of MCA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, precipitated two law- suits on behalf of MCA's stockholders. While the first, a Delaware class action based purely on state-law claims, was pending, the second suit was filed in a California federal court, alleging that Matsushita's tender offer violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission Rules pro- mulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Section 27 of that Act confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts in such suits. Matsushita prevailed in the federal case, and while that judgment was on appeal, the parties to the state action reached a settlement, agreeing, inter alia, that class members who did not opt out of the class would waive all claims in connection with the tender offer, including those asserted in the California federal action. The Chancery Court approved the agreement, and the Delaware Supreme Court af- firmed. Respondents are members of both the state and federal classes who did not opt out of the settlement class. In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit found that the Delaware judgment was not a bar to fur- ther prosecution of the federal action under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, and fashioned a test limiting the preclusive force of a state-court settlement judgment to those claims that could "have been extinguished by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state claims." Held: The Delaware settlement judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, notwithstanding the fact that it released claims within the exclu- sive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Pp. 373­387. (a) Section 1738-which directs federal courts to treat a state-court judgment with the same respect that it would receive in the rendering State's courts-is generally applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment incorporates a class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the federal courts' jurisdiction. The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of § 1738, and the fact that the judgment might bar litiga- tion of exclusively federal claims does not necessarily make § 1738 inap- 516us2$27z 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 368 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Syllabus plicable, Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373, 380. Pp. 373­375. (b) Marrese provides the analytical framework for deciding whether the Delaware judgment precludes this exclusively federal action. A federal court must first determine whether the rendering State's law indicates that the claim would be barred from litigation in a court of that State; if so, the federal court must decide whether, as an exception to § 1738, it should refuse to give preclusive effect to the state-court judgment. P. 375. (c) Delaware Supreme Court cases have provided rules regarding the preclusive force of class-action settlement agreements in subsequent state-court suits and have also spoken to the effect of such judgments in federal court, indicating that when the Chancery Court approves a global release of claims, its settlement judgment will preclude ongoing or future federal-court litigation of any released claims. Thus, it ap- pears that a Delaware court would give this settlement judgment pre- clusive effect in a subsequent proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that respondents could not have pressed their Exchange Act claims in the Chancery Court. The release in the judgment specifically refers to this lawsuit, the state courts found the settlement fair and the class notice adequate, and respondents acknowledge that they did not opt out of the class. Pp. 375­379. (d) Because it appears that the judgment would be res judicata under Delaware law, this Court must proceed to the second step of the Mar- rese analysis and ask whether § 27 of the Exchange Act partially re- pealed § 1738. Any such modification must be implied, but this Court has seldom, if ever, held that a federal statute impliedly repealed § 1738. There is no suggestion in § 27 that Congress meant to contravene the common-law rules of preclusion or to repeal § 1738's express statutory requirement. Nor does § 27 evince any intent to prevent a state-court litigant from voluntarily releasing Exchange Act claims in judicially ap- proved settlements. Assuming that § 27 is intended to serve at least the general purposes of achieving greater uniformity of construction and more effective and expert application of the Exchange Act, a state court threatens neither purpose when it upholds a settlement releasing Exchange Act claims. In addition, other provisions of the Exchange Act suggest that Congress did not intend to create an exception to § 1738 for suits alleging violations of the Act, and precedent supports the con- clusion that the concerns underlying the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in § 27 are not undermined by state-court approval of settlements releas- ing Exchange Act claims. Even when exclusively federal claims are at stake, there is no universal right to litigate such claims in federal court. See, e. g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 105. Pp. 380­386. 516us2$27z 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 369 Opinion of the Court (e) The subject-matter jurisdiction exception to full faith and credit, relied on by the Ninth Circuit in this case, is inapposite here, where the rendering court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit and the defendants. Pp. 386­387. 50 F. 3d 644, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Parts I, II­A, and II­C. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 387. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in which Souter, J., joined as to Part II­B, post, p. 388. Barry R. Ostrager argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Henry Paul Monaghan argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Harold Edgar, Roger W. Kirby, and Irving Malchman.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a federal court may withhold full faith and credit from a state-court judg- ment approving a class-action settlement simply because the settlement releases claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The answer is no. Absent a partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, by another federal statute, a federal court must give the judg- ment the same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. I In 1990, petitioner Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. made a tender offer for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a *Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Thaddeus Holt filed a brief for C. L. Grimes as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 370 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court Delaware corporation. The tender offer not only resulted in Matsushita's acquisition of MCA, but also precipitated two lawsuits on behalf of the holders of MCA's common stock. First, a class action was filed in the Delaware Court of Chan- cery against MCA and its directors for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to maximize shareholder value. The com- plaint was later amended to state additional claims against MCA's directors for, inter alia, waste of corporate assets by exposing MCA to liability under the federal securities laws. In addition, Matsushita was added as a defendant and was accused of conspiring with MCA's directors to violate Dela- ware law. The Delaware suit was based purely on state- law claims. While the state class action was pending, the instant suit was filed in Federal District Court in California. The com- plaint named Matsushita as a defendant and alleged that Matsushita's tender offer violated Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rules 10b­13 and 14d­10.1 These Rules were created by the SEC pursuant to the 1968 Williams Act Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex- change Act), 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. Section 27 of the Exchange Act confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts for suits brought to enforce the Act or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. See 15 U. S. C. § 78aa. The District Court declined to certify the class, entered summary judgment for Matsushita, and dis- missed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. After the federal plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal but before the Ninth Circuit handed down a decision, the parties 1 We express no opinion in this case on the existence of a private cause of action under §§ 14(d)(6) and (7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n(d)(6) and (7), the statutory authority for Rule 14d­10. 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 371 Opinion of the Court to the Delaware suit negotiated a settlement.2 In exchange for a global release of all claims arising out of the Matsushita-MCA acquisition, the defendants would deposit $2 million into a settlement fund to be distributed pro rata to the members of the class. As required by Delaware Chancery Rule 23, which is modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Chancery Court certified the class for pur- poses of settlement and approved a notice of the proposed settlement. The notice informed the class members of their right to request exclusion from the settlement class and to appear and present argument at a scheduled hearing to de- termine the fairness of the settlement. In particular, the notice stated that "[b]y filing a valid Request for Exclusion, a member of the Settlement Class will not be precluded by the Settlement from individually seeking to pursue the claims alleged in the . . . California Federal Actions, . . . or any other claim relating to the events at issue in the Dela- ware Actions." App. to Pet. for Cert. 96a. Two such no- tices were mailed to the class members and the notice was also published in the national edition of the Wall Street Journal. The Chancery Court then held a hearing. After argument from several objectors, the court found the class representation adequate and the settlement fair. The order and final judgment of the Chancery Court incor- porated the terms of the settlement agreement, providing: "All claims, rights and causes of action (state or fed- eral, including but not limited to claims arising under the federal securities law, any rules or regulations pro- mulgated thereunder, or otherwise), whether known or unknown that are, could have been or might in the fu- ture be asserted by any of the plaintiffs or any member of the Settlement Class (other than those who have val- 2 A previous settlement was rejected by the Court of Chancery as unfair to the class. See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 598 A. 2d 687 (1991). 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 372 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court idly requested exclusion therefrom), . . . in connection with or that arise now or hereafter out of the Merger Agreement, the Tender Offer, the Distribution Agree- ment, the Capital Contribution Agreement, the em- ployee compensation arrangements, the Tender Agree- ments, the Initial Proposed Settlement, this Settlement . . . and including without limitation the claims as- serted in the California Federal Actions . . . are hereby compromised, settled, released and discharged with prejudice by virtue of the proceedings herein and this Order and Final Judgment." In re MCA, Inc. Share- holders Litigation, C. A. No. 11740 (Feb. 22, 1993), re- printed in App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a­75a (emphasis added). The judgment also stated that the notice met all the require- ments of due process. The Delaware Supreme Court af- firmed. In re MCA, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 633 A. 2d 370 (1993) (judgt. order). Respondents were members of both the state and federal plaintiff classes. Following issuance of the notice of pro- posed settlement of the Delaware litigation, respondents nei- ther opted out of the settlement class nor appeared at the hearing to contest the settlement or the representation of the class. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, petitioner Matsu- shita invoked the Delaware judgment as a bar to further prosecution of that action under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1738. The Ninth Circuit rejected petitioner's argument, ruling that § 1738 did not apply. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F. 3d 644, 661­666 (1995). Instead, the Court of Appeals fash- ioned a test under which the preclusive force of a state-court settlement judgment is limited to those claims that "could . . . have been extinguished by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state claims." Id., at 665. The lower courts have taken varying approaches to determining the preclusive effect of a state-court judgment, entered in a class 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 373 Opinion of the Court or derivative action, that provides for the release of exclu- sively federal claims.3 We granted certiorari to clarify this important area of federal law. 515 U. S. 1187 (1995). II The Full Faith and Credit Act mandates that the "judicial proceedings" of any State "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken." 28 U. S. C. § 1738. The Act thus directs all courts to treat a state-court judgment with the same respect that it would receive in the courts of the ren- dering State. Federal courts may not "employ their own rules . . . in determining the effect of state judgments," but must "accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 481­482 (1982). Because the Court of Appeals failed to follow the dictates of the Act, we reverse. A The state-court judgment in this case differs in two re- spects from the judgments that we have previously consid- ered in our cases under the Full Faith and Credit Act. As respondents and the Court of Appeals stressed, the judg- ment was the product of a class action and incorporated a settlement agreement releasing claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Though respondents urge "the irrelevance of section 1738 to this litigation," Brief for Respondents 25, we do not think that either of these features exempts the judgment from the operation of § 1738. That the judgment at issue is the result of a class action, rather than a suit brought by an individual, does not under- 3 Compare the decision below with Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F. 3d 1553 (CA3), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 986 (1994); Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F. 2d 29 (CA1 1991); and Abramson v. Pennwood Investment Corp., 392 F. 2d 759 (CA2 1968). 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 374 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court mine the initial applicability of § 1738. The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of a "judi- cial proceeding" within the meaning of § 1738. Cf. McDon- ald v. West Branch, 466 U. S. 284, 287­288 (1984) (holding that § 1738 does not apply to arbitration awards because arbi- tration is not a "judicial proceeding"). Therefore, a judg- ment entered in a class action, like any other judgment en- tered in a state judicial proceeding, is presumptively entitled to full faith and credit under the express terms of the Act. Further, § 1738 is not irrelevant simply because the judg- ment in question might work to bar the litigation of exclu- sively federal claims. Our decision in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373 (1985), made clear that where § 1738 is raised as a defense in a sub- sequent suit, the fact that an allegedly precluded "claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts does not necessarily make § 1738 inapplicable." Id., at 380 (em- phasis added). In so holding, we relied primarily on Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., supra, which held, without decid- ing whether claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are exclusively federal, that state-court proceedings may be issue preclusive in Title VII suits in federal court. Kremer, we said, "implies that absent an exception to § 1738, state law determines at least the . . . preclusive effect of a prior state judgment in a subsequent action involving a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts." Marrese, 470 U. S., at 381. Accordingly, we decided that "a state court judgment may in some circumstances have pre- clusive effect in a subsequent action within the exclusive ju- risdiction of the federal courts." Id., at 380. In Marrese, we discussed Nash County Bd. of Ed. v. Bilt- more Co., 640 F. 2d 484 (CA4), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 878 (1981), a case that concerned a state-court settlement judg- ment. In Nash, the question was whether the judgment, which approved the settlement of state antitrust claims, pre- vented the litigation of exclusively federal antitrust claims. 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 375 Opinion of the Court See 470 U. S., at 382, n. 2. We suggested that the approach outlined in Marrese would also apply in cases like Nash that involve judgments upon settlement: that is, § 1738 would con- trol at the outset. See 470 U. S., at 382, n. 2. In accord with these precedents, we conclude that § 1738 is generally applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment at issue incorporates a class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. B Marrese provides the analytical framework for deciding whether the Delaware court's judgment precludes this exclu- sively federal action. When faced with a state-court judg- ment relating to an exclusively federal claim, a federal court must first look to the law of the rendering State to ascertain the effect of the judgment. See id., at 381­382. If state law indicates that the particular claim or issue would be barred from litigation in a court of that State, then the fed- eral court must next decide whether, "as an exception to § 1738," it "should refuse to give preclusive effect to [the] state court judgment." Id., at 383. See also Migra v. War- ren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 81 (1984) ("[I]n the absence of federal law modifying the operation of § 1738, the preclusive effect in federal court of [a] state-court judg- ment is determined by [state] law"). 1 We observed in Marrese that the inquiry into state law would not always yield a direct answer. Usually, "a state court will not have occasion to address the specific question whether a state judgment has issue or claim preclusive effect in a later action that can be brought only in federal court." 470 U. S., at 381­382. Where a judicially approved settle- ment is under consideration, a federal court may conse- quently find guidance from general state law on the pre- clusive force of settlement judgments. See, e. g., id., at 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 376 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court 382­383, n. 2 (observing in connection with Nash that "[North Carolina] law gives preclusive effect to consent judg- ment[s]"). Here, in addition to providing rules regarding the preclusive force of class-action settlement judgments in subsequent suits in state court, the Delaware courts have also spoken to the particular effect of such judgments in fed- eral court. Delaware has traditionally treated the impact of settle- ment judgments on subsequent litigation in state court as a question of claim preclusion. Early cases suggested that Delaware courts would not afford claim preclusive effect to a settlement releasing claims that could not have been pre- sented in the trial court. See Ezzes v. Ackerman, 234 A. 2d 444, 445­446 (Del. 1967) ("[A] judgment entered either after trial on the merits or upon an approved settlement is res judicata and bars subsequent suit on the same claim . . . . [T]he defense of res judicata . . . is available if the pleadings framing the issues in the first action would have permitted the raising of the issue sought to be raised in the second action, and if the facts were known, or could have been known to the plaintiff in the second action at the time of the first action"). As the Court of Chancery has perceived, however, "the Ezzes inquiry [was] modified in regard to class actions," In re Union Square Associates Securities Litiga- tion, C. A. No. 11028, 1993 WL 220528, *3 (June 16, 1993), by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A. 2d 1089 (1989). In Nottingham, a class action, the Delaware Supreme Court approved a settlement that released claims then pend- ing in federal court. In approving that settlement, the Not- tingham court appears to have eliminated the Ezzes require- ment that the claims could have been raised in the suit that produced the settlement, at least with respect to class actions: " `[I]n order to achieve a comprehensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of settled questions at the 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 377 Opinion of the Court core of a class action, a court may permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in the class action.' " 564 A. 2d, at 1106 (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F. 2d 456, 460 (CA2 1982)). See Union Square, supra, at *3 (relying directly on Notting- ham to hold that a Delaware court judgment settling a class action was res judicata and barred arbitration of duplicative claims that could not have been brought in the first suit). These cases indicate that even if, as here, a claim could not have been raised in the court that rendered the settlement judgment in a class action, a Delaware court would still find that the judgment bars subsequent pursuit of the claim. The Delaware Supreme Court has further manifested its understanding that when the Court of Chancery approves a global release of claims, its settlement judgment should pre- clude ongoing or future federal-court litigation of any re- leased claims. In Nottingham, the Court stated that "[t]he validity of executing a general release in conjunction with the termination of litigation has long been recognized by the Delaware courts. More specifically, the Court of Chancery has a history of approving settlements that have implicitly or explicitly included a general release, which would also re- lease federal claims." 564 A. 2d, at 1105 (citation omitted). Though the Delaware Supreme Court correctly recognized in Nottingham that it lacked actual authority to order the dismissal of any case pending in federal court, it asserted that state-court approval of the settlement would have the collateral effect of preventing class members from prosecut- ing their claims in federal court. Perhaps the clearest state- ment of the Delaware Chancery Court's view on this matter was articulated in the suit preceding this one: "When a state court settlement of a class action releases all claims which arise out of the challenged transaction and is determined to 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 378 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court be fair and to have met all due process requirements, the class members are bound by the release or the doctrine of issue preclusion. Class members cannot subsequently reliti- gate the claims barred by the settlement in a federal court." In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 598 A. 2d 687, 691 (1991).4 We are aware of no Delaware case that suggests otherwise. Given these statements of Delaware law, we think that a Delaware court would afford preclusive effect to the settle- ment judgment in this case, notwithstanding the fact that respondents could not have pressed their Exchange Act claims in the Court of Chancery. The claims are clearly within the scope of the release in the judgment, since the judgment specifically refers to this lawsuit. As required by Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23, see Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A. 2d 915, 920 (1994), the Court of Chancery found, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, that the settlement was "fair, reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of the . . . Settlement class" and that notice to the class was "in full compliance with . . . the requirements of due process." In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C. A. No. 11740 (Feb. 22, 1993), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 74a. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 812 (1985) (due process for class-action plaintiffs requires "notice plus an opportunity to be heard and partici- pate in the litigation"). The Court of Chancery "further de- termined that the plaintiffs[,] . . . as representatives of the Settlement Class, have fairly and adequately protected the 4 In fact, the Chancery Court rejected the first settlement, which con- tained no opt-out provision, as unfair to the class precisely because it be- lieved that the settlement would preclude the class from pursuing their exclusively federal claims in federal court. See In re MCA, Inc. Share- holders Litigation, 598 A. 2d, at 692 ("[I]f this Court provides for the release of all the claims arising out of the challenged transaction, the claims which the Objectors have asserted in the federal suit will likely be forever barred"). 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 379 Opinion of the Court interests of the Settlement Class." In re MCA, Inc. Share- holders Litigation, supra, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at 812 (due process requires that "the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members").5 Under Delaware Rule 23, as under Federal Rule of Civil Pro- cedure 23, "[a]ll members of the class, whether of a plaintiff or a defendant class, are bound by the judgment entered in the action unless, in a Rule 23(b)(3) action, they make a timely election for exclusion." 2 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 2755, p. 1224 (1977). See also Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 874 (1984) ("There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class ac- tion is binding on class members in any subsequent litiga- tion"). Respondents do not deny that, as shareholders of MCA's common stock, they were part of the plaintiff class and that they never opted out; they are bound, then, by the judgment.6 5 Apart from any discussion of Delaware law, respondents contend that the settlement proceedings did not satisfy due process because the class was inadequately represented. See Brief for Respondents 34­45. Re- spondents make this claim in spite of the Chancery Court's express ruling, following argument on the issue, that the class representatives fairly and adequately protected the interests of the class. Cf. Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A. 2d 915, 923 (Del. 1994) ("[The] constitutional requirement [of ade- quacy of representation] is embodied in [Delaware] Rule 23(a)(4), which requires that the named plaintiff `fairly and adequately protect the inter- ests of the class' "). We need not address the due process claim, however, because it is outside the scope of the question presented in this Court. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 533 (1992). While it is true that a respondent may defend a judgment on alternative grounds, we generally do not address arguments that were not the basis for the decision below. See Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U. S. 80, 86 (1988). 6 Respondents argue that their failure to opt out of the settlement class does not constitute consent to the terms of the settlement under tradi- tional contract principles. Brief for Respondents 16­25. Again, the issue raised by respondents-whether the settlement could bar this suit 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 380 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court 2 Because it appears that the settlement judgment would be res judicata under Delaware law, we proceed to the second step of the Marrese analysis and ask whether § 27 of the Exchange Act, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts for suits arising under the Act, partially re- pealed § 1738. Section 27 contains no express language re- garding its relationship with § 1738 or the preclusive effect of related state-court proceedings. Thus, any modification of § 1738 by § 27 must be implied. In deciding whether § 27 impliedly created an exception to § 1738, the "general ques- tion is whether the concerns underlying a particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an implied partial repeal of § 1738." Marrese, 470 U. S., at 386. "Resolution of this question will depend on the particular federal statute as well as the nature of the claim or issue involved in the subsequent federal action. . . . [T]he primary consideration must be the intent of Congress." Ibid. As a historical matter, we have seldom, if ever, held that a federal statute impliedly repealed § 1738. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U. S. 518, 523­525 (1986) (Anti-Injunction Act does not limit § 1738); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S., at 83­85 (42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not limit claim preclusion under § 1738); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S., at 468­476 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not limit § 1738); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 96­105 (1980) (§ 1983 does not limit issue preclusion under § 1738). But cf. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S. 127, 138­139 (1979) (declining to give claim preclusive as a matter of contract law, as distinguished from § 1738 law-is outside the scope of the question on which we granted certiorari. We note, how- ever, that if a State chooses to approach the preclusive effect of a judg- ment embodying the terms of a settlement agreement as a question of pure contract law, a federal court must adhere to that approach under § 1738. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 481­482 (1982). 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 381 Opinion of the Court effect to prior state-court debt collection proceeding in fed- eral bankruptcy suit, without discussing § 1738, state law, or implied repeals). The rarity with which we have discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for such findings, namely, that there be an " `irreconcilable conflict' " between the two federal statutes at issue. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., supra, at 468 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 154 (1976)). Section 27 provides that "[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U. S. C. § 78aa. There is no suggestion in § 27 that Congress meant for plaintiffs with Exchange Act claims to have more than one day in court to challenge the legality of a securities transaction. Though the statute plainly mandates that suits alleging violations of the Ex- change Act may be maintained only in federal court, nothing in the language of § 27 "remotely expresses any congres- sional intent to contravene the common-law rules of pre- clusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of . . . 28 U. S. C. § 1738." Allen v. McCurry, supra, at 97­98. Nor does § 27 evince any intent to prevent litigants in state court-whether suing as individuals or as part of a class- from voluntarily releasing Exchange Act claims in judicially approved settlements. While § 27 prohibits state courts from adjudicating claims arising under the Exchange Act, it does not prohibit state courts from approving the release of Exchange Act claims in the settlement of suits over which they have properly exercised jurisdiction, i. e., suits arising under state law or under federal law for which there is con- current jurisdiction. In this case, for example, the Delaware action was not "brought to enforce" any rights or obligations under the Act. The Delaware court asserted judicial power 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 382 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court over a complaint asserting purely state-law causes of action7 and, after the parties agreed to settle, certified the class and approved the settlement pursuant to the requirements of Delaware Rule of Chancery 23 and the Due Process Clause. Thus, the Delaware court never trespassed upon the exclu- sive territory of the federal courts, but merely approved the settlement of a common-law suit pursuant to state and non- exclusive federal law. See Abramson v. Pennwood Invest- ment Corp., 392 F. 2d 759, 762 (CA2 1968) ("Although the state court could not adjudicate the federal claim, it was within its powers over the corporation and the parties to approve the release of that claim as a condition of settlement of the state action"). While it is true that the state court assessed the general worth of the federal claims in determin- ing the fairness of the settlement, such assessment does not amount to a judgment on the merits of the claims. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F. 2d 456, 461 (CA2 1982) (" `Approval of a settlement does not call for find- ings of fact regarding the claims to be compromised. The court is concerned only with the likelihood of success or fail- ure; the actual merits of the controversy are not to be deter- mined' ") (quoting Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part II: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L. J. 765, 809 (1969) (footnotes omitted)). The Delaware court never purported to resolve the merits of the Exchange Act claims in the course of appraising the settlement; indeed, it expressly disavowed that purpose. See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C. A. No. 11740 (Feb. 16, 1993), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a ("In determining whether a settlement should be approved, a court should not try the merits of the underlying claims. This principle would seem to be especially appropriate where the under- 7 Though the plaintiff class premised one of its claims of fiduciary breach on the allegation that MCA wasted corporate assets by exposing the cor- poration to liability under the federal securities laws, the cause pleaded was nonetheless a state common-law action for breach of fiduciary duty. 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 383 Opinion of the Court lying claims, like the federal claims here, are outside the jurisdiction of this Court" (citation omitted)). The legislative history of the Exchange Act elucidates no specific purpose on the part of Congress in enacting § 27. See Murphy v. Gallagher, 761 F. 2d 878, 885 (CA2 1985) (not- ing that the legislative history of the Exchange Act provides no readily apparent explanation for the provision of exclusive jurisdiction in § 27) (citing 2 & 3 L. Loss, Securities Regula- tion 997, 2005 (2d ed. 1961)). We may presume, however, that Congress intended § 27 to serve at least the general pur- poses underlying most grants of exclusive jurisdiction: "to achieve greater uniformity of construction and more effec- tive and expert application of that law." Murphy v. Gal- lagher, supra, at 885. When a state court upholds a set- tlement that releases claims under the Exchange Act, it threatens neither of these policies. There is no danger that state-court judges who are not fully expert in federal securi- ties law will say definitively what the Exchange Act means and enforce legal liabilities and duties thereunder. And the uniform construction of the Act is unaffected by a state court's approval of a proposed settlement because the state court does not adjudicate the Exchange Act claims but only evaluates the overall fairness of the settlement, generally by applying its own business judgment to the facts of the case. See, e. g., Polk v. Good, 507 A. 2d 531, 535 (Del. 1986). Furthermore, other provisions of the Exchange Act sug- gest that Congress did not intend to create an exception to § 1738 for suits alleging violations of the Act. Congress plainly contemplated the possibility of dual litigation in state and federal courts relating to securities transactions. See 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a) (preserving "all other rights and reme- dies that may exist at law or in equity"). And all that Con- gress chose to say about the consequences of such litigation is that plaintiffs ought not obtain double recovery. See ibid. Congress said nothing to modify the background rule that where a state-court judgment precedes that of a federal 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 384 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court court, the federal court must give full faith and credit to the state-court judgment. See Murphy v. Gallagher, supra, at 884. Finally, precedent supports the conclusion that the con- cerns underlying the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in § 27 are not undermined by state-court approval of settlements releasing Exchange Act claims. We have held that state- court proceedings may, in various ways, subsequently affect the litigation of exclusively federal claims without running afoul of the federal jurisdictional grant in question. In Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U. S. 388 (1929) (cited in Marrese, 470 U. S., at 381), we held that state-court findings of fact were issue preclusive in federal patent suits. We did so with full recognition that "the logical conclusion from the establishing of [the state law] claim is that Becher's patent is void." 279 U. S., at 391. Becher reasoned that al- though "decrees validating or invalidating patents belong to the Courts of the United States," that "does not give sacro- sanctity to facts that may be conclusive upon the question in issue." Ibid. Similarly, while binding legal determinations of rights and liabilities under the Exchange Act are for fed- eral courts only, there is nothing sacred about the approval of settlements of suits arising under state law, even where the parties agree to release exclusively federal claims. See also Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S., at 139, n. 10 (noting that "[i]f, in the course of adjudicating a state-law question, a state court should determine factual issues using standards identi- cal to those of § 17, then collateral estoppel, in the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court"); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 258 (1897) (when a state court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the complaint, the state court may decide the validity of a patent when that issue is raised as a defense). We have also held that Exchange Act claims may be re- solved by arbitration rather than litigation in federal court. 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 385 Opinion of the Court In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220 (1987), we found that parties to an arbitration agreement could waive the right to have their Exchange Act claims tried in federal court and agree to arbitrate the claims. Id., at 227­228. It follows that state-court litigants ought also to be able to waive, or "release," the right to litigate Ex- change Act claims in a federal forum as part of a settlement agreement. As Shearson/American Express Inc. demon- strates, a statute conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction for a certain class of claims does not necessarily require resolu- tion of those claims in a federal court. Taken together, these cases stand for the general proposi- tion that even when exclusively federal claims are at stake, there is no "universal right to litigate a federal claim in a federal district court." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S., at 105. If class-action plaintiffs wish to preserve absolutely their right to litigate exclusively federal claims in federal court, they should either opt out of the settlement class or object to the release of any exclusively federal claims. In fact, some of the plaintiffs in the Delaware class action requested exclusion from the settlement class. They are now proceed- ing in federal court with their federal claims, unimpeded by the Delaware judgment. In the end, §§ 27 and 1738 "do not pose an either-or propo- sition." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). They can be reconciled by reading § 1738 to mandate full faith and credit of state-court judgments incor- porating global settlements, provided the rendering court had jurisdiction over the underlying suit itself, and by read- ing § 27 to prohibit state courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits arising under the Exchange Act. Cf. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce- dure § 4470, pp. 688­689 (1981) ("[S]ettlement of state court litigation has been held to defeat a subsequent federal action if the settlement was intended to apply to claims in exclusive federal jurisdiction as well as other claims. . . . These rulings 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 386 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of the Court are surely correct"). Congress' intent to provide an exclu- sive federal forum for adjudication of suits to enforce the Exchange Act is clear enough. But we can find no sugges- tion in § 27 that Congress meant to override the "principles of comity and repose embodied in § 1738," Kremer v. Chemi- cal Constr. Corp., 456 U. S., at 463, by allowing plaintiffs with Exchange Act claims to release those claims in state court and then litigate them in federal court. We conclude that the Delaware courts would give the settlement judg- ment preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding and, fur- ther, that § 27 did not effect a partial repeal of § 1738. C The Court of Appeals did not engage in any analysis of Delaware law pursuant to § 1738. Rather, the Court of Ap- peals declined to apply § 1738 on the ground that where the rendering forum lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, full faith and credit is not required. 50 F. 3d, at 661, 666. See Underwriters Nat. Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704­705 (1982) (" `[A] judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a court in another State only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the merits-had jurisdiction, that is, to render the judg- ment' ") (quoting Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106, 110 (1963)). The Court of Appeals decided that the subject-matter juris- diction exception to full faith and credit applies to this case because the Delaware court acted outside the bounds of its own jurisdiction in approving the settlement, since the set- tlement released exclusively federal claims. See 50 F. 3d, at 661­662, and n. 25. As explained above, the state court in this case clearly possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter of the under- lying suit and over the defendants. Only if this were not so-for instance, if the complaint alleged violations of the Exchange Act and the Delaware court rendered a judgment 516us2$27n 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 387 Opinion of Stevens, J. on the merits of those claims-would the exception to § 1738 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction apply. Where, as here, the rendering court in fact had subject-matter jurisdic- tion, the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to full faith and credit is simply inapposite. In such a case, the rele- vance of a federal statute that provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction is not to the state court's possession of juris- diction per se, but to the existence of a partial repeal of § 1738.8 * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I join Parts I, II­A, and II­C of the Court's opinion, and while I also agree with the Court's reasons for conclud- ing that § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not create an implied partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act, I join neither Part II­B nor the Court's judgment be- cause I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the question of Delaware law should be addressed by the Court of Appeals in the first instance, and that the Ninth Circuit remains free to consider whether Delaware courts fully and fairly litigated the adequacy of class representation. 8 Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 (1940), is not to the contrary. In that case, the federal statute at issue expressly prohibited certain common-law actions from being either instituted or maintained in state court. Id., at 440­441. Thus, by merely entertaining a common-law foreclosure suit, over which it otherwise would have had jurisdiction, the state court vio- lated the terms of the Act. That is not the situation here, where there is no contention that just by entertaining the class action the Delaware court acted in violation of federal law. 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 388 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of Ginsburg, J. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens joins, and with whom Justice Souter joins as to Part II­B, con- curring in part and dissenting in part. I join the Court's judgment to the extent that it remands the case to the Ninth Circuit. I agree that a remand is in order because the Court of Appeals did not attend to this Court's reading of 28 U. S. C. § 1738 in a controlling decision, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461 (1982). But I would not endeavor, as the Court does, to speak the first word on the content of Delaware preclusion law. Instead, I would follow our standard practice of remitting that issue for decision, in the first instance, by the lower federal courts. See, e. g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373, 387 (1985). I write separately to emphasize a point key to the applica- tion of § 1738: A state-court judgment generally is not enti- tled to full faith and credit unless it satisfies the require- ments of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Kremer, 456 U. S., at 482­483. In the class-action setting, adequate representation is among the due process ingredients that must be supplied if the judgment is to bind absent class members. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 808, 812 (1985); Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A. 2d 915, 923­924 (Del. 1994). Suitors in this action (called the "Epstein plaintiffs" in this opinion), respondents here, argued before the Ninth Circuit, and again before this Court, that they cannot be bound by the Delaware settlement because they were not adequately represented by the Delaware class representatives. They contend that the Delaware representatives' willingness to release federal securities claims within the exclusive juris- diction of the federal courts for a meager return to the class members, but a solid fee to the Delaware class attorneys, disserved the interests of the class, particularly, the absen- tees. The inadequacy of representation was apparent, the Epstein plaintiffs maintained, for at the time of the settle- 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 389 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. ment, the federal claims were sub judice in the proper forum for those claims-the federal judiciary. Although the Ninth Circuit decided the case without reaching the due process check on the full faith and credit obligation, that inquiry re- mains open for consideration on remand. See ante, at 379, n. 5 (due process "w[as] not the basis for the decision below," so the Court "need not address [it]"). I Matsushita's acquisition of MCA prompted litigation in state and federal courts. A brief account of that litigation will facilitate comprehension of the Epstein plaintiffs' posi- tion. On September 26, 1990, in response to reports in the financial press that Matsushita was negotiating to buy MCA, a suit was filed in the Court of Chancery of Delaware, a pur- ported class action on behalf of the stockholders of MCA. Naming MCA and its directors (but not Matsushita) as de- fendants, the complaint invoked state law only. It alleged that MCA's directors had failed to carry out a market check to maximize shareholder value upon a change in corporate control, a check required by Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). For this alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the complaint sought, inter alia, an injunction against Matsushita's proposed ac- quisition of MCA. Matsushita announced its tender offer on November 26, 1990. It offered holders of MCA common stock $71 per share, if they tendered their shares before December 29, 1990. The owners of 91% of MCA's common stock tendered their shares and, on January 3, 1991, for a price of $6.1 bil- lion, Matsushita acquired MCA. On December 3, 1990, a few days after the required Securi- ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings disclosed the terms of the tender offer, several MCA shareholders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central Dis- 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 390 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of Ginsburg, J. trict of California.1 Based solely on federal law, their com- plaints alleged that Matsushita, first named defendant, vio- lated SEC Rules 14d­10, 17 CFR § 240.14d­10 (1994), and 10b­13, id., § 240.10b­13, by offering preferential treatment in the tender offer to MCA principals Lew Wasserman and Sidney Sheinberg. As stated in the complaint, the public tender offer included a special tax-driven stock swap ar- rangement for Wasserman, then MCA's chairman and chief executive officer, and a $21 million bonus for Sheinberg, then MCA's chief operating officer and owner of 1,170,000 shares of MCA common stock. These arrangements allegedly vio- lated, inter alia, the SEC's "all-holder best-price" rule (Rule 14d­10), which requires bidders to treat all shareholders on equal terms. The claims of federal securities law violations fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. See 15 U. S. C. § 78aa. The Epstein plaintiffs also sought class certification to represent all MCA shareholders at the time of the tender offer. Two days later, counsel in the Delaware action advised MCA's counsel that the Delaware plaintiffs intended to amend their complaint to include additional claims against MCA and its directors and to add Matsushita as a defendant. The additional claims alleged that MCA wasted corporate assets by increasing the corporation's exposure to liability for violation of Rules 10b­13 and 14d­10, that MCA failed to 1 Two sets of plaintiffs filed complaints in the Central District of Califor- nia: the Epstein plaintiffs (including Lawrence Epstein, John Linder, Jane Rockford, Maurice Karlin, Ruth Karlin, Beth Karlin, and Bert Karlin) sued both individually and on behalf of all MCA shareholders at the time of the tender offer; Walter Minton brought suit in his individual capacity. All had tendered their shares for the $71 tender price. The District Court consolidated the two cases. Minton and, it appears, Rockford opted out of the Delaware class-action settlement. Matsushita does not contest the qualification of Minton and Rockford, as individuals, to pursue federal claims unimpeded by the settlement in Delaware. See Brief for Petition- ers ii. Matsushita does contest any class-action initiative in federal court. 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 391 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. make full disclosure of the benefits MCA insiders would receive from the takeover, and that directors Wasserman and Sheinberg breached their fiduciary duties by negoti- ating preferential deals with Matsushita. Matsushita, the amended complaint alleged, had conspired with and aided and abetted MCA directors in violation of Delaware law. Within days, the Delaware parties agreed to a settlement and, on December 17, 1990, submitted their proposal to the Delaware Vice Chancellor. The agreement provided for a modification of a "poison pill" in the corporate charter of an MCA subsidiary,2 and for a fees payment of $1 million to the class counsel. The settlement agreement required the release of all claims, state and federal, arising out of the tender offer. The Vice Chancellor rejected the settlement agreement on April 22, 1991, for two reasons: the absence of any monetary benefit to the class members; and the potential value of the federal claims that the agreement proposed to release. The "generous payment" of $1 million in counsel fees, the Vice Chancellor observed, "confer[red] no benefit on the members of the Class." In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 598 A. 2d 687, 695 (Del. Ch. 1991). And the value of the revised poison pill to the class, the Vice Chancellor said, was "illu- sionary[,] . . . apparently . . . proposed merely to justify a settlement which offers no real monetary benefit to the Class." Id., at 696. The Vice Chancellor described the state-law claims as "at best, extremely weak and, therefore, [of] little or no value." Id., at 694. "[T]he only claims which have any substantial merit," he said, "are the claims . . . in the California federal suit that were not asserted in this Delaware action." Id., at 696. After the rejection of 2 The subsidiary in question was spun off from MCA during the merger because it owned a television station that federal law prohibited Matsu- shita from acquiring. The $71 tender offer price included $5 worth of stock in this new corporation. 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 392 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of Ginsburg, J. the settlement, the Delaware lawsuit lay dormant for more than a year. The federal litigation proceeded. In various rulings, the District Court denied the federal plaintiffs' motion for par- tial summary judgment, denied the Epstein plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and granted Matsushita's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims. On April 15, 1992, the District Court entered its final judgment, which the Epstein plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On October 22, 1992, after the federal plaintiffs had filed their notice of appeal, the Delaware parties reached a second settlement agreement. Matsushita agreed to create a $2 million settlement fund that would afford shareholders 2 to 3 cents per share before payment of fees and costs. The Delaware class counsel requested $691,000 in fees. In re- turn for this relief, the Delaware plaintiffs agreed to release "all claims, rights and causes of action (state or federal, in- cluding but not limited to claims arising under the federal securities laws, and any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder, or otherwise) . . . in connection with or that arise now or hereafter out of the [tender offer] . . . including without limitation the claims asserted in the California Fed- eral Actions . . . ." App. 187­188. Unlike the first settle- ment proposal, the second agreement included an opt-out provision. This time the Vice Chancellor approved the settlement. He stated: "[I]t is in the best interests of the class to settle this litigation and the terms of the settlement are fair and reasonable-although the value of the benefit to the class is meager." In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C. A. No. 11740, 1993 WL 43024, *1 (Del. Ch., Feb. 16, 1993). He found the class members' recovery of 2 to 3 cents per share "adequate (if only barely so) to support the proposed settle- ment." Id., at *4. The federal claims, he reasoned, having been dismissed by the District Court, "now have minimal economic value." Ibid. And he gave weight to the pres- 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 393 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. ence in the second settlement agreement of an opt-out provi- sion. Ibid. Addressing the objectors' contention that the proposed settlement was "collusive," the Vice Chancellor recalled that "the settling parties ha[d] previously proposed a patently inadequate settlement," and he agreed that "suspicions abound." Id., at *5. Nevertheless, he noted, the "[o]bjec- tors have offered no evidence of any collusion," so he de- clined to reject the settlement on that ground. Ibid. Re- ducing the counsel fees from the requested $691,000 to $250,000, the Vice Chancellor offered this observation: "[T]he defendants' willingness to create the settlement fund seems likely to have been motivated as much by their concern as to their potential liability under the federal claims as by their concern for liability under the state law claims which this Court characterized as `extremely weak.' " Id., at *6. In a brief order, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed "on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chan- cery . . . ." In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C. A. No. 126,1993, 1993 WL 385041, *1 (Sept. 21, 1993), judgt. order reported at 633 A. 2d 370. Before the Ninth Circuit, Matsushita argued that the Dela- ware class-action settlement barred litigation of the federal claims raised in the Epstein action. The Ninth Circuit dis- agreed. Relying on Federal Circuit Court decisions,3 the Court of Appeals held that state courts lack plenary power to approve settlements that effectively extinguish exclusively federal claims. Only if federal and state claims rest on the "identical factual predicate," the Ninth Circuit concluded, could a state-court settlement subsume an exclusively fed- eral claim. It was not enough, in the Ninth Circuit's view, that the discrete federal and state claims stem from the 3 Closest in point, the court said, were Grimes v. Vitalink Communica- tions Corp., 17 F. 3d 1553 (CA3 1994), and Nottingham Partners v. Trans- Lux Corp., 925 F. 2d 29 (CA1 1991). See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F. 3d 644, 662 (CA9 1995). 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 394 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of Ginsburg, J. "same transaction," the test Matsushita urged. 50 F. 3d, at 661­665. The federal securities claims did not turn on the same operative facts as the state claims pleaded in Delaware, the Ninth Circuit found; accordingly, the federal claims could not have been extinguished by the issue-preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state claims. This analysis led the Ninth Circuit to declare that the Delaware decree "ex- ceed[ed] the jurisdiction of the state court and, therefore, is not entitled to full faith and credit." Id., at 666. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held, first, that a private right of action could be maintained to redress Rule 14d­10 violations. Id., at 652. The court next held that Matsu- shita violated Rule 14d­10 by paying Wasserman consider- ation not offered to other shareholders, id., at 657; reversing the District Court's disposition of this matter, the Ninth Cir- cuit held that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on liability and remanded for a determination of damages, ibid. Regarding plaintiffs' claim that the $21 million pay- ment to Sheinberg violated Rule 14d­10, the Ninth Circuit vacated the summary judgment for Matsushita and re- manded for a determination whether the payment was in fact made to encourage Sheinberg to tender his shares. Id., at 659. II A Section 1738's full faith and credit instruction, as the Court indicates, requires the forum asked to recognize a judgment first to determine the preclusive effect the judgment would have in the rendering court. See Kremer, 456 U. S., at 466; Marrese, 470 U. S., at 381. Because the Ninth Circuit did not evaluate the preclusive effect of the Delaware judgment through the lens of that State's preclusion law, I would re- mand for that determination. See id., at 386­387; Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 87 (1984) ("Prudence . . . dictates that it is the District Court, in the 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 395 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. first instance, not this Court, that should interpret Ohio preclusion law and apply it.").4 B Every State's law on the preclusiveness of judgments is pervasively affected by the supreme law of the land. To be valid in the rendition forum, and entitled to recognition na- tionally, a state court's judgment must measure up to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Kremer, 456 U. S., at 482­483. "A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to such a judgment." Id., at 482 (footnote omitted). In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, this Court listed mini- mal procedural due process requirements a class-action money judgment must meet if it is to bind absentees; those requirements include notice, an opportunity to be heard, a right to opt out, and adequate representation. 472 U. S., at 812. "[T]he Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the inter- ests of the absent class members." Ibid. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 42­43, 45 (1940)). As the Shutts Court's phrase "at all times" indicates, the class representative's duty to represent absent class members adequately is a con- tinuing one. 472 U. S., at 812; see also Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F. 2d 67, 75 (CA5 1973) (representative's failure to pursue an appeal rendered initially adequate class representation inadequate, so that judgment did not bind the class). Although emphasizing the constitutional significance of the adequate representation requirement, this Court has recog- 4 In its endeavor to forecast Delaware preclusion law, the Court appears to have blended the "identical factual predicate" test applied by the Dela- ware Supreme Court in Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A. 2d 1089, 1106­1107 (1989), with the broader "same transaction" test advanced by Matsushita. See ante, at 376­378. 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 396 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of Ginsburg, J. nized the first line responsibility of the States themselves for assuring that the constitutional essentials are met. See Hansberry, 311 U. S., at 42.5 Final judgments, however, re- main vulnerable to collateral attack for failure to satisfy the adequate representation requirement. See id., at 40, 42; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 42(d) and (e), Comments e and f, pp. 406, 410­412 (1982) (noting, inter alia, that judgment is not binding on purportedly represented person where, to the knowledge of the opposing party, the representative seeks to advance his own interest at the ex- pense of the represented person); see also id., § 41, Comment a, p. 394 (if § 42 circumstances exist, "the represented person may avoid being bound either by appearing in the action be- fore rendition of the judgment or by attacking the judgment by subsequent proceedings"). (Emphasis added.) A court conducting an action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action. See 7B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1789, p. 245 (2d ed. 1986). In Delaware, the constitutional due process requirement of adequate representation is embodied in Delaware Court of Chancery's Rule 23, a class-action rule modeled on its federal counterpart. Prezant, 636 A. 2d, at 923, 920. Delaware re- quires, as a prerequisite to class certification, that the named 5 Many States, including Delaware, have class-action rules correspond- ing to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a rule ranking adequacy of representation as a prerequisite to maintaining a class action. See 3 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, App. 13­1 (3d ed. 1992) (listing 39 States and the District of Columbia with rules comparable to the amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a)(4) (representatives may sue on behalf of the class only if "the repre- sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"); see also General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147, 157­158, n. 13 (1982) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4)'s ade- quate representation requirement "raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest," in addition to the question whether the representative shares the interests of the class members). 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 397 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. plaintiffs "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Del. Ch. Rule 23(a)(4). In Prezant, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether adequate class represen- tation was "a sine qua non for approval of a class action settlement," and concluded that it was. 636 A. 2d, at 920, 926. The state high court overturned a judgment and re- manded a settlement because the Court of Chancery had failed to make an explicit finding of adequate representation. Id., at 926. The Delaware Supreme Court underscored that due proc- ess demands more than notice and an opportunity to opt out; adequate representation, too, that court emphasized, is an essential ingredient. Id., at 924 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S., at 812). Notice, the Delaware Su- preme Court reasoned, cannot substitute for the thorough examination and informed negotiation an adequate repre- sentative would pursue. Prezant, 636 A. 2d, at 924. The court also recognized that opt-out rights "are infrequently utilized and usually economically impracticable." Ibid. The Vice Chancellor's evaluation of the merits of the set- tlement could not bridge the gap, the Delaware Supreme Court said, because an inadequate representative "taint[s]" the entire settlement process. Id., at 925.6 "[A]n adequate representative," the Delaware Supreme Court explained, "vigorously prosecuting an action without conflict and bar- gaining at arms-length, may present different facts and a 6 In both Prezant and the instant case, a temporary settlement class device was used, telescoping the inquiry of adequate representation into the examination of the fairness of the settlement. According to the Dela- ware Supreme Court, however, this near simultaneity does not relieve the representative of her duty to demonstrate, nor the court of its duty to determine, the adequacy of representation. Prezant, 636 A. 2d, at 923. In a comprehensive opinion, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion after examining the temporary class settlement device in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F. 3d 768, 794­800 (1995). 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT 398 MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. EPSTEIN Opinion of Ginsburg, J. different settlement proposal to the court than would an in- adequate representative." Ibid. Consequently, the Dela- ware Supreme Court held, "in every class action settlement, the Court of Chancery is required to make an explicit deter- mination on the record of the propriety of the class action according to the requisites of Rule 23(a) and (b)." Ibid. In the instant case, the Epstein plaintiffs challenge the preclusive effect of the Delaware settlement, arguing that the Vice Chancellor never in fact made the constitutionally required determination of adequate representation. See id., at 923.7 They contend that the state court left unresolved key questions: notably, did the class representatives share substantial common interests with the absent class members, and did counsel in Delaware vigorously press the interests of the class in negotiating the settlement.8 In particular, the Epstein plaintiffs question whether the Delaware class representatives-who filed the state lawsuit on September 26, 1990, two months before the November 26 tender offer announcement-actually tendered shares in December, thereby enabling them to litigate a Rule 14d­10 claim in fed- eral court. They also suggest that the Delaware repre- sentatives undervalued the federal claims-claims they could only settle, but never litigate, in a Delaware court. Finally, 7 The Vice Chancellor did not have the benefit of the Delaware Supreme Court's clear statement in Prezant, decided one year after this settlement was approved. In Prezant, however, the Delaware Supreme Court largely reiterated and applied what this Court had stated almost a decade earlier in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 808, 812 (1985). See also 2 R. Balotti & J. Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations and Business Organization § 13.22, p. 13­131, and n. 578 (2d ed. 1996 Supp.). 8 The order approving the class for settlement purposes, the Epstein plaintiffs urge, contains no discussion of the adequacy of the representa- tives, see App. 198, and the order and final judgment approving the settle- ment contains only boilerplate language referring to the adequacy of rep- resentation, see id., at 204­205. The Delaware Supreme Court approved the Court of Chancery's judgment in a one paragraph order. See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 633 A. 2d 370 (1993) (judgt. order). 516us2$27p 11-02-98 14:46:20 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 367 (1996) 399 Opinion of Ginsburg, J. the Epstein plaintiffs contend that the Vice Chancellor im- properly shifted the burden of proof; 9 he rejected the Dela- ware objectors' charges of "collusion" for want of evidence while acknowledging that "suspicions [of collusion] abound." In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1993 WL 43024, at *5.10 Mindful that this is a court of final review and not first view, I do not address the merits of the Epstein plaintiffs' contentions, or Matsushita's counterargument that the issue of adequate representation was resolved by full and fair liti- gation in the Delaware Court of Chancery.11 These argu- ments remain open for airing on remand. I stress, however, the centrality of the procedural due process protection of adequate representation in class-action lawsuits, emphati- cally including those resolved by settlement. See generally J. Coffee, Suspect Settlements in Securities Litigation, N. Y. L. J., March 28, 1991, p. 5, col. 1. 9 Delaware law appears to place the burden of proof on the class rep- resentatives. See 2 Balotti & Finkelstein, supra, at 11, n. 7, § 13­17, p. 13­121 (class representative must prove satisfaction of Del. Ch. Rule 23(a) requirements, including adequacy of representation); see also 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1765, pp. 273­274, and n. 29 (2d ed. 1986); 3B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 23.02­2 (2d ed. 1995). 10 In this regard, it is noteworthy that Matsushita did not move to dis- miss the Delaware action after the Vice Chancellor, in rejecting the first proposed settlement, surveyed the state-law claims and found them insub- stantial. See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 598 A. 2d 687, 694 (Del. Ch. 1991) (Vice Chancellor described "the asserted state law claims" as "at best, extremely weak" and of "little or no value"). 11 Counsel for Matsushita acknowledged that relief from a judgment may be sought in Delaware pursuant to that State's counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 51­52; Del. Ch. Rule 60; see also 2 Newberg & Conte, supra, at 9, n. 5, §§ 11.27, 11.63 (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides an avenue to challenge the ade- quacy of representation in a class settlement). 516us2$28z 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 400 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY CO. v. HILES certiorari to the appellate court of illinois, 5th judicial district No. 95­6. Argued January 8, 1996-Decided February 27, 1996 Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles-clamps that lock with their mates-joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, draw- bars may remain off center when cars are uncoupled and must be re- aligned manually to ensure proper coupling. Respondent Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of petitioner Norfolk & Western Railway Company's yards. He sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had vio- lated § 2 of the Safety Appliance Act (SAA or Act), which requires that cars be equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles." The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the State Appellate Court affirmed. Held: Section 2 does not make a railroad liable as a matter of law for injuries incurred by a railroad employee while trying to straighten a misaligned drawbar. Pp. 403­414. (a) Congress passed the SAA in 1893 to promote switchyard safety by requiring the use of standardized automatic couplers. SAA liability may be predicated on the failure of coupling equipment to perform as required by the Act, and the SAA creates an absolute duty requiring not only that automatic couplers be present, but also that they actually perform. See, e. g., Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U. S. 96, 98. Pp. 403­409. (b) However, failure to couple will not cause a violation if the railroad can show that a coupler has not been properly set to couple on impact. Affolder, supra, at 99. Affolder's restriction on failure-to-perform lia- bility logically extends to every step necessary to prepare a nondefec- tive coupler for coupling, including ensuring a drawbar's proper align- ment. Thus, the absolute duty is not breached as a matter of law when a drawbar becomes misaligned during the ordinary course of railroad operations. Hiles' interpretation would require a finding that, as a mat- 516us2$28z 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 401 Opinion of the Court ter of law, a misaligned drawbar is a malfunctioning drawbar, when, in fact, misalignment occurs as a part of the normal course of railroad car operations. His reading of § 2 would mean that every railroad car for nearly a century has been in violation of the SAA. Also contrary to Hiles' argument, § 2 does not command railroads to develop a mechanism for automatic drawbar realignment. Congress legislated working auto- matic couplers for employee safety, not employee safety by whatever means a court might deem appropriate. Pp. 409­414. 268 Ill. App. 3d 561, 644 N. E. 2d 508, reversed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Thomas W. Alvey, Jr., Kurt E. Reitz, and Mary Sue Juen. Lawrence M. Mann argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jeanne Sathre.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Before us in this case is the question whether § 2 of the Safety Appliance Act (SAA), 49 U. S. C. § 20302(a)(1)(A), makes a railroad liable as a matter of law for injuries in- curred by a railroad employee while trying to straighten a misaligned drawbar. We hold that it does not and, accord- ingly, reverse the judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court. I Railroad cars in a train are connected by couplers located at both ends of each car. A coupler consists of a knuckle joined to the end of a drawbar, which itself is fastened to a housing mechanism on the car. A knuckle is a clamp that interlocks with its mate, just as two cupped hands-placed palms together with the fingertips pointing in opposite direc- *Robert W. Blanchette filed a brief for the Association of American Rail- roads as amicus curiae urging reversal. Robert B. Thompson, Patrick J. Harrington, and Clinton J. Miller III filed a brief for the United Transportation Union as amicus curiae urg- ing affirmance. 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 402 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court tions-interlock when the fingers are curled.1 When cars come together, the open knuckle on one car engages a closed knuckle on the other car, automatically coupling the cars. The drawbar extends the knuckle out from the end of the car and is designed to pivot in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral move- ment, drawbars may remain off center when cars are uncou- pled. This misalignment, if not corrected, may prevent cars from coupling by allowing the knuckles to pass by each other. To ensure proper coupling, railroad employees must realign drawbars manually. Respondent William J. Hiles was a member of a switching crew at petitioner Norfolk & Western Railway Company's Luther Yard in St. Louis, Missouri. His duties included cou- pling and uncoupling railroad cars and aligning drawbars. On July 18, 1990, Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated the SAA, which requires that cars be equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being un- coupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles." 49 U. S. C. § 20302(a)(1)(A). Norfolk & Western argued that the misaligned drawbar did not result from defective equipment. The trial court granted Hiles' motion for directed verdict on liability. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. 268 Ill. App. 3d 561, 644 N. E. 2d 508 (1994). The Illinois Appellate Court recognized a deep split of authority over the proper interpre- tation of the SAA, but determined that it would not recon- sider its "longstanding authority permitting a plaintiff . . . to 1 See R. Reinhardt, Workin' on the Railroad 274 (1970) (the automatic coupler style "use[s] the principle of the hooked fingers of the human hand"). 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 403 Opinion of the Court recover under the Safety Appliance Act for injuries sus- tained while attempting to align a misaligned drawbar." Id., at 565, 644 N. E. 2d, at 511. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review, and we granted certiorari, 515 U. S. 1191 (1995), to resolve the conflict among the lower courts.2 II A For most of the 19th century, the link-and-pin coupler was the standard coupler used to hook together freight cars. It consisted of a tubelike body that received an oblong link. During coupling, a railworker had to stand between the cars as they came together and guide the link into the coupler pocket. Once the cars were joined, the employee inserted a pin into a hole a few inches from the end of the tube to hold the link in place. See J. White, American Railroad Freight Car 490 (1993) (hereinafter White). The link-and-pin cou- pler, though widely used, ultimately proved unsatisfactory because (i) it made a loose connection between the cars with too much give and play; (ii) there was no standard design and train crews often spent hours trying to match pins and links while coupling cars; (iii) links and pins were frequently lost, resulting in substantial replacement costs; and (iv) crew members had to go between moving cars during coupling and were frequently injured and sometimes killed. Id., at 490­497. 2 Compare, e. g., Kavorkian v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 33 F. 3d 570 (CA6 1994), Lisek v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 30 F. 3d 823 (CA7 1994), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1112 (1995), Goedel v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 13 F. 3d 807 (CA4 1994), Reed v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England R. Co., 939 F. 2d 128 (CA3 1991), and Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 798 F. 2d 764 (CA5 1986), with Coleman v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 681 F. 2d 542 (CA8 1982), and Metcalfe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 491 F. 2d 892 (CA10 1974). 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 404 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court In 1873, Eli H. Janney patented a knuckle-style coupler that was to become the standard for the freight car couplers used even today.3 See Figure 1. The coupler had a bifur- cated drawhead and a revolving hook, which, when brought in contact with another coupler, would automatically inter- lock with its mate. Figure 1 The Janney coupler had several advantages over link-and- pin couplers. Not only did it alleviate the problem of loose parts that plagued the link-and-pin coupler,4 it also allowed railworkers to couple and uncouple cars without having to 3 Janney was a dry goods clerk and former Confederate Army officer from Alexandria, Virginia, who used his lunch hours to whittle from wood an alternative to the link-and-pin coupler. See F. Wilner, Safety: "A great investment," Railway Age, Mar. 1993, p. 53 (hereinafter Wilner). 4 Automatic couplers also made possible the use of power air brakes, which had not been successfully used with link-and-pin couplers because of excessive slack in the coupling. See Hearings on S. 811 et al. before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 1049, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1892) (hereinafter Sen. Hearings). 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 405 Opinion of the Court go between the cars to guide the link and set the pin.5 One commentator described the automatic coupling operation as follows: "While the cars were apart, the brakeman had to make sure the knuckle of the coupler on the waiting car stood in an open position and that the pin had been lifted into its set position. When the opposite coupler was closed and locked in position, the brakeman was able to stand safely out of the way and signal the engineer to move the cars together. When the knuckle of the coupler of the moving car hit the lever arm of the revolving knuckle on the open coupler, it revolved around the locked one, while concurrently the locking pin dropped automatically from its set position into the coupler, lock- ing the knuckle in place. Although the brakeman had to set up the entire situation by hand, the actual locking operation was automatic and did not require the brake- man to stand between the cars." Clark 191. Though the market was flooded with literally thousands of patented couplers,6 Janney's design was clearly among the best and slowly achieved recognition in the industry. See id., at 193­201. In 1888, the Master Car Builders Associa- tion Executive Committee obtained a limited waiver of pat- ent rights-placing much of Janney's design in the public do- main-and adopted the design as its standard. Conversion 5 Ezra Miller is generally credited with creating the first semiautomatic coupling device for passenger cars-known as the Miller Hook-but it was never widely used on freight cars. See C. Clark, Development of the Semiautomatic Freight-Car Coupler, 1863­1893, 13 Technology and Cul- ture 170, 180­182 (1972) (hereinafter Clark); White 505­506. 6 In 1875, there were more than 900 car coupler patents. White 498. By 1887, the number of coupler patents had topped 4,000, ibid., and by 1900, approximately 8,000 coupler patents had been issued. Clark 179. 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 406 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court to the new standard proceeded slowly,7 partly as a result of the sheer number of competing designs on the market. The lack of standardized couplers itself caused safety problems,8 and reformers pushed Congress to pass legislation requiring the use of standardized automatic couplers. In 1893, satisfied that an automatic coupler could meet the demands of commercial railroad operations and, at the same time, be manipulated safely, see Clark 206, Congress passed the SAA. Its success in promoting switchyard safety was stunning. Between 1877 and 1887, approximately 38% of all railworker accidents involved coupling. Id., at 179. That percentage fell as the railroads began to replace link-and-pin couplers with automatic couplers. The descent accelerated during the SAA's 7-year grace period and by 1902, only two years after the SAA's effective date, coupling accidents con- stituted only 4% of all employee accidents. In absolute numbers, coupler-related accidents dropped from nearly 11,000 in 1892 to just over 2,000 in 1902, even though the number of railroad employees steadily increased during that decade. 7 The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for instance, adopted a policy of putting automatic couplers on all new cars and on every car that went into the shop for repairs. Sen. Hearings, at 27. In 1890, approximately 10% of all freight cars in use in the United States were equipped with auto- matic couplers and power brakes. Wilner 54. By 1893, approximately 16% of freight cars were so equipped. Ibid. Witnesses testifying before the Senate Committee in 1892 placed the figure between 12% and 20%. Sen. Hearings, at 12 (12% of cars fitted with Janney-style couplers); id., at 27, 42 (20% of cars fitted with mutually interchangeable couplers). 8 The new automatic couplers had design modifications that permitted them to couple with link-and-pin style couplers, but not easily. See Clark 192 ("[T]he knuckle of the Janney was notched in order to allow the oppos- ing link to enter the drawhead to the point of coupling . . . but in practical service it was most difficult to effect"); S. Rep. 1049, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1892) ("These representative men, speaking for thousands of their asso- ciates, say that what they desire is uniformity, and that the danger of their calling has increased rather than diminished by the introduction of different types of couplers"). 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 407 Opinion of the Court Employee Coupling Accidents, 1892­1902 9 Employee Percentage Railroad Employee Coupler Coupler Year Employees Accidents Accidents Accidents 1892 821,415 30,821 10,697 34.71 1893 873,602 34,456 11,710 33.99 1894 779,608 25,245 7,491 29.67 1895 785,034 27,507 8,428 30.64 1896 826,620 31,830 8,686 27.29 1897 823,476 29,360 6,497 22.13 1898 874,558 33,719 5,648 16.75 1899 928,924 37,133 5,477 14.75 1900 1,017,653 42,193 4,198 9.95 1901 1,071,169 43,817 2,966 6.77 1902 1,189,315 53,493 2,256 4.22 B As originally passed, § 2 of the SAA provided: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any . . . common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled[,] without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." Act of Mar. 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U. S. C. § 2 (1988 ed.), recodified, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20302(a).10 The text of § 2 requires that rail cars be equipped with auto- matic couplers and that all couplers be sufficiently compatible 9 Clark 207. 10 In Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 18­19 (1904), we clari- fied that the statute should be read as though there were a comma after the word "uncoupled," so that the words "without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars" applies to both coupling and uncou- pling. When Congress recodified the SAA in 1994, it placed a comma behind the word "uncoupled." See 49 U. S. C. § 20302(a)(1)(A). 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 408 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court so that they will couple on impact. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 16­17 (1904). The railroad is liable for an employee's injury or death caused by a violation of the SAA. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 295 (1908) ("If the railroad . . . use[s] cars which do not comply with the standard, it violates the plain prohibitions of the law, and there arises from that violation the liability to make compensation to one who is injured by it").11 Early SAA cases involved injuries that occurred when an employee was forced to go between the cars during coupling operations. See, e. g., Johnson, supra, at 2 (hand crushed between cars during coupling); San Antonio & Aransas Pass R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476, 478 (1916) (foot crushed between couplers); Atlantic City R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 56, 58 (1916) (arm caught in drawhead between cars during coupling). Our later cases extended the reach of SAA liabil- ity beyond injuries occurring between cars during coupling to other injuries caused by the failure of cars to automati- cally couple. Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U. S. 96, 97 (1950) (railroad employee who ran after a run- away train caused by failure to couple lost a leg when he fell under a car); Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 338 U. S. 430, 432­433 (1949) (plaintiff successfully boarded runaway cars that failed to couple, but was injured when the cars collided with another train); O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 338 U. S. 384, 385­386 (1949) (railworker killed when two runaway cars-the result of a broken coupler-collided with cars whose couplers he was adjusting). Liability in each of these cases was predicated on the failure of coupling equipment to perform as required by the SAA, and we held that the SAA creates an absolute duty requiring not only 11 We have held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., makes railroads liable for a violation of the SAA, see O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 338 U. S. 384, 391 (1949), although early cases, like Johnson, supra, preceded FELA's enactment in 1908. Hiles did not assert a negligence claim under FELA. 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 409 Opinion of the Court that automatic couplers be present, but also that they actu- ally perform. See, e. g., Affolder, supra, at 98; Carter, supra, at 433­434. III Hiles urges that railroads have an absolute duty to outfit their cars with safe equipment and that the SAA is violated if an employee is required to go between the ends of cars to manually adjust a misaligned drawbar. We cannot agree. Hiles correctly points out that failure to perform as required by the SAA is itself an actionable wrong dependent on nei- ther negligence nor proof of a defect,12 see Affolder, supra, at 98­99; O'Donnell, supra, at 390, 393, but the absolute duty to which we have referred on numerous occasions is not breached as a matter of law when a drawbar becomes mis- aligned during the ordinary course of railroad operations. In Affolder, the plaintiff was working with a crew coupling cars. The 25th and 26th cars failed to couple and, after a few more cars were added, the first 25 cars began rolling down a slight incline. The plaintiff ran after the runaway cars in an attempt to board and stop them, but instead fell under a car and lost his leg. At trial, the railroad attempted to prove that the coupler at issue was not defective and that the knuckle on the coupler was closed when the coupling at- tempt was made. Following O'Donnell, we reaffirmed that the failure of equipment to perform as required is sufficient to create SAA liability, Affolder, supra, at 99 (quoting O'Donnell, supra, at 390), but we noted that failure to couple would not create liability if the coupler was not properly set: "Of course [imposition of failure-to-perform liability] as- sumes that the coupler was placed in a position to oper- ate on impact. Thus, if `the failure of these two cars to couple on impact was because the coupler on the Penn- 12 Hiles neither pleaded nor attempted to prove at trial that Norfolk & Western acted negligently or that the drawbar was defective. 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 410 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court sylvania car had not been properly opened,' the railroad had a good defense." 339 U. S., at 99.13 In Carter, we similarly conditioned the duty on the coupler's being "properly set." 338 U. S., at 434; see O'Donnell, supra, at 394, n. 7 (declining to consider "a situation where an adequate coupler failed to hold because it was improp- erly set"). In Affolder, we predicated failure-to-perform liability on placing the coupler "in a position to operate on impact." 339 U. S., at 99. We implicitly recognized that certain prelimi- nary steps, such as ensuring that the knuckle is open, are necessary to proper performance of the coupler and that a failure to couple will not constitute an SAA violation if the railroad can show that the coupler had not been placed in a position to automatically couple. Though Affolder involved a claimed closed knuckle, its language was not so limited and, as a matter of common sense, could not have been. Hiles could not reasonably complain that an otherwise working electrical appliance failed to perform if he had neglected to plug in the power cord. Similarly, a court cannot reasonably find as a matter of law that an otherwise nondefective cou- pler has failed to perform when the drawbar has not been placed "in a position to operate on impact." We think Affol- der's restriction on failure-to-perform liability logically ex- tends to every step necessary to prepare a nondefective cou- pler for coupling, see supra, at 404­405 (describing the ordinary process of preparing for an automatic coupling), including ensuring proper alignment of the drawbar.14 13 Justice Jackson, dissenting on other grounds, agreed: "Before a failure to couple establishes a defective coupler, it must be found that it was properly set so it could couple. If it was not adjusted as such automatic couplers must be, of course the failure is not that of the device." Affolder, 339 U. S., at 101. 14 Our holding that Affolder's restriction on liability extends to mis- aligned drawbars suggests that, at least in this case, the absence of a failed coupling attempt is of no consequence. On this record, Hiles would not 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 411 Opinion of the Court Hiles contends that the distinction between a closed knuckle and a misaligned drawbar makes a difference be- cause opening a knuckle can be accomplished without going between cars but realigning a drawbar cannot. This is par- ticularly true, Hiles argues, given that Congress' "central policy" in enacting the SAA was to protect the worker by obviating the necessity of going between cars. Brief for Re- spondent 12­13. We decline to adopt an expansive interpre- tation of § 2 that would prohibit railroad employees from going between cars to realign slued drawbars. The lan- guage of § 2, which requires couplers that both will couple and can be uncoupled without the necessity of persons going between the cars, does not easily lend itself to Hiles' inter- pretation. Instead, as even Hiles apparently concedes, see Brief for Respondent 19, the text of § 2 only requires rail- roads to use a particular kind of coupler with certain attrib- utes, and there is no question that Norfolk & Western's cars are equipped with couplers with the necessary functional characteristics.15 have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if he had been injured during a failed coupling attempt. 15 Hiles reads into the legislative history a singular congressional intent to keep railroad workers from going between cars. Our construction of § 2 rests on the text of the statute and our prior interpretations of that language. In any event, we think Hiles' reading of the legislative history is erroneous. For instance, Hiles selectively quotes statements made by W. E. Rodgers during Senate Committee hearings to suggest that Con- gress wanted to force the railroads to adopt a coupler that would keep railworkers out from between cars altogether. Brief for Respondent 14. A full reading of these statements makes clear, however, that Mr. Rodgers believed that adoption of the Janney design, as it then existed, would fully satisfy the requirements of § 2. Sen. Hearings, at 14. Hiles' reliance on statements made by H. S. Haines, vice president of the American Railway Association, is similarly misplaced. See Brief for Respondent 15. Mr. Haines evidently thought that 500 existing couplers would satisfy the re- quirements of the proposed bill. Sen. Hearings, at 41; see Hearings on Automatic Couplers and Power Brakes before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1892). If Con- 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 412 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court Adopting Hiles' reading of § 2 would require us to hold that a misaligned drawbar, by itself, is a violation of the SAA, and we are quite unwilling to do that. It is true that our failure-to-perform cases made clear that the railroad will be liable for injuries caused by malfunctioning equipment, even when cars are equipped with automatic couplers. But we cannot agree that a misaligned drawbar is, as a matter of law, a malfunctioning drawbar. Historically, misaligned drawbars were an inevitable byproduct of the ability to tra- verse curved track and, like the closed knuckle in Affolder, are part of the normal course of railroad car operations. We are understandably hesitant to adopt a reading of § 2 that would suggest that almost every railroad car in service for nearly a century has been in violation of the SAA. See United Transportation Union v. Lewis, 711 F. 2d 233, 251, n. 39 (CADC 1983). Our hesitance is augmented by the en- forcement scheme Congress enacted with the SAA. From its beginning, § 6 of the SAA provided that railroads in viola- gress had any singular purpose in enacting § 2, it was to require the rail- roads to equip cars with uniformly compatible automatic couplers that em- ployees could operate without having to go between the cars. See H. R. Rep. No. 1678, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1892) ("It is the judgment of this committee that all cars and locomotives should be equipped with automatic couplers, obviating the necessity of the men going between the cars"); S. Rep. No. 1049, supra n. 8, at 6 (1892) ("What the railroad employe´s need to secure greater safety in the performance of their duties is uniformity. They want all couplers alike and perfectly interchangeable"). We think Congress fairly intended to prohibit the practice of placing railworkers between moving cars to guide a link into its matching coupler pocket or, worse, into an unfamiliar coupler cavity. Cf. Hearings on Automatic Cou- plers and Power Brakes before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1892) ("He goes in to make a coupling. He does not know the conditions that exist there. He can not tell whether it is a Janney or a Hinson, a Dowling, a Drexel, or some other kind of a drawbar"). Contrary to Hiles' assertion, the legislative history contains no suggestion that Congress intended to prevent an employee from going between cars to ensure that the knuckle is open, that the lock- ing pin is set, see supra, at 405, or that the drawbar is aligned. 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 400 (1996) 413 Opinion of the Court tion of § 2 were liable for "a penalty of one hundred dollars for each and every such violation." Act of Mar. 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U. S. C. § 6 (1988 ed.), recodified, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 21302(a). The amount of the penalty for a § 2 violation has varied over the years,16 but the threat of a pen- alty has not. Yet Hiles points to not a single instance in which a railroad has been fined for misaligned drawbars. It is not the case that the Government has simply neglected to enforce the penalty provisions of the SAA for nearly 100 years.17 We think there is a better explanation than that the Government has failed to enforce this particular aspect of the SAA since its inception: A misaligned drawbar simply is not a violation of § 2.18 Finally, relying on the railroads' experimental attempts to develop automatic realigning devices, Hiles argues that Con- gress' clear intent to protect railroad employees in coupling operations required the railroads to "develop a mechanism for automatic realignment of a drawbar." Brief for Re- spondent 27. Or, in the words of his amicus, "[t]he Legisla- tive wisdom of Section 2 is that it is as flexible as technol- ogy." Brief for United Transportation Union as Amicus 16 The statute currently requires the Secretary of Transportation to im- pose a penalty of "at least $500 but not more than $10,000." 49 U. S. C. § 21302(a)(2). 17 See, e. g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559 (1911) (§ 1 power brake violations); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. United States, 233 F. 2d 520 (CA5 1956) (§ 2 coupler violation); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 271 F. Supp. 212 (WD Mo. 1967) (§ 9 brake violation); United States v. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co., 76 F. Supp. 289 (ED La. 1948) (§ 2 coupler violation). 18 Hiles' view of § 2 also conflicts with regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that provide for the safety of em- ployees who go between cars to "prepare rail cars for coupling," 49 CFR § 218.22(c)(5) (1994), or to "adjust a coupling device," § 218.39(a). In its proposed rulemaking for § 218.39, the FRA explained that the proposed rule would protect employees who place themselves between cars to cou- ple air hoses or adjust coupling devices, including "adjusting drawbars." 48 Fed. Reg. 45272, 45273 (1983). 516us2$28n 11-04-98 14:10:27 PAGES OPINPGT 414 NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO. v. HILES Opinion of the Court Curiae 17. We reject this argument, for we find no such command in the text of § 2. Congress plainly instructed the railroads to install compatible and automatic couplers on all cars, at a time when this basic technology had been in exist- ence for two decades and had received widespread testing and recognition as a feasible technology superior to what was then in primary use. In contrast, Hiles concedes that auto- matic realignment technology did not even exist in 1893 when Congress passed the SAA, see Brief for Respondent 26­27, and, according to Norfolk & Western, automatic re- alignment has never been shown to be effective. But this matters not, because Congress legislated working automatic couplers for employee safety, not employee safety by what- ever method a court might deem appropriate. The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is Reversed. 516us2$29z 10-21-97 16:52:21 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 415 Syllabus UNITED STATES et al. v. CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 94­1893. Argued December 6, 1995-Decided February 27, 1996* 42 F. 3d 181, vacated and remanded. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for peti- tioners in No. 94­1893 were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Phillips, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Douglas N. Letter, Mark B. Stern, Bruce G. Forrest, William E. Kennard, and Christopher J. Wright. H. Bartow Farr III, Richard G. Taranto, Daniel L. Brenner, Neal M. Gold- berg, and David L. Nicoll filed briefs for petitioner in No. 94­1900. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Jonathan S. Mas- sey, Peter J. Rubin, Mark L. Evans, Kenneth W. Starr, Paul T. Cappuccio, James R. Young, John Thorne, and Michael E. Glover. *Together with No. 94­1900, National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the California Cable Television Association by Bruce D. Sokler and Frank W. Lloyd III; and for the Consumer Federation of America et al. by Gigi B. Sohn and Andrew Jay Schwartzman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Burt Neuborne and Steven R. Shapiro; for BellSouth Corp. by Walter H. Alford, John F. Beasley, William Barfield, and Roger M. Flynt, Jr.; for East Ascension Telephone Co. by Richard A. Epstein; for GTE Corp. by M. Edward Whelan III, John F. Raposa, and Richard A. Cordray; for Mets Fans United/Virginia Consumers for Cable Choice et al. by Samuel A. Simon; for the United States Telephone Associ- ation et al. by Michael W. McConnell and Kenneth S. Geller; and for U S 516us2$29z 10-21-97 16:52:21 PAGES OPINPGT 416 UNITED STATES v. CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELEPHONE CO. OF VA. Per Curiam Per Curiam. The judgment is vacated and the cases are remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for consideration of the question whether they are moot. West, Inc., by Lloyd N. Cutler, Louis R. Cohen, William T. Lake, and Stuart S. Gunckel. 516us2$30Z 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 417 Syllabus HERCULES, INC. et al. v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 94­818. Argued October 30, 1995-Decided March 4, 1996 Petitioner chemical manufacturers produced the defoliant Agent Orange under contracts with the Federal Government during the Vietnam era. After they incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, tort claims by veterans alleging physical injury from the use of Agent Orange, petitioners filed suits under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on alternative theories of contractual indem- nification and warranty of specifications provided by the Government. The Claims Court granted summary judgment against them and dis- missed the complaints. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed. Held: Petitioners may not recover on their warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. Pp. 422­430. (a) The Tucker Act's grant of jurisdiction to the Claims Court to hear and determine claims against the Government that are founded upon any "express or implied" contract with the United States, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a), extends only to contracts either express or implied in fact, not to claims on contracts implied in law, see, e. g., Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 581. Because the contracts at issue do not contain ex- press warranty or indemnification provisions, petitioners must establish that, based on the circumstances at the time of contracting, there was an implied agreement between the parties to provide the undertakings that petitioners allege. Pp. 422­424. (b) Neither an implied contractual warranty of specifications nor United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132, the seminal case recognizing a cause of action for breach of such a warranty, extends so far as to render the United States responsible for costs incurred in defending and set- tling the veterans' tort claims. Where, as here, the Government pro- vides specifications directing how a contract is to be performed, it is logical to infer that the Government warrants that the contractor will be able to perform the contract satisfactorily if it follows the specifications. However, this inference does not support a further inference that would extend the warranty beyond performance to third-party claims against the contractor. Thus, the Spearin claims made by petitioners do not extend to postperformance third-party costs as a matter of law. Pp. 424­425. 516us2$30Z 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 418 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Syllabus (c) Although the Government required petitioner Wm. T. Thompson Co. to produce Agent Orange under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) and threat of civil and criminal fines, imposed detailed specifications, had superior knowledge of the hazards, and, to a measura- ble extent, seized Thompson's processing facilities, these conditions do not give rise to an implied-in-fact agreement to indemnify Thompson for losses to third parties. The Anti-Deficiency Act, which bars federal employees from entering into contracts for future payment of money in advance of, or in excess of, an existing appropriation, 31 U. S. C. § 1341, must be viewed as strong evidence that a contracting officer would not have provided, in fact, the contractual indemnification Thompson claims. And, the detailed statutes and regulations that enable such contracting officers to provide indemnity agreements to certain contractors show that implied agreements to indemnify should not be readily inferred. Also contrary to Thompson's argument, the DPA provision specifying that "[n]o person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a[n] . . . order issued pursuant to this Act," 50 U. S. C. App. § 2157, does not reveal an intent to indemnify contractors. Likewise, since Thomp- son claims a breach of warranty by its customer rather than its seller and supplier, it misplaces its reliance on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan- Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124. Finally, petitioners' equitable ap- peal to "simple fairness" is considerably weakened by the fact that the injured veterans could not recover from the Government, see Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, and, in any event, may not be entertained by this Court, see United States v. Minnesota Mut. Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212, 217­218. Pp. 426­430. 24 F. 3d 188, affirmed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor, J., joined, post, p. 431. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James S. Turner, Alan Dumoff, Jerold Oshinsky, Gregory W. Homer, Rhonda D. Orin, and Walter S. Rowland. Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor Gen- 516us2$30Z 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 419 Opinion of the Court eral Bender, David S. Fishback, Alfred Mollin, and Michael T. McCaul.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners in this case incurred substantial costs defend- ing, and then settling, third-party tort claims arising out of their performance of Government contracts. In this action under the Tucker Act, they sought to recover these costs from the Government on alternative theories of contractual indemnification or warranty of specifications provided by the Government. We hold that they may not do so. When the United States had armed forces stationed in Southeast Asia in the 1960's, it asked several chemical manu- facturers, including petitioners Hercules Incorporated (Her- cules) and Wm. T. Thompson Company (Thompson), to manu- facture and sell it a specific phenoxy herbicide, code-named Agent Orange. The Department of Defense wanted to spray the defoliant in high concentrations on tree and plant life in order to both eliminate the enemy's hiding places and destroy its food supplies. From 1964 to 1968, the Govern- ment, pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), 64 Stat. 798, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 2061 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), entered into a series of fixed-price produc- tion contracts with petitioners. The military prescribed the formula and detailed specifications for manufacture. The contracts also instructed the suppliers to mark the drums containing the herbicide with a 3-inch orange band with "[n]o *Herbert L. Fenster, Ray M. Aragon, and Robin S. Conrad filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as amicus curiae urging reversal. Robert M. Hager filed a brief for the Agent Orange Coordinating Coun- cil as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Gershon M. Ratner filed a brief for the National Veterans Legal Serv- ices Program as amicus curiae. 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 420 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court further identification as to conten[t]." Lodging 30 (available in clerk's office case file). Petitioners fully complied. In the late 1970's, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against nine manufacturers of Agent Orange, including petitioners. The plaintiffs alleged that the veterans' exposure to dioxin, a toxic byproduct found in Agent Orange and believed by many to be hazardous, had caused various health problems. The lawsuits were consoli- dated in the Eastern District of New York and a class action was certified. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Liti- gation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 787­792 (1980). District Judge Pratt awarded petitioners summary judg- ment on the basis of the Government contractor defense in May 1983. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga- tion, 565 F. Supp. 1263. Before the judgment was entered, however, the case was transferred to Chief Judge Weinstein, who withdrew Judge Pratt's opinion, ruled that the viability of the Government contractor defense could not be deter- mined before trial, and reinstated petitioners as defendants. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 753 (1984). In May 1984, hours before the start of trial, the parties settled. The defendants agreed to create a $180 million settlement fund with each manufacturer contributing on a market-share basis. Hercules' share was $18,772,568; Thompson's was $3,096,597. Petitioners also incurred costs defending these suits exceeding $9 million combined.1 1 Nearly 300 plaintiffs decided to "opt out" of the certified class and to proceed with their claims independent of the class action. After the class action settled, the defendant manufacturers sought and received summary judgment against these plaintiffs. The District Court found that the opt- out plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence of a causal connection between the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange and their alleged inju- ries and that the Government contractor defense barred liability. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (1985). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but solely on the basis of the Government contractor defense. In re "Agent Orange" 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 421 Opinion of the Court Petitioners want the United States to reimburse them for the costs of defending and settling this litigation. They at- tempted to recover first in District Court under tort theories of contribution and noncontractual indemnification. Having failed there,2 they each sued the Government in the United States Claims Court, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and raising various claims sounding in contract.3 On the Government's motions, the Claims Court granted sum- mary judgment against petitioners and dismissed both com- plaints. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 616 (1992); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17 (1992). The two cases were consolidated for appeal and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit af- firmed. 24 F. 3d 188 (1994). The court held that petition- ers' claim of implied warranty of specifications failed because petitioners could not prove causation between the alleged breach and the damages. The court explained that, had petitioners pursued the class-action litigation to completion, the Government contractor defense would have barred the imposition of tort liability against them. The Government contractor defense, which many courts recognized before the Agent Orange settlement, but which this Court did not con- Product Liability Litigation, 818 F. 2d 187, 189 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Krupkin v. Dow Chemical Co., 487 U. S. 1234 (1988). 2 The District Court dismissed the claims, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, supra, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The ap- peals court found first that Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977), precluded such recovery and second that "well-established principles of tort law" would not recognize contribution and indemnity where the underlying claims that settled "were without merit." In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, supra, at 207. 3 Thompson also raised in its amended complaint a claim under the Tak- ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but subsequently abandoned that claim while still in the Claims Court. Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17, 22, n. 6 (1992). 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 422 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court sider until afterward, shields contractors from tort liability for products manufactured for the Government in accordance with Government specifications, if the contractor warned the United States about any hazards known to the contractor but not to the Government. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500, 512 (1988). Because the Court of Ap- peals believed petitioners could have availed themselves of this defense, the court held that, by settling, petitioners vol- untarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible. It also rejected Thompson's claim of contrac- tual indemnification. Thompson had argued that the Gov- ernment, pursuant to § 707 of the DPA, 50 U. S. C. App. § 2157 (1988 ed.), impliedly promised to indemnify Thompson for any liabilities incurred in performing under the DPA. Not persuaded, the court held that § 707 did not create in- demnification, but only provided a defense to a suit brought against the contractor by a disgruntled customer whose work order the DPA contract displaced. We granted certiorari, 514 U. S. 1049 (1995), and now affirm the judgment below but on different grounds.4 We begin by noting the limits of federal jurisdiction. "[T]he United States, as sovereign, `is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to enter- tain the suit.' " United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 4 Justice Breyer's dissent does not distinguish between, or separately address, the warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. The dissent further observes that petitioners "also set forth" a third "much more general fact-based claim." Post, at 436. This third claim, we believe, is indistinguishable from the contractual-indemnification claim that Thompson (but not Hercules) has raised, and which we address. To the extent that it differs from a claim for contractual indemnification, we decline to consider it; such a claim was neither presented to the Court of Appeals nor argued in the briefs to this Court. 516US2 Unit: $U30 [05-25-00 07:01:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 423 Opinion of the Court (1941). Congress created the Claims Court 5 to permit "a special and limited class of cases" to proceed against the United States, Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 75 (1878), and the court "can take cognizance only of those [claims] which by the terms of some act of Congress are committed to it," Thurston v. United States, 232 U. S. 469, 476 (1914); United States v. Sherwood, supra, at 586­589. The Tucker Act confers upon the court jurisdiction to hear and determine, inter alia, claims against the United States founded upon any "express or implied" contract with the United States. 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a). We have repeatedly held that this jurisdiction extends only to contracts either express or implied in fact, and not to claims on contracts implied in law. Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 581 (1921); Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925); United States v. Minnesota Mut. Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212, 217 (1926); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 218 (1983). Each material term or contractual obligation, as well as the contract as a whole, is subject to this jurisdictional limitation. See, e. g., Sutton, supra, at 580­581 (refusing to recognize an implied agree- ment to pay the fair value of work performed because the term was not "express or implied in fact" in the Government contract for dredging services); Lopez v. A. C. & S., Inc., 858 F. 2d 712, 714­715, 716 (CA Fed. 1988) (a Spearin warranty within an asbestos contract must be implied in fact). The distinction between "implied in fact" and "implied in law," and the consequent limitation, is well established in 5 Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, the newly created Claims Court inherited substantially all of the trial court jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. 96 Stat. 25. In 1992, Congress changed the title of the Claims Court and it is now the United States Court of Federal Claims. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 4506. Because the most recent change went into effect after that court rendered its decision in this case, we shall refer to it as the Claims Court throughout this opinion. 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 424 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court our cases. An agreement implied in fact is "founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an ex- press contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the par- ties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 592, 597 (1923). See also Russell v. United States, 182 U. S. 516, 530 (1901) ("[T]o give the Court of Claims jurisdiction the demand sued on must be founded on a convention between the parties-`a coming together of minds' "). By contrast, an agreement implied in law is a "fiction of law" where "a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty, as to repay money obtained by fraud or duress." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra, at 597. Petitioners do not contend that their contracts contain express warranty or indemnification provisions. Therefore, for them to prevail, they must establish that, based on the circumstances at the time of contracting, there was an im- plied agreement between the parties to provide the under- takings that petitioners allege. We consider petitioners' warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims in turn. The seminal case recognizing a cause of action for breach of contractual warranty of specifications is United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132 (1918). In that case, Spearin had con- tracted to build a dry dock in accordance with the Govern- ment's plans which called for the relocation of a storm sewer. After Spearin had moved the sewer, but before he had com- pleted the dry dock, the sewer broke and caused the site to flood. The United States refused to pay for the damages and annulled the contract. Spearin filed suit to recover the balance due on his work and lost profits. This Court held that "if the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by [the Government], the con- tractor will not be responsible for the consequences of de- fects in the plans and specifications." Id., at 136. From this, petitioners contend the United States is responsible for 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 425 Opinion of the Court costs incurred in defending and settling the third-party tort claims. Neither the warranty nor Spearin extends that far. When the Government provides specifications directing how a contract is to be performed, the Government warrants that the contractor will be able to perform the contract satisfacto- rily if it follows the specifications. The specifications will not frustrate performance or make it impossible. It is quite logical to infer from the circumstance of one party providing specifications for performance that that party warrants the capability of performance. But this circumstance alone does not support a further inference that would extend the war- ranty beyond performance to third-party claims against the contractor. In this case, for example, it would be strange to conclude that the United States, understanding the herbi- cide's military use, actually contemplated a warranty that would extend to sums a manufacturer paid to a third party to settle claims such as are involved in the present action. It seems more likely that the Government would avoid such an obligation, because reimbursement through contract would provide a contractor with what is denied to it through tort law. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977).6 6 Justice Breyer asserts, post, at 440, that "the majority . . . impl[ies] that a 1960's contracting officer would not have accepted an indemnifica- tion provision because of Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977)." The case is cited not for such an implication, but to provide added support for our decision not to extend the warranty-of- specification claim beyond performance. Although we decided Stencel after the formation of the Agent Orange contracts, we observed in that opinion that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1964 had adopted the position we would hold in Stencel, and that decisions inconsist- ent with that view began to arise in the Circuits only in 1972. Stencel, 431 U. S., at 669, n. 6 (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379, 404 (CA9 1964), and Barr v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464 F. 2d 1141, 1143­ 1144 (CA10 1972)). Therefore, when the contracts at issue were drafted, Wiener at the very least suggested that the Government would not be liable under a tort theory. 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 426 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court As an alternative basis for recovery, Thompson contends that the context in which the Government compelled it to manufacture Agent Orange constitutes an implied-in-fact agreement by the Government to indemnify for losses to third parties.7 The Government required Thompson to produce under authority of the DPA and threat of civil and criminal fines, imposed detailed specifications, had superior knowledge of the hazards, and, to a measurable extent, seized Thompson's processing facilities. Under these con- ditions, petitioner contends, the contract must be read to include an implied agreement to protect the contractor and indemnify its losses. We cannot agree. The circumstances surrounding the contracting are only relevant to the extent that they help us deduce what the parties to the contract agreed to in fact. These conditions here do not, we think, give rise to an implied-in-fact indem- nity agreement.8 There is also reason to think that a con- 7 Hercules did not plead contractual indemnification in its complaint or raise the claim in the Court of Appeals. Indeed, in the Claims Court, Hercules expressly disavowed having raised any contractual- indemnification claim. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defend- ant's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment in No. 90­496, p. 55 ("Hercules' claims for relief all are based on breaches of contractual duties; they are not claims that the Government has impliedly or expressly agreed to indemnify Hercules for open-ended liabilities"). 8 Justice Breyer argues that the record before us does not permit us to find, as we do, that the conditions asserted do not support the inference that the contracting parties had a meeting of the minds and in fact agreed that the United States would indemnify. If Justice Breyer is suggest- ing that the petitioners need further discovery to develop claims alleged in the complaints and not to some unarticulated third claim, see n. 4, supra; post, at 436), we believe his plea for further discovery must neces- sarily apply only to Thompson's contractual-indemnification claim; we hold in this case that the Spearin claims made by both petitioners do not ex- tend to postperformance third-party costs as a matter of law. See supra, at 425. In any event, Justice Breyer fails to explain what facts are needed, or might be developed, which would place a court on remand in a better position than where we sit today. We take all factual allegations 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 427 Opinion of the Court tracting officer would not agree to the open-ended indemni- fication alleged here. The Anti-Deficiency Act bars a federal employee or agency from entering into a contract for future payment of money in advance of, or in excess of, an existing appropriation. 31 U. S. C. § 1341.9 Ordinarily no federal appropriation covers contractors' payments to third-party tort claimants in these circumstances, and the Comptroller General has repeatedly ruled that Government procurement agencies may not enter into the type of open-ended indem- nity for third-party liability that petitioner Thompson claims to have implicitly received under the Agent Orange con- tracts.10 We view the Anti-Deficiency Act, and the contract- as true and still find them inadequate. In addition, we are skeptical that any material information regarding these 30-year-old transactions remains undisclosed, yet still discoverable. Hercules, and presumably Thompson, had access to all discovery materials (including thousands of documents and scores of depositions) produced during the Agent Orange class-action litigation. See Motion of United States for a Protective Order Staying Discovery in No. 90­496 (Cl. Ct.), pp. 1, 3­4, n. 1. 9 The Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1341, provides: "(a)(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not- "(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; "(B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the pay- ment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law." 10 With one peculiar exception that the Comptroller General expressly sanctioned, "the accounting officers of the Government have never issued a decision sanctioning the incurring of an obligation for an open-ended indemnity in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary." In re Assumption by Government of Contractor Liability to Third Persons- Reconsideration, 62 Comp. Gen. 361, 364­365 (1983). Justice Breyer finds our reliance on the Comptroller General problematic because of a Comptroller General opinion that finds capped indemnity agreements not improper. Post, at 437­438. But the Anti-Deficiency Act applies equally to capped indemnification agreements. We do not suggest that all indem- nification agreements would violate the Act, cf. infra, at 428­429 (citing 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 428 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ing officer's presumed knowledge of its prohibition, as strong evidence that the officer would not have provided, in fact, the contractual indemnification Thompson claims. In an ef- fort to avoid the Act's reach, Thompson argues that the Anti-Deficiency Act is not applicable to an implied-in-fact in- demnity because such an indemnification is "judicially fash- ioned" and is "not an express contractual provision." Brief for Petitioners 41. However, "[t]he limitation upon the authority to impose contract obligations upon the United States is as applicable to contracts by implication as it is to those expressly made." Sutton, 256 U. S., at 580 (opinion of Brandeis, J.). When Thompson contracted with the United States, statutory mechanisms existed under which a Government contracting officer could provide an indemnity agreement to specified classes of contractors under specified conditions. See, e. g., 50 U. S. C. § 1431 (1988 ed., Supp. V) (permitting the President, whenever he deems it necessary to facilitate national defense, to authorize Government contracting with- out regard to other provisions of law regulating the making of contracts; in 1958, the President, in Executive Order No. 10789, delegated this authority to the Department of De- fense, provided that the contracts were "within the limits of the amounts appropriated and the contract authorization therefor" and "[p]roper records of all actions taken under the authority" were maintained; in 1971, the President amended the Order to specify the conditions under which indemnifica- tion could be provided to defense contractors); 10 U. S. C. § 2354 (1956 statute authorizing indemnification provisions in contracts of a military department for research or develop- ment); 42 U. S. C. § 2210 (indemnity scheme, first enacted statutes that expressly provide for the creation of indemnity agreements); the Act bars agreements for which there has been no appropriation. We consider open-ended indemnification in particular because that is the kind of agreement involved in this case. 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 429 Opinion of the Court in 1957, for liability arising out of a limited class of nuclear incidents, described in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envi- ronmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 63­67 (1978)). These statutes, set out in meticulous detail and each sup- ported by a panoply of implementing regulations,11 would be entirely unnecessary if an implied agreement to indem- nify could arise from the circumstances of contracting. We will not interpret the DPA contracts so as to render these statutes and regulations superfluous. Cf. Astoria Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 112 (1991).12 We find unpersuasive Thompson's argument that § 707 of the DPA13 reveals Congress' intent to hold harmless manu- facturers for any liabilities which flow from compliance with an order issued under the DPA. Thompson reads the provi- sion too broadly. The statute plainly provides immunity, not indemnity. By expressly providing a defense to liability, 11 See, e. g., 48 CFR § 235.070 (1994) (specifying criteria for indemnifica- tion clauses in Department of Defense research and development con- tracts); §§ 252.235­7000 to 252.235­7001 (contract language to be used for indemnification under 10 U. S. C. § 2354); 32 CFR § 7­303.62 (1983) (con- tract language to be used for indemnification under 50 U. S. C. §§ 1431­ 1435 (1988 ed. and Supp.V)). 12 Justice Breyer asserts that, by citing these statutes and regula- tions, "the majority implies that a contracting officer, in all likelihood, would not have agreed to an implicit promise of indemnity, for doing so would amount to a bypass of" the provisions. Post, at 436­437. We view the statutes and regulations, which cover different fields of Government contracting, not as implying what a contracting officer might have done with regard to the Agent Orange contracts, but as showing that a promise to indemnify should not be readily inferred. 13 Section 707 provides, in relevant part: "No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this Act . . . notwithstanding that any such rule, regulation, or order shall thereafter be declared by judicial or other competent authority to be invalid." 50 U. S. C. App. § 2157 (1988 ed.). 516us2$30H 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 430 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Congress does not implicitly agree that, if liability is imposed notwithstanding that defense, the Government will reim- burse the unlucky defendant.14 We think Thompson's reli- ance on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956), is likewise misplaced; there, in an action between private parties, we held that the stevedore was lia- ble to the shipowner for the amount the latter paid in dam- ages to an injured employee of the former. Here Thompson claims a breach of warranty by its customer, not by its seller and supplier. Perhaps recognizing the weakness of their legal position, petitioners plead "simple fairness," Tr. of Oral Arg. 3, and ask us to "redress the unmistakable inequities," Brief for Petitioners 40. Fairness, of course, is in many respects a comparative concept, and the fact that the veterans who claimed physical injury from the use of Agent Orange could not recover against the Government, see Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), considerably weakens petition- ers' equitable appeal. But in any event we are constrained by our limited jurisdiction and may not entertain claims "based merely on equitable considerations." United States v. Minnesota Mut. Investment Co., 271 U. S., at 217­218. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 14 The United States urges us to interpret § 707 as only barring liability to customers whose orders are delayed or displaced on account of the pri- ority accorded Government orders under § 101 of the DPA, which author- izes the President to require contractors to give preferential treatment to contracts "necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense." 50 U. S. C. App. § 2071(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). We need not decide the scope of § 707 in this case because it clearly functions only as an immunity, and provides no hint of a further agreement to indemnify. 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 431 Breyer, J., dissenting Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, dissenting. The petitioners, two chemical companies, have brought this breach-of-contract action seeking reimbursement from the Government for their contribution to the settlement of lawsuits brought by Vietnam veterans exposed to their product Agent Orange. The companies argue that their contracts with the Government to produce Agent Orange contain certain promises or warranties that, in effect, hold them harmless. To win this case, as in the most elementary breach-of-contract case, the companies must show that the Government in fact made the warranties or promises, that the Government breached them, and that the Agent Orange settlement contribution was a consequent foreseeable harm. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 346, 347, 351 (1979); 5 A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 997, 1001, 1002 (1964). The companies concede that the promises, or warranties, are not written explicitly in their contracts; but, the compa- nies intend to prove certain background facts and legal cir- cumstances, which, they say, will show that these promises, or warranties, are an implicit part of the bargain that the parties struck. See 3 id., §§ 538, 551 (common and trade usage, course of dealings, and existing statutes and rules of law are always probative as to the meaning of the parties). The background facts alleged include the following: x In the 1960's the Government, by exercising special stat- utory authority, required the companies to enter into the Agent Orange production contracts over the explicit objec- tion of at least one of the companies. See Defense Produc- tion Act of 1950 (DPA), 50 U. S. C. App. § 2061 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V); App. 8­9, 23­24. x The Government required the companies to produce Agent Orange according to precise, detailed production spec- ifications. Ibid. x At that time the Government knew but did not reveal that Agent Orange was defective, or unsafe, to the point 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 432 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting where its use might lead to plausible tort claims advanced by those who used it. Id., at 10­11, 25. x The Government specified that the companies could not label Agent Orange in ways that might have promoted its safe use (with, say, dilution instructions), while, at the same time, the Government permitted its soldiers to use Agent Orange in unreasonably risky ways (such as using empty containers for showers or barbecues). Id., at 8­10. The background (1960's) legal circumstances include the following: x United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132 (1918), in which this Court approved the common judicial practice of read- ing Government contracts that provide detailed "plans and specifications," as containing an implied warranty that "the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications." Id., at 136. x Lower court decisions reading Government contracts as containing an implied warranty that performance costs will not increase due to the Government's superior knowledge of undisclosed "vital information" that causes the cost increase. See Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. United States, 312 F. 2d 774, 777­778, and n. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (collecting cases). x The broad language of the statute that authorized the President to enter into defense procurement contracts- language broad enough to authorize Government promises to indemnify. 50 U. S. C. § 1431 (1988 ed., Supp. V); Exec. Order 10789, 3 CFR 426 (1954­1958 Comp.). See also Exec. Order 11610, 3 CFR 594 (1971­1975 Comp.) (taking view that the statute grants authority to promise indemnification). x The language of the DPA, which, while permitting the Government to place compulsory defense orders, also says that the compelled firms shall not "be held liable for damages . . . for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with" such an "order." 50 U. S. C. App. § 2157 (1988 ed.). 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 433 Breyer, J., dissenting These background facts and circumstances, say the compa- nies, show that the Government knew far better than they that its Agent Orange contract specifications would force them to produce a risky product for risky use. They add that all parties knew of legal doctrines that made the Gov- ernment responsible in analogous circumstances for analo- gous risks. They argue that the Government would not have wanted to force them (under the DPA) to enter into a contract subjecting them (through its specifications) to seri- ous risks of damage, in respect to which (because of the Government's superior knowledge) they could not bargain for compensation. They conclude that the Government, in the contracts, took responsibility for those risks by implicitly promising to assume responsibility for the consequences of specification defects, including indemnification for the settle- ment of defect-related tort suits. The Federal Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judg- ment against the companies. But, in doing so, it did not decide against the companies in respect to their claimed promises. Instead the Federal Circuit assumed (reluctantly and for argument's sake) that the companies would be able to prove the existence of the promises, but it went on to hold against them regardless. Even assuming the promises, the Circuit wrote, the companies will not be able to prove causa- tion between promises and damages. The Circuit believed that, had the companies litigated the Agent Orange tort suits instead of settling them, they would have asserted a "gov- ernment contractor defense," see Boyle v. United Technolo- gies Corp., 487 U. S. 500 (1988), and thereby won the law- suits. It concluded that, since the companies could readily have won the suits, the settlement amounts to a "voluntary payment" that cuts any causal link between a broken prom- ise, or warranty, and resulting harm. The companies, in their petition for certiorari and initial brief on the merits, primarily asked us to review, and to re- 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 434 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting verse, this "no causation" holding. The Court, in today's opinion, does not discuss that holding. Instead it holds that the companies will not be able to prove the existence of the implicit promises. In my view, however, the record before us now does not permit this latter holding. Rather, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' "no causation" holding and then remand this case for further proceedings. I need mention only one fatal flaw in the Court of Appeals' "no causation" holding, that of hindsight. The Court of Ap- peals, in essence, found the companies' Agent Orange settle- ment so obviously unnecessary, so abnormal, so far removed from ordinary litigation behavior, that it could not have been "foreseeable," see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351; 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1002, or (if I recast the same point in the Court's tort-like "causation" language) that it cut the causal link between promise breach and harm. But, viewed without the benefit of legal hindsight, the settlement was neither unforeseeable nor was it an intervening "cause" of the loss. In 1984, when the companies settled, the settlement was not notably different in terms of reasonableness or motiva- tion from other settlements that terminate major litigation, for at that time the law that might have provided the compa- nies with a defense was far less clear than it is today. I concede that even then some Circuits already had found in the law a "government contractor defense" that, in effect, immunized defense contractors from most suits by service- men claiming injury from defective products. See McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704 F. 2d 444, 448­451 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1043 (1984); Brown v. Caterpil- lar Tractor Co., 696 F. 2d 246, 249­254 (CA3 1982); Tillett v. J. I. Case Co., 756 F. 2d 591, 599­600 (CA7 1985). But, most of these Circuits had held that the existence of such a defense was a matter of state law, which might differ among the States. See Brown, supra; Tillett, supra; Hansen v. Johns- Manville Products Corp., 734 F. 2d 1036, 1044­1045 (CA5 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 435 Breyer, J., dissenting 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1051 (1985). The Second Cir- cuit, the home of the Agent Orange litigation, had not de- cided the issue. And, the two Agent Orange Second Circuit trial judges who (due to certain here irrelevant procedural considerations) both considered the companies' "government contractor" defense decided the issue in opposite ways. Compare In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga- tion, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1274­1275 (EDNY 1983), with In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 847­850 (EDNY 1984), aff'd, 818 F. 2d 145 (CA2 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Fraticelli v. Dow Chemical Co., 484 U. S. 1004 (1988). This Court did not authoritatively uphold the "government contractor" defense until 1988, four years after the settlement here at issue. Boyle, supra. And, it did so on a ground different from that upon which the Circuit Courts had previously relied. Compare McKay, supra, at 448­451; Tillett, supra, at 596­597 (finding the "government contractor defense" implicit in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950)), with Boyle, supra, at 509­511 (explicitly rejecting Feres as the basis for a "government contractor defense"). In light of this contemporaneous legal uncertainty, the set- tlement, viewed from the companies' perspective and with- out benefit of hindsight, seems a reasonable litigation strat- egy, through which the companies avoided added litigation costs and the threat of significant additional liability while helping to provide the veterans with at least some compensa- tion. See In re "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp., at 749 (ex- plaining why Agent Orange District Court approved the set- tlement). Nothing in the record here suggests the contrary. And, if reasonable at the time, the settlement must have been a "foreseeable" potential consequence of litigation and therefore within the scope of what the companies claim were implicit promises or warranties protecting them against the harms of litigation. See also 24 F. 3d 188, 205­208 (CA Fed. 1994) (Plager, C. J., dissenting). For that reason, this Court 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 436 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting simply should set aside the Court of Appeals' determination on the point. The Court instead decides this case on an alternative basis, namely, that the companies cannot prove the existence of the implicit promises or warranties that they claim. But the existence of a contractual promise implied in fact is very much a creature of particular circumstance-the particular terms, the negotiating circumstances, and the background understandings of law or industry practice. See 3 Corbin, supra, §§ 562, 566­570. Unlike the majority, which com- partmentalizes the companies' claims into several separate doctrinal categories (a "Spearin" claim, an implied indemni- fication claim)-each rejected separately for doctrine-specific reasons-I believe the companies' submissions, fairly read, also set forth a much more general fact-based claim. In essence, the companies say that the parties, when specify- ing the details of this compulsory defense order, implic- itly agreed to allocate to the Government certain risks of defective-government-specification-caused harm-namely, those risks for which each company, because of its inferior knowledge, could not seek compensation in the contract price. And, the companies allege background facts that, if true and complete (as we must assume at this stage of the proceedings), make that implication plausible. The legal considerations to which the majority points do not answer the companies' basic implied-in-fact contentions. To do so, the majority would have to argue that the five sets of legal circumstances to which it points, taken separately or together, show that no Government contracting officer would have agreed to a promise or warranty (of the sort claimed); hence, one cannot possibly imply the existence of such a promise "in fact." See 3 Corbin, supra, § 561. The major- ity cannot argue that, because those five sets of circum- stances suggest the contrary. First, the majority implies that a contracting officer, in all likelihood, would not have agreed to an implicit promise of 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 437 Breyer, J., dissenting indemnity, for doing so would amount to a bypass of, and "render . . . superfluous," the statutes and "panoply of imple- menting regulations" that set forth specific procedures that contractors must follow to obtain a promise of indemnity. Ante, at 429. My problem with this argument lies in the fact that, in 1964, the relevant statute, Executive Order, and regulations read very differently. At that time, their lan- guage was nonspecific or ambiguous on the procedures re- quired for indemnification. The statute has always been phrased in general language, making no explicit reference to indemnification. See 50 U. S. C. § 1431 (1988 ed., Supp. V); 50 U. S. C. § 1431 (1964 ed.). The portion of the Executive Order that today treats indemnification as special, and sets out procedures for indemnification, did not exist in 1964, and the relevant regulations were also either silent or much more ambiguous than they are today. Compare Exec. Order 11610, 3 CFR 594 (1971­1975 Comp.) (indemnification), with Exec. Order 10789, 3 CFR 426 (1954­1958 Comp.) (no specific reference to indemnification); compare 32 CFR § 17­301 et seq. (1975) (implementing today's indemnification proce- dures) with 32 CFR § 17­301 et seq. (1964) (no reference to indemnification procedures) and 32 CFR § 17.204­4 (1960) ("Informal commitments may be formalized under certain circumstances to permit payment to persons who have taken action without formal contract [e. g., where a person has fur- nished property or services to the military in good-faith reli- ance on the apparent authority of a person giving an oral instruction]. Formalization of commitments under such cir- cumstances normally will facilitate the national defense by assuring such persons that they will be treated fairly and paid expeditiously"); 32 CFR § 17.206(i) (1964) (indemnifica- tion contracts must subject Government's obligation to avail- ability of appropriated funds). Second, the majority points to Comptroller General opin- ions that say that an "open-ended" agreement to indemnify would violate the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1341 (1988 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 438 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting ed.). Ante, at 427, and n. 10 (citing In re Assumption by Government of Contractor Liability to Third Persons- Reconsideration, 62 Comp. Gen. 361 (1983)). The problem with this argument is that other Comptroller General opin- ions say that an agreement to indemnify that is not open- ended, but is capped at an amount that a private insurer might have provided, is not improper. See Reimbursement of Costs in Connection with Liabilities to Third Parties for Employees' Negligence, 22 Comp. Gen. 892 (1943). A capped agreement, which, if reflected in the contract price, makes the Government a kind of self-insurer, is in effect within the appropriation (because the expenditure of assum- ing the risk of liability will roughly equal the cost of premi- ums that the Government saves by self-insuring), and may well prove sufficient for the plaintiffs' purposes. After all, on plaintiffs' factual allegations, a contractor who was as aware of the plaintiffs' alleged risks as was the Government would have sensed trouble, wanted insurance, and likely have obtained a premium payment sufficient to buy it. The companies need argue only for a capped implicit warranty that would treat the unknowing contractor similarly. See also In re Government Indemnification of Public Utilities Against Loss Arising Out of Sale of Power to Government, 59 Comp. Gen. 705 (1980) (indemnification in contracts with a "sole source" of a good or service lawful under Anti- Deficiency Act). Whether an agreement to spend money beyond that which was appropriated is in writing or not is irrelevant to the Anti-Deficiency Act. Third, the majority distinguishes United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132 (1918), on the ground that the implied warranty that Justice Brandeis there discussed protects a contractor from "specifications" that, in the majority's words, will "frustrate performance or make it impossible," but does not "extend . . . beyond performance to third-party claims against the contractor." Ante, at 425. Spearin itself does not make this distinction. Nor have subsequent cases. See 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 439 Breyer, J., dissenting Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 551 F. 2d 945 (CA5 1977) (allowing recovery against the Government of damages paid by a Government contractor to a third party to which the contractor caused damage by following Government specifications). See also 24 F. 3d, at 197 (Spearin holds contractor harmless if the product proves defective). If the Government must pay, say, for the contractor's own machinery destroyed by a (defective- specification-caused) explosion when that destruction frus- trates performance, see Ordnance Research, Inc. v. United States, 609 F. 2d 462, 479 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (treating explosions causing increased costs as a breach of the warranty of speci- fications), why should the Government not also have to pay when the explosion takes place just after performance is complete? And, why should it not have to reimburse the contractor's payment for identical damage caused his next- door neighbor in the same explosion? In any event, whether or not there are good answers to these questions, they are unlikely to answer plaintiffs' further argument, namely that, even if Spearin does not compel a decision in their favor, it offers indirect support, as background, for implying a prom- ise that would provide (in the particular circumstances) Spearin-like protection. Fourth, the majority says that the DPA's "hold harmless" provision ("No person shall be held liable for damages . . . for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with [an] order") does not provide for in- demnification. Ante, at 429. The petitioners, however, do not claim the contrary. They state explicitly that they "do not attempt to interpret the DPA's hold harmless language as an affirmative indemnity." Reply Brief for Petitioners 2. They add that "an indemnity should be implied from all the circumstances of this case, including the circumstance that petitioners and the Government contracted against the back- drop of the sweeping hold harmless language contained in the DPA." Ibid. They argue simply that the DPA's stated 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT 440 HERCULES, INC. v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting objective-to relieve them of involuntarily created liability- would have led contracting officers in the 1960's (given the parties' uncertainty about future statutory interpretation) to have believed that a contractual "hold harmless" warranty was reasonable in the circumstances, not the contrary. See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 551 (existing statutes and rules of law are always evidence of the meaning of the parties). The rel- evant point is not whether Congress intended to indemnify, but the likely effect of the DPA's language (before judicial interpretation limited it to an immunity provision) on what risks contracting officers at the time might have thought the Government was assuming in a forced production contract under the Act. Fifth, both the Federal Circuit, 24 F. 3d, at 198, n. 8, and the majority, ante, at 425, imply that a 1960's contracting officer would not have accepted an indemnification provision because of Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977). That case held (in light of the Feres doctrine providing the Government with immunity from armed services personnel tort suits) that Government con- tractors, whom armed services personnel had sued in tort, could not, in turn, sue the Government for indemnification. Otherwise a soldier, unable (given Feres) to sue the Govern- ment for injury caused, say, by a defective rifle, would sue the rifle manufacturer instead, and the rifle manufacturer would then sue the Government for indemnity, thereby, in a sense, circumventing the immunity that Feres promised the Government. One problem with this argument is that Stencel postdates the formation of the contracts here at issue by about a dec- ade. More importantly Stencel does not involve contractual promises to indemnify a contractor. Rather it concerns an indemnification provided by state tort law. Stencel, supra, at 667­668, nn. 2, 3. And, it nowhere says, or directly im- plies, that the law prohibits the Government from agreeing, explicitly or implicitly, to indemnify a contractor. Indeed, 516us2$30Q 11-02-98 14:52:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 417 (1996) 441 Breyer, J., dissenting this Court has explicitly written that it "fail[s] to see how the Stencel holding . . . supports the conclusion that if the Tort Claims Act bars a tort remedy, neither is there a con- tractual remedy. The absence of Government tort liabil- ity has not been thought to bar contractual remedies on implied-in-fact contracts, even in those cases also having ele- ments of a tort." Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 465 (1980) (per curiam). I agree with the majority insofar as it warns against a court's too easily read- ing an implicit promise to indemnify a contractor's armed- services-related tort liability; but, then, its words would rep- resent simply a wise caution and not an absolute prohibition. In sum, the companies argue factual circumstances-com- pelled production, superior knowledge, detailed specifica- tions, and significant defect-which, if true, suggest that a government, dealing in good faith with its contractors, would have agreed to the "implied" promise, particularly in light of legal authorities, known at the time, that offered somewhat similar guarantees to contractors in somewhat similar cir- cumstances. The validity of their claim is likely to turn on the strength of the companies' factual case, as supported by evidence, and upon the details of Government contracting practices in the 1960's-matters not now before us and with which the lower courts are more familiar than are we. The Court today unnecessarily restricts Spearin warran- ties, and, lacking particular facts at this stage of the proceed- ing, it relies on statutory circumstances that are common to many Government contracts. I fear that the practical effect of disposing of the companies' claim at this stage of the pro- ceeding will be to make it more difficult, in other cases even if not here, for courts to interpret Government contracts with an eye toward achieving the fair allocation of risks that the parties likely intended. For these reasons, I would remand this case for further proceedings. 516us2$31z 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 442 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus BENNIS v. MICHIGAN certiorari to the supreme court of michigan No. 94­8729. Argued November 29, 1995-Decided March 4, 1996 Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. In declaring the automobile forfeit as a public nuisance under Michigan's statutory abatement scheme, the trial court permitted no offset for petitioner's interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's activ- ity. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, but was in turn reversed by the State Supreme Court, which concluded, inter alia, that Michi- gan's failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was without federal constitutional consequence under this Court's decisions. Held: The forfeiture order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend- ment. Pp. 446­453. (a) Michigan's abatement scheme has not deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without due process. Her claim that she was entitled to contest the abatement by showing that she did not know that her husband would use the car to violate state law is defeated by a long and unbroken line of cases in which this Court has held that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use. See, e. g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465, 467­468, and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 668, 683; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 80, and Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 617­618, distinguished. These cases are too firmly fixed in the country's punitive and remedial jurisprudence to be now displaced. Cf. J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 511. Pp. 446­452. (b) Michigan's abatement scheme has not taken petitioner's property for public use without compensation. Because the forfeiture proceed- ing did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, her property in the au- tomobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for prop- erty which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of govern- mental authority other than the power of eminent domain. See, e. g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488, 492. Pp. 452­453. 447 Mich. 719, 527 N. W. 2d 483, affirmed. 516us2$31z 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 443 Opinion of the Court Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., post, p. 453, and Ginsburg, J., post, p. 457, filed concurring opinions. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 458. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 472. Stefan B. Herpel argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Larry L. Roberts argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John D. O'Hair and George E. Ward. Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an auto- mobile in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. A Michigan court ordered the automobile for- feited as a public nuisance, with no offset for her interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's ac- tivity. We hold that the Michigan court order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency.1 The State then sued both *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association by John J. Gill III and Michael F. Crotty; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor III and Clint Bolick; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by E. E. Edwards III and Richard J. Troberman. Richard K. Willard and Robert Teir filed a brief of amicus curiae for the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities et al. 1 Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.338b (1979). 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 444 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car declared a public nuisance and abated as such under §§ 600.3801 2 and 600.3825 3 of Michigan's Compiled Laws. Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the ground that, when she entrusted her hus- band to use the car, she did not know that he would use it to violate Michigan's indecency law. The Wayne County Cir- cuit Court rejected this argument, declared the car a public nuisance, and ordered the car's abatement. In reaching this disposition, the trial court judge recognized the remedial dis- cretion he had under Michigan's case law. App. 21. He 2 Section 600.3801 states in pertinent part: "Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, . . . is declared a nui- sance, . . . and all . . . nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1995). 3 Section 600.3825 states in pertinent part: "(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place of all furniture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution . . . . "(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided. "(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon the sale of any furniture, fixtures, contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as provided in this section, the officer executing the order of the court shall, after deducting the expenses of keeping such property and costs of such sale, pay all liens according to their priorities . . . , and shall pay the balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of the state. . . ." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3825 (1979). 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 445 Opinion of the Court took into account the couple's ownership of "another automo- bile," so they would not be left "without transportation." Id., at 25. He also mentioned his authority to order the pay- ment of one-half of the sale proceeds, after the deduction of costs, to "the innocent co-title holder." Id., at 21. He de- clined to order such a division of sale proceeds in this case because of the age and value of the car (an 11-year-old Pon- tiac sedan recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600); he commented in this regard: "[T]here's practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this." Id., at 25. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that regardless of the language of Michigan Compiled Law § 600.3815(2),4 Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpret- ing this section prevented the State from abating petitioner's interest absent proof that she knew to what end the car would be used. Alternatively, the intermediate appellate court ruled that the conduct in question did not qualify as a public nuisance because only one occurrence was shown and there was no evidence of payment for the sexual act. 200 Mich. App. 670, 504 N. W. 2d 731 (1993). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement in its entirety. 447 Mich. 719, 527 N. W. 2d 483 (1994). It concluded as a matter of state law that the episode in the Bennis vehicle was an abatable nuisance. Rejecting the Court of Appeals' inter- pretation of § 600.3815(2), the court then announced that, in order to abate an owner's interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner proscribed by § 600.3801 when she entrusted it to another user. Id., at 737, 527 N. W. 2d, at 492. The court next addressed petitioner's 4 "Proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3815(2) (1979). 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 446 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court federal constitutional challenges to the State's abatement scheme: The court assumed that petitioner did not know of or consent to the misuse of the Bennis car, and concluded in light of our decisions in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926), and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), that Michigan's failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was "without constitutional conse- quence." 447 Mich., at 740­741, 527 N. W. 2d, at 493­494. The Michigan Supreme Court specifically noted that, in its view, an owner's interest may not be abated when "a vehicle is used without the owner's consent." Id., at 742, n. 36, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495, n. 36. Furthermore, the court confirmed the trial court's description of the nuisance abatement pro- ceeding as an "equitable action," and considered it "critical" that the trial judge so comprehended the statute. Id., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495. We granted certiorari in order to determine whether Michigan's abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or has taken her interest for public use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 515 U. S. 1121 (1995). We affirm. The gravamen of petitioner's due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an opportunity to contest the abate- ment of her car; she was accorded both. Cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43 (1993). Rather, she claims she was entitled to contest the abatement by showing she did not know her husband would use it to violate Michigan's indecency law. But a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use. Our earliest opinion to this effect is Justice Story's opinion for the Court in The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1 (1827). The Pal- 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 447 Opinion of the Court myra, which had been commissioned as a privateer by the King of Spain and had attacked a United States vessel, was captured by a United States warship and brought into Charleston, South Carolina, for adjudication. Id., at 8. On the Government's appeal from the Circuit Court's acquittal of the vessel, it was contended by the owner that the vessel could not be forfeited until he was convicted for the priva- teering. The Court rejected this contention, explaining: "The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing." Id., at 14. In another admiralty forfeiture decision 17 years later, Justice Story wrote for the Court that in in rem admi- ralty proceedings "the acts of the master and crew . . . bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law de- nounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs." Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 234 (1844) (emphasis added). In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 401 (1878), this Court upheld the forfeiture of property used by a lessee in fraudulently avoiding federal alcohol taxes, observing: "Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on account of the fraud, neglect, or miscon- duct of those intrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even when the owner is otherwise without fault . . . and it has always been held . . . that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the owner . . . whether he be innocent or guilty." In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926), this Court upheld the forfeiture of a purchaser's interest in a car mis- used by the seller. Van Oster purchased an automobile from a dealer but agreed that the dealer might retain possession for use in its business. The dealer allowed an associate to use the automobile, and the associate used it for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor. Id., at 465­466. The State brought a forfeiture action pursuant to a Kansas stat- 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 448 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court ute, and Van Oster defended on the ground that the transpor- tation of the liquor in the car was without her knowledge or authority. This Court rejected Van Oster's claim: "It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant con- sequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it. Much of the jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of the statute and common law of liens as en- ables a mere bailee to subject the bailed property to a lien, the power of a vendor of chattels in possession to sell and convey good title to a stranger, are familiar examples. . . . They suggest that certain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner sur- renders his control at his peril. . . . "It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id., at 467­468. The Van Oster Court relied on J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921), in which the Court upheld the forfeiture of a seller's interest in a car misused by the purchaser. The automobile was forfeited after the purchaser transported bootleg distilled spirits in it, and the selling dealership lost the title retained as security for unpaid purchase money. Id., at 508­509. The Court dis- cussed the arguments for and against allowing the forfeiture of the interest of an owner who was "without guilt," id., at 510, and concluded that "whether the reason for [the chal- lenged forfeiture scheme] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the coun- try to be now displaced," id., at 511.5 5 In Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 617 (1993), the Court ob- served that J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921), "expressly reserved the question whether the [guilty-property] 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 449 Opinion of the Court In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), the most recent decision on point, the Court re- viewed the same cases discussed above, and concluded that "the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense." Id., at 683. Petitioner is in the same position as the various own- ers involved in the forfeiture cases beginning with The Pal- myra in 1827. She did not know that her car would be used in an illegal activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But under these cases the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect her interest against forfeiture by the government. Petitioner relies on a passage from Calero-Toledo, that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of . . . an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done fiction could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner." This observation is quite mistaken. The Goldsmith-Grant Court expressly reserved opinion "as to whether the section can be ex- tended to property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent." Id., at 512 (emphases added). In other words, the Goldsmith-Grant Court drew the very same distinction made by the Michigan Supreme Court in this case: "the distinction between the situation in which a vehicle is used without the owner's consent," and one in which, "although the owner consented to [another person's] use, [the vehicle] is used in a manner to which the owner did not consent." 447 Mich., at 742, n. 36, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495, n. 36. Because John Bennis co-owned the car at issue, petitioner cannot claim she was in the former situation. The dissent, post, at 466­468, and n. 12, quoting Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 364 (1808), seeks to enlarge the reservation in Goldsmith-Grant into a general principle that " `a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed.' " But Peisch was dealing with the same question re- served in Goldsmith-Grant, not any broader proposition: "If, by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his part, [an owner's] property should be invaded, . . . the law cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that property." 4 Cranch, at 364. 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 450 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro- scribed use of his property." 416 U. S., at 689. But she concedes that this comment was obiter dictum, and "[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375, 379 (1994). And the holding of Calero-Toledo on this point was that the interest of a yacht rental company in one of its leased yachts could be forfeited because of its use for transportation of controlled substances, even though the company was " `in no way . . . involved in the criminal enterprise carried on by [the] lessee' and `had no knowledge that its property was being used in connection with or in violation of [Puerto Rican Law].' " 416 U. S., at 668. Petitioner has made no showing beyond that here. Justice Stevens' dissent argues that our cases treat con- traband differently from instrumentalities used to convey contraband, like cars: Objects in the former class are forfeit- able "however blameless or unknowing their owners may be," post, at 459, but with respect to an instrumentality in the latter class, an owner's innocence is no defense only to the "principal use being made of that property," post, at 461. However, this Court's precedent has never made the due process inquiry depend on whether the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the principal use. If it had, perhaps cases like Calero-Toledo, in which Justice Douglas noted in dissent that there was no showing that the "yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs . . . and so far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht," 416 U. S., at 693 (opinion dissenting in part), might have been decided differently. The dissent also suggests that The Palmyra line of cases "would justify the confiscation of an ocean liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on board." Post, at 462. None of our cases have held that an ocean liner may be con- fiscated because of the activities of one passenger. We said in Goldsmith-Grant, and we repeat here, that "[w]hen such 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 451 Opinion of the Court application shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon it." 254 U. S., at 512. Notwithstanding this well-established authority rejecting the innocent-owner defense, petitioner argues that we should in effect overrule it by importing a culpability requirement from cases having at best a tangential relation to the "inno- cent owner" doctrine in forfeiture cases. She cites Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71 (1992), for the proposition that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. She also argues that our holding in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), that the Exces- sive Fines Clause 6 limits the scope of civil forfeiture judg- ments, "would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent persons to be punished by civil forfeiture." Brief for Petitioner 18­19, n. 12. In Foucha the Court held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal trial could not be thereaf- ter confined indefinitely by the State without a showing that he was either dangerous or mentally ill. Petitioner argues that our statement that in those circumstances a State has no "punitive interest" which would justify continued deten- tion, 504 U. S., at 80, requires that Michigan demonstrate a punitive interest in depriving her of her interest in the for- feited car. But, putting aside the extent to which a forfeit- ure proceeding is "punishment" in the first place, Foucha did not purport to discuss, let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases. In Austin, the Court held that because "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner," forfeiture proceedings are subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines. 509 U. S., at 618. There was no occasion in that case to deal with the validity of the "innocent-owner defense," other than to point out that if a forfeiture statute allows such a defense, the defense is 6 U. S. Const., Amdt. 8. 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 452 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Opinion of the Court additional evidence that the statute itself is "punitive" in mo- tive. Id., at 617­618. In this case, however, Michigan's Su- preme Court emphasized with respect to the forfeiture pro- ceeding at issue: "It is not contested that this is an equitable action," in which the trial judge has discretion to consider "alternatives [to] abating the entire interest in the vehicle." 447 Mich., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495. In any event, for the reasons pointed out in Calero-Toledo and Van Oster, forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose. Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses "both by preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable." Calero- Toledo, supra, at 687. This deterrent mechanism is hardly unique to forfeiture. For instance, because Michigan also deters dangerous driving by making a motor vehicle owner liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a driver who had the owner's consent to use it, petitioner was also potentially liable for her husband's use of the car in violation of Michigan negligence law. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.401 (1979). "The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner." Van Oster, 272 U. S., at 467­468. Petitioner also claims that the forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property for public use in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But if the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the automobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding from petitioner to the State. The government may not be required to compen- sate an owner for property which it has already lawfully ac- quired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain. United States v. Fuller, 516us2$31H 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 453 Thomas, J., concurring 409 U. S. 488, 492 (1973); see United States v. Rands, 389 U. S. 121, 125 (1967). At bottom, petitioner's claims depend on an argument that the Michigan forfeiture statute is unfair because it relieves prosecutors from the burden of separating co-owners who are complicit in the wrongful use of property from innocent co-owners. This argument, in the abstract, has considerable appeal, as we acknowledged in Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U. S., at 510. Its force is reduced in the instant case, however, by the Michigan Supreme Court's confirmation of the trial court's remedial discretion, see supra, at 446, and petitioner's recognition that Michigan may forfeit her and her husband's car whether or not she is entitled to an offset for her interest in it, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 9. We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the coun- try to be now displaced." Goldsmith-Grant, supra, at 511. The State here sought to deter illegal activity that contrib- utes to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets. The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both the trial court and the Michigan Supreme Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is therefore Affirmed. Justice Thomas, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court. Mrs. Bennis points out that her property was forfeited even though the State did not prove her guilty of any wrong- doing. The State responds that forfeiture of property sim- ply because it was used in crime has been permitted time out of mind. It also says that it wants to punish, for de- terrence and perhaps also for retributive purposes, persons who may have colluded or acquiesced in criminal use of their 516us2$31N 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 454 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Thomas, J., concurring property, or who may at least have negligently entrusted their property to someone likely to use it for misfeasance. But, the State continues, it does not want to have to prove (or to refute proof regarding) collusion, acquiescence, or negligence. As the Court notes, evasion of the normal requirement of proof before punishment might well seem "unfair." Ante, at 453. One unaware of the history of forfeiture laws and 200 years of this Court's precedent regarding such laws might well assume that such a scheme is lawless-a violation of due process. As the Court remarked 75 years ago in ruling upon a constitutional challenge to forfeiture of the property of an innocent owner: "If the case were the first of its kind, it and its appar- ent paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion to har- monize the [statute at issue] with the accepted tests of human conduct. . . . There is strength . . . in the conten- tion that . . . [the statute at issue] seems to violate that justice which should be the foundation of the due process of law required by the Constitution." J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 510 (1921). But the Court went on to uphold the statute, based upon the historical prevalence and acceptance of similar laws. Id., at 510­511. This case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Consti- tution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesir- able. See, e. g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 428, and n. (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). As detailed in the Court's opinion and the cases cited therein, forfeiture of property without proof of the owner's wrongdoing, merely because it was "used" in or was an "instrumentality" of crime has been permitted in England and this country, both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (a process of law that 516us2$31N 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 455 Thomas, J., concurring can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country must be taken to be due process of law) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 528­529 (1884)). In- deed, 70 years ago this Court held in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926), that an automobile used in crime could be forfeited notwithstanding the absence of any proof that the criminal use occurred with "knowledge or authority" of the owner. Id., at 466. A law of forfeiture without an ex- ception for innocent owners, the Court said, "builds a second- ary defense" for the State "against a forbidden use and pre- cludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the al- leged innocent owner." Id., at 467­468. The limits on what property can be forfeited as a result of what wrongdoing-for example, what it means to "use" property in crime for purposes of forfeiture law-are not clear to me. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 81­83 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Those limits, whatever they may be, become especially significant when they are the sole restrictions on the state's ability to take property from those it merely suspects, or does not even suspect, of colluding in crime. It thus seems appropriate, where a constitutional challenge by an innocent owner is concerned, to apply those limits rather strictly, adhering to historical standards for de- termining whether specific property is an "instrumentality" of crime. Cf. J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co., supra, at 512 (describing more extreme hypothetical applications of a for- feiture law and reserving decision on the permissibility of such applications). The facts here, however, do not seem to me to be obviously distinguishable from those involved in Van Oster; and in any event, Mrs. Bennis has not asserted that the car was not an instrumentality of her husband's crime. If anything, the forfeiture in Van Oster was harder to jus- tify than is the forfeiture here, albeit in a different respect. 516us2$31N 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 456 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Thomas, J., concurring In this case, the trial judge apparently found that the sales price of the car would not exceed by much the "costs" to be deducted from the sale; and he took that fact into account in determining how to dispose of the proceeds of the sale of the car. The state statute has labeled the car a "nuisance" and authorized a procedure for preventing the risk of continued criminal use of it by Mr. Bennis (forfeiture and sale); under a different statutory regime, the State might have author- ized the destruction of the car instead, and the State would have had a plausible argument that the order for destruction was "remedial" and thus noncompensable. That it chose to order the car sold, with virtually nothing left over for the State after "costs," may not change the "remedial" character of the State's action substantially. And if the forfeiture of the car here (and the State's refusal to remit any share of the proceeds from its sale to Mrs. Bennis) can appropriately be characterized as "remedial" action, then the more severe problems involved in punishing someone not found to have engaged in wrongdoing of any kind do not arise.* Improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a rou- lette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hap- less owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice. When the property sought to be forfeited has been entrusted by its owner to one who uses it for crime, however, the Constitution apparently *This is most obviously true if, in stating that there would be little left over after "costs," the trial judge was referring to the costs of sale. The court's order indicates that he may have had other "costs" in mind as well when he made that statement, e. g., law enforcement costs. See also Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3825(3) (1979) (costs of keeping the car to be deducted). Even if the "costs" that the trial judge believed would consume most of the sales proceeds included not simply the expected costs of sale, but also the State's costs of keeping the car and law enforcement costs related to this particular proceeding, the State would still have a plausible argument that using the sales proceeds to pay such costs was "remedial" action, rather than punishment. 516us2$31N 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 457 Ginsburg, J., concurring assigns to the States and to the political branches of the Fed- eral Government the primary responsibility for avoiding that result. Justice Ginsburg, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court and highlight features of the case key to my judgment. The dissenting opinions target a law scarcely resembling Michigan's "red light abatement" prescription, as interpreted by the State's courts. First, it bears emphasis that the car in question belonged to John Bennis as much as it did to Tina Bennis. At all times he had her consent to use the car, just as she had his. See ante, at 448­449, n. 5 (majority opinion) (noting Michigan Supreme Court's distinction between use of a vehicle without the owner's consent, and use with consent but in a manner to which the owner did not consent). And it is uncontested that Michigan may forfeit the vehicle itself. See ante, at 453 (majority opinion) (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 9). The sole question, then, is whether Tina Bennis is enti- tled not to the car, but to a portion of the proceeds (if any there be after deduction of police, prosecutorial, and court costs) as a matter of constitutional right. Second, it was "critical" to the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court that the nuisance abatement proceeding is an "equitable action." See ante, at 446 (majority opinion) (citing 447 Mich. 719, 742, 527 N. W. 2d 483, 495 (1994)). That means the State's Supreme Court stands ready to police exorbitant applications of the statute. It shows no respect for Michigan's high court to attribute to its members toler- ance of, or insensitivity to, inequitable administration of an "equitable action." Nor is it fair to charge the trial court with "blatant unfair- ness" in the case at hand. See post, at 470­471, n. 14, and 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That court declined to order a division of sale proceeds, as the trial judge took pains to explain, for two practical reasons: the Bennises have "an- 516us2$31P 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 458 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting other automobile," App. 25; and the age and value of the forfeited car (an 11-year-old Pontiac purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600) left "practically nothing" to divide after subtraction of costs. See ante, at 445 (majority opin- ion) (citing App. 25). Michigan, in short, has not embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third parties. See post this page (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nor do we condone any such experiment. Michigan has decided to deter johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. For centuries prostitutes have been plying their trade on other people's property. Assignations have occurred in pal- aces, luxury hotels, cruise ships, college dormitories, truck stops, back alleys and back seats. A profession of this vin- tage has provided governments with countless opportunities to use novel weapons to curtail its abuses. As far as I am aware, however, it was not until 1988 that any State decided to experiment with the punishment of innocent third parties by confiscating property in which, or on which, a single transaction with a prostitute has been consummated. The logic of the Court's analysis would permit the States to exercise virtually unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of property where professional criminals have en- gaged in illegal acts. Some airline passengers have mari- juana cigarettes in their luggage; some hotel guests are thieves; some spectators at professional sports events carry concealed weapons; and some hitchhikers are prostitutes. The State surely may impose strict obligations on the owners of airlines, hotels, stadiums, and vehicles to exercise a high degree of care to prevent others from making illegal use of their property, but neither logic nor history supports the 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 459 Stevens, J., dissenting Court's apparent assumption that their complete innocence imposes no constitutional impediment to the seizure of their property simply because it provided the locus for a criminal transaction. In order to emphasize the novelty of the Court's holding, I shall first comment on the tenuous connection between the property forfeited here and the illegal act that was intended to be punished, which differentiates this case from the prece- dent on which the Court relies. I shall then comment on the significance of the complete lack of culpability ascribable to petitioner in this case. Finally, I shall explain why I be- lieve our recent decision in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), compels reversal. I For purposes of analysis it is useful to identify three differ- ent categories of property that are subject to seizure: pure contraband; proceeds of criminal activity; and tools of the criminal's trade. The first category-pure contraband-encompasses items such as adulterated food, sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods. With respect to such "objects the posses- sion of which, without more, constitutes a crime," One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 699 (1965), the government has an obvious remedial interest in remov- ing the items from private circulation, however blameless or unknowing their owners may be. The States' broad and well-established power to seize pure contraband is not im- plicated by this case, for automobiles are not contraband. See ibid. The second category-proceeds-traditionally covered only stolen property, whose return to its original owner has a powerful restitutionary justification. Recent federal stat- utory enactments have dramatically enlarged this category to include the earnings from various illegal transactions. See United States v. Parcel of Rumson, N. J., Land, 507 U. S. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 460 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting 111, 121, n. 16 (1993). Because those federal statutes include protections for innocent owners, see 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(6), cases arising out of the seizure of proceeds do not address the question whether the Constitution would provide a de- fense to an innocent owner in certain circumstances if the statute had not done so. The prevalence of protection for innocent owners in such legislation does, however, lend support to the conclusion that elementary notions of fair- ness require some attention to the impact of a seizure on the rights of innocent parties.1 The third category includes tools or instrumentalities that a wrongdoer has used in the commission of a crime, also known as "derivative contraband," see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U. S., at 699. Forfeiture is more problematic for this category of property than for the first two, both because of its potentially far broader sweep, and because the govern- ment's remedial interest in confiscation is less apparent. Many of our earliest cases arising out of these kinds of sei- zures involved ships that engaged in piracy on the high seas,2 in the slave trade,3 or in the smuggling of cargoes of goods into the United States.4 These seizures by the sovereign 1 Without some form of an exception for innocent owners, the potential breadth of forfeiture actions for illegal proceeds would be breathtaking indeed. It has been estimated that nearly every United States bill in circulation-some $230 billion worth-carries trace amounts of cocaine, so great is the drug trade's appetite for cash. See Range & Witkin, The Drug-Money Hunt, U. S. News & World Report, Aug. 21, 1989, p. 22; Heil- broner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1994, p. 70, col. 1. Needless to say, a rule of strict liability would have cata- strophic effects for the Nation's economy. 2 See, e. g., The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1 (1827); Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210 (1844). The latter case has occasionally been cited by other names, including "Malek Adhel," see O. Holmes, The Common Law 27, n. 82 (M. Howe ed. 1963). 3 See, e. g., Tryphenia v. Harrison, 24 F. Cas. 252 (No. 14,209) (CC Pa. 1806) (Washington, J.). 4 See C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133, 145­148 (1943) (collecting cases); Harmony, 2 How., at 233­234. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 461 Stevens, J., dissenting were approved despite the faultlessness of the ship's owner. Because the entire mission of the ship was unlawful, admi- ralty law treated the vessel itself as if it were the offender.5 Moreover, under "the maritime law of the Middle Ages the ship was not only the source, but the limit, of liability." 6 The early admiralty cases demonstrate that the law may reasonably presume that the owner of valuable property is aware of the principal use being made of that property. That presumption provides an adequate justification for the deprivation of one's title to real estate because of another's adverse possession for a period of years or for a seizure of such property because its principal use is unlawful. Thus, in Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 399 (1878), we upheld the seizure of premises on which the lessee operated an unlawful distillery when the owner "knowingly suffer[ed] and permitt[ed] his land to be used as a site" for that distillery. And despite the faultlessness of their own- ers, we have upheld seizures of vehicles being used to trans- 5 "The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner. The vessel or boat (says the act of Congress) from which such piratical aggres- sion, &c., shall have been first attempted or made shall be condemned. Nor is there any thing new in a provision of this sort. It is not an uncom- mon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew thereof, a wrong or offence has been done as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine also is familiarly applied to cases of smuggling and other misconduct under our revenue laws; and has been applied to other kindred cases, such as cases arising on embargo and non-intercourse acts. In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, bind the interest of the owner to the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs." Ibid. 6 Holmes, The Common Law, at 27. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 462 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting port bootleg liquor, or to smuggle goods into the United States in violation of our customs laws.7 While our historical cases establish the propriety of seiz- ing a freighter when its entire cargo consists of smuggled goods, none of them would justify the confiscation of an ocean liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on board. See, e. g., Phile v. Ship Anna, 1 Dall. 197, 206 (C. P. Phila. Cty. 1787) (holding that forfeiture of a ship was inap- propriate if an item of contraband hidden on board was "a trifling thing, easily concealed, and which might fairly escape the notice of the captain"); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 512 (1921) (expressing doubt about expansive forfeiture applications). The principal use of the car in this case was not to provide a site for petition- er's husband to carry out forbidden trysts. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that the car had ever previously been used for a similar purpose. An isolated misuse of a stationary vehicle should not justify the forfeiture of an inno- cent owner's property on the theory that it constituted an instrumentality of the crime. This case differs from our historical precedents in a sec- ond, crucial way. In those cases, the vehicles or the prop- erty actually facilitated the offenses themselves. See id., at 513 (referring to "the adaptability of a particular form of property to an illegal purpose"); Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 235 (1844). Our leading decisions on forfeited conveyances, for example, involved offenses of which trans- portation was an element. In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926), for example, the applicable statute prohibited transportation of intoxicating liquor. See id., at 466. See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 136 (1925) (car 7 See, e. g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465 (1926) (transportation); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921) (same); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U. S. 49 (1932) (importation); United States v. Commercial Credit Co., 286 U. S. 63 (1932) (same). 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 463 Stevens, J., dissenting had concealed compartments for carrying liquor). In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), similarly, a yacht was seized because it had been used "to transport, or to facilitate the transportation of," a con- trolled substance. See id., at 665­666.8 Here, on the other hand, the forfeited property bore no necessary connection to the offense committed by petitioner's husband. It is true that the act occurred in the car, but it might just as well have occurred in a multitude of other locations. The mobile character of the car played a part only in the negotiation, but not in the consummation, of the offense. In recent years, a majority of the Members of this Court has agreed that the concept of an instrumentality subject to forfeiture-also expressed as the idea of "tainted" items- must have an outer limit. In Austin, the Court rejected the argument that a mobile home and auto body shop where an illegal drug transaction occurred were forfeitable as "in- struments" of the drug trade. 509 U. S., at 621. Justice Scalia agreed that a building in which an isolated drug sale happens to take place also cannot be regarded as an instrumentality of that offense. Id., at 627­628 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Thomas, too, has stated that it is difficult to see how real property bearing no connection to crime other than serving as the location for a drug transaction is in any way "guilty" of an offense. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 81­82 (1993) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The car in this case, however, 8 The majority questions whether the yacht was actually used to trans- port drugs, quoting Justice Douglas' dissenting statement that " `so far as we know' " only one marijuana cigarette was found on board. See ante, at 450. Justice Douglas cited no source for that assertion, however, and it does not appear in the majority or concurring opinions. According to the stipulated facts of the case, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico accused the lessee of using the yacht to "convey, transport, carry and transfer" a narcotic drug. See App. in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., O. T. 1973, No. 73­157, p. 25. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 464 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting was used as little more than an enclosure for a one-time event, effectively no different from a piece of real property.9 By the rule laid down in our recent cases, that nexus is insuf- ficient to support the forfeiture here. The State attempts to characterize this forfeiture as serv- ing exclusively remedial, as opposed to punitive, ends, be- cause its goal was to abate what the State termed a "nui- sance." Even if the State were correct, that argument would not rebut the excessiveness of the forfeiture, which I have discussed above. But in any event, there is no serious claim that the confiscation in this case was not punitive. The majority itself concedes that " `forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.' " Ante, at 451 (quoting Aus- tin, 509 U. S., at 618).10 At an earlier stage of this litigation, 9 In fact, the rather tenuous theory advanced by the Michigan Supreme Court to uphold this forfeiture was that the neighborhood where the of- fense occurred exhibited an ongoing "nuisance condition" because it had a reputation for illicit activity, and the car contributed to that "condition." 447 Mich. 719, 734, 527 N. W. 2d 483, 491 (1994). On that view, the car did not constitute the nuisance of itself; only when considered as a part of the particular neighborhood did it assume that character. See id., at 745, 527 N. W. 2d, at 496 (Cavanagh, C. J., dissenting). One bizarre conse- quence of this theory, expressly endorsed by the Michigan high court, is that the very same offense, committed in the very same car, would not render the car forfeitable if it were parked in a different part of Detroit, such as the affluent Palmer Woods area. See id., at 734, n. 22, 527 N. W. 2d, at 491, n. 22. This construction confirms the irrelevance of the car's mobility to the forfeiture; any other stationary part of the neighborhood where such an offense could take place-a shed, for example, or an apart- ment-could be forfeited on the same rationale. Indeed, if petitioner's husband had taken advantage of the car's power of movement, by picking up the prostitute and continuing to drive, presumably the car would not have been forfeitable at all. 10 We have held, furthermore, that "a civil sanction that cannot be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term." United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989) (emphasis added). 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 465 Stevens, J., dissenting the State unequivocally argued that confiscation of automo- biles in the circumstances of this case "is swift and certain `punishment' of the voluntary vice consumer." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant in No. 97339 (Mich.), p. 22. Therefore, the idea that this forfeiture did not punish petitioner's husband-and, a fortiori, petitioner herself-is simply not sustainable. Even judged in isolation, the remedial interest in this for- feiture falls far short of that which we have found present in other cases. Forfeiture may serve remedial ends when removal of certain items (such as a burglar's tools) will pre- vent repeated violations of the law (such as housebreaking). See, e. g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 364 (1984) (confiscation of unregistered shot- guns); see also C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133 (1943) (seizure of fishing nets used in violation of state fishing laws). But confiscating petitioner's car does not disable her husband from using other venues for similar illegal rendezvous, since all that is needed to commit this offense is a place. In fact, according to testimony at trial, petitioner's husband had been sighted twice during the previous summer, without the car, soliciting prostitutes in the same neighborhood.11 The remedial rationale is even less convincing according to the State's "nuisance" theory, for that theory treats the car as a nuisance only so long as the illegal event is occurring and only so long as the car is located in the relevant neighbor- hood. See n. 9, supra. The need to "abate" the car thus disappears the moment it leaves the area. In short, there- fore, a remedial justification simply does not apply to a confiscation of this type. See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379, 479­480 (1976). 11 The forfeited car was purchased in September of the same year, and thus could not have been involved in any such episodes during the preced- ing summer. See App. 8; 447 Mich., at 728, 527 N. W. 2d, at 488. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 466 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting II Apart from the lack of a sufficient nexus between petition- er's car and the offense her husband committed, I would re- verse because petitioner is entirely without responsibility for that act. Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people. The majority insists that it is a settled rule that the owner of property is strictly liable for wrongful uses to which that property is put. See ante, at 446­450. Only three Terms ago, however, the Court surveyed the same historical ante- cedents and held that all of its forfeiture decisions rested, "at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is prop- erly punished for that negligence." Austin v. United States, 509 U. S., at 615 (citing Calero-Toledo, Goldsmith-Grant Co., Dobbins's Distillery, Harmony, and The Palmyra). Ac- cording to Austin, even the hoary fiction that property was forfeitable because of its own guilt was based on the idea that " ` "such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by the forfeiture." ' " 509 U. S., at 616, quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U. S., at 510­511, in turn quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *301. It is conceded that petitioner was in no way negligent in her use or entrustment of the family car. Thus, no forfeiture should have been permitted. The majority, however, simply ignores Austin's detailed analysis of our case law without explanation or comment. Even assuming that strict liability applies to "innocent" owners, we have consistently recognized an exception for truly blameless individuals. The Court's opinion in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S., at 688­690, established the proposition that the Constitution bars the pu- nitive forfeiture of property when its owner alleges and proves that he took all reasonable steps to prevent its illegal use. Accord, Austin, 509 U. S., at 616­617. The majority 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 467 Stevens, J., dissenting dismisses this statement as "obiter dictum," ante, at 450, but we have assumed that such a principle existed, or expressly reserved the question, in a line of cases dating back nearly 200 years. In one of its earliest decisions, the Court, speak- ing through Chief Justice Marshall, recognized as "unques- tionably a correct legal principle" that "a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are pre- scribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed." Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 363 (1808).12 In other con- texts, we have regarded as axiomatic that persons cannot be punished when they have done no wrong. See Southwest- ern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482, 490­491 (1915) (invalidating penalty under Due Process 12 In Peisch, a ship was wrecked in Delaware Bay and its cargo unladen and carried off by salvors. The United States sought forfeiture of the cargo on several grounds, including failure to pay duties on certain dis- tilled spirits in the cargo at the time of importation, and removal of the same from the tax collector before assessment. This Court held that for- feiture was impermissible because the ship's owners were unable to com- ply with the customs law regarding importation, since the crew had de- serted the ship before landing, and the vessel could not be brought into port. 4 Cranch, at 363. As quoted above, the Court held that forfeiture is inappropriate when the means to prevent the violation cannot be car- ried out. As a separate reason for rejecting the forfeiture, the Court explained that the owners could not be made to suffer for actions taken by the salvors, persons over whom the owners had no control. As the Court put it, an owner should not be "punished" by the forfeiture of property taken "by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his part . . . ." Id., at 364. That rule has itself become an established part of our jurisprudence. See Austin, 509 U. S., at 614­615; Calero-Toledo v. Pear- son Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 688­690 (1974); Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U. S., at 512; United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U. S. 321, 333 (1926); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S., at 467. While both of the principles announced in Peisch arose out of the same set of facts, the majority errs when it treats them as identical. See ante, at 448­449, n. 5. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion discussed and justified each principle inde- pendently, and either could apply in the absence of the other. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 468 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting Clause for conduct that involved "no intentional wrongdoing; no departure from any prescribed or known standard of action, and no reckless conduct"); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 454, and n. 17 (1993) (following Danaher); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 363 (1978); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 580 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I would hold now what we have always assumed: that the principle is required by due process. The unique facts of this case demonstrate that petitioner is entitled to the protection of that rule. The subject of this forfeiture was certainly not contraband. It was not ac- quired with the proceeds of criminal activity and its principal use was entirely legitimate. It was an ordinary car that petitioner's husband used to commute to the steel mill where he worked. Petitioner testified that they had been married for nine years; that she had acquired her ownership interest in the vehicle by the expenditure of money that she had earned herself; that she had no knowledge of her husband's plans to do anything with the car except "come directly home from work," as he had always done before; and that she even called "Missing Persons" when he failed to return on the night in question. App. 8­10. Her testimony is not contradicted and certainly is credible. Without knowledge that he would commit such an act in the family car, or that he had ever done so previously, surely petitioner cannot be accused of failing to take "reasonable steps" to prevent the illicit behavior. She is just as blameless as if a thief, rather than her husband, had used the car in a criminal episode. While the majority admits that this forfeiture is at least partly punitive in nature, it asserts that Michigan's law also serves a "deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive pur- pose." Ante, at 452. But that is no distinction at all; deter- rence is itself one of the aims of punishment. United States 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 469 Stevens, J., dissenting v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989).13 Even on a deterrence rationale, moreover, that goal is not fairly served in the case of a person who has taken all reasonable steps to prevent an illegal act. Forfeiture of an innocent owner's property that plays a central role in a criminal enterprise may be justified on rea- soning comparable to the basis for imposing liability on a principal for an agent's torts. Just as the risk of respondeat superior liability encourages employers to supervise more closely their employees' conduct, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 29, n. 5 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), so the risk of forfeiture encourages owners to exercise care in entrust- ing their property to others, see Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 687; ante, at 452. But the law of agency recognizes limits on the imposition of vicarious liability in situations where no deterrent function is likely to be served; for example, it exonerates the employer when the agent strays from his in- tended mission and embarks on a "frolic of his own." See also United States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658, 673 (1975) (vicarious criminal liability for corporate officer based on company's conduct impermissible if officer was " `powerless' to prevent or correct the violation") (citation omitted). In this case, petitioner did not "entrust" the car to her husband on the night in question; he was entitled to use it by virtue of their joint ownership. There is no reason to think that the threat 13 For that reason, the majority's attempt to analogize this forfeiture to the system of tort liability for automobile accidents is unpersuasive. See ante, at 452. Tort law is tied to the goal of compensation (punitive dam- ages being the notable exception), while forfeitures are concededly puni- tive. The fundamental difference between these two regimes has long been established. "The law never punishes any man criminally but for his own act, yet it frequently punishes him in his pocket, for the act of another. Thus, if a wife commits an offence, the husband is not liable to the penalties; but if she obtains the property of another by any means not felonious, he must make the payment and amends." Phile v. Ship Anna, 1 Dall. 197, 207 (C. P. Phila. Cty. 1787). The converse, of course, is true as well. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 470 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Stevens, J., dissenting of forfeiture will deter an individual from buying a car with her husband-or from marrying him in the first place-if she neither knows nor has reason to know that he plans to use it wrongfully. The same is true of the second asserted justification for strict liability, that it relieves the State of the difficulty of proving collusion, or disproving the lack thereof, by the al- leged innocent owner and the wrongdoer. See ante, at 452 (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S., at 467­468). What- ever validity that interest might have in another kind of case, it has none here. It is patently clear that petitioner did not collude with her husband to carry out this offense. The absence of any deterrent value reinforces the punitive nature of this forfeiture law. But petitioner has done noth- ing that warrants punishment. She cannot be accused of negligence or of any other dereliction in allowing her hus- band to use the car for the wholly legitimate purpose of transporting himself to and from his job. She affirmatively alleged and proved that she is not in any way responsible for the conduct that gave rise to the seizure. If anything, she was a victim of that conduct. In my opinion, these facts establish that the seizure constituted an arbitrary depriva- tion of property without due process of law.14 14 Justice Ginsburg argues that Michigan should not be rebuked for its efforts to deter prostitution, see ante, at 457­458, but none of her argu- ments refutes the fact that the State has accomplished its ends by sacrific- ing the rights of an innocent person. First, the concession that the car itself may be confiscated provides no justification for the forfeiture of the co-owner's separate interest. Second, the assertion that the Michigan Su- preme Court "stands ready to police exorbitant applications of the stat- ute," ibid., has a hollow ring because it failed to do so in this case. That court did not even mention the relevance of innocence to the trial court's exercise of its "equitable discretion." Rather, it stated flatly that "Mrs. Bennis' claim is without constitutional consequence." 447 Mich., at 741, 527 N. W. 2d, at 494. Third, the blatant unfairness of using petitioner's property to compensate for her husband's offense is not diminished by its modest value. It is difficult, moreover, to credit the trial court's state- ment that it would have awarded the proceeds of the sale to petitioner if 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 471 Stevens, J., dissenting III The Court's holding today is dramatically at odds with our holding in Austin v. United States. We there established that when a forfeiture constitutes "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense"-as it undeniably does in this case-it is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. For both of the rea- sons I have already discussed, the forfeiture of petitioner's half interest in her car is surely a form of "excessive" punish- ment. For an individual who merely let her husband use her car to commute to work, even a modest penalty is out of all proportion to her blameworthiness; and when the assess- ment is confiscation of the entire car, simply because an illicit act took place once in the driver's seat, the punishment is plainly excessive. This penalty violates the Eighth Amend- ment for yet another reason. Under the Court's reasoning, the value of the car is irrelevant. A brand-new luxury sedan or a 10-year-old used car would be equally forfeitable. We have held that "dramatic variations" in the value of convey- ances subject to forfeiture actions undercut any argument that the latter are reasonably tied to remedial ends. See Austin, 509 U. S., at 621; United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 254 (1980). I believe the Court errs today by assuming that the power to seize property is virtually unlimited and by implying that our opinions in Calero-Toledo and Austin were misguided. Some 75 years ago, when presented with the argument that the forfeiture scheme we approved had no limit, we insisted that expansive application of the law had not yet come to pass. "When such application shall be made," we said, "it will be time enough to pronounce upon it." Goldsmith- they had been larger, for it expressly ordered that any remaining balance go to the State's coffers. See App. 28. Finally, the State's decision to deter "johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neigh- borhood blight," ante, at 458 (emphasis added), surely does not justify the forfeiture of that share of the car owned by an innocent spouse. 516us2$31I 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT 472 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN Kennedy, J., dissenting Grant Co., 254 U. S., at 512. That time has arrived when the State forfeits a woman's car because her husband has secretly committed a misdemeanor inside it. While I am not prepared to draw a bright line that will separate the permis- sible and impermissible forfeitures of the property of inno- cent owners, I am convinced that the blatant unfairness of this seizure places it on the unconstitutional side of that line. I therefore respectfully dissent. Justice Kennedy, dissenting. The forfeiture of vessels pursuant to the admiralty and maritime law has a long, well-recognized tradition, evolving as it did from the necessity of finding some source of compen- sation for injuries done by a vessel whose responsible owners were often half a world away and beyond the practical reach of the law and its processes. See Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 233 (1844); Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 87­88 (1992). The prospect of deriving prompt compensation from in rem forfeiture, and the impracticality of adjudicating the innocence of the own- ers or their good-faith efforts in finding a diligent and trust- worthy master, combined to eliminate the owner's lack of culpability as a defense. See Harmony v. United States, supra, at 233. Those realities provided a better justification for forfeiture than earlier, more mechanistic rationales. Cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 680­681 (1974) (discussing deodands). The tradeoff, of course, was that the owner's absolute liability was limited to the amount of the vessel and (or) its cargo. For that reason, it seems to me inaccurate, or at least not well supported, to say that the owner's personal culpability was part of the forfeiture rationale. Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 625 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 628­629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As Justice Stevens ob- serves, however, ante, at 466­467, even the well-recognized 516us2$31L 10-22-98 14:10:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996) 473 Kennedy, J., dissenting tradition of forfeiture in admiralty has not been sufficient for an unequivocal confirmation from this Court that a vessel in all instances is seizable when it is used for criminal activity without the knowledge or consent of the owner, see Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., supra, at 688­690. Cf. The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377, 410­411 (1867) (discussing English cases holding knowledge or culpability relevant to the forfeiture of a cargo owner's interest). We can assume the continued validity of our admiralty for- feiture cases without in every analogous instance extending them to the automobile, which is a practical necessity in mod- ern life for so many people. At least to this point, it has not been shown that a strong presumption of negligent entrust- ment or criminal complicity would be insufficient to protect the government's interest where the automobile is involved in a criminal act in the tangential way that it was here. Furthermore, as Justice Stevens points out, ante, at 462­ 463, the automobile in this case was not used to transport contraband, and so the seizure here goes beyond the line of cases which sustain the government's use of forfeiture to suppress traffic of that sort. This forfeiture cannot meet the requirements of due proc- ess. Nothing in the rationale of the Michigan Supreme Court indicates that the forfeiture turned on the negligence or complicity of petitioner, or a presumption thereof, and nothing supports the suggestion that the value of her co- ownership is so insignificant as to be beneath the law's protection. For these reasons, and with all respect, I dissent. 516us2$32z 10-27-97 14:16:16 PAGES OPINPGT 474 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Per Curiam DALTON, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES et al. v. LITTLE ROCK FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES et al. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­1025. Decided March 18, 1996 Respondents, Medicaid providers and physicians who perform abortions in Arkansas, filed this suit against petitioner state officials, claiming that Amendment 68 of the State Constitution, § 1 of which prohibits using state funds to pay for any abortion except one to save the mother's life, conflicts with a requirement in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as amended by the 1994 version of the "Hyde Amendment," that States fund abortions where the pregnancy resulted from an act of rape or incest. The District Court, inter alia, enjoined enforcement of the amendment in its entirety for so long as the State accepts federal Medic- aid funds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Held: Amendment 68 can be enjoined only to the extent that it imposes obligations inconsistent with Title XIX. In a pre-emption case such as this, state law is displaced only to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 204. Because Amendment 68 was challenged only insofar as it conflicted with Title XIX, it was improper to enjoin its application to funding that does not involve the Medicaid program. The injunction is overbroad in its tem- poral scope as well. The Hyde Amendment is not permanent legisla- tion; it was enacted as part of the appropriation of funds for certain Executive Departments for one fiscal year. Its history-before 1994, it limited federal funding to those abortions necessary to save the moth- er's life-identifies the possibility that a different version may be enacted in the future. Thus, it was improper for the District Court to enjoin Amendment 68's enforcement for so long as the State accepted federal Medicaid funds. Per Curiam. Respondents in this case are Medicaid providers and phy- sicians who perform abortions in the State of Arkansas. In November 1993, they filed suit against petitioners, who are Arkansas state officials, seeking injunctive and declaratory 516us2$32K 10-27-97 14:16:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 474 (1996) 475 Per Curiam relief with respect to Amendment 68 of the Arkansas Consti- tution, § 1 of which prohibits the use of state funds to pay for any abortion "except to save the mother's life." Their claim was that this provision is inconsistent with a require- ment in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., as affected by the 1994 version of the "Hyde Amendment," that States fund medi- cally necessary abortions where the pregnancy resulted from an act of rape or incest.1 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judg- ment for respondents and enjoined Amendment 68; the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af- firmed. 60 F. 3d 497 (1995). Petitioners sought certiorari with respect to two aspects of the case: (1) the District Court's holding that "[u]nder the Hyde Amendment . . . fed- eral law requires Arkansas and other states that participate in the federal Medicaid program to pay for abortions in cases where pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, as well as abortions to save the mother's life," 860 F. Supp. 609, 612 (1994), and (2) the District Court's enjoining of Amendment 68 "in its entirety for so long as the State of Arkansas ac- cepts federal funds pursuant to the Medicaid Act," id., at 628 (emphasis added).2 We grant certiorari as to the second 1 The 1994 Hyde Amendment, so named for its sponsor, Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, was enacted as § 509 of the Department of Labor Appropriations Act, 1994, 107 Stat. 1082. Section 509 directs that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be expended for any abor- tion except when it is made known to the Federal entity or official to which funds are appropriated under this Act that such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother or that the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest." 107 Stat. 1113. The provision was reenacted unchanged for fiscal year 1995. See 108 Stat. 2539. 2 Any uncertainty as to the scope of the District Court's injunction was erased by a subsequent order denying petitioners' motion for stay of judg- ment. The order declares that "Amendment 68 to the Arkansas Constitu- tion directly conflicts with federal law (the 1994 Hyde Amendment) and is, therefore, null, void and of no effect." App. to Pet. for Cert. D­2. A footnote to this sentence states: "The Court apologizes for the redundancy, 516us2$32K 10-27-97 14:16:16 PAGES OPINPGT 476 DALTON v. LITTLE ROCK FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES Per Curiam of these questions. Accepting (without deciding) that the District Court's interpretation of the Hyde Amendment is correct, we reverse the decision below insofar as it affirms blanket invalidation of Amendment 68. In a pre-emption case such as this, state law is displaced only "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva- tion and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 204 (1983). See, e. g., Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 109 (1992); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U. S. 355, 376 (1986). "[T]he rule [is] that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 502 (1985). Amendment 68 reads as follows: "§ 1. Public funding. No public funds will be used to pay for any abortion, except to save the mother's life. "§ 2. Public policy. The policy of Arkansas is to pro- tect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitution. "§ 3. Effect of amendment. This amendment will not affect contraceptives or require an appropriation of public funds." Section 1 of this provision is affected by the lower courts' interpretation of Title XIX and the 1994 Hyde Amendment only in cases where a Medicaid-eligible woman seeks to abort a pregnancy resulting from an act of rape or incest and the abortion is not necessary to save the woman's life. Re- spondents do not claim that any other possible application of § 1 is pre-empted by current federal law. It is entirely possi- ble, for example, that § 1 would have application to state pro- grams that receive no federal funding. As the District but, apparently the Court's 35-page order rendered Monday, last, did not make this point clear." Ibid. 516us2$32K 10-27-97 14:16:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 474 (1996) 477 Per Curiam Court noted, the Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16­90­701 et seq. (Supp. 1995), established a program which provides compensation and assistance to victims of criminal acts within the State, including compen- sation for medical expenses, see § 16­90­703(7). Without the limitation imposed by Amendment 68, the program might have the authority to reimburse crime victims for abortions not necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. Assuming the compensation program is entirely state funded, nothing in respondents' challenge to Amend- ment 68 suggests that the application of § 1 to the program would conflict with any federal statute. Because Amend- ment 68 was challenged only insofar as it conflicted with Title XIX, it was improper to enjoin its application to fund- ing that does not involve the Medicaid program. The District Court's injunction is overbroad in its tempo- ral scope as well. The Hyde Amendment is not permanent legislation; it was enacted as part of the statute appropriat- ing funds for certain Executive Departments for one fiscal year. While the versions of the Hyde Amendment applica- ble to the 1994 and 1995 fiscal years authorized the use of federal funds to pay for an abortion after notice that "such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother or that the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest," the version of the amendment applicable to prior years limited federal funding to those abortions necessary to save the life of the mother. See, e. g., § 203, Department of Labor Appro- priations Act, 1993, 106 Stat. 1811. Because this history identifies the possibility that a different version of the Hyde Amendment may be enacted in the future, it was improper for the District Court to enjoin enforcement of Amendment 68 "for so long as the State of Arkansas accepts federal funds pursuant to the Medicaid Act." 860 F. Supp., at 628. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan v. Engler, 73 F. 3d 634, 641 (CA6 1996) (modifying injunction in similar case to "tak[e] into account the changeable nature of spending 516us2$32K 10-27-97 14:16:16 PAGES OPINPGT 478 DALTON v. LITTLE ROCK FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES Per Curiam bills in general, and the Hyde Amendment in particular, which in some years are very restrictive and in other years are less so"). The District Court's invalidation of §§ 2 and 3 of the amendment was based on the proposition that these sections "have no function independent of" § 1. 860 F. Supp., at 626. Even assuming that to be true, once § 1 is left with the sub- stantial application that the Supremacy Clause fully allows, §§ 2 and 3 subsist as well. We therefore reverse the decision of the Eighth Circuit insofar as it affirms the scope of the injunction, and remand for entry of an order enjoining the enforcement of Amend- ment 68 only to the extent that the amendment imposes ob- ligations inconsistent with federal law. It is so ordered. 516us2$33Z 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 479 Syllabus MEGHRIG et al. v. KFC WESTERN, INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­83. Argued January 10, 1996-Decided March 19, 1996 Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, respondent KFC Western, Inc., brought this action under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U. S. C. § 6972(a), to recover its cleanup costs from petitioners, the Meghrigs. KFC claimed, among other things, that the contamination had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment," see § 6972(a)(1)(B), and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equita- ble restitution" under § 6972(a) because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dis- missed the complaint, holding that § 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that § 6972(a)(1)(B) does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "immi- nent and substantial endangerment" at the time suit is filed. The Ninth Circuit disagreed on both points and reversed. Held: Section 6972 does not authorize a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. Pp. 483­488. (a) A private party cannot recover the cost of a past cleanup effort under § 6972(a), which authorizes district courts "to restrain any person [responsible for toxic waste], to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both." (Emphasis added.) Under a plain reading of this remedial scheme, a citizen plaintiff could seek a mandatory injunction that orders a responsible party to "take action" by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of waste, or a prohibitory injunction that "restrains" a responsible party from further violating RCRA. Neither remedy, however, contemplates the award of past cleanup costs, whether denominated "damages" or "equitable restitu- tion." A comparison with the relief provided in the analogous, but not parallel, provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 demonstrates that Congress knows how to provide for the recovery of past cleanup costs, and that § 6972(a) does not provide that remedy. Pp. 483­485. 516us2$33Z 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT 480 MEGHRIG v. KFC WESTERN, INC. Syllabus (b) Section 6972(a)(1)(B)-which permits citizen suits against persons responsible for "waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment" (emphasis added)-does not authorize a suit based upon an allegation that the contaminated site posed such an endangerment at some time in the past. This timing restriction's plain meaning demonstrates that an endangerment can only be "imminent" if it threatens to occur immediately, and the reference to waste which "may present" imminent harm quite clearly excludes waste that no longer presents such a danger. This language implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later. It follows that § 6972(a) was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the risk of future "imminent" harms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts. Other aspects of RCRA's enforcement scheme strongly sup- port this conclusion, and the existence of such an elaborate scheme refutes the Government's contention that district courts may award past cleanup costs under their inherent equitable remedial authority. Pp. 485­488. (c) This Court does not consider whether a private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay cleanup costs arising after a RCRA citizen suit has been properly commenced. P. 488. 49 F. 3d 518, reversed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. John P. Zaimes argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Anne S. Almy, and John T. Stahr. Daniel Romano argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Petroleum Marketers Association of America by Alphonse M. Alfano and Robert S. Bassman; for the Southern California Service Station Association by Dimitri G. Daskalopoulos; and for the Western States Petroleum Associa- tion by Donna R. Black. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Common- wealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 479 (1996) 481 Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether § 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U. S. C. § 6972, author- izes a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environ- ment. We conclude that it does not. I Respondent KFC Western, Inc. (KFC), owns and operates a "Kentucky Fried Chicken" restaurant on a parcel of prop- erty in Los Angeles. In 1988, KFC discovered during the course of a construction project that the property was con- taminated with petroleum. The County of Los Angeles De- partment of Health Services ordered KFC to attend to the problem, and KFC spent $211,000 removing and disposing of the oil-tainted soil. Three years later, KFC brought this suit under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 90 Stat. 2825, as amended, 42 Massachusetts, and William L. Pardee, John Beling, and Karen McGuire, Assistant Attorneys General, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, and James Layton, Joseph P. Bindbeutel, and Douglas E. Nel- son, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General of their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Calvin E. Holloway of Guam, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Vir- ginia, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Carla Stolla of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the State of Louisiana through its Department of Transportation and Development by William M. Hudson III, Edgar D. Gankendorff, Lawrence A. Durant, James M. Bookter, and Charley Hutchens; for the Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District by Timothy W. Burns, Jerome M. Organ, John Fox Arnold, and Nelson G. Wolff; and for Kaufman and Broad Home Corp. et al. by William N. Kammer and Robert C. Longstreth. 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT 482 MEGHRIG v. KFC WESTERN, INC. Opinion of the Court U. S. C. § 6972(a),* seeking to recover these cleanup costs from petitioners Alan and Margaret Meghrig. KFC claimed that the contaminated soil was a "solid waste" covered by RCRA, see 42 U. S. C. § 6903(27), that it had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endan- germent to health or the environment," see § 6972(a)(1)(B), and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equitable resti- tution" of KFC's cleanup costs under § 6972(a) because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the waste's "past or present handling, storage, treatment, trans- portation, or disposal." See App. 12­19 (first amended complaint). The District Court held that § 6972(a) does not permit re- covery of past cleanup costs and that § 6972(a)(1)(B) does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "imminent and substantial endanger- ment to health or the environment" at the time suit is filed, and dismissed KFC's complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. A21­ A23. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, over a dissent, 49 F. 3d 518, 524­528 (1995) (Brunetti, J.), finding that a district court had authority under § 6972(a) to award restitution of past cleanup costs, id., at 521­523, and *Section 6972(a) provides, in relevant part: "Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf- . . . . . "(1)(B) against any person, including . . . any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is con- tributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transporta- tion, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment . . . . . . . . . ". . . The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both . . . ." 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 479 (1996) 483 Opinion of the Court that a private party can proceed with a suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B) upon an allegation that the waste at issue presented an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time it was cleaned up, id., at 520­521. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion regarding the remedies available under RCRA conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Furrer v. Brown, 62 F. 3d 1092, 1100­1101 (1995), and its interpretation of the "imminent endangerment" requirement represents a novel application of federal statutory law. We granted certiorari to address the conflict between the Circuits and to consider the correctness of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RCRA, 515 U. S. 1192 (1995), and now reverse. II RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that gov- erns the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazard- ous waste. See Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U. S. 328, 331­332 (1994). Unlike the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 94 Stat. 2767, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 9601 et seq., RCRA is not principally designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of environmental hazards. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., 920 F. 2d 1415, 1422 (CA8 1990) (the "two . . . main purposes of CERCLA" are "prompt cleanup of haz- ardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party"). RCRA's primary purpose, rather, is to reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, "so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment." 42 U. S. C. § 6902(b). Chief responsibility for the implementation and enforce- ment of RCRA rests with the Administrator of the Environ- 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT 484 MEGHRIG v. KFC WESTERN, INC. Opinion of the Court mental Protection Agency (EPA), see §§ 6928, 6973, but like other environmental laws, RCRA contains a citizen suit pro- vision, § 6972, which permits private citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances. Two requirements of § 6972(a) defeat KFC's suit against the Meghrigs. The first concerns the necessary timing of a citizen suit brought under § 6972(a)(1)(B): That section per- mits a private party to bring suit against certain responsible persons, including former owners, "who ha[ve] contributed or who [are] contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." (Emphasis added.) The second defines the remedies a dis- trict court can award in a suit brought under § 6972(a)(1)(B): Section 6972(a) authorizes district courts "to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste . . . , to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both." (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from the two remedies described in § 6972(a) that RCRA's citizen suit provision is not directed at provid- ing compensation for past cleanup efforts. Under a plain reading of this remedial scheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could seek a mandatory injunction, i. e., one that orders a responsible party to "take action" by at- tending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i. e., one that "restrains" a responsi- ble party from further violating RCRA. Neither remedy, however, is susceptible of the interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit, as neither contemplates the award of past cleanup costs, whether these are denominated "damages" or "equitable restitution." In this regard, a comparison between the relief available under RCRA's citizen suit provision and that which Congress 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 479 (1996) 485 Opinion of the Court has provided in the analogous, but not parallel, provisions of CERCLA is telling. CERCLA was passed several years after RCRA went into effect, and it is designed to address many of the same toxic waste problems that inspired the passage of RCRA. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 6903(5) (RCRA definition of "hazardous waste") and § 6903(27) (RCRA definition of "solid waste") with § 9601(14) (CERCLA pro- vision incorporating certain "hazardous substance[s]," but specifically excluding petroleum). CERCLA differs mark- edly from RCRA, however, in the remedies it provides. CERCLA's citizen suit provision mimics § 6972(a) in pro- viding district courts with the authority "to order such action as may be necessary to correct the violation" of any CERCLA standard or regulation. 42 U. S. C. § 9659(c). But CERCLA expressly permits the Government to recover "all costs of removal or remedial action," § 9607(a)(4)(A), and it expressly permits the recovery of any "necessary costs of response, incurred by any . . . person consistent with the national contingency plan," § 9607(a)(4)(B). CERCLA also provides that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable" for these response costs. See § 9613(f)(1). Congress thus demon- strated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and that the language used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy. That RCRA's citizen suit provision was not intended to provide a remedy for past cleanup costs is further apparent from the harm at which it is directed. Section 6972(a)(1)(B) permits a private party to bring suit only upon a showing that the solid or hazardous waste at issue "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en- vironment." The meaning of this timing restriction is plain: An endangerment can only be "imminent" if it "threaten[s] to occur immediately," Webster's New International Diction- ary of English Language 1245 (2d ed. 1934), and the refer- 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT 486 MEGHRIG v. KFC WESTERN, INC. Opinion of the Court ence to waste which "may present" imminent harm quite clearly excludes waste that no longer presents such a danger. As the Ninth Circuit itself intimated in Price v. United States Navy, 39 F. 3d 1011, 1019 (1994), this language "im- plies that there must be a threat which is present now, al- though the impact of the threat may not be felt until later." It follows that § 6972(a) was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the risk of future "im- minent" harms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts. Cf. § 6902(b) (national policy behind RCRA is "to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment"). Other aspects of RCRA's enforcement scheme strongly support this conclusion. Unlike CERCLA, RCRA contains no statute of limitations, compare § 9613(g)(2) (limitations period in suits under CERCLA § 9607), and it does not re- quire a showing that the response costs being sought are reasonable, compare §§ 9607(a)(4)(A) and (B) (costs recovered under CERCLA must be "consistent with the national contingency plan"). If Congress had intended § 6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism, the absence of these provisions would be striking. Moreover, with one limited exception, see Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 26­27 (1989) (noting exception to notice requirement "when there is a danger that hazardous waste will be discharged"), a private party may not bring suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B) with- out first giving 90 days' notice to the Administrator of the EPA, to "the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur," and to potential defendants, see §§ 6972(b)(2)(A)(i)­ (iii). And no citizen suit can proceed if either the EPA or the State has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a separate enforcement action, see §§ 6972(b)(2)(B) and (C). Therefore, if RCRA were designed to compensate private parties for their past cleanup efforts, it would be a wholly irrational mechanism for doing so. Those parties with in- substantial problems, problems that neither the State nor 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 479 (1996) 487 Opinion of the Court the Federal Government feel compelled to address, could recover their response costs, whereas those parties whose waste problems were sufficiently severe as to attract the attention of Government officials would be left without a recovery. Though it agrees that KFC's complaint is defective for fail- ing properly to allege an "imminent and substantial endan- germent," the Government (as amicus) nonetheless joins KFC in arguing that § 6972(a) does not in all circumstances preclude an award of past cleanup costs. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22­28. The Government posits a situation in which suit is properly brought while the waste at issue continues to pose an imminent endangerment, and suggests that the plaintiff in such a case could seek equi- table restitution of money previously spent on cleanup ef- forts. Echoing a similar argument made by KFC, see Brief for Respondent 11­19, the Government does not rely on the remedies expressly provided in § 6972(a), but rather cites a line of cases holding that district courts retain inherent au- thority to award any equitable remedy that is not expressly taken away from them by Congress. See, e. g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395 (1946); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191 (1967); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944). RCRA does not prevent a private party from recovering its cleanup costs under other federal or state laws, see § 6972(f) (preserving remedies under statutory and common law), but the limited remedies described in § 6972(a), along with the stark differences between the language of that sec- tion and the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate that Congress did not intend for a private citi- zen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA. As we explained in Middle- sex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14 (1981), where Congress has provided "elaborate enforcement provisions" for remedying the viola- 516us2$33J 10-22-98 14:11:46 PAGES OPINPGT 488 MEGHRIG v. KFC WESTERN, INC. Opinion of the Court tion of a federal statute, as Congress has done with RCRA and CERCLA, "it cannot be assumed that Congress in- tended to authorize by implication additional judicial reme- dies for private citizens suing under" the statute. " `[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.' " Id., at 14­15 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19 (1979)). Without considering whether a private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay cleanup costs which arise after a RCRA citizen suit has been prop- erly commenced, cf. United States v. Price, 688 F. 2d 204, 211­213 (CA3 1982) (requiring funding of a diagnostic study is an appropriate form of relief in a suit brought by the Ad- ministrator under § 6973), or otherwise recover cleanup costs paid out after the invocation of RCRA's statutory process, we agree with the Meghrigs that a private party cannot re- cover the cost of a past cleanup effort under RCRA, and that KFC's complaint is defective for the reasons stated by the District Court. Section 6972(a) does not contemplate the award of past cleanup costs, and § 6972(a)(1)(B) permits a pri- vate party to bring suit only upon an allegation that the con- taminated site presently poses an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment," and not upon an allegation that it posed such an endangerment at some time in the past. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. 516us2$34Z 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 489 Syllabus VARITY CORP. v. HOWE et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 94­1471. Argued November 1, 1995-Decided March 19, 1996 After petitioner Varity Corporation decided to transfer money-losing divi- sions in its subsidiary Massey-Ferguson, Inc., to a separately incorpo- rated subsidiary, Massey Combines, it held a meeting to persuade em- ployees of the failing divisions to change employers and benefit plans. Varity, the Massey-Ferguson plan administrator as well as the employer, conveyed the basic message that employees' benefits would remain se- cure when they transferred. In fact, Massey Combines was insolvent from the day it was created, and, when it ended its second year in a receivership, the employees who had transferred lost their nonpension benefits. Those employees, including respondents, filed this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), claiming that Varity, through trickery, had led them to withdraw from their old plan and forfeit their benefits, and seeking the benefits they would have been owed had they not changed employers. The District Court found, among other things, that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, act- ing as ERISA fiduciaries, had harmed plan beneficiaries through delib- erate deception, that they thereby violated ERISA § 404(a)'s fiduciary obligation to administer Massey-Ferguson's plan "solely in the interest of the [plan's] participants and beneficiaries," that ERISA § 502(a)(3) gave respondents a right to "appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress" the harm that this deception had caused them individually, and that such relief included reinstatement to the old plan. The Court of Appeals affirmed, in relevant part. Held:1. Varity was acting as an ERISA "fiduciary" when it significantly and deliberately misled respondents. The District Court's factual find- ings, unchallenged by Varity, adequately support that court's legal con- clusion that, when Varity made its misrepresentations, it was exercising "discretionary authority" respecting the plan's "management" or "ad- ministration," within the meaning of ERISA § 3(21)(A). The court found that the key meeting was largely about benefits, for the docu- ments presented there described the benefits in detail, explained the similarity between past and future plans in principle, and assured the employees that they would continue to receive similar benefits in prac- 516us2$34Z 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 490 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Syllabus tice. To offer beneficiaries such detailed plan information in order to help them decide whether to remain with the plan is essentially an exer- cise of a power "appropriate" to carrying out an important plan purpose. Moreover, the materials used at the meeting came from those at the firm with authority to communicate as fiduciaries with beneficiaries. Finally, reasonable employees, in the circumstances found by the Dis- trict Court, could have thought that Varity was communicating with them both as employer and as plan administrator. Pp. 498­505. 2. In misleading respondents, Varity violated the fiduciary obligations that ERISA § 404 imposes upon plan administrators. To participate knowingly and significantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries' expense is not to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." There is no basis in the statute for any special interpretation that might insulate Varity from the legal consequences of the kind of conduct that often creates liability even among strangers. Pp. 506­507. 3. ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes lawsuits for individualized equitable relief for breach of fiduciary obligations. This Court's decision in Mas- sachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, that § 502(a)(2)- which permits actions "for appropriate relief under [§ ]409"-does not provide individual relief does not mean that such relief is not "appro- priate" under subsection (3). The language that the Court found limit- ing in Russell appears in § 409, which authorizes relief only for the plan itself, and § 409 is not cross-referenced by subsection (3). Further, another remedial provision (subsection (1)) provided a remedy for the Russell plaintiff's injury, whereas here respondents would have no rem- edy at all were they unable to proceed under subsection (3). Granting individual relief is also consistent with ERISA's language, structure, and purpose. Subsection (3)'s language is broad enough to cover indi- vidual relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation, and other statutory language supports this conclusion. Nothing in ERISA's structure indicates that Congress intended § 409 to contain the exclusive set of remedies for every kind of fiduciary breach. In fact, § 502's structure suggests that Congress intended the general "catchall" provisions of subsections (3) and (5) to act as a safety net, offering appropriate equita- ble relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy. Contrary to Varity's argument, there is nothing in the legislative history that conflicts with this interpretation. ERISA's general purpose of protecting beneficiaries' interests also favors a read- ing that provides respondents with a remedy. Amici's concerns that permitting individual relief will upset another congressional purpose- 516us2$34Z 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 491 Opinion of the Court the need for a sensible administrative system-seem unlikely to materi- alize. Pp. 507­515. 36 F. 3d 746 and 41 F. 3d 1263, affirmed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 516. Floyd Abrams argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Thomas J. Kavaler, Katherine B. Harrison, Jonathan Sherman, and William J. Koehn. H. Richard Smith argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David Swinton, Michael J. Eason, and Robert J. Schmit. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Richard P. Bress, Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Allen H. Feldman, Steven J. Mandel, Mark S. Flynn, and Judith D. Heimlich.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. A group of beneficiaries of a firm's employee welfare bene- fit plan, protected by the Employee Retirement Income Se- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Evan Miller, John G. Roberts, Jr., and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the Eastman Kodak Co. et al. by Robert N. Eccles. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of Retired Persons by Steven S. Saleznick and Mary Ellen Signorille; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Stephen R. Bruce, Jeffrey Lewis, Ronald Dean, and Edgar Pauk. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare and Pension Fund by Thomas C. Nyhan and Terence G. Craig; and for the National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys by Kevin P. Roddy, Jonathan W. Cuneo, Bryan L. Clobes, Stephen P. Hoffman, Henry H. Rossbacher, and Steve W. Berman. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 492 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court curity Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (1988 ed.), have sued their plan's admin- istrator, who was also their employer. They claim that the administrator, through trickery, led them to withdraw from the plan and to forfeit their benefits. They seek, among other things, an order that, in essence, would reinstate each of them as a participant in the employer's ERISA plan. The lower courts entered judgment in the employees' favor, and we agreed to review that judgment. In conducting our review, we do not question the lower courts' findings of serious deception by the employer, but instead consider three legal questions. First, in the factual circumstances (as determined by the lower courts), was the employer acting in its capacity as an ERISA "fiduciary" when it significantly and deliberately misled the beneficiar- ies? Second, in misleading the beneficiaries, did the em- ployer violate the fiduciary obligations that ERISA § 404 imposes upon plan administrators? Third, does ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorize ERISA plan beneficiaries to bring a lawsuit, such as this one, that seeks relief for individual bene- ficiaries harmed by an administrator's breach of fiduciary obligations? We answer each of these questions in the beneficiaries' favor, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I The key facts, as found by the District Court after trial, include the following: Charles Howe, and the other respond- ents, used to work for Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a farm equip- ment manufacturer, and a wholly owned subsidiary of the petitioner, Varity Corporation. (Since the lower courts found that Varity and Massey-Ferguson were "alter egos," we shall refer to them interchangeably.) These employees all were participants in, and beneficiaries of, Massey- Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit plan-an ERISA-protected plan that Massey-Ferguson itself adminis- tered. In the mid-1980's, Varity became concerned that 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 493 Opinion of the Court some of Massey-Ferguson's divisions were losing too much money and developed a business plan to deal with the problem. The business plan-which Varity called "Project Sun- shine"-amounted to placing many of Varity's money-losing eggs in one financially rickety basket. It called for a trans- fer of Massey-Ferguson's money-losing divisions, along with various other debts, to a newly created, separately incorpo- rated subsidiary called Massey Combines. The plan foresaw the possibility that Massey Combines would fail. But it viewed such a failure, from Varity's business perspective, as closer to a victory than to a defeat. That is because Massey Combine's failure would not only eliminate several of Varity's poorly performing divisions, but it would also eradicate vari- ous debts that Varity would transfer to Massey Combines, and which, in the absence of the reorganization, Varity's more profitable subsidiaries or divisions might have to pay. Among the obligations that Varity hoped the reorganiza- tion would eliminate were those arising from the Massey- Ferguson benefit plan's promises to pay medical and other nonpension benefits to employees of Massey-Ferguson's money-losing divisions. Rather than terminate those bene- fits directly (as it had retained the right to do), Varity attempted to avoid the undesirable fallout that could have accompanied cancellation by inducing the failing divisions' employees to switch employers and thereby voluntarily re- lease Massey-Ferguson from its obligation to provide them benefits (effectively substituting the new, self-funded Massey Combines benefit plan for the former Massey-Ferguson plan). Insofar as Massey-Ferguson's employees did so, a subsequent Massey Combines failure would eliminate-sim- ply and automatically, without distressing the remaining Massey-Ferguson employees-what would otherwise have been Massey-Ferguson's obligation to pay those employees their benefits. To persuade the employees of the failing divisions to ac- cept the change of employer and benefit plan, Varity called 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 494 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court them together at a special meeting and talked to them about Massey Combines' future business outlook, its likely financial viability, and the security of their employee benefits. The thrust of Varity's remarks (which we shall discuss in greater detail infra, at 499­501) was that the employees' benefits would remain secure if they voluntarily transferred to Mas- sey Combines. As Varity knew, however, the reality was very different. Indeed, the District Court found that Mas- sey Combines was insolvent from the day of its creation and that it hid a $46 million negative net worth by overvaluing its assets and underestimating its liabilities. After the presentation, about 1,500 Massey-Ferguson em- ployees accepted Varity's assurances and voluntarily agreed to the transfer. (Varity also unilaterally assigned to Massey Combines the benefit obligations it owed to some 4,000 work- ers who had retired from Massey-Ferguson prior to this re- organization, without requesting permission or informing them of the assignment.) Unfortunately for these employ- ees, Massey Combines ended its first year with a loss of $88 million, and ended its second year in a receivership, under which its employees lost their nonpension benefits. Many of those employees (along with several retirees whose benefit obligations Varity had assigned to Massey Combines and others whose claims we do not now consider) brought this lawsuit, seeking the benefits they would have been owed under their old, Massey-Ferguson plan, had they not trans- ferred to Massey Combines. After trial, the District Court found, among other things, that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, acting as ERISA fi- duciaries, had harmed the plan's beneficiaries through delib- erate deception. The court held that Varity and Massey- Ferguson thereby violated an ERISA-imposed fiduciary obligation to administer Massey-Ferguson's benefit plan "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan. ERISA § 404(a). The court added that ERISA § 502(a)(3) gave the former Massey-Ferguson employees a 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 495 Opinion of the Court right to "appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress" the harm that this deception had caused them individually. Among other remedies the court considered "appropriate eq- uitable relief" was an order that Massey-Ferguson reinstate its former employees into its own plan (which had continued to provide benefits to employees of Massey-Ferguson's profitable divisions). The court also ordered certain mone- tary relief which is not at issue here. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the District Court's determinations, in rele- vant part. 36 F. 3d 746 (CA8 1994). We granted certiorari in this case primarily because the Courts of Appeals have disagreed about the proper interpre- tation of ERISA § 502(a)(3), the provision the District Court held authorized the lawsuit and relief in this case. Some Courts of Appeals have held that this section, when applied to a claim of breach of fiduciary obligation, does not authorize awards of relief to individuals, but instead only authorizes suits to obtain relief for the plan (as, for example, when a beneficiary sues in a representative capacity, seeking to com- pel a dishonest fiduciary to return embezzled funds to the plan). See McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint Inc., 46 F. 3d 956 (CA9 1995); Simmons v. Southern Bell Telephone and Tele- graph Co., 940 F. 2d 614 (CA11 1991). Other Courts of Ap- peals, such as the Eighth Circuit in this case, have not read any such limitation into the statute. See Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F. 3d 1292 (CA3 1993); Anweiler v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 3 F. 3d 986 (CA7 1993). Varity has raised two additional issues. First, Varity points out that the relevant ERISA section imposes liability only upon plan fiduciaries; and it argues that it was acting only as an employer and not as a plan fiduciary when it de- ceived its employees. Second, it argues that, in any event, its conduct did not violate the fiduciary standard that ERISA imposes. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 496 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court We consider all three issues to be fairly within the scope of the questions that Varity posed in its petition for certio- rari, although only with respect to the workers who were deceived by Varity, for as we construe Varity's petition, it does not sufficiently call into question the District Court's holding that Varity breached a fiduciary duty with respect to the Massey-Ferguson retirees whose benefit obligations had been involuntarily assigned to Massey Combines. With these limitations in mind, we turn to the questions presented. II ERISA protects employee pensions and other benefits by providing insurance (for vested pension rights, see ERISA § 4001 et seq.), specifying certain plan characteristics in detail (such as when and how pensions vest, see §§ 201­211), and by setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the management of both pension and nonpension benefit plans. See § 404. In this case, we interpret and apply these general fiduciary duties and several related statutory provisions. In doing so, we recognize that these fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA's enactment. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U. S. 559, 570 (1985) ("[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility"); H. R. Rep. No. 93­533, pp. 3­5, 11­13 (1973), 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Com- mittee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Library of Con- gress), Ser. No. 93­406, pp. 2350­2352, 2358­2360 (1976) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 255, p. 343 (rev. 2d ed. 1992). 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 497 Opinion of the Court We also recognize, however, that trust law does not tell the entire story. After all, ERISA's standards and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfac- tory protection. See ERISA § 2(a). See also H. R. Rep. No. 93­533, supra, at 3­5, 11­13, 2 Leg. Hist. 2350­2352; 2358­ 2360; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93­1280, pp. 295, 302 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4562, 4569. And, even with respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA imposes, Congress "expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans," id., at 302, 3 Leg. Hist. 4569, as they "develop a `federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.' " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 110­111 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 56 (1987)). Consequently, we believe that the law of trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties. In some in- stances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust requirements. And, in doing so, courts may have to take account of competing con- gressional purposes, such as Congress' desire to offer em- ployees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation ex- penses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place. Compare ERISA § 2 with Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78­81 (1995), and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 262­ 263 (1993). We have followed this approach when interpreting, and applying, the statutory provisions here before us. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 498 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court A We begin with the question of Varity's fiduciary status. In relevant part, the statute says that a "person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan," and therefore subject to ERISA fi- duciary duties, "to the extent" that he or she "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management" of the plan, or "has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration" of the plan. ERISA § 3(21)(A). Varity was both an employer and the benefit plan's admin- istrator, as ERISA permits. Compare ERISA § 3(16) (em- ployer is, in some circumstances, the default plan administra- tor) with NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 329­330 (1981) (common law of trusts prohibits fiduciaries from hold- ing positions that create conflict of interest with trust bene- ficiaries); Bogert & Bogert, supra, § 543, at 218, 264 (same). But, obviously, not all of Varity's business activities involved plan management or administration. Varity argues that when it communicated with its Massey-Ferguson workers about transferring to Massey Combines, it was not adminis- tering or managing the plan; rather, it was acting only in its capacity as an employer and not as a plan administrator. The District Court, however, held that when the misrepre- sentations regarding employee benefits were made, Varity was wearing its "fiduciary," as well as its "employer," hat. In reviewing this legal conclusion, we give deference to the factual findings of the District Court, recognizing its compar- ative advantage in understanding the specific context in which the events of this case occurred. We believe that these factual findings (which Varity does not challenge) ade- quately support the District Court's holding that Varity was exercising "discretionary authority" respecting the plan's "management" or "administration" when it made these mis- representations, which legal holding we have independently reviewed. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 499 Opinion of the Court The relevant factual circumstances include the following: In the spring of 1986, Varity summoned the employees of Massey-Ferguson's money-losing divisions to a meeting at Massey-Ferguson's corporate headquarters for a 30-minute presentation. The employees saw a 90-second videotaped message from Mr. Ivan Porter, a Varity vice president and Massey Combines' newly appointed president. They also received four documents: (a) a several-page, detailed compar- ison between the employee benefits offered by Massey- Ferguson and those offered by Massey Combines; (b) a question-and-answer sheet; (c) a transcript of the Porter videotape; and (d) a cover letter with an acceptance form. Each of these documents discussed employee benefits and benefit plans, some briefly in general terms, and others at length and in detail: (a) The longest document, the side-by-side benefits com- parison, contained a fairly detailed description of the benefit plans. Its object was to show that after transfer, the em- ployees' benefits would remain the same. It says, for exam- ple, that, under Massey-Ferguson's plan, "[d]iagnostic x-ray and laboratory expenses will be paid on the basis of reason- able and customary charges for such services." App. 70. It then repeats the same sentence in describing Massey Com- bines' "[d]iagnostic x-ray and laboratory expenses" benefits. Ibid. It describes about 20 different benefits in this way. (b) The eight questions and answers on the question-and- answer sheet include three that relate to welfare benefits or to the ERISA pension plan Varity also administered: "Q. 3. What happens to my benefits, pension, etc.? "A. 3. When you transfer to MCC [Massey Com- bines], pay levels and benefit programmes will remain unchanged. There will be no loss of seniority or pen- sionable service. "Q. 4. Do you expect the terms and conditions of employment to change? 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 500 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court "A. 4. Employment conditions in the future will de- pend on our ability to make Massey Combines Corpora- tion a success and if changes are considered necessary or appropriate, they will be made. . . . . . "Q. 8. Are the pensions protected under MCC? "A. 8. Responsibility for pension benefits earned by employees transferring to Massey Combines Corpora- tion is being assumed by the Massey Combines Corpora- tion Pension Plan. "The assets which are held in the Massey Ferguson Pen- sion Plan to fund such benefits as determined by actuar- ial calculations, are being transferred to the Massey Combines Corporation Plan. Such benefits and assets will be protected by the same legislation that protect the Massey Ferguson Pension Plan. "There will be no change in pension benefits as a result of your transfer to Massey Combines Corporation." Id., at 75­77. (c) The transcript of the 90-second videotape message re- peated much of the information in the question-and-answer sheet, adding assurances about Massey Combines' viability: "This financial restructuring created Massey Combines Corporation and will provide the funds necessary to en- sure its future viability. I believe that with the con- tinued help and support of you we can make Massey Combines Corporation the kind of successful business enterprise which we all want to work for. ". . . . When you transfer your employment to the Mas- sey Combines Corporation, pay levels and benefit pro- grams will remain unchanged. There will be no loss of seniority or pensionable service. Employment condi- tions in the future will depend on the success of the Massey Combines Corporation and should changes be deemed appropriate or necessary, they will be made. . . . 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 501 Opinion of the Court "Finally, despite the depression which persists in the North American economy, I am excited about the future of Massey Combines Corporation." Id., at 80. (d) The cover letter, in five short paragraphs, repeated verbatim these benefit-related assurances: "To enable us to accept you as an employee of Massey Combines Corporation and to continue to process the payment of benefits to you, we require that you complete the information below and return this letter . . . . "When you accept employment with Massey Com- bines Corporation, pay levels and benefit programs will remain unchanged. There will be no loss of seniority or pensionable service. Employment conditions in the future will depend on our ability to make Massey Com- bines Corporation a success, and if changes are consid- ered necessary or appropriate, they will be made. "We are all very optimistic that our new company, has a bright future, and are excited by the new challenges facing all of us. . . . "In order to ensure uninterrupted continuation of your pay and benefits, please return this signed accept- ance of employment . . . ." Id., at 82­83. Given this record material, the District Court determined, as a factual matter, that the key meeting, to a considerable extent, was about benefits, for the documents described them in detail, explained the similarity between past and future plans in principle, and assured the employees that they would continue to receive similar benefits in practice. The District Court concluded that the basic message conveyed to the employees was that transferring from Massey-Ferguson to Massey Combines would not significantly undermine the security of their benefits. And, given this view of the facts, we believe that the District Court reached the correct legal conclusion, namely, that Varity spoke, in significant part, in its capacity as plan administrator. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 502 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court To decide whether Varity's actions fall within the statu- tory definition of "fiduciary" acts, we must interpret the stat- utory terms which limit the scope of fiduciary activity to dis- cretionary acts of plan "management" and "administration." ERISA § 3(21)(A). These words are not self-defining, and the activity at issue here neither falls clearly within nor out- side of the common understanding of these words. The dis- sent looks to the dictionary for interpretive assistance. See post, at 528­529. Though dictionaries sometimes help in such matters, we believe it more important here to look to the common law, which, over the years, has given to terms such as "fiduciary" and trust "administration" a legal mean- ing to which, we normally presume, Congress meant to refer. See, e. g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 322 (1992). The ordinary trust law understanding of fidu- ciary "administration" of a trust is that to act as an adminis- trator is to perform the duties imposed, or exercise the pow- ers conferred, by the trust documents. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 164 (1957); 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 321 (1992). Cf. ERISA § 404(a). The law of trusts also under- stands a trust document to implicitly confer "such powers as are necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes" of the trust. 3 A. Scott & W. Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 186, p. 6 (4th ed. 1988). See also Bogert & Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 551, at 41; Central States, 472 U. S., at 570. Conveying information about the likely future of plan benefits, thereby permitting beneficiaries to make an informed choice about continued participation, would seem to be an exercise of a power "appropriate" to carrying out an important plan purpose. After all, ERISA itself specifically requires administrators to give beneficiaries certain infor- mation about the plan. See, e. g., ERISA §§ 102, 104(b)(1), 105(a). And administrators, as part of their administrative responsibilities, frequently offer beneficiaries more than the minimum information that the statute requires-for exam- ple, answering beneficiaries' questions about the meaning of 516US2 Unit: $U34 [05-25-00 07:03:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 503 Opinion of the Court the terms of a plan so that those beneficiaries can more easily obtain the plan's benefits. To offer beneficiaries detailed plan information in order to help them decide whether to remain with the plan is essentially the same kind of plan- related activity. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229(1) (1957) (determining whether an activity is within the "scope of . . . employment" in part by examining whether it is "of the same general nature as that authorized"). Moreover, as far as the record reveals, Mr. Porter's letter, videotape, and the other documents came from those within the firm who had authority to communicate as fiduciaries with plan beneficiaries. Varity does not claim that it author- ized only special individuals, not connected with the meeting documents, to speak as plan administrators. See § 402(b)(2) (a plan may describe a "procedure under the plan for the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and adminis- tration of the plan"). Finally, reasonable employees, in the circumstances found by the District Court, could have thought that Varity was communicating with them both in its capacity as employer and in its capacity as plan administrator. Reasonable em- ployees might not have distinguished consciously between the two roles. But they would have known that the em- ployer was their plan's administrator and had expert knowl- edge about how their plan worked. The central conclusion ("your benefits are secure") could well have drawn strength from their awareness of that expertise, and one could reason- ably believe that the employer, aware of the importance of the matter, so intended. We conclude, therefore, that the factual context in which the statements were made, combined with the plan-related nature of the activity, engaged in by those who had plan- related authority to do so, together provide sufficient sup- port for the District Court's legal conclusion that Varity was acting as a fiduciary. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 504 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court Varity raises three contrary arguments. First, Varity ar- gues that it was not engaged in plan administration because neither the specific disclosure provisions of ERISA, nor the specific terms of the plan instruments, App. 5­26, required it to make these statements. But that does not mean Varity was not engaging in plan administration in making them, as the dissent seems to suggest. See post, at 531­532, and n. 12. There is more to plan (or trust) administration than simply complying with the specific duties imposed by the plan documents or statutory regime; it also includes the ac- tivities that are "ordinary and natural means" of achieving the "objective" of the plan. Bogert & Bogert, supra, § 551, at 41­52. Indeed, the primary function of the fiduciary duty is to constrain the exercise of discretionary powers which are controlled by no other specific duty imposed by the trust instrument or the legal regime. If the fiduciary duty ap- plied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose. Second, Varity says that when it made the statements that most worried the District Court-the statements about Mas- sey Combines' "bright future"-it must have been speaking only as employer (and not as fiduciary), for statements about a new subsidiary's financial future have virtually nothing to do with administering benefit plans. But this argument parses the meeting's communications too finely. The ulti- mate message Varity intended to convey-"your benefits are secure"-depended in part upon its repeated assurances that benefits would remain "unchanged," in part upon the de- tailed comparison of benefits, and in part upon assurances about Massey Combines' "bright" financial future. Varity's workers would not necessarily have focused upon each un- derlying supporting statement separately, because what pri- marily interested them, and what primarily interested the District Court, was the truthfulness of the ultimate conclu- sion that transferring to Massey Combines would not ad- 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 505 Opinion of the Court versely affect the security of their benefits. And, in the present context (see supra, at 499­501), Varity's statements about the security of benefits amounted to an act of plan administration. That Varity intentionally communicated its conclusion through a closely linked set of statements (some directly concerning plan benefits, others concerning the via- bility of the corporation) does not change this conclusion. We do not hold, as the dissent suggests, post, at 529­531, that Varity acted as a fiduciary simply because it made state- ments about its expected financial condition or because "an ordinary business decision turn[ed] out to have an adverse impact on the plan." Post, at 539. Instead, we accept the undisputed facts found, and factual inferences drawn, by the District Court, namely, that Varity intentionally connected its statements about Massey Combines' financial health to statements it made about the future of benefits, so that its intended communication about the security of benefits was rendered materially misleading. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a­65a, ¶¶ 65, 68. And we hold that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits in that con- text is an act of plan administration. Third, Varity says that an employer's decision to amend or terminate a plan (as Varity had the right to do) is not an act of plan administration. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U. S., at 78­81. How then, it asks, could conveying information about the likelihood of termination be an act of plan adminis- tration? While it may be true that amending or terminating a plan (or a common-law trust) is beyond the power of a plan administrator (or trustee)- and, therefore, cannot be an act of plan "management" or "administration"-it does not fol- low that making statements about the likely future of the plan is also beyond the scope of plan administration. As we explained above, plan administrators often have, and com- monly exercise, discretionary authority to communicate with beneficiaries about the future of plan benefits. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 506 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court B The second question-whether Varity's deception violated ERISA-imposed fiduciary obligations-calls for a brief, af- firmative answer. ERISA requires a "fiduciary" to "dis- charge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." ERISA § 404(a). To participate knowingly and significantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save the employer money at the ben- eficiaries' expense is not to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." As other courts have held, "[l]ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA," Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F. 2d 320, 326 (CA7 1983). See also Central States, 472 U. S., at 570­571 (ERISA fiduciary duty includes common- law duty of loyalty); Bogert & Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543, at 218­219 (duty of loyalty requires trustee to deal fairly and honestly with beneficiaries); 2A Scott & Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 170, pp. 311­312 (same); Restate- ment (Second) of Trusts § 170 (same). Because the breach of this duty is sufficient to uphold the decision below, we need not reach the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries. We recognize, as mentioned above, that we are to apply common-law trust standards "bearing in mind the special na- ture and purpose of employee benefit plans." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93­1280, at 302, 3 Leg. Hist. 4569. But we can find no adequate basis here, in the statute or otherwise, for any special interpretation that might insulate Varity, acting as a fiduciary, from the legal consequences of the kind of conduct (intentional misrepresentation) that often creates liability even among strangers. We are aware, as Varity suggests, of one possible reason for a departure from ordinary trust law principles. In ar- guing about ERISA's remedies for breaches of fiduciary obli- 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 507 Opinion of the Court gation, Varity says that Congress intended ERISA's fidu- ciary standards to protect only the financial integrity of the plan, not individual beneficiaries. This intent, says Varity, is shown by the fact that Congress did not provide remedies for individuals harmed by such breaches; rather, Congress limited relief to remedies that would benefit only the plan itself. This argument fails, however, because, in our view, Congress did provide remedies for individual beneficiaries harmed by breaches of fiduciary duty, as we shall next discuss. C The remaining question before us is whether or not the remedial provision of ERISA that the beneficiaries invoked, ERISA § 502(a)(3), authorizes this lawsuit for individual re- lief. That subsection is the third of six subsections con- tained within ERISA's "Civil Enforcement" provision (as it stood at the times relevant to this lawsuit): "Sec. 502. (a) A civil action may be brought- "(1) by a participant or beneficiary- "(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section [providing for liquidated damages for failure to provide certain information on request], or "(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; "(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [entitled "Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty"]; "(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan; 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 508 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court "(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or benefi- ciary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) [requiring disclosure of certain tax registration statements]; "(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title; or "(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i)." ERISA § 502(a), 88 Stat. 891, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). The District Court held that the third subsection, which we have italicized, authorized this suit and the relief awarded. Varity concedes that the plaintiffs satisfy most of this provision's requirements, namely, that the plaintiffs are plan "participants" or "beneficiaries," and that they are suing for "equitable" relief to "redress" a violation of § 404(a), which is a "provision of this title." Varity does not agree, however, that this lawsuit seeks equitable relief that is "ap- propriate." In support of this conclusion, Varity makes a complicated, four-step argument: Step One: Section 502(a)'s second subsection says that a plaintiff may bring a civil action "for appropriate relief under section 409." Step Two: Section 409(a), in turn, reads: "Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Sec. 409. (a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obliga- tions, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equi- 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 509 Opinion of the Court table or remedial relief as the court may deem appro- priate, including removal of such fiduciary. . . ." (Em- phasis added.) Step Three: In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134 (1985), this Court pointed to the above- italicized language in § 409 and concluded that this section (and its companion remedial provision, subsection (2)) did not authorize the plaintiff's suit for compensatory and punitive damages against an administrator who had wrongfully de- layed payment of her benefit claim. The first two italicized phrases, the Court said, show that § 409's "draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual beneficiary." Id., at 142 (emphasis added). The Court added that, in this con- text, the last italicized phrase ("other equitable or remedial relief") does not "authorize any relief except for the plan itself." Id., at 144. Step Four: In light of Russell, as well as ERISA's lan- guage, structure, and purposes, one cannot read the third subsection (the subsection before us) as including (as "ap- propriate") the very kind of action-an action for individual, rather than plan, relief-that this Court found Congress ex- cluded in subsection (2). It is at this point, however, that we must disagree with Varity. We have reexamined Rus- sell, as well as the relevant statutory language, structure, and purpose. And, in our view, they support the beneficiar- ies' view of the statute, not Varity's. First, Russell discusses § 502(a)'s second subsection, not its third subsection, and the language that the Court found limiting appears in a statutory section (§ 409) that the second subsection, not the third, cross-references. Russell's plain- tiff expressly disavowed reliance on the third subsection, id., at 139, n. 5, perhaps because she was seeking compensatory and punitive damages and subsection (3) authorizes only "eq- uitable" relief. See Mertens, 508 U. S., at 255, 256­258, and 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 510 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court n. 8 (compensatory and punitive damages are not "equitable relief" within the meaning of subsection (3)); ERISA § 409(a) (authorizing "other equitable or remedial relief") (emphasis added). Further, Russell involved a complicating factor not present here, in that another remedial provision (subsection (1)) already provided specific relief for the sort of injury the plaintiff had suffered (wrongful denial of benefits), but said "nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay in the plan adminis- trators' processing of a disputed claim." Russell, supra, at 144. These differences lead us to conclude that Russell does not control, either implicitly or explicitly, the outcome of the case before us. Second, subsection (3)'s language does not favor Varity. The words of subsection (3)-"appropriate equitable relief" to "redress" any "act or practice which violates any provision of this title"-are broad enough to cover individual relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation. Varity argues that the title of § 409-"Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty"-means that § 409 (and its companion, subsection (2)) cover all such liability. But that is not what the title or the provision says. And other language in the statute suggests the contrary. Section 502(l), added in 1989, calculates a certain civil pen- alty as a percentage of the sum "ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary . . . to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries" under subsection (5). Subsection (5) is identi- cal to subsection (3), except that it authorizes suits by the Secretary, rather than the participants and beneficiaries. Compare § 502(a)(3) with § 502(a)(5). This new provision, therefore, seems to foresee instances in which the sort of relief provided by both subsection (5) and, by implication, subsection (3), would include an award to "participants and beneficiaries," rather than to the "plan," for breach of fidu- ciary obligation. Third, the statute's structure offers Varity little support. Varity notes that the second subsection refers specifically 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 511 Opinion of the Court (through its § 409 cross-reference) to breaches of fiduciary duty, while the third subsection refers, as a kind of "catch- all," to all ERISA Title One violations. And it argues that a canon of statutory construction, namely "the specific governs over the general," means that the more specific second (fidu- ciary breach) subsection makes the more general third (catchall) subsection inapplicable to claims of fiduciary breach. Canons of construction, however, are simply "rules of thumb" which will sometimes "help courts determine the meaning of legislation." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Ger- main, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). To apply a canon properly one must understand its rationale. This Court has under- stood the present canon ("the specific governs the general") as a warning against applying a general provision when doing so would undermine limitations created by a more spe- cific provision. See, e. g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384­385 (1992); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U. S. 1, 6, 8 (1981); Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans- mirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 228­229 (1957). Yet, in this case, why should one believe that Congress intended the specific remedies in § 409 as a limitation? To the contrary, one can read § 409 as reflecting a special congressional concern about plan asset management without also finding that Congress intended that section to contain the exclusive set of remedies for every kind of fiduciary breach. After all, ERISA makes clear that a fiduciary has obligations other than, and in addition to, managing plan assets. See § 3(21)(A) (defining "fiduciary" as one who "ex- ercises any discretionary authority . . . respecting manage- ment of such plan or . . . respecting management or disposi- tion of its assets") (emphasis added). For example, as the dissent concedes, post, at 530, a plan administrator engages in a fiduciary act when making a discretionary determination about whether a claimant is entitled to benefits under the terms of the plan documents. See § 404(a)(1)(D); Dept. of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin 75­8, 29 CFR § 2509.75­8 (1995) 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 512 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court ("[A] plan employee who has the final authority to authorize or disallow benefit payments in cases where a dispute exists as to the interpretation of plan provisions . . . would be a fiduciary"); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Pro- gram, 740 F. 2d 454, 457 (CA6 1984); Birmingham v. Sogen- Swiss Intern. Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F. 2d 515, 521­522 (CA2 1983). And, as the Court pointed out in Russell, 473 U. S., at 144, ERISA specifically provides a remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to the interpretation of plan documents and the payment of claims, one that is outside the framework of the second subsection and cross- referenced § 409, and one that runs directly to the injured beneficiary. § 502(a)(1)(B). See also Firestone, 489 U. S., at 108. Why should we not conclude that Congress provided yet other remedies for yet other breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation in another, "catchall" remedial section? Such a reading is consistent with § 502's overall structure. Four of that section's six subsections focus upon specific areas, i. e., the first (wrongful denial of benefits and informa- tion), the second (fiduciary obligations related to the plan's financial integrity), the fourth (tax registration), and the sixth (civil penalties). The language of the other two sub- sections, the third and the fifth, creates two "catchalls," providing "appropriate equitable relief" for "any" statutory violation. This structure suggests that these "catchall" pro- visions act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy. And, contrary to Varity's ar- gument, there is nothing in the legislative history that con- flicts with this interpretation. See S. Rep. No. 93­127, p. 35 (1973), 1 Leg. Hist. 621 (describing Senate version of enforce- ment provisions as intended to "provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]"); H. R. Rep. No. 93­533, at 17, 2 Leg. Hist. 2364 (describing House version in identical terms). 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 513 Opinion of the Court Fourth, ERISA's basic purposes favor a reading of the third subsection that provides the plaintiffs with a remedy. The statute itself says that it seeks "to protect . . . the interests of participants . . . and . . . beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries . . . and . . . providing for appropriate remedies . . . and ready access to the Federal courts." ERISA § 2(b). Section 404(a), in furtherance of this general objective, re- quires fiduciaries to discharge their duties "solely in the in- terest of the participants and beneficiaries." Given these objectives, it is hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm indi- viduals by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy. Amici supporting Varity find a strong contrary argument in an important, subsidiary congressional purpose-the need for a sensible administrative system. They say that holding that the Act permits individuals to enforce fiduciary obli- gations owed directly to them as individuals threatens to increase the cost of welfare benefit plans and thereby dis- courage employers from offering them. Consider a plan ad- ministrator's decision not to pay for surgery on the ground that it falls outside the plan's coverage. At present, courts review such decisions with a degree of deference to the ad- ministrator, provided that "the benefit plan gives the admin- istrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eli- gibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone, supra, at 115. But what will happen, ask amici, if a beneficiary can repackage his or her "denial of benefits" claim as a claim for "breach of fiduciary duty?" Wouldn't a court, they ask, then have to forgo deference and hold the administrator to the "rigid level of conduct" expected of fi- duciaries? And, as a consequence, would there not then be two "incompatible legal standards for courts hearing benefit claim disputes" depending upon whether the beneficiary 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 514 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Opinion of the Court claimed simply "denial of benefits," or a virtually identical "breach of fiduciary duty?" See Brief for Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae 10. Consider, too, they add, a medical review board trying to decide whether certain proposed surgery is medically necessary. Will the board's awareness of a "duty of loyalty" to the surgery-seeking bene- ficiary not risk inadequate attention to the countervailing, but important, need to constrain costs in order to preserve the plan's funds? Id., at 11. Thus, amici warn that a legally enforceable duty of loyalty that extends beyond plan asset management to individual beneficiaries will risk these and other adverse consequences. Administrators will tend to interpret plan documents as re- quiring payments to individuals instead of trying to preserve plan assets; nonexpert courts will try to supervise too closely, and second guess, the often technical decisions of plan administrators; and, lawyers will complicate ordinary benefit claims by dressing them up in "fiduciary duty" cloth- ing. The need to avoid these consequences, they conclude, requires us to accept Varity's position. The concerns that amici raise seem to us unlikely to mate- rialize, however, for several reasons. First, a fiduciary obli- gation, enforceable by beneficiaries seeking relief for them- selves, does not necessarily favor payment over nonpayment. The common law of trusts recognizes the need to preserve assets to satisfy future, as well as present, claims and re- quires a trustee to take impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 (discussing duty of impartiality); id., § 232 (same). Second, characterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty does not necessarily change the standard a court would apply when reviewing the administrator's deci- sion to deny benefits. After all, Firestone, which authorized deferential court review when the plan itself gives the ad- ministrator discretionary authority, based its decision upon 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 515 Opinion of the Court the same common-law trust doctrines that govern standards of fiduciary conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 ("Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion") (as quoted in Firestone, 489 U. S., at 111). Third, the statute authorizes "appropriate" equitable re- lief. We should expect that courts, in fashioning "appro- priate" equitable relief, will keep in mind the "special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans," and will respect the "policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others." Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U. S., at 54. See also Russell, 473 U. S., at 147; Mertens, 508 U. S., at 263­264. Thus, we should expect that where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be "appropriate." Cf. Russell, supra, at 144. But that is not the case here. The plaintiffs in this case could not proceed under the first subsection because they were no longer members of the Massey-Ferguson plan and, therefore, had no "benefits due [them] under the terms of [the] plan." § 502(a)(1)(B). They could not proceed under the second subsection because that provision, tied to § 409, does not provide a remedy for individual beneficiaries. Rus- sell, supra, at 144. They must rely on the third subsection or they have no remedy at all. We are not aware of any ERISA-related purpose that denial of a remedy would serve. Rather, we believe that granting a remedy is consistent with the literal language of the statute, the Act's purposes, and pre-existing trust law. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. 516us2$34Q 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 516 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting Justice Thomas, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia join, dissenting. In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134 (1985), we held that actions for fiduciary breach under §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), 29 U. S. C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2) (1988 ed.), the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act) specifically designed for civil enforcement of fiduciary duties, must "be brought in a repre- sentative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole." 473 U. S., at 142, n. 9. The Court today holds that § 502(a)(3), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3), the catchall remedial provision that directly follows § 502(a)(2), provides the individual relief for fiduciary breach that we found to be unavailable under § 502(a)(2). This holding cannot be squared with the text or structure of ERISA, and to reach it requires the repudiation of much of our reasoning in Russell. The Court also finds that Varity was subject to fiduciary obligations under ERISA because it engaged in activity of a "plan-related na- ture" that plan participants reasonably perceived to be con- ducted in the employer's capacity as plan fiduciary. Ante, at 503. This holding, like the first, has no basis in statutory text. Because these holdings are fundamentally at odds with the statutory scheme enacted by Congress, I respect- fully dissent. I A "ERISA is, we have observed, a `comprehensive and retic- ulated statute,' the product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation's private employee benefit system." Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 251 (1993) (quot- ing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora- tion, 446 U. S. 359, 361 (1980)). The Act is "an enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved innumerable dis- putes between powerful competing interests-not all in 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 517 Thomas, J., dissenting favor of potential plaintiffs." 508 U. S., at 262. Given the "evident care" with which ERISA was crafted, we have tra- ditionally been "reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme" embodied in the statute. Russell, supra, at 147. Accordingly, we have repeatedly declined invitations by plan participants and beneficiaries to extend benefits and reme- dies not specifically authorized by the statutory text. See, e. g., Mertens, supra, at 262 (rejecting claim that ERISA af- fords a cause of action against a nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in a fiduciary breach); Russell, supra, at 145­148 (declining invitation to create an implied private cause of action for extracontractual damages); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 56 (1987) (holding that civil enforce- ment scheme codified at § 502(a) is not to be supplemented by state-law remedies). Nowhere is the care with which ERISA was crafted more evident than in the Act's mechanism for the enforcement of fiduciary duties. Part 4 of the Act's regulatory provi- sions, entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility," see §§ 401­414, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1101­1114, assigns fiduciaries "a number of de- tailed duties and responsibilities." Mertens, supra, at 251. Part 4 also includes its own liability provision, § 409, which we considered in Russell. Entitled "Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty," § 409 provides: "Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to re- store to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary." § 409(a), as codi- fied in 29 U. S. C. § 1109(a) (1988 ed.). 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 518 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting Section 409, however, only creates liability. In order to en- force the right and obtain the remedy created by § 409, a plaintiff must bring suit under § 502(a)(2), one of ERISA's "carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions." Rus- sell, supra, at 146. That section allows plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, as well as the Secretary of Labor, to bring a "civil action . . . for appropriate relief" under § 409. Of the nine enforcement provisions currently codified at § 502(a), § 502(a)(2) is the only one that specifically authorizes suit for breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs in this case chose not to proceed through this carefully constructed framework, designed specifically to provide a cause of action for claims of fiduciary breach. Instead, the plaintiffs brought their claims for breach of fi- duciary duty under § 502(a)(3) of the Act, which they claim provides an alternative basis for relief. Section 502(a)(3), as codified in 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988 ed.), is a catchall remedial provision that authorizes a civil action "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this sub- chapter or the terms of the plan." Since respondents are seeking equitable relief to redress a claimed violation of § 404, which is a provision in the same subchapter as § 502(a)(3), and since § 502(a)(3) authorizes re- covery for breach of any provision in that subchapter, re- spondents contend that their claim of breach of fiduciary duty is cognizable under the plain language of § 502(a)(3). Re- spondents have a plausible textual argument, if § 502(a)(3) is read without reference to its surrounding provisions or our precedents. Respondents' decision to proceed under § 502(a)(3)'s catch- all provision instead of under §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) was obvi- 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 519 Thomas, J., dissenting ously motivated by our decision in Russell. We held in Rus- sell that § 409 authorizes recovery only by "the plan as an entity," 473 U. S., at 140, and does not allow for recovery by individual plan participants. Id., at 139­144; see also id., at 144 ("Congress did not intend that section to authorize any relief except for the plan itself"). The respondents, how- ever, do not seek relief on behalf of the plan; rather they wish to recover individually. We reserved the question whether relief might be available for individuals under § 502(a)(3) in Russell, id., at 139, n. 5, and respondents rightly understood this provision to offer the only possible route for securing their desired relief. We would have to read § 502(a)(3) in a vacuum, however, to find in respondents' favor. Congress went to great lengths to enumerate ERISA's fiduciary obligations and du- ties, see §§ 401­408; §§ 410­412, to create liability for breach of those obligations, see § 409, and to authorize a civil suit to enforce those provisions, see § 502(a)(2). Section 502(a)(3), in contrast, is a generally worded provision that fails even to mention fiduciary duty. "[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general." Mo- rales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384 (1992) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437, 445 (1987)). "[T]he law is settled that `[h]owever inclu- sive may be the general language of a statute, it "will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment." ' " Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans- mirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 228 (1957) (citations omitted). This is particularly true where, as here, Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions. See HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U. S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam) (This "basic principle of statutory construction" ap- plies "particularly when the two [provisions] are interrelated and closely positioned, both in fact being parts of" the same 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 520 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting statutory scheme). Applying this basic rule of statutory construction, I conclude that Congress intended §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) to provide the exclusive mechanism for bringing claims of breach of fiduciary duty.1 If Congress had intended to allow individual plan partici- pants to secure equitable relief for fiduciary breaches, I pre- sume it would have made that clear in §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), the provisions specifically enacted to address breach of fidu- ciary duty. See Russell, 473 U. S., at 144 (rejecting claim for extracontractual damages for failure timely to provide benefits in part because "the statutory provision explicitly authorizing a beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his rights under the plan-§ 502(a)(1)(B)-says nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages") (citation omit- ted). In fact, Congress did provide for equitable relief in § 409, which authorizes "such other equitable or remedial re- lief as the court may deem appropriate" to redress a breach of fiduciary duty, but it only allowed such relief to be recov- ered by the plan. Congress did not extend equitable relief to individual plan participants, and we reversed the Court of Appeals in Russell for holding that it did. See id., at 140. Thus, to accept the majority's position, I would have to con- clude not only that Congress forgot to provide for individual relief in §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), but that it clearly intended to provide for individual relief in § 502(a)(3), a catchall provision that fails even to mention fiduciary breach and uses language identical to that in § 409, which we have already held author- izes equitable relief only on behalf of the plan. Compare 1 On other occasions we have recognized that "[r]edundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting," and that where statutes over- lap, courts should give effect to both absent a " `positive repugnancy' " between them. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (quoting Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842)). But Ger- main and similar cases involved claims of implied repeal, which we have long held should not be recognized unless two statutes irreconcilably con- flict. Germain did not involve simultaneously enacted, consecutive provi- sions of the same Act, as in this case. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 521 Thomas, J., dissenting § 409 (authorizing "such . . . equitable . . . relief as the court may deem appropriate") with § 502(a)(3) (authorizing "appro- priate equitable relief"). While I would disagree with the majority's strained statutory interpretation in any case, "[t]he assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered espe- cially suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's inter- locking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a `comprehensive and reticulated statute.' " Russell, supra, at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S., at 361). See also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837 (1988).2 The majority's reading of § 502(a)(3) also renders a portion of § 409 superfluous. If, as the Court today holds, § 502(a)(3) authorizes relief for breaches of fiduciary duty, then that sec- tion must authorize relief on behalf of the plan as well as on behalf of individuals. Nothing in § 502(a)(3) limits relief 2 The majority apparently believes that § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), "provides a remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty with re- spect to the interpretation of plan documents and the payment of claims." Ante, at 512 (citing Russell, 473 U. S., at 144). Since, in the majority's view, § 502(a)(1)(B) allows for individual recovery for fiduciary breach out- side the framework created by §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), the majority wonders "[w]hy should we not conclude that Congress provided yet other remedies for yet other breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation in another, `catchall' remedial section?" Ante, at 512. The answer is simple. Contrary to the majority's understanding, § 502(a)(1)(B) does not create a cause of action for fiduciary breach, and Russell expressly rejected the claim that it does. Thus, the entire prem- ise of the question is flawed. Section 502(a)(1)(B) deals exclusively with contractual rights under the plan. It allows a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." As we recognized in Russell, this provision "says nothing about the recovery of extracon- tractual damages." 473 U. S., at 144. If the justification for the Court's holding is that we should allow individual recovery for fiduciary breach under § 502(a)(3) since such recovery is available under § 502(a)(1)(B), then there really is no justification at all. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 522 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting solely to individuals. And § 404(a), which the Court holds to be enforceable through § 502(a)(3), provides protection pri- marily, if not exclusively, for the plan. See Russell, supra, at 142­143, and n. 10. But if § 502(a)(3) allows plan partici- pants to secure equitable relief on behalf of the plan, then § 409's promise of appropriate equitable relief for the plan is entirely redundant. Thus, the Court violates yet another well-settled rule of statutory construction, namely, that "courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). Of course, this result could be avoided simply by reading the statute as written and by respecting the canon that specific enactments trump general ones in carefully constructed statutes like ERISA. B This is not simply a case about the "specific governing the general," however. Nor is this a case solely about the inter- relationship between §§ 409 and 502(a)(3). At every turn lies statutory proof, most of which the majority ignores, that Congress never intended to authorize individual plan partici- pants to secure relief for fiduciary breach under ERISA. The majority also gives short shrift to our decision in Rus- sell. See ante, at 509­510. It is only by overlooking the lan- guage and structure of ERISA and our reasoning in Russell that the majority is able to reach the conclusion that it does. I begin with the Court's failure to address our reasoning and analysis in Russell. We held in Russell that under § 409, "actions for breach of fiduciary duty [must] be brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole." 473 U. S., at 142, n. 9. Because the holding in Russell ap- plied only to §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), and because we reserved the question of individual relief under § 502(a)(3), see id., at 139, n. 5, the majority concludes that "Russell does not con- trol, either implicitly or explicitly, the outcome of the case before us." Ante, at 510. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 523 Thomas, J., dissenting Russell cannot be so easily dismissed. Our holding in that case was based not only on the text of § 409, but also on "the statutory provisions defining the duties of a fiduciary, and [on] the provisions defining the rights of a beneficiary." 473 U. S., at 140. The language of § 409 weighed heavily in our analysis, but it was ultimately "[a] fair contextual reading of the statute," id., at 142, that led to our conclusion that "Con- gress did not intend that section to authorize any relief ex- cept for the plan itself." Id., at 144. The majority is simply wrong when it states that the language "the Court found limiting" in Russell appears only in § 409. Ante, at 509. Since our holding in Russell relied on the language and structure of ERISA as a whole, and not solely on the text of §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), the Court cannot dismiss Russell on the ground that Russell provides no insight into the provisions at issue in this case. Much of our reasoning in Russell forecloses the possibility of individual relief even under § 502(a)(3). For instance, in interpreting § 409 in Russell to afford relief solely on behalf of the plan, we found it significant that "the relevant fidu- ciary relationship characterized at the outset [of § 409 is] one `with respect to a plan.' " 473 U. S., at 140. It must also be significant, then, that Congress employed the same or similar language virtually every time it referred to a fiduciary or a fiduciary obligation in ERISA. See, e. g., §§ 3(21)(A), 404, 405, 406, 409, 411, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1104, 1105, 1106, 1109, 1111. Section 404, the very provision that respond- ents seek to enforce in this case, governs the manner in which "a fiduciary . . . discharge[s] his duties with respect to a plan." § 404(a)(1) (emphasis added). And the definition of a fiduciary under ERISA also places the focus on the responsibilities of a "fiduciary with respect to a plan." § 3(21)(A) (emphasis added). In light of the "basic canon of statutory construction that identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning," Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drill- ing Co., 505 U. S. 469, 479 (1992) (citation omitted), we should 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 524 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting accord Congress' repeated references to a "fiduciary with re- spect to a plan" the same significance we attributed to it in Russell, namely, that it reveals that ERISA's fiduciary obli- gations were designed to regulate the relationship between the fiduciary and the plan, and not the relationship between the fiduciary and individual participants. Furthermore, "the emphasis on the relationship between the fiduciary and the plan as an entity" that we found to be "apparent" on the face of § 409, Russell, 473 U. S., at 140, pervades all of the fiduciary provisions in ERISA. This is to be expected, since the relief available under § 409 ulti- mately reflects the fiduciary duties and obligations that § 409 enforces. We recognized in Russell that, consistent with the wording of § 409, "the principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to the proper management, adminis- tration, and investment of fund assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest." Id., at 142­143. Though it is true that ERISA requires fiduciaries to dis- charge their "duties with respect to a plan solely in the inter- est of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclu- sive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries," § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), it is equally true that the duties to which these commands apply deal primarily with obligations that relate to the plan, not individual plan partici- pants. In fact, one of the two statutes we specifically cited in Russell as evidence that Congress was primarily con- cerned with the misuse of plan assets was § 404, the provision that respondents seek to enforce in this case. See 473 U. S., at 142­143, and n. 10.3 That Congress was principally con- 3 We also observed in Russell that the Act's legislative history, like its statutory provisions, "emphasize[s] the fiduciary's personal liability for losses to the plan." 473 U. S., at 140, n. 8 (emphasis in original). We gleaned from the legislative history that "the crucible of congressional concern was misuse and mismanagement of plan assets by plan administra- tors and that ERISA was designed to prevent these abuses in the future." Id., at 141, n. 8. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 525 Thomas, J., dissenting cerned with "the financial integrity of the plan," id., at 142, n. 9, is thus reflected not only in § 409, but throughout the fiduciary provisions § 409 enforces.4 Thus, though the majority finds Russell to be irrelevant, it is all but dispositive. We analyzed in that case all of the provisions the Court today holds to be enforceable through § 502(a)(3). We considered these provisions as part of our "contextual reading" of § 409, and only when we read § 409 in conjunction with these surrounding provisions did it become "abundantly clear that [§ 409's] draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual beneficiary." Russell, supra, at 142. This is not to say that Congress did not intend to pro- tect plan participants from fiduciary breach; it surely did. Congress chose, however, to protect individuals by creating a single remedy on behalf of the plan rather than authorizing piecemeal suits for individual relief. Given Congress' apparent intent to allow suit for breach of fiduciary duty exclusively under §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), and given the abundant evidence of Congress' intent to authorize only relief on behalf of the plan, I would hold that individual relief for fiduciary breach is unavailable under § 502(a)(3). 4 The majority's citation of § 502(l), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(l) (1988 ed., Supp. I), in support of its interpretation of § 502(a)(3) is unpersuasive. Section 502(l) was enacted by Congress in 1989, more than a decade after ERISA was initially enacted. We have recognized that in interpreting ERISA, as with all statutes, " `the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazard- ous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.' " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 114 (1989) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960)). See also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839­840 (1988). In any event, to the extent that § 502(l) indicates Congress' understanding (in 1989) that individual relief might be available for fiduciary breach, § 502(l) confirms that Congress did not believe that § 502(a)(3) affords such relief. That is the most reasonable inference from Congress' citation of §§ 502(a)(2) and (a)(5)-and, notably, not of § 502(a)(3)-in reference to statutes purport- edly authorizing amounts to be paid to plan participants and beneficiaries. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 526 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting II Even assuming that ERISA authorizes recovery for breach of fiduciary duty by individual plan participants, I cannot agree with the majority that Varity committed any breach of fiduciary duty cognizable under ERISA. Section 3(21)(A) of the Act explicitly defines the extent to which a person will be considered a fiduciary under ERISA. See 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A). In place of the statutory language, the majority creates its own standard for determining fidu- ciary status. But constrained, as I am, to follow the com- mand of the statute, I conclude that Varity's conduct is not actionable as a fiduciary breach under the Act.5 A Under ERISA, an employer is permitted to act both as plan sponsor and plan administrator. § 408(c)(3), 29 U. S. C. § 1108(c)(3) (1988 ed.). Employers who choose to administer their own plans assume responsibilities to both the company and the plan, and, accordingly, owe duties of loyalty and care to both entities. In permitting such arrangements, which ordinary trust law generally forbids due to the inherent po- tential for conflict of interest,6 Congress understood that the 5 As explained supra, at 524, the principal duties that ERISA imposes on plan fiduciaries involve the management of plan assets, the maintenance of records, disclosure of specified information, and avoidance of conflicts of interest. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 142­143 (1985). Accordingly, we have recognized that "[f]iduciary status under ERISA generally attends the management of `plan assets.' " John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86, 89 (1993). However, since the Court holds that individual plan partici- pants are entitled to recover for breach of fiduciary duty, I proceed here on the assumption that fiduciary status can be predicated to some extent on interactions with individual plan participants. 6 See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 329­330 (1981) ("To deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his loyalties must be en- forced with `uncompromising rigidity.' A fiduciary cannot contend `that, 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 527 Thomas, J., dissenting interests of the plan might be sacrificed if an employer were forced to choose between the company and the plan. Hence, Congress imposed on plan administrators a duty of care that requires them to "discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiar- ies." § 404(a)(1). Congress also understood, however, that virtually every business decision an employer makes can have an adverse impact on the plan, and that an employer would not be able to run a company profitably if every busi- ness decision had to be made in the best interests of plan participants. In defining the term "fiduciary" in § 3(21)(A) of ERISA, Congress struck a balance that it believed would protect plan participants without impinging on the ability of employers to make business decisions. In recognition that ERISA allows trustee-beneficiary arrangements that the common law of trusts generally forbids, Congress "define[d] `fiduciary' not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan." Mertens, 508 U. S., at 262 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, under ERISA, a person "is a fiduciary with respect to a plan" only "to the extent" that "he has any discretionary authority or discre- tionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (1988 ed.).7 This although he had conflicting interests, he served his masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of his secondary one' ") (citations omitted). See also G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 121, 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1993). 7 A person is also a "fiduciary with respect to a plan" under ERISA "to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, [or] (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so." § 3(21)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A). In this case, the parties agree that Varity's status as a fiduciary turns on an interpretation of the statute's third category, which 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 528 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting "artificial definition of `fiduciary,' " Mertens, supra, at 255, n. 5, is designed, in part, so that an employer that adminis- ters its own plan is not a fiduciary to the plan for all purposes and at all times, but only to the extent that it has discretion- ary authority to administer the plan. When the employer is not acting as plan administrator, it is not a fiduciary under the Act, and the fiduciary duty of care codified in § 404 is not activated. Though we have recognized that Congress borrowed from the common law of trusts in enacting ERISA, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 111 (1989), we must not forget that ERISA is a statute, and in " `every case involving construction of a statute,' " the " `starting point . . . is the language itself.' " Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976) (citation omitted); see Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994). We should be particularly careful to abide by the statutory text in this case, since, as explained, ERISA's statutory definition of a fiduciary departs from the common law in an important respect. The majority, how- ever, tells us that the "starting point" in determining fidu- ciary status under ERISA is the common law of trusts. Ante, at 497. According to the majority, it is only "after" courts assess the common law that they may "go on" to con- sider the statutory definition, and even then the statutory inquiry is only "to ask whether, or to what extent, the lan- guage of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust requirements." Ibid. This is a novel approach to statutory construction, one that stands our traditional approach on its head. To determine whether an employer acts as a fiduciary under ERISA, I begin with the text of § 3(21)(A)(iii). To "administer" a plan is to "manage or supervise the execution relates to plan administration. See Brief for Petitioner 31; Brief for Respondents 33. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 529 Thomas, J., dissenting . . . or conduct of" the plan. Webster's Ninth New Colle- giate Dictionary 57 (1991). See also Webster's New Inter- national Dictionary 34 (2d ed. 1957) (same). Essentially, to administer the plan is to implement its provisions and to carry out plan duties imposed by the Act. The question in this case is whether Varity was carrying out discretionary responsibilities over management or implementation of the plan, when, as respondents argued below, it "made misrepre- sentations to the class plaintiffs about MCC's business pros- pects and about the anticipated effect of the employment transfers on plaintiffs' benefits." Brief for Plaintiffs- Appellees in No. 93­2056 (CA8), p. 27. Although represen- tations of this sort may well affect plan participants' assess- ment of the security of their benefits, I disagree with the majority that such communications qualify as "plan adminis- tration" under the Act. In the course of running a business, an employer that ad- ministers its own benefits plan will make countless business decisions that affect the plan. Congress made clear in § 3(21)(A), however, that " `ERISA does not require that "day-to-day corporate business transactions, which may have a collateral effect on prospective, contingent employee bene- fits, be performed solely in the interest of plan partici- pants." ' " Adams v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 905 F. 2d 943, 947 (CA6) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 984 (1990). Thus, ordinary business decisions, such as whether to pay a dividend or to incur debt, may be made without fear of liability for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, even though they may turn out to have negative consequences for plan participants. Even business decisions that directly af- fect the plan and plan participants, such as the decision to modify or terminate welfare benefits, are not governed by ERISA's fiduciary obligations because they do not involve discretionary administration of the plan. See Curtiss- Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78 (1995) (par- 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 530 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting enthetically quoting Adams, supra, at 947, for the proposi- tion that " `a company does not act in a fiduciary capacity when deciding to amend or terminate a welfare benefits plan' "). In contrast, the discretionary interpretation of a plan term, or the discretionary determination that the plan does not authorize a certain type of procedure, would likely qualify as plan administration by a fiduciary. There is no claim in this case, however, that Varity failed to implement the plan according to its terms, since respondents actually received all of the benefits to which they were entitled under the plan, as the courts below found. An employer will also make countless representations in the course of managing a business about the current and ex- pected financial condition of the corporation.8 Similarly, an employer may make representations that either directly or impliedly evince an intention to increase, decrease, or main- tain employee welfare benefits. Like the decision to termi- nate or modify welfare benefits, the decision to make, or not to make, such representations is made in the employer's "cor- porate nonfiduciary capacity as plan sponsor or settlor," Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F. 3d 1308, 1323, n. 28 (CA5 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1066 (1995), and ERISA's fiduciary rules do not apply. Such communications simply are not made in the course of implementing the plan or executing its terms. Rather, they are the necessary incidents of conduct- ing a business, and Congress determined that employers 8 The statements Varity made in this case are typical of the kind of statements management often makes in assessing the expected financial health of the company. See App. 80 ("I believe that with the continued help and support of you we can make Massey Combines Corporation the kind of successful business enterprise which we all want to work for"); ibid. ("[D]espite the depression which persists in the North American economy, I am excited about the future of Massey Combines Corpora- tion"); id., at 82 ("We are all very optimistic that our new company, has a bright future, and are excited by the new challenges facing all of us"). 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 531 Thomas, J., dissenting would not be burdened with fiduciary obligations to the plan when engaging in such conduct. See § 3(21)(A)(iii).9 To be sure, ERISA does impose a "comprehensive set of `reporting and disclosure' requirements," which is part of "an elaborate scheme . . . for enabling beneficiaries to learn their rights and obligations at any time." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, supra, at 83; see §§ 101­111, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1021­1031.10 But no provision of ERISA requires an em- ployer to keep plan participants abreast of the plan sponsor's 9 Applying ERISA's fiduciary obligations to these types of communica- tions will distort corporate decisionmaking in a way never intended by Congress. For instance, as petitioner observes, an employer contemplat- ing the purchase of a competitor or the downsizing of a division "would be required, in order to avoid liability under ERISA, to fully describe [to its employees] its plans to do so because such plans might affect the `security' of welfare benefits." Reply Brief for Petitioner 16, n. 20. Even if the Court's holding is not extended to cover the nondisclosure of information that might affect employee benefits, a simple inquiry by an employee into the possible effect of a business decision on plan benefits would be suffi- cient to saddle the employer with fiduciary obligations in conducting the proposed business transaction. 10 For instance, the benefits plan must be established pursuant to a writ- ten instrument. § 402(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1102(a)(1). Plan administrators must also furnish to participants a summary plan description, § 101(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1021(a), which "shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan." § 102(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1022(a)(1). The summary plan description must describe, among other things, the plan's requirements governing eligibility for par- ticipation and benefits as well as the procedures for presenting claims for benefits. § 102(b), 29 U. S. C. § 1022(b). Material modifications must be disclosed and must also be "written in a manner calculated to be under- stood by the average plan participant." § 102(a)(1). Plan administrators are also required to disclose specified financial information in annual re- ports filed with the Secretary of Labor and made available to participants upon request. §§ 103(b), 104(b), 29 U. S. C. §§ 1023(b), 1024(b). ERISA also dictates the times at which such disclosures must be made. § 104(b)(1). 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 532 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting financial security or of the sponsor's future intentions with regard to terminating or reducing the level of benefits.11 And to the extent that ERISA does impose disclosure obli- gations, the Act already provides for civil liability and pen- alties for disclosure violations wholly apart from ERISA's provisions governing fiduciary duties. See §§ 502(a)(1)(A), 502(c). Though "[t]his may not be a foolproof informational scheme, . . . it is quite thorough." Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, at 84. Congress' decision not to include the types of representations at issue in this case within the Act's exten- sive disclosure requirements is strong evidence that Con- gress did not consider such statements to qualify as "plan administration." 12 11 To the contrary, "[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78 (1995). As we made clear last Term, "ERISA does not create any sub- stantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or any other kind of welfare benefits," nor does it "establish any minimum participation, vesting, or funding requirements for welfare plans as it does for pension plans." Ibid. 12 Nor is the communication of information about the company's well- being or the possible effect of a business transaction on plan benefits con- sidered plan administration under the Massey-Ferguson plan at issue in this case. The plan, the terms of which the majority fails to address, contains only two provisions that either require or authorize plan adminis- trators to communicate plan information to plan participants. The first is contained in § 8.1.3, and it requires the plan administrator to make all disclosures required by ERISA. See App. 19 (requiring plan administra- tor to file required reports with the appropriate governmental agencies and to "comply with requirements of law for disclosure of Plan provisions and other information relating to the Plan to Employees and other inter- ested parties"). The second, entitled "Communication to Employees," is contained in § 10 of the plan. That section requires the company, "[i]n accordance with the requirements of the Act, [to] communicate the princi- pal terms of the Plan to the Employees" and to "make available for inspec- tion, by Employees and their beneficiaries, during reasonable hours at the principal office of the Company and at such other places as may be re- quired by the Act, a copy of the Plan, the Trust Agreement, and of such other documents as may be required by the Act." Id., at 21. The only other responsibility the plan expressly delegates to the plan administrator 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 533 Thomas, J., dissenting Because an employer's representations about the com- pany's financial prospects or about the possible impact of ordinary business transactions on the security of unvested welfare benefits do not involve execution or implementation of duties imposed by the plan or the Act, and because these are the types of representations employers regularly make in the ordinary course of running a business, I would not hold that such communications involve plan administration. The untruthfulness of a statement cannot magically trans- form it from a nonfiduciary representation into a fiduciary one; the determinative factor is not truthfulness but the capacity in which the statement is made. B With only passing reference to the relevant statutory text, the majority discards the limits that Congress imposed on fiduciary status and replaces them with a far broader stand- ard plucked from the common law of trusts. See ante, at 502. Relying on trust treatises and our decision in Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cen- tral Transport, Inc., 472 U. S. 559 (1985), the majority con- cludes that a person engages in plan administration when- ever he exercises " `powers as are necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes' of the trust." Ante, at is the administration of claims pursuant to the plan's claims procedure, which is described in § 11 of the plan. See generally id., at 18­20 (section of plan entitled "Allocation of Responsibilities Among Named Fiduciar- ies," which enumerates all of the fiduciary obligations imposed by the plan). Though I do not claim that plan administration is necessarily limited to performance of duties imposed by the plan documents, see ante, at 504, the majority's response to this straw man argument-that ERISA's fiduciary obligations would be meaningless if only the performance of duties im- posed by the plan qualified as plan administration-is nonetheless flawed. The majority's argument is based on the mistaken assumption that a plan cannot assign discretionary authority to plan administrators (the exercise of which would clearly be subject to fiduciary duties under the Act), an assumption flatly contradicted both by the common law of trusts and by common sense. See Bogert & Bogert, supra n. 6, § 552. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 534 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting 502 (quoting 3 A. Scott & W. Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 186, p. 6 (4th ed. 1988)).13 The majority's approach is flawed in at least two respects. First, the standard that it borrows from the common law of trusts is not the common-law standard for determining whether a person is a fiduciary. Rather, it is the standard the common law uses to define the scope of a fiduciary's au- thority once it is settled that a person is a fiduciary. Thus, the Court inexplicably takes a common-law standard that presumes that a person is a fiduciary and applies it to deter- mine whether, under the statute, that person is a fiduciary in the first place. The majority's approach ignores the patent differences between the definition of a fiduciary under ERISA and the common law, and in the process expands the activities that are governed by fiduciary standards beyond those designated by the statutory text.14 13 Also, the majority twice looks to § 404(a) in attempting to determine the scope of fiduciary status under ERISA. See ante, at 502, 511. Spe- cifically, the majority relies on § 404(a)(1)(D), which requires a fiduciary to discharge his duties "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan." But § 404(a)(1)(D) does not determine whether a person is acting as a fiduciary. Like the other provisions of § 404, it merely establishes a ground rule for functions performed by a person deemed to be a fiduciary under § 3(21)(A). The majority cannot rely on § 404(a)(1)(D) to determine whether a person has assumed fiduciary status, since that provision applies only after it has been established that a person is a fiduciary. 14 The majority's reliance on Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U. S. 559 (1985) (cited ante, at 502), illustrates the flaw in the majority's approach. Although we quoted there the same passage from the Scott treatise that the majority substitutes for the text of § 3(21)(A), see Central States, supra, at 570, the Court was not attempting to determine in that case, as we are here, whether a person was acting as a fiduciary with respect to a plan under § 3(21)(A). There was no question that the trustee in Central States was a fiduciary under § 3(21)(A), and there was no question that the audit the trustees wished to perform was a fiduciary function. The only question in Central States was whether the plan trustees, who were admittedly 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 535 Thomas, J., dissenting Second, the majority disregards any possible distinction between the respective roles of an ERISA trustee and an ERISA plan administrator that might counsel against the wholesale importation, into the statutory definition of plan administration, of common-law rules governing trustees. Under ERISA, a plan trustee is charged with "exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan." § 403, 29 U. S. C. § 1103. Because the trustee's authority over plan assets is exclusive, a plan administrator under ERISA lacks the pre-eminent responsibility of the common-law trustee, namely, the management of the trust corpus. Thus, while it may be true under the common law that a trustee has such powers as are necessary to further the purposes of the trust, it does not automatically follow that the administrator of a benefits plan (who by definition lacks authority over plan assets) possesses all authority "necessary or appropriate" for carrying out the purposes of the plan. And the majority cites no authority for its as- sumption that an ERISA plan administrator is the functional equivalent of a common-law trustee. See ante, at 502, 505, 506. At bottom, the majority's analysis is an exercise in ques- tion begging. If speculating about the company's financial stability or the security of plan benefits does not involve dis- cretionary authority in plan administration, it is wholly irrel- evant that providing such information "would seem" to be related to "carrying out an important plan purpose." Ante, at 502. That a communication was "about benefits," ante, at 501, or an activity was of a "plan-related nature," ante, at 503, is also of little significance unless the act involved plan administration. The whole purpose of § 3(21)(A)(iii) is to fiduciaries, were authorized by the plan to perform this concededly fidu- ciary function. Like the common-law principle cited therein, the Central States dicta only becomes relevant once it is settled that a person is a fiduciary. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 536 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting make clear that one who engages even in benefit-related or plan-related conduct is a fiduciary only "to the extent" he has discretionary authority to administer the plan. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86, 104­105 (1993) (Congress uses the phrase "to the extent" to make clear that "to some extent" actions that would otherwise be included in a general category were meant to be excluded). The majority's end run around this important limitation by reference to inapplicable principles from the common law of trusts is unpersuasive. The majority confirms that the statutory text is largely irrelevant under its approach by indulging the notion that a plan participant's subjective understanding of the employers' conduct is relevant in determining whether an employer's actions qualify as "plan administration" under ERISA. The majority concludes that Varity was engaged in plan adminis- tration in part on the ground that "reasonable employees . . . could have thought" that Varity was administering the plan. Ante, at 503. ERISA does not make a person a fiduciary to the extent reasonable employees believe him to be a fidu- ciary, but rather to the extent "he has any discretionary au- thority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." § 3(21)(A)(iii). Under ERISA, an act either involves plan administration, or it does not; whether the em- ployees have a subjective belief that the employer is acting as a fiduciary cannot matter. A rule turning on the subjec- tive perceptions of plan participants is simply inconsistent with ERISA's fundamental structure, which is built not upon perceptions, but "around reliance on the face of written plan documents." Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U. S., at 83.15 15 As petitioner observed: "It is difficult to imagine a situation involving any communication in any `context' as to future business decisions that might affect a participant's benefit choices that could not `reasonably' be viewed by employees as an act of a plan administrator, especially when employees directly ask about such intentions." Reply Brief for Petitioner 18 (emphasis in original). 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 537 Thomas, J., dissenting C Finally, the majority's conclusion that a fiduciary duty was breached is based upon an inaccurate assessment of the rec- ord in this case. It is true that Varity expressed falsely op- timistic forecasts about its new venture's prospects for suc- cess in an effort to entice employees to transfer to the new company. But the majority, I believe, tells only part of the story when it states that "the basic message conveyed to the employees was that transferring from Massey-Ferguson to Massey Combines would not significantly undermine the se- curity of their benefits." Ante, at 501. As I read the rec- ord, the message Varity conveyed was that the security of jobs and benefits would be contingent upon the success of the new company. Varity repeatedly informed its employ- ees that "[e]mployment conditions in the future will depend on our ability to make Massey Combines Corporation a suc- cess and if changes are considered necessary or appropriate, they will be made." App. 76 (emphasis added).16 The ma- jority also fails to note that the plan documents expressly reserved to Varity the right "[t]o Terminate, Suspend, With- draw, Amend or Modify the Plan in Whole or in Part." Id., 16 See also App. 80 (transcript of videotape message to employees) ("When you transfer your employment to the Massey Combines Corpora- tion, pay levels and benefit programs will remain unchanged. . . . Employ- ment conditions in the future will depend on the success of the Massey Combines Corporation and should changes be deemed appropriate or nec- essary, they will be made"); id., at 82 (cover letter to employees) ("When you accept employment with Massey Combines Corporation, pay levels and benefit programs will remain unchanged. . . . Employment conditions in the future will depend on our ability to make Massey Combines Corpo- ration a success, and if changes are considered necessary or appropriate, they will be made"). When read in light of the District Court's finding that the combines industry had been in a state of "unprecedented decline [for the four years prior to the creation of MCC] . . . caused in significant part by an extreme depression in this country's agricultural economy," App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a, the company's qualifications take on even greater significance. 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT 538 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE Thomas, J., dissenting at 43. The Court thus holds today that an employer breaches a fiduciary obligation to participants in an ERISA plan when it makes optimistic statements about the com- pany's financial condition and thereby implies that unvested welfare benefits will be secure, even though the employer simultaneously informs plan participants that changes will be made if economic conditions so require and the plan docu- ments expressly authorize the employer to terminate the un- vested welfare benefits at any time. I cannot agree with this result. III I do not read the Court's opinion to extend fiduciary liabil- ity to all instances in which the Court's rationale would logi- cally apply. Indeed, the Court's awkward articulation of its holding confirms that this case is quite limited. See ante, at 503 ("We conclude . . . that the factual context in which the statements were made, combined with the plan-related nature of the activity, engaged in by those who had plan- related authority to do so, together provide sufficient support for the District Court's legal conclusion that Varity was act- ing as a fiduciary"); ante, at 505 ("[W]e hold that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits in that context is an act of plan administration") (emphasis added). If not limited to cases involving facts similar to those pre- sented in this case, the Court's expansion of recovery for fiduciary breach to individuals and its substantial broadening of the definition of fiduciary will undermine the careful bal- ance Congress struck in enacting ERISA. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S., at 54 (ERISA's "civil enforce- ment scheme . . . represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans"); Mertens, 508 U. S., at 262­263. Although Congress sought to guarantee that employees receive the welfare benefits promised by employers, Congress was also 516us2$34N 10-22-98 14:17:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 516 U. S. 489 (1996) 539 Thomas, J., dissenting aware that if the cost of providing welfare benefits rose too high, employers would not provide them at all. See Russell, 473 U. S., at 148, n. 17 (warning against expanding liability beyond that intended by Congress, "lest the cost of federal standards discourage the growth of private pension plans") (citation omitted); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F. 2d 1155, 1170 (CA3 1990) (recognizing "Congress's judg- ment that employees themselves are best served by an en- forcement regime that minimizes employers' expected liabil- ity for reporting and disclosure violations-and with it, the disincentives against creating employee benefit plans in the first place").17 Application of the Court's holding in the many cases in which it may logically apply could result in significantly increased liability, or at the very least height- ened litigation costs, and an eventual reduction in plan bene- fits to accommodate those costs. Fortunately, the import of the Court's holdings appears to be far more modest, and courts should not feel compelled to bind employers to the strict fiduciary standards of ERISA just because an ordinary business decision turns out to have an adverse impact on the plan. I respectfully dissent. 17 That is presumably why Congress exempted welfare benefits from the stringent, and costly, vesting requirements imposed on pension benefits. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U. S., at 78. 10-24-98 19:28:08 516ordnot1 Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 539 and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita- tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS FOR OCTOBER 2, 1995, THROUGH MARCH 18, 1996 October 2, 1995 Affirmed on Appeal No. 94­1922. Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council, Inc., et al. v. Sundquist, Governor of Tennessee, et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Tenn. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Reported below: 877 F. Supp. 1096. Appeal Dismissed No. 95­132. Voinovich, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Quilter, Speaker Pro Tempore of Ohio House of Repre- sentatives, et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio dismissed. The stay granted by this Court on September 8, 1995 [515 U. S. 1184], is continued pending final disposition by this Court of the appeal in No. 95­378, Voinovich, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Quilter, Speaker Pro Tempore of Ohio House of Representa- tives, et al. Vacated and Remanded on Appeal No. 94­2032. Franklin et al. v. Lawrimore et al. Appeal from D. C. S. C. Judgment vacated and case remanded to the District Court for entry of a fresh judgment from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­1871. Exxon Corp. v. Youell et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U. S. 277 (1995). Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 105. No. 94­1926. Kapoor v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further 801 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 802 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. consideration in light of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995). Reported below: 54 F. 3d 765. No. 94­1931. Edmond v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177 (1995). Reported below: 41 M. J. 419. No. 94­2090. Pacesetter Construction Co., Inc. v. Car- penters 46 Northern California Counties Conference Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of First Op- tions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938 (1995). Reported below: 51 F. 3d 281. Certiorari Dismissed No. S­2. Rees v. Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 341 F. 2d 859. No. 95­5066. Byron v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari dis- missed. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 279, 647 N. E. 2d 946. Miscellaneous Orders. (For revisions to the Rules of this Court effective this date, see 515 U. S. 1195.) No. A­274. Religious Technology Center v. F. A. C. T. NET, Inc., et al. D. C. Colo. Application for stay pending appeal, addressed to Justice Souter and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1526. In re Disbarment of Rutledge. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 514 U. S. 1013.] No. D­1531. In re Disbarment of Maddox. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 514 U. S. 1060.] No. D­1564. In re Disbarment of Muraski. Motion to defer further consideration of rule to show cause granted. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1156.] No. D­1571. In re Disbarment of Peck. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1172.] No. D­1573. In re Disbarment of Hoppmann. Motion to defer further consideration of rule to show cause granted. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1172.] 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 803 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. M­77 (O. T. 1994). Marian v. Scott et al. Motion for reconsideration of order denying leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [515 U. S. 1129] denied. No. M­78 (O. T. 1994). Arnette v. Allstate Insurance Co. Motion for reconsideration of order denying leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [515 U. S. 1129] denied. No. M­79 (O. T. 1994). Holder v. Harlem Men's Shelter; No. M­1. Whitehead v. Deutsch, Director of Central Intelligence; No. M­2. Buoscio v. Spade et ux.; No. M­3. Mohammed v. Scheve et ux.; No. M­4. Lewis v. United States; No. M­5. Reynolds, Warden v. Banks; No. M­6. Perry v. House of Representatives; No. M­7. Stage v. Department of Labor; No. M­8. Zapon et al. v. Department of Justice; No. M­9. Doe v. Washington; No. M­10. Whitehead v. Deutsch, Director of Central Intelligence; No. M­11. Hunt v. United States; No. M­13. Fraser v. Pennsylvania System of Higher Ed- ucation et al.; and No. M­14. Miles v. Gramley, Warden. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­12. Gulledge v. Kansas. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is awarded $3,999.78 for the period April 1 through June 30, 1995, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 514 U. S. 1095.] No. 94­1268. Joint School District No. 241 et al. v. Harris, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of Her Two Children, Butler and Harris, et al.; and No. 94­1314. Citizens Preserving America's Heritage, Inc., et al. v. Harris, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of Her Two Children, Butler and Harris, et al., 515 U. S. 1154. Motion of respondents to retax costs denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 804 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1283 (D­1590). Qualls v. Regional Transportation District et al.; and Qualls et al. v. Regional Transporta- tion District et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondents Regional Transportation District et al. for an order to show cause granted. It is ordered that David L. Smith, of Denver, Colo., shall within 21 days of this order pay respondents $500 as ordered by this Court on March 6, 1995 [514 U. S. 1010], and show cause in writing why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court or otherwise disciplined for failure to comply with an order of this Court. David L. Smith is hereby suspended from practice before this Court pending the timely filing and consideration of his response to the order to show cause. No. 94­1412. Fuentes v. United States, 515 U. S. 1102. The Solicitor General is invited to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days. No. 94­1511. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al. v. Casey et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certio- rari granted, 514 U. S. 1126.] Further consideration of motion of respondents to strike Appendix A of brief of petitioners deferred to hearing of case on the merits. No. 94­1868. North Carolina Power v. North Carolina Utilities Commission. Sup. Ct. N. C.; and No. 95­27. Merrill et al. v. Barbour. C. A. D. C. Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases ex- pressing the views of the United States. No. 94­9688. Vey v. Romoff et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; and No. 95­5139. Luna v. Sutherland et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioners are allowed until October 23, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­9729. Chersin et al. v. Machine Tool Finance Corp. et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 23, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 805 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9253. In re Sheehy et ux. Super. Ct. Pa. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied. No. 94­9789. In re Hollingsworth; No. 95­5296. In re Johnson; No. 95­5471. In re Tavares; No. 95­5506. In re Hines; No. 95­5516. In re Long; No. 95­5604. In re Kennon; No. 95­5824. In re Wood; and No. 95­5855. In re West. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 94­2094. In re Lighter, dba Wells Fargo Protective Alarm Services Co.; No. 94­2103. In re Char Yigh Marine (Panama) S. A.; No. 94­2129. In re Hutchinson, Individually and as Per- sonal Representative of the Estate of Hutchinson, De- ceased, et al.; No. 94­9282. In re Franklin; No. 94­9405. In re Echols; No. 94­9526. In re Franklin; No. 94­9560. In re Peterson; No. 94­9643. In re Bryant; No. 94­9653. In re Lee; No. 95­269. In re Alcan Aluminum Corp.; No. 95­5175. In re Shores; No. 95­5184. In re Thornwell; No. 95­5228. In re Tamayo; No. 95­5236. In re Moore; No. 95­5452. In re Fitzpatrick; No. 95­5458. In re Crowder et al.; No. 95­5469. In re Smith; and No. 95­5512. In re Moses. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 94­9398. In re Maropulos; No. 94­9701. In re Hasan; No. 94­9749. In re Vincent; and No. 95­5486. In re Johnson. Petitions for writs of prohibi- tion denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 806 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. Certiorari Denied. (See also No. 94­9253, supra.) No. 94­1666. Frederick v. Government of the Virgin Is- lands. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­1689. Gilbert et al. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1391. No. 94­1720. Gandarillas-Zambrana, aka Gandarillas, aka Gandarillos v. Board of Immigration Appeals. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1251. No. 94­1722. Julia Saavedra Balmaceda, Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 279. No. 94­1723. Wartski et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1159. No. 94­1728. Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation v. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, et al.; and No. 94­2092. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, et al. v. Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 428. No. 94­1734. Lansing Dairy, Inc., et al. v. Glickman, Sec- retary of Agriculture, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1339. No. 94­1740. Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v. Northwest Power Planning Council et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1371. No. 94­1756. Ferrante v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1158. No. 94­1760. 60 Key Centre, Inc. v. Administrator, Gen- eral Services Administration, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 55. No. 94­1763. Muirhead et al. v. Farmers Home Adminis- tration et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 964. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 807 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­1770. Davila et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1772. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local No. 441 v. Interstate Brands Corp., Merita Bread Division. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1159. No. 94­1778. Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1096. No. 94­1796. Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 537. No. 94­1804. Williams et al. v. Ashland Engineering et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 588. No. 94­1807. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation et al. v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 325. No. 94­1817. Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. v. Gadsden Regional Medical Center, fka Baptist Hospital of Gadsden, Inc. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 655 So. 2d 995. No. 94­1823. Pierce v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 431. No. 94­1825. National Commodity & Barter Assn. et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 42 F. 3d 1406. No. 94­1827. Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers et al.; and No. 94­1997. City of Fort Myers v. Zipperer. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 619. No. 94­1831. Allen et al. v. PaineWebber, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 427. No. 94­1842. Myers & Associates, Ltd., et al. v. Trinity Industries, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 229. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 808 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1845. Norton et al. v. Houston Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 530. No. 94­1846. Barnard v. Jackson County et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1218. No. 94­1848. BMMG, Inc., et al. v. American Telecast Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1398. No. 94­1849. Eagleston v. Guido et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 865. No. 94­1850. Czekaj et al. v. California. App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., Santa Barbara County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1851. M & J Coal Co. et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1148. No. 94­1853. Castriotta v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Nev. 67, 888 P. 2d 927. No. 94­1854. Barkauskas v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 260 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 675 N. E. 2d 659. No. 94­1856. Candela v. Woods. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 545. No. 94­1858. Spottedwolf et al. v. Woods Petroleum Corp. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1032. No. 94­1859. Powell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 897 S. W. 2d 307. No. 94­1861. Martinez Musquiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 927. No. 94­1863. Versa Products Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Man- ufacturing) Ltd. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 189. No. 94­1864. Hennessey et al. v. Blalack et al. (three judgments). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 809 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 49 F. 3d 728 (first judgment); 47 F. 3d 427 (second judgment) and 425 (third judgment). No. 94­1865. First Pacific Bank et al. v. Gilleran et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1023. No. 94­1866. Northwest Title & Escrow Corp. v. Edina Realty, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 48 F. 3d 1224. No. 94­1867. American Life League, Inc., et al. v. Reno, Attorney General. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 47 F. 3d 642. No. 94­1869. In re Eubanks, dba Lawyer Complaint Service. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 1193. No. 94­1872. Deibler et ux. v. Atlantic Properties Group, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 652 A. 2d 553. No. 94­1874. Porter-Cooper v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1285. No. 94­1876. Mauk et ux. v. Engle, Director, Washington County Department of Social Services. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 Md. App. 274, 646 A. 2d 1036. No. 94­1877. Maisonet v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 App. Div. 2d 297, 618 N. Y. S. 2d 718. No. 94­1879. Islam et al. v. Creative Tours Micronesia, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1102. No. 94­1880. Homestead Insurance Co. v. Zoppo et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 552, 644 N. E. 2d 397. No. 94­1884. Wolfe v. Allegheny Beverage Corp. et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 166 Pa. Commw. 646, 646 A. 2d 762. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 810 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1886. Waldau v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 181. No. 94­1887. Willingham et al. v. Sac and Fox Nation. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1061. No. 94­1888. Sime et al. v. City of Rohnert Park. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1889. Miele et al. v. Perini Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­1891. Thacker v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 S. W. 2d 380. No. 94­1892. Damian et al. v. Galayda. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 421, 644 N. E. 2d 298. No. 94­1894. Cadle Co. v. Bankston & Lobingier et al. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 868 S. W. 2d 918. No. 94­1895. Payne et al. v. Kaplan, Administrator of the Estate of Kaplan, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1363. No. 94­1896. Romero et ux. v. Kmart Corp., dba Kmart Discount Store No. 7061. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1005. No. 94­1897. Fox v. Department of Justice. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1898. Grynberg v. Klein et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­1901. La Societe Generale Immobiliere et al. v. Minneapolis Community Development Agency et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 629. No. 94­1902. Fausto-Rendon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1146. No. 94­1903. Hochberg et al. v. Howlett et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 3. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 811 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­1904. Radio Association Defending Airwave Rights, Inc., et al. v. Department of Transportation, Fed- eral Highway Administration. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 794. No. 94­1905. Gallo-Chamorro v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 502. No. 94­1907. Wilson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 211. No. 94­1908. Manhard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen- ner & Smith, Inc., et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 N. Y. 2d 193, 647 N. E. 2d 1308. No. 94­1909. Winpenny v. Winpenny. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 348, 643 A. 2d 677. No. 94­1910. Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 Wis. 2d 206, 525 N. W. 2d 754. No. 94­1911. Robinson v. Benton et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1156. No. 94­1912. Metcalf, Director, Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services v. Rehabilitation Associa- tion of Virginia, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 42 F. 3d 1444. No. 94­1913. Edwards v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1047. No. 94­1914. Cozad v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1231. No. 94­1917. Gumbus et al. v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, AFL­CIO/CLC, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1168. No. 94­1918. Texans United Education Fund v. Texaco Inc. et al. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 858 S. W. 2d 38. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 812 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1919. Tap Electrical Contracting Service, Inc. v. Sweeney, New York State Commissioner of Labor. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 App. Div. 2d 547, 616 N. Y. S. 2d 86. No. 94­1920. Okun et ux. v. Oklahoma. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1921. Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County, Virginia v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 520. No. 94­1923. Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Lai et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1299. No. 94­1924. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 362. No. 94­1925. Short Hills Associates, fka Prutaub Joint Venture v. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Mid- dle East et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 N. J. 326, 650 A. 2d 757. No. 94­1927. Albert v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 Cal. App. 4th 529, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777. No. 94­1928. ConAgra, Inc., et al. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 443. No. 94­1929. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. John- sen. Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 119 N. M. 245, 889 P. 2d 853. No. 94­1930. Association of National Advertisers, Inc., et al. v. Lungren, Attorney General of California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 726. No. 94­1932. Duplitronics, Inc. v. Concept Design Elec- tronics & Manufacturing, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 342. No. 94­1933. Sobiecki v. United States; and 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 813 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9078. Brozek-Lukaszuk et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 387. No. 94­1934. Myers, Warden, et al. v. Jiminez. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 976. No. 94­1936. Schultz v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1152. No. 94­1937. Coalition for Free and Open Elections et al. v. McElderry, Chairman of the Oklahoma State Election Board, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 493. No. 94­1938. Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc., et al. v. Hudson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 832. No. 94­1943. Alexander v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 644 So. 2d 238. No. 94­1944. Moss v. Bernard. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 4. No. 94­1945. Perkins, Individually and on Behalf of Penn v. Guey et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 46 F. 3d 478. No. 94­1946. Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Wel- fare v. Idell S. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 325. No. 94­1947. Love v. Pepersack et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 120. No. 94­1948. Harrel v. University of Houston et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1004. No. 94­1951. Alf et al. v. Florida; Alspaugh et al. v. Florida; and Dupuy et al. v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 691 (first judgment), 1211 (second judgment), and 692 (third judgment). No. 94­1952. City of Hayward, California v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 832. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 814 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1953. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 594. No. 94­1954. Kissinger et al. v. Arkansas State Highway Commission. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1224. No. 94­1955. County of Boyd et al. v. US Ecology, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 359. No. 94­1956. Branson v. Fletcher et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1227. No. 94­1957. Hayes, Spouse of Hayes and Tutrix for Hayes et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 377. No. 94­1958. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., dba Sam's Whole- sale Club v. Follette et ux., Individually and as Next Friends of Follette, a Minor Child. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1234 and 47 F. 3d 311. No. 94­1959. Williams v. Garraghty. Sup. Ct. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 224, 455 S. E. 2d 209. No. 94­1960. Freeman et vir v. Simon et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1156. No. 94­1961. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 727. No. 94­1962. Kieffer v. Bank of America et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1963. Nesladek, Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Nesladek, Deceased v. Ford Motor Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 734. No. 94­1965. Charash v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1967. Montoya et ux. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1286. No. 94­1970. Gulf South Medical & Surgical Institute et al. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 520. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 815 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­1971. Shiley, Inc., et al. v. Michael. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1316. No. 94­1972. Foster v. Northwestern Electric Coopera- tive, Inc. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1974. Koukios, dba Scientific Information Sys- tems v. Marketing Dynamics Inc., dba Lite America. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1975. Bardney v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1134. No. 94­1976. Alaska State Legislature v. Alaska et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1977. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Free- hold Cogeneration Associates, L. P.; and No. 94­1995. New Jersey Division of the Ratepayer Ad- vocate v. Freehold Cogeneration Associates, L. P., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1178. No. 94­1979. Lussier v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1103. No. 94­1980. Williams et al. v. Pollard et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 433. No. 94­1981. Braswell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1127. No. 94­1982. Ratliff v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1983. Cazey v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 669. No. 94­1984. Gensburg et al. v. Miller et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 Cal. App. 4th 512, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97. No. 94­1986. Viswanathan v. Mississippi County Commu- nity College Board of Trustees. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 Ark. 810, 887 S. W. 2d 531. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 816 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1987. Glover Bottled Gas Corp. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1230. No. 94­1989. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Carroll et al.; and No. 95­112. Carroll et al. v. Litton Systems, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1164. No. 94­1990. ANR Pipeline Co. et al. v. Oklahoma Board of Equalization et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 P. 2d 1219. No. 94­1991. Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 198. No. 94­1992. Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1562. No. 94­1993. Hall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­1994. Huebner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 376. No. 94­1996. Anderson v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 Md. App. 713. No. 94­1998. Capital Wholesale Electric, Inc. v. Mc- Carthy Construction Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 13. No. 94­1999. Fontanille v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2000. Wood v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 530. No. 94­2001. Woodpointe Inn Associates Limited Part- nership et al. v. City of Harper Woods et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1220. No. 94­2002. Morris v. Oregon Department of Revenue. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 320 Ore. 579, 889 P. 2d 1294. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 817 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­2004. CCC Information Services Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 61. No. 94­2005. United States v. Xerox Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 647. No. 94­2006. Hopewell Cogeneration Limited Partner- ship et al. v. Virginia Corporation Commission. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 107, 453 S. E. 2d 277. No. 94­2007. Drew v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 823. No. 94­2008. Grunewald v. Katinsly. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1037. No. 94­2009. Gurley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1188. No. 94­2010. Brown v. Maintenance & Industrial Serv- ices, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1167. No. 94­2011. Ray Qualmann Marine Construction, Inc. v. San, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of San, Deceased. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 652 So. 2d 831. No. 94­2012. Jacobs v. Grievance Committee for the Eastern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 84. No. 94­2013. Hammoud, aka Givan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 310. No. 94­2014. Jones et al. v. Resolution Trust Corpora- tion et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 587. No. 94­2015. Stark et al. v. Reinke, dba Lakeside Prop- erties. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 166. No. 94­2017. Salt Lake County et al. v. Sheets. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1383. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 818 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­2018. Gregory v. Thomas L. Jacobs & Associates et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 531. No. 94­2019. Oryx Energy Co., fka Sun Gas Co., Inc. v. Bourque et al. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 643 So. 2d 1337. No. 94­2020. Ishmael v. United States; and No. 94­9641. Ishmael v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 850. No. 94­2021. Geraci v. Eckankar. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 526 N. W. 2d 391. No. 94­2023. Dalberto v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 436 Pa. Super. 391, 648 A. 2d 16. No. 94­2024. Educational Development Network Corp. et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 47 F. 3d 1162. No. 94­2025. Engstrom et al. v. First National Bank of Eagle Lake. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1459. No. 94­2026. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Assn., AFL­CIO v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2028. Chemalali v. District of Columbia. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 A. 2d 1226. No. 94­2029. Fields v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 45 F. 3d 430. No. 94­2030. Harkins et al. v. Scattered Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 857. No. 94­2031. Valerio v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1162. No. 94­2033. Collins v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 428. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 819 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­2034. Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S. A. v. Young et al. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 645 So. 2d 1266. No. 94­2035. Gregori et al. v. Schwartz. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1017. No. 94­2036. Hawaiian Homes Commission et al. v. Aged Hawaiians. Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 Haw. 192, 891 P. 2d 279. No. 94­2038. Fleming v. Greater St. Louis Area Major Case Squad et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 48 F. 3d 1223. No. 94­2039. Nissei ASB Co. v. FMT Corp., Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2040. Burgmeier et al. v. Agribank, FCB, fka Federal Land Bank of St. Paul. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­2041. Sanitary and Improvement District No. 210 of Douglas County, Nebraska v. City of Omaha et al. Ct. App. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 Neb. App. lxxi. No. 94­2042. Blakeney v. Baker Hughes, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1032. No. 94­2043. Cameron et al. v. General Motors Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2044. Industrial Excess Landfill Inc. et al. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1168. No. 94­2045. Pummell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 11. No. 94­2046. Schrock v. McAninch, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 10. No. 94­2047. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Company of South Dakota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 560. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 820 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­2048. Reed v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 449. No. 94­2049. Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 Cal. App. 4th 195, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740. No. 94­2051. Jumonville v. Rubin, Secretary of Treas- ury. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1033. No. 94­2052. Crisan v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., et al.; and DiDonato v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2055. Lawrence v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 94­2056. Kearns v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., et al.; Kearns v. Woods Motors, Inc., et al.; Kearns v. Fred La- very Porsche et al.; Kearns v. Ferrari S. p. A. et al.; and Kearns v. United Technologies Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1194 (first judg- ment); 53 F. 3d 345 (second, third, fourth, and fifth judgments). No. 94­2057. Owen et ux. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2058. Highland Falls-Fort Montgomery Central School District et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1166. No. 94­2059. Lehto v. Allstate Insurance Co. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 Cal. App. 4th 60, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 814. No. 94­2061. Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 Kan. 602, 886 P. 2d 869. No. 94­2062. City of National City et al. v. Rattray. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 793. No. 94­2063. Primedical, Inc., et al. v. Allied Invest- ment Corp. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1096. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 821 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­2065. Goetz et al. v. Crosson et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 800. No. 94­2066. El-Hawatky et al. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2067. TNS, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Work- ers International Union, AFL­CIO. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 82. No. 94­2070. Langdale v. Hunterdon County et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2072. Neely et al., Administrators of the Estate of Neely, Deceased v. Dade County, Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1037. No. 94­2073. Eglin v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 530. No. 94­2074. Koniag, Inc. v. Stratman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1402. No. 94­2075. L. G. v. El Paso County Department of Social Services. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 P. 2d 647. No. 94­2076. Harrison et al. v. Howard University. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 562. No. 94­2078. Montoya v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1147. No. 94­2079. Shifflett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 9. No. 94­2080. Cummings et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 529. No. 94­2082. El Shahawy et al. v. Harrison et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1049. No. 94­2083. Stern v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 822 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­2084. Adams, Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue v. Perini Corp. et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 419 Mass. 763, 647 N. E. 2d 52. No. 94­2085. Stuckey et ux. v. Cisneros, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­2086. Skrmetta Machinery Corp. v. Laitram Ma- chinery, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 343. No. 94­2087. Brown Daltas & Associates, Inc., et al. v. Northbrook Excess Surplus Insurance Co. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 30. No. 94­2088. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­2089. Downey v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 652 So. 2d 824. No. 94­2091. Barton et al. v. American Red Cross et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 678 and 679. No. 94­2093. Public Utility District No. 1, Snohomish County, Washington v. Class Plaintiffs in MDL­551 et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1513. No. 94­2095. Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 277. No. 94­2096. Schreiber v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 11. No. 94­2097. Shannon et al. v. City of Santa Ana et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1145. No. 94­2098. Abofreka v. South Carolina Board of Medi- cal Examiners. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2099. City of Houston et al. v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Assn. et al. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 S. W. 2d 322. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 823 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­2101. Salinas v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 S. W. 2d 93. No. 94­2105. Adamson et al. v. Armco, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 650. No. 94­2106. Maynard v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 267. No. 94­2108. Sturgis v. Logan et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 282. No. 94­2109. MacLeod v. Broccoletti et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2110. Hommerding v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­2112. Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677. No. 94­2113. Transportation Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. D. W. Ferguson & Associates et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1142. No. 94­2114. Segal v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­2116. Landscape Properties, Inc. v. Vogel et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1416. No. 94­2118. Conklin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 77. No. 94­2119. Forehand v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 Ark. App. xv. No. 94­2120. Cannon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1462. No. 94­2121. Cummings v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 203. No. 94­2122. Jarreau v. Port Arthur Towing Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 312. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 824 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­2123. Janus Industries, dba Acapulco Smoke Shop, et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1548. No. 94­2124. Milton v. Heller. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 944. No. 94­2126. Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Pan American Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 992. No. 94­2127. George et al. v. Casale et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 314. No. 94­2128. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 60 F. 3d 810. No. 94­2131. Smith et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­2132. Keller v. United States et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 851. No. 94­2133. Crawford v. United States Department of Agriculture. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 46. No. 94­2136. Leik et al. v. Santiago. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­2137. General Motors Corp. v. French et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 768. No. 94­2138. Wiley et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 773. No. 94­8473. Holloway v. Colorado Department of Cor- rections et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1509. No. 94­8485. Grajeda v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­8573. Eslick v. Traughber et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1168. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 825 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­8580. Gunter v. Rogers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1182. No. 94­8610. Eisenstein v. Eisenstein. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­8664. Rijo-Montas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­8672. Gordon v. United States Marshals Service et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­8674. Ahmad v. Ortiz et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1004. No. 94­8685. Brown v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 N. C. 426, 451 S. E. 2d 181. No. 94­8744. Jill V. v. Orange County Social Services Agency. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 31 Cal. App. 4th 221, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848. No. 94­8757. Foren v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­8773. Hamrick v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 877. No. 94­8794. Petersen v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­8807. Okolo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1143. No. 94­8813. Powell v. DuCharme, Superintendent, Washington State Reformatory. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 998 F. 2d 710. No. 94­8870. Dover v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1152. No. 94­8879. VanDelft v. Moses et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 794. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 826 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­8884. Crittenden v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1225. No. 94­8915. Borkins v. United States Postal Service et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1506. No. 94­8923. Zak v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1134. No. 94­8936. McDaniel v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 385. No. 94­8960. Chigbo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 543. No. 94­8963. Bolden v. PRC, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 545. No. 94­8967. Williams v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 57. No. 94­8989. Lyle v. Dedeaux et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 320. No. 94­9010. Hernandez-Avalos et al. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 842. No. 94­9038. MacDonald v. United States; No. 94­9372. Benally v. United States; No. 94­9380. Lee v. United States; No. 94­9428. McKensley v. United States; and No. 94­9485. Kinlicheenie v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 486. No. 94­9055. Sellers v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 116. No. 94­9066. Goad v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 580. No. 94­9073. Cole v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 303. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 827 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9076. Cotal-Crespo et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1. No. 94­9092. Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 322. No. 94­9109. Enis v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 163 Ill. 2d 367, 645 N. E. 2d 856. No. 94­9114. Dumaguin v. Chater, Commissioner of So- cial Security. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1218. No. 94­9152. Davis v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 648 So. 2d 107. No. 94­9157. Strickland v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9174. Mitchell v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 P. 2d 1186. No. 94­9178. Perdue v. Troutman et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 94­9182. McGregor v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 P. 2d 1366. No. 94­9197. Fazzini v. Henman, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1150. No. 94­9199. Idrogo v. Mireles, Judge, District Court of Texas, Bexar County, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 425. No. 94­9201. Breazeale v. Thompson, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1138. No. 94­9213. Newton v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9214. Weatherford v. LeCureux, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 327. No. 94­9215. Leedy v. Agribank, FCB. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1507. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 828 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9219. Goldwitz v. Chauvin International Ltd. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1237. No. 94­9220. Ratnaweera et ux. v. Resolution Trust Corporation et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 39 F. 3d 1188. No. 94­9224. Kim Ly Lim v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9227. Lapsley v. Northern Indiana Public Serv- ice Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9228. Spearman v. Epps et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 728. No. 94­9231. Gardner v. Holden, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 P. 2d 608. No. 94­9239. Strickland v. Pontiac Correctional Center et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 432. No. 94­9240. Woodruff v. Chun, Regional Administrator, California Adult Parole Services, Region II, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1149. No. 94­9242. Woodcock v. Chemical Bank et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 363. No. 94­9243. Bennett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1364. No. 94­9245. Ayala v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9246. Boyd v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 Conn. App. 516, 651 A. 2d 1313. No. 94­9250. Roberson v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1126. No. 94­9255. Burden v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 829 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9257. Kimberlin v. DeLong, Personal Repre- sentative for DeLong, Deceased, and in Her Own Capac- ity. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 N. E. 2d 121. No. 94­9258. Tyler v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 398, 643 N. E. 2d 1150. No. 94­9263. Smith v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 893 S. W. 2d 908. No. 94­9264. Hector M. v. Jessica G. Ct. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 337 Md. 388, 653 A. 2d 922. No. 94­9269. London v. Mac Corporation of America. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 316. No. 94­9270. Logan v. Black. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 426. No. 94­9272. Juels v. Federal Republic of Germany et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 566. No. 94­9275. LaFountain v. Simasko et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1216. No. 94­9276. Nicholas v. Burkitt. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9278. Ploneda v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9279. Bond v. O'Dea, Warden. Ct. App. Ky. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9281. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1140. No. 94­9287. Hammond v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 879, 452 S. E. 2d 745. No. 94­9288. Hooper v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9289. Weeks v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 Va. 460, 450 S. E. 2d 379. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 830 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9290. Wagner v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 270 Mont. 26, 889 P. 2d 1189. No. 94­9291. Wise v. Hannigan, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1178. No. 94­9292. Thomas v. Holmes, Regional Manager, De- partment of Health and Human Services. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1233. No. 94­9293. Brewer v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Greene County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9296. Henry v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 So. 2d 1361. No. 94­9298. Thomas v. Jackson, Judge, Court of Appeals of Utah, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1233. No. 94­9299. Kimble v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9300. Waters v. Neidenbach et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 94­9301. Carter v. Fenner et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­9304. Jones v. Sikes et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 677. No. 94­9305. Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 258. No. 94­9306. Maloney v. Gladstone et al. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9307. Bastida v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 423. No. 94­9310. Davis v. Gramley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9313. Morris, aka Pruitt v. Rivers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 831 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9314. Hutchinson v. Chesney, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Frackville, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9317. Simko v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 483, 644 N. E. 2d 345. No. 94­9318. Scott v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9324. Galloway v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9327. De Caceres v. Clarkson et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9330. Prunty v. Ferguson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 326. No. 94­9331. Garner v. Hawaii Department of Education et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 436. No. 94­9333. Fritz v. Bosse, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9334. Hall v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 682. No. 94­9335. Givens v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 So. 2d 418. No. 94­9337. Fields v. City of Brockton. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 423. No. 94­9339. Heatherly v. Witkowski, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1165. No. 94­9340. Gribble v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9341. Glover v. Leonardo, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 832 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9344. Edmon v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1018. No. 94­9347. Lee v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 529. No. 94­9349. Ward v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9350. Thompson v. Estate of Thompson. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9351. Thompson v. Estate of Thompson. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9352. Lydon v. Malme et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1089. No. 94­9353. Spinner et ux. v. County of Los Angeles, Department of Public Works, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9356. Whitton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 So. 2d 861. No. 94­9357. Dinkins v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 894 So. 2d 330. No. 94­9358. Hubbard v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1400. No. 94­9359. Gaskins v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9360. Rouse v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 N. C. 59, 451 S. E. 2d 543. No. 94­9361. Burns v. Burns. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1133. No. 94­9364. Stiff v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 206 App. Div. 2d 235, 620 N. Y. S. 2d 87. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 833 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9366. Okoronkwo v. United States; and No. 94­9465. Eke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 426. No. 94­9367. Sturgis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 784. No. 94­9370. Rodenbaugh v. Curto et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9373. Battle v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1164. No. 94­9374. Crowell v. Moore, Director, South Caro- lina Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­9375. Phillips v. Law Offices of Kelly, Lewis & Hardt et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9376. Mendizaval v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9378. Johns v. Town of Los Gatos et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9379. Kish v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 617, 646 N. E. 2d 459. No. 94­9381. Clark v. Jones, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9383. Williams v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 N. C. 1, 452 S. E. 2d 245. No. 94­9386. Lewis v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9390. Wilson v. Cooper, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 276. No. 94­9391. Sanchez v. Shillinger, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1232. No. 94­9393. Morris v. Ylst, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 334. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 834 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9394. Cash v. Los Angeles County District At- torney. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 13. No. 94­9396. Lewis v. Department of the Army. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1238. No. 94­9397. Jones v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9399. Anderson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ill. App. 3d 947, 641 N. E. 2d 591. No. 94­9404. Haughton v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 665, 640 A. 2d 472. No. 94­9407. Lyon v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 427. No. 94­9408. Kelubai v. Wright, Superintendent, Maxi- mum Control Complex. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 275. No. 94­9409. Williams v. United States Postal Service et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1178. No. 94­9410. Spruill v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 338 N. C. 612, 452 S. E. 2d 279. No. 94­9413. Brocklebank v. English et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9416. Helton v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 146. No. 94­9417. Glant v. Glant. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 1198. No. 94­9421. Erickson v. Reynolds et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 429. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 835 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9422. Hines, aka Sheheed v. Brown et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1228. No. 94­9423. Foti v. Cameron et al. App. Ct. Mass. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 Mass. App. 1108, 639 N. E. 2d 1119. No. 94­9424. Green v. Ziegler. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9425. Tyler v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9427. Nwanze v. Jones et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9429. Perkovic et al. v. West Penn Abstract Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1462. No. 94­9434. Irwin v. Hawk, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 40 F. 3d 347. No. 94­9435. Banks v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 540 Pa. 143, 656 A. 2d 467. No. 94­9436. Brady v. Tansy, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 285. No. 94­9437. Whalen v. Alvey et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­9438. Testa v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 343. No. 94­9439. Testa v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9440. Jones v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 539 Pa. 222, 651 A. 2d 1101. No. 94­9441. Gunn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 728. No. 94­9445. Stanton v. Gonnering et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 836 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9447. Plescia v. United States; No. 95­5053. Demma v. United States; and No. 95­5264. Grossi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1452. No. 94­9448. Thomas v. Washington, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1000. No. 94­9450. Toney v. Washington, Director, Illinois De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 993. No. 94­9452. Reiche v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­9453. Rupert v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 190. No. 94­9455. Scott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 732. No. 94­9456. Rivera v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 39 F. 3d 1188. No. 94­9457. Marrone, aka Moose, et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 735. No. 94­9459. Chambers v. United States; and No. 95­5344. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 16. No. 94­9462. Codario v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 314. No. 94­9464. Terrell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 94­9471. Drago v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 732. No. 94­9474. Blythe v. United States; No. 94­9489. Minor v. United States; and 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 837 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9503. Oliver v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 70. No. 94­9475. Bacon v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 Vt. 279, 658 A. 2d 54. No. 94­9476. Aguilera v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 327. No. 94­9477. Borjesson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1146. No. 94­9478. Rampersad v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 430. No. 94­9480. Harris v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9481. Meredith v. Farley, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Prison. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 48 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­9482. Lloyd v. New York (two judgments). App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 210 App. Div. 2d 1013, 622 N. Y. S. 2d 176. No. 94­9486. Kaneshiro v. Marshall, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9487. Monroe v. McLaurin et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 534. No. 94­9488. Mikkilineni v. Amwest Surety Insurance Co. et al.; and Mikkilineni et al. v. Indiana County Transit Authority et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9490. Mance v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1246. No. 94­9492. McCloud v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 257 Kan. 1, 891 P. 2d 324. No. 94­9493. C. R. S. v. T. A. M. et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 892 P. 2d 246. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 838 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9494. Bell v. Bilandic et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­9495. Cully v. Sweeney et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 1454, 644 N. E. 2d 1027. No. 94­9496. Ghazali v. Moran et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 52. No. 94­9497. Faison v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 731. No. 94­9498. Hemphill v. Housing Authority of the City of Charleston et al. Cir. Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9499. Holsey v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­9500. Hoye v. Rickards, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1466. No. 94­9501. Goldman v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9502. Harvey v. Superior Court of California, County of Riverside. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­9504. Sheehy et ux. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Potter County Assistance Office. Ct. Common Pleas of Potter County, Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9505. Attwood v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 270. No. 94­9506. McCarty v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 326. No. 94­9507. Aguirre v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 Cal. App. 4th 391, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 839 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9509. Kellogg et al. v. Shoemaker et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 503. No. 94­9510. Madison v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9511. Webb v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 636. No. 94­9512. Ross v. Dontzin, Judge, Supreme Court of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9513. Ralli-Rojas v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 436. No. 94­9514. Tinsley v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9515. Wooldridge v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 343. No. 94­9516. Pierce v. Kearney et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 267. No. 94­9517. Merricks v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 94­9518. Lucien v. Irvin et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­9519. Spremo v. Graci et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1502. No. 94­9520. Roberts v. Andolina et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 4. No. 94­9521. Flores v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 467. No. 94­9522. Haverstock et al. v. Gomez, Director, Cali- fornia Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 14. No. 94­9523. Cruz v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 840 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9524. Maduno v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1212. No. 94­9525. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1141. No. 94­9527. Emery v. Merkel, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1227. No. 94­9528. Alleyn v. Morgan, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9529. Pertsoni v. Vasquez, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­9530. Stenzel v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 658. No. 94­9531. Thomas v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 P. 2d 522. No. 94­9532. Sumler v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 361. No. 94­9533. See v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Depart- ment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9534. Patch v. United States et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­9535. Ibrahim, aka Casey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9536. Bright v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1220. No. 94­9537. Coffie v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 731. No. 94­9538. Washington v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9539. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­9540. Mason v. Godinez, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 852. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 841 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9541. Pinto v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 384. No. 94­9542. Micou v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1220. No. 94­9543. Francisco Munoz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9544. Curtis v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 52 F. 3d 312. No. 94­9545. Barnes v. Borough of Pottstown, Pennsyl- vania, et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9546. Jones v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9547. James v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1158. No. 94­9548. Kelley v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 440 Pa. Super. 633, 654 A. 2d 600. No. 94­9549. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 94­9550. McGinnis v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9551. Taylor v. Walter et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9552. Holt v. Campbell, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1169. No. 94­9553. Etemad v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1479. No. 94­9554. Green v. Carver State Bank. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 733. No. 94­9555. Wilson v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 95, 452 S. E. 2d 669. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 842 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9556. Whitmore v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1225. No. 94­9557. Young v. Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 19. No. 94­9558. Culkin v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farm- ington Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1229. No. 94­9559. Riemer v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­9561. O'Connell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1128. No. 94­9562. Bryant v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­9563. Greenfield v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 669. No. 94­9564. Hirano v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­9565. Geddis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 70. No. 94­9566. Hassan v. Wright, Director, Illinois De- partment of Public Aid. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1063. No. 94­9567. Eubanks v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­9568. Shieh v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9569. Pounds v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 94­9570. Bomengo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 535. No. 94­9571. Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1135. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 843 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9572. O'Neal v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 655. No. 94­9573. Lewis v. McLees. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9574. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9575. Pollack v. Department of Justice. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 115. No. 94­9576. Hill v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 914. No. 94­9577. Lostutter v. Washington, Director, Illi- nois Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 392. No. 94­9578. McClure v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 17. No. 94­9579. Meling v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1546. No. 94­9580. Mahan v. Oklahoma et al. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9581. McGore v. Stine, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9582. Gentry v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Wash. 2d 570, 888 P. 2d 1105. No. 94­9583. Cooper v. Witkowski, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 5. No. 94­9584. Worelds v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 429. No. 94­9585. Smith v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 898 S. W. 2d 838. No. 94­9586. Terrell v. Morton, Administrator, New Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 844 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9587. Trice v. Williams et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9588. White v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9589. Mallory et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­9590. McAdams v. Automotive Rentals, Inc. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 319 Ark. 254, 891 S. W. 2d 52. No. 94­9591. Brown v. McCaughtry, Warden. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9592. Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9593. Wallace v. Newsome, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1039. No. 94­9594. Lowery v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 535. No. 94­9595. Jones v. ITT Financial Services, dba Aetna Finance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1045. No. 94­9596. Medrano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 94­9597. O'Rourke v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­9598. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1423. No. 94­9599. Martel v. New Hampshire; and Martel v. City of Concord. Dist. Ct. N. H., Concord Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9600. Scofield v. Zenon, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 16. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 845 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9601. Spain v. City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 268. No. 94­9602. Stokes v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1233. No. 94­9603. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1218. No. 94­9604. Ortiz-Villegas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1435. No. 94­9605. Agbongiague v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 70. No. 94­9606. Brown v. Varner. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9607. Conlee v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­9608. Reed v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9609. Rochell et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 94­9610. Santana v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1033. No. 94­9611. Pierce v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9612. Thomas v. Clark et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­9613. Washington v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 270. No. 94­9615. Freeman v. Dubois, Commissioner, Massa- chusetts Department of Correction. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 846 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9616. Davis v. North Carolina; and No. 95­5448. Hood v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 1, 455 S. E. 2d 627. No. 94­9618. Glover v. Superior Court of California, So- lano County. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9619. Epison v. United States; and No. 94­9671. Williams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1271. No. 94­9620. Hutchison v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 S. W. 2d 161. No. 94­9621. Fortenberry v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 194. No. 94­9622. Clayton v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 P. 2d 646. No. 94­9623. Chase v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9624. Arnold v. Boatmen's Trust Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1135. No. 94­9625. Bergmann v. McCaughtry, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­9626. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1033. No. 94­9627. Daniel et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­9628. Domingo Garza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­9629. Attwood v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9630. Harris v. Matthews et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 535. No. 94­9631. Govostis v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1124. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 847 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9632. Hewlett v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 439 Pa. Super. 668, 653 A. 2d 1300. No. 94­9633. Fleming v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 273 N. J. Super. 526, 642 A. 2d 1029. No. 94­9634. Moseley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1229. No. 94­9635. Joseph v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 401. No. 94­9636. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 287. No. 94­9637. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1066. No. 94­9638. Jimenez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 276. No. 94­9639. Kemp v. Bane, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 App. Div. 2d 956, 610 N. Y. S. 2d 907. No. 94­9640. Monroe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­9642. Bates v. Scorza et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9644. Hoyett v. 40th Judicial Circuit Court et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9645. Barrino v. Beyer, Administrator, New Jer- sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 313. No. 94­9646. Adams v. Edwards et al. Ct. App. Mo., West- ern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 S. W. 2d 651. No. 94­9647. Adams v. Edwards. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 S. W. 2d 655. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 848 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9649. Dotson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 227. No. 94­9651. Hawkins v. Abramajtys, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9652. Easley v. Vance et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 426. No. 94­9654. McFarland v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 65. No. 94­9655. Lopez v. Arizona. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9656. Merritt v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 677. No. 94­9657. Landrum v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 191 Wis. 2d 107, 528 N. W. 2d 36. No. 94­9658. Millsap v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1039. No. 94­9659. Thompson, on Behalf of Thompson v. Sha- lala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 727. No. 94­9660. Testa v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union, AFL­CIO, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­9661. Amaral v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank et al. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 657 A. 2d 1069. No. 94­9662. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 731. No. 94­9663. Goodman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1166. No. 94­9664. Scott v. Kmart Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 849 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9665. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 419. No. 94­9666. Prenzler v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 347. No. 94­9667. Raitport v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9668. Richardson v. Gammon, Superintendent, Moberly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9669. Biggins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 679. No. 94­9670. Williams v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 993. No. 94­9672. Domanski v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­9673. Hunt v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 Vt. 383, 658 A. 2d 919. No. 94­9674. Stephens v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 356, 456 S. E. 2d 560. No. 94­9675. Crittenden v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 4th 83, 885 P. 2d 887. No. 94­9676. Sidebottom v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 744. No. 94­9677. Polewsky v. Vermont Department of Social Welfare. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 Vt. 650, 655 A. 2d 735. No. 94­9678. Baca v. Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 285. No. 94­9679. Blount v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 126. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 850 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9680. Sylvan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1127. No. 94­9681. Tursi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1008. No. 94­9682. Wilson v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 538 Pa. 485, 649 A. 2d 435. No. 94­9683. Henderson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 11. No. 94­9685. Strickland et vir v. Maine Department of Human Services et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 48 F. 3d 12. No. 94­9686. Prue v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9687. Williamson v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 84. No. 94­9689. O'Leary v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 339. No. 94­9690. Strickler v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 120, 452 S. E. 2d 648. No. 94­9691. Garcia-Rosell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 94­9692. Cox v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1049. No. 94­9694. Adams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­9696. Fain v. Borg, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1246. No. 94­9697. Settenberg v. North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 62. No. 94­9698. Gilbertson v. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 1193. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 851 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9699. Rochon v. Blackburn, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1033. No. 94­9700. Owens v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9702. Rodrigues v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 885 P. 2d 1. No. 94­9703. Sauceda v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­9704. Jackson v. Vannoy et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 175. No. 94­9705. Marino v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 94­9706. Manarite v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1407. No. 94­9707. Jackson v. Davis, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9708. Kalyon v. Hanslmaier, Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9709. Kailey v. Gallagher et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 286. No. 94­9710. R. M. v. Wyoming Department of Family Services et al. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 P. 2d 791. No. 94­9711. Keylin v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 3. No. 94­9712. Bradshaw v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 317. No. 94­9713. Hosea v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 431. No. 94­9714. Velez v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 852 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9715. Gilbert v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­9716. Fulop v. Hamilton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1141. No. 94­9717. Whitlock v. Godinez, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 59. No. 94­9718. Watkins v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9719. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­9721. Jones v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9722. Gibson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 876. No. 94­9723. Nwanze v. Morchower, Luxton & Whaley. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 267. No. 94­9724. Duchi v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1135. No. 94­9725. Jenkins v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9726. Lucien v. Bierman. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 275. No. 94­9727. Reddic v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 18. No. 94­9728. Sartin v. Dodson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 268. No. 94­9730. Wilson v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 152. No. 94­9731. Watson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 1159. No. 94­9732. Martinez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 853 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9733. Carmichael v. Riveland et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9737. Dingle v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9738. Jordan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 732. No. 94­9739. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­9740. Sceifers v. Trigg, Superintendent, Indiana Youth Center. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 701. No. 94­9741. Gray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 94­9742. Stewart v. Coalter, Superintendent, Mas- sachusetts Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 610. No. 94­9743. Brown v. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9744. Mack v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 126. No. 94­9745. Chapman v. Burton Berger & Associates et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1133. No. 94­9746. Feliciano v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­9747. Waffer v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9748. Attwood v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 686. No. 94­9750. Beo v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 854 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9751. Dailey v. Howard. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 629. No. 94­9752. Skandier v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 319. No. 94­9753. Haburn et al. v. Wake County et al. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9754. Lucciola v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 436 Pa. Super. 665, 648 A. 2d 1235. No. 94­9755. Sanborn v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 892 S. W. 2d 542. No. 94­9756. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­9757. Prather v. Beyer, Assistant Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9758. Herrera-Isais v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­9759. Means v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 17. No. 94­9760. Gresham v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 A. 2d 871. No. 94­9761. Macri v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9762. Williamson et al. v. Haywood County, North Carolina, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 558. No. 94­9763. Damon, aka Ralph-Bey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 94­9764. Yanez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 276. No. 94­9765. Walker v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 540 Pa. 80, 656 A. 2d 90. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 855 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9766. Hindi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 334. No. 94­9767. Hoover v. Yanich, District Justice, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 315. No. 94­9768. Chaparro v. Easton et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­9769. Brown v. Audubon Insurance Co. et al. (two judgments). Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 644 So. 2d 1163. No. 94­9770. Simms v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 S. W. 2d 735. No. 94­9771. Velez v. Spence Chapin Adoption Agency et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9772. Young v. White et al. Ct. App. Utah. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9774. Hernandez-Solis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 94­9775. Sekoian v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9776. Shigemura v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 250. No. 94­9777. Roca Suarez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1480. No. 94­9778. Stone v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1218. No. 94­9779. Britton v. Nevada Department of Prisons Staff et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9780. Askew v. Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9781. Giles v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 314. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 856 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9782. Skaggs v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­9783. Felix-Santos v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1. No. 94­9784. Saenz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­9785. Ferguson v. Lamb et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 266. No. 94­9786. McCoy v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9787. Ford v. City of Rockford et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­9788. Arias v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1123. No. 94­9790. Brown v. Robey et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9792. Solimine v. International Law Students Assn. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9793. Iniguez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9794. Waters v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1506. No. 94­9795. Longworth v. Wright, Superintendent, Clallam Bay Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 15. No. 94­9796. Holly v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 707. No. 94­9797. Mitchell et ux. v. Keenan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 473. No. 94­9798. Franklin v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 S. C. 47, 456 S. E. 2d 357. No. 94­9799. Fields v. McAnnally. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 14. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 857 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9801. Adams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­9802. Sims v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 94­9804. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 94­9805. Jones v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 289. No. 94­9806. Spiliotis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­9807. Newton v. United States; No. 95­5008. Moss v. United States; No. 95­5086. Batten v. United States; and No. 95­5089. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 913. No. 94­9808. Scott v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 904. No. 94­9809. McKinney v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 94­9810. Laury v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 145. No. 94­9811. Davis v. Hennepin County Department of Children & Family Services. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 527 N. W. 2d 835. No. 94­9812. McDowell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 94­9813. Lockett v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 287. No. 94­9814. Cucciniello v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 94­9815. Bell v. Roddy et al. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 646 So. 2d 967. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 858 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9816. Carter v. Utah. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 P. 2d 629. No. 94­9817. Crawford v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1146. No. 94­9818. McKibben v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9819. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­9820. McPeters v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 94­9821. Cheatham v. Williams et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 320. No. 94­9822. Johnson v. Tennessee et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1472. No. 94­9823. Fournier v. Magnusson, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9824. Hooker v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 P. 2d 1351. No. 94­9825. Gray v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 894. No. 94­9826. Estrada, aka Garcia, aka Sanchez v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institu- tional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9827. Gordon v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9828. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1137. No. 94­9829. Rash v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1218. No. 94­9830. Jaskolski v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 859 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 94­9831. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1148. No. 94­9832. Whitmore v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9833. Van Wagner v. Pendell et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 323. No. 94­9834. Larson v. District Court of North Dakota, Grand Forks County, et al. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9835. Daughtrey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 770. No. 94­9836. McCracken v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 P. 2d 323. No. 94­9837. Torres-Morales, aka Alcarez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 339. No. 94­9838. Tapia-Torres v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 94­9839. Walker v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 P. 2d 301. No. 94­9840. Nance v. North Carolina. Super. Ct. N. C., Rowan County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9841. Black v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9842. Barajas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 279. No. 94­9843. Tannehill v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1049. No. 94­9844. Marshall v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 531. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 860 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9845. Gibbs v. Franklin et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1206. No. 94­9846. Giovanni v. Stalder, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 908. No. 94­9847. Hyde v. Office of Special Counsel et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 337. No. 94­9848. Gresham v. Transportation Communications International Union et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 6. No. 94­9849. Janis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1147. No. 94­9850. Stevens v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 319 Ark. 640, 893 S. W. 2d 773. No. 94­9851. Lang v. Bank of North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 530 N. W. 2d 352. No. 94­9852. Adams v. Braxton, Deputy Director/Insti- tutions, District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 A. 2d 729. No. 94­9853. Bookert v. Roth et vir. Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 119 N. M. 638, 894 P. 2d 994. No. 94­9855. Campbell v. California Department of Motor Vehicles. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 33 Cal. App. 4th 489, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348. No. 94­9856. Abdul-Wadood v. Waples et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­9857. Chapman v. Currie Motors, Inc., et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ill. App. 3d 1115, 683 N. E. 2d 1302. No. 94­9858. Baker v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­2. Association of Frigidaire Model Makers et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 271. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 861 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­3. Brown v. Kilgore et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­4. Lopez, Sheriff of Bexar County v. Vojvodich. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 879. No. 95­5. Moss v. Chassin, Commissioner, New York State Department of Health, et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 App. Div. 2d 889, 618 N. Y. S. 2d 931. No. 95­7. Esser v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­8. Sicor Ltd. et al. v. Cetus Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 848. No. 95­9. Bui v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 419 Mass. 392, 645 N. E. 2d 689. No. 95­10. Tatum v. Austin. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 427. No. 95­11. Rust v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 472. No. 95­12. Gust et al. v. Levy. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 268 Ill. App. 3d 355, 643 N. E. 2d 1206. No. 95­13. Executive Leasing Corp. et al. v. Banco Popu- lar de Puerto Rico, as Successor in Interest to Banco de Ponce, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 66. No. 95­14. Morgan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1105. No. 95­15. Portland Housing Authority v. Doe et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 A. 2d 1200. No. 95­16. Mandel v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo- ration. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1119. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 862 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­17. Schueller v. Ashley Memorial Hospital et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1136. No. 95­18. O'Neal v. Judicial Qualification Commission of Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 326, 454 S. E. 2d 780. No. 95­19. Allgood v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 492. No. 95­20. Cimermancic v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­21. McAuliffe et al. v. Sherwin Manor Nursing Center, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1216. No. 95­22. Suros v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 App. Div. 2d 203, 618 N. Y. S. 2d 532. No. 95­23. Roden, Trustee of Ernest M. Still Trust, et al. v. Blackwell Land Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 333. No. 95­24. L. K. Comstock & Co., Inc., et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 50 F. 3d 319. No. 95­29. Jacobs v. Guido et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 765. No. 95­30. Fishell et ux. v. Soltow et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1168. No. 95­32. DeVault v. DeVault. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­33. Tytor v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 2, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 286. No. 95­34. Jeffries v. Harleston, President of City College of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 9. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 863 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­36. Terry v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1128, 685 N. E. 2d 454. No. 95­37. Berardi v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1223. No. 95­38. Murray et al. v. Stuckeys, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 564. No. 95­40. Kmart Corp. v. Laughlin. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 871. No. 95­41. Zimmerman v. Officers for Justice et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 334. No. 95­43. Bennett Enterprises, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 493. No. 95­45. Pirkle et al. v. Ogontz Controls Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 344. No. 95­46. Matzkin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 322. No. 95­47. Class of 48+1 and the Intervenor Plaintiffs, Successors in Interest to King v. Greenblatt et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1. No. 95­48. Moore v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1128. No. 95­49. Illinois v. Olivera. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 382, 647 N. E. 2d 926. No. 95­50. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­51. Dillon v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­52. Johns v. Ware County Board of Commission- ers et al. Super. Ct. Ware County, Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 95­54. City of Philadelphia v. Africa et al.; and No. 95­5058. Africa v. City of Philadelphia et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 945. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 864 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­55. Taylor v. Cummins Atlantic, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 95­58. Cohen v. United States; and No. 95­93. Smith v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1223. No. 95­59. Zebulon Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 267 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 684 N. E. 2d 1123. No. 95­61. Petito v. Piffath, Administratrix of the Es- tate of Piffath, Deceased. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 N. Y. 2d 1, 647 N. E. 2d 732. No. 95­62. Dynamic Construction Co. et al. v. Insurance Company of North America. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1219. No. 95­65. Hooper et al. v. Perrino et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1216. No. 95­66. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Hardester et ux. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 52 F. 3d 70. No. 95­67. Ford Life Insurance Co. v. Miller, Admin- istratrix for the Estate of Miller. Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 661 So. 2d 203. No. 95­68. Borelli McNeil et al. v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority et al. Ct. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­70. Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc., et al. v. Ahlstrom Recovery et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 800. No. 95­71. Christunas v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1220. No. 95­76. Fairchild, dba Fairchild Waste Control v. Buena Vista Charter Township et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 325. No. 95­77. Botchie v. O'Dowd, Sheriff, Charleston County, et al. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 S. C. 130, 456 S. E. 2d 403. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 865 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­78. Colorow v. Utah et al. Sup. Ct. Utah. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 892 P. 2d 1032. No. 95­80. Hemmerle et al. v. Bakst, Trustee for Sun- Island Realty, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 43 F. 3d 678. No. 95­81. Balderson v. Balderson. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Idaho 48, 896 P. 2d 956. No. 95­89. Bills v. Aseltine et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 596. No. 95­90. Rodriguez-Garcia et al. v. Estado Libre Aso- ciado de Puerto Rico et al. Super. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 95­91. Berkeley v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­92. Owen v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­94. Salazar v. Price Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­96. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Crocker. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 735. No. 95­97. Mangrum v. Kentucky; and Jackson et al. v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 95­99. Gulf Coast Industrial Workers Union v. Exxon Chemical Americas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­100. NTDEC et al. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 281. No. 95­101. Anderson v. Cunard Line Ltd. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­102. Torreblanca de Aguilar et al. v. Boeing Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1404. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 866 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­103. Kast v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 562. No. 95­104. National Refractories & Minerals Corp. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1227. No. 95­106. Rielly v. News Group Boston, Inc., et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 909, 644 A. 2d 982. No. 95­107. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1033. No. 95­109. Kiley et ux. v. First National Bank of Mary- land. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 Md. App. 317, 649 A. 2d 1145. No. 95­113. Mahoney et al. v. RFE/RL, Inc. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 447. No. 95­115. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. v. Com- missioner of Patents and Trademarks. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­117. Hammad v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­118. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. v. Hyun- dai Corp., U. S. A., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 768. No. 95­119. CMK Construction, Inc., et al. v. Carpen- ters' Pension Trust Fund-Detroit and Vicinity et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1167. No. 95­120. Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 430. No. 95­121. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Local 856, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 324. No. 95­122. Granberry et al. v. Islay Investments et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 4th 738, 889 P. 2d 970. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 867 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­123. Graham v. Mengel, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Ohio and Secretary of the Board of Bar Examin- ers, et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 Ohio App. 3d 620, 649 N. E. 2d 282. No. 95­126. Blue v. Department of the Treasury. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 22. No. 95­128. United States v. County of San Diego et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 965. No. 95­130. Cornish Shipping Ltd. v. International Ned- erlanden Bank N. V., fka NMB Postbank Groep, N. V. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 499. No. 95­131. Misano di Navigazione S. p. A. v. Eneria, Indi- vidually and as Guardian of Eneria, and as Tutrix of Eneria et al. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­136. Kelley Co., Inc. v. Rite-Hite Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1538. No. 95­140. Breedlove v. Hart et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­144. R. J. Steichen & Co. et al. v. Honn. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­146. Route 17 Corp. v. Town of Ashland et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 3. No. 95­147. Grady, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, et al. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1293. No. 95­148. Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golfers' Association of America, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 322. No. 95­149. Pipkins v. Nevada State Bar. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Nev. 1728, 916 P. 2d 211. No. 95­150. Andress v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 324. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 868 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­153. Lozano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. No. 95­154. Miller et al. v. Pezzani et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1407. No. 95­158. Burpo v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 261, 647 N. E. 2d 996. No. 95­159. Mohamed, fka Kerr v. Kerr et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 911. No. 95­161. Triem et al. v. Tamico, Inc. Super. Ct. Alaska, 1st Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­162. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 734. No. 95­164. Stover v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 192, 455 S. E. 2d 238. No. 95­165. Watts v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­166. National Fidelity Life Insurance Co. v. Chadima, Trustee of the George Milton Chadima and Lil- lian Esther Chadima Trust, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 345. No. 95­168. Kestler v. Board of Trustees of the North Carolina Local Governmental Employees' Retirement System et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 800. No. 95­169. Metzger v. Sebek et al. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 S. W. 2d 20. No. 95­170. New York v. Banks. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 N. Y. 2d 558, 650 N. E. 2d 833. No. 95­171. Papaila v. Uniden America Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 54. No. 95­172. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development et al. v. Poole et vir. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 869 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­175. Fletcher's Fine Foods, Ltd. v. Gates et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1457. No. 95­180. Lawrence Paper Co. v. Gomez, Kansas Work- ers Compensation Director, et al. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 257 Kan. 932, 897 P. 2d 134. No. 95­181. Union Underwear Co., Inc., dba Fruit of the Loom v. Scearce et al. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 896 S. W. 2d 7. No. 95­182. Trident Associates Limited Partnership v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 127. No. 95­183. Brazil-Breashears v. Bilandic et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 789. No. 95­185. Florio et ux. v. Skorepa et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 64. No. 95­186. Rueben v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1046. No. 95­187. Pointon v. City of Choctaw et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 286. No. 95­188. Roberts v. South Carolina et al. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 S. C. 219, 456 S. E. 2d 905. No. 95­189. Sandhaus et al. v. Weinreich. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 810. No. 95­197. Nelson et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 339. No. 95­198. Daubert et ux., Individually and as Guard- ians ad Litem for Daubert, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharma- ceuticals, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1311. No. 95­200. Magluta v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1530. No. 95­202. Young et ux., dba Young's Deli and For- merly dba Country Fair Store No. 90, et al. v. Country 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 870 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. Fair, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 771. No. 95­204. Garner, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Wileman, Deceased v. Capital Blue Cross et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 314. No. 95­207. Meadows v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 132. No. 95­212. Fred v. Wackenhut Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 335. No. 95­215. Hughes v. Bedsole, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Cumberland County, North Carolina, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1376. No. 95­216. Curley v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 254. No. 95­219. Lee v. Walton. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 888 S. W. 2d 604. No. 95­228. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­229. Wong v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1347. No. 95­231. Coggeshall Development Corp. et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 81. No. 95­235. Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 82. No. 95­238. Bhardwaj v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 817. No. 95­246. Cemaj et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1045. No. 95­251. Republic Waste Industries, Inc. v. G. I. In- dustries. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 16. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 871 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­257. Ghanayem v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1438. No. 95­283. Bauman v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 M. J. 134. No. 95­285. Gilham v. United States; and No. 95­5697. Barcus v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 16. No. 95­286. Mississippi River Transmission Corp. et al. v. Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue and Taxa- tion. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 648 So. 2d 1108. No. 95­287. Eley v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 328. No. 95­302. Crespo v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 348. No. 95­313. Ozar et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1440. No. 95­317. Woodbridge v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 336. No. 95­328. Finlay et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1410. No. 95­332. Swearengen et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­338. Mandacina v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 871. No. 95­347. Borelli v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 810. No. 95­5001. Morgan v. Corcoran, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1216. No. 95­5002. Culbreath v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 95­5003. Baker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 268. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 872 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5005. Baker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 837. No. 95­5006. Gosier v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 Ill. 2d 16, 649 N. E. 2d 364. No. 95­5007. Christy v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 540 Pa. 192, 656 A. 2d 877. No. 95­5009. Fields v. United States; and No. 95­5479. Hudson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 770. No. 95­5010. Dawdy v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1427. No. 95­5011. Hamamcy v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­5012. Van Blericom v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1148. No. 95­5013. Gunderman v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 287. No. 95­5014. Flores v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1045. No. 95­5018. Carmen-Perez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 282. No. 95­5019. Bright v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 265, 455 S. E. 2d 37. No. 95­5020. Bradshaw v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 W. Va. 519, 457 S. E. 2d 456. No. 95­5023. Phillip v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1045. No. 95­5024. Hill v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 So. 2d 1071. No. 95­5025. Wilson v. Rogers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 873 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5026. Gonzalez v. Department of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 314. No. 95­5027. Hickson v. Garner, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 670. No. 95­5028. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 535. No. 95­5030. Diaz v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1041. No. 95­5031. Ledet v. 15th Judicial District Court et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1042. No. 95­5032. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1232. No. 95­5033. Patrick v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 269. No. 95­5034. Outlow v. Sobina, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Somerset, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5035. Prosper v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5036. Parks v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 656 A. 2d 1137. No. 95­5037. Shea v. Shea. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­5038. R. J. v. S. L. J. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 S. W. 2d 683. No. 95­5039. Parker v. University of Mississippi et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­5040. Thomas v. Drochner et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 874 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5041. Copeland v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 611. No. 95­5042. Wiitala v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1172. No. 95­5043. McSween v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 684. No. 95­5044. Turner v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 319. No. 95­5045. Laswell v. Frey. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1011. No. 95­5046. Sligar v. Tulsa Regional Medical Center et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 338. No. 95­5047. Rogers v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5048. Langella v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 312. No. 95­5049. Lawrence v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 310, 454 S. E. 2d 446. No. 95­5050. Terrell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 327. No. 95­5051. Hall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 95­5052. Gonzales v. Duncan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1141. No. 95­5054. Green v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 269. No. 95­5055. Duarte v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5057. Brownell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5059. Campbell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1079. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 875 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5060. Charlton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 95­5061. Alexander et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5062. Bell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 95­5064. Banda v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1243. No. 95­5065. Betts v. Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1173. No. 95­5067. Jones v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 652 So. 2d 346. No. 95­5068. Martinez v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 530. No. 95­5069. Jones v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 390. No. 95­5070. Jenkins v. Stuart et al.; and No. 95­5274. Jenkins v. McBride, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 342. No. 95­5071. Ray v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­5072. Sales v. Gammon, Superintendent, Moberly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5073. Martini v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 N. J. 3, 651 A. 2d 949. No. 95­5074. Washington v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 257 Ill. App. 3d 26, 628 N. E. 2d 351. No. 95­5075. Worthy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­5077. Wade, aka Witherspoon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 63. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 876 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5078. Wilson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 436, 647 N. E. 2d 910. No. 95­5079. Joseph v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 78, 452 S. E. 2d 862. No. 95­5080. Hull v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1431. No. 95­5082. Higdon v. Hensley et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 728. No. 95­5083. Holbrook v. City of Dalton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 95. No. 95­5087. Carper v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 95­5088. Cross et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 95­5090. Boyd v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 999 F. 2d 1286. No. 95­5091. Beals v. Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5092. Maldonado v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 936. No. 95­5093. Kalinsky v. Unemployment Appeals Com- mission. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 1162. No. 95­5094. Washington v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 756. No. 95­5095. Doe v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 693. No. 95­5096. Okpala v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 877 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5097. Mullgrav v. Mitchell, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 312. No. 95­5098. Jae v. Creese. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5099. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1162. No. 95­5100. Fryar v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1044. No. 95­5101. Fazzini v. United States Department of Justice. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5102. Fazzini v. Guzik et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5103. Gilchrist v. Holt, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 732. No. 95­5104. Headley v. Tilghman, Warden. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 472. No. 95­5105. Barragan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1032. No. 95­5106. Rhodes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 95­5108. Gockley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 338. No. 95­5109. Hardy v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 147. No. 95­5110. Gorman v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 Md. App. 791. No. 95­5111. Thomas v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5112. Malone v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 393. No. 95­5113. Mortimer v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 429. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 878 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5114. Jeffreys v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 50 F. 3d 6. No. 95­5115. Centeno-Torres et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 84. No. 95­5116. Brown v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5118. Sweeney v. United States; and No. 95­5134. Delaney v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 182. No. 95­5119. Pryor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­5120. Rivera v. United States; and No. 95­5143. Montes-Gomez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 95­5121. Ocampo-Tello v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 69. No. 95­5122. Oyairo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­5123. Syed v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5124. Ross v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 Ariz. 598, 886 P. 2d 1354. No. 95­5125. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­5126. Cannady et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 544. No. 95­5127. Alexander v. United States; and No. 95­5177. Harris et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1477. No. 95­5129. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 879 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5130. Stack v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­5131. Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1041. No. 95­5132. Wishon v. City of Jacksonville, Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 920. No. 95­5133. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 269. No. 95­5135. Hare v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 447. No. 95­5136. Seagrave v. Lake County, California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5137. Shultz v. McGinnis et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 326. No. 95­5138. Parnell v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5140. Krause v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 206 Mich. App. 421, 522 N. W. 2d 667. No. 95­5141. McCray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5142. Novak v. Novak. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 263 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 683 N. E. 2d 548. No. 95­5144. Moore et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 568. No. 95­5145. Myers v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 668. No. 95­5146. Martinez et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5147. McBrearty v. Workers' Compensation Ap- peals Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 880 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5148. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5149. Njoku v. Young et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5150. Johnson v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 423. No. 95­5152. Clark v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­5153. Sanders v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 660 A. 2d 395. No. 95­5154. White, aka Livingston, aka Hilton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1388. No. 95­5155. Lisa A. et al. v. Los Angeles County De- partment of Children's Services. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5156. Wilson v. Bureau of Prisons. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1226. No. 95­5157. McCarthy v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 51. No. 95­5158. Sellers v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 P. 2d 895. No. 95­5159. Mack v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 650 So. 2d 1289. No. 95­5160. King v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 Ariz. 268, 883 P. 2d 1024. No. 95­5161. Hunt v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 960. No. 95­5162. Davis v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 1169. No. 95­5163. Bishop v. State Bar of Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 881 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5165. Cinel v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 646 So. 2d 309. No. 95­5166. Moore v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 P. 2d 1253. No. 95­5169. Sweet v. Sutherland et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 326. No. 95­5170. Nosrati v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 269. No. 95­5173. Olmos-Esparza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5174. Pratt v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 671. No. 95­5176. Vaughn v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5178. Collier v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1139. No. 95­5179. Salas v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 95­5180. Antonelli v. Holt, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5181. Spearman v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5182. Wood v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 272. No. 95­5183. Tripati v. Agra et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5185. Barrett v. Fieldhouse et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5186. Cully v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Em- ployment Services, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 1465, 644 N. E. 2d 1387. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 882 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5188. Oswald v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mo- berly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 277. No. 95­5189. Miller v. Smith et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5190. Booker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5191. Thierman v. Thierman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1213. No. 95­5192. Stevenson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 62. No. 95­5193. Stamper v. Chapleau, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 95­5194. Thornton v. Lombardo, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 770. No. 95­5197. Dryden v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1500. No. 95­5198. Futrell v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1079. No. 95­5199. DeMauro v. Commissioner of Internal Rev- enue. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5201. Green v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1280. No. 95­5202. Glant v. Lamb et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­5203. Escamilla v. Broome County Government et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5204. McGlothlin v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 S. W. 2d 183. No. 95­5206. Middleton v. Kentucky. Cir. Ct. Grant County, Ky. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 883 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5208. Cunningham v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 295. No. 95­5209. Speller v. Iowa. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 69. No. 95­5210. Rico v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 495. No. 95­5211. Aflleje v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1129. No. 95­5212. Brown v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5213. Blair v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 639. No. 95­5214. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­5215. Tyler Shartle v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 438 Pa. Super. 403, 652 A. 2d 874. No. 95­5216. Rauser v. Beard et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 896. No. 95­5217. Okoro v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 95­5218. Preston v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5219. Rocha v. Price, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 286. No. 95­5220. Walter v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 766. No. 95­5222. Robinson v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5223. Bennett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 884 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5225. Troutman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­5226. Stephen v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5227. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5229. Watt v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 274. No. 95­5231. Milton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 78. No. 95­5232. Johnson v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institute at Huntingdon, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 768. No. 95­5233. Leggett v. George et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 342. No. 95­5234. Mir v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5235. Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 2. No. 95­5237. Marcum v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5238. Kathy M. P. v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 Wis. 2d 767, 532 N. W. 2d 471. No. 95­5239. Coleman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 S. W. 2d 319. No. 95­5240. Conaway v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 N. C. 487, 453 S. E. 2d 824. No. 95­5241. Fields v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1024. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 885 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5242. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5243. Duke v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 571. No. 95­5244. Emerson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1171. No. 95­5245. Fincher v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5246. Febre v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 818. No. 95­5247. DeMay v. McGinnis, Director, Michigan De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5248. Greenberg v. New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5249. Harris v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 322, 647 N. E. 2d 893. No. 95­5250. Haywood v. Veterans Administration Medi- cal Center et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5252. DeJesus v. Stinson, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1062. No. 95­5253. Allen v. City of Aurora, Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 P. 2d 333. No. 95­5254. Reeves v. Vance et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 423. No. 95­5255. Curry v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 263 Ill. App. 3d 1134, 683 N. E. 2d 554. No. 95­5256. Delgado-Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1280. No. 95­5258. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 82. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 886 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5259. Whitehead v. Bradley University et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5261. Wright v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 728. No. 95­5262. Trevino v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 333. No. 95­5263. Swist v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 907, 644 N. E. 2d 650. No. 95­5265. Atkins v. Michigan Department of Correc- tions. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5266. Whiton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 356. No. 95­5267. Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 83. No. 95­5268. Winters v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5269. Thornton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5270. Browning v. Fourteen Defendants et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5271. Adepegba v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­5272. Booker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1166. No. 95­5273. McLaurin v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 N. Y. 2d 848, 648 N. E. 2d 786. No. 95­5275. Paquette v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 7. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 887 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5277. Hypolite v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 773. No. 95­5278. Rutherford v. Hailey. Cir. Ct. Cabell County, W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5279. Randall v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5281. Bowe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 638. No. 95­5282. Bergmann v. McCaughtry, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5283. Watson v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 Md. App. 739. No. 95­5285. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5286. Carman v. Saunders, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 320. No. 95­5287. Castillo v. California Department of Parks and Recreation et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 13. No. 95­5288. Bibbs v. Witkowski, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 772. No. 95­5289. White v. Jones et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1218. No. 95­5291. Grimm v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5292. Lowe v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 650 So. 2d 969. No. 95­5293. Mayweather v. Terrell, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 95­5294. McCullough v. Burnett, Circuit Judge, Craighead County, Arkansas. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1396. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 888 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5295. Jones v. Love, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institute at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5297. LaFountain v. Jones et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 272. No. 95­5298. Perna v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 897. No. 95­5299. Lesko v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 769. No. 95­5300. O'Brien v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 277. No. 95­5301. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 341. No. 95­5302. Gilbreath v. Reynolds, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 285. No. 95­5303. Pfeil v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­5304. Wallace v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 P. 2d 504. No. 95­5305. Whitney v. Yarborough, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5306. Tedder v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5308. Pankey v. Carnahan, Governor of Missouri, et al.; and Pankey v. Cook et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5310. Ashley et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 311. No. 95­5311. White v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 530 N. W. 2d 77. No. 95­5313. Nelson v. New Jersey et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 889 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5314. Labankoff et al. v. Baker, California Cir- cuit Judge, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5316. Tucker v. Department of the Army. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5317. Vega v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 P. 2d 107. No. 95­5319. Avila v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 338. No. 95­5320. Berger v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 16. No. 95­5321. Chandler v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 270, 455 S. E. 2d 219. No. 95­5322. Armendarez v. Shanks, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 337. No. 95­5323. Brewer v. McKinney et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 537. No. 95­5324. Wise v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5325. Okafor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1286. No. 95­5326. Pacheco v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1390. No. 95­5327. Snyder v. Grayson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­5329. Whitfield v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 947. No. 95­5330. Woody v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­5331. Bell et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 322. No. 95­5332. Watkins v. Nelson, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 287. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 890 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5333. Hayes, aka Cole v. McVicar, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5334. DeZaine v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5335. Howell v. Snyder, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5336. Hudson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 744. No. 95­5337. Lakram v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 App. Div. 2d 360, 616 N. Y. S. 2d 200. No. 95­5338. McElveen v. Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 167. No. 95­5339. Joseph v. Charlotte County Sheriff's De- partment et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 6. No. 95­5340. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­5341. Kimbrough v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 536. No. 95­5342. Keller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 638. No. 95­5343. Jelinek v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 655. No. 95­5345. Meadows v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 95­5346. Norris v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 902 S. W. 2d 428. No. 95­5347. Reynolds v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1237. No. 95­5348. Cleary v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 307. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 891 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5350. Hudgins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 115. No. 95­5351. Presley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 64. No. 95­5353. Zambrano-Gavadia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1048. No. 95­5354. Young v. Salt Lake City. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5357. Baugh v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1390. No. 95­5359. Jacobs v. Ronollo et al. Ct. App. Mo., East- ern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 S. W. 2d 136. No. 95­5360. Bennett v. Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5362. Anderson v. Williams, Sheriff, Tarrant County, Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­5363. Stanley v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 103. No. 95­5364. Riley v. Plantier, Superintendent, Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5365. Longbehn v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1136. No. 95­5366. Lee v. Carter et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5367. Jae v. Domovich, Superintendent, State Correctional Institute at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5368. Lowery v. Hersey, Judge, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 272. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 892 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5369. Brown v. Lensing, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5370. Dusenbery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5371. Garrett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5372. Craig v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1136. No. 95­5373. Aguiar v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1127. No. 95­5374. Heath v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1271. No. 95­5375. Giraldo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 776. No. 95­5376. McKenzie v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­5377. Nichols v. Grayson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­5378. Jankowski v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institute at Huntingdon, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5379. Knapp v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5380. Little v. Hatcher, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5381. Martinez-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­5382. Leath v. United States; and No. 95­5392. Leath, aka Thomas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 770. No. 95­5383. White v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 91, 647 N. E. 2d 787. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 893 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5384. Hernandez-Nunez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 330. No. 95­5385. Peck v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1287. No. 95­5386. Rushing v. Champion, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 343. No. 95­5387. Carrington v. Transport Workers' Union of America AFL­CIO et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5388. Miller v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 N. C. 663, 455 S. E. 2d 137. No. 95­5389. Johnson v. Evatt, Commissioner, South Car- olina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 822. No. 95­5390. Middleton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 679. No. 95­5393. Moore v. United States; and No. 95­5586. Ortiz et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 323. No. 95­5394. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 545. No. 95­5396. Parra v. United States; and No. 95­5402. Evans v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1220. No. 95­5397. Sutherland v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 343. No. 95­5398. Prince v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5399. Reeves v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5400. Vining v. Georgia Department of Correc- tions. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 894 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5401. Baxter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 774. No. 95­5403. Galindo v. Ingle, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5404. Williams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 331. No. 95­5405. Travis v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. No. 95­5406. Zuckerman v. Ryan. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5408. Curiale v. Alaska et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5409. Burchill v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5412. Jackson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5413. Carter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­5414. Bouters v. Florida; and Koshel v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 235 (first judgment) and 232 (second judgment). No. 95­5416. Murphy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5417. LaRette v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 681. No. 95­5418. Ray v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 685. No. 95­5421. Tellio v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 341. No. 95­5422. Wanless v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5423. Jones v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 895 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5424. Martin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5425. Jordan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 668. No. 95­5426. Moncayo v. Government of the Virgin Is- lands. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 768. No. 95­5427. Mallory v. Gilmore et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5428. Kowalski v. Carson. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5429. Marcantonio v. Rutgers, The State Univer- sity of New Jersey, et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5430. Lee v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1534. No. 95­5431. Minor v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5432. McGee v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 191 Wis. 2d 360, 530 N. W. 2d 70. No. 95­5433. Carr v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 38 and 73. No. 95­5435. Stafford v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5436. Smith v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 268. No. 95­5437. Onyekwuluje v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 818. No. 95­5438. Racich v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 341. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 896 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5439. Carter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 95­5440. Whitmill v. Armontrout, Assistant Direc- tor/Zone II, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1154. No. 95­5441. Bedney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 825. No. 95­5442. Cook v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1029. No. 95­5443. Wilson v. Grant, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5444. Bell v. Collins, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1046. No. 95­5445. Davis v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 517. No. 95­5446. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­5447. Eya v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1063. No. 95­5449. Shee Ho v. Illinois Power Co., Clinton Power Station. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 906. No. 95­5451. Hamilton v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1044. No. 95­5453. Lockhart v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 69. No. 95­5454. Read v. Oregon Board of Parole and Post- Prison Supervision. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5456. Shorter v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1248. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 897 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5457. Hicks-Bey v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 A. 2d 569. No. 95­5459. Kirby v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 633. No. 95­5461. Fowler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­5462. Felici v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 504. No. 95­5463. Booth v. Maryland. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5464. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 66. No. 95­5465. Cobb v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1491. No. 95­5466. Clawson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 806. No. 95­5468. Lindow v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1171. No. 95­5470. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 532. No. 95­5472. Sloan v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 799. No. 95­5475. Weston v. First Interstate Bank of Cali- fornia. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1149. No. 95­5476. Spears v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5478. Reed v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 775. No. 95­5481. Elias v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 536. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 898 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5485. Tavares v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5487. Kallestad v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1044. No. 95­5488. Vergel et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 635. No. 95­5489. Sladon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 30. No. 95­5490. Ketchum v. Department of Housing and Urban Development et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 548. No. 95­5492. Quiroz-Gutirrez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 341. No. 95­5493. Torres-Barraza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 95­5494. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 11. No. 95­5497. Walker et al. v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 338 Md. 253, 658 A. 2d 239. No. 95­5498. Collins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5500. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5502. Ricco v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 58. No. 95­5503. Jelley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 637. No. 95­5504. Ball v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5505. Deutsch v. United States Department of Justice et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5507. Holt v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 897. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 899 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5509. Washington v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 So. 2d 935. No. 95­5510. Stewart v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 21. No. 95­5511. Jackson, aka King, et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 62. No. 95­5513. Murcer v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 95­5514. Jones, aka Palmer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 95­5515. Id-din, aka Stewart v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 771. No. 95­5520. Sehorn v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­5521. Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 311. No. 95­5524. Embrey v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 333. No. 95­5529. Kreuzhage v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 635. No. 95­5531. Bell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1041. No. 95­5532. Daly v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 427. No. 95­5533. Harris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 269. No. 95­5535. Gehl et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 12. No. 95­5540. Attwood v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 652 So. 2d 827. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 900 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5542. Gan-Viejo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­5544. Daughenbaugh v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 171. No. 95­5546. Hill v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1151. No. 95­5554. Marrero Crespo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 818. No. 95­5555. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1004. No. 95­5560. Lane v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 633. No. 95­5564. Rosario v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 41. No. 95­5566. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 95­5568. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 95­5570. Lopez Pineda v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 693. No. 95­5571. Bin Wu et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 323. No. 95­5574. Lorenzo Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5575. Troublefield v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5578. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 69. No. 95­5579. Jiminez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5580. Lowe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 604. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 901 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5581. LeBlanc v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 393. No. 95­5583. Marchant v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 509. No. 95­5588. Sanchez-Montoya v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 786. No. 95­5593. Murdock v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 12. No. 95­5596. Krese v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 331. No. 95­5597. Murray v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 95­5598. McKinney v. United States; and No. 95­5630. Wade v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 664. No. 95­5599. Lueth v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1225. No. 95­5608. Danielson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 282. No. 95­5609. Baloney v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 429 and 430. No. 95­5610. Flowers et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 218. No. 95­5618. Johnson v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 732. No. 95­5620. Izard, aka Lewis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1390. No. 95­5621. Rojo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1041. No. 95­5622. Walking Eagle v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 902 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5624. Price v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1198. No. 95­5626. Orlander v. United States Parole Commis- sion. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5629. Tay Chu, aka Chu Tay Thuong v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5632. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­5634. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 818. No. 95­5638. McWilliams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 774. No. 95­5639. Mohanlal v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 811. No. 95­5640. Joseph v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­5641. Jones v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­5648. Potes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­5652. Stokely v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 819. No. 95­5657. Scott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­5658. Owens v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1532. No. 95­5660. LaFuente et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 457. No. 95­5662. McCormick v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 214. No. 95­5664. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 924. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 903 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5665. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 95­5666. Maxim v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 394. No. 95­5670. Hancock v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 774. No. 95­5672. Fondren v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 533. No. 95­5676. Hansen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1044. No. 95­5679. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 664. No. 95­5682. Hess v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­5684. Hurtado v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 577. No. 95­5686. Johnson et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1150. No. 95­5687. Acuna, aka Gaitan v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1531. No. 95­5689. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 144. No. 95­5690. Khoi Trong Tran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­5691. Vaughn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1218. No. 95­5694. Buchanan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 95­5695. Cordell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­5696. Blake v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 684. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 904 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5698. Arango de Cadavid v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­5699. Crowder v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1146. No. 95­5705. Murillo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 731. No. 95­5706. Lipman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 318. No. 95­5707. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 95­5708. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­5711. Skyers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1386. No. 95­5713. Boyer v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 296. No. 95­5714. Beavers v. Netherland, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5715. Pastor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­5716. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­5718. Saiyed v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5720. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 732. No. 95­5724. Wilson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5726. Watroba v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 28. No. 95­5730. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 905 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 No. 95­5731. Covarrubia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1068. No. 95­5734. Ogando v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. No. 95­5742. Obiukwu v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5753. Hewitt v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­5773. Osborne v. Montgomery Engineering Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 816. No. 95­5774. Kupka v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 94­1691. New York v. Spencer. Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 N. Y. 2d 749, 646 N. E. 2d 785. No. 94­1857. Beyer et al. v. Simmons. C. A. 3d Cir. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1160. No. 94­1939. South Carolina v. Fossick. Sup. Ct. S. C. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 317 S. C. 375, 453 S. E. 2d 899. No. 94­1969. Nebraska v. Rust. Sup. Ct. Neb. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 247 Neb. 503, 528 N. W. 2d 320. No. 94­1973. Mondragon, Secretary, New Mexico De- partment of Corrections, et al. v. Smith. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 801. No. 94­2111. Dutton, Warden v. Houston. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 381. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 906 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­1829. Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation & Out- door Council, Inc., et al. v. Alaska et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to intervene in order to file a petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 549. No. 94­1841. Ruyle et al. v. Continental Oil Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 837. No. 94­1916. Sac-Co Inc., dba Acme Cash Register Co., fka CBS Liquor Control, Inc. v. AT&T Global Information Solutions Co., fka NCR Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1076. No. 94­2069. Spectramed, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1575. No. 95­42. A. Uberti & C. v. Superior Court of Arizona, County of Pima (Cordova et ux., Real Parties in Interest). Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 181 Ariz. 565, 892 P. 2d 1354. No. 95­79. Olszewski v. American Telephone & Tele- graph Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Con- nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 316. No. 95­5224. Wall v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 428. No. 94­1885. New Jersey v. Saez et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Motions of respondents Orlando Navarro and Luis Saez for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 139 N. J. 279, 653 A. 2d 1130. No. 94­1942. McKnight, Personal Representative of the Estate of McKnight, et al. v. American Cyanamid 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 907 516 U. S. October 2, 1995 Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1216. No. 95­28. Schering Corp. v. Food and Drug Administra- tion. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 390. No. 95­35. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics In- stitute, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Jus- tice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1026. No. 95­264. Kramer v. Tribe. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or deci- sion of this petition. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 315. No. 94­1950. Shaper v. Tracy, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 97 Ohio App. 3d 760, 647 N. E. 2d 550. No. 94­1964. Shoemaker, Former Chief, Ohio Adult Pa- role Authority, et al. v. Kellogg et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent Glen S. Kellogg for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 503. No. 94­2027. Montgomery Securities et al. v. Dannen- berg et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of American Bankers Asso- ciation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 615. No. 94­2060. ARCO Products Co. v. Graham Oil Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 43 F. 3d 1244. No. 94­2071. Texaco Inc. et al. v. Williams et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioners to consolidate this petition with No. 94­1387, Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A., et al. v. Calhoun et al., Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Cal- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 908 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 2, 1995 516 U. S. houn, Deceased [certiorari granted, 514 U. S. 1126], denied. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 765. No. 94­2135. City of Morgan City v. Southern Louisiana Electric Cooperative Assn. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of Colorado Association of Municipal Utilities, Municipal Electric Systems of Oklahoma, Inc., and American Public Power Associa- tion et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 319. No. 94­8642. Crawford v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 94­9091. Lee v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari before judgment denied. No. 94­9234. Saunders v. American Telephone & Tele- graph Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 94­9368. Callahan v. Simmons, Judge, Circuit Court of Michigan, Wayne County. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of re- spondent for award of damages denied. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 47 F. 3d 1167. No. 95­53. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Slaugh- ter, Secretary, Department of Revenue and Taxation of Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Motion of American Gas Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 522. No. 95­64. Davis v. Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of Joe R. Whatley to substitute class representative in place of deceased petitioner denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 300. No. 95­85. Reebok International Ltd. et al. v. Banque Internationale A. Luxembourg S. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae out of time denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1387. No. 95­116. Winters v. Costco Wholesale Group Bene- fits Program and Concept Administrators, Inc. C. A. 9th 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 909 516 U. S. October 2, 4, 1995 Cir. Motions of National Association of Insurance Commissioners and Northwest Women's Law Center et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 550. No. 95­125. General Motors Corp. v. City of Kansas City. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Motion of Committee on State Taxa- tion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 S. W. 2d 59. No. 95­127. Van Klassens, Inc., et al. v. Imagineering, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Pass & Seymour, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 53 F. 3d 1260. No. 95­155. Deloitte & Touche v. Miller et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of American Institute of Certified Public Ac- countants for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1407. No. 95­178. Howell v. Mauzy et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Motion of petitioner to remand case to Supreme Court of Texas denied. Certiorari denied. No. 95­203. City of Memphis et al. v. East Brooks Books, Inc., dba Getwell Bookmart and Airport Adult Theater, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioners to defer consider- ation of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 220. No. 95­208. Murray, By and Through His Parents and Next Friends, Murray et al. v. Montrose County School District RE­1J. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of National Associa- tion of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 921. October 4, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 95­6006 (A­300). Lane v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 910 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 4, 5, 10, 1995 516 U. S. grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. October 5, 1995 Certiorari Granted No. 94­1941. United States v. Virginia et al.; and No. 94­2107. Virginia et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Briefs of petitioners are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Thursday, November 16, 1995. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 15, 1995. Reply briefs, if any, are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, January 3, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 976 F. 2d 890 and 44 F. 3d 1229. No. 95­5207. Cooper v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 16, 1995. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Friday, December 15, 1995. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, January 3, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 889 P. 2d 293. October 10, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 94­ 1419, ante, p. 1.) Certiorari Dismissed No. 95­31. Faulkner v. Jones, Chairman, Board of Visi- tors of The Citadel, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Nancy Mellette to add party or to intervene denied. Certiorari dis- missed as moot. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 440. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­299. Union Security Life Insurance Co. v. Crocker. Application for stay of enforcement of judgment of 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 911 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 the Supreme Court of Alabama, case No. 1931672, entered on July 14, 1995, and modified on September 8, 1995, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court. No. D­1576. In re Disbarment of Ross. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1176.] No. 94­805. Bush, Governor of Texas, et al. v. Vera et al.; No. 94­806. Lawson et al. v. Vera et al.; and No. 94­988. United States v. Vera et al. D. C. S. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 515 U. S. 1172.] Motions of the So- licitor General and the state and private appellants for divided argument granted in part, and the time is divided as follows: state appellants, 20 minutes; private appellants, 10 minutes; the Solicitor General, 10 minutes; and appellees, 40 minutes. No. 94­1175. Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1157.] Motion of New York Clearing House Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 94­1453. Peacock v. Thomas. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 514 U. S. 1126.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­1471. Varity Corp. v. Howe et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 514 U. S. 1082.] Motion of respondents for leave to file a supplemental brief denied. No. 95­5565. In re Riascos. C. A. 11th Cir. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 641. No. 95­5878. In re Lorenz; No. 95­5895. In re Meyer; and No. 95­5973. In re Zack. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 912 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­314. In re Fleming; No. 95­5576. In re Sanders; and No. 95­5613. In re Harvey. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 95­5284. In re Chudnovsky; and No. 95­5644. In re Colen. Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied. (See also No. 95­5565, supra.) No. 94­1940. Michigan v. Mallory et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1968. Adams et al. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen- ner & Smith, Inc., et al.; and No. 95­44. Becherer et al. v. Adams et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1054. No. 94­2064. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians et al. v. Pfingst, District Attorney, San Diego County; and No. 95­174. Pfingst, District Attorney, San Diego County v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 535. No. 94­2102. U. A. Local No. 343 of the Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL­CIO, et al. v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 48 F. 3d 1465. No. 94­2115. Younger v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­2117. Kidd et ux. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 175. No. 94­9090. Mata v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­9650. Easter v. Stainer, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 13. No. 94­9800. Gonzalez v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 52 F. 3d 310. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 913 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­39. Jekot v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1176. No. 95­56. Fort Wayne National Corp. v. Indiana De- partment of State Revenue et al. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 N. E. 2d 109. No. 95­63. LTV Steel Co., Inc., et al. v. Shalala, Secre- tary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 478. No. 95­75. Robertson-Aikman v. Immigration and Natu- ralization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­82. Sprecher v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 3. No. 95­84. Cuban American Bar Assn., Inc., et al. v. Christopher, Secretary of State, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1412. No. 95­95. Unisys Corp., dba Remington Rand Univac et al. v. Anderson et al.; and No. 95­281. Anderson et al. v. Unisys Corp., dba Reming- ton Rand Univac et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 302. No. 95­108. Lindeman v. City of Miami. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­110. Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1163. No. 95­114. Stubblefield Construction Co. et al. v. City of San Bernardino. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 Cal. App. 4th 687, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413. No. 95­139. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 365. No. 95­192. Blackston v. Heffler et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1389. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 914 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­194. Haas v. United States Postal Service, c/o General Mail Facility, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 314. No. 95­196. De Mere v. Jain. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 686. No. 95­201. Pine v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 889 S. W. 2d 625. No. 95­206. Maruca v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­217. Witty v. Hewlett-Packard Colorado, Inc., aka Hewlett-Packard. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 287. No. 95­218. Nobers et al. v. Crucible, Inc., et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 431 Pa. Super. 398, 636 A. 2d 1146. No. 95­220. Pacific Lumber Co. et al. v. Kayes et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1449. No. 95­221. Allan & Allan Arts, Ltd., dba Gateway Playhouse v. Rosenblum. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 App. Div. 2d 136, 615 N. Y. S. 2d 410. No. 95­222. Voyager Guaranty Insurance Co. et al. v. Whitson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­225. Wall v. GTE Southwest Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 633. No. 95­233. Raytech Corp. v. White et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 187. No. 95­234. Monk v. Quality Electric Supply Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1381. No. 95­236. Hill v. City of Chester et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 815. No. 95­237. Sebastian International, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1073. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 915 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­241. Wong et al. v. Carson City Council et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­245. Camboni et ux. v. Whiten et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­247. Merex A. G. et al. v. Fairchild Weston Sys- tems, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 765. No. 95­249. Bensalem Township et al. v. Blanche Road Corp., t/a Blanche Road Associates, I. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 253. No. 95­252. Caudle v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­253. United States et al. v. Koch et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1015. No. 95­256. Insinger Machine Co. v. Philadelphia Tax Review Board. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 Pa. Commw. 344, 645 A. 2d 365. No. 95­260. AIU Insurance Co. et al. v. W. R. Grace & Company-Conn. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­261. Jones et al. v. Norfolk Southern Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­262. Feaver, Acting Secretary of Florida De- partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al. v. Estate of LeClair et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1390. No. 95­263. Cheshire Medical Center v. W. R. Grace & Co. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 26. No. 95­267. Nebraska v. Yelli. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 Neb. 785, 530 N. W. 2d 250. No. 95­268. Stun-Tech, Inc. v. RACC Industries, Inc. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 916 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­271. Mekkam v. Oregon Health Sciences Univer- sity et al. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 Ore. App. 470, 888 P. 2d 1093. No. 95­272. Ray v. Lehman, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 606. No. 95­274. Ingram v. Hillsborough County, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1388. No. 95­275. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 876. No. 95­280. Buser, by His Next Friends, Buser et al. v. Corpus Christi Independent School District. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 490. No. 95­284. Miller v. Gentry et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1487. No. 95­288. Bank of Israel et al. v. Lewin. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 450. No. 95­291. Spickler v. Maine. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 764. No. 95­292. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 719. No. 95­293. Gregory v. Electrical Workers Local 58 Pension Trust Fund et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 325. No. 95­294. County of Kern et al. v. Anderson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1310. No. 95­295. Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hovis, Judge, District Court of Kiowa County, Oklahoma, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 298. No. 95­297. Huber v. Howard County, Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 61. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 917 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­298. ABB Robotics Inc. et al. v. GMFanuc Robot- ics Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1062. No. 95­311. Duncan v. Duncan, aka Scott, aka Young, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 677. No. 95­312. Roussin v. Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 350. No. 95­319. Grant et ux. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 17. No. 95­348. Olsen v. Paley et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1050. No. 95­359. Pudlo v. City of Chicago. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Ill. App. 3d 107, 648 N. E. 2d 135. No. 95­374. Fuller, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Fuller v. Cummings et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 3. No. 95­377. Fitten v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 179. No. 95­384. Boyett v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 150. No. 95­431. Turner v. General Motors Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­5056. Hochschild v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 95­5063. Brisbon v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 236, 647 N. E. 2d 935. No. 95­5107. Partin v. Arkansas State Board of Law Ex- aminers et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 69. No. 95­5117. Brown v. United States; and No. 95­5187. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 618. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 918 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5151. Jerome v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 637. No. 95­5164. Box v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 345. No. 95­5167. Ramey v. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 346. No. 95­5168. Sahar v. Honeywell, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 278. No. 95­5171. Lopera-Ochoa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5172. Medlock v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 P. 2d 1333. No. 95­5221. Talley v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 317. No. 95­5251. Davis v. Alexander et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5312. James v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1327. No. 95­5356. Smith v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5455. Williams v. Dow et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1051. No. 95­5460. Wright v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 214 App. Div. 2d 995, 626 N. Y. S. 2d 647. No. 95­5477. Shown v. Boone, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 78. No. 95­5480. Friedman v. Montana. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 919 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­5482. Finnegan v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 N. Y. 2d 53, 647 N. E. 2d 758. No. 95­5483. Fard, aka Thompson v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di- vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5484. Azubuko v. Massachusetts Commissioner of Registry. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 423. No. 95­5491. Wohlford et ux. v. Mays et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 330. No. 95­5496. Jenkins v. Maqueen et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5501. Shah v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 637. No. 95­5508. Hudson v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 166. No. 95­5517. Jorgenson v. Filmservice Lab, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5518. Callahan v. Liacos et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5519. Crane v. Snider, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 13. No. 95­5522. Rogers v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 P. 2d 959. No. 95­5523. Highlands v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 440 Pa. Super. 648, 655 A. 2d 1045. No. 95­5525. Turner v. Campoy, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 30. No. 95­5526. Densmore v. Grayson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 920 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5527. Corrigan v. Allstate Insurance Co. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5530. Mier v. Nauhaus et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 816. No. 95­5534. Turner v. Moats, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 62. No. 95­5536. Farmer v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 448 Mich. 875, 530 N. W. 2d 753. No. 95­5537. Binnick v. Lancaster County Personnel Board et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 277. No. 95­5538. L'Ggrke v. City of Tulsa et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5547. Etheridge v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 903 S. W. 2d 1. No. 95­5548. Davila v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5549. Foster v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 112. No. 95­5550. Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 867. No. 95­5551. Johnson v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5552. Lanasa v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5553. Adams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5556. Chauncey v. Chauncey. Ct. App. Ohio, Cu- yahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5557. Solimine v. Dedham, Massachusetts, Dis- trict Court et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 51 F. 3d 264. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 921 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­5558. Bruno v. Mele, Sheriff, Harford County, Maryland, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 5. No. 95­5559. Coney v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 1009. No. 95­5561. Williams v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5562. John R. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5563. Jernigan v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1043. No. 95­5567. Perez v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5573. Dennison v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 440 Pa. Super. 646, 655 A. 2d 1043. No. 95­5577. Rivera v. Long Island Railroad. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 765. No. 95­5585. Crawford v. Garner, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5590. Kitsos v. Review Board of the Illinois At- torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5591. Wesley v. Young et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5592. Tillman v. Borg, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 282. No. 95­5594. Morales v. Bartlett, Superintendent, El- mira Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 766. No. 95­5595. Adams v. Coombe, Commissioner, New York State Department of Correction. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 922 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5601. Bell v. Hatcher, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5602. Janneh v. CSH­1 Hotel Limited Partner- ship, dba Holiday Inn Arena et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5607. Harris v. Chicago Police Department. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5611. Holloway v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 S. W. 2d 482. No. 95­5612. Hines v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 638. No. 95­5614. Emmett v. Lawry's Restaurants, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 279. No. 95­5631. Thomas v. Null et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 663. No. 95­5636. Baird v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 662, 640 A. 2d 469. No. 95­5653. Sarandos v. City of Visalia, California, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5669. Fields v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Idaho 904, 908 P. 2d 1211. No. 95­5677. Ferris v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 632. No. 95­5685. Burris v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 N. E. 2d 961. No. 95­5693. Cousins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­5701. Tsimbidaros v. Department of Justice et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5719. Solimine v. Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 923 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­5721. Gilbert v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1229. No. 95­5727. Wright v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 66. No. 95­5728. Bullard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­5732. Stansbury v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 4th 824, 889 P. 2d 588. No. 95­5738. Riggi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 398. No. 95­5739. Crittenden v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­5741. Palmer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 63. No. 95­5743. Pujol v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5748. Williams v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Mari- copa County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5751. Galloway v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 908. No. 95­5752. Duckett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 637. No. 95­5758. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 774. No. 95­5761. Lang v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­5763. Lazo v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 330. No. 95­5766. Winn v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­5767. Wiley v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 Ill. 2d 259, 651 N. E. 2d 189. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 924 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5790. Boyd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 631. No. 95­5791. Butler v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 941. No. 95­5798. Hussain v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­5800. Hilson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1532. No. 95­5802. Dorsey v. Ragans, Superintendent, Cal- houn Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5808. Mosavi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5811. Rutherford v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 370. No. 95­5812. McKay v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­5813. Jacob v. Clarke, Director, Nebraska De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 178. No. 95­5814. Chavez-Mejia v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 78. No. 95­5817. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 731. No. 95­5818. Harris v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 95­5819. Green v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1513. No. 95­5820. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 163. No. 95­5834. Singleton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 129. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 925 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­5835. Poole v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 62. No. 95­5836. Lancaster et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­5838. Knowles v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­5839. Whittaker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 69. No. 95­5842. Wyce v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 639. No. 95­5843. Weaver v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 685. No. 95­5844. Sarabia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­5846. Fidel Santana v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 639. No. 95­5848. Casalis-Noy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­5850. Ready v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 18. No. 95­5857. Greenwood v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 A. 2d 825. No. 95­5859. Fonseca-Machado v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­5860. Fuentes-Mendoza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1113. No. 95­5861. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 167. No. 95­5863. Diamond v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 249. No. 95­5866. Gehrke v. Lee, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 68. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 926 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5867. Harrison v. Ulmer, Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Florida, 6th Judicial Circuit. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 658 So. 2d 990. No. 95­5870. McKenzie v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 532 N. W. 2d 210. No. 95­5871. Newsome v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 95­5872. Najera-Rubio v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1240. No. 95­5877. Leaks v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1157. No. 95­5880. Campbell et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 769. No. 95­5881. Galloway v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1069. No. 95­5886. Traynoff v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 168. No. 95­5890. Van Wagner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 661. No. 95­5894. McGregor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5899. Charlton v. Crandell, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 929. No. 95­5900. Jackson, aka Aletor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1219. No. 95­5911. Burnside v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 31. No. 95­5912. Austin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­5918. Reece v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­5919. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 690. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 927 516 U. S. October 10, 1995 No. 95­5922. Dukes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5923. Fisher et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 96. No. 95­5924. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­5925. Grossi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1452. No. 95­5926. Perales v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­5930. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­5931. Kaho v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­5932. Kirsh et vir v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1062. No. 95­5936. Berger v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­5944. McClenton v. United States (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 770 (first judgment); 53 F. 3d 584 (second judgment). No. 95­5955. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 63. No. 95­6011. Matteson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 191 Wis. 2d 360, 530 N. W. 2d 69. No. 94­1802. Hospital San Rafael, Inc., et al. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 45. No. 95­72. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of National Music Publishers' Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 950. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 928 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 10, 16, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­223. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Orangeburg Sausage Co. Ct. App. S. C. Motions of American Council of Life Insurance and South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys Asso- ciation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 316 S. C. 331, 450 S. E. 2d 66. No. 95­240. Newman v. Consolidation Coal Co. Super. Ct. Pa. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed as a seaman granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 438 Pa. Super. 703, 652 A. 2d 415. No. 95­273. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., et al. v. Ar- cata Graphics Fairfield, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of National Bar Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 815. Rehearing Denied No. 94­8182. Avery v. Brodeur, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections, 514 U. S. 1070; and No. 94­9175. Roaquin v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 515 U. S. 1165. Petitions for rehearing denied. October 16, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­167. Waldron v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995). Reported below: 53 F. 3d 680. Miscellaneous Orders No. M­15. Farr v. Florida. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, Jus- tice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would grant the motion. No. M­16. Marian v. Goris et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­5673. Guess v. Jones, Sheriff. C. A. 6th Cir.; No. 95­5674. Guess v. Wilkinson et al. C. A. 6th Cir.; No. 95­5703. Guess v. Straight. C. A. 6th Cir.; and 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 929 516 U. S. October 16, 1995 No. 95­5704. Guess v. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Peti- tioner is allowed until November 6, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­5984. In re Franklin; No. 95­6038. In re Ullrich; No. 95­6039. In re Walker; No. 95­6040. In re Wohlgemuth; No. 95­6046. In re Jerold; No. 95­6047. In re Kirk; No. 95­6048. In re Land; No. 95­6052. In re Renderman; No. 95­6053. In re Sandlin; No. 95­6054. In re Seaman; No. 95­6055. In re Parker; No. 95­6056. In re Payne; No. 95­6057. In re Sierra; No. 95­6060. In re Golini; No. 95­6061. In re Gauthier; No. 95­6062. In re Garrett; No. 95­6063. In re Harpster; No. 95­6064. In re Divine; No. 95­6065. In re Dutcher; and No. 95­6074. In re Kennedy. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 95­5683. In re Eslinger; and No. 95­5963. In re Saka. Petitions for writs of mandamus denied. No. 95­5654. In re Sweeting; and No. 95­5675. In re Hemmerle. Petitions for writs of prohi- bition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 95­244. Quackenbush, California Insurance Commis- sioner v. Allstate Insurance Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 350. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 930 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 16, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­266. Jaffee, Special Administrator for Allen, Deceased v. Redmond et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1346. No. 95­340. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., dba Brown Shoe Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1426. Certiorari Denied No. 94­1818. Equicor, Inc. v. Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1529. No. 95­57. Germino v. Department of Defense. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 345. No. 95­98. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, dba Tampa General Hospital, et al. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1516. No. 95­105. American Mutual Life Insurance Co. et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1172. No. 95­111. Delco Development Co., Inc., et al. v. Me- chanics & Farmers Savings Bank, F. S. B. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 Conn. 594, 656 A. 2d 1034. No. 95­135. Erhard v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1470. No. 95­138. Friedman v. Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 866. No. 95­141. Kanouse v. Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P. A. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1286. No. 95­142. Harris, Trustee for the Christopher Har- ris Trust v. Missouri Department of Conservation. Ct. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 931 516 U. S. October 16, 1995 App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 S. W. 2d 66. No. 95­143. International Rectifier Corp. v. SGS- Thomson Microelectronics, Inc.; and No. 95­321. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. v. In- ternational Rectifier Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 839. No. 95­145. Freeman v. Planning Board of West Boyl- ston et al.; and No. 95­322. Planning Board of West Boylston et al. v. Freeman. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 419 Mass. 548, 646 N. E. 2d 139. No. 95­160. Gold Coast Publications, Inc., et al. v. Cor- rigan et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1336. No. 95­199. Navajo Nation v. Hopi Tribe et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 908. No. 95­224. Kraebel, dba Barklee Realty Co. v. Mi- chetti, Commissioner, New York City Department of Hous- ing, Preservation and Development, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1063. No. 95­300. Skywark v. United States Lines, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1064. No. 95­303. Ross Yordy Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Naylor et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 285. No. 95­304. Rafferty et al. v. City of Youngstown et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 278. No. 95­305. Plaisance v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­306. Kipen v. Department of the Navy. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 82. No. 95­307. Dorman et ux. v. Jones et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 285. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 932 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 16, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­308. Palm Beach County et al. v. West Penin- sular Title Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1490. No. 95­316. Grenell v. New Jersey. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 767. No. 95­318. Aura Systems, Inc., et al. v. Frankston. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 333. No. 95­320. Reynolds et al. v. Wagner et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­327. Silver Rose Entertainment, Inc., et al. v. Clay County et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 646 So. 2d 246. No. 95­330. Cunningham v. Whittier Union High School District et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­333. Julien v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 632. No. 95­336. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission et al. v. Christy. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1140. No. 95­337. Rice v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 166 Ill. 2d 35, 651 N. E. 2d 1083. No. 95­341. Trigalet et al., as Personal Representa- tives of the Estate of Trigalet v. Warrick et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 645. No. 95­342. Thompson et al. v. City of San Jose. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 Cal. App. 4th 330, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205. No. 95­343. Bullis v. Froehlich et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­344. Burr v. O'Boynik et al. Ct. App. Kan. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Kan. App. 2d xiii. No. 95­417. Vencius et ux. v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 210 App. Div. 2d 219, 619 N. Y. S. 2d 336. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 933 516 U. S. October 16, 1995 No. 95­437. Thomas et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­441. Puentes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1567. No. 95­461. Massaro v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1063. No. 95­5569. Saenz v. Diesslin, Regional Director, Col- orado Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 916. No. 95­5587. Stow v. Marshall, Superintendent, North Central Correctional Institution, et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 1110, 646 N. E. 2d 437. No. 95­5603. Van Lee v. Mayer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5605. Brannson v. Ely, Judge, Circuit Court of Missouri, Jackson County, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5606. MacGuire v. Rich. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5615. Scott v. Rogers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5617. Taylor v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 95­5623. Wooldridge v. Yarbrough et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 339. No. 95­5625. Shieh v. Ebershoff et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5627. Solimine v. Ortho McNeil Pharmaceutical et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 59. No. 95­5628. Oslund v. Thompson, Superintendent, Ore- gon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 73. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 934 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 16, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5643. Johnson v. Cody, Warden. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5646. Moran v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 592. No. 95­5647. Baker v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1138. No. 95­5651. Sheffield v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5655. Rogers v. Kolesar et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5656. Sweeney v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1531. No. 95­5659. Knight v. Intermarine, U. S. A. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 431. No. 95­5663. Murphy v. Cannon. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Kan. App. 2d xiii, 889 P. 2d 1162. No. 95­5667. Mangrum v. Holloway. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5668. Deutsch v. Easterbrook et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5678. Dedes v. Page et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1123. No. 95­5692. Weston v. First Interstate Bank of Cali- fornia et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1149. No. 95­5712. Boulton v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5722. Adams v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1286. No. 95­5737. Cousins v. North Carolina Department of Correction et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 52 F. 3d 320. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 935 516 U. S. October 16, 1995 No. 95­5772. Chia v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5788. Attwood v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5799. Franchi v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­5856. Turner v. United States; No. 95­5917. Wilwright v. United States; and No. 95­5959. Duskin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 586. No. 95­5858. Hoyte et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1239. No. 95­5885. Carriere v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1245. No. 95­5914. Routt v. United States; and No. 95­5920. Shephard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1240. No. 95­5937. Ogundeko v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­5938. Haymond v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­5942. Prince v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5946. Payne v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­5948. Walton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5952. Barrios v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 633. No. 95­5953. Minor v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 647 A. 2d 770. No. 95­5960. Smith v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 936 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 16, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5961. Esqueda-Moreno v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 578. No. 95­5962. Pagar v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 637. No. 95­5964. Sobin v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1423. No. 95­5965. Castro v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 78. No. 95­5966. Buntin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 774. No. 95­5968. Lipscomb v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­5970. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 356. No. 95­5971. Woosley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5976. DeMauro v. Commissioner of Internal Rev- enue. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5978. Femia v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 43. No. 95­5981. Gunn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5983. Garvin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1081. No. 95­5992. Wenger v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 280. No. 95­5995. Crum v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5998. Kinney v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­6001. Baugh v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 937 516 U. S. October 16, 1995 No. 95­6002. Arevalo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6003. Bernardo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 812. No. 95­6005. Chow v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­6007. Marino v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6009. Lyons v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1198. No. 95­6010. Martin v. Hall, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6026. George v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­6029. Estrada v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 392. No. 95­6034. Bonavolante v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1452. No. 95­6035. Crowder v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 825. No. 95­69. Kernan, Warden v. Weston. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 633. No. 95­134. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Is- bell et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion of Association of American Railroads for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 181 Ariz. 316, 890 P. 2d 611, and 182 Ariz. 134, 893 P. 2d 1297. No. 95­163. Zoning Board of Adjustment for the Town- ship of West Amwell et al. v. DeBlasio. C. A. 3d Cir. Mo- tion of New Jersey State League of Municipalities for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 592. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 938 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 16, 19, 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­258. Jones, Chairman, Board of Visitors of The Citadel, et al. v. Faulkner et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Nancy Mellette to add party or to intervene denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 440. No. 95­415. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent to seal appendix granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 556. October 19, 1995 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­340. Hellums v. Alabama et al. D. C. S. D. Ala. Application for stay, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. The temporary stay entered Octo- ber 14, 1995, is vacated. No. A­355. Davidson, as Next Friend of Davidson v. Netherland, Warden. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution. October 30, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded. (See No. 95­6016, ante, p. 10.) Miscellaneous Orders No. A­132 (95­226). Haversat v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Breyer and re- ferred to the Court, denied. No. A­368. Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Radiofone, Inc. Motion of respondent to vacate the October 25, 1995 [post, p. 1301], order granting the application to vacate the stay entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. D­1317. In re Disbarment of Casalino. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 510 U. S. 930.] 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 939 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. D­1558. In re Disbarment of Rosengarden. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1140.] No. D­1574. In re Disbarment of Muhammad. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1176.] No. D­1575. In re Disbarment of Rosenblum. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1176.] No. D­1577. In re Disbarment of Ortman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1176.] No. D­1578. In re Disbarment of Thrower. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1177.] No. D­1580. In re Disbarment of Ewers. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1177.] No. D­1581. In re Disbarment of Crawford. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1177.] No. D­1582. In re Disbarment of Kellner. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1177.] No. D­1583. In re Disbarment of Tache. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1177.] No. D­1584. In re Disbarment of Felman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1177.] No. D­1589. In re Disbarment of Mione. Carl Nicholas Mione, of Brooklyn, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1591. In re Disbarment of Zoccola. Robert F. Zoccola, of Carmel, Ind., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1592. In re Disbarment of Boughton. Robert Wil- lard Boughton, of Cleveland, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 940 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1593. In re Disbarment of McLenithan. Richard E. McLenithan, of Hudson Falls, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1594. In re Disbarment of Eberhart. David Cleon Eberhart III, of Spring Hill, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1595. In re Disbarment of Edelman. Irving Edel- man, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1596. In re Disbarment of Greenberg. Alan Gra- ham Greenberg, of Minnetonka, Minn., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1597. In re Disbarment of Wollman. John Henry Wollman, of West Chester, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1598. In re Disbarment of Signore. Stephen Romer Signore, Jr., of Ambler, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1599. In re Disbarment of Weisgerber. Robert Glenn Weisgerber, of Black Mountain, N. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 941 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. D­1600. In re Disbarment of Inglis. Charles K. Inglis, of St. Petersburg, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1601. In re Disbarment of Bustamante. John H. Bustamante, of Lakewood, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­17. Mahaffey v. Illinois. Motion for leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted. No. M­18. DeMilo & Co., Inc. v. Connecticut Department of Transportation. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­5831. Guess v. Gerken, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Hocking County, Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until November 20, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­406. In re Danko. C. A. Fed. Cir. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 80. No. 95­5747. In re Spradley. C. A. 11th Cir. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied. No. 95­6203. In re Bonty; No. 95­6204. In re Bonta; No. 95­6223. In re Cavan; No. 95­6230. In re Rodriguez; No. 95­6235. In re Moncrief; No. 95­6236. In re Lanzon; No. 95­6237. In re Jory; No. 95­6243. In re Deere; No. 95­6244. In re Harris; No. 95­6245. In re Grasmick; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 942 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6257. In re Walker; No. 95­6258. In re Wesley; No. 95­6300. In re Wheeler; No. 95­6301. In re Son Van Hoang; No. 95­6303. In re Shepherd; No. 95­6305. In re Lane; and No. 95­6306. In re Maida. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 95­5829. In re Brown; and No. 95­5833. In re Smith. Petitions for writs of mandamus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 95­157. United States v. Armstrong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of respondents Robert Rozelle, Shelton Auntwan Martin, and Aaron Hampton for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1508. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 95­406 and 95­5747, supra.) No. 94­2068. Parkerson v. Brooks et vir. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 189, 454 S. E. 2d 769. No. 94­2134. Peterson v. American Life & Health Insur- ance Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 404. No. 94­9693. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1162. No. 94­9720. Mobley v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 292, 455 S. E. 2d 61. No. 94­9854. Baker v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 540 Pa. 131, 656 A. 2d 116. No. 95­1. Martinez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 899 S. W. 2d 655. No. 95­133. Mears et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Liquidating Agent/Receiver of Olympic International Bank & Trust Co. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 1111, 646 N. E. 2d 1097. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 943 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­151. Klamath Tribe v. Oregon et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 758. No. 95­334. Village of New Lebanon et al. v. Bunch, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Bravard. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1069. No. 95­335. National Engineering & Contracting Co., Inc., et al. v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1531. No. 95­350. Wunderlich v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 684 N. E. 2d 464. No. 95­351. Knox County Board of Education v. Rynes, by His Parent and Next Friend, Rynes, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 169. No. 95­352. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. McNeely. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 189. No. 95­356. Wooten v. Campbell et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 696. No. 95­357. Houston v. All Saints Health System, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­362. Romberg et ux. v. Nichols et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 453. No. 95­363. Corrigan et al. v. City of Newaygo et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1211. No. 95­367. Keles v. New York University et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 766. No. 95­369. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 268 Ill. App. 3d 1116, 685 N. E. 2d 29. No. 95­379. Newkirk, by Next Friends, Newkirk and Newkirk, et al. v. Fink, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Counselor of East Lansing Public Schools. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1070. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 944 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­392. Garfield et al. v. J. C. Nichols Real Estate et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 662. No. 95­395. Clapp v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 765. No. 95­396. Jiminez v. Mary Washington College et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 369. No. 95­399. Treece v. Florida Parole Commission. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­402. G. K. A. Beverage Corp. et al. v. Honickman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 762. No. 95­403. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni; and South- west Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1138 (first judgment) and 71 (second judgment). No. 95­404. Sebulsky v. Richardson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1145. No. 95­405. Carroll et al. v. Lorson et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­407. Martel v. County of Los Angeles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 993. No. 95­408. Mansour v. Goldstock et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 App. Div. 2d 671, 587 N. Y. S. 2d 880. No. 95­411. Flinn v. American Home Assurance Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­413. Alabama v. Tucker. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 667 So. 2d 1339. No. 95­444. Askin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 100. No. 95­451. Schulz et al. v. New York et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 N. Y. 2d 225, 654 N. E. 2d 1226. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 945 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­462. Mena v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­483. Buchbinder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­494. Zahran et ux. v. Frankenmuth Mutual In- surance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 334. No. 95­498. Parker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 638. No. 95­500. Barber v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 62. No. 95­517. Touron v. Metropolitan Dade County et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 430. No. 95­532. Zuno-Arce v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1420. No. 95­547. Stillo et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 553. No. 95­557. Burton v. North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 772. No. 95­5260. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 406. No. 95­5276. Bass v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­5280. Bona v. GNAC, Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5307. Sack v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 264. No. 95­5315. Shepard et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 9. No. 95­5352. Gaster v. Parrott et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 266. No. 95­5361. Dowdy et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 388. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 946 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5391. Willingham v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 S. W. 2d 351. No. 95­5467. Porterfield v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 S. W. 2d 672. No. 95­5541. Baxter v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1501. No. 95­5650. Rodriguez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 S. W. 2d 658. No. 95­5680. Jackson v. Circuit Court of Michigan, Ingham County. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5681. Scarbrough v. City of Prichard, Alabama, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5688. Bryant v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5700. Panaro v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 App. Div. 2d 1036, 624 N. Y. S. 2d 497. No. 95­5702. Dutcher v. Sweeney. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 110 Nev. 1538, 893 P. 2d 400. No. 95­5709. Murphy v. Justus et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 275. No. 95­5710. Lonewolf v. Orange County Social Serv- ices et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5717. Rowe v. Crosby, Superintendent, New River Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5723. Vickson v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5725. Washington v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 362. No. 95­5729. Charleston v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1064. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 947 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­5733. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 95­5735. Riggins v. Walter et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 333. No. 95­5745. Romo et al. v. Champion et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1013. No. 95­5746. Spencer v. Howard et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5749. Washington v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Yuma County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5754. DeLoach v. Garner, Chairman, Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 679. No. 95­5755. Graham v. Huebner. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 337. No. 95­5756. Henderson v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 266. No. 95­5757. Lewis v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 Ill. 2d 305, 651 N. E. 2d 72. No. 95­5759. Kostovski et ux. v. Jolevski et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5760. Kohl v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 273. No. 95­5762. Lewis v. North Carolina Employment Secu- rity Commission et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 773. No. 95­5764. Kaliczynski v. Resolution Trust Corpora- tion et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5765. Kaliczynski v. Resolution Trust Corpora- tion et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5768. Williams v. Ward, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 343. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 948 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5769. Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 394. No. 95­5770. Villers v. Dutton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 95­5771. Adams v. Ware et al. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 S. W. 2d 269. No. 95­5775. Jones v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5777. Jason v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­5778. Jones v. Missouri et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5779. Koonce v. Caspari, Superintendent, East- ern Missouri Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5780. McAdams v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5781. Mangrum v. Bledsoe. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5782. McCullar v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 635. No. 95­5783. Jenkins v. Jenkins. Ct. App. Utah. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5784. Attwood v. Chiles, Governor of Florida, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 657 So. 2d 1167. No. 95­5785. Curtis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304. No. 95­5786. Macon v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 949 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­5787. Orzechowski v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5792. Curry v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 261 Ill. App. 3d 1132, 682 N. E. 2d 1266. No. 95­5794. Burchill v. Steinberg. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 441 Pa. Super. 664, 657 A. 2d 46. No. 95­5795. Hernandez v. Florida Power & Light Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1390. No. 95­5796. Graham v. Hannigan, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 342. No. 95­5803. Forman v. Coombe, Acting Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 812. No. 95­5805. Evans v. Clarke, Director, Nebraska De- partment of Correctional Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 330. No. 95­5806. Homo et al. v. City of Henniker, New Hamp- shire. Super. Ct. N. H., Merrimack County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5809. Moore v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 311. No. 95­5810. Jones v. Humphrey, Attorney General of Minnesota (two judgments). C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 330 (first judgment). No. 95­5821. Smith v. Gray et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5823. Tamayo v. Department of Labor et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1228. No. 95­5825. Coleman v. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5826. Clay v. Godinez, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 950 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5828. Jones v. City of Jennings et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 329. No. 95­5832. Freeman v. Idaho. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5837. Murph v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 118 N. C. App. 176, 455 S. E. 2d 169. No. 95­5840. Williams v. Godinez, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1316. No. 95­5864. Franklin v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5879. Tayag v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1085. No. 95­5888. Arnold v. Ray's Advertising Specialties, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 115. No. 95­5896. Nixon v. West Virginia. Cir. Ct. Brooke County, W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5902. Boyd v. West, Clerk, District Court of Texas, Knox County. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 62 F. 3d 397. No. 95­5915. Paul v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1081. No. 95­5989. Parker v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­5997. Hyung Su Lee v. United States; and No. 95­6082. Gun Ho Kim v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­6004. Blythe v. United States; No. 95­6017. Parks v. United States; No. 95­6019. Peart v. United States; and 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 951 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­6020. Peart v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 95­6004, 57 F. 3d 1064. No. 95­6021. Philyor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6022. Rodas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 393. No. 95­6024. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 331. No. 95­6027. Golden v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 179. No. 95­6042. Singh v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1033. No. 95­6043. Brunson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 673. No. 95­6067. Doe v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6069. Herbert et vir v. Henneberry, Director, Patuxent Institution, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 166. No. 95­6071. Greer v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 897. No. 95­6075. Parker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 647. No. 95­6076. Shackelford v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 636. No. 95­6083. Riveros v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6084. Walker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 168. No. 95­6091. Turner v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 897. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 952 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6094. Dominguez, aka Valleperez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6095. McClain v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­6100. Jernigan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 95­6102. Kouba v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1224. No. 95­6105. Walker v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. No. 95­6107. Cosky v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­6108. Bean v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6109. Gilbert v. Spears, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 636. No. 95­6110. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 69. No. 95­6113. Kidston v. Stibbards et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1063. No. 95­6116. Carrafa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­6119. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 391. No. 95­6120. Perez-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1. No. 95­6121. Oriakhi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1290. No. 95­6122. Sahhar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1026. No. 95­6124. McPherson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 744. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 953 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­6125. Burton v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 812. No. 95­6126. Bustos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 912. No. 95­6128. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 829. No. 95­6133. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­6136. McMillan et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­6137. Brien v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 274. No. 95­6138. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­6142. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1137. No. 95­6143. Mares v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 837. No. 95­6144. Burchard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 829. No. 95­6147. Gaston v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­6148. Gesmundo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1176. No. 95­6150. Gibbs v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 394. No. 95­6151. George v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­6152. Franco-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6161. Braziel v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 635. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 954 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6163. St. Martin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6165. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­6170. Czekala v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 168. No. 95­6173. Tatum v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 168. No. 95­6175. Cullum v. United States (two judgments). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 393. No. 95­6176. Abril-Peralta v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 179. No. 95­6179. Tobin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6182. DiNovo v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1061. No. 95­6183. Dixon et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 168. No. 95­6184. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­6186. Brock v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 154. No. 95­6187. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1217. No. 95­6188. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1357. No. 95­6190. Pitt v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 661. No. 95­6191. Coffey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 249. No. 95­6192. Buys v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 955 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 No. 95­6193. Allison v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 350. No. 95­6194. Shark v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­6196. Joelson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 835. No. 95­6197. Letterlough v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 332. No. 95­6212. Griego v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 393. No. 95­6213. Cross v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 588. No. 95­6214. Cronn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 393. No. 95­6218. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 177. No. 95­6219. Shepard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 177. No. 95­6221. Pinella v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­6222. Small v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 284. No. 95­6233. Woiner v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6261. Wong v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., Research Depart- ment. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 819. No. 95­73. Cargill, Inc. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1388. Justice Thomas, dissenting. This case questions whether the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) can, under the Clean Water Act, constitutionally assert jurisdiction over private property based solely on the actual or 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 956 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Thomas, J., dissenting 516 U. S. potential presence of migratory birds that cross state lines. I dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case. Petitioner, the successor in interest to Leslie Salt Company, owns a 153-acre tract of land southeast of San Francisco. Across the highway is the San Francisco Bay National Wildlife Refuge, which was created when the United States condemned land pre- viously owned by petitioner. In approximately 1919, the prede- cessor of Leslie Salt began manufacturing salt on the property. To facilitate salt production, Leslie Salt dug pits on dry ground to collect calcium chloride and dug shallow basins to crystallize salt. These basins lie on approximately 12.5 acres of the tract. Leslie Salt discontinued salt production in 1959.1 Since then, the area has been dry most of the year, but, during the winter and spring, rainwater occasionally creates temporary ponds. In 1985, Leslie Salt began digging a feeder ditch and a siltation pond on its property and began discharging fill material that affected the basins. After learning of Leslie Salt's activities, the Corps issued a cease-and-desist order under the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1988 ed.). Leslie Salt filed suit challenging the Corps' jurisdiction over its property. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California originally found that the Corps lacked jurisdiction over the land, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a determination whether the presence of migra- tory birds created a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to sustain Corps jurisdiction. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F. 2d 354 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1126 (1991). On re- mand, the District Court held that the presence of migratory birds on the property did create a sufficient connection to inter- state commerce to permit Corps regulation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F. 3d 1388 (CA9 1995). Petitioner seeks review of this ruling. I would grant certiorari to resolve whether the potential or occasional 1 After 1959, the crystallizing basins remained generally void of vegetation due to the compaction and high salinity of the soil. The dry and barren condition of the basins created a dust problem, and, as a result, Leslie Salt was cited for air pollution violations. To prevent further citations, Leslie Salt subsequently plowed the basins in 1983 and 1985 to loosen the soil and create conditions more hospitable to plant growth. Ironically, Leslie Salt's actions to avoid citation for air pollution helped create the conditions that later subjected it to penalties under the Clean Water Act. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 957 955 Thomas, J., dissenting existence of migratory birds on petitioner's property creates a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to permit Corps regula- tion of these lands. The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any "pollut- ant"-including dredged or fill materials-into "navigable waters" without a permit from the Corps. 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(12). "Navigable waters" are defined in the Clean Water Act as "waters of the United States." § 1362(7). The Clean Water Act does not further define the waters to which Corps jurisdiction extends. Instead, the Corps has promulgated regulations defin- ing the "waters of the United States" as: "(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; . . . . . "(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." 33 CFR § 328.3(a) (1995). In the preamble to regulations promulgated in 1986, the Corps further suggested that "waters of the United States" includes waters: "a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds pro- tected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or "b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other mi- gratory birds which cross state lines . . . ." 51 Fed. Reg. 41217.2 Only last Term, we held that possession of a firearm in a local school zone does not substantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995). The basis asserted to create federal jurisdiction over petitioner's land in this case 2 These regulations presumptively exclude "settling basins" from the Corps' definition of "waters of the United States." 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986). I find it strange that Leslie Salt could have filled in its settling ponds without Corps regulation if it had still been using them in salt produc- tion, but cannot now that it has abandoned the production of salt. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 958 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Thomas, J., dissenting 516 U. S. seems to me to be even more farfetched than that offered, and rejected, in Lopez. At least in Lopez the Government could as- sert that the presence of weapons in and around schools may result in violent crime that affects education and, hence, the econ- omy. See id., at 563­564. In this case, the Corps' basis for juris- diction rests entirely on the actual or potential presence of migra- tory birds on petitioner's land. In light of Lopez, I have serious doubts about the propriety of the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over petitioner's land in this case. It is undisputed that the occasional rainwater ponds at issue in this case have never been, are not now, and probably will never be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce. The "other waters" provision of 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1995) does not require that an activity substantially affect interstate commerce, only that the activity "could affect interstate or foreign com- merce." (Emphasis added.) In keeping with the "could affect" test, the so-called "migratory bird rule" extends the Corps' regu- latory jurisdiction over any waters that might serve as a potential habitat for "migratory birds which cross state lines." 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986). Apparently, the Corps' regulations are based on the assumption, improper in my opinion, that the self-propelled flight of birds across state lines creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a habitat for migratory birds. As the Court of Appeals admitted, the Corps' expansive interpretation of its regu- latory powers under the Clean Water Act may test the very "bounds of reason," 55 F. 3d, at 1396, and, in my mind, likely stretches Congress' Commerce Clause powers beyond the break- ing point. This case is not like Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979), relied on by the Government, which upheld a ban on the sale of bald or golden eagles or any part thereof. The eagle feathers at issue in Allard were actually items of interstate commerce, not simply airborne interstate travelers. Id., at 54. Similarly mis- placed is the Court of Appeals' reliance on Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979), a case involving interstate transportation of minnows for commercial purposes. Both the Court of Appeals and the Government rely on the Seventh Circuit's declaration of an interstate nexus in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F. 2d 256, 261 (1993): "Throughout North 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 959 516 U. S. October 30, 1995 America, millions of people annually spend more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds." That is no doubt true, and I do not challenge Congress' power to preserve migratory birds and their habitat through legitimate means. However, that substantial interstate commerce depends on the continued existence of migratory birds does not give the Corps carte blanche authority to regulate every property that migratory birds use or could use as habitat. The point of Lopez was to explain that the activity on the land to be regulated must substantially affect interstate commerce before Congress can reg- ulate it pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. The record in this case demonstrates that migratory birds do visit petitioner's seasonal rainwater ponds. But there was no showing that humans ever went to petitioner's property to hunt, trap, or observe migratory birds. Indeed, as far as the record reveals, the only persons ever to visit petitioner's property in connection with migratory birds were the Government's experts. The record further suggests that the habitat itself was the prod- uct of industrial land use and that petitioner's attempts to remedy air pollution violations made the temporary ponds more hospitable to migratory birds. There was no indication that petitioner's ac- tivities would harm any birds or affect the wildlife refuge across the road. Other than the occasional presence of migratory birds, there was no showing that petitioner's land use would have any effect on interstate commerce, much less a substantial effect. Nor was there any showing that the cumulative effect of land use involving seasonal standing water-water that is wholly isolated from any water used, or usable, in interstate commerce-would have a sub- stantial effect on interstate commerce. This case raises serious and important constitutional questions about the limits of federal land-use regulation in the name of the Clean Water Act that provide a compelling reason to grant certio- rari in this case. These questions were left open in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121 (1985), and should now be resolved. I respectfully dissent. No. 95­368. Smith et al. v. Rush. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 918. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 960 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 October 30, November 6, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­410. Schoonover v. Wild Injun Products et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner to consolidate or defer consideration of petition denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 80. No. 95­5797. Horsley v. Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certio- rari denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the motion to defer consideration. Re- ported below: 45 F. 3d 1486. Rehearing Denied No. 94­1465. Roberts v. Kings County Hospital et al., 514 U. S. 1083; No. 94­8354. Eckert et al. v. Estate of Eckert, 514 U. S. 1099; and No. 95­45. Pirkle et al. v. Ogontz Controls Co. et al., ante, p. 863. Petitions for rehearing denied. November 6, 1995 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­371. Lemond Construction Co. v. Wheeler. Ap- plication for stay of execution of judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama, case No. 1930866, entered on September 29, 1995, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court. No. A­377. Owens-Illinois Corp. v. Rekdahl et al. Ap- plication for stay of judgment, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted. Execution and en- forcement of that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, case No. B068259, entered on May 25, 1995, and modified on June 20, 1995, awarding punitive damages against applicant Owens-Illinois Corp. is stayed pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 961 516 U. S. November 6, 1995 No. D­1585. In re Disbarment of Palmisano. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1183.] No. D­1602. In re Disbarment of Bryant. Thomas E. Bryant, Jr., of Mobile, Ala., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1603. In re Disbarment of Shapiro. Phillip E. Sha- piro, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1604. In re Disbarment of Carson. George Edward Carson, of Jackson, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1605. In re Disbarment of Edell. Norman Edell, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1606. In re Disbarment of Smith. Randall Eugene Smith, of Bradenton, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1607. In re Disbarment of Morrison. Charles T. Morrison, Jr., of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1608. In re Disbarment of Heath. Steven E. Heath, of Bradley Beach, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 962 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 6, 1995 516 U. S. No. D­1609. In re Disbarment of Hendricks. Carl C. Hendricks, Jr., of Beaufort, S. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1610. In re Disbarment of Phillips. S. Patrick Phillips, of Bossier City, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­19. Brewer v. Ward, Warden. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency exe- cuted by petitioner denied. Justice Stevens, Justice Ken- nedy, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would grant the motion. No. M­20. Kendall v. City of Tacoma. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 94­896. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. Sup. Ct. Ala. [Certiorari granted, 513 U. S. 1125.] Motion of peti- tioner for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted. Motion of respondent for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted. No. 94­923. Shaw et al. v. Hunt, Governor of North Car- olina, et al.; and No. 94­924. Pope et al. v. Hunt, Governor of North Car- olina, et al. D. C. E. D. N. C. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 515 U. S. 1172.] Motion of appellants James Arthur Pope et al. for divided argument granted. Motion of appellees for divided argument granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, for divided argu- ment, and for additional time for oral argument granted. The time is divided as follows: appellants Ruth Shaw et al., 30 minutes; appellants James Arthur Pope et al., 10 minutes; appellees James B. Hunt, Jr., et al., 20 minutes; appellees Ralph Gingles et al., 10 minutes; the Solicitor General, 10 minutes. No. 94­1654. Heiser et al. v. Umbehr. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1172.] Motion of the Solicitor Gen- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 963 516 U. S. November 6, 1995 eral for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­9088. Neal v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1141.] Motion for appointment of coun- sel granted, and it is ordered that Donald Thomas Bergerson, Esq., of San Francisco, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 95­5906. Attwood v. Smith et al. Sup. Ct. Fla.; and No. 95­5907. Attwood v. Palm Beach Post et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Motions of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Peti- tioner is allowed until November 27, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­6392. In re Camyn. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 95­5910. In re Sack. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 95­5905. In re O'Leary. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 95­210. Holly Farms Corp. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 5 presented by the petition. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1360. No. 95­5257. Ornelas et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 328. No. 95­5661. Melendez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 130. Certiorari Denied No. 95­88. Edwards v. Department of the Interior. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1152. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 964 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 6, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­193. Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli et al. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 A. 2d 740. No. 95­370. Atchley v. Smith et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 77. No. 95­372. Swanson et al. v. Faulkner, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Revenue, et al.; and No. 95­373. Homesley et al. v. Faulkner, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Revenue, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 956. No. 95­387. Lewis v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 451, 457 S. E. 2d 173. No. 95­391. Wood et al. v. Wash et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 637. No. 95­400. Nummer v. Michigan Department of Treas- ury. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 448 Mich. 534, 533 N. W. 2d 250. No. 95­409. Prometheus Funding Corp., fka Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., et al. v. Merchants Home Delivery Serv- ices, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1486. No. 95­412. Shaw v. Hahn et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1128. No. 95­416. Seabolt v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­421. Malekzadeh v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­423. Johnson v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­429. Brown, Administratrix of the Estate of Brown, Deceased v. Odom et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 60. No. 95­430. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. v. Strausberg, Trustee, Allis-Chalmers Corporation Prod- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 965 516 U. S. November 6, 1995 uct Liability Trust. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 765. No. 95­432. Aaron et al. v. City of Wichita, Kansas. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 652. No. 95­440. Hopewell v. Dunker et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 68. No. 95­502. Spickler v. York. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­529. Water District No. 1 of Johnson County v. Koopman; and No. 95­5411. Koopman v. Water District No. 1 of Johnson County et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1417. No. 95­556. Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church et al. v. Mother African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 A. 2d 227. No. 95­5450. Luckett v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 871. No. 95­5633. Hildwin v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 107. No. 95­5642. Jackson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5804. Felder v. Montague, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 773. No. 95­5847. Sigman v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5851. Yurtis v. Phipps. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5865. Eaglin v. Welborn, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 496. No. 95­5868. Knuckles v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Butler County. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 966 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 6, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5869. Monroe v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 679. No. 95­5874. Nixon v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 167. No. 95­5875. Lee v. Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5882. Hambrick v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5883. Hull v. Sims. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5884. Bell v. DeTella, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1073. No. 95­5887. Wallace v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5889. Ballard v. Holland, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5891. Brown v. Mazzola et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5892. Weets v. Matlock. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 531 N. W. 2d 118. No. 95­5893. Vey v. Castor, Chairman, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5898. Spigelski v. Banaszak. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 123. No. 95­5903. Davis v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5908. Roberts v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 1168. No. 95­5909. Shackleford v. Decker et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 967 516 U. S. November 6, 1995 No. 95­5916. Brady et al. v. Brady. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5928. Jacob v. Pacific Bell Directory. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5933. Kent v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­5935. Austin v. Upshaw. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5939. Daggett v. Krebs et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­5940. Morris v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 344. No. 95­5941. Lowery v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 1173. No. 95­5947. Valdez v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 P. 2d 363. No. 95­5951. Colonel v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 658 So. 2d 989. No. 95­5986. Reemsnyder v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­6025. Spruill v. Mozell. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 167. No. 95­6033. Hicks v. Collins, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1386. No. 95­6078. Bentley v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6103. Traunig v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1413. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:48] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 968 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 6, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6106. Warden et ux. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­6114. Richards v. Woods, Director of Classifica- tion, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institu- tional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 320. No. 95­6177. Murton, aka Cudjoe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­6207. Knight v. Department of the Navy et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 638. No. 95­6215. Babcock v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 908. No. 95­6216. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6220. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 402. No. 95­6227. Carlow v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 654. No. 95­6238. Lucero v. Riley, Secretary of Education, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 338. No. 95­6246. Dickey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­6248. Hankins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 897. No. 95­6249. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­6250. Galaviz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 320. No. 95­6251. Heavilin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 835. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 969 516 U. S. November 6, 1995 No. 95­6252. Dodge v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 142. No. 95­6269. Castro Cardenas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 176. No. 95­6273. Griswold v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 291. No. 95­6274. Scott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­6275. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 826. No. 95­6276. Lovett v. United States; Lovett v. United States; and Hepburn v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 897. No. 95­6277. Metu, aka Chuk v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6278. Raitport v. Department of Health and Human Services et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 52 F. 3d 312. No. 95­6279. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6281. Raulerson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 534. No. 95­6283. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 41. No. 95­6286. D'Antoni v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 173. No. 95­6287. Hill v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 826. No. 95­6291. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1388. No. 95­6294. Gil v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1414. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 970 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 6, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6296. Charles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­6297. Buchanan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 914. No. 95­6298. Cintron v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 170. No. 95­6307. Jones v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 688. No. 95­6308. Linn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 30. No. 95­6310. Allen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 664. No. 95­6312. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1415. No. 95­6316. Stovall v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 837. No. 95­6317. ReBrook v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 961. No. 95­6319. Linares-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­6320. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1012. No. 95­6322. Molina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 420 and 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6323. Ford v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 549. No. 95­6325. Federick v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­6326. Hill v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 672. No. 95­6328. Cerullo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 548. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 971 516 U. S. November 6, 1995 No. 95­6329. Torres-Diaz v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 445. No. 95­6330. Washington v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 829. No. 95­6331. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 908. No. 95­6332. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­6333. Williams v. Henry, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6334. Peralta v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­6339. Manley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­6345. Davis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. No. 95­6346. Gilmore v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 392. No. 95­6357. Woods v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 917. No. 95­209. Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. Weems et ux. Sup. Ct. Ala. Motion of Business Council of Alabama for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 663 So. 2d 905. No. 95­453. Luther v. Ethicon, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. No. 95­6272. Gallaher v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 326. Rehearing Denied No. 94­9250. Roberson v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, ante, p. 828; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 972 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 6, 8, 9, 13, 1995 516 U. S. No. 94­9279. Bond v. O'Dea, Warden, ante, p. 829; and No. 95­5202. Glant v. Lamb et al., ante, p. 882. Petitions for rehearing denied. November 8, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­1030. Kansas v. Kickapoo Tribe, aka Kickapoo Na- tion in Kansas, of the Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1422. November 9, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­213. Chaves et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Liquidating Agent/Receiver of Malden Trust Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1178. Certiorari Denied No. 95­6495 (A­374). Barnes v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 971. November 13, 1995 Miscellaneous Orders No. M­21. Clemente v. United States; No. M­22. Livecchi v. Xerox Corp.; and No. M­23. Beasley v. Hand et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­5139. Luna v. Sutherland et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 804] denied. No. 95­6031. Desmond v. New Valley Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de- nied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until De- cember 4, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 973 516 U. S. November 13, 1995 by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­6406. In re Smith. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 95­6079. In re Smith. Petition for writ of prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 95­124. Denver Area Educational Telecommunica- tions Consortium, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; and No. 95­227. Alliance for Community Media et al. v. Fed- eral Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 105. No. 95­354. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 542. Certiorari Denied No. 94­1881. Collins v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1569. No. 94­2022. Louisiana v. Schirmer. Sup. Ct. La. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 646 So. 2d 890. No. 94­8845. Tabas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­9729. Chersin et al. v. Machine Tool Finance Corp. et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 689. No. 95­25. Ord & Norman et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 203. No. 95­60. Bustamante v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 933. No. 95­86. Doolin Security Savings Bank, F. S. B. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1395. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 974 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 13, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­152. Davis v. Fandino et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 516. No. 95­184. Tom Shaw, Inc. v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1520. No. 95­214. DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Offi- cers Assn.; and No. 95­446. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Assn. v. DeAngelis. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 591. No. 95­230. Walmer v. Department of Defense et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 851. No. 95­243. Norinsberg Corp. v. Department of Agricul- ture. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1224. No. 95­248. Federal Housing Partners IV et al. v. Cis- neros, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 362. No. 95­250. Plainville Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1320. No. 95­255. Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 32 et al. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 29. No. 95­375. City of Charleston et al. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 385. No. 95­380. Andolsek v. City of Kirtland et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 Ohio App. 3d 333, 650 N. E. 2d 911. No. 95­383. Levey, by the Personal Representative of His Estate, et al. v. State Developmental Center, Grafton, North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 533 N. W. 2d 707. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 975 516 U. S. November 13, 1995 No. 95­389. Walker v. Russell, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 472. No. 95­401. Knott v. Holtzman. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 Wis. 2d 649, 533 N. W. 2d 419. No. 95­418. Canez v. Laborers' International Union of North America et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 40 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­419. Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1216. No. 95­427. County of Saginaw et al. v. Whaley et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1111. No. 95­435. Battle v. Duke University et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 772. No. 95­438. Berkson v. Silverman, Chief, New Jersey Bureau of Securities. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 N. J. 412, 661 A. 2d 1266. No. 95­439. Flaherty et ux. v. National Marine Fisher- ies Service et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 811. No. 95­443. Bonar v. (Bonar) Moser. Cir. Ct. Tucker County, W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­445. Ernst & Young v. Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corporation et al. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 A. 2d 95. No. 95­449. Housing Authority of the Sac and Fox Nation v. Lewis et vir. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 P. 2d 503. No. 95­455. Fraser v. Lintas: Campbell-Ewald et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 722. No. 95­464. Manna v. Department of Justice et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1158. No. 95­472. Hastings v. Small Business Administration. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 182. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 976 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 13, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­473. McCulloch v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 12th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 925 S. W. 2d 14. No. 95­479. Crawford v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­521. Watts v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­522. Roy v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1085. No. 95­540. Federation of Connecticut Taxpayer Orga- nizations et al. v. Suggs et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 811. No. 95­558. Thompson v. United States et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 30. No. 95­578. Rosquete v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 639. No. 95­585. Huerta Rojas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1212. No. 95­626. Reynolds v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 Md. App. 780. No. 95­5084. Holman v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Ill. 2d 356, 647 N. E. 2d 960. No. 95­5290. Dillehay v. United States; and No. 95­5395. Saikaly v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­5309. Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 1441. No. 95­5474. Calvi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 312. No. 95­5589. Rieck v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5776. Moran v. McDaniel, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1567 and 57 F. 3d 690. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 977 516 U. S. November 13, 1995 No. 95­5793. Mahaffey v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 165 Ill. 2d 445, 651 N. E. 2d 174. No. 95­5854. Cooke v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5897. Penry v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 903 S. W. 2d 715. No. 95­5921. Hawkins v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 P. 2d 586. No. 95­5934. Kelley v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 773. No. 95­5943. McNamara v. Cochran et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1286. No. 95­5945. Jenkins v. Kansas et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5949. Tucker v. New Jersey State Prison et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 770. No. 95­5950. Polk v. Kaiser, Chief of Operations, Okla- homa Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 286. No. 95­5954. Miller v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 Ore. App. 758, 888 P. 2d 605. No. 95­5957. Reeves v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­5958. Ricketts v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 Conn. App. 749, 659 A. 2d 188. No. 95­5967. Lenon v. Pung, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 830. No. 95­5969. Burton v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 615 So. 2d 1042. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 978 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 13, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5974. Vincent v. C & P Telephone Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­5975. DeMauro v. Coldwell Banker & Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 767. No. 95­5977. Franklin v. Howes, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 170. No. 95­5979. Graham v. Bayh, Governor of Indiana, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1419. No. 95­5980. Flores v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5982. Hunter v. Citibank, N. A. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 810. No. 95­5985. Seagle v. Myers. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 901. No. 95­5987. Bogle v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 1103. No. 95­5988. Rivera v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 166 Ill. 2d 279, 652 N. E. 2d 307. No. 95­5991. Wilson v. Dougherty County, Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 95­5993. West v. Hanrahan. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 268 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 685 N. E. 2d 29. No. 95­5999. Loomis v. Rentie et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1424. No. 95­6000. Irons v. Calderon, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1424. No. 95­6012. Moody v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6013. Mason v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 979 516 U. S. November 13, 1995 No. 95­6014. Jenkins v. Burtzloff et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6030. Hernandez v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 637. No. 95­6032. Gupman et ux. v. Agribank, FCB, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 330. No. 95­6036. Pryor v. Young, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1429. No. 95­6037. Shafer v. City and County of Denver. Dist. Ct. Colo, County of Denver. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6041. Ply v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6066. Gonzalez v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6072. Elam v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 636. No. 95­6073. Abulkhair v. New Jersey (two judgments). Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6164. Abdul-Wadood v. Wilson. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 905. No. 95­6217. Saunders v. McAninch, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6340. Logan, aka Vaughan v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6354. Gilkey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 901. No. 95­6355. Ruggiero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 647. No. 95­6362. Cannon v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 684. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 980 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 13, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6363. Salinas-Galvan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 396. No. 95­6370. West v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 32. No. 95­6374. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 457. No. 95­6378. Brunson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111. No. 95­6397. Skorniak v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 750. No. 95­6416. Raphael v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 458. No. 95­6418. Mattos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­6421. Saleem v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 396. No. 95­6423. Barretto v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 128. No. 95­6425. Aladics v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­6437. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 906. No. 95­420. Calderon, Warden v. Douglas. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. No. 95­450. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Delta Re- sources, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Motions of American Council of Life Insurance and General Motors Acceptance Corp. et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 722. No. 95­454. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al. v. Baker et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners to defer con- sideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 814. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 981 516 U. S. November 13, 1995 No. 95­5996. Carpenter v. Gomez, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 4th 634, 889 P. 2d 985. Opinion of Justice Stevens, respecting the denial of the peti- tion for writ of certiorari. As I have pointed out on more than one occasion, an order denying a petition for certiorari expresses no opinion on the mer- its of the case. See, e. g., Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U. S. 1184 (1995) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). That is so, in part, because the Court properly exercises broad discretion in the administration of its docket, and in part because there are often jurisdictional or prudential reasons for refusing to grant review of the questions presented in a petition. See Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 940, 942­946 (1978) (memo- randum of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Nonethe- less, when the Court denies a petition that raises a substantial question, it is sometimes useful to point out those concerns which, although unrelated to the merits, justify the decision not to grant review. See, e. g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U. S. 1045 (1995) (memo- randum of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 962­963 (1983) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). As the dissent by three members of the California Supreme Court demonstrated, this case clearly raises a novel and important constitutional question: What standard should be applied in deter- mining whether juror misconduct involving highly prejudicial in- formation requires reversal of a capital conviction and sentence? Here, a juror falsely denied receiving information that petitioner was already under a sentence of death for other crimes. In sus- taining petitioner's collateral attack on his conviction, the state trial judge frankly acknowledged the absence of a clear standard for determining prejudice in such a case. See In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634, 669­670, 889 P. 2d 985, 1008 (1995) (Mosk, J. dis- senting). In reversing the state trial judge's decision, the State Supreme Court impliedly acknowledged that no such standard exists by relying on cases of this Court that bear only a tangential relation to the issue involved. Id., at 647­651, 889 P. 2d, at 993­995. Despite the importance of the constitutional question presented, I concur in the order denying the petition for writ of certio- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 982 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 13, 1995 516 U. S. rari. Because the State Supreme Court stated that the issue would remain open for further review when it acts on the direct appeal from petitioner's conviction, it is likely that the absence of a "final judgment" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (1988 ed.) deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the case. At the very least, the expressed intention of the California Supreme Court to review the question further provides a prudential ground for declining to review at this time the juror misconduct issue presented in this petition. No. 95­6734 (A­424). Barnes v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 495. Rehearing Denied No. 94­9330. Prunty v. Ferguson et al., ante, p. 831; No. 94­9409. Williams v. United States Postal Service et al., ante, p. 834; No. 94­9424. Green v. Ziegler, ante, p. 835; No. 94­9561. O'Connell v. United States, ante, p. 842; No. 94­9606. Brown v. Varner, ante, p. 845; No. 94­9632. Hewlett v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 847; No. 94­9644. Hoyett v. 40th Judicial Circuit Court et al., ante, p. 847; No. 94­9759. Means v. United States, ante, p. 854; No. 94­9794. Waters v. Thomas, Warden, ante, p. 856; No. 94­9858. Baker v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al., ante, p. 860; No. 95­5142. Novak v. Novak, ante, p. 879; No. 95­5360. Bennett v. Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, et al., ante, p. 891; No. 95­5422. Wanless v. Oklahoma, ante, p. 894; No. 95­5604. In re Kennon, ante, p. 805; No. 95­5713. Boyer v. United States, ante, p. 904; No. 95­5824. In re Wood, ante, p. 805; and No. 95­5878. In re Lorenz, ante, p. 911. Petitions for re- hearing denied. No. 94­8642. Crawford v. District of Columbia et al., ante, p. 908. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 983 516 U. S. November 14, 15, 21, 22, 1995 November 14, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 95­6711 (A­414). Sidebottom v. Bowersox, Superin- tendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. November 15, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­6023. Spirko v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 271. Certiorari Denied No. 95­6753 (A­427). Sidebottom v. Bowersox, Superin- tendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. November 21, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 95­6831 (A­445). DelVecchio v. Illinois Department of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay of execu- tion of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1274. November 22, 1995 Certiorari Granted No. 95­129. Exxon Co., U. S. A., et al. v. Sofec, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 570. No. 95­232. Henderson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 574. No. 95­386. Richards et al. v. Jefferson County, Ala- bama, et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 662 So. 2d 1127. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 984 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 22, 27, 1995 516 U. S. Rehearing Denied No. 95­5417. LaRette v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center, ante, p. 894. Petition for rehear- ing denied. November 27, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­9473. Daughtry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995). Reported below: 48 F. 3d 829. No. 95­447. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. American Medical International, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 900 P. 2d 619 (1995). Reported below: 54 F. 3d 785. No. 95­5545. Gatewood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995). Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­250. West v. Hanrahan. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Ap- plication for stay, addressed to Justice O'Connor and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­401 (95­6494). Hart v. Hart. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1588. In re Disbarment of Jackson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1185.] No. D­1590. In re Disbarment of Smith. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 804.] No. D­1611. In re Disbarment of Bernard. James Cur- tiss Bernard, of Columbus, Ga., is suspended from the practice of 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 985 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1612. In re Disbarment of Suddard. Oliver V. Sud- dard, of Wilmington, Del., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1613. In re Disbarment of Jones. David Arthur Jones, of Lincoln, N. H., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1614. In re Disbarment of Billings. Richard H. Billings, of Elizabeth, Colo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1615. In re Disbarment of Reggie. Edmund Mi- chael Reggie, of Crowley, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1616. In re Disbarment of Kelley. Phil M. Kelley, of Portland, Ore., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1617. In re Disbarment of Savoy. John E. Savoy, of Phoenix, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1618. In re Disbarment of Powell. William Jack- son Powell, of Arlington, Va., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 986 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. D­1619. In re Disbarment of Jasinski. Robert M. Jasinski, of Palm Beach, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1620. In re Disbarment of Nelson. Paul Angus Nelson, of Tampa, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­24. Doe v. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey; and No. M­25. Kissi v. Matthews. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­6533. In re Paar. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 95­564. In re Klecan et al.; No. 95­6413. In re Thompson; and No. 95­6477. In re Beckwith. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­2037. Pomranz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 156. No. 94­9617. Hansen v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 649 So. 2d 1256. No. 95­87. Murphy v. Diversified Products Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1038. No. 95­205. Dalton v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 216 Ga. App. 411, 454 S. E. 2d 554. No. 95­265. Cleveland Industrial Square, Inc. v. White, Mayor of Cleveland, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 324. No. 95­278. Ham v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 78. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 987 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­282. Brooks et al. v. United Airlines et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. No. 95­301. Stonehenge Insured Notes - I Limited Part- nership et al. v. Department of the Treasury et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1157. No. 95­309. International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators, AFL­CIO v. Compact Video Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1464. No. 95­329. Doolittle v. National Credit Union Adminis- tration. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 536. No. 95­366. Reali et al. v. Feminist Women's Health Center. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 32 Cal. App. 4th 1641, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189. No. 95­456. Ristow et ux. v. South Carolina State Ports Authority et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1051. No. 95­459. Replogle v. Pennsylvania Civil Service Com- mission. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 A. 2d 60. No. 95­467. Martinez-Rodriguez v. Colon-Pizarro et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 980. No. 95­469. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1421. No. 95­470. United Employer Benefit Corp. v. Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services et al. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 Ore. App. 477, 892 P. 2d 722. No. 95­474. Breedlove v. Tysons Manor Homeowners Assn. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 265. No. 95­475. Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1570. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 988 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­476. Chrysler Motors Corp., nka Chrysler Corp. v. Lee Janssen Motor Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 Neb. 322, 534 N. W. 2d 309. No. 95­477. Novopharm Ltd. v. Glaxo, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1043. No. 95­480. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York et al. v. Ahysen et al. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­482. Woodall et al. v. City of El Paso et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1120. No. 95­485. Hernandez et al. v. Thomas et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­486. Littles v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. (U. S.). C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1051. No. 95­487. Propac-Mass, Inc. v. Ruthardt, Massachu- setts Commissioner of Insurance. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 420 Mass. 45, 648 N. E. 2d 407. No. 95­490. Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­495. Aaron Smith Trucking Co., Inc., et al. v. King, by His Guardian, King. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 823. No. 95­496. Moore v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 569 et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 339. No. 95­497. Silvestri v. Christman et al.; and In re Sil- vestri. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 814 (first judgment) and 817 (second judgment). No. 95­499. Cleland v. City of Burlington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 Wash. App. 1054. No. 95­501. Yi v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certio- rari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 989 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­503. Ortaliza et ux. v. General Mills, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 72. No. 95­504. Florida v. Miragaya. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 654 So. 2d 262. No. 95­506. Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. Commissioner, New York State Department of Taxation and Finance. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 N. Y. 2d 165, 654 N. E. 2d 954. No. 95­507. Settle v. Dickson County School Board et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 152. No. 95­508. Kearns v. Chrysler Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1430. No. 95­510. Thomas v. Whalen et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­512. Boyette v. American International Adjust- ment Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­513. Bank Melli Iran et al. v. Pahlavi. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1406. No. 95­514. Noone et al. v. New England Telephone Co. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 59. No. 95­519. Chavez et ux. v. Copper State Rubber of Arizona, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 182 Ariz. 423, 897 P. 2d 725. No. 95­528. Schoemer et ux. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 26. No. 95­542. Leon v. Supreme Court of Florida and Flor- ida Board of Bar Examiners. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­560. Burlington Air Express, Inc. v. Georgia Pa- cific Corp. et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 Ga. App. 312, 457 S. E. 2d 219. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 990 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­580. SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Schneider (Eu- rope) AG et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 839. No. 95­583. Collins v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­597. Storer et al. v. French, Trustee. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1125. No. 95­610. Roussin v. Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­611. George et al. v. Consolo. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 791. No. 95­614. Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 719. No. 95­615. Rauckhorst v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­627. Saadeh v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 510. No. 95­635. Walker v. McLellan et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 339. No. 95­637. Wolfson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 58. No. 95­640. Grimm et al. v. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 556. No. 95­645. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­654. Slain v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­655. Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 Md. 261, 661 A. 2d 1157. No. 95­657. Rush v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 636. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 991 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­658. Falkoff v. International Business Machines Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 811. No. 95­661. McFarland v. Prince George's County, Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 167. No. 95­663. Olbres et ux. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 967. No. 95­675. Kellogg, Trustee for West Texas Market- ing Corp. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1194. No. 95­680. Liberatore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­681. Gurino v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1388. No. 95­5085. Downs v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5196. Green v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401. No. 95­5318. Tenbusch v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 131 Ore. App. 634, 886 P. 2d 1077. No. 95­5349. Bruce v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5355. Ward v. Dyke et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 271. No. 95­5415. Gonzalez Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 632. No. 95­5420. Powell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 898 S. W. 2d 821. No. 95­5499. Cox v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 74. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 992 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5528. Lewin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 636. No. 95­5584. Posey v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 635. No. 95­5600. Kelly v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5649. Siao-Pao v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5736. Davis v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 457. No. 95­5740. Rissley v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 Ill. 2d 364, 651 N. E. 2d 133. No. 95­5744. Lowery v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 640 N. E. 2d 1031. No. 95­6015. McGinley v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 440 Pa. Super. 650, 655 A. 2d 1046. No. 95­6044. Adams, Individually and as Next Friend for Adams, a Minor Child v. City of Fort Worth, Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 S. W. 2d 607. No. 95­6045. Baker v. Larrimer & Larrimer et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6050. Perkins v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 214. No. 95­6051. Choudhary v. Vermont et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1159. No. 95­6058. Collins v. Oklahoma et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 837. No. 95­6068. Hamilton v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 993 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­6070. Birges v. Nevada Supreme Court. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Nev. 1532, 893 P. 2d 394. No. 95­6077. Rodriguez v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 1166. No. 95­6080. Stanford v. Times Mirror Co. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6081. Coleman v. Murphy et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6085. Seastrong v. Miller County Juvenile Court Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1224. No. 95­6088. C. J. v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 166 Ill. 2d 264, 652 N. E. 2d 315. No. 95­6089. Burgess v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6090. Williams v. Brewer et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 320. No. 95­6092. Van Lee v. Mayer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6093. Hinchey v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 181 Ariz. 307, 890 P. 2d 602. No. 95­6096. Weinstein v. Weinstein. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 440 Pa. Super. 660, 655 A. 2d 1054. No. 95­6099. Lemons v. O'Sullivan, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 357. No. 95­6101. Monroe v. Brown. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6111. Matuska v. District Court of Cass County et al. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6112. Murray v. West. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 1035. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 994 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6115. Waters v. Magurn. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1043. No. 95­6118. Pierce v. Freeman, Secretary, North Caro- lina Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6123. Bowie v. North Carolina; and No. 95­6162. Bowie v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 199, 456 S. E. 2d 771. No. 95­6129. Williams v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6130. Thompson v. Buchanan, Sheriff, Yavapai County, Arizona, et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6140. Mutch v. Jarratt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6141. Lewis v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6145. Martin v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6146. Jackson v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6153. Pinder v. Johnson. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1169. No. 95­6154. Sanders v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6155. Pollock v. Brigano, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6156. White v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 264, 457 S. E. 2d 841. No. 95­6157. Veneri v. White, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 995 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­6158. Grant v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6159. Spearman v. Morales, Attorney General of Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6160. Rosendahl v. Seymour et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6166. Rieber v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 So. 2d 999. No. 95­6168. Mitchell v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 339. No. 95­6169. Kohler v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 58 F. 3d 58. No. 95­6171. Brinkley v. Skjonsberg et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 832. No. 95­6172. Washington v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6180. Burton v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1398. No. 95­6181. Santiago v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 439 Pa. Super. 447, 654 A. 2d 1062. No. 95­6185. Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School District et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1075. No. 95­6189. Ervin v. Morrison, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1049. No. 95­6195. Jackson v. Board of Civil Service Commis- sioners for the City of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6198. Wendt v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 996 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6199. Solomon v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 212, 456 S. E. 2d 778. No. 95­6200. Campbell v. Florida Parole Commission. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 67. No. 95­6201. Jenkins v. Scott et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 338. No. 95­6205. Stockenauer v. DeLeeuw. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­6208. Listerman v. GTE California Inc. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6225. Beaird v. Cody, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 915. No. 95­6226. Cavin v. South Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 265. No. 95­6241. Lynch v. Bensalem Township et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6253. Fautenberry v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 435, 650 N. E. 2d 878. No. 95­6270. Avitt v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6280. Williams v. Bradburn et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6290. Smith v. Lamer, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­6293. Butler v. Smith et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 772. No. 95­6295. Walls v. Delaware Department of Correc- tion. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 A. 2d 488. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 997 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­6315. Trimper v. City of Norfolk, Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 68. No. 95­6343. Mansori v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6344. Graham v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 250 Va. 79, 459 S. E. 2d 97. No. 95­6348. Graham v. Henderson. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 173. No. 95­6349. Duran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 938. No. 95­6356. Steele v. Duckworth, Superintendent, In- diana State Reformatory, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1419. No. 95­6358. Reeves v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6360. Tepper v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 685. No. 95­6368. Turner v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 674. No. 95­6379. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1036. No. 95­6382. Heckard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 786. No. 95­6384. Hall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­6386. Spaeni v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 313. No. 95­6387. Reid v. United States; and No. 95­6532. Reid v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 998 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6388. Pitts v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. No. 95­6389. Prince v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1074. No. 95­6394. Woods v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. No. 95­6396. Peganoff v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 440 Pa. Super. 651, 655 A. 2d 1047. No. 95­6399. Jennings v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6400. McQuay v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 332. No. 95­6401. Martin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6405. Felton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 826. No. 95­6407. Ellisor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 401. No. 95­6408. Doyle v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 396. No. 95­6409. Garrett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 396. No. 95­6410. Hager v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 178. No. 95­6411. Eli v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­6415. Edmond et al. v. United States; and No. 95­6420. Sutton v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1080. No. 95­6417. Leggett v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1417. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 999 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­6426. Bennett v. United States; and No. 95­6491. Hansley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 709. No. 95­6428. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 914. No. 95­6430. Veras v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1365. No. 95­6435. Michon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6439. Powell v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1064. No. 95­6442. Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­6452. Akinrinade v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1279. No. 95­6454. Castillo-Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 399. No. 95­6456. Bernas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­6459. Furlong v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­6461. Harper v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 M. J. 158. No. 95­6462. Hampton v. Valentine. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6463. Anderson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1323. No. 95­6464. Higgs et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 399. No. 95­6468. Osoria v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 399. No. 95­6470. Reed v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1000 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6476. Scruggs v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 663. No. 95­6481. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 193. No. 95­6482. Borkoski v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 142. No. 95­6484. Barquero v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­6485. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1290. No. 95­6486. Collins v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1379. No. 95­6487. Gibbs v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 536. No. 95­6489. Witherspoon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 902. No. 95­6493. Green v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­6496. Sanford v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­6498. Allen v. Hadden et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1529. No. 95­6499. Griffith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­6502. Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­6508. Mendoza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­6511. Boyd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6512. Aniton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 901. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1001 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 95­6514. Bocook v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 167. No. 95­6515. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1040. No. 95­6519. Baskin v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6520. Flint v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 535. No. 95­6522. Lesure v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 320. No. 95­6525. Barnett v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6528. Gentry v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 917. No. 95­6529. Gatewood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 248. No. 95­6530. Salemo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 214. No. 95­6531. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 319. No. 95­6534. Salemo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6535. Tapia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1137. No. 95­6537. Valencia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 914. No. 95­6538. Amezola v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1425. No. 95­6539. Davis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6543. Kiett v. Beyer et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1002 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6545. Walker, aka Harrell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1196. No. 95­6548. Keegan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­6549. Jemerigbe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1018. No. 95­6553. Mahaffey v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 166 Ill. 2d 1, 651 N. E. 2d 1055. No. 95­6559. Allison v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 43. No. 95­310. St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana, Inc., et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1386. No. 95­324. Michigan v. Garcia. Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 448 Mich. 442, 531 N. W. 2d 683. No. 95­493. Oklahoma v. Flores. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 P. 2d 558. No. 95­6008. Isaacs v. Thomas, Warden. Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County. Certiorari denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Rehearing Denied No. 94­1910. Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG et al., ante, p. 811; No. 94­1948. Harrel v. University of Houston et al., ante, p. 813; No. 94­1960. Freeman et vir v. Simon et al., ante, p. 814; No. 94­1975. Bardney v. United States, ante, p. 815; No. 94­1986. Viswanathan v. Mississippi County Commu- nity College Board of Trustees, ante, p. 815; No. 94­2023. Dalberto v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 818; No. 94­2091. Barton et al. v. American Red Cross et al., ante, p. 822; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1003 516 U. S. November 27, 1995 No. 94­9215. Leedy v. Agribank, FCB, ante, p. 827; No. 94­9220. Ratnaweera et ux. v. Resolution Trust Corporation et al., ante, p. 828; No. 94­9306. Maloney v. Gladstone et al., ante, p. 830; No. 94­9313. Morris, aka Pruitt v. Rivers, Warden, ante, p. 830; No. 94­9335. Givens v. Louisiana, ante, p. 831; No. 94­9353. Spinner et ux. v. County of Los Angeles, Department of Public Works, et al., ante, p. 832; No. 94­9359. Gaskins v. Runyon, Postmaster General, ante, p. 832; No. 94­9373. Battle v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 833; No. 94­9405. In re Echols, ante, p. 805; No. 94­9423. Foti v. Cameron et al., ante, p. 835; No. 94­9456. Rivera v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ante, p. 836; No. 94­9587. Trice v. Williams et al., ante, p. 844; No. 94­9599. Martel v. New Hampshire; and Martel v. City of Concord, ante, p. 844; No. 94­9641. Ishmael v. United States, ante, p. 818; No. 94­9660. Testa v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union, AFL­CIO, et al., ante, p. 848; No. 94­9725. Jenkins v. Kansas, ante, p. 852; No. 95­18. O'Neal v. Judicial Qualification Commission of Georgia, ante, p. 862; No. 95­94. Salazar v. Price Co. et al., ante, p. 865; No. 95­161. Triem et al. v. Tamico, Inc., ante, p. 868; No. 95­183. Brazil-Breashears v. Bilandic et al., ante, p. 869; No. 95­5037. Shea v. Shea, ante, p. 873; No. 95­5070. Jenkins v. Stuart et al., ante, p. 875; No. 95­5091. Beals v. Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, et al., ante, p. 876; No. 95­5132. Wishon v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, ante, p. 879; No. 95­5148. Johnson v. United States, ante, p. 880; No. 95­5163. Bishop v. State Bar of Georgia, ante, p. 880; No. 95­5178. Collier v. California, ante, p. 881; No. 95­5185. Barrett v. Fieldhouse et al., ante, p. 881; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1004 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 November 27, 28, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5206. Middleton v. Kentucky, ante, p. 882; No. 95­5254. Reeves v. Vance et al., ante, p. 885; No. 95­5267. Turner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, ante, p. 886; No. 95­5268. Winters v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. et al., ante, p. 886; No. 95­5274. Jenkins v. McBride, Warden, et al., ante, p. 875; No. 95­5275. Paquette v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, ante, p. 886; No. 95­5278. Rutherford v. Hailey, ante, p. 887; No. 95­5308. Pankey v. Carnahan, Governor of Missouri, et al.; and Pankey v. Cook et al., ante, p. 888; No. 95­5389. Johnson v. Evatt, Commissioner, South Car- olina Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 893; No. 95­5408. Curiale v. Alaska et al., ante, p. 894; No. 95­5468. Lindow v. United States, ante, p. 897; No. 95­5490. Ketchum v. Department of Housing and Urban Development et al., ante, p. 898; No. 95­5577. Rivera v. Long Island Railroad, ante, p. 921; and No. 95­5925. Grossi v. United States, ante, p. 927. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 94­1841. Ruyle et al. v. Continental Oil Co., ante, p. 906; and No. 95­79. Olszewski v. American Telephone & Tele- graph Co., ante, p. 906. Petitions for rehearing denied. Jus- tice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. November 28, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­544. Centennial Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Kel- ley et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Miscellaneous Order No. 94­1893. United States et al. v. Chesapeake & Poto- mac Telephone Company of Virginia et al.; and No. 94­1900. National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1005 516 U. S. November 28, December 1, 4, 1995 granted, 515 U. S. 1157.] In these cases, 10 additional minutes alloted for oral argument. Certiorari Denied No. 95­6643 (A­408). Hai Hai Vuong v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di- vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sen- tence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 673. No. 95­6679 (A­411). Amos v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Jus- tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 333. No. 95­6904 (A­463). LaRette v. Bowersox, Superintend- ent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 986. December 1, 1995 Certiorari Granted No. 95­323. United States v. Noland, Trustee for Debtor First Truck Lines, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument in tandem with No. 95­ 325, United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., et al., immediately infra. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 210. No. 95­325. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabrica- tors of Utah, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument in tandem with No. 95­323, United States v. Noland, Trustee for Debtor First Truck Lines, Inc., immediately supra. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1155. December 4, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­1726. Texaco Inc. v. American Geophysical Union et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 913. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1006 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­7702. Marbury v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Thompson v. Keo- hane, ante, p. 99. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1213. No. 95­5081. Feltrop v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Thompson v. Keohane, ante, p. 99. Re- ported below: 46 F. 3d 766. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 121, Orig., ante, p. 122.) No. A­476. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al. v. Carriger. Application to vacate stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O'Con- nor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1572. In re Disbarment of Giampa. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1172.] No. D­1621. In re Disbarment of Harvey. Walter L. Har- vey, of Scottsdale, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­16. Marian v. Goris et al. Motion for reconsidera- tion of order denying leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [ante, p. 928] denied. No. M­26. Berry v. Ohio. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted. No. 94­1837. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Gallagher, 515 U. S. 1190.] Motion of the Solici- tor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1007 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 No. 95­83. Meghrig et al. v. KFC Western, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1192.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­1941. United States v. Virginia et al.; and No. 94­2107. Virginia et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 910.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 94­2003. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter- national, Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1191.] Motion of American Intellectual Property Law Associa- tion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 94­2032. Franklin et al. v. Lawrimore et al., ante, p. 801. Motion of appellees to retax costs granted. No. 95­26. Markman et al. v. Westview Instruments, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1192.] Motion of American Board of Trial Advocates for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 95­157. United States v. Armstrong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Joseph F. Walsh, Esq., of Los Angeles, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Robert Rozelle in this case. Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Barbara E. O'Connor, Esq., of Los Angeles, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Shelton Auntwan Martin in this case. Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Timothy C. Lannen, Esq., of Los Angeles, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respond- ent Aaron Hampton in this case. No. 95­5207. Cooper v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 910.] Motion of American Associa- tion on Mental Retardation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1008 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­5257. Ornelas et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 963.] Peter D. Isakoff, Esq., of Washington, D. C., is invited to brief and argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. No. 95­6234. In re Kemp; and No. 95­6613. In re Adedeji. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 95­6206. In re Akpan; and No. 95­6521. In re Janek. Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­9803. Rainey v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 540 Pa. 220, 656 A. 2d 1326. No. 95­176. Mayer et ux. v. Spanel International, Ltd., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 670. No. 95­242. Nebraska v. Williams. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 247 Neb. 931, 531 N. W. 2d 222. No. 95­353. Mitchelson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 283. No. 95­360. Liquidation Commission for BCCI (Overseas) Ltd., Macau v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 551. No. 95­361. Sun Country Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Avia- tion Administration. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 56 F. 3d 1531. No. 95­364. Coody v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 320 Ark. 455, 896 S. W. 2d 897. No. 95­381. Connors v. Sterling Milk Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 1208, 647 N. E. 2d 1384. No. 95­428. City of Colorado Springs et al. v. Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County, Colorado, et 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1009 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 P. 2d 1105. No. 95­442. U. S. Healthcare, Inc., et al. v. Dukes, Trustee ad Litem of the Estate of Dukes, Deceased, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 350. No. 95­468. National Enquirer, Inc., et al. v. Hood et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­478. Compagnie de Reassurance d'Ile de France et al. v. New England Reinsurance Corp. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 56. No. 95­488. Alaska Airlines, Inc., et al. v. California Department of Food and Agriculture et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 Cal. App. 4th 506, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426. No. 95­515. Jones-Blair Co. et al. v. Hardage Steering Committee. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 343. No. 95­523. Spears v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 234 Conn. 78, 662 A. 2d 80. No. 95­526. Aldridge et al. v. Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement Plan Benefits Committee et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1202. No. 95­530. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Green. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1029. No. 95­531. Bilder v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 Ohio App. 3d 653, 651 N. E. 2d 502. No. 95­533. Branson v. Nott et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 287. No. 95­536. Friedman et ux. v. Grace et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1141. No. 95­537. Giampa v. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District of New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [06-06-00 07:23:41] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1010 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 211 App. Div. 2d 212, 628 N. Y. S. 2d 323. No. 95­538. Dolenz v. Nationwide Indemnity Insurance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 637. No. 95­539. Elie et al. v. Broxmeyer. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 647 So. 2d 893. No. 95­541. Carpenter v. Condon, Attorney General of South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 S. C. 282, 458 S. E. 2d 533. No. 95­546. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dis- trict v. S. A. Healy Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 305. No. 95­549. Dumas et al. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 549. No. 95­550. Prince George's County, Maryland v. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc., t/a Warwick Books. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 988. No. 95­551. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. U. S. Philips Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 592. No. 95­552. Harford County, Maryland v. Chesapeake B & M, Inc., t/a Highway Craft, Gift & Book Store. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1005. No. 95­553. Rowland v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 901 S. W. 2d 871. No. 95­555. Jackson v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 591, 664 A. 2d 1340. No. 95­562. Maxwell v. E-Systems, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 823. No. 95­569. Andrisani v. Wiscot et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1398. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1011 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 No. 95­571. Mendenhall v. Goldsmith et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 685. No. 95­573. Lurie v. Halderman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1077. No. 95­582. Mustin v. Withrow, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1169. No. 95­589. Westinghouse Electric Corp. et al. v. Board of Managers of Winston Towers No. 4 Condominium Assn. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 267 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 684 N. E. 2d 1117. No. 95­592. Bank of California, N. A., Trustee of the Julia D. Ragsdale Trust, et al. v. Oregon Department of Revenue. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 321 Ore. 216, 895 P. 2d 1348. No. 95­603. Operating Engineers Pension Trust et al. v. Insurance Company of the West. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 Cal. App. 4th 59, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1. No. 95­672. Gary v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­687. Negrette v. Principal Mutual Life Insur- ance Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 72. No. 95­698. Freeman v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 239. No. 95­701. Weil, Executive Director, Colorado Depart- ment of Health Care Policy and Financing v. Hern et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 906. No. 95­729. Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 73. No. 95­5616. Carr v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5876. Levinson v. Federal Communications Com- mission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1012 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6018. Putman v. Thomas, Warden. Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6135. VanSickle v. English, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Waynesburg, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 898. No. 95­6167. Martinez v. Roth et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 342. No. 95­6209. Candelaria v. Tansy, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 787. No. 95­6210. Bray v. Brewer et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­6224. Carter v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 394. No. 95­6228. Betts v. Attorney Registration and Disci- plinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 275. No. 95­6229. Cavin v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6231. Carson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 393. No. 95­6232. Windom v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 So. 2d 432. No. 95­6239. Manning v. Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 31. No. 95­6240. Lucien v. Johnson et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 573. No. 95­6242. Hansel v. Town Court for the Town of Springfield, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 391. No. 95­6247. Hayes v. Klincar et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1013 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 No. 95­6256. Williams v. Vaughn, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6259. Gerwig v. California Department of Cor- rections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6260. Diaz v. Carpenter et al. Ct. App. Ind. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 650 N. E. 2d 688. No. 95­6262. Oltarzewski v. Martinez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 17. No. 95­6265. Conboy v. T. Rowe Price. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 821. No. 95­6267. Vega v. Daley. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 1163. No. 95­6268. Chia v. Motorola Communications, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 174. No. 95­6271. Grubb v. Frye, Sheriff, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1414. No. 95­6282. Choudhary v. Vermont Department of Pub- lic Service et al. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 Vt. 655, 659 A. 2d 1164. No. 95­6284. Scaife v. Jackson et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 548. No. 95­6292. Harper v. Sutton, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6302. Wunderlich v. Genesee County, Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6318. Seals v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6327. Csorba v. Varo, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6342. Roberson v. Henson. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 774. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1014 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6359. Spinks v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 441 Pa. Super. 673, 657 A. 2d 53. No. 95­6364. Allen v. Hundley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 414. No. 95­6438. Lewis v. Palms Associates; and Lewis v. Circuit Court of Virginia, City of Virginia Beach. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1066 (first judgment); 64 F. 3d 658 (second judgment). No. 95­6457. Carter v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 545, 651 N. E. 2d 965. No. 95­6467. Manes v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 Ore. App. 670, 896 P. 2d 18. No. 95­6490. West v. Newberry, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6501. Hansley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 709. No. 95­6513. Beideman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6523. Williams v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6527. Lord v. Lord. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6540. Brigman v. Freeman, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1414. No. 95­6544. Nanni v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1425. No. 95­6547. Johnson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 A. 2d 978. No. 95­6551. Boone v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 323. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1015 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 No. 95­6554. Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 635. No. 95­6560. Alton v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1065. No. 95­6561. Clark v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 917. No. 95­6563. Rankin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 338. No. 95­6564. Steen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1022. No. 95­6566. Edge v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1245. No. 95­6567. Tunnell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6568. Talbert v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 917. No. 95­6574. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. No. 95­6584. Wynn v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 921. No. 95­6589. Girardi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 943. No. 95­6590. Daniel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 401. No. 95­6591. Haynes et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­6594. Lee v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­6596. Krimmel v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 873. No. 95­6600. Yusufu, aka Kano, aka Barbarine v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 505. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1016 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6606. Claireayant v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1112. No. 95­6610. Jackson v. United States; No. 95­6615. Gordon v. United States; No. 95­6637. Jackson v. United States; and No. 95­6652. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111. No. 95­6616. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­6619. Siddique v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­6622. Daves v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1113. No. 95­6626. Castellano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­6627. Blake v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 138. No. 95­6628. Oguguo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­6632. Trevino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 177. No. 95­6633. De Leon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1112. No. 95­6635. Francis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­6638. Shivers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 938. No. 95­6639. Sheats v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 180. No. 95­6641. Shomorin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6642. Ogando v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1017 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 No. 95­6646. Wesley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. No. 95­6648. Thatcher v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1429. No. 95­6650. Johnson v. Sublett, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 926. No. 95­6651. McGinley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­6658. Hugley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 550. No. 95­6661. Riley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 709. No. 95­6663. Wilhike v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­195. Windham et al. v. First Gibraltar Bank, F. S. B. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Manager of the FSLIC Resolution Fund to be substituted for First Gibraltar Bank as respondent granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 342. No. 95­656. Canadian General Insurance Co. v. Domtar, Inc. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 533 N. W. 2d 25. No. 95­5807 (A­475). Asay et al. v. Florida Parole Com- mission et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 So. 2d 859. No. 95­6951 (A­477). White v. Florida; and White v. Sin- gletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 664 So. 2d 242 (first judgment); 663 So. 2d 1324 (second judgment). 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1018 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6952 (A­478). White v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1198. Rehearing Denied No. 94­1419. Wood, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary v. Bartholomew, ante, p. 1; No. 94­9214. Weatherford v. LeCureux, Warden, et al., ante, p. 827; No. 94­9305. Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc., ante, p. 830; No. 94­9339. Heatherly v. Witkowski, Warden, et al., ante, p. 831; No. 94­9372. Benally v. United States, ante, p. 826; No. 94­9429. Perkovic et al. v. West Penn Abstract Co. et al., ante, p. 835; No. 94­9478. Rampersad v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections, ante, p. 837; No. 94­9514. Tinsley v. United States, ante, p. 839; No. 94­9529. Pertsoni v. Vasquez, Warden, ante, p. 840; No. 94­9607. Conlee v. United States, ante, p. 845; No. 94­9696. Fain v. Borg, Warden, et al., ante, p. 850; No. 94­9749. In re Vincent, ante, p. 805; No. 94­9761. Macri v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al., ante, p. 854; No. 95­275. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, ante, p. 916; No. 95­305. Plaisance v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al., ante, p. 931; No. 95­307. Dorman et ux. v. Jones et al., ante, p. 931; No. 95­308. Palm Beach County et al. v. West Peninsu- lar Title Co. et al., ante, p. 932; No. 95­5092. Maldonado v. United States, ante, p. 876; No. 95­5294. McCullough v. Burnett, Circuit Judge, Craighead County, Arkansas, ante, p. 887; No. 95­5509. Washington v. Alabama, ante, p. 899; No. 95­5587. Stow v. Marshall, Superintendent, North Central Correctional Institution, et al., ante, p. 933; No. 95­5590. Kitsos v. Review Board of the Illinois At- torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, ante, p. 921; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1019 516 U. S. December 4, 1995 No. 95­5593. Murdock v. United States, ante, p. 901; No. 95­5656. Sweeney v. United States, ante, p. 934; No. 95­5659. Knight v. Intermarine, U. S. A., ante, p. 934; No. 95­5675. In re Hemmerle, ante, p. 929; No. 95­5678. Dedes v. Page et al., ante, p. 934; No. 95­5772. Chia v. United States et al., ante, p. 935; No. 95­5833. In re Smith, ante, p. 942; No. 95­5984. In re Franklin, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6038. In re Ullrich, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6039. In re Walker, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6040. In re Wohlgemuth, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6046. In re Jerold, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6047. In re Kirk, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6052. In re Renderman, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6053. In re Sandlin, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6054. In re Seaman, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6055. In re Parker, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6056. In re Payne, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6057. In re Sierra, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6060. In re Golini, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6061. In re Gauthier, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6062. In re Garrett, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6063. In re Harpster, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6065. In re Dutcher, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6203. In re Bonty, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6223. In re Cavan, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6230. In re Rodriguez, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6235. In re Moncrief, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6244. In re Harris, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6245. In re Grasmick, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6258. In re Wesley, ante, p. 942; No. 95­6300. In re Wheeler, ante, p. 942; and No. 95­6303. In re Shepherd, ante, p. 942. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 95­51. Dillon v. Tennessee, ante, p. 863; No. 95­149. Pipkins v. Nevada State Bar, ante, p. 867; No. 95­212. Fred v. Wackenhut Corp. et al., ante, p. 870; and 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1020 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 4, 5, 8, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­348. Olsen v. Paley et al., ante, p. 917. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petitions for rehearing denied. December 5, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­6132. Thomas v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 903 P. 2d 328. Certiorari Denied No. 95­6978 (A­485). Atkins v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6983 (A­463). O'Neal v. Bowersox, Superintend- ent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 169. December 8, 1995 Probable Jurisdiction Postponed No. 95­299. Arizona v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. Appeal from D. C. D. C. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Brief of appellant is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, January 19, 1996. Brief of appellees is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 887 F. Supp. 318. Certiorari Granted No. 95­191. O'Hare Truck Service, Inc., et al. v. City of Northlake et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon oppos- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1021 516 U. S. December 8, 11, 1995 ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, January 19, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 883. No. 95­388. Brown et al. v. Pro Football, Inc., dba Washington Redskins, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al., Major League Baseball Players Association, and National Hockey League Players et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon oppos- ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, January 19, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1041. No. 95­566. Montana v. Egelhoff. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio- rari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, January 19, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, Febru- ary 16, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 272 Mont. 114, 900 P. 2d 260. No. 95­591. United States v. International Business Machines Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, January 19, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1234. December 11, 1995 Affirmed on Appeal No. 95­177. Brooks et al. v. Georgia et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C. Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would vacate the April 4, 1995, District Court dismissal order and remand the case for 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1022 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 1995 516 U. S. further consideration in light of the United States' withdrawal of its appeal. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­1412. Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for rehearing granted, and the order entered May 30, 1995 [515 U. S. 1102], denying the petition for writ of certiorari is vacated. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 565. No. 94­1432. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 565. No. 94­7820. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1574. No. 94­8607. Arroyo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1213. No. 94­8730. Baena-Gabriel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1146. No. 94­8893. Perez-Valdez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1146. No. 94­8765. James v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1023 516 U. S. December 11, 1995 ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 850. No. 94­8811. Hawthorne et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 428. No. 94­8972. Estrada v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­9004. Brawner v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 609. No. 94­9022. Morton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 677. No. 94­9127. Robinson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 440. No. 94­9365. Olsen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 534. No. 94­9648. Wilcox v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1226. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1024 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­190. Knapp et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995). Reported below: 52 F. 3d 335. No. 95­5200. Grantham v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 325. No. 95­5419. Ross v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­5473. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 637. No. 95­5572. Bonner v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 95­5822. Mariette v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1064. No. 95­5827. Lanier v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1062. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­410. First National Bank & Trust, Wibaux, Mon- tana, et al. v. Comptroller of the Currency. C. A. 9th 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1025 516 U. S. December 11, 1995 Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1586. In re Disbarment of Glassman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1185.] No. D­1591. In re Disbarment of Zoccola. Robert F. Zoc- cola, of Carmel, Ind., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on October 30, 1995 [ante, p. 939], is discharged. No. D­1622. In re Disbarment of Lynch. James Edward Lynch, of Washington Crossing, Pa., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1623. In re Disbarment of Myers. Donald Myers, of Elizabeth, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1624. In re Disbarment of Weiss. Howard Jesse Weiss, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­27. Bauldwin v. Resolution Trust Corporation et al.; No. M­28. Perez v. Marshall et al.; and No. M­29. Cruz v. United States. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 105, Orig. Kansas v. Colorado. Motion of the Special Master for fees and reimbursement of expenses for the period August 1, 1994, through November 1, 1995, granted, and the Spe- cial Master is awarded a total of $39,132.75 to be paid as follows: for the period August 1, 1994, through July 31, 1995, a total of $21,518.19 to be paid 40% by Kansas, 40% by Colorado, and 20% by the United States; for the period August 1 through November 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1026 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 1995 516 U. S. 1, 1995, a total of $17,614.56 to be paid equally by Kansas and Colorado. [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 514 U. S. 673.] No. 108, Orig. Nebraska v. Wyoming et al. Motion of the Special Master for compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $71,399 for the period October 1, 1994, through November 17, 1995, to be paid as follows: 30% by Nebraska, 30% by Wyoming, 15% by Colorado, and 25% by the United States. [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 515 U. S. 1.] No. 120, Orig. New Jersey v. New York. Motion of the Special Master for compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $81,649.50 for the period June 1 through November 17, 1995, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 515 U. S. 1130.] No. 121, Orig. Louisiana v. Mississippi et al. Motion of the Special Master for allowance of fees and disbursements granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $156,577.09 to be paid in full by Louisiana. [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 122.] No. 94­1614. Wisconsin v. City of New York et al.; No. 94­1631. Oklahoma v. City of New York et al.; and No. 94­1985. Department of Commerce et al. v. City of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1190.] Motion of Oklahoma and Wisconsin for divided argument granted in part, and the time is divided as follows: the Solicitor General, 20 minutes; Wisconsin, 10 minutes; respondents, 30 min- utes. Request for additional time for oral argument denied. No. 94­1664. Koon v. United States; and No. 94­8842. Powell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1190.] Motion of petitioner Stacey Koon for divided argument denied. Motion of petitioner Lau- rence Powell for divided argument granted, and the time is di- vided as follows: petitioner Koon, 15 minutes; petitioner Powell, 15 minutes. No. 95­737. Royce Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner to expe- dite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Jus- 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1027 516 U. S. December 11, 1995 tice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 95­5207. Cooper v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 910.] Motion of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 95­6383. Sims v. Barkley, Superintendent, River- view Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until January 2, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­6371. In re Williams; and No. 95­6644. In re Solimine. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­2053. Nelson et al. v. Murphy, Acting Director, Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disa- bilities of Illinois, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 497. No. 95­179. Mayorga-Perez v. Immigration and Natural- ization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 15. No. 95­211. Quinn et al. v. Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1096. No. 95­226. Haversat v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 335. No. 95­349. Siguel v. Allstate Life Insurance Co. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1211. No. 95­385. Bram v. City of Cleveland et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 1218, 645 N. E. 2d 732. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1028 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­422. O'Neill et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 677. No. 95­425. Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County, Indiana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 57 F. 3d 505. No. 95­426. Denney v. Regents of the University of California et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 Cal. App. 4th 1251, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188. No. 95­518. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 592. No. 95­525. United States v. Turecamo of Savannah, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1083. No. 95­543. Clark v. Fancher et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­570. African Enterprise, Inc., et al. v. Scholes, as Receiver for Douglas et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 750. No. 95­574. Olivo v. Mapp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­575. Riggan et al. v. City of Saint Paul, Saint Paul Island, Alaska. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 53 F. 3d 339. No. 95­577. City of Santa Ana et al. v. Lambert et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 134. No. 95­594. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Houston et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1420. No. 95­598. Stoutenborough et al. v. National Football League, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 59 F. 3d 580. No. 95­602. Watson v. Trepel et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1079. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1029 516 U. S. December 11, 1995 No. 95­604. Long Cove Club Associates, L. P. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 319 S. C. 30, 458 S. E. 2d 757. No. 95­605. Oklahoma Association for Equitable Taxa- tion v. City of Oklahoma City. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 901 P. 2d 800. No. 95­612. Kimpel v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 665 So. 2d 990. No. 95­623. Walker v. Indiana et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 173. No. 95­629. Hegarty, Personal Representative of the Estate of Hegarty, Deceased v. Wright et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1367. No. 95­634. Lovell v. Planters Bank & Trust Company of Claiborne Parish; and Lovell v. Newell et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­639. Flinn v. Plummer. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­686. Hegler v. Borg, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1472. No. 95­703. Citizens Association for Sound Energy v. Boltz et ux. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 886 S. W. 2d 283. No. 95­732. Willey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1374. No. 95­736. Roller v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 264. No. 95­5816. Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 331. No. 95­5927. Keiser v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 847. No. 95­6309. Nonnette v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1030 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6311. Aurelia N. v. Santa Clara County Depart- ment of Family Services. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6314. Williams v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 321 Ark. 344, 902 S. W. 2d 767. No. 95­6321. Love v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 323. No. 95­6335. Burnside v. Lattimore et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6336. Bogan v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6337. Bryant v. South Carolina Department of Corrections et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 60 F. 3d 820. No. 95­6338. Quinniey v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 App. Div. 2d 1069, 625 N. Y. S. 2d 984. No. 95­6341. Lyle v. Richardson. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6347. Gordon v. Peoria School District 150 et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 905. No. 95­6350. Harrison v. Oklahoma et al. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6351. Payne v. Love, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6352. Jenkins v. McKune, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 338. No. 95­6365. Nelson v. Caswell. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6366. Nail v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1031 516 U. S. December 11, 1995 No. 95­6372. Suttles v. Hightower, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6376. Breedlove v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 74. No. 95­6390. Spears v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 P. 2d 431. No. 95­6431. Brown v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 S. W. 2d 278. No. 95­6448. Ferenc v. Reinosa et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6507. Mayes v. Newberry, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6550. Mills v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 396. No. 95­6557. Singletary v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 824. No. 95­6565. So-Fine v. Morton, Administrator, New Jer- sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6569. Wilkerson v. Mosley, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­6587. Hambrick v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6664. Woods v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 314. No. 95­6666. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1243. No. 95­6668. Hood v. Phillips, Director, North Carolina Division of Prisons. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 60 F. 3d 822. No. 95­6671. Hill v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1417. No. 95­6672. Key v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 424. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1032 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6674. Angel v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­6676. Zajac v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 145. No. 95­6678. Bishop v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 569. No. 95­6681. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1159. No. 95­6682. Roberson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 914. No. 95­6686. Whitis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­6691. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 321. No. 95­6692. Battiste v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­6694. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­6695. Johnson et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 826. No. 95­6696. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­6730. Nelson v. McKinna, Superintendent, Colo- rado Territorial Correctional Facility. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 484. No. 95­6757. Palacios-Bastida v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 322. No. 95­393. Heller v. Bowman. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Mo- tion of Association for Union Democracy for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 420 Mass. 517, 651 N. E. 2d 369. No. 95­616. Calderon, Warden, et al. v. Phillips. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1033 516 U. S. December 11, 1995 pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1030. No. 95­633. Michigan v. Sanders. Ct. App. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6834 (A­456). Briddle v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Jus- tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 364. Rehearing Granted. (See No. 94­1412, supra, at 1022.) Rehearing Denied No. 94­9227. Lapsley v. Northern Indiana Public Serv- ice Co., ante, p. 828; No. 94­9253. In re Sheehy et ux., ante, p. 805; No. 94­9613. Washington v. Moore, Director, South Car- olina Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 845; No. 94­9783. Felix-Santos v. United States, ante, p. 856; No. 95­223. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Orangeburg Sausage Co., ante, p. 928; No. 95­312. Roussin v. Missouri, ante, p. 917; No. 95­333. Julien v. Texas et al., ante, p. 932; No. 95­406. In re Danko, ante, p. 941; No. 95­5145. Myers v. United States, ante, p. 879; No. 95­5191. Thierman v. Thierman et al., ante, p. 882; No. 95­5282. Bergmann v. McCaughtry, Warden, et al., ante, p. 887; No. 95­5510. Stewart v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, ante, p. 899; No. 95­5585. Crawford v. Garner, Warden, et al., ante, p. 921; No. 95­5773. Osborne v. Montgomery Engineering Co. et al., ante, p. 905; No. 95­5796. Graham v. Hannigan, Warden, et al., ante, p. 949; No. 95­5933. Kent v. Reich, Secretary of Labor, ante, p. 967; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1034 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 December 11, 12, 13, 20, 1995 516 U. S. No. 95­6113. Kidston v. Stibbards et al., ante, p. 952; No. 95­6204. In re Bonta, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6236. In re Lanzon, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6237. In re Jory, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6243. In re Deere, ante, p. 941; No. 95­6257. In re Walker, ante, p. 942; No. 95­6301. In re Son Van Hoang, ante, p. 942; No. 95­6305. In re Lane, ante, p. 942; and No. 95­6306. In re Maida, ante, p. 942. Petitions for rehear- ing denied. No. 94­9755. Sanborn v. Kentucky, ante, p. 854. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. December 12, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 95­7084 (A­508). Briddle v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 473. December 13, 1995 Miscellaneous Order No. A­492 (95­6510). Gray v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. December 20, 1995 Miscellaneous Order No. 94­1837. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Barnett Bank of Marion 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1035 516 U. S. December 20, 29, 1995, January 2, 3, 4, 1996 County, N. A. v. Gallagher, 515 U. S. 1190.] Motion of respond- ents for divided argument granted. December 29, 1995 Dismissals Under Rule 46 No. 95­1002. Hanna et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari as to Question II dis- missed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 908. No. 94­2104. Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. McAllister. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 1292. January 2, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 95­992. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al. Appeal from D. C. D. C. Motion of appellants to expedite consideration of jurisdictional statement denied. January 3, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 95­7283 (A­548). Correll v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Re- ported below: 63 F. 3d 1279. January 4, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders No. 94­1614. Wisconsin v. City of New York et al.; No. 94­1631. Oklahoma v. City of New York et al.; and No. 94­1985. Department of Commerce et al. v. City of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1190.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense temporarily with printing in these and other cases granted pending renewal of the Department of Justice's appropriations and contract authority. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1036 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 4, 5, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­1028. United States v. Fadem et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense temporarily with printing in this case granted pending renewal of the Department of Justice's appropriations and contract authority. January 5, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­892. Alaska v. Babbitt, Secretary of the Inte- rior, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Certiorari Granted No. 95­365. Lane v. Pena, Secretary of Transportation, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 15, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. No. 95­489. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 15, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1015. No. 95­559. Doctor's Associates, Inc., et al. v. Casarotto et ux. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 15, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 274 Mont. 3, 901 P. 2d 596. No. 95­5841. Whren et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1037 516 U. S. January 5, 8, 1996 granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 16, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 15, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 371. No. 95­6510. Gray v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 pre- sented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Fri- day, February 16, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 15, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursu- ant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Re- ported below: 58 F. 3d 59. January 8, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded. (See also No. 94­ 9323, ante, p. 163; and No. 94­8988, ante, p. 193.) No. 95­5539. Stephens v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treas- ury. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment va- cated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the position presently asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for respondent filed November 8, 1995. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 431. No. 95­6174. Libby v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127 (1994). Reported below: 109 Nev. 905, 859 P. 2d 1050. No. 95­6254. Vasquez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1038 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. Certiorari Dismissed No. 95­717. Mahalek, Individually and as the Heir of Kole v. Korean Air Lines, Co., Ltd. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari before judgment dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1573. In re Disbarment of Hoppmann. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 515 U. S. 1172.] No. D­1589. In re Disbarment of Mione. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 939.] No. D­1592. In re Disbarment of Boughton. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 939.] No. D­1593. In re Disbarment of McLenithan. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1594. In re Disbarment of Eberhart. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1595. In re Disbarment of Edelman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1625. In re Disbarment of Gajewski. Shirley Fer- rell Gajewski, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1626. In re Disbarment of Sokolow. Craig Bryan Sokolow, of Minersville, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1627. In re Disbarment of Richards. James W. Richards, of Rush, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1628. In re Disbarment of Hills. Frank S. Hills, of Sausalito, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1039 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1629. In re Disbarment of Clapp. Edward Dorwart Clapp, of St. Paul, Minn., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1630. In re Disbarment of Toms. James Huston Toms, of Hendersonville, N. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1631. In re Disbarment of Cassell. Stuart B. Cas- sell, of Forest Hills, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­30. Hampton v. TransAmerica Insurance Co. et al.; No. M­33. Blackmon v. Essary; No. M­34. Ryan v. Doria et al.; No. M­35. Metallo v. United States; No. M­36. Johnson v. Nagle, Warden, et al.; and No. M­37. Johnson v. United States. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­31. Fischbach v. Board of Education of Talbot County, Maryland, et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. M­32. Cooper v. Connecticut. Motion for leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. No. 123, Orig. Corrinet v. Boutros Ghali, Secretary- General of the United Nations. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied. No. 94­1664. Koon v. United States; and No. 94­8842. Powell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1190.] Motion of counsel for petitioner 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1040 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. Powell to reschedule oral argument in these cases set for January 9, 1996, granted. Oral argument in No. 94­1966, Loving v. United States [certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1191], will be heard at 11 a.m., Tuesday, January 9, 1996. No. 94­1941. United States v. Virginia et al.; and No. 94­2107. Virginia et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 910.] Motions of Women's Schools Together, Inc., et al. and South Carolina Institute of Lead- ership for Women for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions. No. 94­2003. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter- national, Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1191.] Motions of Howard C. Anawalt and Software Protection Committee of Minnesota Intellectual Property Law Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Justice Ste- vens took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions. No. 95­83. Meghrig et al. v. KFC Western, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1192.] Motions of Bi-State Development Agency of Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District and Massachusetts et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. No. 95­157. United States v. Armstrong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion of Criminal Jus- tice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 95­323. United States v. Noland, Trustee for Debtor First Truck Lines, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1005.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 95­325. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fab- ricators of Utah, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1005.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 95­354. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1041 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­591. United States v. International Business Machines Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1021.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with print- ing the joint appendix granted. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 95­638. Bankers Trust Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co. C. A. 6th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 95­6503. In re Holcomb; and No. 95­7070. In re Brown. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until January 29, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­6821. In re Everhart; No. 95­6822. In re Giseburt; No. 95­6823. In re Neal; No. 95­6912. In re Magee; No. 95­6914. In re Moyer; No. 95­6994. In re Chatfield; and No. 95­7074. In re Magee. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 95­625. In re Holywell Corp. et al.; No. 95­678. In re Lucille; No. 95­6445. In re Holston; No. 95­6597. In re Kloehn; No. 95­6693. In re Tamayo; and No. 95­6946. In re Cartwright. Petitions for writs of man- damus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­2050. Tyson v. Trigg, Superintendent, Indiana Youth Center, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 50 F. 3d 436. No. 95­254. American Legion et al. v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 789. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1042 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­277. Power v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 420 Mass. 410, 650 N. E. 2d 87. No. 95­279. Atkins v. Oregon Department of Revenue. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 320 Ore. 713, 894 P. 2d 449. No. 95­289. Williams v. United States; No. 95­290. Ross v. United States; No. 95­6402. Lo v. United States; and No. 95­6677. Khalil v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 507. No. 95­371. Douglas County, Oregon v. Babbitt, Secre- tary of the Interior, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1495. No. 95­382. Todd Shipyards Corp. et al. v. Hoke et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 333. No. 95­394. Droz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1120. No. 95­397. Penny et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1181. No. 95­414. CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com- mission et al. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 P. 2d 1214. No. 95­434. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 656. No. 95­436. Mach-Tech, Ltd. Partnership et al. v. Com- missioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­448. Interstate Brands Corp. v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 574. No. 95­452. Campbell v. Campbell et al. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 S. W. 2d 630. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1043 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­457. Perales, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services, et al. v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1305. No. 95­458. Tiffany et al. v. Farm Credit Bank of Omaha, fka Federal Land Bank of Omaha, et al. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 529 N. W. 2d 294. No. 95­460. Hume v. Sterling, Individually and in His Capacity as Shelby County Assessor of Property, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1219. No. 95­463. Salas v. Casellas, Chairman, Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­471. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Anderson; and No. 95­708. Anderson v. Northern Telecom, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 810. No. 95­491. Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 279, 649 N. E. 2d 182. No. 95­492. LeMaster v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1224. No. 95­505. Ablang v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 801. No. 95­509. Pacifica Foundation et al. v. Federal Com- munications Commission et al.; and No. 95­520. Action for Children's Television et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 654. No. 95­516. Spicer v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1152. No. 95­545. Kurtz v. City of North Miami. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 1025. No. 95­554. Scarth et al. v. NICOR Exploration Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1341. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1044 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­567. Santiago-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 422. No. 95­568. Gray v. New York Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 95­587. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Pro- fessional Publications, Inc., et al. v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1540. No. 95­590. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 528. No. 95­596. Berkley et al. v. Itoba Ltd.; and No. 95­606. LEP Group PLC v. Itoba Ltd. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 118. No. 95­608. Holywell Corp. et al. v. Smith, Individually and as Trustee of the Miami Center Liquidating Trust, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­613. Sarduy v. Southern Bell Telephone Tele- graphic, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­621. Washington, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Washington et ux., De- ceased, et al. v. Creel. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1072. No. 95­624. Southern Guaranty Insurance Company of Georgia v. Southeastern Express Systems et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 Cal. App. 4th 1, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216. No. 95­628. Sabia, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Bateman, et al. v. Seminole County, Flor- ida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­631. Brandt, Administrator of the Investment Plus Plan of the Southeast Banking Corp. v. Weiner 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1045 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1003. No. 95­632. Kertesz v. Plotkins. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­636. Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1063. No. 95­643. Walpole et al. v. Great American Insurance Cos. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 63. No. 95­644. Islamic Republic of Iran v. McKesson Corp. et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 346. No. 95­647. Southern Christian Leadership Conference et al. v. Sessions, Attorney General of Alabama, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­648. Kolker v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 649 So. 2d 250. No. 95­649. S. Diamond Associates, Inc. v. Original Appa- lachian Artworks, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 925. No. 95­650. Robinson et al. v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft et al.; and Robinson et al. v. Volkswagenwerk AG et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1259 (first judgment) and 1268 (second judgment). No. 95­651. Ahmed, aka Gresham, Personal Represen- tative of the Estate of Gresham v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 165. No. 95­653. Honda Motor Co. et al. v. Satcher; and No. 95­674. Satcher v. Honda Motor Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1311. No. 95­665. Phillips v. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1046 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­666. Goodall, an Infant, by His Father and Next Friend, Goodall, et al. v. Stafford County School Board. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 168. No. 95­667. Johnson v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 Ore. App. 449, 890 P. 2d 1016. No. 95­670. WesTech Gear Corp. v. Anzalone. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 N. J. 256, 661 A. 2d 796. No. 95­671. Columbia Convalescent Center, Inc., et al. v. Georgia Department of Medical Assistance. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 638, 458 S. E. 2d 635. No. 95­676. Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1496. No. 95­677. Nichols et al. v. Paulucci et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 652 So. 2d 389. No. 95­679. Spiegel v. Babbitt, Secretary of the Inte- rior, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1531. No. 95­682. Wetta v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 Ga. App. 128, 456 S. E. 2d 696. No. 95­683. Partin v. Florida Commission on Ethics. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 720. No. 95­684. Plowman v. Massad et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 796. No. 95­688. Michigan Supervisors' Office & Profes- sional Employees International Union et al. v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. No. 95­689. Fioretti v. Massachusetts General Life Insurance Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1228. No. 95­691. Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1495. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1047 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­692. Lawrence Industries, Inc. v. Sharp, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, et al. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 S. W. 2d 886. No. 95­694. In re Lamm. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341 N. C. 196, 458 S. E. 2d 921. No. 95­697. Cromwell et ux. v. Securities Service Net- work, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­699. Troster v. Pennsylvania State Department of Corrections et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 65 F. 3d 1086. No. 95­702. Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 144. No. 95­704. Hamid et al. v. Price Waterhouse et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1411. No. 95­707. Savannah Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Na- tional Utility Service, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 895. No. 95­710. Baker et al. v. Bank of Bartlett et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1166. No. 95­715. 1120 Central Condominiums Owners Assn. et al. v. City of Seal Beach, California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 174. No. 95­718. Pennsylvania v. Albino. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 424, 664 A. 2d 84. No. 95­721. Republic of the Philippines et al. v. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 396. No. 95­722. Hall v. Paoli Orjales. Ct. App. P. R. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­723. Tinsley v. TRW Inc. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 659. No. 95­727. McCotter v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certio- rari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1048 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­730. Cooper-Jolley v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­735. Peters v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 Mich. 515, 537 N. W. 2d 160. No. 95­739. Maggard, Deceased, et al. v. Leslie Re- sources, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 95­741. Snelling v. Cisneros, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 330. No. 95­745. Ortega-Acosta v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 635. No. 95­756. Jenkins v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1242. No. 95­759. LaMantia et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 705. No. 95­762. Yu v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 308. No. 95­764. Collings et al. v. Longview Fibre Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 828. No. 95­778. Buchbinder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­784. Podgurski v. Suffolk County, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­787. Azar v. Hayter. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 342. No. 95­794. Rhodes v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 287. No. 95­796. Martin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 464. No. 95­802. Polley et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 381. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1049 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­812. Neben & Starrett, Inc. v. Chartwell Finan- cial Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 877. No. 95­832. Jensen v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 71. No. 95­833. Cuda et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­835. Delgado et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1357. No. 95­840. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 470. No. 95­863. Bonito v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 167. No. 95­870. Starkes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284 and 1285. No. 95­871. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 141 Supple- mental Unemployment Benefit Trust Fund v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 64 F. 3d 245. No. 95­874. Smith v. Leonard et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 834. No. 95­876. Kirton v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Conn. App. 914, 659 A. 2d 1237. No. 95­5128. Burch v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 345. No. 95­5205. Jayson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 322. No. 95­5582. Como v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 87. No. 95­5619. Champion v. California; and No. 95­6264. Ross v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 4th 879, 891 P. 2d 93. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1050 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­5635. Hock v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1470. No. 95­5645. Sterling v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 451. No. 95­5671. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 180. No. 95­5801. Hunt v. Department of the Army. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1084. No. 95­5852. Reed v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­5862. Gour v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­5873. May et al. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­5904. Ghazaleh v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 240. No. 95­5929. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5994. Canan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 954. No. 95­6028. Gomez-Villa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1199. No. 95­6059. Flores v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 904 S. W. 2d 129. No. 95­6097. Scales v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 1326. No. 95­6098. St. Pierre v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6127. Walters v. Allstate Insurance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1222. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1051 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6134. Perez v. United States; No. 95­6475. Jacobs v. United States; and No. 95­6500. Galindo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 901. No. 95­6139. Mason v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 905 S. W. 2d 570. No. 95­6202. Williams v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 85, 660 A. 2d 1316. No. 95­6255. Wilson v. City of Akron, Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 667 So. 2d 750. No. 95­6263. Ross v. Calderon, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 4th 184, 892 P. 2d 1287. No. 95­6285. High v. Thomas, Warden, et al. Super. Ct. Butts County, Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6369. Webster v. City of Amarillo, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 464. No. 95­6373. Bonin v. Calderon, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 815. No. 95­6375. Pourzandvakil v. Humphrey, Attorney Gen- eral of Minnesota, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6380. Young v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 319 S. C. 33, 459 S. E. 2d 84. No. 95­6385. Elfakir et ux. v. Automobile Club Insur- ance Associates et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6395. Omernick v. Steger et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 Wis. 2d 641, 537 N. W. 2d 435. No. 95­6403. G. W. B. v. J. S. W. et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 658 So. 2d 961. No. 95­6404. Caesar v. Marshal, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 337. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1052 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6412. Oglesby v. Green et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 401. No. 95­6422. Spiegelman v. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6429. Slagle v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 509, 651 N. E. 2d 937. No. 95­6432. Pudder v. Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6434. Nelson v. Cotton. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6440. Coker et al. v. Redick et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6441. Gonzales v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 181 Ariz. 502, 892 P. 2d 838. No. 95­6443. Fuentes v. Shanks, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 915. No. 95­6444. Hay v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6447. Greany v. Barkley, Superintendent, River- view Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6450. Dolphin v. Starkman. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1419. No. 95­6451. Bedson v. Hendrickson, Deputy Sheriff, Pasco County, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­6453. Crill v. Capaul et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 910. No. 95­6455. Rodriguez v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 So. 2d 1166. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1053 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6458. Hubbard v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6469. Santiago v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 188, 662 A. 2d 610. No. 95­6471. Spaziano v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 1363. No. 95­6472. Saucier v. Alcede, Warden, Calcasieu Cor- rectional Center. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 62 F. 3d 392. No. 95­6473. Celestine v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6478. Sales v. City of Conway, Arkansas, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1074. No. 95­6479. Spybuck v. Champion, Attorney General of Oklahoma. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 916. No. 95­6480. Sneed v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6483. Beeler v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 4th 953, 891 P. 2d 153. No. 95­6492. Greer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 776. No. 95­6494. Hart v. Hart. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6497. Barner v. Nevada et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6504. Uzowuru v. Williams Brothers Construc- tion Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 51 F. 3d 1042. No. 95­6505. McWilliams v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 666 So. 2d 90. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1054 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6506. Janneh v. GAF Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6509. Hunt v. Nuth, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1327. No. 95­6516. Nobles v. Metropolitan Transit Authority et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 394. No. 95­6517. Ball v. Garrett, Judge of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6518. Wojnicz v. Stegall et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­6526. Myers v. Massachusetts Trial Court et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 1122, 649 N. E. 2d 1143. No. 95­6536. White v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6541. Ramirez v. Thurman, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6546. Trottie v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6552. Banks v. Harper et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1477. No. 95­6558. Ross v. Rockwell International Rocket- dyne. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 834. No. 95­6562. Smith v. Velasquez et al. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6570. Willoughby v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 181 Ariz. 530, 892 P. 2d 1319. No. 95­6571. Thomas v. Carver, Warden, et al. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1055 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6572. Peterson v. Mac Industries et al. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6573. Harrington v. Fagley et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 311. No. 95­6576. McLamb v. Roberts, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­6578. Shannon v. Hueszel. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­6579. Glover v. Roberts, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 682. No. 95­6580. Gospodareck v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 666 So. 2d 844. No. 95­6581. Desmond v. Department of the Navy et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 289. No. 95­6582. Acosta v. Strack, Superintendent, Fishkill Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6583. Arndt v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6585. Attwood v. Sands et al.; and Attwood v. Sin- gletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6586. Green v. Citizens Bank et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1219. No. 95­6588. Grubor v. Pennsylvania et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 168 Pa. Commw. 694, 649 A. 2d 1012. No. 95­6592. Ham v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6593. Price v. Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1056 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6598. Harris v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6599. Jackson v. West Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 657. No. 95­6601. Wodkiewicz v. Patent and Trademark Of- fice Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 347. No. 95­6602. Sloan v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 1371. No. 95­6603. Turner v. Cullum, Secretary of Virginia Health and Human Resources. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 962. No. 95­6604. Uske v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1375. No. 95­6609. Paderes v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 919. No. 95­6614. Barnette v. Jones et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6617. Getty v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6618. Starks-El v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1267. No. 95­6620. Trice v. Toombs, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6621. Chandler v. Circuit Court of Virginia, City of Virginia Beach, et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6623. Gent v. Gordon et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 899. No. 95­6624. Mosley v. Shelby et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [06-06-00 07:24:47] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1057 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6625. Jones v. Gilmore, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 665. No. 95­6629. Solimine v. United States et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 654. No. 95­6630. Williams v. Jabe, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 327. No. 95­6631. Bradley v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 319. No. 95­6634. Frazier v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­6645. Roberson v. Raney, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6647. Vey v. Colville et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 314. No. 95­6649. Jones v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6662. Cook v. Moyer et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6665. Collins v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 1556, 651 N. E. 2d 1013. No. 95­6667. Cox v. Robinson, Secretary, Maryland De- partment of Public Safety and Correctional Services. Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6673. Crowder v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 782. No. 95­6680. Tsimbidaros v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6683. Dorsey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 260. No. 95­6684. Glass v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Reformatory. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 905. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1058 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6685. Osborne v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 344. No. 95­6689. Hayes v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 685 N. E. 2d 459. No. 95­6690. Cree v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­6697. Noble v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6706. Higgins v. Cuomo, Former Governor of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6707. Barnett v. Bonaventure et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 820. No. 95­6708. Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investi- gation. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6712. O'Neill v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 182. No. 95­6713. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111. No. 95­6714. O'Brien v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 65. No. 95­6715. Passi v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1278. No. 95­6716. Clark v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 110. No. 95­6717. Connally v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­6719. Parry v. Rosemeyer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Greensburg. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 110. No. 95­6722. Torres-Saucedo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 484. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1059 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6723. Tomlin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6725. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6727. James v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­6728. Jeanise v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 322. No. 95­6729. Mejia-Cendejas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 177. No. 95­6732. Muscoreil v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 214 App. Div. 2d 953, 626 N. Y. S. 2d 637. No. 95­6733. Ketchum v. Roswell, Arizona, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1428. No. 95­6735. DeBari v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 312. No. 95­6736. Donahue v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 182. No. 95­6738. Faison v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 22. No. 95­6739. Fontenot v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1429. No. 95­6740. Goodwin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6743. Orellana v. Kyle. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 29. No. 95­6744. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1070. No. 95­6745. Barksdale v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1532. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1060 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6749. Vance v. Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 119. No. 95­6750. Woods v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. No. 95­6752. Crepeau v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1415. No. 95­6754. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 1515. No. 95­6761. Terry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1541. No. 95­6762. Collins v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1416. No. 95­6766. Caamano-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 314. No. 95­6767. Correa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­6770. Ogea v. United States; and No. 95­6780. Miller v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. No. 95­6771. Satizabal v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 912. No. 95­6774. Hubbard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 819. No. 95­6776. Ingrao v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 98. No. 95­6777. Travis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 170. No. 95­6778. Powell v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 674, 459 S. E. 2d 219. No. 95­6781. Graham v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [06-06-00 07:25:35] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1061 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6782. Romero Contreras v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­6783. Black v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­6786. Trevino, aka Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 333. No. 95­6789. Dwyer v. Millsaps, Director, Community Supervision and Corrections Department for Travis County, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 58 F. 3d 635. No. 95­6790. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 68. No. 95­6792. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 914. No. 95­6793. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. No. 95­6794. Mundy v. Carithers, Judge, Circuit Court of Florida, Fourth Judicial Circuit. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6795. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1390. No. 95­6796. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 851. No. 95­6797. Mansfield v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­6798. Dodge v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 670. No. 95­6800. Porter v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 962. No. 95­6802. Antonelli v. Hurley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6804. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1062 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6805. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­6806. Bowles v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 659. No. 95­6807. Bascope-Zurita v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1057. No. 95­6808. Alvarado-Saldivar v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 697. No. 95­6816. McLeggan v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­6818. McSwine v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­6824. Lea v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1018. No. 95­6827. David v. Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6828. Ahmad v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 396. No. 95­6835. Abbott v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 309. No. 95­6837. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 281. No. 95­6839. Claiborne v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 897. No. 95­6842. Miles v. Dorsey, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1459. No. 95­6843. Obermeyer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 177. No. 95­6844. Alden v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 659. No. 95­6849. Hart v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 917. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1063 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6850. Campbell v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 962. No. 95­6852. Hartz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­6853. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 766. No. 95­6854. Wimberly v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 281. No. 95­6855. Beasley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­6857. Escareno v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 549. No. 95­6858. Marshall v. United States; and No. 95­6939. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6859. Daniels v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 311. No. 95­6862. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 464. No. 95­6863. Ingham v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 218. No. 95­6867. Porter v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 830. No. 95­6868. Randolph v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 670. No. 95­6870. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111. No. 95­6871. Jefferson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6872. DiGirolamo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 544. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1064 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6873. Hines v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­6874. Fine v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 167. No. 95­6876. Andrino-Carillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 922. No. 95­6877. Arias-Mendez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 835. No. 95­6879. Huston v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 442 Pa. Super. 676, 660 A. 2d 653. No. 95­6882. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­6883. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 169. No. 95­6888. Nwanze v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 167. No. 95­6890. Orr v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­6893. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 342. No. 95­6895. Burris v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6909. Dickson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 409. No. 95­6915. McLauren v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 323. No. 95­6916. Cofer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1479. No. 95­6918. Gardner v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 82. No. 95­6920. Keso v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 Wis. 2d 638, 537 N. W. 2d 433. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1065 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­6921. Reid v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­6922. Burns v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 825. No. 95­6924. Chapel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­6926. Gregorio Martinez, aka Martinez Estrada v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1398. No. 95­6933. Harvilchuck v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­6935. Humphrey v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 306. No. 95­6936. Hill v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 664 A. 2d 347. No. 95­6938. Sheffey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1419. No. 95­6940. Onyejekwe v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6942. McKoy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 907. No. 95­6945. Crawford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6948. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1425. No. 95­6949. Leon-Leon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 95­6953. Gresham v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­6954. Gomez-Quinceno v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6956. Evans v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1066 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6958. Stokes v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 569. No. 95­6959. Plumlee et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1415. No. 95­6960. Shafer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 168. No. 95­6965. Cortez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 292. No. 95­6968. Wright v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6971. Araiza-Tovar v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 314. No. 95­6976. Morga v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. No. 95­6981. Okolo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­6985. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 1057. No. 95­6989. Johnson v. Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 657. No. 95­6991. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1426. No. 95­6999. Patch v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 124. No. 95­7001. Burns v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­424. Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc., et al. v. Ber- gen Record Corp. et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Motion of New Jersey Press Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 N. J. 392, 655 A. 2d 417. 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1067 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­524. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Thomas & Betts Corp. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1498. No. 95­617. Curtis et al. v. School Committee of Fal- mouth et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of Family Research Council et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 420 Mass. 749, 652 N. E. 2d 580. No. 95­646. Carlsbad Municipal School District et al. v. Daddow. Sup. Ct. N. M. Motion of New Mexico Public School Insurance Authority for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 120 N. M. 97, 898 P. 2d 1235. No. 95­659. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correc- tional Center v. Antwine. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respond- ent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1357. No. 95­660. Nowicki v. Cooper, Assistant Family Court Commissioner, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike brief in opposition denied. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 782. No. 95­669. American Cyanamid Co. v. Gorton et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 194 Wis. 2d 203, 533 N. W. 2d 746. No. 95­731. American Home Products Corp. et al. v. Johnson & Johnson et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 843. No. 95­6595. Doe v. Harvard University. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1484. No. 95­737. Royce Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers et al. for leave to file a brief 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1068 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 8, 1996 516 U. S. as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 1130. No. 95­829. Planning Research Corp., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Schwedt. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of National Security Industrial Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 196. No. 95­5913. Brown v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to file amended petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 415. No. 95­6542. Nichols v. McElveen et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to amend petition for writ of certiorari de- nied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­6903. Branch v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner to amend petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6460 (A­517). Fanta v. City of Seattle et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. 94­9219. Goldwitz v. Chauvin International Ltd., ante, p. 828; No. 94­9341. Glover v. Leonardo, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, ante, p. 831; No. 94­9740. Sceifers v. Trigg, Superintendent, Indiana Youth Center, ante, p. 853; No. 95­367. Keles v. New York University et al., ante, p. 943; No. 95­517. Touron v. Metropolitan Dade County et al., ante, p. 945; No. 95­558. Thompson v. United States et al., ante, p. 976; No. 95­5235. Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue, ante, p. 884; 516ORD Unit: $PT1 [05-03-00 19:32:49] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1069 516 U. S. January 8, 1996 No. 95­5427. Mallory v. Gilmore et al., ante, p. 895; No. 95­5496. Jenkins v. Maqueen et al., ante, p. 919; No. 95­5537. Binnick v. Lancaster County Personnel Board et al., ante, p. 920; No. 95­5605. Brannson v. Ely, Judge, Circuit Court of Missouri, Jackson County, et al., ante, p. 933; No. 95­5701. Tsimbidaros v. Department of Justice et al., ante, p. 922; No. 95­5763. Lazo v. United States, ante, p. 923; No. 95­5780. McAdams v. Ohio, ante, p. 948; No. 95­5804. Felder v. Montague, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, ante, p. 965; No. 95­5851. Yurtis v. Phipps, ante, p. 965; No. 95­5889. Ballard v. Holland, Warden, ante, p. 966; No. 95­5897. Penry v. Texas, ante, p. 977; No. 95­5934. Kelley v. Maryland et al., ante, p. 977; No. 95­5945. Jenkins v. Kansas et al., ante, p. 977; No. 95­5974. Vincent v. C & P Telephone Co. et al., ante, p. 978; No. 95­5986. Reemsnyder v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration et al., ante, p. 967; No. 95­6014. Jenkins v. Burtzloff et al., ante, p. 979; No. 95­6032. Gupman et ux. v. Agribank, FCB, et al., ante, p. 979; No. 95­6037. Shafer v. City and County of Denver, ante, p. 979; No. 95­6048. In re Land, ante, p. 929; No. 95­6079. In re Smith, ante, p. 973; No. 95­6114. Richards v. Woods, Director of Classifica- tion, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institu- tional Division, ante, p. 968; No. 95­6159. Spearman v. Morales, Attorney General of Texas, et al., ante, p. 995; No. 95­6213. Cross v. United States, ante, p. 955; and No. 95­6392. In re Camyn, ante, p. 963. Petitions for rehear- ing denied. No. 94­8024. Young v. Shilaos et al., 514 U. S. 1053. Mo- tion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1070 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 9, 12, 16, 1996 516 U. S. January 9, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 94­1664. Koon v. United States; and No. 94­8842. Powell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, 515 U. S. 1190.] These cases are set for oral ar- gument at 1 p.m. on Tuesday, February 20, 1996. January 12, 1996 Certiorari Granted No. 95­173. Degen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 23, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Fri- day, March 22, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1511. No. 95­345. United States v. Ursery. C. A. 6th Cir.; and No. 95­346. United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of respondents Guy Jerome Ursery and Charles Wesley Arlt, Sr., for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, cases consoli- dated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Brief of the Solicitor General is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, February 23, 1996. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 22, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: No. 95­345, 59 F. 3d 568; No. 95­346, 33 F. 3d 1210 and 56 F. 3d 41. January 16, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders No. 95­799. In re Ratcliff; and No. 95­6655. In re Phillips. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­1527. Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Burroughs Well- come Co.; and 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1071 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 No. 94­1531. Novopharm, Inc., et al. v. Burroughs Well- come Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1223. No. 95­358. Rice et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 51 F. 3d 194. No. 95­398. Boudreau v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 81. No. 95­465. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, Adminis- trator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 564. No. 95­511. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 917. No. 95­535. Torcasio v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1340. No. 95­565. Restland Funeral Home, Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 56. No. 95­572. Luft et ux. v. Farmers Home Administration et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 342. No. 95­579. Perlmutter, Individually and as General Administratrix and Administratrix ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Perlmutter v. Cooper et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­584. Elagamy v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­588. Redland Soccer Club, Inc., et al. v. Depart- ment of the Army et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 827. No. 95­600. Tingley et al. v. Williams County Depart- ment of Human Services. Ct. App. Ohio, Williams County. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1072 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 Ohio App. 3d 385, 654 N. E. 2d 148. No. 95­607. Purmort et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1009. No. 95­609. Hopkins v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 533. No. 95­620. Action for Children's Television et al. v. Federal Communications Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1249. No. 95­695. Riggin et al. v. Office of Senate Fair Em- ployment Practices et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1563. No. 95­709. Ford Motor Co. et al. v. Tebbetts, Admin- istratrix of the Estate of Tebbetts. Sup. Ct. N. H. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 140 N. H. 203, 665 A. 2d 345. No. 95­716. Fernandez, Executrix of the Estate of Poston, et al. v. Emerson, Trustee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 170. No. 95­720. International Association of Entrepre- neurs of America Benefit Trust v. Angoff, Director, Mis- souri Department of Insurance. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1266. No. 95­724. Service Employees International Union, Local 102, et al. v. County of San Diego. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1346. No. 95­725. Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co. et al. v. Britz, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700. No. 95­733. Stewart v. City of Lake Charles, Louisiana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 321. No. 95­734. Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Nelson Industries, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1433. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1073 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 No. 95­738. Department of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision v. Rapaport. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 212. No. 95­742. Fleming, Personal Representative of the Estate of Hoskinson, et al. v. California et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 Cal. App. 4th 1378, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63. No. 95­749. Kilcrease v. General Motors Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 323. No. 95­750. Guillen-Garcia v. Immigration and Natural- ization Service. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 340. No. 95­751. Maritrans Operating Partners, L. P., et al. v. M/V Balsa 37 et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 64 F. 3d 150. No. 95­752. Common Council of Charleston, West Vir- ginia v. Berkley et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 295. No. 95­755. In re Breedlove. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1065. No. 95­758. Moretti v. Citibank, N. A., Branch No. 11, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 309. No. 95­760. Romero et ux., Individually, and Romero, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Romero, De- ceased v. Board of County Commissioners of Lake County, Colorado, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 702. No. 95­761. Alabama v. Cochran. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1404 and 61 F. 3d 20. No. 95­763. Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Vance. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 222, 652 N. E. 2d 776. No. 95­765. Sanchez, a Minor, By and Through Her Next Friend, Parent, and Guardian, DeFerdinando, et al. v. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1074 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. School District 9­R. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 902 P. 2d 450. No. 95­766. Nelson, Governor of Nebraska, et al. v. Orr et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 497. No. 95­769. Allen v. Allen et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 441 Pa. Super. 663, 657 A. 2d 45. No. 95­772. Outdoor Communications, Inc. v. City of Murfreesboro. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­776. Cisneros v. U. D. Registry, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 Cal. App. 4th 107, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228. No. 95­777. Saenz v. Arrellano Gonzalez. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 322. No. 95­780. Singh v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 App. Div. 2d 568, 623 N. Y. S. 2d 919. No. 95­785. Baritsky v. (Baritsky) Siegler. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. No. 95­792. Tristani et al. v. Lorenzo et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­814. Atteberry et al. v. Maumelle Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 415. No. 95­826. Jenkins v. New Mexico Securities Division. Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied. No. 95­828. MacDraw, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 404. No. 95­839. Lindsay et al. v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 942. No. 95­861. Tonquin Fisheries, Inc., Owner of the F/V Tonquin v. Ward, Mother of Tousignant, Captain of the 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1075 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 Above-Named Vessel, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 176. No. 95­864. Maresca v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 80. No. 95­866. Gosbee v. Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- poration, as Receiver for Midwest Federal Savings Bank of Minot. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 536 N. W. 2d 698. No. 95­877. Yoonessi v. State University of New York (Buffalo) et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 10. No. 95­881. Henry v. Montana et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Mont. 491, 898 P. 2d 1195. No. 95­884. Mocco v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 141 N. J. 142, 661 A. 2d 251. No. 95­894. Fitzgerald v. Bayham et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­899. Bonner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­903. Phelps v. Winchester Medical Center, Inc. Cir. Ct. Warren County, Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­904. Pabon v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 404. No. 95­905. Martinez v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 327. No. 95­906. Sutton v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 355. No. 95­907. McNaughton v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 544. No. 95­911. Chudson v. Environmental Protection Agency. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 919. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1076 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­913. Solem v. Courter, Virginia Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 659. No. 95­916. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 914. No. 95­922. Phillips v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 346. No. 95­940. Allender v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 909. No. 95­950. Gorwell v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 339 Md. 203, 661 A. 2d 718. No. 95­952. Myers v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­954. Moore v. Campbell et al. Ct. App. Mo., West- ern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 S. W. 2d 378. No. 95­5830. Cueto v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1245. No. 95­6049. Krout v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 643. No. 95­6087. Ogrod v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 441 Pa. Super. 670, 657 A. 2d 52. No. 95­6117. Carr v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 824. No. 95­6288. Flores-Peraza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6289. Fares et al. v. Immigration and Natural- ization Service et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 6. No. 95­6299. Fechter et vir v. Shiroky et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 175. No. 95­6313. Cadotte v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 661. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1077 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 No. 95­6353. Bivins v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 N. E. 2d 928. No. 95­6361. Aguirre-Cerda v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­6367. Cain v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 4th 1, 892 P. 2d 1224. No. 95­6377. Alba v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 905 S. W. 2d 581. No. 95­6381. Fuller v. Wooten, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 338. No. 95­6391. Powers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1460. No. 95­6398. Spivey v. Thomas, Warden. Super. Ct. Butts County, Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6424. Bryant-Bey v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Lucas County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6427. Stretcher v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­6446. Dixon v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Lucas County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 Ohio App. 3d 552, 656 N. E. 2d 1. No. 95­6640. Scott v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 P. 2d 1283. No. 95­6654. Miller v. Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­6656. Kight v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1539. No. 95­6657. Johnson v. Utah. Dist. Ct. Utah, Kane County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6669. Granberry v. Heisner et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1078 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6670. Fica v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6688. Dickerson v. United Parcel Service. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 894. No. 95­6699. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transportation Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 461. No. 95­6701. McIntyre v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1424. No. 95­6702. Valles v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 321. No. 95­6703. Talley v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 659. No. 95­6704. Carey v. St. Theresa School et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 905. No. 95­6705. Bedson v. Clegg, Deputy Sheriff, Pasco County, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­6709. Cotham v. Carlton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 662. No. 95­6720. Stokley v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 182 Ariz. 505, 898 P. 2d 454. No. 95­6726. Lipscomb v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 214 App. Div. 2d 970, 626 N. Y. S. 2d 919. No. 95­6741. Stokes v. Wood, Superintendent, Washing- ton State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6742. Phillips v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 312. No. 95­6747. Cole v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 301. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1079 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 No. 95­6748. Vega v. Williams et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 277. No. 95­6755. Singh v. Reeves, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6756. Van Belle et ux. v. Atlantic Equipment Engineers et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 819. No. 95­6758. McClain v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6760. Hill v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 433, 653 N. E. 2d 271. No. 95­6763. Ally v. Koch et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6768. Kharrat v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 833. No. 95­6769. Jacobs v. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Depart- ment of Correction, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6772. Finch v. Gomez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6773. Shipp v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6775. Nelson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6779. McBride v. Sikes, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6784. Busby v. Hollywood Ardmore Cooperative, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 666. No. 95­6785. Daughtry v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 488, 459 S. E. 2d 747. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1080 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6787. Tucker v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 319 S. C. 425, 462 S. E. 2d 263. No. 95­6788. Wilson v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6791. Hall v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6803. Bout v. Abramajtys. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6810. Ferguson v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6815. Townsend v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farmington Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 303. No. 95­6820. Holman v. Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 178. No. 95­6829. Adderly v. Whitaker. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­6846. Everett v. Roberts, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­6860. Neill v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 P. 2d 537. No. 95­6866. Jenkins v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 S. W. 2d 626. No. 95­6896. Raitport v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 344. No. 95­6901. Lau v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 785. No. 95­6902. Amerson v. Iowa et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 92. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1081 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 No. 95­6907. Elias v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 910. No. 95­6910. Harrelson v. Trippett, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 299. No. 95­6911. Henley v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 210. No. 95­6923. Cook v. White. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6927. Rowser v. Wayne Car Releasing Services, Inc. Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6937. Gardner v. Metropolitan Government De- partment of Codes et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6961. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 327. No. 95­6963. Clency v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 751. No. 95­6974. Lewis v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 175. No. 95­6975. Nefstad v. Baldwin, Superintendent, East- ern Oregon Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 335. No. 95­6987. Merlos v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 962. No. 95­6998. Moore v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 92. No. 95­7005. Nieto v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1464. No. 95­7011. Georgopapadakos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. No. 95­7013. Gillard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 472. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1082 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7016. Dean v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1479. No. 95­7019. Morales v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. No. 95­7021. Montgomery v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­7026. Cuevas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7030. Hernandez v. United States; and No. 95­7051. Perez-Garcia et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1468. No. 95­7036. Bartlett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 167. No. 95­7038. Bush v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 557. No. 95­7039. Barton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. No. 95­7040. Bayron v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 292. No. 95­7049. Sherlin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 1208. No. 95­7052. Moore v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1258. No. 95­7056. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 169. No. 95­7058. Lambros v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 698. No. 95­7062. Sapp et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1100. No. 95­7067. Searcy v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 N. E. 2d 355. No. 95­7086. Harris v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 402. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1083 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 No. 95­7090. Heater v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 311. No. 95­7091. Danger v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 485. No. 95­7092. Hooks v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 850. No. 95­7093. Hickman v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7095. Beckwith v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­7099. Sanchez-Cobarruvias v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 781. No. 95­7104. Curtis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 294. No. 95­7106. Langley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 602. No. 95­7108. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 825. No. 95­7112. Hooker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­7113. Ford v. Hoke, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility, New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7126. Supplee v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 458. No. 95­7127. Williams v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7129. Sullivan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 323. No. 95­7130. Craner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 315. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1084 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7133. Grisham v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1074. No. 95­7135. Denis-Lamarchez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 597. No. 95­7138. Rogers v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Conn. App. 777, 664 A. 2d 291. No. 95­7141. Austin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1115. No. 95­581. Seattle Lake Shore & Eastern Railroad, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike brief in opposition of City of Seattle et al. denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 684. No. 95­595. Hiller Systems, Inc., et al. v. Servis, Admin- istratrix of the Estate of Humphrey, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Michael G. Miller and Sadie R. Richardson for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 203. No. 95­601. Lowsley-Williams & Cos. et al. v. Raytheon Co. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 95­768. Clark et al. v. Brien, Representative of Un- derwriters at Lloyd's London. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1082. No. 95­743. Palermo et al. v. Woods. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1161. No. 95­757. Harris v. AT&T Communications, Inc., fka AT&T Information Systems. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 322. No. 95­767. California Public Utilities Commission et al. v. Bras, Individually and dba J. Jack Bras & Associ- ates. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of AT&T et al. for leave to file a 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1085 516 U. S. January 16, 1996 brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 869. Rehearing Denied No. D­1590. In re Disbarment of Smith, ante, p. 984; No. 94­8845. Tabas v. United States, ante, p. 973; No. 94­9617. Hansen v. Mississippi, ante, p. 986; No. 95­265. Cleveland Industrial Square, Inc. v. White, Mayor of Cleveland, et al., ante, p. 986; No. 95­582. Mustin v. Withrow, Warden, ante, p. 1011; No. 95­610. Roussin v. Missouri, ante, p. 990; No. 95­5649. Siao-Pao v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, ante, p. 992; No. 95­5681. Scarbrough v. City of Prichard, Alabama, et al., ante, p. 946; No. 95­5782. McCullar v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 948; No. 95­5783. Jenkins v. Jenkins, ante, p. 948; No. 95­5943. McNamara v. Cochran et al., ante, p. 977; No. 95­5991. Wilson v. Dougherty County, Georgia, et al., ante, p. 978; No. 95­5993. West v. Hanrahan, ante, p. 978; No. 95­6012. Moody v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 978; No. 95­6140. Mutch v. Jarratt et al., ante, p. 994; No. 95­6145. Martin v. Washington, ante, p. 994; No. 95­6146. Jackson v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 994; No. 95­6154. Sanders v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, ante, p. 994; No. 95­6171. Brinkley v. Skjonsberg et al., ante, p. 995; No. 95­6201. Jenkins v. Scott et al., ante, p. 996; No. 95­6208. Listerman v. GTE California Inc. et al., ante, p. 996; No. 95­6327. Csorba v. Varo, Inc., ante, p. 1013; No. 95­6352. Jenkins v. McKune, Warden, ante, p. 1030; No. 95­6356. Steele v. Duckworth, Superintendent, In- diana State Reformatory, et al., ante, p. 997; 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1086 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 16, 18, 19, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6368. Turner v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, ante, p. 997; No. 95­6421. Saleem v. United States, ante, p. 980; and No. 95­6521. In re Janek, ante, p. 1008. Petitions for re- hearing denied. No. 95­5450. Luckett v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al., ante, p. 965. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. January 18, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­5434. Crossen et ux. v. United States et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. January 19, 1996 Certiorari Granted No. 95­27. Merrill et al. v. Barbour. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 2 presented by the peti- tion. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1270. No. 95­668. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Brief of the Solicitor General is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 24. No. 95­719. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1087 516 U. S. January 19, 1996 be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 427. No. 95­754. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr et vir; and No. 95­886. Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Briefs of petitioners are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. Reply briefs, if any, are to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1335. No. 95­809. Lockheed Corp. et al. v. Spink. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Equal Employment Advisory Council, ERISA Industry Committee et al., and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Cer- tiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 616. No. 95­860. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 11 Cal. 4th 138, 900 P. 2d 690. No. 95­865. United States v. Winstar Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of the Solicitor General is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1531. 516ord$$2k 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1088 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 19, 22, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6465. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: "Whether a defendant who would otherwise have a con- stitutional right to a jury trial may be denied that right because the presiding judge has made a pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months?" Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon oppos- ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 1, 1996. Brief of the Solicitor General is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, March 29, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed pursuant to this Court's Rule 25.3. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 252. Certiorari Denied No. 95­6856 (A­580). Flamer v. Delaware et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Souter, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Re- ported below: 68 F. 3d 710 and 736. No. 95­7098 (A­515). Bailey v. Snyder, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Souter, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Re- ported below: 68 F. 3d 736. January 22, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­339. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Hollie, Per- sonal Representative of and Administratrix of the Es- tate of Swift, Deceased. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., ante, p. 217. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 90. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1089 516 U. S. January 22, 1996 Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 95­6710, ante, p. 297.) No. A­534. Demarey v. United States. Application for re- lease pending appeal, addressed to Justice Scalia and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1596. In re Disbarment of Greenberg. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1597. In re Disbarment of Wollman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1598. In re Disbarment of Signore. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1599. In re Disbarment of Weisgerber. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 940.] No. D­1600. In re Disbarment of Inglis. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 941.] No. D­1601. In re Disbarment of Bustamante. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 941.] No. D­1602. In re Disbarment of Bryant. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1603. In re Disbarment of Shapiro. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1604. In re Disbarment of Carson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1605. In re Disbarment of Edell. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1606. In re Disbarment of Smith. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1609. In re Disbarment of Hendricks. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 962.] No. D­1610. In re Disbarment of Phillips. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 962.] No. D­1612. In re Disbarment of Suddard. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.] 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1090 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 22, 1996 516 U. S. No. D­1615. In re Disbarment of Reggie. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.] No. D­1617. In re Disbarment of Savoy. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.] No. D­1618. In re Disbarment of Powell. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.] No. D­1619. In re Disbarment of Jasinski. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 986.] No. D­1632. In re Disbarment of Muraca. Frank John Muraca, of Dunmore, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1633. In re Disbarment of Connick. Harry A. Con- nick, of Novato, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1634. In re Disbarment of Wells. Edward G. Wells, of Palatine, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1635. In re Disbarment of McGlory. Dennis Craw- ford McGlory, of Crystal Lake, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1636. In re Disbarment of Tinsley. Lindell T. Tinsley, of Washington, D. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1637. In re Disbarment of Noxon. Stevan Noxon, of Fresno, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1091 516 U. S. January 22, 1996 him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­38. Gowin v. Dade County Auto Tag Office, De- partment of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari that does not comply with the Rules of this Court denied. No. M­39. Robinson v. Arizona. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 106, Orig. Illinois v. Kentucky. Motion of the Special Master for compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $4,988 for the period December 13, 1994, through December 22, 1995, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 513 U. S. 177.] No. 95­124. Denver Area Educational Telecommunica- tions Consortium, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; and No. 95­227. Alliance for Community Media et al. v. Fed- eral Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motion of petitioners for di- vided argument denied. No. 95­129. Exxon Co., U. S. A., et al. v. Sofec, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 983.] Motion of Mari- time Law Association of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 95­157. United States v. Armstrong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion of respondent Robert Rozelle for divided argument denied. No. 95­266. Jaffee, Special Administrator for Allen, Deceased v. Redmond et al. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 930.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­340. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., dba Brown Shoe Co. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 930.] Motion of the Solici- 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1092 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 22, 1996 516 U. S. tor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­354. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­7076 (A­516). In re Wapnick. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Breyer and referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 95­6848. In re Hackett. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­1537. Richards, fka Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 37 F. 3d 587. No. 94­1747. Rossman v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1144. No. 94­1868. North Carolina Power v. North Carolina Utilities Commission. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 338 N. C. 412, 450 S. E. 2d 896. No. 95­466. Bennett et al. v. United States; No. 95­801. Barona et al. v. United States (two judg- ments); and No. 95­6433. McCarver v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: Nos. 95­466, 95­801 (first judgment), and 95­6433, 56 F. 3d 1087; No. 95­801 (second judg- ment), 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­534. Lundman, Trustee for the Next of Kin of Lundman, Deceased v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 530 N. W. 2d 807. No. 95­622. Gurdon et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver of Riverhead Savings Bank, FSB, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 1157. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1093 516 U. S. January 22, 1996 No. 95­641. Three Sisters Sportswear Co. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 684. No. 95­642. Friend v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 548. No. 95­673. Wilson, Governor of California, et al. v. Voting Rights Coalition et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1411. No. 95­712. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1286. No. 95­790. Southmark Corp. v. Marley. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 104. No. 95­791. Hester et ux., Individually, and Hester, as Executrix of the Estate of Hester, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 61 F. 3d 382. No. 95­798. Waite, Personal Representative of the Estate of Waite, Deceased v. Carpenter et al. Ct. App. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 Neb. App. 879, 533 N. W. 2d 917. No. 95­805. Chase Packaging Corp. v. Super Sack Manu- facturing Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1054. No. 95­810. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Crimi- nal Justice, Institutional Division v. Sherman. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 136. No. 95­819. Papa v. Nassau County Department of Social Services. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 N. Y. 2d 875, 658 N. E. 2d 1042. No. 95­820. Knoll et al. v. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 170. No. 95­822. Cossey v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1094 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 22, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­823. Employers Resource Management Co., Inc., et al. v. Shannon, Commissioner, State Corporation Com- mission of Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1126. No. 95­825. Grogan v. Taylor, dba Rocky Mountain Pla- teau. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 P. 2d 60. No. 95­827. Gross v. Chevrolet Country, Inc. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 873. No. 95­844. M. Bianchi of California v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 920. No. 95­850. El-Attar v. Mississippi State University et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 468. No. 95­868. Darlak v. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 59 F. 3d 20. No. 95­882. Kelly v. Tree Farm Development Corp. et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 661 So. 2d 824. No. 95­919. United States ex rel. Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1282. No. 95­971. Connell v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 M. J. 462. No. 95­988. Moore v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 326. No. 95­998. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 297. No. 95­1014. Keogh et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 312. No. 95­5407. Timberlake v. Lamer, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 537. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1095 516 U. S. January 22, 1996 No. 95­5815. Billiot v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 1. No. 95­5972. Shumway v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 Wash. App. 1046. No. 95­6178. Vincent v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­6436. McMichen v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 598, 458 S. E. 2d 833. No. 95­6799. Sivak v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Idaho 387, 901 P. 2d 494. No. 95­6801. Dailey v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 246. No. 95­6813. Slappy v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 317. No. 95­6814. Frazier v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 323, 652 N. E. 2d 1000. No. 95­6826. LaFevers v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 P. 2d 292. No. 95­6832. Thomas v. Turner. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 788. No. 95­6833. Haigler v. South Carolina. Ct. Common Pleas of Orangeburg County, S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6836. Parker v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1178. No. 95­6838. Wilson v. Raymond et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 167. No. 95­6840. Pryor v. City of DeSoto, Missouri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6864. Fitzgerald v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 658 So. 2d 565. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1096 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 22, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6865. Meadows v. Jackson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 340. No. 95­6875. Hudgins v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 319 S. C. 233, 460 S. E. 2d 388. No. 95­6878. Allen v. City of Memphis et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 170. No. 95­6880. Mann v. South Carolina. Ct. Common Pleas of Greenville County, S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6881. Johnson v. Trent, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 657. No. 95­6884. Alexander v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 228 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 648 N. E. 2d 353. No. 95­6885. Echols v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 344. No. 95­6886. McMoore v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 214 App. Div. 2d 893, 626 N. Y. S. 2d 289. No. 95­6900. Barnes v. AAA Standard Service, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 64. No. 95­6906. Dunlap v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 308, 652 N. E. 2d 988. No. 95­6928. Cremeans v. Chapleau, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 167. No. 95­6931. Mack v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 502, 653 N. E. 2d 329. No. 95­6932. Borch v. Hluchaniuk, Assistant United States Attorney, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 60. No. 95­6955. Finney v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 674. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:57 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1097 516 U. S. January 22, 1996 No. 95­6964. Barwick v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 685. No. 95­6973. Berry v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 354, 650 N. E. 2d 433. No. 95­6979. Roselin v. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1085. No. 95­7000. Royal v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 250 Va. 110, 458 S. E. 2d 575. No. 95­7057. Kirk v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 72 Ohio St. 3d 564, 651 N. E. 2d 981. No. 95­7063. Antonelli v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7073. Padgett v. O'Sullivan, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 72. No. 95­7111. Bowen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 899. No. 95­7150. Rich v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 637. No. 95­7152. Blum v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1436. No. 95­7154. Baker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1478. No. 95­7158. Sloan v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 861. No. 95­7159. Chronister v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 339. No. 95­7160. Combs v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­7164. Perdomo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 317. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1098 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 22, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7165. Plata v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1078. No. 95­7166. Parks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 860. No. 95­7167. Villalba v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­7175. Childress et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 693. No. 95­7181. Marin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 399. No. 95­7185. Knowles v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. No. 95­7189. Kinney v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 458. No. 95­7191. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1073. No. 95­7199. Green v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 546. No. 95­7200. Fultz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 835. No. 95­7201. Gessa v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 493. No. 95­7202. Fair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 833. No. 95­7205. Gorby v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 475. No. 95­7212. Ramon Dieguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 314. No. 95­7213. Escobedo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 470. No. 95­7214. Douglas v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 638. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1099 516 U. S. January 22, 1996 No. 95­7218. Knight v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 393. No. 95­7220. McLellan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 729. No. 95­7224. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 327. No. 95­7226. Wolverton v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 193 Wis. 2d 234, 533 N. W. 2d 167. No. 95­355. McKown et al. v. Lundman, Trustee for the Next of Kin of Lundman, Deceased. Ct. App. Minn. Motion of Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 530 N. W. 2d 807. No. 95­664. County of Contra Costa v. Visness. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 775. Rehearing Denied No. 95­353. Mitchelson v. United States, ante, p. 1008; No. 95­538. Dolenz v. Nationwide Indemnity Insurance Co., ante, p. 1010; No. 95­555. Jackson v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, ante, p. 1010; No. 95­5806. Homo et al. v. City of Henniker, New Hamp- shire, ante, p. 949; No. 95­5808. Mosavi v. United States, ante, p. 924; No. 95­6018. Putman v. Thomas, Warden, ante, p. 1012; No. 95­6077. Rodriguez v. Florida, ante, p. 993; No. 95­6167. Martinez v. Roth et al., ante, p. 1012; No. 95­6229. Cavin v. South Carolina, ante, p. 1012; No. 95­6396. Peganoff v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 998; No. 95­6439. Powell v. United States, ante, p. 999; and No. 95­6628. Oguguo v. United States, ante, p. 1016. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 95­6008. Isaacs v. Thomas, Warden, ante, p. 1002. Peti- tion for rehearing denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1100 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 January 23, 25, 1996 516 U. S. January 23, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 95­7453 (A­587). Townes v. Angelone, Director, Vir- ginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Applica- tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 840. No. 95­7512 (A­598). Townes v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. No. 95­7573 (A­611). Townes v. Angelone, Director, Vir- ginia Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer- tiorari denied. January 25, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­616. Anderson, Warden v. Buell. Application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the Court's refusal to vacate the stay entered by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On July 17, 1982, respondent abducted an 11-year-old girl while she was collecting aluminum cans in a ballpark across the street from her home. The Ohio Supreme Court's opinion affirming re- spondent's conviction and death sentence describes what authori- ties found six days later: "[The victim] had been viciously sexually assaulted by the thrusting of a rigid object against the inlet of her vagina and then strangled to death. Her feet were bound with a large 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1101 1100 Scalia, J., dissenting piece of plastic and tape." State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 125, 489 N. E. 2d 795, 798 (1986). We denied certiorari. 479 U. S. 871 (1986). Respondent com- menced proceedings for postconviction relief in state court, and denial of this relief was made final by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1992. 62 Ohio St. 3d 1508, 583 N. E. 2d 1320, rehearing denied, 63 Ohio St. 3d 1418, 586 N. E. 2d 126. More than six months later and just five days prior to his then- scheduled execution date, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Two days thereafter, on September 18, 1992, Judge Paul R. Matia "reluc- tantly" granted a stay even though he noted that "[c]ounsel for [respondent had] deliberately waited until literally hours before the execution to begin their federal court procedures." Buell v. Tate, No. 1:92CV1918 (ND Ohio, Sept. 18, 1992), p. 3. Judge Matia subsequently granted respondent's motion to dis- miss his federal habeas petition without prejudice so that re- spondent could bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the Ohio appellate courts. Denial of that claim was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court on November 17, 1993, 67 Ohio St. 3d 1500, 622 N. E. 2d 649, and this Court again denied review, 511 U. S. 1100 (1994). Rather than then proceed with a federal habeas claim, respondent elected to pursue a motion for delayed reinstatement of appeal, which was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court on September 28, 1994, 70 Ohio St. 3d 1211, 639 N. E. 2d 110, as was his subsequent motion for reconsideration in the Ohio Supreme Court on November 9, 1994, 71 Ohio St. 3d 1407, 641 N. E. 2d 204. We denied review on May 30, 1995. 515 U. S. 1105. Respondent does not contest that he then did not commence any effort in the United States District Court until after the State, on October 27, 1995, scheduled his execution for January 25, 1996. Citing an "irreparable rift" with his counsel of eight years, respondent thereupon went to the District Court and on November 17, 1995, requested that Judge Matia appoint new coun- sel for the preparation and filing of a habeas petition. That re- quest was granted on December 19, 1995. Such counsel on Janu- ary 4, 1996, moved for a stay of execution pending final disposition of respondent's yet-to-be-filed habeas petition. On January 19, 1996, assuming that respondent had exhausted his state post- conviction remedies as of September 28, 1994-when the Ohio 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1102 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Scalia, J., dissenting 516 U. S. Supreme Court denied his aforementioned motion-Judge Matia concluded that respondent had engaged in "inexcusable" and "dila- tory behavior" by doing "nothing for more than one year" before returning to federal court. No. 1:95CV2415 (ND Ohio, Jan. 19, 1996), p. 1. Relying on our decision in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849 (1994), Judge Matia refused to grant the stay request. On respondent's motion, however, the Sixth Circuit granted a stay on January 23, 1996. Its only explanation was that "[a]fter careful consideration of the [parties' submissions], the motion for the stay of execution is granted until April 1, 1996, or until fifteen days after a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed in the district court, whichever first occurs." No. 96­3076 (CA6, filed Jan. 23, 1996), p. 1. I would grant the State's motion to vacate this stay. The Sixth Circuit acted effectively without explanation and without any ref- erence to the inequitable conduct described by the District Court. Respondent requested a stay not so that the District Court could consider a pending habeas petition, but so that new counsel could "properly investigate and present to the Court the proper grounds for habeas relief." No. 1:95CV2415 (ND Ohio, Jan. 4, 1996), p. 1. We noted in McFarland, supra, that 21 U. S. C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1988 ed.) "grants indigent capital defendants a mandatory right to qualified legal counsel" in federal habeas proceedings. 512 U. S., at 854. We accordingly held that "once a capital defendant invokes his right to appointed counsel, a federal court . . . has jurisdiction under [28 U. S. C.] § 2251 to enter a stay of execution." Id., at 858. We made clear, however, that a capital habeas petitioner within the purview of § 848(q)(4)(B) had no automatic entitlement to such a stay: "Section 2251 does not mandate the entry of a stay, but dedi- cates the exercise of stay jurisdiction to the sound discretion of a federal court. Under ordinary circumstances, a capital defendant presumably will have sufficient time to request the appointment of counsel and file a formal habeas petition prior to his scheduled execution. But the right to counsel neces- sarily includes a right for that counsel meaningfully to re- search and present a defendant's habeas claims. Where this opportunity is not afforded, `[a]pproving the execution of a defendant before his [petition] is decided on the merits would 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1103 516 U. S. January 25, 26, 1996 clearly be improper.' On the other hand, if a dilatory capital defendant inexcusably ignores this opportunity and flouts the available processes, a federal court presumably would not abuse its discretion in denying a stay of execution." Ibid. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 889 (1983)) (cita- tion omitted). This recognizes, as we have emphasized elsewhere, that a habeas petitioner requesting a stay of execution "seeks an equitable rem- edy" and that "[e]quity must take into consideration the State's strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and [a habeas petitioner's] obvious attempt at manipulation." Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for the Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam). These principles must be brought to bear on this case. The State has, as noted, a strong interest in executing its duly ac- quired judgment, which was made final in 1986. Respondent's interest, on the other hand, is entirely indeterminate and for all we know nonexistent. He seeks additional time not in order to elaborate on a known claim, but in order to develop a claim, which may or may not be possible. If this is sufficient to out- weigh the State's interest in proceeding with its judgment, execu- tions could be stayed indefinitely. If that were not enough, as the District Court (which was familiar with respondent and his tactics) concluded, the face of the record plainly reveals evidence of inequitable conduct by respondent. He twice engaged in dila- tory maneuvers-in 1992 by waiting "until literally hours before the execution to begin [his] federal court procedures" and, in the present proceeding, by waiting until the State had again set an execution date before returning to federal court to point to what he terms an "irreparable rift" with his counsel of eight years and to seek a stay under McFarland, supra. In these circumstances, it is my view that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in bringing the State's orderly procedures once again to a halt. January 26, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­804. United States Department of Justice et al. v. Rosenfeld. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 803. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1104 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 1, 6, 13, 15, 1996 516 U. S. February 1, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­606 (95­1201). Lopez et al. v. Monterey County, California, et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Application for stay of modification of an injunction filed November 1, 1995, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, case No. C­91­20559­RMW, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted pending action by this Court on the statement as to jurisdiction. Should the appeal be dismissed or the judgment affirmed, this order shall terminate automatically. If probable jurisdiction is noted or postponed, this order shall continue in effect pending the send- ing down of the judgment of this Court. February 6, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­624. Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al. D. C. S. D. Ga. Application for stay pending appeal, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. February 13, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 95­124. Denver Area Educational Telecommunica- tions Consortium, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; and No. 95­227. Alliance for Community Media et al. v. Fed- eral Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motion of Time Warner Cable for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied. February 15, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 95­7919 (A­679). Horsley v. Thompson, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ala. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2l 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1105 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 Dismissals Under Rule 46 No. 95­901. TIG Insurance Group et al. v. Infantino. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 335. No. 95­270. Worcester County, Maryland, et al. v. Cane et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed as to James Purnell under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 165. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­156. United States v. Muschik. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Neal v. United States, ante, p. 284. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 512. No. 95­390. Sylvester et al. v. Bryant et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Conference of Chief Justices for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to consider the question of mootness. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 308. No. 95­6731. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 327. No. 95­6751. Smith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 956. No. 95­6809. Sterling v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1189. No. 95­7072. Colon v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1106 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 41. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­584. New Mexico Department of Human Services et al. v. Joseph A. et al., by Their Next Friend, Wolfe, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Jus- tice Scalia and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­603. Jensen v. United States. Application for stay of execution of sentence, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­667. Apache Corp. v. Moore et al. Application for stay of enforcement of the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District, case No. 07­93­0069­CV, entered July 29, 1994, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court. No. D­1607. In re Disbarment of Morrison. Charles T. Morrison, Jr., of Los Angeles, Cal., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on Novem- ber 6, 1995 [ante, p. 961], is discharged. No. D­1638. In re Disbarment of Bachstein. Harry Sam- uel Bachstein, Jr., of Tucson, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1639. In re Disbarment of Farrell. Gary Farrell, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1640. In re Disbarment of Benton. James Robert Benton, of Jonesboro, Ga., is suspended from the practice of law 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1107 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1641. In re Disbarment of Marcus. Martin B. Mar- cus, of Oak Park, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1642. In re Disbarment of O'Keefe. Michael P. O'Keefe, of Lenexa, Kan., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1643. In re Disbarment of Stanley. Christopher Danahy Stanley, of Cleveland, Ohio, is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1644. In re Disbarment of Guth. Milton Jerome Guth, of Cleveland, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1645. In re Disbarment of Schouman. James F. Schouman, of Dearborn, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1646. In re Disbarment of Glover. Paul L. Glover, of Downers Grove, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1647. In re Disbarment of McCloskey. John Thomas McCloskey, of Farmington Hills, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1108 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. D­1648. In re Disbarment of Swano. William Allen Swano, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1649. In re Disbarment of Stigler. David D. Stigler, of Fort Worth, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1650. In re Disbarment of Gerdeman. James M. Gerdeman, of Lubbock, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1651. In re Disbarment of Piper. James Patrick Piper, of Dallas, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1652. In re Disbarment of Allen. James Trueman Allen, of El Paso, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1653. In re Disbarment of Bastine. Volly C. Bas- tine, Jr., of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1654. In re Disbarment of Kelleher. James J. Kelleher, of East Northport, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­40. Davis v. Browner, Administrator, Environ- mental Protection Agency; 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1109 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. M­41. Jamhoury v. Matheis et al.; No. M­42. Musser v. Damrow et al.; and No. M­43. Crouch v. Colorado. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­157. United States v. Armstrong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion of Washington Legal Foundation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 95­345. United States v. Ursery. C. A. 6th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1070.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Lawrence J. Emery, Esq., of Lan- sing, Mich., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 95­388. Brown et al. v. Pro Football, Inc., dba Washington Redskins, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1021.] Motions of Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al. and National Hockey League Players Association et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solici- tor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­566. Montana v. Egelhoff. Sup. Ct. Mont. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1021.] Motion of American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 95­754. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr et vir; and No. 95­886. Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1087.] Motion of Medtronic, Inc., to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 95­897. Auer et al. v. Robbins et al. C. A. 8th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case express- ing the views of the United States. No. 95­5257. Ornelas et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 963.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. No. 95­7085. Guess v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir.; and 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1110 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7123. Attwood v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motions of peti- tioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioners are allowed until March 12, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­7134. Hardy et ux. v. City of Orlando. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 12, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­7070. In re Brown; No. 95­7310. In re McCall; No. 95­7325. In re Price; No. 95­7363. In re Nanayakkara; and No. 95­7535. In re Kirby. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 95­6982. In re Ellis; No. 95­7006. In re Craig; No. 95­7225. In re Tal; and No. 95­7299. In re Sample. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 95­7537. In re Moses. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 95­992. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al. Appeal from D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 910 F. Supp. 734. Certiorari Granted No. 95­938. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Re- ported below: 58 F. 3d 452. No. 95­6556. Old Chief v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 75. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1111 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 94­8233. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­8475. Bollwage v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 F. 3d 431. No. 94­8797. Flanagan v. United States; and No. 94­8839. Kiker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 65. No. 94­9315. Cichon v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 269. No. 94­9342. Hofer v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­9458. Beasley v. United States; and No. 94­9684. Hillis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 332. No. 95­484. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Moore (two judg- ments); and No. 95­1020. Moore v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: Nos. 95­484 (first judg- ment) and 95­1020, 53 F. 3d 1054; No. 95­484 (second judgment), 53 F. 3d 339. No. 95­527. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Colorado et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 P. 2d 1013. No. 95­619. Alzanki v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 994. No. 95­630. Baird v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1213. No. 95­693. Mullis v. United States; and No. 95­6419. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 312. No. 95­696. Zuspann v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1156. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1112 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­700. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 929. No. 95­713. Qantas Airways Ltd. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 385. No. 95­747. Misura v. County of El Dorado, on Behalf of Woods, a Minor Child. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 Cal. App. 4th 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908. No. 95­748. Hoeck v. City of Portland. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 781. No. 95­753. Russell et al. v. Hiltz. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 175. No. 95­770. Tino v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. No. 95­773. Dean v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 660. No. 95­774. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L. P. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; and No. 95­775. National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 151. No. 95­782. SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown et al.; and No. 95­1015. Town of Smithtown et al. v. SSC Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 502. No. 95­783. Oklahoma v. Bell. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­786. City of Portland, Oregon v. Hussey et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1260. No. 95­795. Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp. (two judg- ments). C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1578 (first judgment). No. 95­807. Jones v. Baltimore City Police Department et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 Md. App. 771. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1113 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­811. Loken v. Century 21-Award Properties. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 Cal. App. 4th 263, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683. No. 95­821. Martin, Guardian and Conservator of Mar- tin v. Martin et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 450 Mich. 204, 538 N. W. 2d 399. No. 95­824. Meyer v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., fka Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­834. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL­CIO­CLC, Local Union No. 88. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 61 F. 3d 632. No. 95­837. Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 29. No. 95­838. Collins et al. v. City of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 236. No. 95­842. Ramsdell v. Machias Savings Bank et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 5. No. 95­843. Bush v. Jones et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­849. Crandon v. Dunnick, Commissioner of the Kansas Banking Commission. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 257 Kan. 727, 897 P. 2d 92. No. 95­852. Tyus et al. v. Bosley, Mayor, St. Louis, Mis- souri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 1345. No. 95­854. Lowe's Markets, Inc., dba St. Helens Shop N' Kart v. MacKillop et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1441. No. 95­855. Bair, Director, Iowa Department of Reve- nue and Finance v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 410. No. 95­859. Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 32. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1114 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­862. Fricker v. New York City Off Track Betting Corporation et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 App. Div. 2d 590, 624 N. Y. S. 2d 928. No. 95­869. Chums, Ltd. v. Snugz/USA, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 669. No. 95­872. Traywick v. Medical University of South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 297. No. 95­873. Thomas v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­883. West of England Ship Owners Mutual Pro- tection and Indemnity Assn. (Luxembourg) v. Morewitz, as Administrator of the Estates of Passalis et al., De- ceased. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1356. No. 95­885. Minor v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­888. Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys- tem v. Estate of Morgan et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 608. No. 95­889. Kuhns v. Meridian Bancorp, Inc., Successor to the First National Bank of Allentown. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 456. No. 95­890. United States ex rel. Hindo v. University of Health Sciences/Chicago Medical School et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 608. No. 95­893. Schnabolk et al. v. Securitron Magnalock Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 256. No. 95­895. Miller v. DeMuth. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 438 Pa. Super. 437, 652 A. 2d 891. No. 95­898. Senter v. Hughes Aircraft Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1115 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­900. Mutual Trading Corp. et al. v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 63 F. 3d 516. No. 95­902. Somerset County v. Aravanis. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 Md. 644, 664 A. 2d 888. No. 95­910. District of Columbia et al. v. Covington et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1101. No. 95­912. Hiatt et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 838. No. 95­917. Robertson et al. v. Moench. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 553. No. 95­920. Ventura et al. v. Morales, Attorney Gen- eral of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 358. No. 95­923. Security Management Corp. v. Baltimore County, Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 104 Md. App. 234, 655 A. 2d 1326. No. 95­926. Mark I Marketing Corp. et al. v. R. R. Don- nelley & Sons Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 66 F. 3d 285. No. 95­927. In re Guy. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 670 A. 2d 1338. No. 95­930. Maric v. St. Agnes Hospital Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 310. No. 95­932. Clay v. Cooper, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 905. No. 95­933. Keat v. Chavez et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 Cal. App. 4th 1406, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72. No. 95­934. Johnson v. Johnson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 828. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1116 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­935. Ram v. De Galan et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­936. Hocker v. Department of Transportation. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 676. No. 95­937. Cossett et ux. v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 1416, 655 N. E. 2d 737. No. 95­941. Coffin v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­943. American Atlas Corp. v. Allegheny County Industrial Development Authority. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 456. No. 95­947. Newsom et al. v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­956. Florida v. McLeod. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 664 So. 2d 983. No. 95­960. Alabama v. Johnson, District Judge for Jefferson County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 669 So. 2d 205. No. 95­967. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Nielsen et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 145. No. 95­968. Einziger v. Jacobs et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 291. No. 95­979. Creque v. Creque. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 95­980. Customer Co. v. City and County of Sacra- mento. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 4th 368, 895 P. 2d 900. No. 95­981. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 Wis. 2d 303, 533 N. W. 2d 780. No. 95­982. McWhorter v. Attorney Grievance Board of Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 Mich. 130, 534 N. W. 2d 480. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1117 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­983. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 826. No. 95­985. Arvelo v. American International Insur- ance Co. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 306. No. 95­986. Hale v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1478. No. 95­987. Garen v. Board of Bar Examiners of Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Nev. 1716, 916 P. 2d 198. No. 95­989. Hearthside Baking Co., dba Maurice Lenell Cooking Co. v. Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co., Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 666. No. 95­993. Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd. v. Newcomb et vir. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 67 F. 3d 292. No. 95­994. Tyson Foods, Inc., et al. v. WLR Foods, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1172. No. 95­996. Malot v. Roy F. Weston, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 676. No. 95­999. Allum v. Bank of America Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1005. Morata v. United States Postal Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 72. No. 95­1006. Herzog v. Damron. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 211. No. 95­1013. Huet-Vaughn v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 M. J. 105. No. 95­1019. Knighten v. Todd Electric, Inc., et al. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1021. Stewart v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 916. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1118 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­1022. Vitela v. Texas (two judgments). Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1029. Dubria v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1032. Berend et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 178. No. 95­1033. Bally v. Kemna, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 104. No. 95­1039. Christensen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 326. No. 95­1045. McBane v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 S. W. 2d 548. No. 95­1048. Spaulding et al. v. Barry, Mayor of the Dis- trict of Columbia, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 638. No. 95­1050. Dick v. Peoples Bank of Bloomington. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1052. Weissman et al. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 31. No. 95­1055. Uhlrig et al. v. Harder et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 567. No. 95­1057. Gersten v. Rundle, State Attorney, Dade County, Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 56 F. 3d 1389. No. 95­1060. Salb v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 819. No. 95­1061. Tilbury et al. v. Multnomah County, Ore- gon, et al. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 Ore. 112, 902 P. 2d 577. No. 95­1067. Regnante v. DiDomenico et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 308. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1119 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­1071. Williams v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 M. J. 348. No. 95­1074. Kelley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 483. No. 95­1076. Bumpass v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1099. No. 95­1077. Aurispa et al. v. Texas Department of Com- merce et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­1088. Tanner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 231. No. 95­1091. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1428. No. 95­1093. Holloway v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 M. J. 397. No. 95­1108. Denikov et al. v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1159, 685 N. E. 2d 466. No. 95­1112. Carreiro v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 990. No. 95­1148. Great State Beverages, Inc. v. Wenners. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 140 N. H. 100, 663 A. 2d 623. No. 95­5004. Clawson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 273. No. 95­5358. Reigle v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­5410. Stoneking v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 399. No. 95­5637. Kahley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­5750. Delamotte v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 818. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1120 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­5849. Palacios-Casquete v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 557. No. 95­5853. Wims et al. v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 4th 293, 895 P. 2d 77. No. 95­5901. Clayton v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 392. No. 95­6086. San Miguel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­6104. Williams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 769. No. 95­6131. Velasquez-Velasquez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 31. No. 95­6149. Dormescore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 31. No. 95­6266. Thomas v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1385. No. 95­6324. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 399. No. 95­6393. Weir v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1031. No. 95­6414. Taylor v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 666 So. 2d 73. No. 95­6449. Downing v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 Cal. App. 4th 1641, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176. No. 95­6466. Irving v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 23. No. 95­6524. Agubata v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1081. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1121 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­6577. McGrath v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1005. No. 95­6605. Rashid v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 314. No. 95­6607. Bostian v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 474. No. 95­6608. Pazmino-Marquez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1112. No. 95­6611. Miller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111 and 1112. No. 95­6653. McDermott v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1448. No. 95­6659. Homrich v. United States; and No. 95­6967. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­6687. Reyes-Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 321. No. 95­6698. Penny v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­6700. Hemken v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1422. No. 95­6718. Stanley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­6746. Kinder v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 757. No. 95­6764. Brett v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P. 2d 29. No. 95­6811. Travaglia v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 108, 661 A. 2d 352. No. 95­6812. Sena-Mendez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 182. No. 95­6819. Davis v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 4th 463, 896 P. 2d 119. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1122 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6841. Shulze v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­6847. Nadal v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­6851. Stano v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 942. No. 95­6861. Miller v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 531, 664 A. 2d 1310. No. 95­6887. Moore v. Tennessee et al. Cir. Ct. Maury County, Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6891. Sweed v. 73rd Legislative of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­6892. Strickland v. Rankin County Correctional Facility et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6898. Riggins v. Givens et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6899. Shiyr v. Missouri et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1421. No. 95­6905. Esparza v. Elliott, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6908. Gamble v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 659 So. 2d 242. No. 95­6913. Jones, aka Ali-Abdur'Rahman v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6917. Coulter v. Jones, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1499. No. 95­6919. Lumpkin v. Dragovich, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6929. Carson v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1173. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1123 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­6930. Lopes v. Rhode Island. Sup. Ct. R. I. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 660 A. 2d 707. No. 95­6934. Heimermann v. California Federal Bank et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 539. No. 95­6943. McReynolds v. Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 86 N. Y. 2d 886, 659 N. E. 2d 774. No. 95­6944. Miller v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6947. Bustamante v. O'Connor et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6950. Vey v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­6957. Halstead v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6962. Smith v. Parke, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 659. No. 95­6969. Roche v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6970. Wright v. Parke-Davis Division of Warner- Lambert Co. et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6972. Brewer v. Ward, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 1519. No. 95­6986. Williams v. Skandalakis et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 693, 461 S. E. 2d 226. No. 95­6990. Jeffries v. Hundley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­6995. Washington v. LeBlanc, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7003. Williams v. Resseau, Sheriff, Putnam County, Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1124 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7018. Sexton v. Howard, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 1557. No. 95­7023. Bell v. Cook et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7024. McCormick v. Kaylo, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 321. No. 95­7027. Ammons v. Poliak et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7028. Stephenson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7029. Williams v. Calderon, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1465. No. 95­7031. Flakes v. Norfolk Southern Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 314. No. 95­7032. Dea v. Pennsylvania Department of Trans- portation. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7033. Fromal v. Jackson. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 321. No. 95­7034. Fales v. Seinfeld, Acting Chief Judge, Washington Court of Appeals, Division Two. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7035. Mack v. Buffalo Municipal Civil Service Commission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7037. Verdugo v. California State University at Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7047. Young v. City of Culver City, California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7048. Rowser v. Local 299, International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 60 F. 3d 829. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1125 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7053. Mosby, aka Muhaymin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 454. No. 95­7055. Mendoza-Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 691. No. 95­7060. Nicolaison v. Erickson. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 109. No. 95­7064. Brooks v. United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7069. Queen v. Klevenhagen, Sheriff, Harris County, Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7075. Murphy v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7077. Cluck v. Osherow (two judgments). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 395. No. 95­7078. Braun v. Willard. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Kan. App. 2d xxxii, 897 P. 2d 198. No. 95­7080. Baker v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Mont. 273, 901 P. 2d 54. No. 95­7082. Squire v. Casey, Gerry, Casey, Westbrook, Reed and Hughes et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. No. 95­7083. Blackston v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7087. George v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7094. Holliness v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7096. Wynn v. AC Rochester, Division of General Motors Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 308. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1126 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7097. Powers v. Floyd. Ct. App. Tex., 10th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 S. W. 2d 713. No. 95­7100. Bradley v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7101. Marian v. Calles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7102. Law v. Law. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7103. Bradley v. Cantley et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 899. No. 95­7105. Macri v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 713. No. 95­7107. Mueller et al. v. Cruise et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1391. No. 95­7109. Higgins v. Ehrlich et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7110. Hines v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7114. Hunt v. Cody, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 837. No. 95­7115. Burley v. Gulbranson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7116. Carr v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7117. Attwood v. Sprouse, Superintendent, Madi- son Correctional Institution. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7118. Cannon v. Miller et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 165. No. 95­7120. Hernandez v. New Mexico et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 669. No. 95­7121. Arvin-Thornton v. Philip Morris Products, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 655. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1127 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7122. Anderson v. Lewis, Director, Arizona De- partment of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7124. Cantrell v. Norcal/San Bernardino, Inc. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7125. Arndt v. Pennsylvania State Police. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7128. Tobin v. Casco Northern Bank, N. A. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 A. 2d 1. No. 95­7132. Steel v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7136. Evans v. Beason, Judge. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7139. Warren v. Alexander, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7142. Pudder v. Irwin. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7143. Mallett v. LeBlanc, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7144. Melkonian et al. v. Truck Insurance Ex- change et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7146. Merhi v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 326. No. 95­7148. Nwadiei v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 688 N. E. 2d 389. No. 95­7149. Vom Baur v. Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. No. 95­7151. Swint v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7156. Soley v. Soley. Ct. App. Ohio, Lucas County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 Ohio App. 3d 540, 655 N. E. 2d 1381. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1128 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7157. Simmons v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 541 Pa. 211, 662 A. 2d 621. No. 95­7161. Woodruff v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 S. W. 2d 443. No. 95­7162. Williams v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341 N. C. 1, 459 S. E. 2d 208. No. 95­7163. Whisenand v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 501. No. 95­7168. Womack v. Dunn et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 318. No. 95­7169. Tyson v. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7170. Young v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 256 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 671 N. E. 2d 836. No. 95­7172. Gaster v. State-Record Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 656. No. 95­7173. Hunter v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 244. No. 95­7174. Glant v. Glant. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 So. 2d 123. No. 95­7177. Campbell v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 612, 460 S. E. 2d 144. No. 95­7179. Mu'Min v. Thompson, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 316. No. 95­7180. Jaffer v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 319. No. 95­7183. Moore v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1247. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1129 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7184. Matian v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 Cal. App. 4th 480, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459. No. 95­7187. Knight v. Court of Civil Appeals of Ala- bama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7188. Maxson v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7192. Sweeney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 661. No. 95­7193. Brandley v. Keeshan et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 196. No. 95­7194. Boulden v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 338. No. 95­7196. Soley v. Soley. Ct. App. Ohio, Wood County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7197. Garner v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 N. C. 573, 459 S. E. 2d 718. No. 95­7204. Dillier v. California et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7206. Houston v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7207. Ruckel v. Churchich et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7208. Schaaf v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­7209. Prihoda v. Husz. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 Wis. 2d 372, 539 N. W. 2d 135. No. 95­7210. Ornelas v. Myers, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 308. No. 95­7211. DiFrisco v. New Jersey (two judgments). Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 137 N. J. 434, 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1130 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. 645 A. 2d 734 (first judgment); 142 N. J. 148, 662 A. 2d 442 (sec- ond judgment). No. 95­7216. Green v. 25th Judicial District Probation Department. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7217. Jeffrey v. Edinburg Hospital. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­7219. Malik et al. v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 338. No. 95­7221. Malik v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7223. Ford v. Long, Warden. Sup. Ct. Nev. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Nev. 872, 901 P. 2d 123. No. 95­7227. Wolfe v. Sobina, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Somerset. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7228. Devon v. Vaughn et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7229. Cannady et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7230. Bennett v. California (two judgments). Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7232. Braga v. New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7233. Cooper v. Lombardi, Director, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7234. Blackmon v. United States; and No. 95­7239. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 128. No. 95­7235. Mahdavi v. Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1131 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7237. Dupree v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 319 S. C. 454, 462 S. E. 2d 279. No. 95­7238. Santiago v. Workman. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7240. Sipe v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 Cal. App. 4th 468, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266. No. 95­7241. Abbo v. Rossi, McCreery & Associates, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7243. Solliday v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 399. No. 95­7244. Bayron v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 292. No. 95­7245. Sutter v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 476. No. 95­7246. Yarborough v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 471. No. 95­7247. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1236. No. 95­7248. Santos Urrutia v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1067. No. 95­7249. Vargas v. Georgia (two judgments). Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7251. Koff v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1428. No. 95­7253. Sasson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 874. No. 95­7255. Parras v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 70 F. 3d 125. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1132 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7256. Arce v. Good et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 122. No. 95­7259. Videa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 467. No. 95­7261. Walcott v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 635. No. 95­7264. Little v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 450. No. 95­7265. Clemmons v. Stotts et al. (two judgments). C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1231. No. 95­7266. Miller v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 303. No. 95­7267. Carter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­7268. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 124. No. 95­7269. Brockway v. East Central Mental Health Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 99 F. 3d 402. No. 95­7271. Gallego-Sanchez v. Immigration and Natu- ralization Service. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7274. Browning-Taylor v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 182. No. 95­7276. Watson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 337. No. 95­7277. Burrus v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 300. No. 95­7278. Sutton v. DeTella, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7281. O'Neal v. McAninch, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 663. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1133 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7285. Hill v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 326. No. 95­7286. George v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 471. No. 95­7287. Felker v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 907. No. 95­7288. Faulhaber v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 306. No. 95­7291. McLaughlin v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341 N. C. 426, 462 S. E. 2d 1. No. 95­7292. Otto v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 367. No. 95­7293. Perez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1151. No. 95­7294. O'Neal v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 860. No. 95­7296. Schwartz v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7297. Wright v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 651 N. E. 2d 758. No. 95­7301. Barnett v. Missouri Department of Cor- rections et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 783. No. 95­7306. Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1424. No. 95­7307. Mangum v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 80. No. 95­7308. Mulford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1134 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7309. Mason v. United States Parole Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 472. No. 95­7311. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 292. No. 95­7314. Hobbs v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 179. No. 95­7318. Daniel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 918. No. 95­7326. Okwechime v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 426. No. 95­7327. Richards v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7329. Dolenc v. Rollins. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7331. Allicock v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 342. No. 95­7332. Berg v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 472. No. 95­7333. Childs v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 787, 651 N. E. 2d 252. No. 95­7334. Cowan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 124. No. 95­7342. Owolabi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 156. No. 95­7347. Bautista-Chavarriaga v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 550. No. 95­7350. Houston v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Ill. App. 3d 1158, 688 N. E. 2d 161. No. 95­7351. Failor v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Ill. App. 3d 968, 649 N. E. 2d 1342. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1135 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7353. Heirens v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 271 Ill. App. 3d 392, 648 N. E. 2d 260. No. 95­7354. George v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 297. No. 95­7359. Misek-Falkoff v. Keller. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 N. Y. 2d 777, 655 N. E. 2d 706. No. 95­7361. Lira-Espinosa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 309. No. 95­7370. Minter v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 326. No. 95­7371. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1113. No. 95­7375. Farris v. Hallahan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 175. No. 95­7377. Jefferson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 291. No. 95­7379. Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 310. No. 95­7380. Pringle v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1073. No. 95­7382. Berry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1266. No. 95­7383. Cook v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1217. No. 95­7384. May v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 167. No. 95­7387. Hourihan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 458. No. 95­7390. Trondel-Pena v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 465. No. 95­7392. Mobley v. United States; and 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1136 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7488. Chavis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 550. No. 95­7393. Kimble v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 471. No. 95­7394. McConnell v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 312. No. 95­7396. Ives v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 309. No. 95­7399. Campos Alvarez v. United States; and No. 95­7471. Perez Zamora et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1420. No. 95­7401. Ivory v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7402. Nance v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 298. No. 95­7403. Burch v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. No. 95­7406. Salaam, aka McLaughlin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 462. No. 95­7407. Savage v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 1435. No. 95­7408. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 462. No. 95­7410. Rivers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1283. No. 95­7411. Ruffin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1258. No. 95­7412. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 535. No. 95­7415. Scott v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 479. No. 95­7416. Pierce v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 818. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1137 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7423. Newton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 810. No. 95­7426. Boone v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 76. No. 95­7427. Cancel v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7428. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 317. No. 95­7431. Castanon v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 475. No. 95­7432. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 334. No. 95­7435. Montgomery v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. No. 95­7437. Lane v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­7438. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1213. No. 95­7439. Adkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 461. No. 95­7440. Bolton v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 396. No. 95­7441. Church v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7445. Peveler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 475. No. 95­7446. Scott v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 139. No. 95­7449. Kinder v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 536. No. 95­7451. Lindsley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1138 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7454. Montano v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 550. No. 95­7455. Harris et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 318. No. 95­7459. Stites v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1020. No. 95­7460. Carbajal-Ceja v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 481. No. 95­7462. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 405. No. 95­7466. Santos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 536. No. 95­7468. Gray v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7470. Eickleberry v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7476. Glover v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 887. No. 95­7477. Dotson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 1108. No. 95­7479. Puckett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 661. No. 95­7487. Arthur v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1189. No. 95­7492. Spagnoulo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1111. No. 95­7493. Reynolds v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 292. No. 95­7494. Ramiro v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­7495. Segeada v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1237. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1139 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 No. 95­7498. Fitzgerald v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1234. No. 95­7499. Damron v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 475. No. 95­7500. Granada v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 82. No. 95­7508. Kitcheyan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. No. 95­7513. Chambers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 299. No. 95­7515. Nunez Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1266. No. 95­7516. Guzman Rivera et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 5. No. 95­7521. Biggs v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 913. No. 95­7523. Arias Santa v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1258. No. 95­7524. Cross v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7526. Williams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 168. No. 95­7531. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 1248. No. 95­7532. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1120. No. 95­7533. Alberto Munoz v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7541. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1258. No. 95­7549. Ranson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 482. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1140 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7563. Basey v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 303. No. 95­7566. Sizemore v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7653. Flournoy v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 535 N. W. 2d 354. No. 95­705. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Smith. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respond- ent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 815. No. 95­726. Connecticut v. Colton. Sup. Ct. Conn. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 234 Conn. 683, 663 A. 2d 339. No. 95­706. Babcock & Wilcox Co. et al. v. Arkwright- Boston Manufacturing Mutual Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 762. No. 95­867. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re- ported below: 62 F. 3d 1411. No. 95­925. Illinois Antibiotics Co. et al. v. Schering Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 903. No. 95­714. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v. Cisneros, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of National Asso- ciation of Insurance Commissioners, National Association of Inde- pendent Insurers, National Association of Mutual Insurance Com- panies et al., and Washington Legal Foundation et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 1351. No. 95­909. Koch Oil Co. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims Against Powerine Oil Co., 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1141 516 U. S. February 20, 1996 Debtor in Bankruptcy. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of U. S. Council on International Banking, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 969. No. 95­914. Broida v. Smith, Individually and as Per- sonal Representative of the Estate of Horowitz, De- ceased, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­1001. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, et al. v. Time Warner Cable, a Division of Time Warner Entertainment Co., L. P. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioners to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 867. No. 95­918. Chester v. American Telephone & Tele- graph Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Con- nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 470. No. 95­1030. Hughes, Hubbard & Reed v. Robbs. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 308. No. 95­6980. Shepherd v. American Telephone & Tele- graph Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1274. No. 95­921. Shumate v. Huff et al. Cir. Ct. Pulaski County, Va. Motion of respondents for award of costs denied. Certiorari denied. No. 95­972. Rothenbusch v. Ford Motor Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of National Employment Lawyers Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 904. No. 95­1053. Weed v. International Business Machines Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re- ported below: 61 F. 3d 908. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1142 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 20, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7345. Sterling v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner to amend the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 462. No. 95­7961 (A­690). Sloan v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 234. Rehearing Denied No. 95­634. Lovell v. Planters Bank & Trust Company of Claiborne Parish; and Lovell v. Newell et al., ante, p. 1029; No. 95­784. Podgurski v. Suffolk County, New York, et al., ante, p. 1048; No. 95­5600. Kelly v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, ante, p. 992; No. 95­5801. Hunt v. Department of the Army, ante, p. 1050; No. 95­5852. Reed v. Texas, ante, p. 1050; No. 95­6097. Scales v. Louisiana, ante, p. 1050; No. 95­6268. Chia v. Motorola Communications, Inc., ante, p. 1013; No. 95­6369. Webster v. City of Amarillo, Texas, et al., ante, p. 1051; No. 95­6373. Bonin v. Calderon, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1051; No. 95­6450. Dolphin v. Starkman, ante, p. 1052; No. 95­6455. Rodriguez v. Florida, ante, p. 1052; No. 95­6460. Fanta v. City of Seattle et al., ante, p. 1068; No. 95­6592. Ham v. Nagle, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1055; No. 95­6603. Turner v. Cullum, Secretary of Virginia Health and Human Resources, ante, p. 1056; No. 95­6697. Noble v. United States et al., ante, p. 1058; No. 95­6789. Dwyer v. Millsaps, Director, Community Supervision and Corrections Department for Travis County, Texas, et al., ante, p. 1061; No. 95­6824. Lea v. United States, ante, p. 1062; No. 95­6903. Branch v. United States, ante, p. 1068; and No. 95­6940. Onyejekwe v. United States, ante, p. 1065. Petitions for rehearing denied. 516ord$$2m 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1143 516 U. S. February 20, 23, 26, 1996 No. 93­1932. Etim et al. v. United States, 513 U. S. 815; No. 94­9114. Dumaguin v. Chater, Commissioner of So- cial Security, ante, p. 827; No. 94­9278. Ploneda v. California, ante, p. 829; No. 95­5702. Dutcher v. Sweeney, ante, p. 946; and No. 95­6448. Ferenc v. Reinosa et al., ante, p. 1031. Mo- tions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. February 23, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 95­7992 (A­695). Bonin v. Calderon, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 1155. February 26, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­6889. Kubosh v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 404. No. 95­7068. Schlicker v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 327. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 95­7186, ante, p. 363; and No. 35, Orig., ante, p. 365.) No. D­1608. In re Disbarment of Heath. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 961.] No. D­1611. In re Disbarment of Bernard. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 984.] No. D­1614. In re Disbarment of Billings. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.] 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1144 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 26, 1996 516 U. S. No. D­1616. In re Disbarment of Kelley. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.] No. D­1620. In re Disbarment of Nelson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 986.] No. D­1622. In re Disbarment of Lynch. James Edward Lynch, of Washington Crossing, Pa., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on Decem- ber 11, 1995 [ante, p. 1025], is discharged. No. D­1623. In re Disbarment of Myers. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1025.] No. D­1624. In re Disbarment of Weiss. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1025.] No. D­1655. In re Disbarment of Tanner. John F. Tanner, of Birmingham, Ala., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1656. In re Disbarment of Markovitch. Michael Markovitch, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­44. Cross v. Noles, Warden; No. M­45. Hockenberry v. Duffy et al.; No. M­46. Moore et ux. v. Christmas Log Homes et al.; andNo. M­47. Timmons v. County of Dallas et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­1012. Caldwell v. American Basketball Assn., Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondents Don L. Chap- man and Diane Munchak Wilson for an order substituting them as executors of the estate of Tedd Munchak, deceased, granted. No. 95­7694. Jones v. Farrington et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de- 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1145 516 U. S. February 26, 1996 nied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until March 18, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­6503. In re Holcomb; No. 95­7324. In re Solimine; No. 95­7338. In re Tal; and No. 95­7388. In re Martinez. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 95­728. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1512. Certiorari Denied No. 95­618. T. B. D. v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 So. 2d 479. No. 95­652. Kirk, Administratrix of the Estate of Kirk, Deceased, et al. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 147. No. 95­662. Couch v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 171. No. 95­788. Doe et al. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1066. No. 95­808. Southeastern Express Co. et al. v. Triad Systems Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1330. No. 95­846. Rushton v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 834. No. 95­896. Washington Service Contractors Coalition et al. v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 811. No. 95­908. Contel Cellular Inc. et al. v. Leaf River Valley Cellular Telephone Co., Inc., et al. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 685 N. E. 2d 458. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1146 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 26, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­945. Gumport, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Es- tate of Transcon Lines v. Sterling Press, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1432. No. 95­973. Jenkins v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­976. Kolodzieczak et al. v. Friend et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 1386. No. 95­1004. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 703. No. 95­1009. Horton v. Monroe Systems for Business, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1011. McDaniels v. Flick et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 446. No. 95­1017. General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommuni- cations Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1500. No. 95­1024. Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1119. No. 95­1026. Murray & Murray Co., L. P. A. Profit- Sharing Plan and Trust, et al. v. Superior Court of Ari- zona, Maricopa County (Performance Industries, Inc., fka Mr. Gasket Co., Inc., Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1027. Mirin v. Eyerly et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­1038. Lemond Construction Co. v. Wheeler, Ad- ministrator of Estate of Wheeler. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 669 So. 2d 855. No. 95­1042. Kraebel, dba Barklee Realty Co. v. New York City Department of Finance. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 App. Div. 2d 416, 629 N. Y. S. 2d 42. No. 95­1044. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. et al. v. Cerney. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 Ohio App. 3d 482, 662 N. E. 2d 827. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1147 516 U. S. February 26, 1996 No. 95­1046. Jenkins, Trustee of Green River Realty Trust v. Meetinghouse Cooperative Bank. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 1113, 647 N. E. 2d 449. No. 95­1070. Crumpton v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1400. No. 95­1073. Illinois v. Coats. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 647 N. E. 2d 1088. No. 95­1078. Connett v. Justus Enterprises of Kansas, Inc., aka Justus Cylinder-Technology, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 382. No. 95­1090. Florida v. Rivers et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 660 So. 2d 1360. No. 95­1092. Douglass v. Department of Transportation. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 676. No. 95­1095. FoodScience Corp. et al. v. Herschler. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 677. No. 95­1107. Beasley v. Commonwealth Edison Co. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 685 N. E. 2d 446. No. 95­1120. Bolt v. Singleton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­1149. Brake v. District Court of Appeal of Flor- ida, Third District. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 666 So. 2d 142. No. 95­1171. DeSouza v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1198. McNeel et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and Nightengale et ux. v. Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 60 F. 3d 833 (first judgment); 65 F. 3d 175 (second judgment). No. 95­1208. Henry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1148 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 26, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­6211. Duncan v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 648 So. 2d 1090. No. 95­6555. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 41. No. 95­6575. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 78. No. 95­6612. Lundis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 164. No. 95­6869. Mogensen v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 170. No. 95­6894. Lisenbee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 341. No. 95­6941. Jacobs v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 96. No. 95­7002. Alston v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341 N. C. 198, 461 S. E. 2d 687. No. 95­7065. Crowe v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 582, 458 S. E. 2d 799. No. 95­7258. Whittlesey v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 Md. 30, 665 A. 2d 223. No. 95­7270. Purdy v. Superior Court of Arizona, Navajo County, et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7272. Roberson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 319. No. 95­7275. Stokes v. Kiethly et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. No. 95­7280. Sikora v. Doe et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7282. Smith v. Keohane, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 301. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1149 516 U. S. February 26, 1996 No. 95­7284. Graham v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7298. Tokhtameshev v. American National Can Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 313. No. 95­7304. Jones v. Bliss et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7337. Vargas v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 835. No. 95­7397. Mayfield v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7404. Lawson v. Blankenship et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 876. No. 95­7465. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­7480. Pasquale v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7481. Swint v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7489. Tyler v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7490. Young v. Hansen et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 455. No. 95­7501. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 538. No. 95­7502. Haywood v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7520. Abner v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 124. No. 95­7522. Watkis v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 168. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1150 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 26, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7534. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 471. No. 95­7548. Olvera v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 482. No. 95­7552. Brasher v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7553. Bennett v. Bogan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 812. No. 95­7561. Osburn v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 332. No. 95­7567. Engelking v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 876. No. 95­7571. Cumming v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7574. Estache et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 125 and 126. No. 95­7575. DeJesus v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7577. Hinton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 534. No. 95­7578. Hazel v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7579. Easter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1018. No. 95­7580. Hatten v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 257. No. 95­7581. Dubisky et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 182. No. 95­7582. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7584. Hardin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 485. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1151 516 U. S. February 26, 1996 No. 95­7602. Meadows v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 462. No. 95­7604. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 123. No. 95­7608. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 475. No. 95­7609. Prince v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­7611. Ward v. Turner. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 322. No. 95­7613. Glass v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 13. No. 95­7614. Burk v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1429. No. 95­7615. Moss v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 860. No. 95­7617. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 125. No. 95­7622. Ward v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 146. No. 95­7625. Napert v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 534. No. 95­7632. Davis v. Britt, Judge, North Carolina Supe- rior Court, 16B District. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 460. No. 95­7633. Hatchett v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 477. No. 95­7636. Brice v. United States Parole Commission. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 161. No. 95­7640. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 538. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1152 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 26, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7643. Rosch v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1275. No. 95­7644. Biles v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 126. No. 95­7648. Bentley v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 818. No. 95­7652. Espinal v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7659. Rodriguez-Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 126. No. 95­7661. Morning v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 531. No. 95­7665. DeFranco v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1388. No. 95­7666. Warner v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 788. No. 95­7667. Zsofka v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 289. No. 95­7668. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­7669. Grandlund v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 507. No. 95­7671. Shuey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 887. No. 95­7672. Okoro v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7677. Hanna v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7680. White v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 545. No. 95­7683. Mills v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1284. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1153 516 U. S. February 26, 1996 No. 95­7685. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 721. No. 95­7686. Jones, aka Hackett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 342. No. 95­7687. Murphy v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 237. No. 95­7688. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 538. No. 95­7691. Bethancourt v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1074. No. 95­7692. Salazar v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7697. Dodds v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 179. No. 95­7699. Trout v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1276. No. 95­7705. Norfus v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­7710. Colberg v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 538. No. 95­7717. Ross v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­7727. Hale v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 545. No. 95­7732. Coe v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 549. No. 95­7740. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 462. No. 95­915. In re Aeroquip Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. No. 95­1016. Quick v. National Auto Credit, Inc., fka Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Kendrick 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1154 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 February 26, 1996 516 U. S. Wilhite for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 741. No. 95­1018. Kentucky v. Eldred. Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 S. W. 2d 694. No. 95­1023. Twenty-Three Nineteen Creekside, Inc., et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioners to strike the brief in opposition denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 130. No. 95­1125. General Public Utilities Corp. et al. v. Dodson et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Edison Electric Insti- tute et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this motion and this petition. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 1103. No. 95­1130. Greco v. Fitzpatrick, Chief Justice, Pro- bate and Family Court of Massachusetts, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of petitioner to consider this case with No. 95­1207, Greco v. Atwood & Cherny et al., denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 164. Rehearing Denied No. 94­8817. Kinchen v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 514 U. S. 1131; No. 95­608. Holywell Corp. et al. v. Smith, Individually and as Trustee of the Miami Center Liquidating Trust, et al., ante, p. 1044; No. 95­613. Sarduy v. Southern Bell Telephone Tele- graphic, Inc., ante, p. 1044; No. 95­676. Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., ante, p. 1046; No. 95­709. Ford Motor Co. et al. v. Tebbetts, Admin- istratrix of the Estate of Tebbetts, ante, p. 1072; No. 95­6285. High v. Thomas, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1051; No. 95­6704. Carey v. St. Theresa School et al., ante, p. 1078; and No. 95­6843. Obermeyer v. United States, ante, p. 1062. Petitions for rehearing denied. 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1155 516 U. S. February 27, 28, 29, March 1, 4, 1996 February 27, 1996 Certiorari Denied No. 95­8060 (A­711). Granviel v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di- vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sen- tence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 156. February 28, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­27. Merrill et al. v. Barbour. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1086.] Writ of certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. February 29, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. A­723. James v. Cain, Warden. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari Denied No. 95­8118 (A­722). Loyd v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death of Antonio James, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 So. 2d 372. March 1, 1996 Dismissals Under Rule 46 No. 95­1160. Tracy v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. No. 95­299. Arizona v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 1020.] Ap- peal dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. March 4, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­315. United States v. US West, Inc., et al.; and United States v. Pacific Telesis Group et al. C. A. 9th 516ord$$2n 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1156 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 4, 1996 516 U. S. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and case remanded for consideration of the question whether it is moot. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1092 (first judgment) and 1106 (second judgment). No. 95­7015. Santos et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 41. No. 95­7059. Lamb v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 631. No. 95­7289. Hines v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 392. Miscellaneous Orders No. 95­129. Exxon Co., U. S. A., et al. v. Sofec, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 983.] Motion of re- spondents for divided argument denied. No. 95­325. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabrica- tors of Utah, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1005.] Motion of United Steelworkers of America, AFL­ CIO, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 95­345. United States v. Ursery. C. A. 6th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1070]; and No. 95­346. United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1070.] Motion of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 95­346 granted. Motion of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 95­386. Richards et al. v. Jefferson County, Ala- bama, et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 983.] 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1157 516 U. S. March 4, 1996 Motion of National Association of Counties et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 95­642. Friend v. United States, ante, p. 1093. The Solicitor General is invited to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days. No. 95­7372. Guess v. Karnes, Sheriff, Franklin County, Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Peti- tioner is allowed until March 25, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­7776. In re Kennedy; No. 95­7788. In re Robinson; No. 95­7836. In re Cotton; and No. 95­7869. In re Baker. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 95­7352. In re Robinson; and No. 95­7365. In re McQueen. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 94­1988. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 655 A. 2d 876. No. 95­891. Ohio v. Robinette. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695. Certiorari Denied No. 95­548. Martin et al. v. Drummond Co., Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 So. 2d 937. No. 95­599. Illinois Central Railroad v. DeBiasio. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 678. No. 95­690. Friedman v. Grievance Committee for the Southern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 20. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1158 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 4, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­831. Canaveral Port Authority et al. v. Inter- national Longshoremen's Assn., AFL­CIO, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 205. No. 95­841. Akins et al. v. Zeneca, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1417. No. 95­848. Wright et vir v. MetroHealth Medical Center et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 1130. No. 95­857. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 181. No. 95­875. Counts v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 345. No. 95­880. Tatum et al. v. Columbia Natural Re- sources, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 58 F. 3d 1101. No. 95­924. Patterson et al. v. NationsBank of Texas, N. A., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 469. No. 95­964. Polk County, Iowa, et al. v. Brown. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 650. No. 95­995. Murphey Favre, Inc., et al. v. Lynn et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 273 Mont. 535, 903 P. 2d 221. No. 95­1051. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., et al. v. East Hampden Associates Limited Partnership et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 903 P. 2d 1180. No. 95­1054. K. W. Thompson Tool Co., dba Thompson Center Arms v. Pumphrey, Individually and Guardian ad Litem for Sparks et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1128. No. 95­1062. Blakeney et al. v. Lomas Information Sys- tems, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 482. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1159 516 U. S. March 4, 1996 No. 95­1064. Serfecz et al. v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 591. No. 95­1066. Simone et ux. v. Worcester County Institu- tion for Savings. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 309. No. 95­1068. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Luther. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 16, 649 N. E. 2d 1000. No. 95­1069. Hoffman Controls Corp. v. Burgess-SAIA, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 535. No. 95­1094. Banfield, Executrix of the Estate of Ban- field, Deceased, et al. v. Turner et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 325. No. 95­1124. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia v. Bailey. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 53. No. 95­1135. Ozga Enterprises, Inc. v. Wisconsin Depart- ment of Natural Resources et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 196 Wis. 2d 644, 539 N. W. 2d 335. No. 95­1142. Northrup et al. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 347. No. 95­1158. Brown et al. v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Produc- tions, Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 525. No. 95­1169. Thomas & Betts Corp. et al. v. Panduit Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 654. No. 95­1172. Sanjuan et al. v. American Board of Psy- chiatry & Neurology, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 247. No. 95­1183. Morris v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 82. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1160 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 4, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­1209. Cuenca v. Department of Education. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 669. No. 95­1210. Leland v. Morris et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1215. Min-Ju Chang v. Pena, Secretary of Trans- portation. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1220. Pugliatti v. Pennsylvania Workmen's Com- pensation Board. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­1231. BIC Corp. v. Bean et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 669 So. 2d 840. No. 95­1235. Tino v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 664. No. 95­1238. Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N. A., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1486. No. 95­1253. Aleem v. International Union of American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 324. No. 95­6737. Hock v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 176. No. 95­6925. Velasquez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1420. No. 95­7295. Omara v. International Service Systems, Inc. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 App. Div. 2d 246, 624 N. Y. S. 2d 388. No. 95­7300. McGinnis et al. v. Blodgett, Deputy Direc- tor, Washington Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 307. No. 95­7303. Jones v. Williams et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7305. Jones v. Schleicher et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1161 516 U. S. March 4, 1996 No. 95­7312. Muzakkir v. Villasenor. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 175. No. 95­7322. Echols v. American Fork Investors et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 669. No. 95­7328. Powell v. Carnahan, Governor of Missouri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7335. Williams v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 153, 652 N. E. 2d 721. No. 95­7339. Van Duren v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7340. Randle v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1268. No. 95­7341. Spremo v. Babchik et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 216 App. Div. 2d 382, 628 N. Y. S. 2d 167. No. 95­7343. Prevot v. Prevot. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 556. No. 95­7344. Simpson v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341 N. C. 316, 462 S. E. 2d 191. No. 95­7346. Christian v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 215 App. Div. 2d 493, 640 N. Y. S. 2d 757. No. 95­7348. Gonzalez v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 400. No. 95­7349. Desir v. Jackson Memorial Hospital et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 182. No. 95­7355. Brownlow v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 997. No. 95­7357. Barakett v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certio- rari denied. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1162 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 4, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7360. McGahee v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Pa. Super. 680, 663 A. 2d 250. No. 95­7362. Judy v. Carnahan, Governor of Missouri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7364. Lightfoot v. Bienvenu, Judge, 16th Judicial District, Louisiana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­7367. Schamber v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 551. No. 95­7376. Haman v. King et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1388. No. 95­7386. Berry v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 915. No. 95­7409. Cross v. Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7425. Linder v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7429. Bowles v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 533 N. W. 2d 617. No. 95­7447. Turner v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 650 N. E. 2d 705. No. 95­7475. Finch v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 325. No. 95­7484. Reeves v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 472. No. 95­7503. Gonzales v. Tansy, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 178. No. 95­7510. Ashe v. Styles, Superintendent, Yancey Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 46. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1163 516 U. S. March 4, 1996 No. 95­7586. Hicks v. Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 36 Cal. App. 4th 1649, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269. No. 95­7599. Levi v. Hawk, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7603. Jackson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 688 N. E. 2d 388. No. 95­7605. Nuss v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 548. No. 95­7624. Curiale v. Sedwick, Judge, United States District Court for the District of Alaska. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7627. Heath v. Gunter et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 669. No. 95­7628. Edmond v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7629. Hawkins v. Riveland, Secretary, Washing- ton Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1424. No. 95­7631. Dread v. Maryland State Police. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7654. Garchow v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7670. Cole v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 24. No. 95­7695. Stump v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 125. No. 95­7703. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 11. No. 95­7706. Mann v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 342. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1164 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 4, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7707. Whitehead v. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence; and No. 95­7708. Whitehead v. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 67 F. 3d 298. No. 95­7715. Correo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7716. Childress v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­7719. Wright, aka Denvers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 168. No. 95­7721. Norfus v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­7730. Lewis v. United States Attorney et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1249. No. 95­7736. Grigsby v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 545. No. 95­7737. Pinkston v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 875. No. 95­7738. Rubidoux v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 482. No. 95­7741. Picciotti v. Sweeney. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 App. Div. 2d 911, 624 N. Y. S. 2d 974. No. 95­7742. Byrd v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7743. Valdez Andaverde v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1305. No. 95­7745. Causley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1425. No. 95­7747. Bonifacio Amparo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1222. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1165 516 U. S. March 4, 1996 No. 95­7748. Arafati v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 545. No. 95­7753. Roman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. No. 95­7754. Bonner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 667. No. 95­7762. Oliver v. Zavaras, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1250. No. 95­7763. Pippens v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 876. No. 95­7764. Caldera v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 1250. No. 95­7767. Zurita-Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. No. 95­7768. Walker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 931. No. 95­7770. Payne v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1200. No. 95­7773. Canizales-Satizabal v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 364. No. 95­7775. Johnson v. Abramajtys, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7778. Lai v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­7779. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 128. No. 95­7783. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1263. No. 95­7792. Fitzgerald v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. No. 95­7793. Harris v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 542. 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1166 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 4, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7794. Flores-Guzman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. No. 95­7796. Green v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7799. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 95. No. 95­7803. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1332. No. 95­7805. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­7807. Levy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 458. No. 95­7809. Kirnon et al. v. Schneider, Governor of the Virgin Islands, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 311. No. 95­7813. Flemmings v. Morton et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7815. Florence v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1246. No. 95­7828. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 877. No. 95­7830. Stapleton v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 117. No. 95­7832. Smith et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 374. No. 95­7834. Rogers v. McCaughtry, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7840. Ducret v. Beyer, Assistant Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1133. Fransen et al. v. Conoco, Inc., fka Con- tinental Oil Co., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1167 516 U. S. March 4, 12, 15, 1996 nied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 1481. No. 95­7780. Nichols et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner Ricardo Sanchez to amend the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 831. Rehearing Denied No. 95­6262. Oltarzewski v. Martinez, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1013; No. 95­6516. Nobles v. Metropolitan Transit Authority et al., ante, p. 1054; No. 95­6630. Williams v. Jabe, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1057; No. 95­6680. Tsimbidaros v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al., ante, p. 1057; No. 95­6684. Glass v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Reformatory, ante, p. 1057; No. 95­6706. Higgins v. Cuomo, Former Governor of New York, et al., ante, p. 1058; No. 95­6747. Cole v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, et al., ante, p. 1078; No. 95­6923. Cook v. White, ante, p. 1081; and No. 95­6927. Rowser v. Wayne Car Releasing Services, Inc., ante, p. 1081. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 94­2003. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter- national, Inc., ante, p. 233. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. March 12, 1996 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 95­7898. Stiles v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 902 P. 2d 1104. March 15, 1996 Miscellaneous Order No. 95­386. Richards et al. v. Jefferson County, Alabama, et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. [Certiorari granted, ante, 516ord$$2o 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1168 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 15, 18, 1996 516 U. S. p. 983.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted to the extent that it includes the question whether the occupational tax challenged by petitioners violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The parties are directed to address at oral argument only the remaining question: Whether the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohib- its the application of res judicata in this case. March 18, 1996 Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 95­ 1025, ante, p. 474.) Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­6759. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner to amend petition for writ of certiorari granted. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, ante, p. 137. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 723. Certiorari Dismissed No. 95­7528. Jackson v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari dismissed. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1590. In re Disbarment of Smith. Motion to recall and amend the judgment denied. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 984.] No. D­1625. In re Disbarment of Gajewski. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1627. In re Disbarment of Richards. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1630. In re Disbarment of Toms. James Huston Toms, of Hendersonville, N. C., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on January 8, 1996 [ante, p. 1039], is discharged. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1169 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. D­1631. In re Disbarment of Cassell. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1039.] No. D­1635. In re Disbarment of McGlory. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1090.] No. D­1639. In re Disbarment of Farrell. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1106.] No. D­1642. In re Disbarment of O'Keefe. Michael P. O'Keefe, of Lenexa, Kan., having requested to resign as a mem- ber of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on February 20, 1996 [ante, p. 1107], is discharged. No. D­1649. In re Disbarment of Stigler. It having been reported that David D. Stigler, of Fort Worth, Tex., has died, the rule to show cause, issued on February 20, 1996 [ante, p. 1108], is discharged. No. D­1657. In re Disbarment of Dameron. Thomas H. Dameron, of Alexandria, Va., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1658. In re Disbarment of Bruckner. Richard J. Bruckner, of Omaha, Neb., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1659. In re Disbarment of Berg. Howard M. Berg, of Boca Raton, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1660. In re Disbarment of Tighe. Charles I. Tighe III, of Mt. Laurel, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1170 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. D­1661. In re Disbarment of Reeves. Weldon Ray Reeves, of Sacramento, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­48. Luna v. Merit Systems Protection Board. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­6510. Gray v. Netherland, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1037.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Mark E. Olive, Esq., of Richmond, Va., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 95­6710. Attwood v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of peti- tioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 297] denied. No. 95­7514. Shieh v. State Bar of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until April 8, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 95­7473. In re Hawks; No. 95­7536. In re Kinder; No. 95­7806. In re Johnson; and No. 95­7900. In re Robinson. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 95­7538. In re Lorenz; and No. 95­7733. In re Usher. Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 95­939. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 220. No. 95­1065. Schenck et al. v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 377. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1171 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­259. Walters v. Metropolitan Educational En- terprises, Inc., et al.; and No. 95­779. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1225. Certiorari Denied No. 95­331. Sivaskandan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 108. No. 95­481. City of Carlsbad et al. v. Warren. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 439. No. 95­744. Gilbert v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1438. No. 95­793. American Train Dispatchers Assn. v. Sur- face Transportation Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 842. No. 95­929. Adhiyappa v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 261. No. 95­931. UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Service; and No. 95­944. Air Courier Conference of America/Inter- national Committee v. United States Postal Service. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 621. No. 95­948. Term Auto Sales, Inc., et al. v. City of Cleveland et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 54 F. 3d 777. No. 95­953. Liberty Cable Co., Inc. v. City of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 961. No. 95­962. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al. v. Fritsch et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 248. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1172 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­975. Biskup v. McCaughtry. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 245. No. 95­990. Jones v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 1112. No. 95­1031. Ghent v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1083. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 695. No. 95­1085. Parker v. Evening Post Publishing Co. et al. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 317 S. C. 236, 452 S. E. 2d 640. No. 95­1097. Hogan et al. v. Village of Lake Barring- ton, Illinois, et al. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 225, 649 N. E. 2d 1366. No. 95­1104. Owen v. California State Bar et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1105. Cincinnati Reds v. Bridewell et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 136. No. 95­1106. Parsa v. White, Director, Alabama Finance Department, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­1110. Blumeyer et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1013. No. 95­1111. Estate of Menna et al. v. St. Agnes Medi- cal Center. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1113. Stelwagon Manufacturing Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 63 F. 3d 1267. No. 95­1115. Flakt, Inc. v. Joy Technologies, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 843. No. 95­1116. Irving v. District of Columbia et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 A. 2d 980. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1173 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­1117. Leger v. Adams, Massachusetts Commis- sioner of Revenue. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 421 Mass. 168, 654 N. E. 2d 927. No. 95­1122. Thomas v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1126. Idaho v. Gafford. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Idaho 472, 903 P. 2d 61. No. 95­1127. Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. Mercer County et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 788. No. 95­1131. Jones v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 340 Md. 235, 666 A. 2d 128. No. 95­1132. Hall v. Savings of America. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 470. No. 95­1136. Murray v. Detroit Riverview Hospital et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 168. No. 95­1137. Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1064. No. 95­1140. Shin Chong Yong v. Gannett Outdoor Co., Inc. of Southern California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 119. No. 95­1141. Beddingfield et al. v. Allegheny County et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1010. No. 95­1152. Chirico et al. v. Township of Newtown et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1255. No. 95­1153. Boyle et al. v. Smith, Commissioner, Minne- sota Department of Revenue, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1093. No. 95­1157. McPherson v. Brickley et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1174 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­1161. Leeco, Inc. v. Burns et al. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1165. Moore et ux. v. Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 406. No. 95­1166. McDonald et ux., Individually and as Next Friends and Guardians of McDonald, a Minor, et al. v. Provident Indemnity Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 234. No. 95­1174. Ghali v. Kentucky. Cir. Ct. Campbell County, Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1177. Chatterjee v. City of Baton Rouge et al. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 813. No. 95­1179. Neighbour v. Covert et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1508. No. 95­1180. Jones v. Fulton County Board of Commis- sioners et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 402. No. 95­1188. Clarke v. Hall et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1255. No. 95­1189. Urban v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Kan. App. 2d xxx, 890 P. 2d 1253. No. 95­1192. Titan Sports, Inc., dba World Wrestling Federation v. Ventura, dba Jesse "The Body" Ventura, aka Janos. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 725. No. 95­1203. McCoy et al. v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 917. No. 95­1207. Greco v. Atwood & Cherny et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Mass. App. 1126, 650 N. E. 2d 828. No. 95­1237. Black v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1175 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­1241. Wacek et ux. v. Vavricka, fka Aakre, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1254. Elton et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 542. No. 95­1272. Hubbard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1261. No. 95­1278. Lucille v. City of Chicago et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1287. Faust v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­1290. Gabovitch v. Shear et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1252. No. 95­1306. Brink v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6660. Gilday v. Callahan, Superintendent, MCI Norfolk. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 257. No. 95­6675. Clark v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­6817. Monday v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 640. No. 95­7020. Jackson, aka King v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 468. No. 95­7025. Breeland v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 457. No. 95­7050. Roberts v. Long Beach Unified School Dis- trict. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7061. Rivers v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 537 Pa. 394, 644 A. 2d 710. No. 95­7071. Byrd v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 So. 2d 67. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1176 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7131. Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, District Di- rector, New York District of the Immigration and Natu- ralization Service, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 732. No. 95­7137. Barley v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 906 S. W. 2d 27. No. 95­7140. Vaneaton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 49 F. 3d 1423. No. 95­7215. Horton v. Department of the Navy et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 279. No. 95­7242. Bonds v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 474. No. 95­7368. Baker v. Kansas City, Missouri, et al. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 S. W. 2d 283. No. 95­7369. Luker v. Miller. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 266 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 684 N. E. 2d 464. No. 95­7373. Guest v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 166 Ill. 2d 381, 655 N. E. 2d 873. No. 95­7381. Shepherd v. Illinois Department of Chil- dren and Family Services et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7385. Smith v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7391. Whitehead v. Upland Mortgage Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7395. Mark K. v. John S. et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 898 P. 2d 891. No. 95­7398. Cannon v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 P. 2d 89. No. 95­7405. Sanders v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1177 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­7413. Salzer v. Stinson. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 F. 3d 708. No. 95­7417. Arteaga v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7418. Bear v. Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 334. No. 95­7419. Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Cor- rection, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 951. No. 95­7420. Kills on Top v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 273 Mont. 32, 901 P. 2d 1368. No. 95­7421. Burton v. Economus, Judge, Court of Com- mon Pleas, Mahoning County, Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 474. No. 95­7424. Akers v. Fitzgerald et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 536. No. 95­7443. Rossi v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., County of Maricopa. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7448. Wilczynski v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 891 P. 2d 998. No. 95­7457. Rivers v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 Ga. 694, 461 S. E. 2d 205. No. 95­7458. Rountree v. Mengel, Clerk, Supreme Court of Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Ohio St. 3d 1402, 655 N. E. 2d 182. No. 95­7461. Thomas v. Heise. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7467. Willis v. Matson Plastering Co., Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7469. Gumm v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 413, 653 N. E. 2d 253. No. 95­7472. Harju v. Duncan et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 57 F. 3d 1077. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1178 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7474. Davis v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 658 N. E. 2d 896. No. 95­7478. Rodriguez v. Wolf, Judge, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663 So. 2d 631. No. 95­7482. Shown v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7486. Wallace v. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 466. No. 95­7496. Covillion v. New Hampshire et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7497. George v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7504. Dever v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 722, 654 N. E. 2d 1249. No. 95­7507. Higgason v. Hanks, Superintendent, Wa- bash Valley Correctional Institute. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7509. Allen v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 626, 653 N. E. 2d 675. No. 95­7518. Stuckey v. Thompson, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7519. Schleeper v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 118. No. 95­7527. Lundgren v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 474, 653 N. E. 2d 304. No. 95­7529. Joseph v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Ohio St. 3d 450, 653 N. E. 2d 285. No. 95­7547. Scrivner v. Tansy, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 1234. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1179 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­7550. Pendleton v. Vance et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 300. No. 95­7557. Washington v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 164 Vt. 609, 669 A. 2d 550. No. 95­7558. Thomas v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7559. Williams v. Washington, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7585. Osiris Flores v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7592. Field v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 344. No. 95­7606. Luna v. Lacy. Ct. App. Ohio, Huron County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7607. Socorro v. Thurman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 308. No. 95­7619. Chapman v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 688 N. E. 2d 387. No. 95­7630. Ghaemmaghami v. Local Union No. 11, Inter- national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL­CIO. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7634. Fuller v. Virginia et al.; and Fuller v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 54 F. 3d 773 (first judgment); 60 F. 3d 821 (second judgment). No. 95­7637. McDonald v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7646. Fitzgerald v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 249 Va. 299, 455 S. E. 2d 506. No. 95­7674. Ortega v. Price City, Utah. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1180 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7689. Walker v. City of Ames, Iowa. Dist. Ct. Iowa, Story County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7704. Bryant v. McDade, Superintendent, Har- nett Correctional Institution. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 459. No. 95­7712. Sherman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 136. No. 95­7722. Johnson v. Welby et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7723. Leonard v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Lawrence County. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7734. Stevens v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7739. Guerrero v. Ryan, Secretary of State of Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Ill. App. 3d 945, 651 N. E. 2d 586. No. 95­7746. Tines v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 891. No. 95­7755. Burnette v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1384. No. 95­7757. Seguin v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 421 Mass. 243, 656 N. E. 2d 1229. No. 95­7761. Calhoun v. Huskisson et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7772. Smith v. Richardson, Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1257. No. 95­7781. Nagol v. New Mexico. Ct. App. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 95­7784. Lave v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1181 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­7786. Klein v. Andalman. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7787. Lorenz v. Lorenz. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 548 N. W. 2d 192. No. 95­7791. Hopgood v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 183. No. 95­7797. Gooding et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 297. No. 95­7808. Luckett, aka Clark v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 F. 3d 340. No. 95­7811. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. No. 95­7825. Wilson, aka Whalen v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 479. No. 95­7826. Whitmore v. Avery, Superintendent, Com- munity Corrections Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 688. No. 95­7837. Waters v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 876. No. 95­7841. Edelson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 F. 3d 457. No. 95­7843. Huerta v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­7844. Hayden v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 465. No. 95­7846. Hodge v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 962. No. 95­7847. Henderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1284. No. 95­7848. Farrell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 891. No. 95­7855. Morris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 298. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1182 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7858. Marutz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 F. 3d 491. No. 95­7859. Milbrand v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 58 F. 3d 841. No. 95­7860. McCray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1286. No. 95­7862. Ruggles v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 262. No. 95­7865. Behringer v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (two judgments). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 75 F. 3d 187 (first judgment) and 189 (second judgment). No. 95­7866. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 27. No. 95­7870. Baker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 876. No. 95­7874. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 327. No. 95­7877. Ramey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1264. No. 95­7879. Ross v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1285. No. 95­7883. Vega-Soto v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 1281. No. 95­7890. Owens v. Phillips, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7891. Espinas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 F. 3d 881. No. 95­7897. Baker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. No. 95­7903. Carr v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 171. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1183 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 No. 95­7904. Wells v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 342. No. 95­7906. Graham v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 352. No. 95­7907. Hereford v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 Wis. 2d 1054, 537 N. W. 2d 62. No. 95­7909. Guidry v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 336. No. 95­7914. Stonier et ux. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1233. No. 95­7923. Woodfork, aka Woodfolk v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 A. 2d 1145. No. 95­7924. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 1418. No. 95­7929. Lacy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 95­7930. Lai et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 913. No. 95­7931. Moore v. Carlton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 F. 3d 689. No. 95­7932. McKinney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 113. No. 95­7934. Wallace v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 128. No. 95­7939. Sanchez v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 95­7957. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 64 F. 3d 661. No. 95­7959. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 70 F. 3d 121. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1184 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 March 18, 1996 516 U. S. No. 95­7960. Van Fripp v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 887. No. 95­7978. Lemon v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 95­942. Dean v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 55 F. 3d 640. No. 95­984. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. New Jersey Commissioner of Insurance et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Motion of Illinois for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae out of time denied. Certiorari denied. No. 95­1082. Nippon Carbide Industries Co., Inc. v. Min- nesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Association of International Automobile Manufacturers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 694. No. 95­1118. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis- consin et al. v. Marshfield Clinic et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 65 F. 3d 1406. No. 95­1128. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp. et al. v. North River Insurance Co.; and No. 95­1138. Underwriters and Underwriting Syndi- cates at Lloyd's et al. v. North River Insurance Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 63 F. 3d 160. No. 95­1154. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust v. Shad- burne-Vinton, nka Shadburne. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Baxter Healthcare Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 F. 3d 1071. No. 95­1178. Maricopa County v. Junot. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 67 F. 3d 307. 516ord$$2p 10-24-98 20:56:58 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1185 516 U. S. March 18, 1996 Rehearing Denied No. 94­8915. Borkins v. United States Postal Service et al., ante, p. 826; No. 95­832. Jensen v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, ante, p. 1049; No. 95­850. El-Attar v. Mississippi State University et al., ante, p. 1094; No. 95­882. Kelly v. Tree Farm Development Corp. et al., ante, p. 1094; No. 95­5407. Timberlake v. Lamer, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1094; No. 95­6385. Elfakir et ux. v. Automobile Club Insur- ance Associates et al., ante, p. 1051; No. 95­6546. Trottie v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, ante, p. 1054; No. 95­6583. Arndt v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, ante, p. 1055; No. 95­6601. Wodkiewicz v. Patent and Trademark Of- fice Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, ante, p. 1056; No. 95­6813. Slappy v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 1095; No. 95­6840. Pryor v. City of DeSoto, Missouri, et al., ante, p. 1095; No. 95­6974. Lewis v. Runyon, Postmaster General, ante, p. 1081; and No. 95­7180. Jaffer v. United States, ante, p. 1128. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 95­371. Douglas County, Oregon v. Babbitt, Secre- tary of the Interior, et al., ante, p. 1042; and No. 95­6558. Ross v. Rockwell International Rocket- dyne, ante, p. 1054. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehear- ing denied. 10-22-98 06:59:02 516BV$1301 Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 1301. The numbers between 1185 and 1301 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish in-chambers opinions with permanent page numbers, thus making the official citations available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 516us1ic1z 08-21-97 13:09:02 PAGES IC1301PGT OPINION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN CHAMBERS FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. RADIOFONE, INC. on application to vacate stay No. A­368. Decided October 25, 1995 The Federal Communications Commission's application to vacate the Sixth Circuit's stay preventing the FCC from taking any action in furtherance of a nationwide auction of a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum is granted. Allowing the auction to proceed will not defeat the Sixth Cir- cuit's power to grant appropriate relief in a pending challenge to FCC regulations that prevent respondent from bidding for 3 of the 493 li- censes available. Moreover, the harm to the public caused by a nation- wide postponement of the auction would outweigh the possible harm to respondent. Justice Stevens, Circuit Justice. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has ap- plied to me in my capacity as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit to vacate a stay entered by the Court of Appeals on October 18, 1995. The stay prevented the FCC from taking any action in furtherance of a nationwide auction of a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Apparently, the Court of Appeals feared that completion of the auction would moot a challenge pending before it to FCC regulations that prevent respondent from bidding for 3 of the 493 licenses available. I am persuaded, however, that allowing the national auction to go forward will not defeat the power of the Court of Ap- peals to grant appropriate relief in the event that respondent overcomes the presumption of validity that supports the FCC regulations and prevails on the merits. I am also per- suaded that the harm to the public caused by a nationwide postponement of the auction would outweigh the possible 1301 516us1ic1z 08-21-97 13:09:02 PAGES IC1301PGT 1302 FCC v. RADIOFONE, INC. Opinion in Chambers harm to respondent. I should point out that because re- spondent has not filed an opposition to the application, my opinion is based on the factual representations in the FCC's papers. Accordingly, the application to vacate the stay is granted. 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) I N D E X ABATEMENT. See Constitutional Law, III, IV. ABORTION. See Social Security Act. ADMIRALTY. See Maritime Law. AGENT ORANGE. See Tucker Act. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING DEATH PEN- ALTY. See Constitutional Law, I. AIRPLANE CRASH ON HIGH SEAS. See Warsaw Convention. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 1. APPELLATE COURTS. See Jurisdiction, 2, 3. ARKANSAS. See Social Security Act. ARTICLE 17. See Warsaw Convention. ASSET FORFEITURE. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. AUCTION OF PORTION OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM. See Stays. AUTOMATIC STAY OF CREDITOR'S SETOFF. See Bankruptcy, 2. BANKING. See Jurisdiction, 4. BANKRUPTCY. See also Jurisdiction, 2. 1. Exemption of debt from discharge-Fraudulent misrepresenta- tion-Level of reliance.-Level of creditor's reliance on a fraudulent mis- representation that is necessary to exempt a debt from discharge in bank- ruptcy under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A) is justifiable reliance, not reasonable reliance. Field v. Mans, p. 59. 2. Setoff rights-Automatic stay.-Refusal of petitioner creditor-a bank-to pay its debt to respondent bankruptcy debtor upon latter's de- mand-that is, its refusal to pay withdrawals that would reduce respond- ent's account balance below sum petitioner claimed to be due on an unpaid loan-was not a "setoff" within meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(7) and hence did not violate Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, p. 16. 1303 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1304 INDEX BOUNDARIES. Border along Mississippi River.-Louisiana's exceptions to Special Master's report defining boundary between that State and Mississippi along a 7-mile stretch of Mississippi River are overruled. Louisiana v. Mississippi, p. 22. BRADY JURISPRUDENCE. See Habeas Corpus, 2. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. CAPITAL MURDER. See Constitutional Law, I. CERTIORARI. See Supreme Court, 1, 2. CITIZEN SUITS. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. CLASS ACTIONS. See Judgments. CLEANUP OF TOXIC WASTES. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. I. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Death penalty-Invalidation of one aggravating factor.-Zant v. Ste- phens, 462 U. S. 862, supports conclusion that invalidation of one aggravat- ing factor does not necessarily require that a death sentence be set aside, but it did not establish a rule that existence of one valid aggravator always excuses a constitutional error in admission or exclusion of evidence. Tug- gle v. Netherland, p. 10. II. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce. State intangibles tax-Corporate stock.-North Carolina's intangibles tax on a fraction of value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to corporation's exposure to State's income tax dis- criminates against interstate commerce in violation of dormant Commerce Clause. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, p. 325. III. Due Process. State abatement scheme-Forfeiture of car because of joint owner's ac- tions.-A Michigan court order forfeiting petitioner's car as a public nui- sance because her husband had sex with a prostitute in car did not violate Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's activity. Bennis v. Michigan, p. 442. 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1305 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued. IV. Taking of Property. State abatement scheme-Forfeiture of car because of joint owner's ac- tions.-A Michigan court order forfeiting petitioner's car as a public nui- sance because her husband had sex with a prostitute in car did not violate Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's activity. Bennis v. Michigan, p. 442. CORPORATE STOCK. See Constitutional Law, II. COURTS OF APPEALS. See Jurisdiction, 2, 3. CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, I; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; Habeas Corpus; Supreme Court, 1. 1. Firearm use during a drug trafficking crime.-To sustain a convic- tion for "use" of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1), Government must show that defendant actively employed fire- arm during and in relation to predicate crime. Bailey v. United States, p. 137. 2. Statutory minimum sentences-LSD sales.-United States Sen- tencing Guidelines' dose-based method for determining weight of LSD sold by a drug trafficker does not require reconsideration of actual-weight method used to determine statutory minimum sentences under 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1) and Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453. Neal v. United States, p. 284. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT. See Warsaw Convention. DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law, I. DEBT DISCHARGE. See Bankruptcy, 1. DEFOLIANT USE DURING VIETNAM WAR. See Tucker Act. DELAWARE. See Judgments. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Con- stitutional Law, II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, II. DRUG TRAFFICKING. See Criminal Law. DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, III. ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM. See Stays. 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1306 INDEX EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974. Equitable relief-Breach of fiduciary obligations.-Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA authorized plan beneficiaries to bring a lawsuit against plan administrator, who was also their employer, seeking equitable relief for individual beneficiaries harmed by administrator's breach of fiduciary obligations. Varity Corp. v. Howe, p. 489. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Labor; Railroads. ENVIRONMENT. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. EVIDENCE WITHHOLDING. See Habeas Corpus, 2. EXPEDITED FUNDS AVAILABILITY ACT. See Jurisdiction, 4. FEDERAL CONTRACTORS. See Tucker Act. FEDERAL COURTS. See Judgments; Jurisdiction. FEDERAL INCOME TAXES. See Jurisdiction, 5. FEDERAL JUDGMENT CREDITORS. See Jurisdiction, 1. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Plea agreement-Stipulated forfeiture of assets.-Rule 11(f) does not require inquiry into factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets under a plea agreement; judicial advice as to Rule 31(e) right to a special forfeit- ure verdict and an express, written waiver are unnecessary to waive that right. Libretti v. United States, p. 29. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Judgments; Social Security Act. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS. See Employee Retirement Income Se- curity Act of 1974. FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, IV. FIREARM USE. See Criminal Law, 1. FORFEITURE OF ASSETS. See Federal Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure. FORFEITURE OF CAR AS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. See Constitu- tional Law, III, IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION. See Bankruptcy, 1. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. See Judgments. 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1307 GVR ORDER. See Supreme Court, 1, 2. HABEAS CORPUS. 1. Miranda warnings-State-court "in custody" determination.-A state court's determination whether a suspect was "in custody," and thus entitled to Miranda warnings is not a "factual issue presumed to be cor- rect" under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)-which governs federal habeas proceed- ings-but is a mixed question of law and fact warranting independent federal review. Thompson v. Keohane, p. 99. 2. Murder trial-Withholding of inadmissible polygraph results.- Ninth Circuit misapplied Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, in reversing habeas denial because of a state prosecutor's failure to turn over inadmis- sible polygraph results, since it is not "reasonably likely" that disclosure would have resulted in a different outcome at respondent's murder trial. Wood v. Bartholomew, p. 1. HOURS OF SERVICE ACT. See Railroads, 2. HYDE AMENDMENT. See Social Security Act. INCOME TAXES. See Jurisdiction, 5. IN CUSTODY. See Habeas Corpus, 1. IN FORMA PAUPERIS. See Supreme Court, 3. INTANGIBLES TAX. See Constitutional Law, II. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. See Jurisdiction, 5. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION. See Warsaw Conven- tion. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, II. JUDGMENT CREDITORS. See Jurisdiction, 1. JUDGMENTS. State class-action settlement-Full faith and credit in federal court.- A Delaware judgment approving a class-action settlement is entitled to full faith and credit by federal courts even though settlement released claims within exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, p. 367. JURISDICTION. 1. Federal courts-Ancillary jurisdiction-Federal judgment credi- tors.-Federal courts do not possess ancillary jurisdiction over new ac- tions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1308 INDEX JURISDICTION-Continued. money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for judgment. Pea- cock v. Thomas, p. 349. 2. Federal courts-Bankruptcy appeal-Remand order to state court.-A court of appeals lacks jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) to review a district court order remanding a removed bankruptcy case to state court because of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, p. 124. 3. Federal courts-Qualified-immunity appeals.-A defendant's imme- diate appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss does not deprive a federal court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of summary judgment. Behrens v. Pelletier, p. 299. 4. Federal courts-Suits between banks.-Expedited Funds Availabil- ity Act, 12 U. S. C. § 4010, provides for federal-court jurisdiction not only in suits between customers and banks, but also in cases initiated by one bank against another bank. Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., p. 264. 5. Tax Court-Federal income tax refund.-Title 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B) deprives Tax Court of jurisdiction to award a refund of income taxes paid more than two years before date on which Internal Revenue Service mailed taxpayer a notice of deficiency, when, on that date, taxpayer had not yet filed a tax return. Commissioner v. Lundy, p. 235. JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE STANDARD. See Bankruptcy, 1. KAL 007. See Warsaw Convention. LABOR. National Labor Relations Act-Employee.-A worker may be a com- pany's "employee," within terms of NLRA, even if, at same time, a union pays that worker to organize company. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., p. 85. LOSS-OF-SOCIETY DAMAGES. See Warsaw Convention. LOUISIANA. See Boundaries. LSD SALES. See Criminal Law, 2. MARITIME LAW. Nonseafarer's wrongful death-Pre-emption of state remedies.-In maritime wrongful-death cases in which no federal statute specifies ap- propriate relief and decedent was a nonseafarer, state remedies remain 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1309 MARITIME LAW-Continued. applicable and have not been displaced by federal action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375. Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, p. 199. MEDICAID. See Social Security Act. MICHIGAN. See Constitutional Law, III, IV. MINIMUM SENTENCES. See Criminal Law, 2. MIRANDA RIGHTS. See Habeas Corpus, 1. MISSISSIPPI. See Boundaries. MURDER. See Constitutional Law, I; Habeas Corpus, 2. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. See Labor. NORTH CAROLINA. See Constitutional Law, II. NOTICE OF TAX DEFICIENCY. See Jurisdiction, 5. ON-DUTY TIME. See Railroads, 2. PLANE CRASH ON HIGH SEAS. See Warsaw Convention. PLEA AGREEMENTS. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. POLLUTION. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. POLYGRAPH RESULTS. See Habeas Corpus, 2. PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW. See Maritime Law; Social Secu- rity Act. PROSTITUTION. See Constitutional Law, III, IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. See Jurisdiction, 3. RAILROADS. 1. Safety Appliance Act-Liability for employee injuries.-Section 2 of Act does not make a railroad liable as a matter of law for injuries incurred by a railroad employee while trying to straighten a misaligned drawbar to ensure that railroad cars automatically couple on impact. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Hiles, p. 400. 2. Train crew employees-On-duty time-Time spent waiting for transportation at shift's end.-Text, structure, and purposes of Act- which limits number of hours that train crew employees can remain on duty-demonstrate that time spent waiting for transportation back to terminal at end of workers' shift is properly classified as "limbo time," not on-duty time. Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., p. 152. 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1310 INDEX REASONABLE RELIANCE STANDARD. See Bankruptcy, 1. REFUND OF INCOME TAXES. See Jurisdiction, 5. REMOVAL. See Jurisdiction, 2. REPETITIOUS FILINGS. See Supreme Court, 3. RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976. Citizen suits-Toxic waste cleanup costs.-Act does not authorize a citi- zen suit to recover prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or environment. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., p. 479. SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT. See Railroads, 1. SENTENCING GUIDELINES. See Criminal Law, 2. SETOFF RIGHTS. See Bankruptcy, 2. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. See also Supreme Court, 2. Abortion-Pre-emption of state law.-Amendment 68 of Arkansas Con- stitution, which denies state money to fund any abortion but one "to save the mother's life," is invalid only to extent it actually conflicts with re- quirement of federal Medicaid law, as affected by 1994 Hyde Amendment, that States fund medically necessary abortions in rape and incest cases. Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Services, p. 474. STATE FUNDING OF ABORTIONS. See Social Security Act. STATE TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II. STATUTORY MINIMUM SENTENCES. See Criminal Law, 2. STAYS. Auction of portion of electromagnetic spectrum.-FCC's application to vacate a stay preventing it from proceeding with an auction of a portion of electromagnetic spectrum is granted. FCC v. Radiofone, Inc. (Ste- vens, J., in chambers), p. 1301. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 2. SUPREME COURT. 1. GVR order-Criminal case.-An order granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding case is appropriate for it enables court below to consider potentially relevant decisions and arguments that were not previously before it when it held that appeal of petitioner's criminal con- viction was untimely. Stutson v. United States, p. 193. 2. GVR order-Social Security case.-Supreme Court has power to issue a GVR order without first finding error below; equities and legal 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1311 SUPREME COURT-Continued. uncertainties of this Social Security eligibility case merit such an order. Lawrence v. Chater, p. 163. 3. In forma pauperis-Repetitious filings.-Abusive filers are pro- spectively denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on all certiorari pe- titions in noncriminal matters. Attwood v. Singletary, p. 297; Jones v. ABC­TV, p. 363. TAKING OF PROPERTY. See Constitutional Law, IV. TAX COURT JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 5. TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II; Jurisdiction, 5. TOXIC WASTE CLEANUP. See Resource Conservation and Recov- ery Act of 1976. TRAIN CREW EMPLOYEES. See Railroads. TUCKER ACT. Agent Orange manufacturers-Recovery from Government of third- party tort claims.-Petitioners, Vietnam era federal contractors who man- ufactured Agent Orange, could not recover from Government under Tucker Act substantial costs they incurred in defending and settling tort claims of veterans alleging injuries from defoliant's use. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, p. 417. UNION ORGANIZER. See Labor. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES. See Criminal Law, 2. VETERANS. See Tucker Act. VIETNAM WAR. See Tucker Act. WARSAW CONVENTION. Article 17-Loss-of-society damages-Plane crash on high seas.-In a suit brought pursuant to Article 17, petitioners could not recover loss-of- society damages for their relative's death in crash of Korean Air Lines flight KE007 on high seas under Death on the High Seas Act. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., p. 217. WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. WITHHOLDING OF EVIDENCE. See Habeas Corpus, 2. 516ind$pbv 11-04-98 11:44:23 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1312 INDEX WORDS AND PHRASES. 1. "Employee." National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., p. 85. 2. "Uses . . . a firearm." 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). Bailey v. United States, p. 137. WRONGFUL DEATH. See Maritime Law.