513bv$spin 01-29-98 22:51:22 UNITED STATES REPORTS 513 OCT. TERM 1994 513bv$titl 01-29-98 22:52:34 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 513 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Beginning of Term October 3, 1994, Through February 28, 1995 Together With Opinions of Individual Justices in Chambers FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1998 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 513us2$$$i 01-29-98 22:55:42 PGT * frt J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice. LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. DREW S. DAYS III, Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 513us2$$ii 01-29-98 22:58:18 PGT * frt SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1988 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Opinions reported on page 1301 et seq. are those written in chambers by individual Justices. Page A. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,1157 A.; Macias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 A. v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Abad v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Abate; Cleckley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Abdullah v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Abdul-Wasi; Gadson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Abdurrahman v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Abdus-Sabir v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Abengowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Abidekun v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Ables v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Abraham & Straus, Inc.; DiGianni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Abramajtys; Matlock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Abrams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Abrams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Abrego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Abreo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. v. McElveen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Accu-Labs Research, Inc.; Halim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Acevedo v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1036 Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1122 Acosta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,903,932,986,1132 Acton; Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1145 Acuna v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Adail v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Adair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,906,996 Adam; Benjamin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Adamo v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 v 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR vi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Adams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Adams v. Barclays American Business Credit, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Adams v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1036 Adams; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Adams v. Leapley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Adams v. Maryland Dept. of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs. . . 1113 Adams v. Melnick/Nickel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Adams v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Adams v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1042,1085 Adank; Higgason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1074,1108 Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Adkins v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Adkins; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Adlington v. Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Administrative Director of N. J. Courts; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Administrators, Tulane Ed. Fd.; Int'l Primate Prot. League v. . . . 1032 Advance Security, Inc. v. Mulhall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Afaneh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Affiliated FM Ins. Co.; Chicago Bd. of Ed. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 AFL Disposal Co. v. Board of Health and Hospitals of Boston . . . 931 Agbada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Agee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Ager; Trice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Agha v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 Agofsky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,949 Agrio, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Aguilar v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,865,1034 Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Aguilar; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Ahitow; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Ahitow; Pittman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Aiken & Mawicke, S. C.; Buschman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Airbus Industrie, G. I. E. v. Linton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Air Line Pilots; Nellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Air Transport Workers; Samuels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Aispuro v. Melendez Longoria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Aizen v. New Jersey Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Akaberian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Akron; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Alabama; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Alabama v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED vii Page Alabama; Clisby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Alabama; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Alabama; Giles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1199 Alabama; Gowens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Alabama v. Hansbrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Alabama; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504 Alabama; Kirby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Alabama; McGahee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Alabama; McNair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Alabama; Musgrove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Alabama v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Alabama; Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Alabama; Rheuark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Alabama; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Alabama; Woodard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Alabama; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Alabama Comm'r of Revenue; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Alabama Power Co.; Municipal Utilities Bd. of Albertville v. . . . . 1148 Alabama State Bar; Garmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Alachua County School Bd.; Guyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Alamosa; American Water Development, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Alarid v. Secretary, N. M. Dept. of Taxation and Revenue . . . . . . 1081 Alaska; Bullwinkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Alaska; Holden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Alaska; Jerrel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Alaska; Sauer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Alaska; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Alaska Operating Engineers-Employers Trust Fund; Andrews v. 874 Albanese v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Albrecht v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Albuquerque; Roscoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Aldan-Pierce; Mafnas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Alderman v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1185 Aldridge v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Alebord v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Aleotti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Alex; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Alexander v. Cormier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Alexander; Lennon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Alexander v. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Alexandre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Alexandria Division of Social Services; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1050 Alford; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Alford; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR viii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Alfred v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Alfredo A. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Alfredo A. v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . 822 Alhambra; Ramona Convent of Holy Names v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Ali v. McDade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 All American Marine Slip; Grupo Protexa, S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Allbright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Allen v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Allen v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Allen v. Dane County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Allen v. Duarte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Allen v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Allen v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Allen; Keenan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Allen v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Allen v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Allen v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,852,862,992,1050 Allen v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Allenbrand; Oyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Allen-Myland, Inc.; International Business Machines Corp. v. . . . 1066 Alley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Allison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Allmond; Fulton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Alloyd Co.; Gustafson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Deus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Allstate Ins. Co.; Deus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Allstate Life Ins. Co., Northbrook; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Aloma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Alonso v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Alonso v. Municipal Court of Cal., Ventura County . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Alonso Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Alpharetta; Geoffrey Development Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Alphonso v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Alston v. Redman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Altamirano-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Alter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Althoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Altimus v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Altschul, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1188 Alvarado Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Alvarez v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ix Page Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,881,1146 Alvarez Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Amalgamated. For labor union, see name of trade. Amarillo Hospital Dist.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Amato v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. Little Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Ambassador Hotel; Fertel-Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Ambort v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Amburgey v. Costa Mesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 American Airlines, Inc.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 American Bankers Assn. v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 American Bonding Co. v. Trustees of Carpenters for So. Nev. Health & Welfare Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 American Cablevision of Queens, Inc.; Praimnath v. . . . . . . . . . 888,1035 American Disposal Co. v. Hume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 American Diving & Salvage Co. v. Illinois Historic Preserv. Agcy. 961 American Energy Services, Inc.; Lekan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1066 American Express Bank Ltd. v. Sheerbonnet Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 American Foreign Shipping Co.; B & A Marine Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 961 American President Lines, Ltd. v. Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. . . . . . 1198 American Real Estate Corp.; Lokay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,1033 American Tel. & Tel. Co.; Francis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 American Tel. & Tel. Co.; Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. . . . . . 1052 American Trans Air, Inc.; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 American Union of Baptists, Inc. v. Trustees of Particular Primi- tive Baptist Church at Black Rock, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 American Water Development, Inc. v. Alamosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 AMF Corp.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Amis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Ammar v. Shilling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Ammar v. Welsch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Amoco Oil Co.; Germinaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Amoco Pipeline Co.; Woodson Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Amsden v. Professional Conduct Comm., N. H. Supreme Court 902,995 Amtrak; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1122 Amuso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Amwest Surety Ins. Co.; Mikkilineni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Ana G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Anchorage; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n; Swanner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n; Whitehall Properties v. . . . . . 979 Andaya; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR x TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Anders v. West Mead Township Zoning Hearing Bd. . . . . . . . . . . 965 Andersen & Co.; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Anderson v. Busman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Anderson v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Anderson v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100,1199 Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Anderson v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1074 Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Anderson v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557,805,922 Anderson v. Humana, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Anderson; Macias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Anderson v. Makel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Anderson; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819, 823, 882, 913, 939, 942, 1008, 1015, 1049, 1052, 1100, 1172, 1180, 1193 Andonian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Andres Paez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Andrews v. Alaska Operating Engineers-Employers Trust Fund 874 Andrews v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Andrews v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1057 Andrews-Powley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd. v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Andrisani v. Saugus Colony Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Andrus; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1066 Angel Flores v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Angheluta v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Anheuser-Busch, Inc.; Balducci Publications v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Anjum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Ankomah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Annapolis Road, Ltd. v. Anne Arundel County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Anne Arundel County; Annapolis Road, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 ANR Pipeline Co. v. Director of Property Valuation, Kan. Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Ansari v. Plummer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Anthony, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 An Unknown Number, Unidentified Agents of U. S. A.; Vennes v. 1076 Apelt v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,834 Appellate Dept., Super. Ct. of Cal., Placer County; Kile v. . . . . 875,1035 Appellate Div., Sup. Ct. of N. Y., Second Jud. Dept.; Carter v. . . . 1194 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Aquil v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xi Page ARA Health Services, Inc.; Michener v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Arave v. Fetterly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Arave; Paradis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Arce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1173 Archer Daniels Midland Co.; CPC International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1184 Ardila-Calderon v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Ardoin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Arellano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Arenas-Patino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Arevalo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Arias-Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Arizona; Apelt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,834 Arizona v. Burkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Arizona v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Arizona v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Arizona; Gallegos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Arizona; Mance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Arizona; Martinez Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Arizona; Mata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Arizona; Peabody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1066 Arizona; Pfeiffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1105 Arizona; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Arizona; Styers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Arizona; Summerlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Arizona Dept. of Economic Security; Hartford v. . . . . . . . . . . 1090,1186 Arizona Dept. of Economic Security; Melendez v. . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1034 Arkansas; Hunes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1061 Arkansas; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Arkansas; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1075,1145 Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Armontrout; Bannister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1103 Armontrout; Ealey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Armontrout; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Armour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Armstrong v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Armstrong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1060 Army Corps of Engineers; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Arnold; Duchesne County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Arnold v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Arnold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Arnold & Arnold; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Arnstein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,995 Arpaio; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR xii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Arrington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Arroyo Grande; Kawaoka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Arterberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Arthur Andersen & Co.; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Artuz; Padilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman v. Kline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Arvonio; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Asam v. Harwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 ASARCO Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Asbell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Asgrow Seed Co. v. DeeBees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Ashby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Asher; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Asheville; Biltmore Square Associates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Ashford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Ashley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1181 Ashness v. First Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Ashworth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Askew; Bowles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Assar v. Crescent Counties Foundation for Medical Care . . . . . . . 816 Associate Judge, District Court of Tex., Galveston Cty.; Fulton v. 865 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Association for Retarded Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. Thorne . . . . . . 1079 Association of Christian Academies and Colleges of Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Assured Thrift & Loan Assn.; Shong-Ching Tong v. . . . . . . . . . . 815 Astec Industries, Inc.; Mendenhall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Atchison; Combined Management, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Dempsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Athmann v. North Slope Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Atkins v. Coltec Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Atkins v. Tandy Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Atkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Atkinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Atkisson; Wexford Associates, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Atlantic Richfield Co.; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. . . . 811 Atlis Systems, Inc.; Enand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 AT&T Communications, Inc.; Voakes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Attorney General; Abdurrahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Attorney General; Ayuda, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Attorney General; Cahoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:23 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xiii Page Attorney General; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Attorney General; Cullum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Attorney General v. Koray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Attorney General of Alaska; Olson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Attorney General of Cal.; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Attorney General of Colo. v. Gagan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Attorney General of Fla.; Tamayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Attorney General of Ill.; Hickey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Attorney General of La.; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Attorney General of Mich.; American Bankers Assn. v. . . . . . . . . 1110 Attorney General of Mo. v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Attorney General of Mont.; Goodwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Attorney General of N. C.; Nakell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Attorney General of Tex. v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB . . . . . . . . 876 Attorney General of Wash.; Soundgarden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Attorney General of Wyo.; Pote v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Seaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Seaton-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Atwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Auburn; Gocken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Augustus v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Aultman v. Larkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Aumada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Auriti v. Segal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Aurora; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Aurora; Penk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Austex, Ltd. v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Austin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,1118,1175,1178 Auto Club Ins. Assn. v. White & White, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Automobile Workers; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Automobile Workers; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Thorn Apple Valley, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Avalos-Zarate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Avco Lycoming Textron; Klopp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Averhart v. Shettle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Avery v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Avery; Whitmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Aviel; Dance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Aviles v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Awawdeh v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Awofolu v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Ayala v. Leonardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Ayala v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Ayers v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ayers v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ayers v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Ayers v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ayrs v. Greenwald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Ayuda, Inc. v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Azar v. Health Alliance Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1104 Aziz v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Aziz v. Perkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Aziz v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Aziz v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Azor v. Cardinal Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Azubuko v. Commissioner of Parking, Boston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1137 Azuogu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 B. v. Vermont Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services . . . . . . 1004 Baasch v. Reyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,998 Babbitt; Middlemist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore. 1072 Babin v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Babinski v. Regucci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Baby Boy Janikova v. Kirchner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Baby K v. Ms. H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Baby "Richard" v. Kirchner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Baca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Bach; Boostrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1052 Bachelor's Library Adult Bookstore; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Bacon v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Bacon v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Badarayan v. Drake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Baer; Sellers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Baez v. Douglas County Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Bagnoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Bahn; Feldman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Bailey v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1003 Bailey v. Board of Ed. for Detroit Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Bailey v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Bailey v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Bailey v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064,1134,1198 Bain, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Baines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Baiza Hernandez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Baker v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Baker v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Baker; Chaplin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page Baker; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Baker v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1034 Baker v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1033 Baker v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1066 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,906,934,1030 Baker Protective Services, Inc.; Egan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Bakersfield; Pierro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Bakker; Teague v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Baldeon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Baldinger; DeWeerth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Balducci Publications v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Baldwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Ball v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Ballard v. Breeden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Ballard v. Gartz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Ballard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 B & A Marine Co. v. American Foreign Shipping Co. . . . . . . . . . . 961 Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural Resources Dist. . . . . . . . . 874 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro v. SMS Hasenclever GmbH . . . . . . . 917 Banda Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Bandy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Banh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Banic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Bank of Floyd; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Banks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Banks v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Banks v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Banks v. District of Columbia Dept. of Con. and Reg. Affairs . . . 820 Banks v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,953,1096 Banks; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Bannister v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1103 Bannister; Delo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Banque Nat. de Paris; One Times Square Assoc. Partnership v. . 1153 Banta; Henegar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Baptiste; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Barber v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Barber v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Barber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Barbour; Gossage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1093 Barbour; Thelan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Barclays American Business Credit, Inc.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Barlow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Barnard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Barnes; Parsons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Barnes v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,913,1005 Barnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Barnette v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Barnette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Baro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Barone; Hosoya Fireworks Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Barr; Skurdal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Barragan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Barrera Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Barrett v. Mississippi Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Barrientos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Barrow v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Tex. at El Paso . . . . . . . . 1118 Bartel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Bartlett v. Ortiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Bartlett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Bartley; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Barton; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Barton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1066 Bascue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bashara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Basheer v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Bashford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Bass v. Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Bass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Bass, PLC; Borowy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Bates v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Baton Rouge; Brossette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Baton Rouge; Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 822 Battaglia v. Schenectady County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Batten v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1034 Bauer v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1036 Bauer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1036 Baugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Bautista Rivera v. Court of Appeal of Cal., First App. District . . 867 Baxley; Roussos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Baxter v. California Comm'n on Judicial Appointments . . . . . . . . 970 Bayham; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Bayliner Marine Corp.; Stanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Bayou des Familles Dev. Corp. v. West Jefferson Levee Dist. . . . 1083 Baze v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 BB Asset Management, Inc. v. Symantec Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xvii Page Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1185 Beasley; McDermott International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Beasley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1118 Beason; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Beauchamp v. Board of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Beaufort County Schools; Roach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Becerra-Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Bechill; Greenwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Bechtel Group, Inc.; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1185 Beck v. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Becker v. Kennewick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Beckman v. Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bd. . . . . . . . 1113 Becton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Becton Dickinson & Co. v. United States ex rel. Siller . . . . . . . . . 928 Beddoe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Bedford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Bedford v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Bedinhaus; Modern Graphic Arts, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Beerman; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Behler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Behles; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1033 Behrens v. Pelletier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Beil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Beitler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Bejjani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 BE&K Construction Co.; Iron Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Belin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Belin; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Belknap v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Belk-Simpson; Laughter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1011 Bell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Bell v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Bell v. Klincar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Bell v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections . . . . . . . 1079 Bell v. Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Bell v. Pathmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Bell v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Bell v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Bell v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Bell v. Supermarkets General Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1077,1168 Bella v. Chamberlain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Bellazerius v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 BellSouth Corp.; Sandler Associates, L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Belsito v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Beltman North American Co.; Cleveland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Benavides v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Benavides Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Bench v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Bencs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Bender v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Bender v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Beneby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Benedict; Vaughan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Benigni v. Cowles Media Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Benigni v. Maas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Benigni v. Star Tribune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Benincasa v. Benincasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Benitez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Benjamin v. Adam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings Assn.; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 Bennatt v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Bennett; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Bennett; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Bennett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Benson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Benson; Breland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Benson; Buckhalton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Benson v. Empire State Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Benson v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Benson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1060 Benson; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Bent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Bentley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1134 Bercovici v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,996 Bergen v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Bergen County Jail; Werner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1025 Berger v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Berk; Quisenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Berkeley; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1010 Berkery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Berkson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Bermudez v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Bernard v. Dallas Water Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Bernard v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix Page Berniard v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Bernstein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Bernstein; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Bernstein; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Berry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Berry v. Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Berry v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Berry v. Sonoma County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Berry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Berryman v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Berton; DeFelice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Beshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Besinga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1010 Bessman v. WSOS Community Action Comm'n, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 938 Bethlehem Steel Corp.; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Betka v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092,1186 Bettis; Rutgerswerke AG v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Beuke v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Beus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Beverly; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,995 Bevevino; Schaffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Bey v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Beyah v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Beyer; Caraballo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Beyer; Merola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Beyer; Pemberthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Beyer; Perri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Beyer; Rigney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Bibbins v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Biegeleisen v. Jacobson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Bieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Biesterveld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Bigg v. Selective Service System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Biggins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Bighom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Bilal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Bilby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Bills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Biltmore Square Associates v. Asheville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Bird v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Bisby v. Zenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Bishop v. Collier County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bishop v. Georgia State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987,1105 Bishop v. State Bar of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Bishop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Bishop Estate; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Bitton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Black v. J. I. Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Blackburn v. Tudor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Blackburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Black Hills Institute of Geo. Research v. Department of Justice . . . 810 Blackmon v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Blackwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Blain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Blake v. Blake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Blake v. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Blakely Borough; Caterina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Blakemore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Blameuser v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Blanc v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Blanchard v. Superior Court of San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Blanchard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Blanchfield v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Bland; California Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Blankenburg v. Corbin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Blaylock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Blazer v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Bledsoe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Bleicken v. Coos County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Bleicken v. Perkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1010 Blevins v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Blinebery; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Block; Kashannejad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Block; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Blodgett v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Bloomingdale's, Inc.; DiGianni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Blue Streak, Inc. v. Gulf Island IV, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Board of Bar Examiners; Ramos Beauchamp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Board of Ed. for Detroit Public Schools; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Board of Ed. of Lockport Twp. High School Dist. 205; Cromley v. 816 Board of Ed. of Park Ridge; Freedman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Board of Governors, FRS; DLG Financial Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Board of Green Township Trustees; Kleve v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Board of Health and Hospitals of Boston; AFL Disposal Co. v. . . 931 Board of Health and Hospitals of Boston; Lepardo v. . . . . . . . . . . 931 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi Page Board of Parole; Macnab v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Board of Regents of Univ. of Tex. at El Paso; Barrow v. . . . . . . . 1118 Board of Regist. for Pro. Engineers & Surveyors; Encinas v. . . . . 1045 Board of Supervisors of Fauquier County; Pomponio v. . . . . . . . . 870 Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves v. Pires . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.; Braslavsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1105 Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.; Smart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Boatright v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Boatwright; Ruark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Bob Schmidt Chevrolet, Inc.; Setola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1122,1144 Bocage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Boeh; Olivas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Boeing Co.; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Boers v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Boggs; Bowser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Bohuk v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Bolan; Judge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1136 Bolden v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Bolender v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1136 Bolling v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Bolton v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bombela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Bonasia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Bond, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1186 Bond v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Boneta, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1124 Bongiovanni v. San Filippo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Bonner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Bonner Mall Partnership; U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. . . . . . . . 18 Bonser v. Nottingham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1033 Booker Harper v. Pearson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Boone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Boostrom v. Bach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1052 Booth v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Boothby; Glass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Borden, Inc.; Kersh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Borden, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Boreland v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Borg; Burks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Borg; Chivars v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Borg; Nonnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Borg; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Borg; Sadler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Borg; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Borg; Thurman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Borg; Wiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Borg & Warner Automotive Electronics & Mechanical System Corp.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Boroja v. Nedeljkovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Borough. See name of borough. Borowy v. Bass, PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Borromeo v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Bostic, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1187 Boston Post Road Ltd. Partnership v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 1109 Botello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Boulder Valley School Dist. RE­2; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Bouler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Bouquet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Boutte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Bowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Bowen v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,995 Bowen; Lierenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Bowers; Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Bowers; Coulombe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Bowie v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Bowie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Bowlen; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Bowles v. Askew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Bowles v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Bowling v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Bowling; Ransome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Bowling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Bowman; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Bowser v. Boggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Bowser v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Boyd v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,907 Boyd v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Boyd v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Boydston; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,880 Boyle v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 BP Performance Polymers, Inc. v. Ethyl Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Bracewell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Brader v. Landis Mfg. Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Bradford; Los Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Bradford v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxiii Page Bradford v. San Luis Obispo County, Dept. of Social Services . . . 1131 Bradford; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Bradford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Bradley v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Bradley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Bradley v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Bradvica v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Brady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Braggs v. Mobile County Health Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1066 Braggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Bramucci; Mobile Medex, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Branch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Branch v. Keohane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,993,1007 Branch Banking & Trust Co.; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Brandt v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Brandt-Erichsen v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Brannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Branson v. Haber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Branson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Brant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Brantley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Braslavsky v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1105 Braswell v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964,1136 Brau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Braxton; Simms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Braxton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Bray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Brazzell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Breard v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Breaux Brothers Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Breeden; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Breedlove v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Breland v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Breland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Brereton; Gooden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Bresnan Communications Co. v. Huntsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Brewer v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Brewer v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Bricker v. Rockwell Hanford Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Bridgeport; Finizie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1052 Bridges v. Pittsburgh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Brifis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Brigano; Boyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Brigano; Humphrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Brigano; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Bright v. QSP, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Brigle; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Brimmer v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Brinkley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Brinkman; Kansas Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,985 Briscoe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Briseno v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Brister; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 995 Britenbach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1033 Brito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Britt v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Brittingham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Broadcast Music, Inc.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Brobst v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1122 Brockman v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 1 . . . . . . . . . 951,1052 Brokaw; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Bronfman v. Kansas City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Bronson v. Domovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Brookings v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Brooks v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Brooks v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Brooks v. Fulton Dept. of Family and Children Services . . . . . . . 879 Brooks v. O'Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Brooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1154 Brooks-Bey v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Brossette v. Baton Rouge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brothers v. Klevenhagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Broughton v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1137 Broussard v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Brown; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Brown; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Brown v. Barton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Brown; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Brown v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Brown v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1089 Brown v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Brown; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Brown; Earth Island Institute, Marine Mammal Fund v. . . . . . . . 999 Brown; Estrella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxv Page Brown v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Brown v. Gardner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Brown; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1136 Brown v. Howard-Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1035 Brown; Kamal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Brown; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Brown; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Brown v. Louisville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Brown v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099,1186 Brown v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Brown v. National Medical Enterprises Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Brown v. Nobles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1186 Brown v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Brown v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Brown v. Paige . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Brown v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Brown v. St. Petersburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Brown v. Siegel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Brown v. Snow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Brown; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829, 852,857,861,900,949,950,1003,1008,1021,1045,1065,1166,1168 Brown v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of N. J. . . . . . . . . 1044 Brown v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Brown; Willcutt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Brown Co. v. Jacobs Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Brown Co.; Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Browner; Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Browner; Fiore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Browner; Municipal & Industrial Disposal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Browner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,882 Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.; United Technologies Corp. v. . . 1183 Brumby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Brumfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Brumley v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Brummett v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Brun Apartments; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1104 Bruning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Brunk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Brunn v. United Guaranty Residential Ins. Co. of N. C. . . . . . . . . 1092 Brunwasser v. Steiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1055 Bryan; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Bryan v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bryan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Bryant v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Bryant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1173 Bryson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Bryson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Buchanan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Buchbinder v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Buck v. Reisman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Buckaloo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Buckeye Cellulose Corp.; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Buckhalton v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Buckles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Buckley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Budd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Bueno v. Huntington Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Buffalo Brothers Management, Inc.; Mosay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Bulldog Leasing Co.; Curtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Buller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Bullwinkle v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Bulsiewicz; Jemzura v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Bunce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Bundy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Bunnell; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Burch; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Burch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Burchard v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Burden v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Burdick v. N. H. Sup. Ct., Comm. on Character and Fitness . . . . 931 Burdine v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Burger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,861,1008 Burgess v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Burke v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Burke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1110 Burkes; Klauser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Burkett; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Burks v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Burks v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Burleson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Burley v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1186 Burnett v. Reasoner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Burnham Broadcasting Co.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Burns v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Burns v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii Page Burnside v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Burress v. Christianity & Crisis, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1035 Burress; Northington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Burress v. Presbyterian Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,992,1035 Burt; Godboldo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Burt; Wardlaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Burton; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Burton v. Central Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n . . . . . . 951 Burton; Crandall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Burton; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1035 Burton; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Burton; Hollingsworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Burton v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Burton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Burton; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Burtrum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Burzynski v. Trustees, N. W. Laundry & Dry Cleaners Trust . . . 1155 Buschman v. Aiken & Mawicke, S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Busey; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Bush v. Crystal Homes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Bush v. Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Bushert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Business Exchange, Inc.; Kiskila v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092,1199 Busman; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Bussell v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Bustamante Lomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Buster v. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Bustillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bustos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Butler; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Butler v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Services . . . 937 Butler v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Butler; Zapata Protein (USA), Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Butler Publishing Co. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Butterworth; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1066 Butterworth; Tamayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Butts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Bybee v. Proctor Community Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Byers; Webber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Byrd v. Presentment Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Byse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 C. v. Timothy L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Caballero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Cablestrand Corp.; Wallshein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cabool v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Cabral-Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Cabrera; Jakabovitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Cahoon v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Cain v. Missouri State Bd. of Podiatry Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1036 Cain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Cain v. Vickers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1104 Caine v. Milwaukee Mack Sales, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Calderon; McPeters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Calderon v. Siripongs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Calderon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Calderon v. Wade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Calderon-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Caldwell v. Fellin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Caldwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Calia v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1168 California; Alfredo A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 California; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 California; Alonso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 California; Angheluta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 California; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 California; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 California; Bedford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 California; Berryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 California; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1089 California; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 California; Cesar A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 California; Conway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 California; Crummie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 California; Cudjo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 California; Dabney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 California; Edinbyrd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 California; Ferro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 California; Garceau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 California; Garcia Piadares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 California; Ghent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 California; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 California; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 California; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 California; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 California; Higareda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 California; Humiston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 California; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 California; Jamerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1185 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxix Page California; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 California; Jestice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 California; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 California; Kirakossian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 California; Kirkpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 California; Lin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 California; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 California; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,842 California; Morse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 California; Naddi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 California; Peraza Salgado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 California v. Pimentel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 California; Pledger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 California; Randolph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 California; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 California; Redmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 California; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 California; Rich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 California; Richmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 California; Roldan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 California; Russel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 California; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 California; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 California; Sandoval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 California; Schankman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 California; Sheldon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 California; Solis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 California; Tanner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 California; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 California; Velasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 California; Wash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 California; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 California; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1163 California; Winston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 California; Worrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 California; Ybarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 California Bd. of Dental Examiners; Damascus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 California Coastal Comm'n; Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1148 California Comm'n on Judicial Appointments; Baxter v. . . . . . . . . 970 California Dept. of Corrections v. Bland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 California Dept. of Corrections v. Moyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 California Dept. of Corrections v. Ramon Morales . . . . . . . . . . 924,1074 California Dept. of Corrections; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 California Dept. of Motor Vehicles; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page California Dept. of Motor Vehicles; Chan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 California Dept. of Motor Vehicles; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 California Public Util. Comm'n; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 California State Bar; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 California State Water Resources Control Bd.; Tahoe Keys Prop- erty Owners' Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Singh v. . . . . . . . 1154 Califorrniaa v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Call v. Carlson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Call; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Callahan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Calvento v. Metcalf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Calverley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Calvillo v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Calvo v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Camacho v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 812 Camardella; Vemco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Camargo-Vergara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Camp; Milone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Campaign National Bank; Landers Seed Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Campbell; Brummett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Campbell v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Campbell v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Campbell v. Sheehan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Campbell v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Campbell v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Campbell Soup Co.; Kyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Campos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Camps v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Canadian General Ins. Co.; WMX Technologies, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1183 Can-Am Industries, Inc.; Hininger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Canape v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Cancel v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Cancio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Candela; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Cane; Worcester County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Cannon v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Canton; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Cantu v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Capital Cities Media; Starnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette . . . . . . . . . . 1106 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Caputo v. Compuchem Laboratories, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Caraballo v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Caradine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Carballo-Menendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Cardenas-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Cardinal Industries; Azor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc.; Mitsubishi International Corp. v. . . . 1146 Cardona v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Cardona-Usquiano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Carey v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Carlsbad; Mass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Carlson; Call v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Carlton; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Carlton; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Carmazzi; Persinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Carmenita Associates; Shadian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Carmichael v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,994 Carnegie v. Dowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Carnell v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Carnet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Carney v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1126 Carpenters Health and Welf. Tr. Fd. for Cal. v. Tri-Capital Corp. 1018 Carper; Karr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Carr v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Carr; Maghe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Carr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1086 Carrillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Carrio v. Hemstree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Carrizales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Carroll v. Crist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Carroll v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Carroll v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Carroll v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Carroll v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Carson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Carson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Carter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Carter v. Amtrak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1122 Carter v. Appellate Div., Sup. Ct. of N. Y., Second Jud. Dept. . . . 1194 Carter v. Burch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Carter v. Endell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Carter v. Gunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Carter v. Harry Lee Carter Estate Management Trust . . . . . . . . 948 Carter v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Carter v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Carter v. Padoven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Carter v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,934,1041 Carter v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Carter Estate Management Trust; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Cartwright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Caruso; Harhai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Caruso; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Carver v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Casal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Casares-Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Casas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Casa Veerkamp, S. A. de C. V. v. Kreimerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Case; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Casey; Cabool v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Casey; Russo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Cashin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Casilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Cassidy v. Industrial Indemnity Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1199 Cassidy v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Castano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Castellanos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Castle Rock v. Huson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Castro, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Castro Gaxiola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Castro Vasquez v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1033 Caterair International v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . 1015 Caterina v. Blakely Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Cates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Cathedral of Joy Baptist Church v. Hazel Crest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Catoe; Gaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Cattaraugus County District Attorney's Office; Lake v. . . . . . . . . 1165 Caughey; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Cave & McKay; Knighten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1199 Cazeau v. Pennsylvania State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Cazes v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1086 C. B. v. Vermont Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services . . . . 1004 Ceaser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Celestine v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page Celotex Corp.; Gasko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Cement Division, National Gypsum Co.; Milwaukee v. . . . . . . . . . 1072 Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Cemex, S. A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Centennial Mortgage Corp. v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 CenTra, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Central Freight Lines, Inc.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Central Interstate Low-Level Radioact. Waste Comm'n; Burton v. 951 Central Interstate Low-Level Radioact. Waste Comm'n; Nebraska ex rel. Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd., Santa Fe Pac. Corp. v. 987 Century-National Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Cervantes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Cervantes Degortari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Cesar A. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Cestnik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Chaffer v. Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Chaklos v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Chamberlain; Bella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Chamberlin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Chamberlin v. Hayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Chambers v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Chambers County Comm'n; Swint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Chambliss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Champion; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Chan v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Chandler v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Chandler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Chang; Lavold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1122 Chanoff v. United States Surgical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Chapa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1180 Chapleau; Leppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Chapleau; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Chaplin v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Chapman v. Bryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Chapman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Charter National Bank-Westheimer; Musemeche v. . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Chastain, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1142 Chatima v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944,1036 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Chatters v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092,1186 Chaudhary, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Chau Hai Do v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Chavers v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,894,1008,1009,1059 Chaviano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Check Services Northwest; Rokke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Cheeks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Cheesman; Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Cheit; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Chertoff; Gaydos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,998 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture . 927 Chesney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Chester; Mikkilineni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Sea Savage, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Chevron U. S. A. Inc.; Sea Savage, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Chew; Los Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Chicago v. Alex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527 Chicago; Lucille v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Chicago Bd. of Ed. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.; Otis v. . . . . . . . . . 873 Chichester v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Chickasaw Nation; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1144 Chief Justice, Super. Court of Me., Androscoggin Cty.; Gallant v. 969 Childress v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Childress v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Childs v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Childs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Chiles v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Ching Luen Enterprises Co. v. Mason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Chischilly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Chisum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1052 Chi Thien Duong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Chivars v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Chivers v. North Slope Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Chong In Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Chong Leung v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 CHoPP Computer Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Chow v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Chowdhury v. Southern Cal. Coach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Christian v. Vasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page Christianity & Crisis, Inc.; Burress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1035 Christiano v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Christianson v. Relfe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1035 Christopher v. Stone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Chrysler Corp.; Men-Guer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 810 Chrysler Motors Corp.; Snelling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 CH2M Hill Southeast, Inc.; Pinellas County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Chukundah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Chukwura v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Church v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Churchill; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.; Clearwater v. . . . . 807 Ciaffoni v. Cowden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Ciardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Cicero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 CIGNA Ins. Co.; Huddleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1125 Cimino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Cinel v. Connick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Ark., Craighead County; Booker Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Mo., St. Louis County; Grizzle v. 1062 Citibank, N. A.; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 City. See name of city. Clanin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Clapp v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Clark v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Clark v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1186 Clark v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1036 Clark v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1019,1027,1119,1177 Clarke; Ditter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Clarke; Slade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Clarke County Comm'n; House v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Clark-Rubin v. Ohio State Univ. Hospitals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Clarkstown; Reiss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Clary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Class; Lohnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Clay; Ferrellgas, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Clay; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Claybrook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Clearwater v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. . . . . 807 Cleckley v. Abate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Clement; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Clemmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Clemon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Clemons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Cleveland v. Beltman North American Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Cleveland; Berger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Cleveland v. Schley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Cleveland Bar Assn.; Okocha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Clifton v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Clifton v. Suburban Cable Television Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Clinton County Social Services; Kikuts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Clisby v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Clonts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Clorox Co.; Omnitech International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Clostermann v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1136 Clotilde, Inc.; Solar-Kist Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Clyburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 CNA Ins. Cos.; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Cobb v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Coble v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Cochran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Cocke; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Coddington v. Wabash Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Cody; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Cody v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Coefield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Coffel; East v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Cofield v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Cohen v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Colavito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Colburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Cole, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Cole v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Cole v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1036 Cole v. Ogorzolka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Cole; Olson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Cole v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,993 Cole; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,995 Coleman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Coleman v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Coleman; Piroglu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Coleman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1007,1113,1197 Colina v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page Collavini v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Collier, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1073 Collier County; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Collier County; First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. . . . 1080 Collier County; Griffith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Collins v. Greene County Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Collins v. Hesse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Collins v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Collins; Reich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Collins v. Schweitzer, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Collins v. Stanislaus County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . 990 Colorado; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Colorado; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Colorado; Hakel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Colorado; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Colorado; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1124,1144 Colorado; Lanphere & Urbaniak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Colorado; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Coltec Industries, Inc.; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Columbia; NAACP Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Columbus v. Knight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Columbus; Quang Ly Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Colville; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,995,1195 Colvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Comanche County; Semien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Combined Management, Inc. v. Atchinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Combs v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Tolley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Commercial Union Assurance Co., plc v. Milken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Commissioner; Acevedo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Commissioner; Babin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Commissioner v. Baptiste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Commissioner; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Commissioner; Buchbinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Commissioner; Corona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Commissioner; Dillon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Commissioner; Downey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Commissioner; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Commissioner; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Commissioner; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Commissioner; Hildebrand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Commissioner; Hyde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Commissioner; Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Commissioner; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Commissioner; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Commissioner; Kovacs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Commissioner; Krause v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Commissioner; Leaphart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1199 Commissioner; Nationalist Movement v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Commissioner; Okon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Commissioner v. Schleier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1055 Commissioner; Sundstrand Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Commissioner; Warda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Commissioner; Wayno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Commissioner; Wizobowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Commissioner; Wolverine, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Parking, Boston; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1137 Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability of Ore.; Schenck v. 871 Committee to Save Mokelumne River; Members of Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.; Diaz Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1185 Comparato v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Compton; Thandiwe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Compton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Comptroller of Currency v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. . . . . . 251 Compuchem Laboratories, Inc.; Caputo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Computer Curriculum Corp. v. Instructional Systems, Inc. . . . . . 1183 Condren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Congregation of Passion, Holy Cross Prov.; Touche Ross & Co. v. 947 Congress of U. S.; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Conklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Conley v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Conlin; Mann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Connecticut; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1036 Connecticut; Christiano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Connecticut; Correia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Connecticut; Daugaard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Connecticut; Mann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Connecticut; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Connecticut; Yurch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Connelly v. Grossman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Conner v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Conner; Sandin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,921 Connick; Cinel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Connor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,949 Connors v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Conrod v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Consolidated Indianapolis-Marion Cty.; Reel Pipe & Valve Co. v. 1058 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Marsilio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Constant, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Constant v. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Constant; Spartanburg Steel Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Continental Casualty Co.; Reich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Contreras v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1007 Conway v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Conzett v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Cook; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Cook v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Cooledge; McCombs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Cool Light Co. v. GTE Products Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Cooney; Nicholson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Cooper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Cooper; Cordova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Cooper v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Cooper; Guinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1010 Cooper v. National RX Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Cooper v. Riggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Cooper v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Cooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,904 Cooper v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Coopers & Lybrand; FoxMeyer Drug Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Coos County Superior Court; Bleicken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Cope v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Coplin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Copple v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Corbin; Blakenburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Cordero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Cordova v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Cordova v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Corley; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Cormier; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Cormier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Corona v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Coronel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Corporate Interiors, Inc.; Sandlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Corrales-Quinceno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Correia v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Corrigan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1186 Corson, Mitchell, Tomhave & McKinley, M. D. S., Inc.; Sejpal v. . 810 Corvallis v. Turpen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Corwin v. Mark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Corwin; Mark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Corwin v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Cosner v. Haws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Costa Mesa; Amburgey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Costello v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Cothran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Cotton v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Couch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,993 Coughlin; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Coughlin; Jameson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Coughlin; Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Coulombe v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Council v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 County. See name of county. Courtney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Court of Appeal of Cal., First App. District; Bautista Rivera v. . . 867 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals of Ohio, Huron County; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Court of Appeals of Wis., Third District; Pesek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Cousino v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,936 Covarrubias Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Cowart v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Cowden; Ciaffoni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Cowhey; McLaurin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Cowin; Yocas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Cowles Media Co.; Benigni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Cowley; Stapleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Cox v. Boeing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Cox; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Cox v. Newton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Cox; Pew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1185 Cox; Steelworkers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Cox v. USX Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Cox; USX Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Coy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Coyne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 CPC International, Inc. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. . . . . . . . . 1184 Crago v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Craig v. California State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Craig v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Crain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,949 Crandall v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Crane v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Crane v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Crank v. Tolle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Crannell v. Crannell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Cranshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Craven v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Crawford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1010 Crawford v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Crawford v. Pee Dee Federal Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Crawford v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Cray Communications, Inc.; Novatel Computer Systems, Inc. v. . 1191 Creative Games Technology, Inc.; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Creech v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Cregan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Crescent Counties Foundation for Medical Care; Assar v. . . . . . . 816 Crescenzi v. Scherling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Crist, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Crist; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Crittenden v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Cromley v. Board of Ed. of Lockport Twp. High School Dist. 205 816 Cromlish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Crooks v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Crosby v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Crosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Cross v. Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Cross v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Crouch; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1036 Crowder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Crowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Crowley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Steelworkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Cruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Crumb, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1010 Crummie v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Cruttenden & Co. v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Cruz v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Cruz v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1101 Cruz; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1066 Crystal Homes, Inc.; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 CSL Utilities, Inc.; Jennings Water, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Adkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Cuartas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Cudjo v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Cuevas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Cullen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1187 Cullen; Tuxedo Union Free School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Cullen & Cullen; Nisqually Indian Tribe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Cullum v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Cully v. Grace Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Cummings v. DeKalb County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Cummings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Cunningham; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Cunningham v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Cunningham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,950 Cuomo v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1039,1055 Cupa-Guillen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Cupit v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Curiale v. Andrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1066 Curiale v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1035 Curran; Gines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Curry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Curtis v. Bulldog Leasing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1197 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1040,1075 Curto; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1034 Custard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 C. W. v. Wasiek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1183 Cyprian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Dabney v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Daddona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Dago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Dahlheim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Dahm; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Dai Quoc Lu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Dale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Dalis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Dallas Water Dept.; Bernard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Dalton; Burchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Dalton; Elshinnawy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page Dalton; Espinueva v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Damascus v. California Bd. of Dental Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Damatta-Olivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Damerville v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Dance v. Aviel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Dancy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Dandridge v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Dane County; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Dane County Social Services; Fertel-Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Daneshvar v. University of W. Va. Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Daniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Daniels v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Danning; Huber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Dash v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Dashnaw v. Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Dass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Daugaard v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Daugherty; Hatfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 David v. Hudacs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Davidson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Davidson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Davies; Scalice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Davila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Davila-Escovedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Davis v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Davis; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1186 Davis v. Greer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Davis v. Hanrahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Davis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Davis; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Davis v. Johnson Controls, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Davis; Kerpan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1104 Davis v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1066 Davis v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Davis; Murphy Exploration & Production Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Davis v. New Jersey Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1010 Davis v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Davis v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Davis v. Oda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Davis v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Davis v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Davis v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Davis v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority . . . . . . . . . . 837 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Davis v. United States . . . . 843,859,876,896,945,961,1008,1041,1098,1101 Davis v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Dawkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1187 Dawson v. Halperin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Dawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1176 Day; Holahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Day v. Norman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Day v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Day v. Waits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Dayton Hudson Corp.; Oconomowoc Lake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Dean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1157 Dearborn v. Loschiavo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Dearinger v. DuCharme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Deaton v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 DeBardeleben v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Deberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 DeBevoise; Thakkar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1186 DeBruyn; Rowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 De Castro, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 DEC International; Kovalic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Deeb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 DeeBees; Asgrow Seed Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Deer Park; Taub v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Deerwester v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 DeFelice v. Berton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 DeFranco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Deggendorf v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1115 Degortari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 De Grandy; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 DeGrijze v. Schwartz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 DeGrooth v. General Dynamics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Dehler v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1130 DeKalb County; Cummings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 DeKalb County; Durden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 De la Cerda v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 De la Fe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1104 Delahanty; Gallant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Delaney; Skyline Lodge, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Delarco v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Delaware; Blanchfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Delaware; Gattis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Delaware v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Delaware; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Delaware; Lawrie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Delaware; Marvel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Delaware; Stansbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Delaware; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Delaware; Walsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1033 Delaware; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Delaware Dept. of Health and Social Services; Parsons v. . . . . . . 875 Delaware River Port Authority of Pa. and N. J.; Peters v. . . . . . . 811 Delaware Women's Health Org., Inc.; Migliorino (Miller) v. . . . . . 1058 Delaware Women's Health Org., Inc.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Delaware Women's Health Org., Inc.; Scheidler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Delbridge v. Franco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Deleon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 DeLeon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 De Leon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Del Grosso; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Del Hierro-Vargas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 DeLisle v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Dellorfano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Del Monte Corp.; Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Delo v. Bannister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Delo; Flieger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Delo; Follins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Delo; McCall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Delo; Nave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Delo; Pollard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1105,1107 Delo; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Delo; Schlup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 Delo; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Delo; Stuckey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Delo; Waring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Demjanjuk; Rison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Demolfetto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Dempsey v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Dempsey v. Turner Broadcasting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1105 Demuniz v. Oregon Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Denham v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Deninno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Dennis v. Dennis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Denoyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Densmore v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1034 Denson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Departmental Disciplinary Comm., First Jud. Dept.; Friedman v. 820 Departmental Disciplinary Comm., First Jud. Dept.; Sneed v. . . . 816 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Departmental Disciplinary Comm., Supreme Court of N. Y., Ap- pellate Div., First Jud. Dept.; Weingrad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Department of Agriculture; Boers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Department of Agriculture; Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. 927 Department of Air Force; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100,1199 Department of Air Force; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Department of Air Force; Krall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1066 Department of Army; Chaklos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Department of Army; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Department of Army; Mangino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Department of Army; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Department of Commerce; McVey-Mehta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Department of Health and Human Services; Lang v. . . . . . . . . 854,1066 Department of Housing and Urban Development; Eno v. . . . . . 916,1036 Department of Interior; Brandt-Erichsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Department of Interior; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Department of Interior; Pahdopony v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Department of Justice; Bauer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1036 Department of Justice; Black Hills Institute of Geo. Res. v. . . . . . 810 Department of Justice; Carney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Department of Justice; Guzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Department of Justice; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Department of Labor; Brumley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Department of Revenue of Ore.; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Department of Transportation; Grapevine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Department of Transportation; Terrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Department of Treasury; Hiratani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1122 Department of Treasury of Mich.; Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. 1016 Department of Veterans Affairs; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Department of Veterans Affairs; Nesby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Department of Veterans Affairs; Quiban v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1009 Depineda v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Derrick v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Derrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 DeSalvo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Desantiago-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. v. Winegar . . . 964 Desmond v. Nynex Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm'n of Ky. . . . . . 871 Detrick; Sampang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Detrick v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Detroit; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Deus; Allstate Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Deutsche Bank AG; Juels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 DeVelasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Deven Lithographers, Inc.; Kersh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Devier v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 DeVille v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Devoe; Engle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 De Vonish v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 DeVries v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 DeWeerth v. Baldinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Dewitt; Meeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 D. G. v. T. M. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 D & G Marine Maintenance v. Kollias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Dial v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Diaz v. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1101,1155 Diaz Lopez v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1185 Diaz-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Dice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Dick v. Yellow Cab Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Dickerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Dickerson v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Dickinson; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Dickinson & Co. v. United States ex rel. Siller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 DiCuccio v. Geisinger Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Dietrich v. Sun Exploration & Production Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 DiGianni, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 DiGianni v. Abraham & Straus, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 DiGianni v. Bloomingdale's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 DiGianni v. Macy's Northeast, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 DiGianni v. Saks Fifth Avenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 DiGianni v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 DiGianni v. Stern's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 DiGioia v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 DiGirlamo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Dillard Department Stores, Inc.; Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1126 Dilley v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Dillman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Dillon v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Dillon; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Dingler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Dipaolo; Sabetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page DiPaolo; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock . 997,1074 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. Director of Property Valuation, Kan. Dept. of Revenue; ANR Pipeline Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 District Bd. of Trustees, Miami-Dade Community Coll.; Duffy v. 1001 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia; Bowles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 District of Columbia; Byran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 District of Columbia; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 District of Columbia v. Lampkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 District of Columbia; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 District of Columbia; Preuss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1033 District of Columbia; Rae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1066 District of Columbia Dept. of Con. and Reg. Affairs; Banks v. . . . 820 District of Columbia Dept. of Con. and Reg. Affairs; Job Protectors Former Administrative Law Judges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Services; Butler v. . . . 937 Ditter v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Diversicare Corp. of America; Med-Therapy Rehab. Services v. . . 817 Dix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Dixon v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Dixon v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Dixon; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1105 Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,994 D-Landco v. Oklahoma Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1035 DLG Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors, FRS . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Do v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1168 Dobbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Dobson; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Dr. John Hagelin for President Committee of Kan. v. Graves . . . . 1126 Dr. K v. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Doe; Acuna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Doe; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Doe; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Doe v. Gainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Doe v. Gallegos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Doe v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089,1199 Doe v. Kirchner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1138,1303 Doe; Lankford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Doerr v. San Bernardino County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1033 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Doherty v. Pennington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Dokes v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1104 Dolny v. Erickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Domanico; Lingenfelter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Domingo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Domovich; Bronson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Domovich; Jerry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1122 Domovich; Veneri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,995 Donovan v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Donovan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,915 Don Snell Buick, Inc.; Dupuis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Dooley v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Doose v. Poppen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 DoPadre v. DoPadre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Dorman v. Emerson Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Dorri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Dorsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Dotson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Dougan; Yeoman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Dougherty v. Marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Doughtie v. Florida Dept. of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Douglas v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Douglas County Comm'n; Baez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Douglas & Lomason Co.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Dou-Han, Inc. v. St. Petersburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Dow Corning Corp. v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Dowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Dow Jones & Co., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301 Dowling; Carnegie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Downer v. Hanneman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Downey v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Drake; Badarayan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Drake v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Dreksler v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Drew, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Drinski; Plakas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Drivers; Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Drown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Drummond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 D'Souza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Duane; Government Employees Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Duarte; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Duberry v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 DuBois; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 DuBois; Scarpa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Duboise; Dupont v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1036 Dubuc v. Musseman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Dubyak v. San Bernardino County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Dubyak v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1105 DuCharme; Dearinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Duchesne County v. Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Duchinsky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Duckworth; Bernard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Duckworth; Lord v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Dudzinski v. Livonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Duffey v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Duffy v. District Bd. of Trustees, Miami-Dade Community College 1001 Duffy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Duffy v. Wetzler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Duhamel v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Duke v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Dulaney v. Wildman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Dumornay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Duncan v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Duncan v. Blinebery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Duncan; Clifton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Duncan v. Del Grosso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Duncan; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Duncan; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Duncan v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 Duncan; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Duncan; Mouneu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Duncan v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1041 Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, Fort Berthold Res. 1103 Dunham-Bey v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Dunkin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Dunkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Dunmore v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Dunston; NYSA­ILA Welfare Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Duong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Dupont v. Duboise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1036 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Hanh Le v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Sawtell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Dupree; Lamar County Bd. of Ed. and Trustees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Dupree; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page Dupuis v. Don Snell Buick, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Duque v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Duran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Duranseau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Durden v. DeKalb County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Durham v. Henman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Durham; Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Durham v. Xerox Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Durr v. Intercounty Title Co. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Durr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Durusau, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Dusenbery v. Graves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Dusenbery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,909,1036 Dussault v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Dutton; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1104 Duval; Libby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Duval; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Dyer v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Dyer v. Sheldon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Dyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,876 Dykes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Dykstra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Dyna Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Ealey v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Earhart v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Early v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Earth Island Institute, Marine Mammal Fund v. Brown . . . . . . . 999 Easley v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Easley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Eason v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 East v. Coffel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 East v. West One Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 East Dayton Tool & Die Co. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. . . 816 Eastman Kodak Co.; Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. . . . 811 Easton; Field v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Eastwood Mall, Inc.; Slanco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Eaton v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 EB, Inc.; Sowashee Venture v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Echenique v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Echols v. Yukon Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1122 Eckard v. Eckard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Ecker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Edelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Edenfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Eder v. ITT Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Edinbyrd v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc.; Short v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Edmonds v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1108 Edmonds v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Edwards; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1074 Edwards; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Edwards v. First American Title Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Edwards v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Edwards v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Edwards v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1133 Edwards v. Ylst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Egan v. Baker Protective Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Egles; Wakefield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 E. G. Lowry Co.; Pemberton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Egwuonwu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Ehi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Eick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059,1186 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Hanh Le v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Sawtell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Einspahr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Eisenmenger; Ethicon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Ekco Housewares Co.; Kraft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 El Camino Resources; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Elcock v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Eldeeb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 El Dorado County Superior Court; Mount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 El Dorado Mobilehome Park v. Rent Rev. Comm'n, Palm Springs 1110 El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. Rent Rev. Comm'n, Palm Springs 1110 Eldridge v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Electrical Workers; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1001 Electronic Data Systems Corp.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Electro-Tec Corp.; Jenkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Eley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Elford v. Elford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 El Hani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Elkhart County Auditor; Yoder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Ellingsworth v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Ellington v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Ellis v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Ellis v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Ellison v. Makel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 El Monte High School Dist.; Srinivasan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Elshinnawy v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Embry; Vashone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 EMC Mortgage Co.; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 EMC Mortgage Corp.; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Emerson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Emerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,856 Emerson Electric Co.; Dorman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Emery v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; Insurance Co. of Pa. v. . . . . . . . . 1051 Empire State Bank; Benson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Enand v. Atlis Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Encinas v. Board of Regist. for Pro. Engineers & Surveyors . . . . 1045 Endell; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Endicott; Vallera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Energy Transportation Co.; Ricord's Succession v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Eng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Engle v. Devoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Englert v. Small Business Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1185 English v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Enigwe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Eno v. Department of Housing and Urban Development . . . . . 916,1036 Enogwe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Enplanar, Inc. v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Enriquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Enterprise Consol. School Dist. v. Lauderdale County School Dist. 988 Enterprise VI v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 EPA; James City County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 EPA; Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . 1148 EPA; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 E. O.; H. R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Epps v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Epps; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1122 Epps v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 EEOC; Etemad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 EEOC; Manville Sales Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 EEOC; O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1198 EEOC; Pender v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 EEOC; Traylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 EEOC; Watergate at Landmark Condominium v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa; Invex Holdings, N. V. v. . . . . . . . 948 Erger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Erickson; Dolny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Erndt v. Pre-Vest, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Ervin v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Erwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Escobar-Urrego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Escobedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1176 Esparza v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Esparza v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Esparza v. Stice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Espinosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Espinoza-Padilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Espinueva v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Esposito v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Espy; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Esquibel v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Essex County Jail; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Estate. See name of estate. Estelle; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Estevez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Estrada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Estrella v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Etemad v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Ethicon, Inc. v. Eisenmenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Ethyl Corp.; BP Performance Polymers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Etim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Ettinger; Foss Maritime Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Euell v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Evans; Ayers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Evans v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Evans; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Evans v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Evans v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Evans v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Evans; Romer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Evans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,912 Evans, George & Bronstein; Magill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Evans-Smith; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Evatt; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Evatt; Crooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Evatt; Montgomery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Evatt; Quillian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Evatt; Slezak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Evatt; Van Duesen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:24 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Everett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Everetts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Ewing v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Ewing v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Executive Life Ins. Co.; NationsBank of Tex., N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . 1147 Exportadora de Sal, S. A. de C. V. v. Sugimoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Exxon Coal USA, Inc.; Spearman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Exxon Co., USA; Keener v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Exxon Corp. v. Eyak Native Village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1036,1102 Exxon Corp.; Eyak Native Village v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Eyak Native Village; Exxon Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1036,1102 Ezeoke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Fadayini v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Fahy v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Faile v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Fair v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1136 Fairchild v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1146 Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc.; Merex A. G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Fairfield; Gerijo, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Falcone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Falls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Family & Children's Center, Inc.; School Mishawaka v. . . . . . . . . 961 Famularo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Fanny v. Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Farley; McGuire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Farley; McNary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Farley; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Farley; Tredway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Farlow; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1185 Farmer v. Cheit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Farmer v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Farmer v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County . . . . . . . 964 Farmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1182 Farmers Home Administration; Zieser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Farnsworth; Femling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Farr v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1186 Farr v. Gray & End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Farr v. Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Farr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Fasola v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Faulkner v. Makel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Faulkner; McGill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Faulkner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,1105 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Faunce v. McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 F. C. Johnson Construction Co. v. Hyneman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1136 Federal Communications Comm'n; Paton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Federal Debt Management, Inc.; Weatherly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 FDIC; Boston Post Road Ltd. Partnership v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 FDIC v. Cocke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 FDIC; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 FDIC; National Trust for Historic Preservation in U. S. v. . . . . . 1065 FDIC; Scales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Federal Election Comm'n; Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 821 Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund . . . . . . 88 Federal Land Bank of Omaha; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Federal National Mortgage Assn.; Gallagher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Federal Republic of Germany; Princz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Co.; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Federal Trade Comm'n; A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Federal Trade Comm'n; Crittenden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Fegley; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Feldman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Feldman v. Bahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Felger; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Felion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Felix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Fellin; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Fellin v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Felton v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Femling v. Farnworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Fennie v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Fenstermacher; Telelect, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Ferdik v. McFadden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 Ferguson; Enterprise VI v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Ferguson v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Ferguson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,977 Fermin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Ferran v. Nassau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1014,1121 Ferrel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Clay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Ferreyros-Perriggo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Ferro v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Fertel-Rust v. Ambassador Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Fertel-Rust v. Dane County Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Fertel-Rust v. Milwaukee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Fertel-Rust v. Milwaukee Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,1013 Fertel-Rust v. Security Bank SSB of Milwaukee . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Fertel-Rust v. Wauwatosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Fetterly; Arave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Fialk v. Moore's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y.; Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v. . 915 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Fiel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Field, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Field v. Easton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Fields v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Fields v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Fields; Kayani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Fields v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Fields v. West Palm Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1023 Fiese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Figers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Figgie v. Moskovitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Fillmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Finizie v. Bridgeport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1052 Finkel v. New York City Housing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Fiore v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 First American Title Ins. Co.; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County . . . 1080 First Bank & Trust Co.; Ashness v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 First Gibraltar Bank, FSB; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 FirsTier Bank, N. A., Omaha; Vercoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 First Interstate Bank of Ariz.; Fitch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 First Realty Property Management, Ltd.; Pargo v. . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Fisher v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Fisher v. Fitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Fisher v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Fisher v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Fisher; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Fisher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1041 Fitch v. First Interstate Bank of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Fitch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Fitch v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Fitt; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Fitzgerald v. Bayham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Fitzgerald v. Gamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fitzsimmons; Buckley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Flakes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Flanagan v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1036 Flattum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Flayter v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Fleck v. Hoffinger Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Fleenor v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Fleming v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1033 Fleming v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1097,1150 Fleming v. U. S. Postal Service Air Mail Facility at O'Hare . . . . . 1085 Fletcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,948 Flieger v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Flightsafety Services; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Flores v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Flores-Juarez Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Flores Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Flores-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Florida; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Florida; Bond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Florida; Cardona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Florida; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Florida; Colina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Florida; Delarco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Florida; Derrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Florida; Fennie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Florida; Gibb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Florida; Gorby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Florida; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Florida; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1066 Florida; Hannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Florida; Hendrix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Florida v. Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Florida; Hyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Florida; Krawczuk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Florida; Lanier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Florida; Lindsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Florida; Marquard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Florida; Melton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Florida; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Florida; Pedrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Florida; Peterka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Florida v. Platt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Florida; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 513repp12a 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Florida; Reaves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Florida; Reilly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Florida; Rhodes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Florida; Saintil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Florida; Schwab v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Florida; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Florida; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1125 Florida v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Florida; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1161,1163 Florida; Stein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Florida; Street v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Florida; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1003 Florida; Vining v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Florida; Walls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Florida; Zeigler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Florida Bar; Calvo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services; Wishon v. . . 1100,1199 Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services of Volusia County; Randall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1104 Florida Dept. of State; Doughtie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Flower v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Flowers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Flowers v. Indiana Univ. School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Flowers v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Floyd v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Floyd v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Fodor v. Time Warner, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Fogleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Foley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Follins v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Fondren v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Fontenot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Food & Commercial Workers v. Mulder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Foote v. Hathaway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Forbes; Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Forbus; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Ford v. Clement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,976,1031,1085,1199 Ford v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ford v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Forde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Fordice; Garlotte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1125 Fordice; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Ford Motor Co.; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Forest Grove, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Forest Hills; Mikkilineni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Forgette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Forman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Formann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Formosa Plastics Corp.; Truck Drivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Forrester v. San Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Forsberg; Tonn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Forsyth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1051 Forsyth v. Vines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Foss Maritime Co. v. Ettinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Foster; Hallco Mfg. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Foster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Foster; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. v. Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Foules v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Foust v. Oral Roberts Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Fowler v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Fowler v. VanMeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Fowlie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Fox v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 FoxMeyer Drug Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Foy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Frances J.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Francis v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Francisco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Franco; Delbridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Frangenberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Frank v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co.; Zahran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Franklin; Gibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Franklin; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Franklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Franklin County; Webber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,950 Franklin Federal Savings Assn.; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 Fraser v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Frazier v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Frederick v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Free v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Freedlander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Freedman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Freedman v. Board of Ed. of Park Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Freedom Ranch, Inc. v. Tulsa Bd. of Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . 821 Freeland v. Harley-Davidson, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Freeman v. Johnston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Freeman v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Freeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1134 Freeman's Estate; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Freiboth v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1055 French; Huffstetler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Fressie v. Trans World Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Freter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Friday v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1066 Frieberger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Friedman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1037 Friedman v. Departmental Disciplinary Comm., First Jud. Dept. 820 Friend v. United Technologies/Hamilton Standard . . . . . . . . . . 895,1035 Friends v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Fritz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Fromal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1034 Fromal v. McCauley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1035 Frost v. Lutz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Fruchtman v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Fruin; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Frumentino v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Fruth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Fugarino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Fulk v. Illinois Central R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Fullard v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Fuller v. Norfolk Southern Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Fuller v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Fuller v. Schaefer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Fuller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Fulton v. Allmond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Fulton County v. Whalen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Fulton Dept. of Family and Children Services; Brooks v. . . . . . . . 879 Funderburg v. Railroad Retirement Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Funderburk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Furman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Furutani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 G. v. T. M. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Gable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Gabrelian v. Gabrelian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Gacek; Ghafari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Gadson v. Abdul-Wasi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Gaerttner v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Gaev v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Gagen; Ritz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Gagliardi v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Gainer; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Gainer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Galanis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Galban v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Galbraith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Gallagher v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Gallagher v. McNutt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gallant v. Delahanty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Gallant v. Magnusson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Gallegos v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Gallegos; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Gallo; Ricco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1035 Galloway v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Galoob Toys, Inc.; Nintendo of America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Gamble; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Gamboa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc.; American President Lines, Ltd. v. . . . . . 1198 Gammon; Jolly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Gammon; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Garceau v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Garcia v. Bernstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Garcia v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Garcia v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Garcia v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . 1062 Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,860,890,1041,1159,1176 Garcia Briseno v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Garcia Piadares v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Garcia Quintania v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Garcia Tovarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Gardell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Gardner; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Gardner v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Gardner v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,988 Garlotte v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1125 Garmon v. Alabama State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Garner; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Garner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Garrad District Judge; Hatfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Garrett v. Arthur Andersen & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Garrett v. Kason Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Garrett v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Garringer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Garrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Gartz; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Garvey v. Szabo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Gary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Garza-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Gaskins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Gasko v. Celotex Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Gasper v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gasperi, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Gaster v. Catoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Gastiaburo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Gaston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Gates; Yagman & Yagman, P. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Gattis v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Gaudin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Gaudin; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1125 Gaumer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Gaval v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Gaworski; ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Gaxiola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Gay, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Gaydos, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,998,1189 Gaydos v. Chertoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,998 Gaydos v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,997 Gaydos v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh 945,998,1075,1145 Gaztambide; Hernandez Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Geary v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Geisinger Clinic; DiCuccio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Geitz v. Thieret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Gelis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gellert v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Gelt Funding Corp.; First Nationwide Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Gendreau v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Gendron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 General Dynamics; Shong-Ching Tong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 General Dynamics Corp.; DeGrooth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh 916 General Electric Co.; Haydoo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 General Electric Co. v. Ingram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 General Electric Co.; Malia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 General Electric Co.; Stern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 General Environmental Science Corp. v. Horsfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 General Motors Corp. v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 General Motors Corp.; Jimenez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1010 General Motors Corp.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 General Motors Corp.; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Geoffrey Development Co. v. Alpharetta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Georgacarakos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 George v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Georgia; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Georgia; James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1185 Georgia; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Georgia; Ledford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1199 Georgia; Meredith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Georgia; Sumrall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Georgia; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Georgia; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Georgia State Bar; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987,1105 Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Gerlin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Germany; Princz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Germany v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Germinaro v. Amoco Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Geurin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1037 Ghafari v. Gacek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Ghazali v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Ghent v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Gholson v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Gholson v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Gibas v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Gibb v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Gibbes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1187 Gibbons v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Gibbs v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page Gibbs v. Haskell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Gibbs v. Oklahoma Dept., Hum. Servs., Affirmative Action Unit 840,995 Gibbs v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Gibson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Gibson v. North American Free Trade Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Giddens v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Gidiglo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Gifford v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Gilbert v. California Public Util. Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Gilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Giles v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1199 Giles v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Giles v. Snow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1104 Gilkey v. Mannion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Gill v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Gill v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Gillette Co. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Gilliam v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Gilliam v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Gilliam; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Gilliard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Gillilan v. Teccor Electronics, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Gilmore v. Gregg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gilmore; Holiday v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Gilmore v. Teamsters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1105 Gines v. Curran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Girolamo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Gittens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Givan-Hammoud v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Givens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Glass v. Boothby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Gleason; Raine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Gleason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Gleave v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1122 Glendale; Hensler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Glenn Engineering & Associates, Ltd.; Mikkilineni v. . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Glover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Gocken v. Auburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Gocken v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1010 Godaire v. Ulrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Godboldo v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Godfrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Godinez; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Goetsch v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Goetz v. Tordoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Goff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Goines v. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Golden v. El Camino Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Golden; Randall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Golden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Golden Pacific Bancorp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Golden Valley; Golden Valley Lutheran College v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Golden Valley Lutheran College v. Golden Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Goldgar v. Office of Administration, Executive Office of President 1079 Gollehon v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Gomez v. Ahitow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gomez; Aquil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Gomez v. Brun Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1104 Gomez v. Housing Authority of El Paso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Gomez; Hydrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Gomez v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Gomez; Lacio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Gomez; McMillan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,992,1101,1183 Gomez-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Gomez-Pabon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Gonzales; Judd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089,1186 Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1117 Gonzalez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Gonzalez v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Gonzalez v. Ocean County Bd. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Gonzalez v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,965,978,1029,1041,1195 Gonzalez Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Good v. New Castle Youth Development Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Gooden v. Brereton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Gooden v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Goodman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1124 Goodman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Goodwin v. Masurek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Gorby v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Gordon v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Gordon v. Pham Tien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Gordon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,954,1064 Gore; BMW of North America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Gorlov v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, Human Re- sources Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Gorton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Gosch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Gosch v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Gossage, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Gossage v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1093 Gossage v. Oldenkamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Gouiran, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Goulding v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1136 Government Employees; Wildberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Duane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Government of Israel; Morritz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Government of Virgin Islands; Duberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Government of Virgin Islands; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Government of Virgin Islands; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Governor of Colo. v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Governor of Del.; Karr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Governor of Idaho; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1066 Governor of La.; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Governor of Md.; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Governor of Md.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Governor of Miss.; Garlotte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1125 Governor of Neb. v. Central Low-Level Radioact. Waste Comm'n 987 Governor of N. Y. v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1039,1055,1108 Governor of Ohio; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Gowen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Gowens v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Goya Foods, Inc.; Unanue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Goya Foods, Inc.; Unanue-Casal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Graber; Mehio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Grable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Grace & Co. v. MDU Resources Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Grace & Co. v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Maryland Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Grace & Co.-Conn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. . . . . . 919 Grace Hospital; Cully v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Grace Investment Co. v. Red Mountain Machinery Co. . . . . . . . . 1044 Grado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Graham; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Graham; Redwood Village Partnership v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Graham v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Graham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,940 Graibe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Granada, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Grandison; Luton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Grand Prairie; Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth v. . . . . . . . . . . 929 Granger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Granoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Grant v. Lone Star Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Grant v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1033 Grant; Scheib v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Grant v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Grant v. Scully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Grant v. Wong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Grapevine v. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Graves; Dr. John Hagelin for President Committee of Kan. v. . . . 1126 Graves; Dusenbery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Graves v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Graves; Maine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Graves v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Graves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Gray v. Alford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Gray & End; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Grayer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Grayson; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Grayson v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.; Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. . . . . 527 Great-West Life Assurance Co.; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Greaves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Greco v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Green, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1145 Green v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Green; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557,805,922 Green v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1136 Green v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Green v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Green v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Green; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Green; Hewlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Green v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1005 Green v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Green v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Green v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,893,908,955,1030,1097 Greenblatt v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Greene v. McFadden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Greene v. Phelps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1186 Greene v. South Carolina Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1185 Greene County Memorial Hospital; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Greenfield v. Miami Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Greenhouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Greenlaw v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1066 Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bd.; Beckman v. . . . . . . . 1113 Greenville; Stearman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1185 Greenwald; Ayrs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Greenwald; Wells Fargo & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Greenwood v. Bechill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Greenwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Greer; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Greer v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Greer v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1185 Greer; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1104 Gregg; Gilmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gregoire; Soundgarden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Gregory v. Lawhorn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Gregory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Greiner; Smathers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1122 Grey v. Rutt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Grier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Griffin; Holston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Griffin v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Griffin v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Griffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1036 Griffin v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Griffin v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Griffith v. Collier County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Griffith v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Griffith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1050 Griggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Grinker; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1052 Grisales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Grisso v. New Madrid County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Grizzle v. Wiesman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Groose; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Groose; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Groose; Conley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Groose; Dunmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Groose; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Groose; Lowe-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Groose; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Groose; Pinster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Groose; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Groose; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Groose; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Groose; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Grossman; Connelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Grossman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Grove North America v. Lowe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527 Grubbs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Grubbs v. Western Baptist Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Grube v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Grupo Protexa, S. A. v. All American Marine Slip . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 GTE Products Corp.; Cool Light Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Guam; Palomo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Guerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Guerrero; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Guetersloh v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Guichard v. Wisnieski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1010 Guinn v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1010 Gulbenkian v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Gulf Island IV, Inc.; Blue Streak, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Gumpl v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Gunawansa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 818 Gunderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Gunn; Dilley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Gunn; Gutierrez Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Gunn; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Gunter; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Gupton v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561 Guthrie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Gutierrez v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Gutierrez v. Toombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,965 Gutierrez-Calle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1010,1067,1108 Gutierrez Marquez v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Guy v. Navarro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Guyer v. Alachua County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Guzman v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Guzman-Bruno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Guzman-Salguero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.; Steward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Gwynn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 H; Baby K v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 H. v. T. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Haass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Haber; Branson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Defined Benefit Plan . . . . 1149 Hackensack Water Co.; Paterson Municipal Utilities Authority v. 1149 Hadlock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Hadrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Hagelin for President Committee of Kan. v. Graves . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hahn; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Hai Do v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Hair; Pressley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Hakel v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Hale v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1066 Hale Mahaolu; Stevenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Halim v. Accu-Labs Research, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Halim v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Hall v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Hall v. Creative Games Technology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hall v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Hall v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Hall v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Hall v. O'Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hall; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1120 Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Hallett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Halliburton Co.; Nash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Hallman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Hallums v. Hambrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Halperin; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Hambrick; Hallums v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Hamer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Hames; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Hamilton v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Hamilton v. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1033 Hamilton; Ohio Savings Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Hamilton v. Seal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Hamilton v. Transit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Hamilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1084 Hammond v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hammond v. Withrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Hampshire v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Hampton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Handgun Control Federation of Ohio; NRA of America v. . . . . . . 815 Haney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,898 Hanh Le v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Hani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Hankerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Hann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Hanna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Hanna v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Hanneman; Downer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Hannigan; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Hannigan; Scaife v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Hannon v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Hanrahan; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Hansbrough; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Hansen; Judd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Hansen v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Hanson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Hanson v. Passer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Harbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Harbold v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Harden; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Harding v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Hardison v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Hardnett v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hardy v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Hargett; Bolton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Hargett; Cowart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Hargett; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Hargett; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Hargett; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hargett; McFadden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,991 Hargett; Nathan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Hargett; Paitsel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Hargett; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Harhai v. Caruso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Harlan; McLaren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Harleston v. Jeffries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Harley-Davidson, Inc.; Freeland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Harman; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Harmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Harnischfeger Corp.; Snow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Harper v. Harman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Harper v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Harper v. Mujahid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Harper v. Pearson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Harper v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Harper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1118,1178 Harrell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Harrell v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Harrington v. Straw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Harris v. Akron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Harris v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504 Harris v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Harris v. Davidson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Harris v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Harris v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Harris v. Hatfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1066 Harris; Head v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Harris v. Hirsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Harris v. Lillard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1137 Harris v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Harris v. Padu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Harris v. Radio-Electronics Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Harris v. Radio Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Harris v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Harris v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Harris v. Schaefer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Harris v. 7232 Pleasant View Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . 827,940,952,978,994,1065,1120,1133,1198 Harris v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Harris County Sheriff's Dept. Civil Service Comm'rs v. Steverson 1081 Harrison; Brooks-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Harrison v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Harrison v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Harrod, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Harry Lee Carter Estate Management Trust; Carter v. . . . . . . . 948 Harshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Harshefi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1065 Hartford v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Security . . . . . . . . . . . 1090,1186 Hartman; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Harvard Univ.; Linehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Harvey v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Harvey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Harwood; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Harwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Haskell; Gibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Hassan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hastert; Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Hatcher; Faile v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Hatchett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Hatfield v. Daugherty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Hatfield; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1066 Hathaway; Foote v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Hathaway v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Hatmaker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Hawaii; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Hawaii; Nakata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Hawkins v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Hawkins v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hawkins v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1118,1140,1141 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Hawley; Muhammad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hawley; Sterling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Hawley; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1193 Haws; Cosner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Haws; London v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Haydoo v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Hayes v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Hayes v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hayes; Chamberlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,895 Haynes v. Hartman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Haynes; Lanier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Haynes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Hays v. Klauser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Hays; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1056 Hays; St. Cyr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1054,1066 Hays; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1056 Hay's Western Wear, Inc. v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Dev. 819 Hazel Crest; Cathedral of Joy Baptist Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Hazime v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Head, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Head v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Head; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Head v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,935,939 Head v. North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 882 Head v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Health Alliance Plan; Azar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1104 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Health Ins. Assn. of America; Shalala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Heath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Heaton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Hebert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Hechinger; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. . . . . . 1126 Hedge; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Heese; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Heidemann; Skelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Heidemann v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Heintz v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1109 Heip Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Heiser v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Heli-Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Heller v. Norcal Mut. Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Helms; Lunde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hemstree; Carrio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Henderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Henderson v. Army Corps of Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Henderson; Belknap v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Henderson v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Henderson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Henderson v. Kessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Henderson v. Mayo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Henderson v. Nevada Entertainment Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . 1078,1199 Henderson; Nevada Entertainment Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1078 Henderson; Redner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Henderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Henderson v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Hendrickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Hendrix v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Henegar v. Banta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Henman; Durham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Henning v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Henry; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 Henry v. Speckard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Hensler v. Glendale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Hensler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,995,1098,1186 Henson; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Hercules, Inc.; O'Driscoll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n Auditing Division . . . . . 1043 Herman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Hernandez; Acevedo-Villalobos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1122 Hernandez v. Coughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hernandez v. Ieyoub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Hernandez v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Hernandez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 912,932,940,967,978,1098,1171 Hernandez Coplin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Hernandez Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hernandez-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Hernandez Torres v. Negron Gaztambide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Hernan Montes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Herrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1034 Herriman v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Herrmann v. IUE AFL­CIO Pension Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Herron-Cole v. Jeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1122 Herzog v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Hess v. Harden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hess v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Heuer v. Secretary of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Hewell; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Hewlett v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Heyward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Hiatt v. Indiana State Student Assistance Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Hibbler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Hickey v. Attorney General of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Hickey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Hickey v. Wellesley School Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Hickman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1170 Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1177 Hicks v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Hickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Hiebert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Higareda v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Higgason v. Adank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Higgins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1075 Higgins v. Fegley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Higgins v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 High Country Broadcasting Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Highlands Ins. Co.; National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. 1112 High Street Associates; Zisk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Hightower v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Hilao; Marcos' Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hilarios-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Hildebrand v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Hildreth; Sanford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Hill v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Hill; Norris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Hill v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,929,1008,1167,1178 Hill; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Hilliard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Hilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Hilts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Hines v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Hines v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1186 Hines v. Seton Hall Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Hininger v. Can-Am Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Hinshaw v. Mahler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Hinton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Hirai v. Ito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Hirano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Hiratani v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1122 Hirsch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hirsh; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hoai v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1122 Hoang v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Hobbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Hobley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Hoddick; Steinfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Hodge v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Hodge; Sardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Hodges; Bass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Hodges v. Huntsman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Hoekel v. Plumbing Planning Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1066 Hoffinger Industries; Fleck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Hoffman v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Hoffman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Hogan v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Hoggard v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Hoke; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Holahan v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Holcomb; Summerfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Holden v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Holdren v. Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Holdridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Holiday v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc.; Iowa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Holland; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Holland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1109 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Holley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Hollidaysburg Trust Co.; Patz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Hollingshead v. Hoxworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Hollingsworth v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Hollingsworth & Vose Co.; Lesnick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Holloway v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Holloway v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Holloway v. Olivarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Holly v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Hollymatic Corp.; Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Holmberg v. Ramsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Holmberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Holmes v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Holmes v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Holmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Holmes County; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Holst v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Holston v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Holy Cross Health System Corp.; Fobbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Holzmann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II v. Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Homeland Stores, Inc.; Resolution Trust Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Home Savings of America, FSB v. Maynard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Hoopa Valley Tribe 1059 Hoo v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Hood v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Hooker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Hoopa Valley Tribe; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. 1059 Hooper v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Hooper v. Morgan County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Hoover v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Hoover Universal, Inc.; Winchester Homes, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Hopkins v. Andaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Hopkins; Dow Corning Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Hopkins; Partee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Hopping v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Hordge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Horn; Madison County Fiscal Court v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Horner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Horning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Horowitz v. State Bar of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Horsfall; General Environmental Science Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Hoskins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Hosoya Fireworks Co. v. Barone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Hospital Assn. of N. Y. v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . 920,1039,1055,1108 Hospital Employees; Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 961 Hotze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Houck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 House v. Clarke County Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 House v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Housing Authority of El Paso; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Houston; Adlington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Houston v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Houston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Howard v. Beason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Howard; Ritter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Howard v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Howard v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Howard-Palmer; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1035 Howe; Realbuto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Howe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Hoxworth; Hollingshead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Hoyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 H. R. v. E. O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Hrbek v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 HTC Industries, Inc. v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Hubbard v. Roesch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Hubbard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1095 Hubbard v. Voinovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Huber v. Danning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Huckaby v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Hudacs; David v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Huddleston v. CIGNA Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1125 Huddleston; Reimann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Hudson v. Hedge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Hudson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Hudson v. Varney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1033 Huerta-Macias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Huff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Huffman v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Huffstetler v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hughes v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hughes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1029,1030,1042,1101 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Hulett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hullar; Milton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Humana, Inc.; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Hume; American Disposal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Humfield; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Humiston v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Hummer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Humphrey v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Humphrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Humphreys, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Humphreys v. Texas State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Humphries v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Hundley; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Hundley; Hrbek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Hundley; Wharton-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Hunegs; Perl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Hunes v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1061 Hunger v. Leininger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Hung Van Huynh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Hunkins v. Minneapolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Hunt v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Hunt v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Hunt v. Grinker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1052 Hunt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Hunter v. Northrop Univ. School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Hunter; Wunderlich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Huntington Banks of Mich.; Kersh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Huntington National Bank; Kabealo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Huntington Park; Bueno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Huntsman; Hodges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Huntsville; Bresnan Communications Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Huppeler v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hurd; Pittsburg State Univ. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston 1071,1145 Hurley v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Hurley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Hurst v. University of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Hurt; Kachina Plywood, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hurt v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Hurtado-Olivero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Hurtado-Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Huson; Castle Rock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Hutchings v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Hutchings von Ludwitz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Hutchison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Hutto v. North American Van Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1199 Huynh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Hyde v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Hyde; Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,921,1012,1075 Hyder v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Hyder v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Hydrick v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Hyman v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Hymans v. Western Bank, Taos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Hyneman; F. C. Johnson Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1136 Hyneman; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1136 Hyon Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Hyundai Manufacture of Fountain Valley; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hyundai Motor Co. v. Phillip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Ibarra v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 ICI Americas, Inc.; Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Idaho; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Idaho; Floyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Idaho; Giles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Idaho; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Idaho; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,901 Idaho; Molina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Idaho v. Odiaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Idaho; Odiaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Idaho; Pratt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Idaho Correctional Institution; Storey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.; Synbiotics Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Ieyoub; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Igbo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Iglesias v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Illinois; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Illinois v. Bachelor's Library Adult Bookstore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Illinois; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Illinois; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Illinois; Blameuser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Illinois; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Illinois; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Illinois; Childress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Illinois; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Illinois; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Illinois; Deerwester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Illinois; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Illinois; Dreksler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Illinois; Fair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1136 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Illinois; Foules v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Illinois; Freiboth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Illinois; Frumentino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Illinois; Givan-Hammoud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Illinois; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Illinois; Griffith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Illinois; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Illinois; Harbold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Illinois; Hobley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Illinois; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Illinois; Johns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Illinois; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Illinois v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Illinois; Kitchen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Illinois; Knoop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Illinois; Lampkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Illinois; Levin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Illinois; Lomprez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Illinois; Lunsford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Illinois v. Page Books, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Illinois; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Illinois; Staten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Illinois v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Illinois; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Illinois; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Illinois Central R. Co.; Fulk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Illinois Court of Claims; Tanner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Illinois Dept. of Veterans' Affairs; Kralman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Illinois Historic Preserv. Agcy.; American Diving & Salvage Co. v. 961 Illinois Historic Preserv. Agcy.; Zych v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Hastert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 ILQ Investments, Inc. v. Rochester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Bejjani v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Camacho v. . . . . . . . . . . 812 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Dalis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Fasola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Fraser v. . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Gidiglo v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Gunawansa v. . . . . . . . . 818 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Hazime v. . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Iwuala v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Lopez-Amaro v. . . . . . . 1146 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Pritchett v. . . . . . . . . . . 961 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Senanayake v. . . . . . . . . 814 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Immigration and Naturalization Service; Suan See Chong v. . . . . 1059 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Waldron v. . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Independent Sprinkler Corp.; Road Sprinkler Fitters v. . . . . . . . 868 Indiana; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Indiana; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1036 Indiana; Fleenor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Indiana; Hopping v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Indiana; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Indiana; Luis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Indiana; Lyles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Indiana; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Indiana; Resnover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Indiana; Schubert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baton Rouge . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Indiana State Student Assistance Comm'n; Hiatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Indiana Univ. School of Law; Flowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Industrial Indemnity Co.; Cassidy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1199 Ingram; General Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Ingram v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Ingram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1007,1128 Inico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Initial U. S. A.; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1036 In Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 In re. See name of party. Instructional Systems, Inc.; Computer Curriculum Corp. v. . . . . . 1183 Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . 1051 Intercounty Title Co. of Ill.; Durr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Interior Bd. of Land Appeals; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Internal Revenue Service; Chow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Internal Revenue Service; Kerpsack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Internal Revenue Service; O'Neil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Internal Revenue Service; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Amateur Athletic Federation; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . 962 International Business Machines Corp. v. Allen-Myland, Inc. . . . . 1066 International Business Machines Corp.; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . 876 International Business Machines Corp. v. Sims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 International Dairy Queen Inc.; Sawyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 International Primate Protection League v. Adm's, Tulane Ed. Fd. 1032 International Rectifier Corp. v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics 1044 International Rectifier Corp.; SGS-Thomson Microelectronics v. 1052 International Terminal Corp. v. M/T Loire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Transcon Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . 138,997 Invex Holdings, N. V. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa . . . . . . . 948 Iovino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Iowa; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Iowa; DeLisle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Iowa; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089,1199 Iowa; Epps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Iowa v. Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Iowa; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Iowa; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Iowa; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Iowa; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Iran; Cicippio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Iran v. Pahlavi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Irby v. Macht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Irby-Wynter; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Irelan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston; Hurley v. 1071,1145 Iron Workers v. BE&K Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Irving v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Isby v. Spencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Isby v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Isiah v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Islamic Republic of Iran; Cicippio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Island Creek Coal Co.; Mine Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Isomedix, Inc.; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Israel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Israel v. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Israel; Morritz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Ito; Hirai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Ito; Macro Energy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Gaworski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 ITT Corp.; Eder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 IUE AFL­CIO Pension Fund; Herrmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Iusan v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preserv. & Dev. . . . . 879,1035 Ivey; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Ivimey v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Ivy v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Iwuala v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Izen v. Nichols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 J.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Jabaay v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Jabe; Edmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Jabe; Lester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1122 Jabe; Razor-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Jackson v. Brigle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Jackson v. Congress of U. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Jackson v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Jackson; Delaware v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Jackson; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Jackson; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Jackson v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. 818,1033 Jackson v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Jackson; Ojai Unified School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Jackson v. Pflum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Jackson v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Jackson v. Rochester Housing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Jackson v. Scheibel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Jackson v. Supreme Court of Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Jackson; Terminix International Co. Ltd. Partnership v. . . . . . . . 1123 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . 891,894,938,940,1009,1042,1115,1196 Jackson County; Roark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Jackson State Univ.; Langley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Jacobs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Jacobs v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Jacobs v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Jacobs v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1070 Jacobs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Jacobs Mfg. Co.; Sam Brown Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Jacobson; Biegeleisen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Jacobson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Jacobson Products Co.; Qualitex Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Jacques v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Jakabovitz v. Cabrera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Jamerson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1185 James; Goines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 James v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1028 James v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 James v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1185 James City County v. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . 823 Jameson v. Coughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Jardine v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Jarrett v. US Sprint Communications Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Jarvis; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Jarvis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Javier Valenzuela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Jeanes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Jefferies v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Jeffers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Jefferson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Jefferson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Jefferson Lines, Inc.; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Jefferson Pilot Life Ins. Co.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Jeffery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Jeffries; Harleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Jeffries v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Jeffus, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Jemzura v. Bulsiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Jenkin v. Electro-Tec Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Jenkins; Heintz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1109 Jenkins v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Jenkins; Missouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Jenkins v. Weis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Jennings Water, Inc. v. CSL Utilities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Jenoriki v. U. S. Postal Inspection Service of Houston . . . . . . . 885,1035 Jensen v. Brokaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Jenson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Jernigan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. . . . . 527 Jerrel v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Jerry v. Domovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1122 Jessie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Jestice v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Jeter; Herron-Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1122 J. I. Case; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Jimenez v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1010 Jiminez; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Jim Walters Resources, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Jive Publishing; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Job v. Wells Fargo National Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Job Protectors Former Administrative Law Judges, In re . . . . . 826 Job Protectors Former Administrative Law Judges v. District of Columbia Dept. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs . . . . . . . . 820 Johanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Johanson v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 John; Marsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro 1016 Johns v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Johns v. McFadden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Johnsen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1035 Johnson; Abdus-Sabir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Johnson; Abrams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Johnson; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Johnson; Barnette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Johnson; Borromeo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Johnson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Johnson; Clostermann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1136 Johnson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Johnson v. De Grandy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Johnson v. Dickinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Johnson v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Johnson v. Dutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1104 Johnson v. Epps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1122 Johnson; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Johnson v. Hyneman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1136 Johnson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Johnson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1144 Johnson v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Johnson; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Johnson v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Johnson v. Prewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Johnson v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Johnson v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,971 Johnson v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Johnson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814, 828,843,905,937,940,949,979,1002,1025,1041,1042,1050,1096, 1098,1115,1133,1175,1180,1182 Johnson; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Johnson; Wilmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Johnson; Yacks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1034 Johnson Construction Co. v. Hyneman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1136 Johnson Controls, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Johnson & Higgins of Cal. v. Steiner Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Johnston; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Johnston v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Johnston v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 John W. Martin Construction Co. v. Norwest Bank Kalispell, N. A. 1128 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Jolly v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1073 Jones v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Jones; Bradvica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Jones v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Jones v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Jones; Hodge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Jones v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,901 Jones v. Jive Publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Jones; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1144 Jones; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Jones v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Jones; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Jones; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Jones v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1104 Jones; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Jones v. Schulze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,985 Jones v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Jones v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Jones v. Simon & Schuster, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817, 852,888,948,954,955,967,1010,1028,1041,1042,1058,1100,1137, 1176,1180 Jones; Weeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Jonsson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Joor Mfg., Inc.; Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Joquin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Jordan v. Aurora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1178 Jorge Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Jose M. v. San Diego County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . 908 Joseph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.; Milwaukee Brewery Pension Plan v. . . . 414 Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Journal Publishing Co.; Woodcock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Jovanovic v. Stained Glass Overlay, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Jovanovich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Joyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Joy Technologies; Valdez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1136 J. R. Simplot Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Judd v. Gonzales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089,1186 Judd v. Hansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Judge v. Bolan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1136 Judge, Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County; Gilkey v. . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Judge, Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Judge, Circuit Court of Ind., Madison County; Isby v. . . . . . . . . . 1056 Judge, Circuit Court of W. Va., Kanawha County; CSR Ltd. v. . . 822 Judge, County Criminal Court No. Four, Tarrant County; Texas v. 866 Judge, Criminal District Court of Tex., Dallas County; Crank v. 1097 Judge, Michigan Circuit Court, 44th Circuit; Northington v. . . . . 835 Judge, Office of Hearing and Appeals; Macias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Judge, Texas District Court, 234th District; McQueen v. . . . . . . . 899 Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm'n of Ky.; Deters v. . . . . . 871 Juels v. Deutsche Bank AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Julian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Julio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Juvenile (AG­S) v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 K., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 K v. Ms. H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Kabealo v. Huntington National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Kachina Plywood, Inc. v. Hurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Kahan v. Seror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Kaiser; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Kaiser Engineers Hanford Co.; Thesenvitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals; Gulbenkian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Kalinowski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Kamal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Kamal v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Kansas; Chiles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Kansas v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1124,1144 Kansas; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Kansas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Kansas v. Valenzuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Kansas; Words v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Kansas City; Bronfman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Kansas City Southern R. Co.; Locomotive Engineers v. . . . . . . . . 930 Kansas Dept. of Corrections v. Brinkman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,985 Kaplan; First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Karch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Karel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1009 Karnes; McLenagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Karr v. Carper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Kashannejad v. Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Kason Industries, Inc.; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Kassouf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kassulke; Turpin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Defined Benefit Plan; Haberern v. . . . . 1149 Kawaoka v. Arroyo Grande . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Kayani v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 KB­X v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Keane; De Vonish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Kearns v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Keel v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Keenan v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Keenan v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Keener v. Exxon Co., USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Kelley; American Bankers Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Kelley; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1034 Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Kelley; Longnecker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Kelley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,951 Kelly v. Broadcast Music, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Kelly; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Kelly v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Kelly v. LaFace Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Kelly v. L. L. Cool J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Kelly; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Kelly v. Sprint Communications Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Kelly; Sprint Communications Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Kelly; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Kelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,939,954 Kelly v. Withrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1137 Kendall v. Kendall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Kenderian, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Kennedy v. Little . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Kennedy v. Zimmerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Kennewick; Becker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Kenney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Kennison; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Kennon v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Kent, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Kent v. Bechtel Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1185 Kentucky; Bowling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Kentucky; Bussell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Kentucky; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Kentucky; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Kentucky v. Linehan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Kentucky; Woodard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet; Cope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet; Yeoman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Keohane; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Keohane; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Keohane; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1137 Kepner-Tregoe, Inc.; Leadership Software, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Kern; Tal-Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Kernan; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,995 Kernan; Costello v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Kernan; Denham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Kernan; Stotts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Kern County; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1083 Kern County Superior Court; Yovev v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Kerpan v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1104 Kerpsack v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Kersh v. Borden, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Kersh v. Deven Lithographers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Kersh v. Huntington Banks of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Kersh v. Liberty State Bank & Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Kessler; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Kessler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Key v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1042 Keys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Keystone Ins. Co.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 KFC National Management Co.; Roush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Khan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Kiernan; Lyons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Kiewit Eastern Co.; T. I. Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Kikuts v. Clinton County Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Kile v. Appellate Dept., Superior Court of Cal., Placer County 875,1035 Kile v. Trepantis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1035 Killion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Kilpatrick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1033 Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1110 Kimball v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Kimberlin v. Quinlan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1123,1144 Kimberlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Kimble v. Montgomery County Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kinard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Kincaid, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1187 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kincheloe; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Kincheloe; Eldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Kincheloe; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Kindler v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Kindt; Story v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 King, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1187 King v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 King v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 King v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 King; Sprague v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,884,941,1135,1177 King v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 King v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 King County; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1034 Kinnamon v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Kinter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Kirakossian v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Kirby v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Kirchner; Baby Boy Janikova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Kirchner; Baby "Richard" v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Kirchner; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1138,1303 Kirchner; O'Connell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1303 Kirk v. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Kirkpatrick v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Kirkpatrick v. Stotts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Kirschner v. Salgado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Kirsh v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Kish v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Kiskila v. Business Exchange, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092,1199 Kitchen v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Klang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Klauser v. Burkes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Klauser; Hays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Kleinbart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Kleinschmidt v. Wehby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Kleve v. Board of Green Township Trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Klevenhagen; Brothers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Klincar; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Kline; Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Klinger v. Nebraska Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Klinginsmith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Klopp v. Avco Lycoming Textron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Klump v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Knapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,992 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Kneller v. Kneller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1034 Knight, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1187 Knight; Columbus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Knight v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Knight v. Mingledorff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Knight v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Knighten v. Cave & McKay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1199 Knipe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Knisley; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1066 Knoop v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Knox v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Knox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1153 Koczak v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Kodak Co.; Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 811 Koehler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Koen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Kollias; D & G Marine Maintenance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Konstam; Video Visions, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Kontakis v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1035 Korando v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Koray; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Korman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Koss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Kovack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Kovacs v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Kovalic v. DEC International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kozelka v. Weider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Kraft v. Ekco Housewares Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Krall v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1066 Kralman v. Illinois Dept. of Veterans' Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Kramer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Kramer v. University of Pittsburgh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Kramm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Krause v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Krause v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Krawczuk v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Kreimerman; Casa Veerkamp, S. A. de C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Kreines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Kreutzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Kriegh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Krikava v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Krishnamurthy v. Nimmagadda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Krissman; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Kroger Co.; Ogunsalu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Krouse v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Krueger v. Saiki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Krueger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Krupp v. Neubert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Kuang Saeteurn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Kubosh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Kucinski v. Morning Call, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Kukla, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Kuntz; New Haven v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Kyles v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1012 L.; Lawrence C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Laborers; Foster Wheeler Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Laborers; Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Labor Union. See name of trade. Lacio v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Lackey v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Ladson v. Metropolitan Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 LaFace Records; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 LaFlamme v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 LaFleur v. Pennsylvania State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana; Transaero, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Laidlaw Holdings, Inc. v. Pollack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Lake v. Cattaraugus County District Attorney's Office . . . . . . . . 1165 Lake County v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Lake Oswego; Larsson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. v. National Labor Relations Bd. 1077 Lamagno; Gutierrez de Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1010,1067,1108 Lamar; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Lamar County Bd. of Ed. and Trustees v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Lamb v. Quincy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Lambert v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Lambey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Lampkin; District of Columbia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Lampkin v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lampkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Lance v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Landis Mfg. Systems, Inc.; Brader v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Lang v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . 854,1066 Langford v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Langguth v. McCuen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Langley v. Jackson State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv Page Lanier v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Lanier v. Haynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Lankford v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Lankford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Lan Ngoc Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Lannon; Occhino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 LaPlante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Lariscy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1033 Larkins; Aultman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Larkins v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Larocca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Larsen; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Larson v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Larson v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Larson v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Larson v. Nutt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Larsson v. Lake Oswego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 LaSalle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Lashley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Laska v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Latsis; Chandris, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Laudani, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1187 Lauderdale Cty. School Dist.; Enterprise Consol. School Dist. v. . 988 Laughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Laughter v. Belk-Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1011 Lavalco, Inc.; Results, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Lavin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Lavold v. Chang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1122 Law v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Lawal v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Lawhorn; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Lawler; Trumbly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Law Offices of Herbert Hafif Pension and Profit Sharing Plan; Martin-Musumeci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Lawrence v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Lawrence v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Lawrence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1101 Lawrence C. v. Timothy L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Lawrie v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Lawson v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Lawton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Layne v. Walter Industries, Inc., Group Benefit Plan . . . . . . . . . . 877 Lazor v. Sperry Rand Corp., Univac Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1104 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lazor v. Unisys Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1104 Le v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Leadership Software, Inc. v. Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Leake v. Northern Va. Assn. of Realtors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Leal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Leaphart v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1199 Leapley; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Leavitt; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 LeBlanc v. Meza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 LeBlanc v. Ward Lake Drilling, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae; Clapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 LeCureux; Fondren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Ledford v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1199 LeDonne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Lee v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 Lee v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Lee v. Flightsafety Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Lee v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1035 Lee v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Lee v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1104 Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,979 Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Leede Exploration v. NICOR Exploration Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Leeds; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Legarda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Legear v. Nix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Legg v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Legge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Leininger; Hunger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Leisure Time Productions, B. V. v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. . . . . . . 987 Lekan v. American Energy Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1066 Lekvold v. Westinghouse Hanford Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 LeMacks; Roller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Lenihan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Lenis v. U. S. Marshal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Lennick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Lennon v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Leonard v. New York Dept. of Correctional Services . . . . . . . . . . 832 Leonard v. Rose's Department Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1034 Leonard v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Leonardo; Ayala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Lepardo v. Board of Health and Hospitals of Boston . . . . . . . . . . 931 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii Page Leppard v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Leslie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 L. E. S. Properties, Hotel Venture v. Westin Hotel Co. . . . . . . . . 1082 Lester v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1122 Letter Carriers; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1199 Leung v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Levario v. State Bar of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Levin v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Levin; Marcus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Levine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Levy; Fanny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Lewellen v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cty. . . 1112 Lewis; Blevins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Lewis v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Lewis; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Lewis; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Lewis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Lewis; Lowry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Lewis v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Lewis; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Lewis; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Lewis; Puffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Lewis; Rader v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Lewis v. Seidman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Lewis; Seiwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Lewis v. Sharp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Lewis; Stein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Lewis v. Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . . . 883 Lewis v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1034 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,905,1014,1051 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.; Nintendo of America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 822 Lezine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Liability Investigative Fund Effort, Inc. v. Massachusetts . . . . . . 1058 Libby v. Duval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. Magnuson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.; Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Liberty State Bank & Trust; Kersh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Lieber, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1142 Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1036 Liegakos v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Lierenz v. Bowen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Life Ins. Co. of North America; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Liggins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1066 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:25 PGT*TCR xcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lilburn v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Lillard; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1137 Lilly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1175 Lin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Linares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Lind; Wang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Linder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Lindler; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Lindsay v. Mozingo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Lindsey v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Lindsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Linehan v. Harvard Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Linehan; Kentucky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Lingenfelter v. Domanico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Linn v. Pitts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Linton; Airbus Industrie, G. I. E. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Lintz v. Skipski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Lions v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Lira; Mains v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Lisek v. Norfolk & Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Little; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Little v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Little Rock; Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Littrell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Livonia; Dudzinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Livsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Lizalde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 L. L. Cool J; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Lloyd v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1010 Lloyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,953 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Locke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Lockett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Locklear v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Locomotive Engineers v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . 930 Loewenstein; Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Loews Theatre Management Corp.; Parke-Hayden, Inc. v. . . . . . . 875 Logan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Lohnes v. Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Lokay v. American Real Estate Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,1033 Lomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Lomask v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Lominac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Lomprez v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcix Page Lonay v. Stookey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 London v. Haws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Londono v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Lone Star Co.; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Long v. Administrative Director of N. J. Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Long; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Long v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Long; Chaffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Long v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Long v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1186 Long v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Long v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Long v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Long v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1034 Long v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1090 Longboat Key v. Reserve, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Long Crow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Long Distance Service of Washington v. Mid Atlantic Telecom . . 931 Long Distance Services, Inc. v. Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. . . . . . 931 Longenette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Long Island R. Co. v. Marchica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Longnecker v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Longoria; Aispuro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Longoria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Long & Scott Farms, Inc.; Aimable v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Longstreet v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Longworth v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Loomis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Lopez v. Behles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1033 Lopez v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1185 Lopez; Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,904,931,940,1153,1181 Lopez-Amaro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . 1146 Lopez-Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lopez-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Lopez Rojas v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Lopez-Yanez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Lorance; Southern Health Corp. of Hamilton, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lorang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Lord v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Lord v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Lorton; Woodward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Lorusso; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Los Angeles; Awofolu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR c TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Los Angeles v. Bradford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Los Angeles v. Chew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Los Angeles; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Los Angeles County; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1063 Los Angeles Police Dept.; Karim-Panahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1009 Los Angeles Superior Court Appellate Dept.; Mason v. . . . . . . . . 1091 Los Angeles Unified School Dist.; Braswell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964,1136 Loschiavo; Dearborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Lot 5, Fox Grove, Alachua County v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Lott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Loudermilk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Loudoun County Dept. of Social Services; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . 845,1034 Louisiana; Augustus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Louisiana; Berniard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Louisiana; Bolden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Louisiana; Bowie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Louisiana v. Corley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Louisiana; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1066 Louisiana; Felton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Louisiana v. Hays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1056 Louisiana; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Louisiana; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1186 Louisiana v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,997 Louisiana; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Louisiana; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Louisiana; Sutherland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections; Bell v. . . . . . . . 1079 Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Dev.; Hay's Western Wear, Inc. v. 819 Louisiana Homes, Inc.; Michigan Dept. of Mental Health v. . . . . . 1077 Louisiana-Pacific Corp.; ASARCO Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Orjias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Ed.; Rankins v. 871 Louisville; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Love; Gaerttner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Love v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Love; Printup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Love v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Love v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1185 Love v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,967 Love v. Wheeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Love; Zagwoski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Lovejoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Lowe; Grove North America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Lowe v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ci Page Lowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,953 Lowe-Bey v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Lowery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Lowry v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Lowry v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Lowry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Lu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Luan Van Hoang v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Lubben v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Lubitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Lucas v. Hahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Lucas v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Lucas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,851 Lucas v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Lucas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1007,1027 Lucht v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Lucille v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Ludwig v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Luen Enterprises Co. v. Mason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Luis v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Lukemire; Staples v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S­W Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . 869 Lumsden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Luna v. Court of Appeals of Ohio, Huron County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Luna v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Luna v. Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Lunde v. Helms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Lungren; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Lunsford v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Luong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Lussier v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Lutcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Luton v. Grandison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Lutz; Frost v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Lyle v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Lyles v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Lynch; Cruttenden & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Lynch; McDermott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Lynch; Nixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Lynch; Public Schools Retirement System of Mo. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lynch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Lynds v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Lyons v. Kiernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Lyons v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lyons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Ly Tran v. Columbus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 M. v. San Diego County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,908 Ma v. TRW, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Maas; Benigni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Maass; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Maass; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Maass; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Maass; Voth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1009 Maberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Macario v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Macht; Irby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Macias v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Macias v. Raul A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Macias-Huerta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Maciel v. Ylst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Mack, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1142 Mack v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Mack v. Stone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Mackall v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Mackey v. Moss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1122 Macklin v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Macnab v. Board of Parole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 MacQueen; CSR Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Macro Energy, Inc. v. Ito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Macy's Northeast, Inc.; DiGianni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Madden v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Madison County Fiscal Court v. Horn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Madrid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Madrigal-Maceda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Mafnas v. Aldan-Pierce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Magee, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Magee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Maghe v. Carr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Magill v. Evans, George & Bronstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Magnolia State Enterprises; Posey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Magnuson; Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Magnusson; Gallant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Magnusson; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Mahaley v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Mahaolu; Stevenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Mahler; Hinshaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Mahler; Shay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Maine v. Graves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ciii Page Maine; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Maine; Torrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mainlands Section 1 and 2 Civic Assn., Inc. v. Massaro . . . . . . . . 808 Mains v. Lira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Majors v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Make; Ellison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Makel; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Makel; Faulkner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Makemson v. McBride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Malbrough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,975 Maldonado Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Malia v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Malik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Mallory v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Mance v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Mancini v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections . . . . . . . 952 Mandilakis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Maness v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Mangano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Manges v. Seattle-First National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Mangini; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Mangino v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Assn.; United World Trade v. 1112 Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth.; Jackson v. 818,1033 Mann v. Conlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Mann v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Mann; Milwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Mann; Samuels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Mannion; Gilkey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Mannion; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Manson v. Stacescu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Manville Sales Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n 1190 March v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1104 Marchica; Long Island R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Marcos' Estate v. Hilao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Marcum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1009 Marcus v. Levin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Mareno v. Westchester County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Mariani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Marin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Marin-Cardona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Marine Towing, Inc. v. Sphere Drake Ins. plc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Marin-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Mark v. Corwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Mark; Corwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Markoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Marks; Dougherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Marks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Marlow v. Office of Court Administration of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Maros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Marquard v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Marquez v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Marquez v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Marquez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Marquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1134 Marsh v. John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Marsh; Rebar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1104 Marshal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Marshall; Bender v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Marshall; Benson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Marshall; Ellington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Marshall; Grayson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Marshall; Hardnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Marshall; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Marshall; Porter County Plan Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Marshall v. San Bernardino County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Marshall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,955 Marsilio v. Consolidated Rail Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Martin v. Bank of Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Martin v. Busey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Martin; Easley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Martin v. Initial U. S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1036 Martin v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Martin v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,897,976,1099 Martin v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Martin Construction Co. v. Norwest Bank Kalispell, N. A. . . . . . . 1128 Martin County v. Wouters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Martindale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Martinez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Martinez v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . 834,861,886,910,955,1042,1157,1179 Martinez-Estrada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Martinez-Moncivais v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Martinez Ramirez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cv Page Martin-Musumeci v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif Pension and Profit Sharing Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Martinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1192 Marts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Martz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Marvel v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Marvel Lighting Corp.; Birkbeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Maryland; Ayers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Maryland; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Maryland; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1186 Maryland; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Maryland; Fullard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Maryland; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Maryland; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Maryland; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Maryland; Seymour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Maryland v. Simmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Maryland; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Maryland Casualty Co.; W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Maryland Comptroller of Treasury; Schenley Press, Inc. v. . . . . . 822 Maryland Dept. of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs.; Adams v. . 1113 Mascitti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Masini Soler v. Solicitor General of Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Mason, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Mason; Ching Luen Enterprises Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Mason v. Los Angeles Superior Court Appellate Dept. . . . . . . . . 1091 Mason v. Meiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Mason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064,1119 Mass v. Carlsbad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Massachusetts; Fruchtman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Massachusetts; Gagliardi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Massachusetts; Liability Investigative Fund Effort, Inc. v. . . . . . 1058 Massachusetts; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1010 Massachusetts; Olszewski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Massachusetts; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Massaro; Mainlands Section 1 and 2 Civic Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 808 Massey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Masters; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. . . . . . . . . 921,1012,1040 Mastrogiovanni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Masurek; Goodwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Mata v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Mata v. Ricketts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1104 Matanuska Maid, Inc.; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mateo-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Mathews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Mathis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1134 Matlock v. Abramajtys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Matos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Matra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,913,938 Mauri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Maxway Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Mauro; John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. 1016 Maxway Corp.; Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Maxwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Mayberry v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Mayberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mayer v. Oliveira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Mayer; Oliveira v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Mayer Foods Corp.; Huppeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Mayes v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Mayes v. Sanford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Maynard; Home Savings of America, FSB v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Mayo; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Mayo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Mayor of District of Columbia v. Sprint Communications Co. . . . . 916 Mayor of District of Columbia; Sprint Communications Co. v. . . . 916 Mayor of Parma v. Picha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Mayor of West Palm Beach; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Maywood, Inc.; Rosas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Mazer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 McAdams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 McAfee v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1104 McAlpine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 McAngues; Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 McAninch; O'Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 McAtee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 McBride, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 McBride v. Head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 McBride v. Jarvis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 McBride; Makemson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 McBride; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 McBride v. Sharpe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 McBride v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 McCall v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 McCarthy; Faunce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cvii Page McCarty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 McCaughtry; Scales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 McCaughtry; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 McCauley; Fromal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1035 McClain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 McClarin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 McClellan; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 McClellan v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 McClellan; St. Louis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 McClellan; Sheik-Abdi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 McClung v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 McCombs v. Cooledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 McCombs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 McCostlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 McCoy v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 McCrary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 McCray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 McCuen; Langguth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 McCullough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 McCullough v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 McCully v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 McCutcheon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 McDade; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 McDaniel v. Cody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 McDaniel v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 McDaniel v. Tellis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 McDermott v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 McDermott International, Inc. v. Beasley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 McDonald v. Boydston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,880 McDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.; Burley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1186 McDonough v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 McDowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1031,1186 McElroy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 McElveen; Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 McFadden; Ferdik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 McFadden; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 McFadden v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,991 McFadden; Johns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 McFadden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1104 McGahee v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 McGahee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 McGee, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McGee v. Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 McGee v. Holmes County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 McGee v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1063 McGill v. Faulkner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 McGinnis; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099,1186 McGinnis; Sweeton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 McGrath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 McGreevy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 McGuire v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 McGuire v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 McGuire v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 McHenry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 McIntosh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 McIntyre v. Crouch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1036 McIntyre v. Leavitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 MCI Telecommunications Corp.; Tracy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 McKellar; Nesmith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 McKenna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002,1185 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352,924 McKenzie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1179 McKenzie v. Weer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 McKinney v. Osceola County Bd. of County Comm'rs . . . . . . . . . . 1110 McKinnon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 McKnight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 McLaren v. Harlan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 McLaughlin v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . 1149 McLaurin v. Cowhey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 McLenagan v. Karnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 McLendon; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 McLeod v. Loudoun County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . 845,1034 McMackin; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 McManus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1196 McMennemy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 McMillan v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 McMillin; Stringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 McMurray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 McNair v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 McNair v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 McNair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 McNamara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 McNary v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 McNeely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 McNutt; Gallagher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 McPeters v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cix Page McQueen v. Brister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 McQueen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 McSparran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 McVey-Mehta v. Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 McWherter; Mujihadeen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 MDU Resources Group; W. R. Grace & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Meade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Meade-Stephens v. School Dist. of Jersey City, Hudson County 991,1122 Means v. Wortham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Meche v. Meche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Medina v. Quamme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Medlock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Med-Therapy Rehab. Services v. Diversicare Corp. of America . . 817 Meeks v. Dewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Meese; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Mehio v. Graber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Mehrer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Meiners; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Melendez v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Security . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1034 Melendez Longoria; Aispuro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Melkonian v. Melkonian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Mello v. Woodhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Melnick/Nickel; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Melton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Melville v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Melvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Member Data Services, Inc.; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Members of Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Bd. v. Committee to Save Mokelumne River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Mendenhall v. Astec Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Mendenhall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Mendez v. San Diego County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . 937 Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,899 Mendive Gonzalez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Mendlow v. University of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Mendocino County Employees Retirement Assn.; Spaletta v. . . 821,1033 Mendoza v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Men-Guer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 810 Menzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Menzies v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Meo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Meraz-Peru v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Mercado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Mercier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp. v. Hospital Employees . . . . . . . . 961 Meredith v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Meredith v. Scarborough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Merex A. G. v. Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Weber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,999 Merola v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Merrill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Mesa-Celis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Mester v. Saiki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1011 Metallo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Metcalf; Calvento v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Metropolitan Dade County; Ladson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Metropolitan Dade County; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cty.; Lewellen v. 1112 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Tortuya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Hechinger . . . . . 1126 Meyer; Montero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Meyers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Meza; LaBlanc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Mezzanatto; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 Miami; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Miami Beach; Greenfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Michael; Pineville Real Estate Operation Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Michael Foods, Inc.; Papetti's Hygrade Egg Products, Inc. v. . . . . 1150 Michael's Piano, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Michel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Michelin Tire Corp.; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Michelletti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Michener v. ARA Health Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Michigan; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Michigan v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Michigan v. Asher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Michigan; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Michigan v. Caruso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Michigan; Cousino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,936 Michigan; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Michigan; Deggendorf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1115 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxi Page Michigan; Densmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1034 Michigan; Dunham-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Michigan; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Michigan; Ewing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Michigan; Gaval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Michigan; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Michigan; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Michigan; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Michigan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Department of Treasury of Mich. 1016 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Cassidy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Keenan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Lyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Mayberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Northington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Michigan Dept. of Mental Health v. Louisiana Homes, Inc. . . . . . . 1077 Michigan Dept. of Social Services; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Michigan Dept. of Treasury; Gillette Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Mickens v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Microsoft Corp.; Apple Computer, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc.; Long Distance Service of Wash. v. 931 Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc.; Long Distance Services, Inc. v. . . . . . 931 Middlemist v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Middleton v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Migdaleck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Mighty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Migliorino (Miller) v. Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. 1058 Mike's Train House; MDK, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Mikkilineni v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Mikkilineni v. Chester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Mikkilineni v. Forest Hills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Mikkilineni v. Glenn Engineering & Associates, Ltd. . . . . . . . 1047,1199 Milburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Miles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Milken; Commercial Union Assurance Co., plc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Miller, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Miller; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1033 Miller v. Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1058 Miller v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Miller v. Keystone Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Miller; Roundtree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1034 Miller; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Miller v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 877,886,977,986,1041,1042,1093,1185 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Miller v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Milligan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Milone v. Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Milton v. Hullar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Milton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,1067,1085 Milwaukee v. Cement Division, National Gypsum Co. . . . . . . . . . 1072 Milwaukee; Fertel-Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 414 Milwaukee Mack Sales, Inc.; Caine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Milwaukee Police Dept.; Fertel-Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,1013 Milwood v. Mann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Mims v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Mims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1107 Mine Workers v. Island Creek Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Mingledorff; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Minh Do v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Minicone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Minier-Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Minneapolis; Hunkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Minnesota; Blodgett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Minnesota; Hathaway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Minnesota; Weisberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue v. Norwest Bank Duluth, N. A. . . 1056 Minnesota Dept. of Corrections; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Minniecheske v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Minnifield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Minter; Ragland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Mirman v. Supreme Court of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Mississippi; Branford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Mississippi; Conner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Mississippi; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,997 Mississippi; Nixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Mississippi; Parish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Mississippi; Simon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Mississippi; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Mississippi Bar; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Missouri; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Missouri; Carver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Missouri; Childs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Missouri; Cobb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Missouri; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Missouri; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Missouri; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Missouri v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 513repp12b 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxiii Page Missouri; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Missouri; Nenninger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Missouri; Shurn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Missouri; Skeens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Missouri; Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Missouri State Bd. of Podiatry Medicine; Cain v. . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1036 Mistick & Sons, Inc. v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Mitchell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., Northbrook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Mitchell v. Amarillo Hospital Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Mitchell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,842 Mitchell v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Mitchell v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Mitchell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Mitchell; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Mitchell v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Mitchell v. United States . . . . . 853,860,874,975,977,1042,1045,1098,1113 Mitchell v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Mitchell v. Zent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Mitsubishi International Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc. . . . 1146 Mitwol, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Mizkun v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 M. K., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Mladosich-Navejar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Moazzam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Mobile County Health Dept.; Braggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1066 Mobile Freezers, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Mobile Medex, Inc. v. Bramucci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Mobil Oil Corp.; Houdek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Mobil Oil Corp.; Virginia Gas Marketers & Auto Repair Assn. v. 1148 Mobin v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Mobley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1098 Mock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Modern Graphic Arts, Inc. v. Bedinghaus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Moffitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Moghal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Mohammed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Moldea v. New York Times Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Molina v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Monga v. Sommer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Monsanto Employees' Credit Union; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Montana; Gollehon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Montana; Langford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Montana; Lilburn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Montana; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Montana; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Montana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Montana Dakota Utilities Co.; W. R. Grace & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Montanino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Montero v. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Montes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Montgomery, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,995 Montgomery v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Montgomery County Government; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Moody v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1027 Moon v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1104 Moore v. Dillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Moore v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Moore v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1001 Moore v. EMC Mortgage Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Moore v. Felger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Moore v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Moore; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Moore v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Moore v. Kennison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Moore; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Moore v. Member Data Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Moore v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Moore v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,1035 Moore v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Moore v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Moore v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,940,977,979,1078,1096,1182 Moore; Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Moorehead, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Moore's Estate; Fialk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Moore's Estate; Staknis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Moose v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Mora Carrillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Morales; California Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1074 Morales v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1102 Moran v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Morehead v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Moreland v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Moretti v. Red Roof Inn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Moretti v. Zisa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxv Page Morgan; Dooley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Morgan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Morgan County; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Morgenstern v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Morin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1188 Morissette v. Yu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1052 Morning Call, Inc.; Kucinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Morrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1196 Morris v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Morris v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Morris v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1122 Morris v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,848 Morrison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Morrison; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1033 Morrisville Borough; Puricelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Morritz v. Government of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Morrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Morse v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Morse v. Republican Party of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1125 Mortimer v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Morton; Kontakis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1035 Morton v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Mosavi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Mosay v. Buffalo Brothers Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Moseley v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Moseley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Moses v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1026,1051 Moskovitz; Figgie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Moss; Mackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1122 Moss v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1103 Motley v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1033 Motley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Moulder; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Mouneu v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Mount v. El Dorado County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Mount v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Mount Sinai Hospital; Heilweil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Moyo; California Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Mozingo; Lindsay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Ms. H; Baby K v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 M/T Loire; International Terminal Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Mucciante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Muhammad v. Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Muhammed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Mujahid; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Mujihadeen v. McWherter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Mukilteo; Rotuotsoa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Mulder; Food & Commercial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Muldrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Mulhall; Advance Security, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Muller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Mullins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Mummau v. Mummau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Munday Enterprises v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Municipal Court Citrus Judicial District; Sanford v. . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Municipal Court of Cal., Ventura County; Alonso v. . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Municipal Court of San Jose, Cal.; Yakich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Municipal & Industrial Disposal Co. v. Browner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Municipality of Anchorage; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Municipal Utilities Bd. of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co. . . . . 1148 Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1119 Munoz-Solarte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Murphy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1187 Murphy v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Murphy; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Murphy v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Murphy; Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Murphy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1042,1135 Murphy Exploration & Production Co. v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Murray v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Murray; Eaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Murray; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Murray; Gholson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Murray; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Murray v. National Broadcasting Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Murray; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Murray v. Penobscot County Dist. Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Murrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Musemeche v. Charter National Bank-Westheimer . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Musgrave v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Musgrove v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Musseman; Dubuc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Musser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Musslewhite v. Reading & Bates Petroleum Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Mustilier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 M/V Sky Reefer; Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. . . . . . 1013,1125 Myers; Castro Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1033 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxvii Page Myers v. Estelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Myers; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Myers v. Jiminez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Myers; Lake County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Myers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1017,1086 Myerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Myrick; Freightliner Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1055 N.; D. G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Nable; Herriman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Naddi v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Durham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Nagle; Carey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Nagle; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Nakata v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Nakell v. Attorney General of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Nalico International Corp.; Reichstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,1009 Napoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Narragansett Indian Tribe; Rhode Island v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Narvaez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Nash, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nash v. Halliburton Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Nashville Banner Publishing Co.; McKennon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352,924 Nassau; Ferran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1014,1121 Nathan v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Nathan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 NAACP, Inc. v. Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 National Broadcasting Co.; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 National Coupling Co.; Snap-Tite, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 National Football League v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 National Football League; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 National Home Ins. Co.; Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. . . . . . . . 1083 Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 National Labor Relations Bd.; Borden, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 National Labor Relations Bd.; Caterair International v. . . . . . . . . 1015 National Labor Relations Bd.; CenTra, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 National Labor Relations Bd.; J. R. Simplot Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 National Labor Relations Bd.; Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. v. 1077 National Labor Relations Bd.; Q­1 Motor Express, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1080 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. . . 1125 National Labor Relations Bd.; Truck Drivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 National Labor Relations Bd.; United Parcel Service, Inc. v. . . . . 1076 National Labor Relations Bd.; VSA Carolinas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 National Labor Relations Bd.; VSA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 National Medical Enterprises Inc.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n . . 1071 National Railroad Passenger Corp.; Krouse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 National Railroad Passenger Corp.; Lebron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 National Rifle Assn. of America v. Handgun Control Fed. of Ohio 815 National RX Services; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 National Trust for Historic Preservation in U. S. v. FDIC . . . . . . 1065 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 National Union Fire Ins. Co.; Gaydos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,997 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh; Gaydos v. 945,998,1075,1145 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh; G. E. Cap. Corp. v. . . 916 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Highlands Ins. Co. 1112 NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. . . . 251 NationsBank of Tex., N. A. v. Executive Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . 1147 Nationwide Life Ins. Co.; Tri-State Machine, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Nature Co.; White Swan, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Nauss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Navarro; Guy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Nave v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Ndefru v. Sherwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Neal; Gooden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Neal; Harding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Neal; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,989,1179 Nealy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Nebraska; Owen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1052 Nebraska v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,997,1124,1144 Nebraska Dept. of Corrections; Klinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Nebraska ex rel. Nelson v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioac- tive Waste Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 NEC Electronics, Inc.; Nghiem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Nedeljkovich; Boroja v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Negrin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Negron Gaztambide; Hernandez Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Nellis v. Air Line Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Nelson v. Central Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n . . . . . . 987 Nelson v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Nelson v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1010 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Nelson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Nenninger v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Nesbit; Witter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Nesby v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Nesmith v. McKellar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxix Page Netherland; Satcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Neton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Neubert; Krupp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Nevada; Canape v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Nevada; Geary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Nevada; Hardison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Nevada; Whalen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Nevada Entertainment Industries, Inc. v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Nevada Entertainment Industries, Inc.; Henderson v. . . . . . . 1078,1199 Newby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 New Castle Youth Development Center; Good v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Sinai v. . . . . . . . . . 1025,1122 New Hampshire Sup. Ct., Comm. on Char. & Fitness; Burdick v. 931 New Haven v. Kuntz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 New Jersey; Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 New Jersey; Bohuk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 New Jersey; Mortimer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 New Jersey; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 New Jersey; Pulasty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 New Jersey; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 New Jersey; Sever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 New Jersey; Stankowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1185 New Jersey; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 New Jersey Bell; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1010 New Jersey Dept. of Ed.; Aizen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 New Jersey Dept. of Transportation; Wes Outdoor Adv. Co. v. 824 New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services; Perez v. . . . . 814 New Madrid County; Grisso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 New Mexico; Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,865,1034 New Mexico; Ibarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 New Mexico; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 New Mexico; Ogden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 New Mexico; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,997 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock; Director, OWCP v. . 997,1074 Newspaper & Mail Deliverers; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Newton; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Newton v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Newton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 New York; Abidekun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 New York; Belsito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 New York; Bibbins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 New York; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page New York; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 New York; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 New York; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 New York; Lussier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 New York; Noorzin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 New York; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 New York; Russo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 New York; Salvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 New York; Santos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 New York; Schulz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 New York; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 New York; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 New York; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1144 New York City Dept. of Housing Preserv. and Dev.; Iusan v. . . 879,1035 New York City Dept. of Social Services, Human Resources Admin- istration; Gorlov v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . 821 New York City Housing Authority; Finkel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 New York Dept. of Correctional Services; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . 832 New York State Assn. of Realtors, Inc.; Shaffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1039,1055,1108 New York State Dept. of Correctional Services v. Rumsey . . . . . 875 New York State Dept. of Correctional Services; Rumsey v. . . . . . 875 New York Times Co.; Moldea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Ngenegbo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Ngoc Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Nicholas v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Nichols; Izen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Nichols v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Nichols v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,950,1005,1027 Nicholson v. Cooney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Nickles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 NICOR Exploration Co.; Leede Exploration v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Niebla-Pacheco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Nieto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Nieves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1050,1180 Niles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1187 Nimmagadda; Krishnamurthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 822 Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Cullen & Cullen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxi Page Nix; Legear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Nix; Rinehart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Nixon v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Nixon v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Njoku v. Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Nobles; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1186 Nobles v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Nobles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Noel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Nolan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Nolley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Nonnette v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Noorzin v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Norandal USA, Inc., Scottsboro Division; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Norcal Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Heller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Nordquist v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Norfolk Southern Corp.; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Norfolk Southern Corp.; Wierbicki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Norfolk & Western R. Co.; Lisek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Norman; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Norman v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Norris; Abdullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Norris; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Norris; Dandridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Norris; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Norris; Dokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1104 Norris; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Norris; Fairchild v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1146 Norris; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Norris; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1005 Norris v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Norris; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Norris; Huffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Norris; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Norris; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Norris v. Oklahoma City Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Norris; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Norris; Prince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Norris; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Norris; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Norris; Singleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Norris; Snell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Norris v. Starr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Norris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 North American Communications, Inc.; U. S. A. Direct, Inc. v. . . . 1152 North American Free Trade Agreement; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . 849 North American Van Lines; Hutto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1199 North Carolina; Bacon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 North Carolina; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 North Carolina; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 North Carolina; Eason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 North Carolina; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 North Carolina; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 North Carolina; Head v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,935,939 North Carolina; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1104 North Carolina; Keel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 North Carolina; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 North Carolina; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1035 North Carolina; Mahaley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 North Carolina; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,1035 North Carolina; Moseley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 North Carolina; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 North Carolina; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 North Carolina; Sexton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 North Carolina; Skipper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 North Carolina; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 North Carolina; Swanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1056 North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc.; Head v. . . . . . . . . . 882 North Carolina R. Co.; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church; Young v. . 929 Northern Va. Assn. of Realtors; Leake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Northington v. Burress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Northington v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Northrop Univ. School of Law; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 North Slope Borough; Athmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 North Slope Borough; Chivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Norwest Bank Duluth, N. A.; Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue v. . . 1056 Norwest Bank Kalispell, N. A.; John W. Martin Constr. Co. v. . . . 1128 Nosair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Nottingham; Bonser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1033 Novatel Computer Systems, Inc. v. Cray Communications, Inc. . . 1191 Novene v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Noyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 NRA Political Victory Fund; Federal Election Comm'n v. . . . . . . 88 Nueces County Appraisal Dist.; Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxiii Page Nunnemaker v. Ylst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Nutt; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Nyberg v. Riska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Nyhuis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Nynex Corp.; Desmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 NYSA­ILA Welfare Fund v. Dunston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 O.; H. R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Oates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Oats v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 O'Bannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Oberle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 O'Brien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Occhino v. Lannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Ocean County; Zekaria Realty, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Ocean County Bd. of Social Services; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 O'Connell v. Kirchner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1303 O'Connell; Rockwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Oczkowski v. Yudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Oda; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Odekirk v. Imperial Palace V. E. B. A. Tr. Employee Medical Plan 1127 Odiaga v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Odiaga; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Odom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Office & Commercial Workers; Puerto Rico Port Authority v. . . . 814 Office of Administration, Executive Office of President; Goldgar v. 1079 Office of Administrative Hearing Officer; Udala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Office of Court Administration of N. Y.; Marlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Office of Personnel Management; Bermudez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Office of Personnel Management; Fredeluces v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Office of Personnel Management; McGuire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Office of Personnel Management; Pacifico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Office of Personnel Management; Quinto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Office of Personnel Management; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Office of Public Defender, Hudson Region; Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Office of Surface Mining, Reclam. & Enf.; Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. 927 Office of Thrift Supervision; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Offstein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Ogden v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Ogden; Prymer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Ogden v. San Juan County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Ogorzolka; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co. v. EEOC . . . . . . . . . . 1198 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ogungbe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Ogunsalu v. Kroger Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Ohio; Batten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1034 Ohio; Bedford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Ohio; Beuke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Ohio; Blazer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Ohio; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Ohio; Combs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Ohio; Crago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Ohio; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Ohio; Dehler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1130 Ohio; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Ohio; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Ohio; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Ohio; Gifford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Ohio; Gilliam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Ohio; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1033 Ohio; Kish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Ohio; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Ohio; Lynds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Ohio; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Ohio; McCellan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ohio; Powers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Ohio v. Singfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Ohio; Steffen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Ohio; Van Hook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1186 Ohio; Wyant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections; Mancini v. . . . . . . . 952 Ohio Savings Bank v. Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Ohio Savings Bank v. Popp's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Ohio State Univ. Hospitals, Inc.; Clark-Rubin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Ojai Unified School Dist. v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Oji, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 O'Keefe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1012 Okiyama v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Oklahoma; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Oklahoma; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Oklahoma; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Oklahoma; Bryson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Oklahoma; Burden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Oklahoma; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Oklahoma; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Oklahoma; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxv Page Oklahoma; Fowler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Oklahoma; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Oklahoma; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Oklahoma; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Oklahoma; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Oklahoma; Jardine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Oklahoma; Larkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Oklahoma; Mayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Oklahoma; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Oklahoma; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Oklahoma; Paxton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Oklahoma; Plantz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Oklahoma; Revilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Oklahoma; Robbins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Oklahoma; Robedeaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Oklahoma; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Oklahoma; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Oklahoma; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1061 Oklahoma; Snow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Oklahoma; Summers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Oklahoma; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Oklahoma; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Oklahoma; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Oklahoma City Univ.; Norris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. . . . 869 Oklahoma Dept., Hum. Servs., Affirmative Action Unit; Gibbs v. 840,995 Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Oklahoma Dept. of Transportation; D-Landco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1035 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1144 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n; National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. . 1071 Okocha, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Okocha v. Cleveland Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Okon v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Old Chief v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Oldenkamp; Gossage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 O'Leary; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 O'Leary v. Sacramento County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Oliva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1115 Olivarez; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Olivas v. Boeh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Oliveira v. Mayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Oliveira; Mayer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Oliver v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Oliver v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Ollie v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Olson v. Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Olson; Rawlins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Olson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Olszewski v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Olvera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Omnitech International, Inc. v. Clorox Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 O'Neal v. McAninch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 O'Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1049 O'Neil v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 One Times Square Assoc. Partnership v. Banque Nat. de Paris . . 1153 Onuorah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Optical Radiation Corp.; Gile v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Optimal Data Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1104 Oral Roberts Univ.; Foust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Orange Cty. Personnel Div., Sheriff Coroner; Quintanilla v. . . . 858,1034 Orange Cty. Social Services Agency; Ana G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Oregon; Altimus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Oregon; Booth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Oregon; Hansen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Oregon; Osiris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Oregon Dept. of Revenue; Trung Van Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Oregon Parole Bd.; Rivera Demuniz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Oregon State Bar; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Oreto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Oriakhi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1168 Orjias; Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Ornelas-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1169 Orr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1064 Ortiz; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Ortiz v. DuBois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Ortiz v. Hoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Ortiz; Ruthers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1178,1179 Ortiz-Marquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Osborne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.; Huppeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Osceola County Bd. of County Comm'rs; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . 1110 Osifo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Osiris v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Osorio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Osorio-Arce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Osorio-De Holguin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxvii Page O'Sullivan; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Osuorji v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Otchere, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Otis v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . 873 Ott; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,998 Otto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Woltering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Outler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Ovalle-Salcedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Overly v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1104 Owen v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1052 Owen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Owens v. Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Owens v. EMC Mortgage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Owens v. Hewell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Owens v. Larsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1051,1192 Oxford House, Inc.; Edmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1108 Oyler v. Allenbrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Pablo Turruellas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Pace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pacific BMW; Sulmeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Savage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Pacific Maritime Assn.; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,874 Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Pacifico v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Padilla v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Padilla-Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Padoven; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Padu; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Paez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Pagan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Page Books, Inc.; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Pagnucco; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Pahdopony v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Pahlavi; Islamic Republic of Iran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Paige; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 PaineWebber, Inc.; Remmey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Paitsel v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Palmieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Palomino-Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Palomino-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Palomo v. Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Panama City Medical Diagnostics, Ltd. v. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Papetti's Hygrade Egg Products, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc. . . . . 1150 Paradis v. Arave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Paramount Pictures Corp.; Beal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Paramus Bd. of Ed.; Charlton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Pargo v. First Realty Property Management, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Parin; St. Hilaire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Parish v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Parke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Parke-Hayden, Inc. v. Loews Theatre Management Corp. . . . . . . 875 Parker; Calia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1168 Parker v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Parker v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Parker v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1029,1110,1158 Parkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Parris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Parrish v. Riverview Nursing Home, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Parsons v. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Parsons v. Delaware Dept. of Health and Social Services . . . . . . . 875 Partee v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Paschal v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Pasquarille v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Passer; Hanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Pasto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Pataki v. Travelers Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Paterson Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hackensack Water Co. 1149 Pathmark; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Patino-Cardona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Paton v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Patricia M. v. San Diego County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . 896 Patrick v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Patten v. Ruttger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Patterson; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Patterson v. Matanuska Maid, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Patterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,845,1007,1029 Pattillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Pattullo v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Patz v. Hollidaysburg Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Paul v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Paulson; San Diego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Paxton v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Payne v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxix Page Payne v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Payne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Payton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Peabody v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1066 Pearsall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Pearson; Booker Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Pearson v. Southerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Pearson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Peddle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Pedraza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1004 Pedrick v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Pedroza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Pee Dee Federal Savings Bank; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Peeler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Peery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Pelletier; Behrens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Pels, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Pemberthy v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Pemberton v. E. G. Lowry Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Pena; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1074,1108 Pena; Dashnaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Pena; Reshard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Pena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Pender v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Penk v. Aurora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Pennington; Doherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Pennsylvania; Adamo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Pennsylvania; Andrews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Pennsylvania; Aviles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Pennsylvania; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Pennsylvania; Bowser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Pennsylvania; Brobst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1122 Pennsylvania; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Pennsylvania; Duffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Pennsylvania; Fahy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Pennsylvania; Fellin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Pennsylvania; Flowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Pennsylvania; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1185 Pennsylvania; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Pennsylvania; Henning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Pennsylvania; Hoffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Pennsylvania; Hyman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Pennsylvania; Kindler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Pennsylvania; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pennsylvania; Moose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Pennsylvania; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Pennsylvania; Reid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Pennsylvania; Tom Mistick & Sons, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Pennsylvania v. Travis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Pennsylvania; Warner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Pennsylvania; Wissinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pennsylvania National Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Shores . . . . . . . . 823 Pennsylvania PUC v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority 928 Pennsylvania PUC; West Penn Power Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,927 Pennsylvania State Police; Cazeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Pennsylvania State Police; LaFleur v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Penobscot County Dist. Attorney; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Pensacola Construction Co. v. Tyger Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . 1080 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.; East Dayton Tool & Die Co. v. . 816 Peppers v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Peraza Salgado v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Perea v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Perez v. New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services . . . . 814 Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1005,1026,1029,1193 Perez-Estrada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Perez-Monragon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Perez-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Perfection Management Co.; Vitale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Performance Contracting, Inc.; Transco Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1151 Perkins; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Perkins; Bleicken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1010 Perkins v. Western Surety Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1033 Perl v. Hunegs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Perri v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Perry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Perry; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Perry; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Perry; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Perry; HTC Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Perry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Perryman v. Prado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Persinger v. Carmazzi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Pesek v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Third District . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Peshomme v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Peterka v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Peters; Albanese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Peters; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Peters; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxi Page Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority of Pa. and N. J. . . . . . . 811 Peters; Free v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Peters v. Polk County Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Peters; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Peters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1006 Peterson v. Fisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Peterson; Swan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,985 Peterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Pet Inc.; Whitson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Pettigrew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1034 Petty v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Pew v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1185 Pfeiffer v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1105 Pfizer, Inc.; Ridgeway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1103 Pflum; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Pham Tien; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Phelps; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1186 Phelps v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Philbin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Philips v. Von Holdt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Phillip; Hyundai Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Phillips; Breedlove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Phillips; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Phillips v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Phillips v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Phillips; Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Service v. . . . . . . . 1071 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,974 Phillips Furniture Co.; Thomure v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Phillips Petroleum Co.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Piadares v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Picha; Ries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Pickens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Pierce v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Pierce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Pierro v. Bakersfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Pierro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Piervinanzi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Pigott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Pike v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Pimentel; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Pimentel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Pineda-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Pinellas County v. CH2M Hill Southeast, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Pinette; Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1106 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pineville Real Estate Operation Corp. v. Michael . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Pink v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Pinochet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Pinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Pinster v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Pion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Piper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Piping of Ohio, Inc. v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Pires; Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Piroglu v. Coleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Pirollo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Pittman v. Ahitow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Pitts; Linn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Pittsburgh; Bridges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Pittsburg State Univ. v. Hurd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Pizzo v. Risinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,995 Pizzo v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116,1193 Placer County Superior Court; Zisk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1104 Plakas v. Drinski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Planas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc.; Blake v. . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . 956 Plantz v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Platsky v. Studeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Platt; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Pledger v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Pledger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Plourde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Plumbing Planning Corp.; Hoekel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1066 Plummer; Ansari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Poarch Band of Creek Indians; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Poesnecker; Ricchio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Polan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Polansky, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Polk County Memorial Hospital; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Pollack; Laidlaw Holdings, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Pollard v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1105,1107 Pomponio v. Board of Supervisors of Fauquier County . . . . . . . . 870 Ponce-Santoyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Pontillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Poole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,855,1042 Poppen; Doose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxiii Page Popp's Estate; Ohio Savings Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Porter v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Porter v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1104 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Porter County Plan Comm'n v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Portillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Portillo-Valenzuela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Portland; Winther v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Portwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Posey v. Magnolia State Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Posner v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Postmaster General; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1066 Postmaster General; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Postmaster General; Humphries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Postmaster General; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Postmaster General; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Postmaster General; March v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1104 Postmaster General; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Postmaster General; Weeden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Pote v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Potter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Potvin; Tempelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Powe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Powell v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Powell v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1026 Powers v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Powers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1181 Prado; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Praimnath v. American Cablevision of Queens, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 888,1035 Prajedes Arellano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Pratt v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Pratt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098,1100 Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.; Macario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Prentzel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Presbyterian Church; Burress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,992,1035 Presentment Agency; Byrd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Pressley v. Hair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Preston v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Preuss v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1033 Preval Planas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Pre-Vest, Inc.; Erndt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Prewitt; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Prewitt; Tagala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Price v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Price; Rather v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Price; Worsham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Prieto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Pri-Har v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Primate and Bishops' Synod of Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia v. Russian Orthodox Church of Holy Resurrection 1121 Prince v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Printup v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Prioleau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Pritchett v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 961 Proctor Community Hospital; Bybee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Professional Conduct Comm., N. H. Supreme Court; Amsden v. . 902,995 Provencio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Provine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Pruitt v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Prunty; Chavers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Prymer v. Ogden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Public Schools Retirement System of Mo. v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pudlo v. Sheahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Puentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. EPA . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Puerto Rico Dept. of Ed.; Association of Christian Academies and Colleges of Puerto Rico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Puerto Rico Port Authority v. Office & Commercial Workers . . . . 814 Puffer v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Pugh v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1066 Pugh v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Pugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Puig-Infante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Pulasty v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Pulido v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Puricelli v. Morrisville Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Purk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Purkett; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Purkett; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Purkett; Hoggard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Purkett; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Purkett; Varner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Purlantov v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Q­1 Motor Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 1080 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxv Page QSP, Inc.; Bright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Quackenbush; Century-National Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Quackenbush; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1153 Quackenbush; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Quamme; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Quang Ly Tran v. Columbus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Wulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Queen v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115,1199 Quiban v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1009 Quigley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Quillian v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Quincy; Lamb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Quinlan; Kimberlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1123,1144 Quinn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Quintania v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Quintanilla v. Orange Cty. Personnel Div., Sheriff Coroner . . . 858,1034 Quintero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,989,1195 Quinto v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Quiroz-Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Quisenberry v. Berk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Quoc Lu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 R. v. E. O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Rabin v. U. S. Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Rader v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Radio-Electronics Officers; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Radio Officers; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Rae, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Rae v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1066 Rafidain Bank; Goodman Holdings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Ragland v. Minter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Railroad Retirement Bd.; Funderburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Raine v. Gleason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Rainey v. Thigpen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Rakes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Rambo; Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Ramirez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Ramirez v. Pacific Maritime Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,874 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,965,1043 Ramirez Guerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Ramona Convent of Holy Names v. Alhambra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Ramon Morales; California Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . 924,1074 Ramos v. Coughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Ramos v. Office of Public Defender, Hudson Region . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,910,1120 Ramos Beauchamp v. Board of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Ramsey; Holmberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Ramsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Rancho Palso Verdes; Stuart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Randall v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services of Volusia County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1104 Randall v. Golden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Randolph v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Randolph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Random House, Inc.; Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Range v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Rankins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Ed. 871 Ransome v. Bowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Raphlah v. Texas Bd. of Higher Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Rasheed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Ratcliffe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Ratelle; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ratelle; Lopez Rojas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Rather v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Raul A.; Macias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P. A.; Billing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Rawlins v. Olson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Rawlins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Ray v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Ray; Constant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Ray v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Ray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Razor-Bey v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Reading & Bates Petroleum Co.; Musslewhite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Realbuto v. Howe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Real-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Reams v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Reasoner; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Reaves v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Reaves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Rebar v. Marsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1104 Rebar v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.; Rosenberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Reddeck, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Reddoch; Shores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Redman; Alston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Redman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Redmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxvii Page Redmond v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Red Mountain Machinery Co.; Grace Investment Co. v. . . . . . . . . 1044 Redner v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Red Roof Inn; Moretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Redwood Village Partnership v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Reed; Carnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Reed v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Reed v. Henson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1157 Reeder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Reed-Fleming; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1034 Reel Pipe & Valve Co. v. Consolidated Indianapolis-Marion Cty. 1058 Rees v. Reyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Reese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Reese v. Vankirk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Regaldo v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Regucci; Babinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America . . . . 929 Reich; Boatright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Reich v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Reich v. Continental Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Reich; Piping of Ohio, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Reich; Wikberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Reichstein v. Nalico International Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,1009 Reid v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Reid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Reidt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1037,1040 Reilly v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Reilly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Reimann v. Huddleston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Reinke v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Reisman; Buck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Reiss v. Clarkstown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Relfe; Christianson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1035 Relic; Searles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Rengifo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Renner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Reno; Abdurrahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Reno; Ayuda, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Reno; Cahoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Reno; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Reno; Cullum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Reno v. Koray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rent Review Comm'n, Palm Springs; El Dorado Mobile. Park v. 1110 Rent Review Comm'n, Palm Springs; El Dorado Palm Springs v. 1110 Rent Review Comm'n, Palm Springs; Residents of El Dorado Mobilehome Park v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Republican Party of Va.; Morse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1125 Reserve, Ltd.; Longboat Key v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Reshard v. Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Residents of El Dorado Mobilehome Park v. Rent Review Comm'n of Palm Springs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Resnover v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Flanagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1036 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Forest Grove, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Homeland Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Moreland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Pattullo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Robinowitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Societe d'Analyses et d'Etudes Bretonneau v. 823 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Solomon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Resolution Tr. Corp.; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1105 Restivo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Restrepo-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Results, Inc. v. Lavalco, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Revenue Comm'r of Ga.; Reich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Revilla v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Reyer; Baasch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,998 Reyes v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Reyes v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Reyes; Rees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Reyes v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Reyes-Mogollon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Reynolds v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Reynolds; Ellingsworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Reynolds v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation . . . . . . . . 962 Reynolds v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Reynolds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Reynolds Memorial Hospital; Vincent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1034 Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Mangini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,921,1012,1075 Rheuark v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Rhinehart v. Seattle Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxix Page Rhode Island; Toegemann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1036 Rhodes v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Rhodes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1164 Ricchio v. Poesnecker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Ricciardi v. Scully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Ricco v. Gallo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1035 Rice; Esquibel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Rice; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Rice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1033 Rich v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Richard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Richardson; Acevedo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1036 Richardson; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Richardson v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Richardson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Richardson v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Richardson v. McBride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Richardson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Richardson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1085 Richardson; Trail v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Richardson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Richmond v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Richmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1178 Richmond County; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Ricketts; Mata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1104 Rickman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ricord's Succession v. Energy Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Riddle v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Ridgeway v. Pfizer, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1103 Ridings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Ries v. Picha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Riggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Riggs; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Rigney v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Riley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1072 Riley; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Riley; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Riley v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Rimell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1104 Rimert v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Rinard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Rincon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Rinehart v. Nix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ringer; Satellite Broadcasting & Com. Assn. of America v. . . . . . 823 Rio Hondo Community College Dist.; Srinivasan v. . . . . . . . . . 873,1035 Rippee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Riselay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Rishor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1195 Risinger; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,995 Riska; Nyberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Risk Retention Group; Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . 1083 Rison v. Demjanjuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Ristow v. South Carolina Ports Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Ritchie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Ritter v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Ritz v. Gagan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Rivas v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Rivas-Sabogal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Rivera v. Court of Appeal of Cal., First Appellate District . . . . . 867 Rivera v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1171 Rivera Demuniz v. Oregon Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Rivera Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Rivera-Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 River Place East Housing Corp.; Rosenfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1035 Riverview Nursing Home, Inc.; Parrish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Mangini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Roach v. Beaufort County Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Roach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Road Sprinkler Fitters v. Independent Sprinkler Corp. . . . . . . . . 868 Roane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Roark v. Jackson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Robbins v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Robedeaux v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Robert Bartlett Realty; Tarkowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Roberts v. Canton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Roberts v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Roberts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1086 Robertson; Avery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Robertson v. Isomedix, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Robertson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Robertson; Kennon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Robertson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Robertson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,906,949,1076 Robertson; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,985 Robertson; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxli Page Roberts Univ.; Foust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Robinowitz v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Robinson v. Arvonio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Robinson v. Bartley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Robinson v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Robinson; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Robinson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Robinson v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Robinson v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1042,1097,1197 Robinson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1052 Robinson; Venezia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Robinson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Robledo-Grimaldo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Rocha; Celestine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Rocha; Fleming v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1033 Rocha; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1186 Rocha; Houston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Rocha; Reams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Roche; Silas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Rochester; ILQ Investments, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Rochester Housing Authority; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Rocker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1187 Rockwell Hanford Operations; Bricker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Rockwood v. O'Connell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Service v. Phillips . . . . . . . . 1071 Roden v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Rodenbaugh v. Curto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1034 Rodenbaugh v. Knisley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1066 Rodenbaugh v. Ott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,998 Rodenbaugh v. Senape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1056 Rodenbaugh v. Singer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 Rodgers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Rodriguez v. Alford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Rodriguez v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Rodriguez v. Secretary of Treasury of P. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . 852,933,942,954,1051,1148,1156,1195 Rodriguez-Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Rodriguez Mendoza v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Rodriguez-Roncancio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Roe; Hurt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Roemer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1186 Roesch; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Rogers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:26 PGT*TCR cxlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rogers v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Rogers v. Guerrero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rogers v. Reed-Fleming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1034 Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,883,1196 Rogers v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1036 Rojas v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Rojas-Hurtado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Rokke v. Check Services Northwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Rokke v. Rokke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Roldan v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Roller v. LeMacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Rollings v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Roman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Romano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Romer v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Roncale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Rone; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1035 Roney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Rosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Rosa v. Warner Electrical Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Rosales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1198 Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Rosas v. Maywood, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Rosas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Roscoe v. Albuquerque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Rose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Rosebar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Rosemeyer; Euell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Rosemeyer; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Rosemeyer; Ollie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Rosemeyer; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072,1191 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Rosenfeld v. River Place East Housing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1035 Rose's Department Store; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1034 Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Ross v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Ross v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Ross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1152 Ross & Co. v. Congregation of Passion, Holy Cross Province . . . . 947 Rosser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Roth v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Rothstein; Trantino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1034 Rotuotsoa v. Mukilteo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxliii Page Roundtree v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1034 Rourke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Rouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Roush v. KFC National Management Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Roussos v. Baxley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Rowe v. DeBruyn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Rowland; Woodall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Roy v. University of Haw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1186 Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Royster v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1164 R & R Mechanical, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. . . . . . 1107 Ruark v. Boatwright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Rubin; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Rubin; Lowry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rubio-Vasques v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Ruddell; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Ruff v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1036 Rugiero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Ruiz-Cases v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Ruiz Sifuentez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Rumsey v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services . . . . . 875 Rumsey; New York State Dept. of Correctional Services v. . . . . . 875 Runyon; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1066 Runyon; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Runyon; Humphries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Runyon; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Runyon; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Runyon; March v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1104 Runyon; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Runyon; Weeden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Rusher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Russel v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Russell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Russell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Russell v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Russell; Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Russell v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Russell v. Norandal USA, Inc., Scottsboro Division . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Russell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944,994,1137 Russell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,891,960,1010 Russian Orthodox Church of Holy Resurrection; Primate and Bish- ops' Synod of Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia v. 1121 Russo v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR cxliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Russo v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Rutgerswerke AG v. Bettis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Ruthers v. Ortiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Rutledge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1177,1193 Rutt; Grey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Ruttger; Patten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Ryder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1124 Saade v. Trippett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Sabetti v. Dipaolo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Sack v. St. Francis Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Sacks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Sacramento; Tillman-Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Sacramento County; O'Leary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Sadler v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Saelee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Saeteurn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Safeco Ins. Co. of America; Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. . . . . 929 Saiki; Krueger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Saiki; Mester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1011 St. Cyr v. Hays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1054,1066 St. Francis Hospital; Sack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 St. Hilaire v. Parin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Saintil v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 St. Louis v. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; R & R Mechanical, Inc. v. . . . . . 1107 St. Petersburg; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 St. Petersburg; Dou-Han, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Saks Fifth Avenue; DiGianni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Salas-Muniz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Salcido v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Salem; Salem Blue Collar Workers Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Salem Blue Collar Workers Assn. v. Salem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Salemi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Salgado v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Salgado; Kirschner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Salim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Saltaris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Salter; Underwager v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Dist.; Utah v. . . . . . . . . . . 872 Samarco, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Sam Brown Co. v. Jacobs Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Sam Brown Co.; Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Sampang v. Detrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Samson v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlv Page Samuels v. Air Transport Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Samuels v. Mann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 San Bernadino County; Dubyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 San Bernardino County; Doerr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1033 San Bernardino County; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Sanchez v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Sanchez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Sanchez v. McLendon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 899,939,941,1007,1030,1042,1158 Sanders v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Sanders v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Sanders v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Sanders v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Sanders v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,994,1172 Sanderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 San Diego; Forrester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 San Diego v. Paulson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 San Diego County v. Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 San Diego County Dept. of Social Services; Jose M. v. . . . . . . . . . 908 San Diego County Dept. of Social Services; Mendez v. . . . . . . . . . 937 San Diego County Dept. of Social Services; Patricia M. v. . . . . . . 896 Sandin v. Conner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,921 Sandler Associates, L. P. v. BellSouth Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Sandoval v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Sands v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 San Filippo; Bongiovanni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Sanford v. Hildreth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Sanford; Mayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Sanford v. Municipal Court Citrus Judicial District . . . . . . . . . . . 882 San Juan County; Ogden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 San Luis Obispo County, Dept. of Social Services; Bradford v. . . . 1131 San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist.; Weber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Santa Fe Pacific Corp. v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pen- sion Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Santana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Santana-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,888 Santos v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Santosuosso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Santoyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Sapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR cxlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sarceno-Barrios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Sardy v. Hodge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Sassi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Satcher v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Satellite Broadcasting & Com. Assn. of America v. Ringer . . . . . 823 Sather v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Sauer v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Saugus Colony Ltd.; Andrisani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Saunders v. Beverly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,995 Saunders v. Magnusson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Saunders v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Savage; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Savage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Sawtell v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Sawyer v. International Dairy Queen Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Scaife v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Scales v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Scales v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Scalice v. Davies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Scanlon v. State Bar of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Scarborough; Meredith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Scarfia v. Travelers Indemnity Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Scarpa v. DuBois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Schaefer; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Schaefer; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Schaffer v. Bevevino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Schankman v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Scheib v. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Scheibel; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Scheidler v. Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. . . . . . . 1058 Schenck v. Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability of Ore. 871 Schenectady County; Battaglia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Schenley Press, Inc. v. Maryland Comptroller of Treasury . . . . . . 822 Scherling; Crescenzi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Schindler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Schleier; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1055 Schley; Cleveland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Schlitz Brewing Co.; Milwaukee Brewery Pension Plan v. . . . . . . 414 Schlup v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 Schmeltzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Schmidgall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Schmidt v. Espy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Schmidt v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Schmidt v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlvii Page Schmidt; Njoku v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Schmidt Chevrolet, Inc.; Setola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1122,1144 Schmieder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Schneider; San Diego County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Schneider v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1077 Schoenborn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Scholesser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Scholtz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Schomer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 School Bd. of Leon County; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 School Dist. of Jersey City, Hudson County; Meade-Stephens v. 991,1122 Schoolfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 School Mishawaka v. Family & Children's Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 961 Schoonejongen; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1040,1075 Schreyer v. Tattersall, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Schriro; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Schriro; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Schriro; McGuire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Schubert v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Schultz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Schulz v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Schulze; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,985 Schwab v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Schwartz; DeGrijze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Schwarz v. California Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Schwarz v. Utah State Tax Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Schweitzer, Inc.; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Schwenke v. Utah State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Scolieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Scopo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Scott, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1108 Scott; Ables v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Scott v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Scott; Alvarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Scott; Andrews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Scott v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Scott; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Scott; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Scott; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Scott; Benavides v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Scott; Bennatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Scott; Blackmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Scott; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Scott; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR cxlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Scott; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Scott; Calvillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Scott; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1036 Scott; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Scott; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Scott; De la Cerda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Scott; Duhamel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Scott; Dyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Scott v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Scott; Floyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Scott; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Scott; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Scott; Gosch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Scott; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Scott; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Scott v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Scott; House v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Scott; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Scott; Hutchings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Scott v. Hyundai Manufacture of Fountain Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Scott v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Scott; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Scott; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,971 Scott; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Scott; Kinnamon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Scott; Kirsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Scott v. Krissman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Scott; Lackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Scott; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Scott; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Scott; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Scott; Madden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Scott; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Scott; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1034 Scott; Mims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Scott; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1122 Scott; Morton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Scott; Motley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1033 Scott; Rivas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Scott; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Scott; Rodriguez Mendoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Scott; Rollings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Scott; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Scott; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlix Page Scott; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1035 Scott; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Scott; Spaulding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Scott; Sterling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Scott; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Scott; Tardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,915,933,960,1014,1135,1195 Scott; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Scott; Wilhelm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Scott; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,880,1137 Scott; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Scrivner, Inc.; Bolton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Scudder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Scully; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Scully; Ricciardi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Scully; Vineski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Seagrave, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,985,1104 Seal; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Seal v. Seal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1035 Searle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Searles v. Relic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Searles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; DiGianni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; McFadden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1104 Sea Savage, Inc. v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Sea Savage, Inc.; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Seaton v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Seaton-El v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Seaton Hall Univ.; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Seattle-First National Bank; Manges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Seattle Times; Rhinehart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Seaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Secretary, N. M. Dept. of Taxation and Revenue; Alarid v. . . . . . 1081 Secretary of Agriculture; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Secretary of Air Force; Halim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Secretary of Air Force; Mizkun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Secretary of Air Force; Mobin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Secretary of Air Force; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Secretary of Army; Agha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 Secretary of Army; Enplanar, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Secretary of Army; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Secretary of Army; Rebar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,974,1104 Secretary of Army; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR cl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Secretary of Commerce; Earth Island Inst., Marine Mammal Fd. v. 999 Secretary of Defense; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Secretary of Defense; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Secretary of Defense; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Secretary of Defense; HTC Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Secretary of Ed.; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Secretary of HHS; Bercovici v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,996 Secretary of HHS; Conners v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Secretary of HHS; Detrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Secretary of HHS; Donovan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Secretary of HHS; Esposito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Secretary of HHS v. Health Ins. Assn. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Secretary of HHS; Jabaay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Secretary of HHS; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Secretary of HHS; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,920 Secretary of HHS; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1010 Secretary of HHS; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Secretary of HHS; McDonough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Secretary of HHS; Sierotowicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Secretary of HHS; Sullins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Secretary of HHS; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1035 Secretary of HHS; Voss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Secretary of HHS v. Whitecotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Secretary of HHS; Yankelevicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1122 Secretary of Interior; Middlemist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Secretary of Interior v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Secretary of Labor; Boatright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Secretary of Labor v. Continental Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Secretary of Labor; Piping of Ohio, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Secretary of Labor; Wikberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Secretary of Navy; Burchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Secretary of Navy; Elshinnawy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Secretary of Navy; Espinueva v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Secretary of State; Heuer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Secretary of State of Ark.; Langguth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Secretary of State of Fla.; Duke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Secretary of State of Fla.; Koczak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Secretary of State of Kan.; Hagelin for Pres. Comm. of Kan. v. . . 1126 Secretary of State of Mont.; Nicholson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Secretary of State of N. M.; Judd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089,1186 Secretary of State of N. Y. v. New York State Assn. of Realtors 1000 Secretary of Transp.; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. . . . . 1012,1074,1108 Secretary of Transp.; Dashnaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cli Page Secretary of Transp.; Reshard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Secretary of Treasury; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Secretary of Treasury of P. R.; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Estrella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Secretary of Veterans Affairs v. Gardner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1136 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Willcutt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Amato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Patrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Posner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Roth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Security Bank SSB of Milwaukee; Fertel-Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Security State Bank & Trust; Weakley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 See Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 1059 Segal; Auriti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Segars v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1125 Seidman; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Seiwell v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Sejpal v. Corson, Mitchell, Tomhave & McKinley, M. D. S., Inc. . . 810 Selective Service System; Bigg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Seligsohn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1170 Sellers v. Baer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Sellers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Semien v. Comanche County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1125 Seminole Tribe of Fla.; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Senanayake v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 814 Senape; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1056 Senkowski; Beyah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Senkowski; DiGioia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Senkowski; Tejeda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Serna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Seror; Kahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Serrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Service Electrical Supply Co.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Sesario Depineda v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Setola v. Bob Schmidt Chevrolet, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1122,1144 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Seven Falls Co.; Wilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 7232 Pleasant View Drive; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Sever v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Severe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Sexton v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Seymour v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 SGS-Thomson Microelectronics v. International Rectifier Corp. 1052 SGS-Thomson Microelectronics; International Rectifier Corp. v. 1044 Shabani; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Shabazz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Shackelford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Shackleford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Shadian v. Carmenita Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Shaffer v. New York State Assn. of Realtors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Shaffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,846 Shalala; Bercovici v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,996 Shalala; Conners v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Shalala; Detrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Shalala; Donovan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Shalala; Esposito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Shalala v. Health Ins. Assn. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Shalala; Jabaay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Shalala; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Shalala; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Shalala; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1010 Shalala; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Shalala; McDonough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Shalala; Sierotowicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Shalala; Sullins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Shalala; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1035 Shalala; Voss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Shalala v. Whitecotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Shalala; Yankelevicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1122 Shannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,901,1177 Sharp; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Sharp v. Virginia State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Sharpe; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Shaw v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Shaw v. Masters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Shaw v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Shaw v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Shaw v. Stroud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Shaw; Stroud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Shaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1162 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cliii Page Shawley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Shay v. Mahler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Shea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Sheahan; Pudlo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.; Mastrobuono v. . . . . . . . . 921,1012,1040 Sheehan; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Sheek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Sheerbonnet Ltd.; American Express Bank Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Sheldon v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Sheldon; Dyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Shelley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Shell Oil Co.; Giddens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Shell Oil Refinery; Slagel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1137 Shelton v. Freeman's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Shelton v. Lorusso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Shelton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Sheppard v. Beerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Sherrill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Sherwood; Ndefru v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Shettle; Averhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Shields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Shilling; Ammar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Shillinger; Knox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Shillinger; Pote v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Shinaberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Shiver v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Shong-Ching Tong v. Assured Thrift & Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Shong-Ching Tong v. General Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Shong-Ching Tong v. Stanton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Shores; Pennsylvania National Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . 823 Shores v. Reddoch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Short v. Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Shorter v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1104 Showboat Hotel & Casino v. Steiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Showboat Operating Co. v. Steiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Showell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Shows, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Shuler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Shurn v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Siaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Siegel; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Sierotowicz v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Sierra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,955 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR cliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sifuentez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Sigler v. Twyford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1107 Silas v. Roche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Siller; Becton Dickinson & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Simmons v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Simmons v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Simmons; Maryland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Simmons v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,908,1097 Simms v. Braxton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Simon v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Simon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Simone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Simon & Schuster, Inc.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Simonson v. Simonson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090,1199 Simplot Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Simpson v. Department of Revenue of Ore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Simpson v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Simpson; Kirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Simpson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,942,1172 Simpson; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Sims, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Sims; International Business Machines Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Sims v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Sims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Sinai v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . 1025,1122 Singer; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 Singfield; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Singh v. California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . 1154 Singletary; Ardila-Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Singletary; Bolender v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1136 Singletary; Brookings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Singletary; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Singletary; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Singletary; Deaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Singletary; Duque v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Singletary; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Singletary; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Singletary; Herzog v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Singletary; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Singletary; Hyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Singletary; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clv Page Singletary; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Singletary; Macklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Singletary; McNair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Singletary; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Singletary; Moss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1103 Singletary; Newton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Singletary; Oats v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Singletary; Paschal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Singletary; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Singletary; Perea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Singletary; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1104 Singletary; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Singletary; Shiver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Singletary; Spaziano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Singletary; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Singleterry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Singleton v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Singleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Siqueiros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Sirbello; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Siripongs; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Sirnic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth v. Grand Prairie . . . . . . . . . . 929 1605 Book Center, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N. Y. . . . . . . . 811 Sizemore v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Sjogren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Skeens v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Skelly v. Heidemann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Skinner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Skinner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Skipper v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Skipski; Lintz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Skurdal v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Skyline Lodge, Inc. v. Delaney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Slade v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Slade v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Slagel v. Shell Oil Refinery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1137 Slan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Slanco v. Eastwood Mall, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Slavin v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Slezak v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Sloan v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1035 Sloan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Sloan v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sloane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Small v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Small Business Administration; Englert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1185 Smalls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Smart v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Smathers v. Greiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1122 Smitch; Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,958,1033,1072,1075,1145,1185 Smith; Ayers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Smith; Betka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092,1186 Smith; Bolling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Smith; Britt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Smith; Broughton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1137 Smith v. Dahm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Smith v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Smith v. Dixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1105 Smith; Dubyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1105 Smith; Duke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Smith; Ervin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Smith v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Smith v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1161,1163 Smith; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Smith v. Fruin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Smith; Gilliam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Smith; Greenlaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1066 Smith; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Smith v. Jefferson Pilot Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Smith v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Smith v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Smith; Koczak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Smith v. Lamar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Smith; Legg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Smith v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Smith v. Lucas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,851 Smith v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Smith; Mallory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Smith; McClung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Smith v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Smith v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Smith v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1061 Smith v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Smith v. Oregon State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Smith; Roden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Smith v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clvii Page Smith v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Smith; Shorter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1104 Smith v. Sirbello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Smith; Sowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Smith v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Smith; Union School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811, 841, 859, 861, 862, 878, 892, 905, 949, 953, 976, 1003, 1008, 1028, 1031,1064,1099,1133,1134,1167,1181 Smith v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Smith; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1122 Smith v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority . . . 947,1035 Smith v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Smith Barney Shearson, Inc.; Greenblatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 SMS Hasenclever GmbH; Banca Nazionale del Lavoro v. . . . . . . . 917 Snapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Snap-Tite, Inc. v. National Coupling Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Snead v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Sneed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Sneed v. Departmental Disciplinary Comm., First Jud. Dept. . . . . 816 Snelenberger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Snell v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Snell Buick, Inc.; Dupuis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Snelling v. Chrysler Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Snow; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Snow; Giles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1104 Snow v. Harnischfeger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Snow v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Snow; Sultenfuss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Snyder v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Sochia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Societe Bic, S. A.; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Societe d'Analyses et d'Etudes Bretonneau v. Resolution Tr. Corp. 823 Solan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Solar-Kist Corp. v. Clotilde, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Solicitor General of Puerto Rico; Masini Soler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Solis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Solomon v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Solomon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1157 Sommer; Monga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Sommerset County Comm'rs; Warman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Sonagere v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 S­1 and S­2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Sonoma County; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Soo Hoo v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Soper; Tassio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Sorenson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Soria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Soriano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Sorrentino Pimentel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Soto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Soule v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Soundgarden v. Gregoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 South Carolina; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 South Carolina; Conzett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 South Carolina; Jefferies v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 South Carolina; Longworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 South Carolina; Riddle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 South Carolina; Rimert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 South Carolina; Ruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1036 South Carolina; Southerland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 South Carolina Election Comm'n; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1185 South Carolina Ports Authority; Ristow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . 837 Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority; Pennsylvania PUC v. 928 Southerland; Pearson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Southerland v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Lawal v. . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Southern Cal. Coach; Chowdhury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Southern Cal. Edison Co.; Transphase Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 962 Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.; Lyons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Southern Health Corp. of Hamilton, Inc. v. Lorance . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Southern Ohio Coal v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclam. & Enf. 927 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n . . . 869 Southwest Signs v. Triangle Sign & Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Sowa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Sowashee Venture v. EB, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Sowell v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Spaletta v. Mendocino County Employees Retirement Assn. . . 821,1033 Sparrow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Spartanburg Steel Products, Inc. v. Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Spaulding v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Spaziano v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 S&P Co. v. Yorkshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Speaker of Fla. House of Representatives v. De Grandy . . . . . . . 804 Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clix Page Speer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Speight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Spekard; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Spence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Spencer v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Spencer v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Spencer v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Spencer; Isby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Spencer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Spencer v. Worthington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Spendthrift Farm, Inc.; Plaut v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Sperry Rand Corp., Univac Division; Lazor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1104 Sphere Drake Ins. plc; Marine Towing, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Sports v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Sprague v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Spriggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Springs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Sprint Communications Co. v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Sprint Communications Co.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Srinivasan v. El Monte High School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Srinivasan v. Rio Hondo Community College Dist. . . . . . . . . . . 873,1035 Srinivasan v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . 873,1035 Stacescu; Manson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Stackhouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Stadler; Gibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Stadler; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Stained Glass Overlay, Inc.; Jovanovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Stainer; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Stainer; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Staknis v. Moore's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Stalder; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Stamboulides v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Stamey v. Winn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Stancil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Stanislaus County Dept. of Social Services; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . 990 Stankowski v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1185 Stansbury v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Stanton; Shong-Ching Tong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Stanwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Staples v. Lukemire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Stapleton v. Cowley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Starnes v. Capital Cities Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Starnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Starr; Norris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Star Tribune; Benigni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965,1104 State Bar of Ga.; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 State Bar of Ga.; Scanlon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 State Bar of Tex.; Horowitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 State Bar of Tex.; Levario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 State Bar of Tex.; Liedtke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1036 State Bd. of Ed. of N. C.; S­1 and S­2 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 State Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance; Dr. K v. . . . . . . . . . . . 817 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Mount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.; McLaughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . 1149 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush . . . . . . . . . 1153 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.; W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. 919 Staten v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 State Tax Comm'r of W. Va.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Staton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Staudt v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Stearman v. Greenville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,1185 Stearman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1185 Steele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Steelworkers v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Steelworkers; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Steffen v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Stein v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Stein v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Stein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Steiner; Brunwasser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1055 Steiner; Showboat Hotel & Casino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Steiner; Showboat Operating Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Steiner Corp.; Johnson & Higgins of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Steinfeld v. Hoddick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Steinmark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Stennett v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Stepanik; Basheer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Stepanik; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Stepanik; Gasper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Stepanik; Heiser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Stepanik; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Stephen v. Caughey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxi Page Stephen v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Stephens v. Ivey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Stephens v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Stephens v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Stephens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1173 Stephenson v. Western Farmers Electric Coop. of Anadarko . . . . 872 Sterling v. Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Sterling v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Stern v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Stern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Sternberg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Stern's; DiGianni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Steutermann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Stevens v. Stott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Stevenson v. Hale Mahaolu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Steverson; Harris County Sheriff's Dept. Civil Serv. Comm'rs v. 1081 Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Stewart v. Irby-Wynter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Stewart v. Keohane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Stewart v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,941,1034,1166 Stice; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Stine; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Stinson; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Stinson; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Stock v. Universal Foods Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Stockstill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Stohosky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Stombaugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Stone; Christopher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Stone; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Stone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Stone v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Stoner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Stookey; Lonay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Storey v. Idaho Correctional Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Story v. Kindt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Stott; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Stotts v. Kernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Stotts; Kirkpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Straw; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Street v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Strickland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Stringer v. McMillin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stroman v. West Coast Grocery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Strong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Stroud v. Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Stroud; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Stuart; Panama City Medical Diagnostics, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Stuart v. Rancho Palos Verdes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Stuart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Stuckey v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Studeman; Platsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Styers v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Suan See Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . 1059 Subafilms, Ltd. v. United Artists Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Suburban Cable Television Co.; Clifton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Succession. See name of succession. Suess v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Sugimoto; Exportadora de Sal, S. A. de C. V. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Suhy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Sule, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Suleiman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Sullins v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Sullivan v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Sullivan v. National Football League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Sullivan; National Football League v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Sullivan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Sullivan Diagnostic Treatment Center; Toliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Sulmeyer v. Pacific BMW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962 Sultenfuss v. Snow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Summerfield v. Holcomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Summerlin v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Summers v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Sumrall v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Sun Exploration & Production Co.; Dietrich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Del Monte Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Sun Refining & Marketing Co.; Thanh Vong Hoai v. . . . . . . . . . 947,1122 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County; Whitaker v. . . . . . . . . . 846 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Alfredo A. v. . . . . . 822 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . 1062 Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Srinivasan v. . . . 873,1035 Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County; Farmer v. . . . . . . 964 Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . 883 Superior Court of San Francisco; Blanchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxiii Page Supermarkets General Corp.; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Supreme Court of N. J.; Mirman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Supreme Court of Pa.; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Sutherland v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Sutherlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Swain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Swan v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,985 Swann v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Swanson v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1056 Sweeney v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1105 Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore.; Babbitt v. 1072 Sweeton v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 1; Brockman v. . . . . . . . . 951,1052 S­W Industries, Inc.; Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. . . . . . . . 869 Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 S. W. S. Erectors, Inc. v. Triangle Sign & Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . 948 Sydnor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Symantec Corp.; BB Asset Management, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Symantec Corp.; Brown Bag Software v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Synbiotics Corp. v. IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Szabo; Garvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Tabas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Tackett; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Tagala v. Prewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. Cal. Water Resources Bd. 988 Tai Tan Duong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Talk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Talley v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,1035 Tal-Mason v. Kern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Tamayo v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Tammen; Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . 1057 Tampa; Whitley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Tan Duong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Tandy Corp.; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Tangeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Tanner v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Tanner v. Illinois Court of Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Tansy; Isiah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Tapia-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Tapia-Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Tardy v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Tasby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Tassio v. Soper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Tate v. Gilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Tate v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Tate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Tattersall, Inc.; Schreyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Tatum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Taub v. Deer Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Tax Appeals Tribunal of N. Y.; 1605 Book Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 811 Tax Comm'r of Ohio v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. . . . . . . . . 818 Taylor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Taylor; Ayers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Taylor v. Bernstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Taylor v. Evans-Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Taylor v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1003 Taylor; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Taylor; Norman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Taylor v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Taylor v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,939,1153 Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 T. B. Butler Publishing Co. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Teague v. Bakker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Teamsters; Gilmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1105 Teccor Electronics, Inc.; Gillilan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Teche Sugar Co.; Breaux Brothers Farms, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Tejeda v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Teledyne, Inc.; Adcox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Telelect, Inc. v. Fenstermacher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Tellis; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Tempelman v. Potvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Temple v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Tennessee; Barber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Tennessee; Brimmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Tennessee; Cazes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1086 Tennessee; Hurley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Tennessee; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Tennessee; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Tennessee; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Tennessee; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Tennessee Comm'r of Revenue; Reimann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Cheesman . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Terminix International Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Jackson . . . . . . . . 1123 Terrell v. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Territory. See name of Territory. 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxv Page Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Texas; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Texas; Angel Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Texas; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Texas; Austex, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Texas; Baiza Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Texas; Barber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Texas; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Texas v. Bowman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Texas v. Bradford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Texas; Burdine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Texas; Burks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Texas; Butler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Texas; Cantu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Texas; Centennial Mortgage Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Texas; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Texas; Coble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Texas; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Texas; Cordova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Texas; Corwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Texas; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Texas; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Texas; Earhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Texas; Easley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Texas; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Texas; Emerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Texas; Emery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Texas; Garcia Briseno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Texas; Gibbons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Texas; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Texas; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Texas; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Texas; Guetersloh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Texas; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1118,1140,1141 Texas; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Texas; Hood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Texas; Huckaby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Texas; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1070 Texas; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1034 Texas; Luan Van Hoang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Texas; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Texas; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Texas; McAfee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1104 Texas; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Texas; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Texas; Motley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Texas; Munday Enterprises v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Texas; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,997 Texas v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1144 Texas; Nobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Texas; Peppers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Texas; Petty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Texas; Queen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115,1199 Texas; Regaldo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Texas; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1085 Texas; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Texas; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944,994,1137 Texas; Shelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Texas; Stennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Texas; Unger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Texas; Van Winkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Texas; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Texas; Wheatfall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Texas; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Texas; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1105 Texas Bd. of Higher Ed.; Raphlah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y. . . 915 Texas State Bar; Humphreys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 T. H. v. T. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Thakkar v. DeBevoise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1186 Thandiwe v. Compton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Thanh Vong Hoai v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co. . . . . . . . . . 947,1122 Thelan v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Theodoropoulos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Thesenvitz v. Kaiser Engineers Hanford Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Thiel v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Thien Duong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Thieret; Geitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Thigpen; Rainey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Thigpen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Thody v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Thomas; Alderman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1185 Thomas; Devier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Thomas v. Humfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Thomas; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Thomas v. McMackin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Thomas v. Metropolitan Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 513repp12c 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxvii Page Thomas v. Monsanto Employees' Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Thomas; North Star Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Thomas; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Thomas; Soule v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Thomas; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,935,954,960,976,1002 Thomas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Thomas; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust; Buster v. . . . . . . . . . 1127 Thompson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Thompson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Thompson; Edmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Thompson v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Thompson v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Thompson v. Keohane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1137 Thompson; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1034 Thompson; Mackall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Thompson; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Thompson v. Rone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1035 Thompson; Samson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Thompson; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,857,1050,1197 Thomure v. Phillips Furniture Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Thorn Apple Valley, Inc.; Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Thorne; Association for Retarded Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. . . . . . 1079 Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Thorpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,1041,1179 Three Affiliated Tribes, Fort Berthold Res.; Duncan Energy v. . . 1103 Thurman v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Thurman; Cancel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Thurman; Chatters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092,1186 Thurman; Galloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Thurmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Thurston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Tichio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 T. I. Construction Co. v. Kiewit Eastern Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Tien; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Tierney v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Tilley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Tillman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Tillman-Brown v. Sacramento . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Time Warner, Inc.; Fodor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Timothy L.; Lawrence C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Tinari, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 T. M. N.; D. G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Todd v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Todd v. Societe Bic, S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Todd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Todd v. Wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Toegemann v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1036 Toledo-Yin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Toler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Toliver v. Sullivan Diagnostic Treatment Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Tolle; Crank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Tolley; Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Tome v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 Tomlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Tom Mistick & Sons, Inc. v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Tong v. Assured Thrift & Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Tong v. General Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Tong v. Stanton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Tonn v. Forsberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Toombs; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Tordoff; Goetz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Torgerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Toro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Torres v. Negron Gaztambide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,949,1059,1096,1098,1116 Torres Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Torres-Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Torres Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Torrey v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Tortuya v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Toti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Touche Ross & Co. v. Congregation of Passion, Holy Cross Prov. 947 Tovarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Town. See name of town. Town & Country Electric, Inc.; National Labor Relations Bd. v. . 1125 Towne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Townley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Townsend v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1100 Tracy v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Tracy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Trail v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Trainor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Tran v. Columbus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Tran v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxix Page Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,977 Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Transcon Lines; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . 138,997 Transco Products, Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc. . . . . . . . 1151 Transit Union; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Transpac Drilling Venture v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Transphase Systems, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. . . . . . . . . . 962 Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A. v. Tammen . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A. v. U. S. District Court 1057 Trans World Airlines; Fressie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Trantino v. Rothstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1034 Travelers Indemnity Co.; Scarfia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Travelers Ins. Co.; Brandon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Travelers Ins. Co.; Cuomo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1039,1055 Travelers Ins. Co.; Hospital Assn. of N. Y. v. . . . . . . 920,1039,1055,1108 Travelers Ins. Co.; New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1039,1055,1108 Travelers Ins. Co.; Pataki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Travis; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Traxler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Traylor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Treasury Employees; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 Tredway v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Treece v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Trent; Holdren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Trepantis; Kile v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1035 Treur v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Trevino v. Leeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Trevino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1028 Trevino; Wachs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Triangle Sign & Service, Inc.; Southwest Signs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Triangle Sign & Service, Inc.; S. W. S. Erectors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 948 Tri-Capital Corp.; Carpenters Health and Welf. Tr. Fd. for Cal. v. 1018 Trice v. Ager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Trimiew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Tripati v. Arpaio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Trippett; Saade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.; Leisure Time Productions, B. V. v. . . . . . 987 Tri-State Machine, Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Trivino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Troncoso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Trotter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Truck Drivers v. Formosa Plastics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Truck Drivers v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Trujillo-Acosta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Trumbly v. Lawler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Trung Van Tran v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Trustees of Carpenters for So. Nev. Health & Welfare Trust; American Bonding Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Trustees of N. W. Laundry & Dry Cleaners Health & Welf. Tr.; Burzynski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Trustees of Particular Primitive Baptist Church at Black Rock, Inc.; American Union of Baptists, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 TRW, Inc.; Ma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Tucker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1036 Tucker v. Essex County Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Tucker v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Tucker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Tudor; Blackburn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Tuesta Toro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Tulsa Bd. of Adjustment; Freedom Ranch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Turner; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Turner v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Turner; Sizemore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1135,1158,1179 Turner v. University Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Turner v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Turner Broadcasting System; Dempsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1105 Turpen; Corvallis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Turpin v. Kassulke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Turruellas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Tuxedo Union Free School Dist. v. Cullen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Twiggs v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Twyford; Sigler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1107 Tyger Construction Co.; Pensacola Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . 1080 Tyler v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Tyson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Udala v. Office of Administrative Hearing Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Ulrich; Godaire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Umana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Unanue v. Goya Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Unanue-Casal v. Goya Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Industries, Inc. 999 Underwager v. Salter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Unger v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Pacific R. Co.; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxi Page Union School Dist. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Union Tank Car Co. v. Various Plaintiffs in Class . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Unisys Corp.; Lazor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1104 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Artists Corp.; Subafilms, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 United Guaranty Residential Ins. Co. of N. C.; Brunn v. . . . . . . . 1092 United Parcel Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . 1076 United States. See name of other party. U. S. A. Direct, Inc. v. North American Communications, Inc. . . . 1152 U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership . . . . . . . 18 U. S. Court of Appeals; Overly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1104 U. S. District Court; Albrecht v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 U. S. District Court; Aldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 U. S. District Court; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 U. S. District Court; Cofield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 U. S. District Court; DeBardeleben v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 U. S. District Court; Fitch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 U. S. District Court; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 U. S. District Court; Gellert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 U. S. District Court; Longstreet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 U. S. District Court; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1052 U. S. District Court; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 U. S. District Court; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 U. S. District Court; T. B. Butler Publishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 U. S. District Court; Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A. v. 1057 U. S. District Court v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 U. S. District Judge; Judd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 U. S. District Judge; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 U. S. Intelligence; Rabin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 United States Lines Reorganization Trust v. United States . . . . . 1126 U. S. Marshal; Lenis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Hoover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Soo Hoo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 U. S. Postal Inspection Service of Houston; Jenoriki v. . . . . . . . 885,1035 U. S. Postal Service; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1199 U. S. Postal Service Air Mail Facility at O'Hare; Fleming v. . . . . 1085 U. S. Supreme Court; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 United States Surgical Corp.; Chanoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 United Student Aid Funds, Inc.; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. . . 1183 United Technologies/Hamilton Standard; Friend v. . . . . . . . . . . 895,1035 United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Assn. 1112 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Universal Foods Corp.; Stock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. . . . . . 1052 University Housing; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 University of Haw.; Roy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1186 University of Medicine and Dentistry of N. J.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . 1044 University of Pittsburgh; Kramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 University of Tenn.; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 University of Wash.; Hurst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 University of Wash.; Mendlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 University of W. Va. Bd. of Trustees; Daneshvar v. . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of U. S. A. v. Vennes . . 1076 UNR Industries; UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. . . . 999 Uplinger v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Upper Providence Township; WVCH Communications, Inc. v. . . . 876 Upper Republican Natural Resources Dist.; Bamford v. . . . . . . . . 874 Urena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 US Sprint Communications Co.; Jarrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 USX Corp. v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 USX Corp.; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Utah; Menzies v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Utah v. Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Dist. . . . . . . . . . . 872 Utah State Bar; Schwenke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Utah State Tax Comm'n; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Utah State Tax Comm'n Auditing Division; Hercules Inc. v. . . . . 1043 Valdez v. Joy Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1136 Valencia-Vargas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Valentine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099,1178 Valenzuela; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Valenzuela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Vallera v. Endicott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Vance v. Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Vanderbilt Univ. Hospital; Wrenn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Van Duesen v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Van Hoang v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Van Hook v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1186 Van Huynh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Vankirk; Reese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 VanMeter; Fowler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Vanterpool v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Van Tran v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Van Winkle v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Vargas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Vargas-Coronado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxiii Page Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.; Ivimey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.; Ludwig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.; NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. . . . 251 Various Plaintiffs in Class; Union Tank Car Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Varner v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Varney; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1033 Vashone v. Embry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Vasquez; Christian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Vasquez v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1033 Vasquez-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Vasquez-Venegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Vastola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Vaughan v. Benedict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Vaughn; Boreland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Vaughn; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Vaughn; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Vaughn; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Vaughn; Royster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1164 Vaughn; Sports v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Vaughn; Twiggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Vautier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Vda de Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,996 Vega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,911,1032 Vela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Velasquez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,978 Velasquez Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Velentzas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Velez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Velez-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Veneri v. Domovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,995 Venezia v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of U. S. A. 1076 Ventritex Co.; Intermedics, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Vercoe v. FirsTier Bank, N. A., Omaha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Vermilion Parish Bus Drivers & Operators Assn. v. Vermilion Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Vermilion Parish School Bd.; Vermilion Parish Bus Drivers & Operators Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Vermont; DeVries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Vermont; Gendreau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Vermont Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services; C. B. v. . . . 1004 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Vernon v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Vernon v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Vernon v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Vernon Home Health Care Agency, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . 1015 Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1145 Veteto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Vey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Vey v. Colville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,995,1195 Vick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Vickers; Cain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1104 Vidal; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Video Visions, Inc. v. Konstam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Vijendira v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Village. See name of village. Villalobos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Villamonte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer . . . . . 1013,1125 Vincent v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1034 Vines; Forsyth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Vineski v. Scully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Vining v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Vinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Viola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Virginia; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Virginia; Breard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Virginia; Chichester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Virginia; Gupton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 Virginia; Mickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Virginia; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Virginia; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Virginia; Swann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Virginia; Tyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Virginia; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Virginia Gasoline Marketers & Automotive Repair Assn., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Virginia State Bar; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. A Risk Retention Group . . . . . . . 1083 Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. National Home Ins. Co. . . . . . . . 1083 Virgin Islands; Duberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Virgin Islands; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Virgin Islands; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Viscaino-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Vitale v. Perfection Management Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 Vitalink Communications Corp.; Grimes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxv Page Viti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Vivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Vladimirov v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Voakes v. AT&T Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Voinovich; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Vong Hoai v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1122 Von Holdt; Philips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Voss v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Voth v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1009 VSA Carolinas v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 VSA, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 W. v. Wasiek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1183 Wabash Life Ins. Co.; Coddington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Wable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Wachs v. Trevino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Waddell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Wade; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Wadlington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Wagoner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Wai Chong Leung v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Wainwright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Waits; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Wakefield v. Egles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Walker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Walker; Drake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Walker; Elcock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Walker v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Walker v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,955,1065,1170 Walker; Zisk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1104 Wall; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Wallace v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Wallace v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1122 Wallace v. Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Wallace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,910,1060 Waller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Wallis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Walls v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Wallshein v. Cablestrand Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Walsh, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1108 Walsh v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1033 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Walter Industries, Inc., Group Benefit Plan for Salaried Employ- ees; Layne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Walters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Walters Resources, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Walton v. Lindler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Walton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Wang v. Lind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Ward v. Citibank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Ward v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Ward v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Ward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1173 Ward v. University of Tenn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Ward v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Warda v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Warden. See name of warden. Ward Lake Drilling, Inc.; LeBlanc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Wardlaw v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Wards Cove Packing Co.; Atonio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Ware v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Waring v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Warman v. Sommerset County Comm'rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Warner v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Warner Electrical Contracting; Rosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Warren v. Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,995 Warren v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1050 Wash v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Washington; Awawdeh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Washington; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Washington v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Washington; Gocken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1010 Washington; Greco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Washington; Hanna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Washington; Lord v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Washington v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Washington; Tierney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 828,852,891,892,939,1014,1122 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Smith v. . . . 947,1035 Wasiek; C. W. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1183 Watergate at Landmark Condominium v. EEOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Waters v. Churchill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Waters; Treece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Waters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Watkins v. DiPaolo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxvii Page Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Watson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Watson v. Farlow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1185 Watson v. Stine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Watson v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Watts v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Wauwatosa; Fertel-Rust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Waycaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Wayno v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Weakley v. Security State Bank & Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Weatherly v. Federal Debt Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Weaver v. School Bd. of Leon County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Webb v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Webb v. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Webber v. Byers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Webber v. Franklin County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,950 Weber v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,999 Weber v. San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Weech v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Weeden v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Weeks v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Weeks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Weer; McKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Wehby; Kleinschmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Weider; Kozelka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Weidrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Weil, Gotshal & Manges; Douglas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Weinfeld, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1187 Weingrad v. Departmental Disciplinary Comm., Supreme Court of N. Y., Appellate Div., First Judicial Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Weinstein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Weir Shipping Ltd. v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Weis; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Weisberg v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Weissbrodt v. White Mountain Apache Tribe of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . 929 Welborn; Musgrave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Welch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1169 Wellesley School Committee; Hickey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Wellons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Wells v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Wells Fargo Alarm Services; Egan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Purlantov v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Greenwald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wells Fargo National Bank, N. A.; Job v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Welsand v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Welsch; Ammar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Went For It, Inc.; Florida Bar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Werhan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Werner v. Bergen County Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1025 Wertheimer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Wesley v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Wesley v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Wes Outdoor Advertising Co. v. New Jersey Dept. of Transp. . . . 824 Wessels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 West; Agha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1034 West; Enplanar, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 West v. Kern County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1083 West; Rebar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 West; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,896,1020 West v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Westchester County; Mareno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 West Coast Grocery; Stroman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Western Bank, Taos; Hymans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Western Baptist Hospital; Grubbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Western Farmers Electric Coop. of Anadarko; Stephenson v. . . . . 872 Western Surety Co.; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1033 Westinghouse Hanford Co.; Lekvold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Westin Hotel Co.; L. E. S. Properties, Hotel Venture v. . . . . . . . . 1082 West Jefferson Levee Dist.; Bayou des Familles Dev. Corp. v. . . . 1083 Westler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 West Mead Township Zoning Hearing Bd.; Anders v. . . . . . . . . . . 965 Westmoreland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 West One Bank; East v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 West Palm Beach; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1023 West Penn Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n . . 925,927 West Virginia; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 West Virginia; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Wetzler; Duffy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Wexford Associates, Inc. v. Atkisson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Wexler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Whalen; Fulton County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Whalen v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Whalen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Wharton-El v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Wheatfall v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Wheeler; Beck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxix Page Wheeler; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Wheeler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Wheelock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Whitaker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,1013 Whitaker v. Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County . . . . . . . . . 846 White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1124 White v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 White; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 White v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 White; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 White; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 White; LaFlamme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 White v. Moulder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 White; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 White v. Union Pacific R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,968,1061,1120,1132,1171 White; Uplinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 White v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Whitecotton; Shalala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Whitehall Properties v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n . . . . . . 979 Whitehead v. Greer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1104 White Mountain Apache Tribe of Ariz.; Weissbrodt v. . . . . . . . . . 929 White Swan, Ltd. v. Nature Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 White & White, Inc.; Auto Club Ins. Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Whitley; Alphonso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Whitley; Cupit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Whitley; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Whitley; DeVille v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Whitley; Holly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Whitley; Johanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Whitley; Kyles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1012 Whitley; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Whitley; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Whitley; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Whitley; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Whitley; Moran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Whitley; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116,1193 Whitley; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Whitley v. Tampa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Whitley; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Whitley; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1199 Whitley; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Whitmore v. Avery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Whitney v. Cruz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1066 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Whitney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Whitson v. Pet Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Widmayer; Conservolite, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Widnall; Halim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Widnall; Mizkun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Widnall; Mobin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Wierbicki v. Norfolk Southern Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Wiesman; Grizzle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Wigerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Wikberg v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Wildberger v. Government Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Wildberger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Wilder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1197 Wildman; Dulaney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Wiley v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Wiley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Wilhelm v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Wilkerson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Wilkerson v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1199 Wilkes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Wilkes v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Wilkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Wilkinson; Gumpl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Wilkinson; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Wilkinson; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Wilkinson; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Willcutt v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 William; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Williams; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Williams v. Arnold & Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Williams v. Borg & Warner Automotive Electronics & Mechanical System Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Williams v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Williams v. Burnham Broadcasting Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Williams; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Williams; Dickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Williams v. Duval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Williams; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Williams v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Williams; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Williams v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Williams v. Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1193 Williams v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxi Page Williams v. Jim Walters Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Williams v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Williams v. Letter Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1199 Williams v. Meese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Williams v. Richmond County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Williams v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,880,1137 Williams v. Service Electrical Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Williams v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839, 880, 882, 885, 891, 926, 940, 950, 951,966, 975, 1030, 1041, 1042, 1045,1083,1102,1132,1171,1179,1181,1197 Williams; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Williams v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1199 Williams v. U. S. Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Williams v. Vidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Williams v. WVUE­TV 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Williams Natural Gas Co.; Chanute v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Williamson v. King County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1034 Williamson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Willis v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Wills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Wilmer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Wilson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1013,1108,1137 Wilson v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1075,1145 Wilson; Bacon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Wilson v. Belin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Wilson v. Berkeley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1010 Wilson v. Bowlen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Wilson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1163 Wilson v. Central Freight Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Wilson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Wilson; Germany v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Wilson v. Hames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Wilson; Morgenstern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,948,967,976,1134,1197 Wilson v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Wilson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Windom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Winegar; Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. v. . . . 964 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Winn; Stamey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Winston v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Winston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Winterboer; Asgrow Seed Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Winters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Winther v. Portland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Winzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Wisconsin; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Wisconsin; Dotson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Wisconsin; Flayter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Wisconsin; Gibas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Wisconsin; Goetsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Wisconsin; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Wisconsin; Harrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Wisconsin; Iglesias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Wisconsin; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Wisconsin; Liegakos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Wisconsin; Reinke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Wisconsin; Staudt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Wisconsin; Thiel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Wisconsin; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Wisconsin; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Wisconsin; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Wise v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Wishon v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1100,1199 Wisnieski; Guichard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1010 Wissinger v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Witcher v. Witcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1199 Witherspoon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Withrow; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Withrow; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1137 Witte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Witter v. Nesbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Wittman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Wixom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Wizbowski v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Canadian General Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . 1183 Wohlfarth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Wolens; American Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Wolfson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Woltering; Outboard Marine Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Wolverine, Ltd. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Wong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Wong; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxiii Page Wood; Bergen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Wood; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Wood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Woodall v. Rowland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Woodard v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Woodhouse; Mello v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Woods v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Woods v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Woods v. Candela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Woods v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Woods v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Woods v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,887,1134 Woodson Construction Co. v. Amoco Pipeline Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Woodward v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Woodward v. Lorton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Woody v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Wooten; Galaviz-Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Wooten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Worcester County v. Cane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Words v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Worrell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Worsham v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Wortham; Means v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Worthington; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Worthington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Wouters; Martin County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Wrenn v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 W. R. Grace & Co. v. MDU Resources Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 824 W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Maryland Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. 919 Wright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1052 Wright v. Alexandria Division of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1050 Wright v. AMF Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Wright; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Wright v. Boulder Valley School Dist. RE­2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Wright; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Wright v. Clay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Wright v. Frances J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Wright; Gholson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Wright; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Wright; Isby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Wright; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wright; Slade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Wright v. Tackett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Wright v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1030,1042,1182 WSOS Community Action Comm'n, Inc.; Bessman v. . . . . . . . . . . 938 Wulf; Quantum Chemical Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Wunderlich v. Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 WVCH Communications, Inc. v. Upper Providence Township . . . 876 WVUE­TV 8; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Wyant v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Wyoming; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,997,1124,1144 X-Citement Video, Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64,804 Xerox Corp.; Durham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Yacks v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1034 Yagman & Yagman, P. C. v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Yakich v. Municipal Court of San Jose, Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Yamamoto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Yankelevicz v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1122 Yannott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Yao Kuang Saeteurn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Ybarra v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Ybarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Yellow Cab Co.; Dick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Yeoman v. Dougan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Yeoman v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Ylst; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Ylst; Maciel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Ylst; Nunnemaker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Ynfante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Yocas v. Cowin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Yoder v. Elkhart County Auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Yong Hyon Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 York v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Yorkshire; S&P Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. McAngues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Young; Heidemann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Young; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Young v. Mannion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church . . 929 Young v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Young; Wilkes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Young v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Yovev v. Kern County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 513repp12d 01-30-98 16:07:27 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxv Page Yu; Morissette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1052 Yudes; Oczkowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Yukon Telephone Co.; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1122 Yurch v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Zabkar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Zagwoski v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Zahran v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Zaia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Zajac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Zakiya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072,1152 Zant; Moon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1104 Zant; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1036 Zapata Protein (USA), Inc. v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Zavala Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Zavaras; Abad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Zavaras; Sesario Depineda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Zeigler v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Zeigler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Zekaria Realty, Inc. v. Ocean County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Zelman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Zeltzer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Zenith Laboratories, Inc.; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 995 Zenon; Bisby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Zenon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Zent; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Ziereis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Zieser v. Farmers Home Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Zimmerman; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Zimmerman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1105 Zisa; Moretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Zisk v. High Street Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Zisk v. Placer County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1104 Zisk v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1104 Zolicoffer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Zuckerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Zuniga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1097 Zych v. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Zzie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 513us1$$1z 11-25-96 19:00:10 PAGES OPINPGT CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 IN RE WHITAKER on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 93­9220. Decided October 11, 1994 Since 1987, pro se petitioner Whitaker has filed 23 claims for relief, all of which have been denied without recorded dissent. He has also been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to this Court's Rule 39.8, for the last two petitions in which he has sought extraordi- nary relief. Held: Whitaker is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the in- stant case, and the Clerk is instructed not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from him in noncriminal matters unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33. In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, this Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system. In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, 179­180. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Fred Whitaker filed a petition for writ of mandamus and requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court's Rule 39. Pursuant to Rule 39.8, 1 513us1$$1z 11-25-96 19:00:10 PAGES OPINPGT 2 IN RE WHITAKER Per Curiam we deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis.* Petitioner is allowed until November 1, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition for a writ of prohibition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee re- quired by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. Since 1987, petitioner has filed 23 claims for relief, includ- ing 18 petitions for certiorari, 9 of which have been filed in the last three Terms. That total also includes five petitions for extraordinary writs filed since June 1992. We have de- nied all of the petitions without recorded dissent. We have also denied petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 39.8 for the last two petitions in which he has sought extraordinary relief. In re Whitaker, 511 U. S. 1105 (1994); In re Whitaker, 506 U. S. 983 (1992). Petitioner's current claim involves a civil action brought in the Alameda, California, Superior Court against Lake Merritt Lodge & Residence, alleging damages of $2 in illegal taxes. His legal arguments here are just as frivolous as those he has made in previous petitions. Although petitioner has exhibited frequent filing patterns with respect to petitions for writ of certiorari, we limit our sanctions at this time to the type of relief requested today- styled as petitions for extraordinary writs. We have im- posed similar sanctions in the past. See, e. g., In re Ander- son, 511 U. S. 364 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16 (1991); In *Rule 39.8 provides: "If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis." 513us1$$1z 11-25-96 19:00:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 1 (1994) 3 Stevens, J., dissenting re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989). As we concluded in Sindram: "The goal of fairly dispensing justice . . . is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests. Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources because they are not subject to the financial considerations-fil- ing fees and attorney's fees-that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions. The risks of abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for ex- traordinary relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and, theoretically, could be filed at any time without limitation. In order to prevent frivo- lous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system." 498 U. S., at 179­180 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens, dissenting. Having already explained why the 1991 amendment to this Court's Rule 39 was both unnecessary and ill considered,1 and having dissented from each of the dispositions cited by the Court today,2 I would only add that I remain convinced that the views expressed in those dissents are correct. Given the current state of our docket, there is a peculiar irony in the Court's reliance, as a basis for singling out this 1 In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U. S. 13, 15 (1991) (dissenting opinion). 2 See In re Anderson, 511 U. S. 364, 366 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16, 17­19 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, 180­183 (1991); In re Mc- Donald, 489 U. S. 180, 185­188 (1989). See also Day v. Day, 510 U. S. 1, 3 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U. S. 1067, 1069­1072 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 513us1$$1z 11-25-96 19:00:10 PAGES OPINPGT 4 IN RE WHITAKER Stevens, J., dissenting petition for special treatment, on the supposed need to con- serve its scarce resources so that it may achieve its " `goal of fairly dispensing justice,' " ante, at 3. I respectfully dissent. 513US1$$2z 11-22-96 14:32:27 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 5 Per Curiam AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES on motion of thomas n. cochran for leave to withdraw as counsel for petitioner No. ­­­. Decided October 31, 1994 Having determined that no meritorious grounds existed for an appeal of Anthony Austin's criminal conviction, Thomas Cochran, his appointed counsel, filed a brief in the Fourth Circuit raising only the issue of sen- tence computation. After the Fourth Circuit affirmed Austin's convic- tion and sentence, Cochran informed him of his right to petition for certiorari, but applied to this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel before the deadline for filing the petition. Held: Cochran's application is granted. Under a plan adopted pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act (Act), the Fourth Circuit has a Rule govern- ing the duration of service by appointed counsel. Cochran is correct that the Fourth Circuit Rule imposes a mandatory duty to file a petition even if the legal arguments are frivolous and, thus, conflicts with this Court's Rule 42.2, which allows an award of damages or costs against him for filing such a petition. Nothing in the Act compels counsel to file papers in contravention of this Court's Rules against frivolous fil- ings. If necessary, the Circuits' Criminal Justice Plans should be re- vised to allow a lawyer to be relieved of the duty to file a petition for certiorari that would present only frivolous claims. The Act does not compel a particular approach. However, from an administrative point of view, it is preferable for a plan to require that the court of appeals approve a withdrawal, because attorneys are more likely to avail them- selves of this avenue for relief if they have the court's endorsement to back up their own judgment. Application granted. Per Curiam. Anthony Austin pleaded guilty to possession of crack co- caine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 151 months' imprisonment. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Thomas Cochran, who had been appointed as Austin's coun- sel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A, submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. Cali- fornia, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). That brief raised the issue of 513US1$$2z 11-22-96 14:32:27 PAGES OPINPGT 6 AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES Per Curiam sentence computation, but concluded that no meritorious is- sues existed for appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Aus- tin's conviction and sentence. Cochran then informed Aus- tin of the right to petition for certiorari. Austin responded with a request to file a petition on his behalf. In advance of the deadline for filing the petition, Cochran applied to this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel. We grant his application. The Criminal Justice Act directs each district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the Circuit, to imple- ment "a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation." 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(a). The Fourth Circuit plan contains a provision governing the duration of service by appointed counsel. Specifically, it provides: "2. Appellate Counsel. Every attorney, including re- tained counsel, who represents a defendant in this court shall continue to represent his client after termination of the appeal unless relieved of further responsibility by the Supreme Court. Where counsel has not been relieved: "If the judgment of this court is adverse to the defend- ant, counsel shall inform the defendant, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certio- rari. If the defendant, in writing, so requests, counsel shall prepare and file a timely petition for such a writ and transmit a copy to the defendant. Thereafter, un- less otherwise instructed by the Supreme Court or its clerk, or unless any applicable rule, order or plan of the Supreme Court shall otherwise provide, counsel shall take whatever further steps are necessary to protect the rights of the defendant, until the petition is granted or denied." 4th Circuit Rules App. II, Rule V.2. Cochran argues that the Rule subjects him to conflicting ob- ligations. On the one hand, the Rule imposes a mandatory duty to file a petition even if the legal arguments are frivo- 513US1$$2z 11-22-96 14:32:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 5 (1994) 7 Per Curiam lous. On the other hand, this Court's Rule 42.2 allows an award of damages or costs against him if he were to file a frivolous petition. As a matter of pure text, Cochran's interpretation is cor- rect. The Fourth Circuit Rule does require the actions of appointed counsel to comply with this Court's Rules, but only after the filing of a petition for certiorari. The Rule im- poses a very clear mandate to file petitions at the client's request, evidenced by the command "shall prepare and file." The Fourth Circuit keeps plenty of company in mandating representation through the certiorari process, even when it may run counter to our Rules.1 Although the Fourth Cir- cuit Rule provides a mechanism to seek relief from this obli- gation, Cochran is the first attorney to move for such relief,2 indicating that counsel feel encouraged or perhaps bound by these Rules to file petitions that rest on frivolous claims. These Circuit Rules may explain, in part, the dramatically increased number of petitions for certiorari on direct appeal from federal courts of appeals filed by persons in forma pauperis.3 1 See D. C. Circuit Rules App. VIII, Rule IV ("The duties of representa- tion by counsel on appeal, where the appeal has been unsuccessful, shall extend to advising the party of the right to file a petition for writ of certiorari . . . . If the party so requests, counsel shall prepare and file such a petition") (emphasis added); 3d Circuit Rules Addendum B, Rule III.6 (same); 5th Circuit Rules App. C, Rule 4 (same); 7th Circuit Rules App. II, Rule V.3 (same); 8th Circuit Rules App. Rule V (same); 9th Circuit Rules App. A, § 4(c) (same); 10th Circuit Rules Addendum I, Rule II.D (same); 11th Circuit Rules Addendum 4(f)(4) (same). 2 Since this Court received Cochran's motion, another attorney has filed a petition for certiorari raising the same issue. Anderson v. United States, No. 94­5958. 3 For the October 1983 Term, we received 523 petitions for certiorari on direct review in criminal cases from in forma pauperis petitioners in fed- eral courts. That number increased fourfold by the October 1993 Term with 2,053 petitions. That increase stands in contrast with the increase in criminal petitions on direct review from state courts-an increase of only 50% in that same 10-year period. 513US1$$2z 11-22-96 14:32:27 PAGES OPINPGT 8 AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES Per Curiam Consistent with the Criminal Justice Act, we have pro- vided by Rule for the payment of counsel appointed by this Court to represent certain indigent defendants. See Rule 39.7 ("In a case in which certiorari has been granted or juris- diction has been noted or postponed, this Court may appoint counsel to represent a party financially unable to afford an attorney to the extent authorized by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A"). But nothing in the Criminal Justice Act compels counsel to file papers in contravention of this Court's Rules against frivolous filings. And though indigent defendants pursuing appeals as of right have a constitutional right to a brief filed on their behalf by an attorney, Anders v. California, supra, that right does not extend to forums for discretionary review. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 616­617 (1974). Our Rules dealing with the grounds for granting certiorari, and penalizing frivolous fil- ings, apply equally to petitioners using appointed or retained counsel. We believe that the Circuit councils should, if nec- essary, revise their Criminal Justice Plans so that they do not create any conflict with our Rules. The plan should allow for relieving a lawyer of the duty to file a petition for certiorari if the petition would present only frivolous claims. A few of the Circuits have adopted plans that accommo- date this Court's Rules in some fashion. For instance, the First Circuit only requires appointed counsel to continue representation at the Supreme Court level if "the person requests it and there are reasonable grounds for counsel properly to do so." 1st Circuit Rule 46.5(c). If counsel de- termines a petition would be frivolous, he must inform the First Circuit and request leave to withdraw. See also 2d Circuit Rules App. A, Rule III.5. The Sixth Circuit takes a different tack, insulating counsel from violation of its Rules (though not, of course, from violation of our Rules) so long as he proceeds according to his best professional judgment, without resorting to the approval of the appellate court. Its recently amended Rule states: "Court appointed counsel is 513US1$$2z 11-22-96 14:32:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 5 (1994) 9 Per Curiam obligated to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Su- preme Court of the United States if the client requests that such a review be sought and, in counsel's considered judg- ment, there are grounds for seeking Supreme Court review." 6th Circuit Rule 12(f) (emphasis in original). We do not be- lieve that the Criminal Justice Act compels either approach. From an administrative point of view, however, we think a plan requiring approval of the court of appeals is preferable, because attorneys are more likely to avail themselves of this avenue for relief if they have the endorsement of the court to back up their own judgment. 513us1$$3z 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. SHABANI certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 93­981. Argued October 3, 1994-Decided November 1, 1994 Respondent Shabani was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846 after the District Court refused to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act in furtherance of a narcotics conspir- acy is required for conviction under § 846. The Court of Appeals re- versed, holding that, under its precedent, the Government must prove at trial that a defendant has committed such an overt act. Held: In order to establish a violation of § 846, the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The statute's plain language does not require an overt act, and such a requirement has not been inferred from congressional silence in other conspiracy statutes, see, e. g., Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373. Thus, absent contrary indications, it is presumed that Congress intended to adopt the common law definition of conspiracy, which "does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liabil- ity," id., at 378. Moreover, since the general conspiracy statute and the conspiracy provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 both require an overt act, it appears that Congress' choice in § 846 was quite deliberate. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. 378, distinguished. While Shabani correctly asserts that the law does not punish criminal thoughts, in a criminal conspiracy the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus. The rule of lenity cannot be invoked here, since the statute is not ambiguous. Pp. 13­17. 993 F. 2d 1419, reversed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, and Joseph Doug- las Wilson. Dennis P. Riordan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Alan M. Caplan and Marc J. Zilversmit. 513us1$$3J 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 10 (1994) 11 Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case asks us to consider whether 21 U. S. C. § 846, the drug conspiracy statute, requires the Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We conclude that it does not. I According to the grand jury indictment, Reshat Shabani participated in a narcotics distribution scheme in Anchorage, Alaska, with his girlfriend, her family, and other associates. Shabani was allegedly the supplier of drugs, which he ar- ranged to be smuggled from California. In an undercover operation, federal agents purchased cocaine from distribu- tors involved in the conspiracy. Shabani was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. He moved to dismiss the indictment because it did not allege the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which act, he ar- gued, was an essential element of the offense. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Hon. H. Rus- sel Holland, denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, Shabani again raised the issue and asked the court to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act was required for conviction. The District Court noted that Circuit precedent did not require the alle- gation of an overt act in the indictment but did require proof of such an act at trial in order to state a violation of § 846. Recognizing that such a result was "totally illogical," App. 29, and contrary to the language of the statute, Judge Hol- land rejected Shabani's proposed jury instruction, id., at 36. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court sentenced Shabani to 160 months' imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 993 F. 2d 1419 (1993). The court acknowledged an inconsistency between its cases holding that an indict- ment under § 846 need not allege an overt act and those re- 513us1$$3J 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT 12 UNITED STATES v. SHABANI Opinion of the Court quiring proof of such an act at trial, and it noted that the latter cases "stand on weak ground." Id., at 1420. Never- theless, the court felt bound by precedent and attempted to reconcile the two lines of cases. The Court of Appeals rea- soned that, although the Government must prove at trial that the defendant has committed an overt act in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy, the act need not be alleged in the indictment because " `[c]ourts do not require as detailed a statement of an offense's elements under a conspiracy count as under a substantive count.' " Id., at 1422, quoting United States v. Tavelman, 650 F. 2d 1133, 1137 (CA9 1981). Chief Judge Wallace wrote separately to point out that in no other circumstance could the Government refrain from alleging in the indictment an element it had to prove at trial. He followed the Circuit precedent but invited the Court of Appeals to consider the question en banc because the Ninth Circuit, "contrary to every other circuit, clings to a problem- atic gloss on 21 U. S. C. § 846, insisting, despite a complete lack of textual support in the statute, that in order to convict under this section the government must prove the commis- sion of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." 993 F. 2d, at 1422 (concurring opinion). For reasons unknown, the Court of Appeals did not grant en banc review. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1108 (1994), to resolve the con- flict between the Ninth Circuit and the 11 other Circuits that have addressed the question, all of which have held that § 846 does not require proof of an overt act.* *See United States v. Sassi, 966 F. 2d 283, 285 (CA7), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 991 (1992); United States v. Clark, 928 F. 2d 639, 641 (CA4 1991); United States v. Figueroa, 900 F. 2d 1211, 1218 (CA8), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 942 (1990); United States v. Paiva, 892 F. 2d 148, 155 (CA1 1989); United States v. Onick, 889 F. 2d 1425, 1432 (CA5 1989); United States v. Cochran, 883 F. 2d 1012, 1017­1018 (CA11 1989); United States v. Savai- ano, 843 F. 2d 1280, 1294 (CA10 1988); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F. 2d 307, 308­309 (CADC 1987); United States v. Bey, 736 F. 2d 891, 894 (CA3 1984); United States v. Dempsey, 733 F. 2d 392, 396 (CA6), 513us1$$3J 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 10 (1994) 13 Opinion of the Court II Congress passed the drug conspiracy statute as § 406 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91­513, 84 Stat. 1236. It provided: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id., at 1265. As amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100­ 690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4377, the statute currently provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any of- fense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 U. S. C. § 846. The language of neither version requires that an overt act be committed to further the conspiracy, and we have not inferred such a requirement from congressional silence in other conspiracy statutes. In Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913), Justice Holmes wrote, "[W]e can see no reason for reading into the Sherman Act more than we find there," id., at 378, and the Court held that an overt act is not required for antitrust conspiracy liability. The same reasoning prompted our conclusion in Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945), that the Selective Service Act "does not require an overt act for the offense of conspiracy." Id., at 340. Nash and Singer follow the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress in- tends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307­308 (1992). We have consistently held that the common law understand- cert. denied, 469 U. S. 983 (1984); United States v. Knuckles, 581 F. 2d 305, 311 (CA2), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 986 (1978). 513US1 Unit: $$U3 [01-06-00 06:42:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 14 UNITED STATES v. SHABANI Opinion of the Court ing of conspiracy "does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability." Nash, supra, at 378; see also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651, 659 (1951); Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464, 468 (1895) ("At common law it was neither necessary to aver nor prove an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy . . ."). Respond- ent contends that these decisions were rendered in a period of unfettered expansion in the law of conspiracy, a period which allegedly ended when the Court declared that "we will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already perva- sive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 404 (1957) (cita- tions omitted). Grunewald, however, was a statute of limi- tations case, and whatever exasperation with conspiracy prosecutions the opinion may have expressed in dictum says little about the views of Congress when it enacted § 846. As to those views, we find it instructive that the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, contains an explicit re- quirement that a conspirator "do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy." In light of this additional element in the general conspiracy statute, Congress' silence in § 846 speaks volumes. After all, the general conspiracy statute preceded and presumably provided the framework for the more spe- cific drug conspiracy statute. "Nash and Singer give Con- gress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled on § 371, it gets an overt-act requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, it dispenses with such a requirement." United States v. Sassi, 966 F. 2d 283, 284 (CA7 1992). Congress appears to have made the choice quite deliberately with respect to § 846; the same Congress that passed this provision also enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91­452, 84 Stat. 922, § 802(a) of which contains an explicit requirement that "one or more of [the conspirators] does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy," id., at 936, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1511(a). 513us1$$3J 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 10 (1994) 15 Opinion of the Court Early opinions in the Ninth Circuit dealing with the drug conspiracy statute simply relied on our precedents interpret- ing the general conspiracy statute and ignored the textual variations between the two provisions. See United States v. Monroe, 552 F. 2d 860, 862 (CA9), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 972 (1977), citing United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671 (1975); United States v. Thompson, 493 F. 2d 305, 310 (CA9), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 834 (1974), citing United States v. Rabino- wich, 238 U. S. 78, 86­88 (1915). Two other Courts of Ap- peals were led down the same path, see United States v. King, 521 F. 2d 61, 63 (CA10 1975); United States v. Hutchin- son, 488 F. 2d 484, 490 (CA8 1973), but both subsequently recognized the misstep and rejected their early interpreta- tions, see United States v. Covos, 872 F. 2d 805, 810 (CA8 1989); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F. 2d 1280, 1294 (CA10 1988). What the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize we now make explicit: In order to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846, the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. 378 (1992), is not to the contrary. In that case, an indictment under § 846 alleged two overt acts which had formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction for attempting to manufacture drugs. The defendant argued that the Government had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508 (1990), overruled, United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688 (1993), by using evi- dence underlying the prior conviction "to prove an essential element of an offense" charged in the second prosecution. We held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the conspiracy charge. Justice Stevens, writing separately, thought that our double jeopardy discussion was unnecessary partly because "there is no overt act requirement in the fed- eral drug conspiracy statute," Felix, supra, at 392 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Shabani argues that, by not responding to this point, the Court im- 513us1$$3J 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT 16 UNITED STATES v. SHABANI Opinion of the Court plicitly held that § 846 requires proof of overt acts; otherwise, the double jeopardy discussion would have been merely advi- sory. The procedural history of Felix, however, belies this contention. The disputed evidence was offered not to prove overt acts qua overt acts, but to prove the existence of a conspiracy. The lower court in Felix noted that it was "mindful that 21 U. S. C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act . . . ." United States v. Felix, 926 F. 2d 1522, 1529, n. 7 (CA10 1991). Nevertheless, evidence of such acts raised double jeopardy concerns because it "tended to show the criminal agreement for the conspiracy," an indisputably essential element of the offense. Ibid. Indeed, Justice Stevens also argued that "the overt acts did not establish an agreement between Felix and his co-conspirators." Felix, 503 U. S., at 392. In light of the lower court opinion, it is apparent that we rejected this point-rather than Jus- tice Stevens' construction of § 846-before reaching the double jeopardy issue. In any event, Shabani's strained reading of Felix is of little consequence for precedential pur- poses, since "[q]uestions which `merely lurk in the record' are not resolved, and no resolution of them may be inferred." Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 183 (1979), quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925). Shabani reminds us that the law does not punish criminal thoughts and contends that conspiracy without an overt act requirement violates this principle because the offense is predominantly mental in composition. The prohibition against criminal conspiracy, however, does not punish mere thought; the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus and has been so viewed since Regina v. Bass, 11 Mod. 55, 88 Eng. Rep. 881, 882 (K. B. 1705) ("[T]he very assembling together was an overt act"); see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ("Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act") (citations omitted). 513us1$$3J 03-28-98 14:35:40 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 10 (1994) 17 Opinion of the Court Finally, Shabani invokes the rule of lenity, arguing that the statute is unclear because it neither requires an overt act nor specifies that one is not necessary. The rule of lenity, however, applies only when, after consulting traditional can- ons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute. See, e. g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 374 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239­241 (1993). That is not the case here. To require that Congress explicitly state its intention not to adopt petitioner's reading would make the rule applicable with the "mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction," id., at 239, a result supported by neither lenity nor logic. As the District Court correctly noted in this case, the plain language of the statute and settled interpretive principles reveal that proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. 513us1$$4z 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT 18 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 93­714. Argued October 4, 1994-Decided November 8, 1994 After this Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari and received briefing on the merits, the parties entered into a settlement and agreed that the case was thereby mooted. Petitioner, however, also requested that the Court exercise its power under 28 U. S. C. § 2106 to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Respondent opposed the motion. Held:1. This Court does not lack the power to entertain petitioner's motion to vacate. Section 2106 supplies the vacatur power, and respondent's suggestion is rejected that Article III's case or controversy requirement prohibits the exercise of that power when no live dispute exists due to a settlement that has mooted the case. Although Article III prevents the Court from considering the merits of a judgment that has become moot while awaiting review, the Court may nevertheless make such dis- position of the whole case as justice may require. Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 677. Pp. 20­22. 2. Mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a fed- eral civil judgment under review. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39­40, and subsequent cases distinguished. Equitable principles have always been implicit in this Court's exercise of the vaca- tur power, and the principal equitable factor to which the Court has looked is whether the party seeking vacatur caused the mootness by voluntary action. Where mootness results from settlement, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary proc- esses of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the ex- traordinary equitable remedy of vacatur. It is irrelevant that the party who won below also agreed to the settlement, since it is the losing party who has the burden of demonstrating equitable entitlement to vacatur. This result is supported by the public interest in the orderly operation of the federal judicial system; petitioner's countervailing policy argu- ments are not persuasive. Although exceptional circumstances may conceivably justify vacatur when mootness results from settlement, such circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agree- ment provides for vacatur. Pp. 22­29. 513us1$$4z 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 18 (1994) 19 Opinion of the Court Motion to vacate denied and case dismissed as moot. Reported below: 2 F. 3d 899. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Brandford Anderson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dale G. Higer and David B. Levant. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assist- ant Attorney General Hunger, Ronald J. Mann, Leonard Schaitman, and John P. Schnitker. John Ford Elsaesser, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Isaac M. Pachulski, K. John Shaffer, and Barbara Buchanan.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether appellate courts in the federal system should vacate civil judgments of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after appeal is filed or certio- rari sought. I In 1984 and 1985, Northtown Investments built the Bonner Mall in Bonner County, Idaho, with financing from a bank in that State. In 1986, respondent Bonner Mall Partnership (Bonner) acquired the mall, while petitioner U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (Bancorp) acquired the loan and mortgage from the Idaho bank. In 1990, Bonner defaulted on its real estate taxes and Bancorp scheduled a foreclosure sale. The day before the sale, Bonner filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., *Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha et al. by Herbert H. Mintz, Robert D. Litowitz, Jean Burke Fordis, David S. Forman, and William L. Androlia; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., by Jill E. Fisch, Arthur H. Bryant, and Leslie A. Brueckner. 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT 20 U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP Opinion of the Court in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. It filed a reorganization plan that depended on the "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule.1 Ban- corp moved to suspend the automatic stay of its foreclosure imposed by 11 U. S. C. § 362(a), arguing that Bonner's plan was unconfirmable as a matter of law for a number of rea- sons, including unavailability of the new value exception. The Bankruptcy Court eventually granted the motion, con- cluding that the new value exception had not survived enact- ment of the Bankruptcy Code. The court stayed its order pending an appeal by Bonner. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reversed, In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 142 B. R. 911 (1992); Bancorp took an appeal in turn, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af- firmed, In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F. 3d 899 (1993). Bancorp then petitioned for a writ of certiorari. After we granted the petition, 510 U. S. 1039 (1994), and received briefing on the merits, Bancorp and Bonner stipulated to a consensual plan of reorganization, which received the ap- proval of the Bankruptcy Court. The parties agreed that confirmation of the plan constituted a settlement that mooted the case. Bancorp, however, also requested that we exer- cise our power under 28 U. S. C. § 2106 to vacate the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals. Bonner opposed the motion. We set the vacatur question for briefing and argument. 511 U. S. 1002­1003 (1994). II Respondent questions our power to entertain petitioner's motion to vacate, suggesting that the limitations on the judi- 1 As described by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the new value exception "allows the shareholders of a corporation in bankruptcy to obtain an interest in the reorganized debtor in exchange for new capital contributions over the objections of a class of creditors that has not re- ceived full payment on its claims." In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F. 3d 899, 901 (1993). We express no view on the existence of such an exception under the Bankruptcy Code. 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 18 (1994) 21 Opinion of the Court cial power conferred by Article III, see U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1, "may, at least in some cases, prohibit an act of vacatur when no live dispute exists due to a settlement that has ren- dered a case moot." Brief for Respondent 21 (emphasis in original). The statute that supplies the power of vacatur provides: "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or re- verse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, de- cree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U. S. C. § 2106. Of course, no statute could authorize a federal court to decide the merits of a legal question not posed in an Article III case or controversy. For that purpose, a case must exist at all the stages of appellate review. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975); Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895). But reason and authority refute the quite different notion that a federal appellate court may not take any action with regard to a piece of litigation once it has been determined that the requirements of Article III no longer are (or indeed never were) met. That proposition is contradicted whenever an appellate court holds that a district court lacked Article III jurisdiction in the first instance, vacates the decision, and remands with directions to dismiss. In cases that become moot while awaiting review, respondent's logic would hold the Court powerless to award costs, e. g., Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. 359, 362­363 (1921), or even to enter an order of dismissal. Article III does not prescribe such paralysis. "If a judg- ment has become moot [while awaiting review], this Court may not consider its merits, but may make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require." Walling v. James 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT 22 U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP Opinion of the Court V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 677 (1944). As with other mat- ters of judicial administration and practice "reasonably ancil- lary to the primary, dispute-deciding function" of the federal courts, Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ), Congress may authorize us to enter orders necessary and appropriate to the final disposition of a suit that is before us for review. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 389­390 (1989); see also id., at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). III The leading case on vacatur is United States v. Munsing- wear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950), in which the United States sought injunctive and monetary relief for violation of a price control regulation. The damages claim was held in abey- ance pending a decision on the injunction. The District Court held that the respondent's prices complied with the regulations and dismissed the complaint. While the United States' appeal was pending, the commodity at issue was de- controlled; at the respondent's request, the case was dis- missed as moot, a disposition in which the United States ac- quiesced. The respondent then obtained dismissal of the damages action on the ground of res judicata, and we took the case to review that ruling. The United States protested the unfairness of according preclusive effect to a decision that it had tried to appeal but could not. We saw no such unfairness, reasoning that the United States should have asked the Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court's decision before the appeal was dismissed. We stated that "[t]he established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and re- mand with a direction to dismiss." Id., at 39. We explained that vacatur "clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, re- 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 18 (1994) 23 Opinion of the Court view of which was prevented through happenstance." Id., at 40. Finding that the United States had "slept on its rights," id., at 41, we affirmed. The parties in the present case agree that vacatur must be decreed for those judgments whose review is, in the words of Munsingwear, " `prevented through happenstance' "-that is to say, where a controversy presented for review has "be- come moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties." Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82, 83 (1987). They also agree that vacatur must be granted where mootness re- sults from the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court. The contested question is whether courts should vacate where mootness results from a settlement. The centerpiece of petitioner's argument is that the Mun- singwear procedure has already been held to apply in such cases. Munsingwear's description of the "established prac- tice" (the argument runs) drew no distinctions between cate- gories of moot cases; opinions in later cases granting vacatur have reiterated the breadth of the rule, see, e. g., Great West- ern Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U. S. 92, 93 (1979) (per curiam); and at least some of those cases specifically involved moot- ness by reason of settlement, see, e. g., Lake Coal Co. v. Rob- erts & Schaeffer Co., 474 U. S. 120 (1985) (per curiam). But Munsingwear, and the post-Munsingwear practice, cannot bear the weight of the present case. To begin with, the portion of Justice Douglas' opinion in Munsingwear de- scribing the "established practice" for vacatur was dictum; all that was needful for the decision was (at most) the propo- sition that vacatur should have been sought, not that it nec- essarily would have been granted. Moreover, as Munsing- wear itself acknowledged, see 340 U. S., at 40, n. 2, the "established practice" (in addition to being unconsidered) was not entirely uniform, at least three cases having been dismissed for mootness without vacatur within the four Terms preceding Munsingwear. See, e. g., Schenley Distill- ing Corp. v. Anderson, 333 U. S. 878 (1948) (per curiam). 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT 24 U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP Opinion of the Court Nor has the post-Munsingwear practice been as uniform as petitioner claims. See, e. g., Allen & Co. v. Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc., 510 U. S. 1160 (1994); Minnesota Newspaper Assn., Inc. v. Postmaster General, 488 U. S. 998 (1989); St. Luke's Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals v. Presbyterian/St. Lukes Medical Center, 459 U. S. 1025 (1982).2 Of course all of those decisions, both granting vaca- tur and denying it, were per curiam, with the single excep- tion of Karcher v. May, supra, in which we declined to va- cate. This seems to us a prime occasion for invoking our customary refusal to be bound by dicta, e. g., McCray v. Illi- nois, 386 U. S. 300, 312, n. 11 (1967), and our customary skep- ticism toward per curiam dispositions that lack the reasoned consideration of a full opinion, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670­671 (1974). Today we examine vacatur once more in the light shed by adversary presentation. The principles that have always been implicit in our treat- ment of moot cases counsel against extending Munsingwear to settlement. From the beginning we have disposed of moot cases in the manner " `most consonant to justice' . . . in view of the nature and character of the conditions which have caused the case to become moot." United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 477­478 (1916) (quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U. S. 300, 302 (1892)). The principal condition to which we have looked is whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action. See Hamburg-Amerikanische, supra, at 478 (remanding a moot case for dismissal because "the ends of justice exact 2 The Solicitor General, who has filed an amicus brief in support of peti- tioner, would apparently distinguish these unvacated cases on the ground that the dismissal was pursuant to this Court's Rule 46.1 (or its predeces- sor), which provides for dismissal when "all parties . . . agre[e]." But such an exception to vacatur for mootness is not mentioned in Munsingwear; nor, we may add, do we see any reason of policy to commend it. 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 18 (1994) 25 Opinion of the Court that the judgment below should not be permitted to stand when without any fault of the [petitioner] there is no power to review it upon the merits"); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S., at 362 (remanding for dismissal because "without fault of the plaintiff in error, the defendant in error, after the pro- ceedings below, . . . caus[ed] the case to become moot"). The reference to "happenstance" in Munsingwear must be understood as an allusion to this equitable tradition of vacatur. A party who seeks review of the merits of an ad- verse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circum- stance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.3 See Hamburg-Amerikanische, supra, at 477­ 478. The same is true when mootness results from unilat- eral action of the party who prevailed below. See Walling, 321 U. S., at 675; Heitmuller, supra, at 362. Where moot- ness results from settlement, however, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary proc- esses of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice. The denial of vacatur is merely one application of the prin- ciple that "[a] suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks." Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963) (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963)). In these respects the case stands no differently than it would if jurisdiction were lacking because the losing party failed to appeal at all. In Karcher v. May, supra, two state 3 We thus stand by Munsingwear's dictum that mootness by happen- stance provides sufficient reason to vacate. Whether that principle was correctly applied to the circumstances of that case is another matter. The suit for injunctive relief in Munsingwear became moot on appeal because the regulations sought to be enforced by the United States were annulled by Executive Order. See Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA8 1947). We express no view on Munsingwear's implicit conclu- sion that repeal of administrative regulations cannot fairly be attributed to the Executive Branch when it litigates in the name of the United States. 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT 26 U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP Opinion of the Court legislators, acting in their capacities as presiding officers of the legislature, appealed from a federal judgment that invali- dated a state statute on constitutional grounds. After the jurisdictional statement was filed the legislators lost their posts, and their successors in office withdrew the appeal. Holding that we lacked jurisdiction for want of a proper ap- pellant, we dismissed. The legislators then argued that the judgments should be vacated under Munsingwear. But we denied the request, noting that "[t]his controversy did not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties. The controversy ended when the losing party- the [State] Legislature-declined to pursue its appeal. Ac- cordingly, the Munsingwear procedure is inapplicable to this case." Karcher, 484 U. S., at 83. So, too, here. It is true, of course, that respondent agreed to the settle- ment that caused the mootness. Petitioner argues that va- catur is therefore fair to respondent, and seeks to distinguish our prior cases on that ground. But that misconceives the emphasis on fault in our decisions. That the parties are jointly responsible for settling may in some sense put them on even footing, but petitioner's case needs more than that. Respondent won below. It is petitioner's burden, as the party seeking relief from the status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not merely equivalent responsibil- ity for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the ex- traordinary remedy of vacatur. Petitioner's voluntary for- feiture of review constitutes a failure of equity that makes the burden decisive, whatever respondent's share in the mooting of the case might have been. As always when federal courts contemplate equitable re- lief, our holding must also take account of the public interest. "Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a va- catur." Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 18 (1994) 27 Opinion of the Court Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissent- ing). Congress has prescribed a primary route, by appeal as of right and certiorari, through which parties may seek relief from the legal consequences of judicial judgments. To allow a party who steps off the statutory path to employ the secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined form of collateral attack on the judgment would-quite apart from any consid- erations of fairness to the parties-disturb the orderly oper- ation of the federal judicial system. Munsingwear estab- lishes that the public interest is best served by granting relief when the demands of "orderly procedure," 340 U. S., at 41, cannot be honored; we think conversely that the public interest requires those demands to be honored when they can. Petitioner advances two arguments meant to justify vaca- tur on systemic grounds. The first is that appellate judg- ments in cases that we have consented to review by writ of certiorari are reversed more often than they are affirmed, are therefore suspect, and should be vacated as a sort of prophylactic against legal error. It seems to us inappropri- ate, however, to vacate mooted cases, in which we have no constitutional power to decide the merits, on the basis of assumptions about the merits. Second, petitioner suggests that "[v]acating a moot decision, and thereby leaving an issue . . . temporarily unresolved in a Circuit, can facilitate the ultimate resolution of the issue by encouraging its continued examination and debate." Brief for Petitioner 33. We have found, however, that debate among the courts of appeals suf- ficiently illuminates the questions that come before us for review. The value of additional intracircuit debate seems to us far outweighed by the benefits that flow to litigants and the public from the resolution of legal questions. A final policy justification urged by petitioner is the facili- tation of settlement, with the resulting economies for the federal courts. But while the availability of vacatur may facilitate settlement after the judgment under review has 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT 28 U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP Opinion of the Court been rendered and certiorari granted (or appeal filed), it may deter settlement at an earlier stage. Some litigants, at least, may think it worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle in the district court, or in the court of appeals, if, but only if, an unfavorable outcome can be washed away by a settlement-related vacatur. And the judicial economies achieved by settlement at the district-court level are ordi- narily much more extensive than those achieved by settle- ment on appeal. We find it quite impossible to assess the effect of our holding, either way, upon the frequency or sys- temic value of settlement. Although the case before us involves only a motion to va- cate, by reason of settlement, the judgment of a court of appeals (with, of course, the consequential vacation of the underlying judgment of the district court), it is appropriate to discuss the relevance of our holding to motions at the court-of-appeals level for vacatur of district-court judgments. Some opinions have suggested that vacatur motions at that level should be more freely granted, since district-court judg- ments are subject to review as of right. See, e. g., Manufac- turers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F. 3d 381, 384 (CA2 1993). Obviously, this factor does not affect the primary basis for our denying vacatur. Whether the appellate court's seizure of the case is the consequence of an appellant's right or of a petitioner's good luck has no bearing upon the lack of equity of a litigant who has voluntarily abandoned review. If the point of the proposed distinction is that district-court judgments, being subject to review as of right, are more likely to be overturned and hence presumptively less valid: We again assert the inappropriateness of disposing of cases, whose merits are beyond judicial power to consider, on the basis of judicial estimates regarding their merits. Moreover, as petitioner's own argument described two para- graphs above points out, the reversal rate for cases in which this Court grants certiorari (a precondition for our vacatur) is over 50%-more than double the reversal rate for appeals 513us1$$4K 03-28-98 15:54:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 18 (1994) 29 Opinion of the Court to the courts of appeals. See Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Set- tlement and Vacatur, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 589, 595, n. 25 (1991) (citing studies). We hold that mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review. This is not to say that vacatur can never be granted when mootness is produced in that fashion. As we have described, the deter- mination is an equitable one, and exceptional circumstances may conceivably counsel in favor of such a course. It should be clear from our discussion, however, that those exceptional circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settle- ment agreement provides for vacatur-which neither dimin- ishes the voluntariness of the abandonment of review nor alters any of the policy considerations we have discussed. Of course even in the absence of, or before considering the existence of, extraordinary circumstances, a court of appeals presented with a request for vacatur of a district-court judg- ment may remand the case with instructions that the district court consider the request, which it may do pursuant to Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). * * * Petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is denied. The case is dismissed as moot. See this Court's Rule 46. It is so ordered. 513us1$$5z 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 30 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus HESS et al. v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 93­1197. Argued October 3, 1994-Decided November 14, 1994 Petitioners, two railroad workers, were injured in unrelated incidents while employed by respondent bistate railway, the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH). PATH is a wholly owned subsid- iary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority or Authority), an entity created when Congress, pursuant to the Consti- tution's Interstate Compact Clause, consented to a compact between the Authority's parent States. Petitioners filed separate personal injury actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). The District Court dismissed the suits under Third Circuit precedent, Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 819 F. 2d 413 (CA3) (Port Authority PBA), which declared PATH a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immu- nity from suit in federal court. The Third Circuit consolidated the cases and summarily affirmed. That court's assessment of PATH's im- munity conflicts with the Second Circuit's decision in Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 873 F. 2d 628. Held: PATH is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Pp. 39­53. (a) The Court presumes that an entity created pursuant to the Com- pact Clause does not qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity unless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the entity to arm it with the States' own immunity, and that Congress concurred in that purpose. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401. The Port Authority emphasizes that certain indicators of immunity are present in this case, particularly provisions in the interstate compact and its implementing legislation establishing state control over Authority commissioners, acts, powers, and responsi- bilities, and state-court decisions typing the Authority as an agency of its parent States. Other indicators, however, point away from immu- nity, particularly the States' lack of financial responsibility for the Au- thority. Pp. 39­46. (b) When indicators of immunity point in different directions, the Court is guided primarily by the Eleventh Amendment's twin reasons 513us1$$5z 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 31 Syllabus for being: the States' dignity and their financial solvency. Neither is implicated here. First, there is no genuine threat to the dignity of New York or New Jersey in allowing petitioners to pursue FELA claims against PATH in federal court. The Port Authority is a discrete entity created by compact among three sovereigns, the two States and the Federal Government. Federal courts are not alien to such an en- tity, for they are ordained by one of its founders. Nor is it disrespectful to one State to call upon the entity to answer complaints in federal court, for the States agreed to the power sharing, coordination, and unified action that typify Compact Clause creations. Second, most Federal Courts of Appeals have identified the "state treasury" crite- rion-whether a judgment against the entity must be satisfied out of a State's treasury-as the most important consideration in determining whether a state-created entity qualifies for Eleventh Amendment immu- nity. The Port Authority, however, is financially self-sufficient: it gen- erates its own revenues and pays its own debts. Where, as here, the States are neither legally nor practically obligated to pay the entity's debts, the Eleventh Amendment's core concern is not implicated. Pp. 47­51. (c) The conflict between the Second and Third Circuits no longer con- cerns the correct legal theory, for the Third Circuit, as shown in two post-Port Authority PBA decisions, now accepts the prevailing "state treasury" view. A narrow intercircuit split persists only because the Circuits differ on whether the Port Authority's debts are those of its parent States. In resolving that issue, the Port Authority PBA court relied primarily on a compact provision calling for modest state contri- butions, capped at $100,000 annually from each State, unless Port Au- thority revenues were "adequate to meet all expenditures," but the court drew from that provision far more than its text warrants. Pp. 51­52. 8 F. 3d 811, reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concur- ring opinion, post, p. 53. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 55. Lawrence A. Katz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Joseph A. Coffey, Jr., and David J. Bederman. 513us1$$5z 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 32 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court Hugh H. Welsh argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Arthur P. Berg, Donald F. Burke, and Anne M. Tannenbaum.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. These paired cases arise out of work-related accidents in which a locomotive engineer and a train conductor, employ- ees of a bistate railway authorized by interstate compact, sustained personal injuries. The courts below-the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit- rejected both complaints on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment sheltered respondent railway from suit in fed- eral court. We granted certiorari to resolve an intercircuit conflict on this issue. 510 U. S. 1190 (1994). Concluding that respondent bistate railway, the Port Authority Trans- Hudson Corporation (PATH), is not cloaked with the Elev- *William G. Mahoney and L. Pat Wynns filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives' Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, An- drea M. Silkowitz, Robert H. Stoloff, and Mary Jacobson, Assistant Attor- neys General, and Eldad Philip Isaac, Deputy Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: G. Oliver Koppell of New York, James H. Evans of Alabama, Winston Bry- ant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Con- necticut, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Pamela Carter of In- diana, Robert T. Stephen of Kansas, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma, Theo- dore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Clifton S. Elgarten. 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 33 Opinion of the Court enth Amendment immunity that a State enjoys, we reverse the judgment of the Third Circuit. I A Petitioners Albert Hess and Charles F. Walsh, both rail- road workers, were injured in unrelated incidents in the course of their employment by PATH. PATH, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority or Authority), operates a com- muter railroad connecting New York City to northern New Jersey. In separate personal injury actions commenced in the United States District Court for the District of New Jer- sey, petitioners sought to recover damages for PATH's al- leged negligence; both claimed a right to compensation under the federal law governing injuries to railroad workers, the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq.1 Hess and Walsh filed their complaints within the 3-year time limit set by the FELA, see 35 Stat. 66, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 56, but neither peti- tioner met the 1-year limit specified in the States' statutory consent to sue the Port Authority. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1­157, 32:1­163 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7101, 7107 (McKinney 1979). PATH moved to dismiss each action, asserting (1) PATH's qualification as a state agency entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court enjoyed by New York and New Jersey,2 and (2) petitioners' failure to 1 Hess additionally invoked the Boiler Inspection Act, ch. 103, 36 Stat. 913, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 22 et seq., as a basis for his claim for damages. 2 The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex- tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 34 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court commence court proceedings within the 1-year limit pre- scribed by New York and New Jersey. Third Circuit prece- dent concerning the Port Authority supported PATH's plea. In Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. Port Au- thority of New York and New Jersey, 819 F. 2d 413 (Port Authority PBA), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 953 (1987), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Port Authority is "an agency of the state and is thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." 819 F. 2d, at 418. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that "[g]iven the solvency and size of the [Port Authority's] General Reserve Fund, it is unlikely that the Authority would have to go to the state to get payment for any liabili- ties issued against it." Id., at 416.3 But the Third Circuit considered "crystal clear" the intentions of New York and New Jersey: "[I]f the Authority is ever in need of financial support, the states will be there to provide it." Ibid. In line with Port Authority PBA, the District Court held in the Hess and Walsh actions that PATH enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity, and could be sued in federal court only within the 1-year time frame New York and New Jersey allowed. See Walsh, 813 F. Supp. 1095, 1096­1097 (NJ 1993); Hess, 809 F. Supp. 1172, 1178­1182 (NJ 1992). Accord- ingly, both actions were dismissed. The District Court in Hess noted an anomaly: Had Hess sued in a New Jersey or New York state court the FELA's 3-year limitation period, not the States' 1-year prescription, would have applied. See id., at 1183­1185, and n. 16. This followed from our reaffirmation in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U. S. 197 (1991), that the en- tire federal scheme of railroad regulation-including all FELA terms-applies to all railroads, even those wholly 3 The court referred to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 42­44 (1985), which shows that the Authority's General Reserve Fund had a balance of over $271 million at the end of 1985. 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 35 Opinion of the Court owned by one State. Time-bar rejection by a federal court of a federal statutory claim that federal prescription would have rendered timely, had the case been brought in state court, becomes comprehensible, the District Court explained, once it is recognized that " `the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.' " Hess, 809 F. Supp., at 1183­1184 (quoting Hilton, 502 U. S., at 205); see 809 F. Supp., at 1185, n. 16. Consolidating Hess and Walsh on appeal, the Third Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court's judgments. 8 F. 3d 811 (1993) (table). B The Port Authority, whose Eleventh Amendment immu- nity is at issue in these cases, was created in 1921, when Congress, pursuant to the Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause,4 consented to a compact between the Authority's par- ent States. 42 Stat. 174. Through the bistate compact, New York and New Jersey sought to achieve "a better co- ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York." N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­1 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6401 (McKinney 1979). The compact grants the Port Au- thority power to "purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within [the Port of New York D]istrict; and to make charges for the use thereof; and for any of such purposes to own, hold, lease and/or oper- ate real or personal property, to borrow money and se- cure the same by bonds or by mortgages upon any prop- erty held or to be held by it." N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­7 4 Article I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Ton- nage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agree- ment or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 36 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court (West 1990); accord, N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6407 (McKin- ney 1979). The Port Authority's domain, the Port of New York District, is a defined geographic area that embraces New York Har- bor, including parts of New York and New Jersey. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­3 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6403 (McKinney 1979).5 "The Port Authority was conceived as a financially inde- pendent entity, with funds primarily derived from private investors." United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 4 (1977). Tolls, fees, and investment income ac- count for the Authority's secure financial position. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a­61a.6 Twelve commissioners, six selected by each State, govern the Port Authority. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1­5, 32:12­3 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6405 (McKinney 1979); 1930 N. Y. Laws, ch. 422, § 6. Each State may remove, for cause, the commissioners it appoints. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1­5, 32:12­5 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6405 (McKinney 1979); 1930 N. Y. Laws, ch. 422, § 4. Consonant with the Authority's geographic domain, four of New York's six commissioners must be resident voters of New York City, and four of New Jersey's must be resident voters of the New Jersey portion of the Port of New York District. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­5 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6405 (McKinney 1979). The Port Authority's commissioners also serve as PATH's directors. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­35.61 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6612 (McKinney 1979). 5 See also N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:2­23.28(j) (West 1990) (defining larger area in which Port Authority has obligation to supply commuter buses to authorized operators); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 7202(10) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (same). 6 At the end of 1993, the Port Authority had over $2.8 billion in net assets and $534 million in its General Reserve Fund. See Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 49, 64 (1993) (hereinafter 1993 Annual Financial Report). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 37 Opinion of the Court The Governor of each State may veto actions of the Port Authority commissioners from that State, including actions taken as PATH directors. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1­17, 32:1­35.61, 32:2­6 to 32:2­9 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 6417, 6612, 7151­7154 (McKinney 1979). Acting jointly, the state legislatures may augment the powers and responsi- bilities of the Port Authority, see N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­8 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6408 (McKinney 1979), and specify the purposes for which the Port Authority's sur- plus revenues are used. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­35.142 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 7002 (McKinney 1979). Debts and other obligations of the Port Authority are not liabilities of the two founding States, and the States do not appropriate funds to the Authority. The compact and its im- plementing legislation bar the Port Authority from drawing on state tax revenue, pledging the credit of either State, or otherwise imposing any charge on either State. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1­8, 32:1­33 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 6408, 6459 (McKinney 1979). The States did agree to appropriate sums to cover the Au- thority's "salaries, office and other administrative expenses," N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­16 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6416 (McKinney 1979), but this undertaking is notably mod- est.7 By its terms, it applies only "until the revenues from operations conducted by the [P]ort [A]uthority are adequate to meet all expenditures." The promise of support has a low ceiling: $100,000 annually from each State. Thus, the States in no way undertake to cover the bulk of the Author- 7 Compact article XV, the provision for expense coverage, reads in full: "Unless and until the revenues from operations conducted by the [P]ort [A]uthority are adequate to meet all expenditures, the legislatures of the two states shall appropriate, in equal amounts, annually, for the salaries, office and other administrative expenses, such sum or sums as shall be recommended by the [P]ort [A]uthority and approved by the governors of the two states, but each state obligates itself hereunder only to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars in any one year." N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­16 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6416 (McKinney 1979). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 38 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court ity's operating and capital expenses. Further, even the lim- ited administrative expense payments for which the States provided are contingent on the advance approval of both Governors, see ibid., and the States' treasuries may not be tapped until both legislatures have appropriated the nec- essary funds. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­18 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6418 (McKinney 1979). A judgment against PATH, it is thus apparent, would not be enforceable against either New York or New Jersey. C The Third Circuit's assessment of PATH's qualification for Eleventh Amendment immunity conflicts with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the same matter. See Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Cor- poration, 873 F. 2d 628, 631 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U. S. 299 (1990). The Second Circuit concluded: "No provision [of the compact or of state legislation pursuant to the compact] commits the treasuries of the two states to satisfy judgments against the Port Author- ity . . . . We believe that this insulation of state treasur- ies from the liabilities of the Port Authority outweighs both the methods of appointment and gubernatorial veto so far as the Eleventh Amendment immunity is con- cerned." 873 F. 2d, at 631. We affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment in Feeney, but we bypassed the question whether PATH enjoyed the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U. S. 299 (1990). Assum- ing, arguendo, that the suit in Feeney was tantamount to a claim against the States,8 we ruled that New York and New 8 Our assumption was in accord with prior state and federal decisions typing the Port Authority a state arm or agency. See, e. g., Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797, 801 (NJ 1940); Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 14 N. Y. 2d 119, 123, 198 N. E. 2d 585, 586 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 39 Opinion of the Court Jersey had effectively consented to the litigation. See id., at 306­309 (relying on N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1­157, 32:1­162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7101, 7106 (McKinney 1979)). Consent is not arguable here, because Hess and Walsh commenced suit too late to meet the 1-year prescrip- tion specified by the States. See supra, at 33. Accordingly, we confront directly the sole question petitioners Hess and Walsh present, and we hold that PATH is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. II The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals. Adoption of the Amendment responded most immediately to the States' fears that "fed- eral courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Petty v. Tennessee- Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U. S. 275, 276, n. 1 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933).9 More perva- sively, current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence empha- sizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system: "The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity. See Hans (1964); Miller v. Port of New York Authority, 18 N. J. Misc. 601, 606, 15 A. 2d 262, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1939). 9 As Chief Justice John Marshall recounted: "[A]t the adoption of the [C]onstitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts" prompted swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406 (1821). See generally 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 96­102 (1922). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 40 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 13 (1890). It thus accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federa- tion." Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 146 (1993). Bistate entities occupy a significantly different position in our federal system than do the States themselves. The States, as separate sovereigns, are the constituent elements of the Union. Bistate entities, in contrast, typically are cre- ations of three discrete sovereigns: two States and the Fed- eral Government.10 Their mission is to address " `interests and problems that do not coincide nicely either with the na- tional boundaries or with State lines' "-interests that " `may be badly served or not served at all by the ordinary channels of National or State political action.' " V. Thursby, Inter- state Cooperation: A Study of the Interstate Compact 5 (1953) (quoting National Resources Committee, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development 34 (1935)); see Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Cooperative Federalism, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 825, 854­855 (1963) (Compact Clause entities formed to deal with "broad, region-wide problems" should not be regarded as "an affir- mation of a narrow concept of state sovereignty," but as "in- dependently functioning parts of a regional polity and of a national union."). A compact accorded congressional consent "is more than a supple device for dealing with interests confined within a region. . . . [I]t is also a means of safeguarding the national interest . . . ." West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22, 27 (1951). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey exemplifies both the need for, and the utility of, Com- pact Clause entities: 10 If the creation of a bistate entity does not implicate federal concerns, however, federal consent is not required. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 517­520 (1893). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 41 Opinion of the Court "From the point of view of geography, commerce, and engineering, the Port of New York is an organic whole. Politically, the port is split between the law-making of two States, independent but futile in their respective spheres. The scarcity of land and mounting commerce have concentrated on the New York side of the Hudson River the bulk of the terminal facilities for foreign com- merce, while it has made the Jersey side, to a substantial extent, the terminal and breaking-up yards for the east- and west-bound traffic. In addition, both sides of the Hudson are dotted with municipalities, who have sought to satisfy their interest in the general problem through a confusion of local regulations. In addition, the United States has been asserting its guardianship over inter- state and foreign commerce. What in fact was one, in law was many. Plainly the situation could not be ade- quately dealt with except through the coordinated ef- forts of New York, New Jersey, and the United States. The facts presented a problem for the unified action of the law-making of these three governments, and law heeded facts." Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Ad- justments, 34 Yale L. J. 685, 697 (1925) (footnote omitted). Suit in federal court is not an affront to the dignity of a Compact Clause entity, for the federal court, in relation to such an enterprise, is hardly the instrument of a distant, dis- connected sovereign; rather, the federal court is ordained by one of the entity's founders. Nor is the integrity of the com- pacting States compromised when the Compact Clause en- tity is sued in federal court. As part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution, the States agreed to the power sharing, coordination, and unified action that typify 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 42 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court Compact Clause creations.11 Again, the federal tribunal cannot be regarded as alien in this cooperative, trigovern- mental arrangement. This is all the more apparent here, where the very claims in suit-the FELA claims of Hess and Walsh-arise under federal law. See supra, at 33. Because Compact Clause entities owe their existence to state and federal sovereigns acting cooperatively, and not to any "one of the United States," see supra, at 33, n. 2, their political accountability is diffuse; they lack the tight tie to the people of one State that an instrument of a single State has: "An interstate compact, by its very nature, shifts a part of a state's authority to another state or states, or to the agency the several states jointly create to run the compact. Such an agency under the control of special interests or gubernatorially appointed representatives is two or more steps removed from popular control, or even of control by a local government." M. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts: A Question of Federalism 300 (1971). In sum, within any single State in our representative democ- racy, voters may exercise their political will to direct state policy; bistate entities created by compact, however, are not subject to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose the federal system. Accordingly, there is good reason not to amalgamate Com- pact Clause entities with agencies of "one of the United States" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. This Court so recognized in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979), the only case, prior 11 See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U. S. 299, 314­ 316 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (observing that no single State has dominion over an entity created by interstate compact and that state/federal shared power is the essential attribute of such an entity); M. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts: A Ques- tion of Federalism 297­300 (1971) (emphasizing limits of individual State's authority over interstate compact entities). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 43 Opinion of the Court to this one, in which we decided whether a bistate entity qualified for Eleventh Amendment immunity.12 Lake Country rejected a plea that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), an agency created by compact to which California and Nevada were parties, acquired the im- munity which the Eleventh Amendment accords to each one of TRPA's parent States. TRPA had argued that if the Amendment shields each State, then surely it must shield an entity "so important that it could not be created by [two] States without a special Act of Congress." Id., at 400. That "expansive reading," we said, was not warranted, for the Amendment specifies "the State" as the entity protected: "By its terms, the protection afforded by [the Eleventh] Amendment is only available to `one of the United States.' It is true, of course, that some agencies exer- cising state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practi- cal consequences as a judgment against the State itself. But the Court has consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a `slice of state power.' " Id., at 400­ 401 (footnotes omitted). We then set out a general approach: We would presume the Compact Clause agency does not qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity "[u]nless there is good reason to be- lieve that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States 12 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U. S. 275, 279, 281­ 282 (1959), and Feeney, 495 U. S., at 308­309, also involved Eleventh Amendment pleas by bistate agencies; we upheld the exercise of federal- court jurisdiction in both cases on the ground that the asserted immunity from suit had been waived. 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 44 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose." Id., at 401. The Court in Lake Country found "no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment." Indeed, all relevant considerations in that case weighed against TRPA's plea. The compact called TRPA a "political subdivision," and required that the major- ity of the governing members be county and city appointees. Ibid. Obligations of TRPA, the compact directed, "shall not be binding on either State." TRPA's prime function, we noted, was regulation of land use, a function traditionally performed by local governments. Further, the agency's performance of that function gave rise to the litigation. Moreover, rules made by TRPA were "not subject to veto at the state level." Id., at 402. This case is more complex. Indicators of immunity or the absence thereof do not, as they did in Lake Country, all point the same way. While 8 of the Port Authority's 12 commis- sioners must be resident voters of either New York City or other parts of the Port of New York District,13 this indicator of local governance is surely offset by the States' controls. All commissioners are state appointees. Acting alone, each State through its Governor may block Port Authority meas- ures; and acting together, both States, through their legisla- tures, may enlarge the Port Authority's powers and add to its responsibilities. The compact and its implementing legislation do not type the Authority as a state agency; instead they use various terms: "joint or common agency"; 14 "body corporate and poli- 13 Cf. Farias v. Bexar Cty. Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F. 2d 866, 875 (CA5) (entity held autonomous, and thus not shielded by Eleventh Amendment, where board members had to be "qualified voters of the region"), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 866 (1991). 14 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­1 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6401 (Mc- Kinney 1979). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 45 Opinion of the Court tic"; 15 "municipal corporate instrumentality of the two states for the purpose of developing the port and effectuating the pledge of the states in the . . . compact." 16 State courts, however, repeatedly have typed the Port Authority an agency of the States rather than a municipal unit or local district. See, e. g., Whalen v. Wagner, 4 N. Y. 2d 575, 581­ 583, 152 N. E. 2d 54, 56­57 (1958) (legislation authorizing specific Port Authority projects does not pertain to the "property, affairs or government" of a city because "the mat- ters over which the Port Authority has jurisdiction are of State concern"). Port Authority functions are not readily classified as typi- cally state or unquestionably local. States and municipali- ties alike own and operate bridges, tunnels, ferries, marine terminals, airports, bus terminals, industrial parks, also com- muter railroads.17 This consideration, therefore, does not advance our Eleventh Amendment inquiry. Pointing away from Eleventh Amendment immunity, the States lack financial responsibility for the Port Authority. Conceived as a fiscally independent entity financed predomi- nantly by private funds, see United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S., at 4, the Authority generates its own revenues, and for decades has received no money from the States. See Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F. 2d 998, 1002 (CA2 1944) ("In the compact . . . the states agreed to make annual appropriations (not in excess of $100,000 for each state) for expenses of the Authority until 15 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­4 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6404 (Mc- Kinney 1979); accord, N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­7 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6407 (McKinney 1979). 16 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­33 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6459 (Mc- Kinney 1979). 17 Other Authority facilities, such as the World Trade Center, an office complex housing numerous private tenants, see 1993 Annual Financial Re- port 33­35, and the Teleport, a satellite communications center, see id., at 30, are not typically operated by either States or municipalities. 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 46 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court [r]evenues from its operations were sufficient to meet its ex- penses. These annual appropriations were discontinued in 1934 because the revenues from the bridges, the Holland Tunnel and Inland Terminal had become sufficient."), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 792 (1945). The States, as earlier observed, bear no legal liability for Port Authority debts; they are not responsible for the pay- ment of judgments against the Port Authority or PATH. The Third Circuit, in Port Authority PBA, assumed that, "if the Authority is ever in need," the States would pay. 819 F. 2d, at 416. But nothing in the compact or the laws of either State supports that assumption. See supra, at 37­38. As the Second Circuit concisely stated: "The Port Authority is explicitly barred from pledging the credit of either state or from borrowing money in any name but its own. Even the provision for the ap- propriation of moneys for administrative expenses up to $100,000 per year requires prior approval by the gover- nor of each state and an actual appropriation before obli- gations for such expenses may be incurred. Moreover, the phrase `salaries, office and other administrative ex- penses' clearly limits this essentially optional obligation of the two states to a very narrow category of expenses and thus also evidences an intent to insulate the states' treasuries from the vast bulk of the Port Authority's operating and capital expenses, including personal in- jury judgments." Feeney, 873 F. 2d, at 631.18 18 Concerning the Third Circuit's decision in Port Authority PBA, the Second Circuit said: "That decision . . . was based on the Third Circuit's understanding that, in the event that `a judgment were entered against the Authority that was serious enough to deplete its resources, the Authority would be able to go to the state legislatures in order to recoup the amount needed for its oper- ating expenses.' To the extent that this statement implies that the states must make such an appropriation, it appears to be in error." Feeney, 873 F. 2d, at 632 (quoting Port Authority PBA, 819 F. 2d, at 416). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 47 Opinion of the Court III When indicators of immunity point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment's twin reasons for being remain our prime guide. See supra, at 39­40. We have already pointed out that federal courts are not alien to a bistate en- tity Congress participated in creating. Nor is it disrespect- ful to one State to call upon the Compact Clause entity to answer complaints in federal court. See supra, at 41­43. Seeing no genuine threat to the dignity of New York or New Jersey in allowing Hess and Walsh to pursue FELA claims against PATH in federal court, we ask, as Lake Country in- structed, whether there is here "good reason to believe" the States and Congress designed the Port Authority to enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. 440 U. S., at 401. PATH urges that we find good reason to classify the Port Authority as a state agency for Eleventh Amendment pur- poses based on the control New York and New Jersey wield over the Authority. The States appoint and can remove the commissioners, the Governors can veto Port Authority ac- tions, and the States' legislatures can determine the projects the Port Authority undertakes. See supra, at 36­37. But ultimate control of every state-created entity resides with the State, for the State may destroy or reshape any unit it creates. "[P]olitical subdivisions exist solely at the whim and behest of their State," Feeney, 495 U. S., at 313 (Bren- nan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), yet cities and counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immu- nity. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890). Moreover, no one State alone can control the course of a Compact Clause entity. See supra, at 42, and n. 11. Gauging actual control, particularly when an en- tity has multiple creator-controllers, can be a "perilous in- quiry," "an uncertain and unreliable exercise." See Note, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1243, 1284 (1992); see also id., at 1302, and n. 264 (describing "degree to which the state controls the 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 48 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court entity" as a criterion neither "[i]ntelligible" nor "judicially manageable"). Moreover, rendering control dispositive does not home in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the preven- tion of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury. See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1129 (1983) (identifying "the award of money judgments against the states" as "the traditional core of eleventh amendment protection").19 Accordingly, Courts of Appeals have recog- nized the vulnerability of the State's purse as the most sa- lient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations. See, e. g., Baxter v. Vigo Cty. School Corp., 26 F. 3d 728, 732­733 (CA7 1994) (most significant factor is whether entity has power to raise its own funds); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F. 3d 996, 999 (CA6 1993) ("The most important factor . . . is whether any monetary judgment would be paid out of the state treas- ury."), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1119 (1994); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 991 F. 2d 935, 942­943 (CA1 1993) ("First, and most fundamentally, [the entity's] inability to tap the Commonwealth treasury or pledge the Commonwealth's credit leaves it unable to exer- cise the power of the purse. On this basis, [the entity] is ill-deserving of Eleventh Amendment protection."); Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Authority, 953 F. 2d 807, 818 (CA3 1991) (in banc) ("[T]he `most important' factor is `whether any judgment would be paid from the state treas- ury.' ") (quoting Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Opera- tions, Inc., 873 F. 2d 655, 659 (CA3) (in banc), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 850 (1989)), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 943 (1992); Bar- 19 The dissent questions whether the driving concern of the Eleventh Amendment is the protection of state treasuries, emphasizing that the Amendment covers "any suit in law or equity." Post, at 60. The sugges- tion that suits in equity do not drain money as frightfully as actions at law, however, is belied by the paradigm case. See Jarndyce and Jarndyce (Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853)). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 49 Opinion of the Court ket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F. 2d 1084, 1087 (CA8 1991) ("Because Missouri and Illi- nois are not liable for judgments against Bi-State, there is no policy reason for extending the states' sovereign immu- nity to Bi-State."); Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 873 F. 2d, at 631 ("In cases where doubt has existed as to the availability of Eleventh Amendment immu- nity, the Supreme Court has emphasized the exposure of the state treasury as a critical factor."), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U. S. 299 (1990); Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F. 2d 435, 440 (CA5 1985) ("One of the most important goals of the immunity of the Eleventh Amendment is to shield states' treasuries. . . . The purpose of the immunity therefore largely disappears when a judgment against the entity does not entail a judgment against the state."), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1057 (1986). In sum, as New York and New Jersey concede, the "vast majority of Circuits . . . have concluded that the state treasury factor is the most important factor to be considered . . . and, in practice, have generally accorded this factor dispositive weight." Brief for States of New Jersey, New York et al. as Amici Curiae 18­19. The Port Authority's anticipated and actual financial inde- pendence-its long history of paying its own way, see supra, at 37­38, and n. 7, 45­46-contrasts with the situation of transit facilities that place heavy fiscal tolls on their founding States. In Alaska Cargo Transport, Inc. v. Alaska R. Corp., 5 F. 3d 378 (CA9 1993), for example, Eleventh Amend- ment immunity was accorded a thinly capitalized railroad that depends for its existence on a state-provided "financial safety net of broad dimension." Id., at 381. And in Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 781 F. 2d 218 (CADC 1986), Eleventh Amendment immunity was accorded an interstate transit system whose revenue short- fall Congress and the cooperating States anticipated from the start, an enterprise constantly dependent on funds from 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:26 PAGES OPINPGT 50 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court the participating governments to meet its sizable operating deficits. See id., at 225­227. As the Morris court con- cluded: "[W]here an agency is so structured that, as a practi- cal matter, if the agency is to survive, a judgment must ex- pend itself against state treasuries, common sense and the rationale of the eleventh amendment require that sovereign immunity attach to the agency." Id., at 227.20 There is no such requirement where the agency is structured, as the Port Authority is, to be self-sustaining. Cf. Royal Carib- bean Corp. v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 973 F. 2d 8, 10­11 (CA1 1992) (Breyer, C. J.) (rejecting Eleventh Amendment immunity plea, despite Commonwealth's control over agency's executives, planning, and administration, where agency did not depend on Commonwealth financing for its income and covered its own expenses, including judgments against it). PATH maintains that the Port Authority's private funding and financial independence should be assessed differently. Operating profitably, the Port Authority dedicates at least some of its surplus to public projects which the States them- selves might otherwise finance. As an example, PATH notes a program under which the Port Authority purchases buses and then leases or transfers them without charge to public and private transportation entities in both States. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:2­23.27 to 32:2­23.42 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7201­7217 (McKinney Supp. 1994); 1993 Annual Financial Report 66. A judgment against the Port Authority, PATH contends, by reducing the Authority's surplus available to fund such projects, produces an effect equivalent to the impact of a judgment directly against the State. It follows, PATH suggests, that distinguishing the 20 The decision in Morris is compatible with our approach. See supra, at 43­44. Thus, we establish no "per se rule that the Eleventh Amend- ment never applies when States act in concert." Post, at 56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 51 Opinion of the Court fiscal resources of the Port Authority from the fiscal re- sources of the States is unrealistic and artificial. This reasoning misses the mark. A charitable organiza- tion may undertake rescue or other good work which, in its absence, we would expect the State to shoulder. But none would conclude, for example, that in times of flood or famine the American Red Cross, to the extent it works for the pub- lic, acquires the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.21 The proper focus is not on the use of profits or surplus, but rather is on losses and debts. If the expenditures of the enterprise exceed receipts, is the State in fact obligated to bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise? When the answer is "No"-both legally and practically- then the Eleventh Amendment's core concern is not implicated. IV The conflict between the Second and Third Circuits, it bears emphasis, is no longer over the correct legal theory. Both Circuits, in accord with the prevailing view, see supra, at 48­49, identify "the `state treasury' criterion-whether any judgment must be satisfied out of the state treasury-as the most important consideration" in resolving an Eleventh Amendment immunity issue. Brief for States of New Jer- sey, New York et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (acknowledging, but opposing, this widely held view). The intercircuit division thus persists only because the Second and Third Circuits di- verge in answering the question: Are the Port Authority's debts those of its parent States? See ibid. Two Third Circuit decisions issued after Port Authority PBA, both rejecting Eleventh Amendment pleas by public 21 It would indeed heighten a "myster[y] of legal evolution" were we to spread an Eleventh Amendment cover over an agency that consumes no state revenues but contributes to the State's wealth. See Borchard, Gov- ernment Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 4 (1924); see also Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213­216, and n. 1, 359 P. 2d 457, 458­460, and n. 1 (1961) (Traynor, J.). 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT 52 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Opinion of the Court transit authorities, indicate the narrow compass of the cur- rent Circuit split. In Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Authority, 953 F. 2d 807 (1991) (in banc), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 943 (1992), the Third Circuit held a regional transit au- thority not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in federal court. The "most important question," according to Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals confirmed, was "whether any judgment would be paid from the state treasury." 953 F. 2d, at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted). Earlier, in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F. 2d 655 (in banc), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 850 (1989), an FELA suit, the Third Circuit concluded that the New Jersey Transit Corporation did not share the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. As in Bolden, the court in Fitchik called "most important" the question "whether any judgment would be paid from the state treasury." 873 F. 2d, at 659. Accounting for Port Authority PBA in its later Bolden decision, the Third Circuit acknowledged that it had relied primarily on the interstate compact provision calling for state contributions unless Port Authority revenues were " `adequate to meet all expenditures.' " See Bolden, 953 F. 2d, at 815 (quoting compact article XV, set out supra, at 37, n. 7). As earlier indicated, however, see supra, at 37­38 and 46, the Third Circuit drew from the compact expense coverage provision far more than the text of that provision warrants. * * * A discrete entity created by constitutional compact among three sovereigns, the Port Authority is financially self- sufficient; it generates its own revenues, and it pays its own debts. Requiring the Port Authority to answer in federal court to injured railroad workers who assert a federal statu- tory right, under the FELA, to recover damages does not touch the concerns-the States' solvency and dignity-that underpin the Eleventh Amendment. The judgment of the 513us1$$5P 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 53 Stevens, J., concurring Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the Hess and Walsh cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, concurring. Justice Ginsburg's thorough opinion demonstrates why the Court's answer to the open question this case presents is entirely faithful to precedent. I join her opinion without reservation, but believe it appropriate to identify an addi- tional consideration that has motivated my vote. Most of this Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is the product of judge-made law unsupported by the text of the Constitution. The Amendment provides as follows: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com- menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." As Justice Brennan explained in his dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 259­302 (1985), this language, when read in light of the historical evidence, is properly understood to mean that the grant of diversity ju- risdiction found in Article III, § 2, does not extend to actions brought by individuals against States. See also Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 509­516 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Yet since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as injecting broad notions of sover- eign immunity into the whole corpus of federal jurisdiction. The Court's decisions have given us "two Eleventh Amend- ments," one narrow and textual and the other-not truly a constitutional doctrine at all-based on prudential considera- tions of comity and federalism. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 23­29 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). 513us1$$5I 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT 54 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION Stevens, J., concurring This Court's expansive Eleventh Amendment jurispru- dence is not merely misguided as a matter of constitutional law; it is also an engine of injustice. The doctrine of sover- eign immunity has long been the subject of scholarly criti- cism.1 And rightly so, for throughout the doctrine's history, it has clashed with the just principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong. See, e. g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). Sovereign immunity inevitably places a lesser value on administering justice to the individ- ual than on giving government a license to act arbitrarily. Arising as it did from the peculiarities of political life in feudal England, 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of Eng- lish Law 515­518 (2d ed. 1909), sovereign immunity is a doc- trine better suited to a divinely ordained monarchy than to our democracy.2 Chief Justice John Jay recognized as much over two centuries ago. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471­472 (1793). Despite the doctrine's genesis in judi- cial decisions, ironically it has usually been the Legislature that has seen fit to curtail its reach. See Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administra- tive Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 867, 867­868 (1970). In my view, when confronted with the question whether a judge-made doctrine of this character should be extended or contained, it is entirely appropriate for a court to give 1 See, e. g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1 (1924); Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 383 (1970). The criticism has not abated in recent years, but rather has focused on this Court's adherence to an unjustifiably broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e. g., Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L. J. 1 (1988); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987). 2 Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 1124­1125 (1993). 513us1$$5I 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 55 O'Connor, J., dissenting controlling weight to the Founders' purpose to "establish Justice." 3 Today's decision is faithful to that purpose. Justice O'Connor, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. The Court's opinion, as I read it, makes two different points. First, an interstate compact entity is presumptively not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, because the States surrendered any such entitlement "[a]s part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution." Ante, at 41. When States act in concert under the Inter- state Compact Clause, they cede power to each other and to the Federal Government, which, by consenting to the state compact, becomes one of the compact entity's creators. As such, each individual State lacks meaningful control over the entity, and suits against the entity in federal court pose no affront to a State's "dignity." Ibid. Second, in place of the various factors recognized in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979), for determining arm-of-the-state status, we may now substitute a single overriding criterion, vulnerability of the state treas- ury. If a State does not fund judgments against an entity, that entity is not within the ambit of the Eleventh Amend- ment, and suits in federal court may proceed unimpeded. By the Court's reckoning, the state treasury is not impli- cated on these facts. Neither, it follows, is the Eleventh Amendment. I disagree with both of these propositions and with the ultimate conclusion the Court draws from them. The Elev- enth Amendment, in my view, clothes this interstate entity with immunity from suit in federal courts. 3 "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." U. S. Const. Preamble. 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT 56 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting I Despite several invitations, this Court has not as yet had occasion to find an interstate entity shielded by the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U. S. 299 (1990) (assum- ing Eleventh Amendment applies, but finding waiver); Lake Country, supra (finding no reason to believe entity was arm of the State); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U. S. 275 (1959) (same as Feeney). As I read its opinion, the Court now builds upon language in Lake Country to cre- ate what looks very much like a per se rule that the Eleventh Amendment never applies when States act in concert. To be sure, the Court leaves open the possibility that in certain undefined situations, we might find " `good reason' " to confer immunity where States structure an entity to enjoy immu- nity and we see evidence that " `Congress concurred in that purpose.' " Ante, at 43­44, quoting Lake Country, supra, at 401. But the crux of the Court's analysis rests on its ap- parent belief that the States ceded their sovereignty in the interstate compact context in the plan of the convention. See ante, at 41­42 ("As part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution, the States agreed to the power shar- ing, coordination, and unified action that typify Compact Clause creations"). Such broad reasoning brooks few, if any, exceptions. In reaching its conclusion, the Court attaches undue significance to the requirement that Congress consent to interstate compacts. Admittedly, the consent requirement performs an important function in our federal scheme. In Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433 (1981), we observed that " `the requirement that Congress approve a compact is to obtain its political judgment: Is the agreement likely to in- terfere with federal activity in the area, is it likely to disad- vantage other States to an important extent, is it a matter that would better be left untouched by state and federal regulation?' " Id., at 440, n. 8, quoting United States Steel 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 57 O'Connor, J., dissenting Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U. S. 452, 485 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). But the consent clause neither transforms the nature of state power nor makes Congress a full-fledged participant in the underlying agreement; it re- quires only that Congress "check any infringement of the rights of the national government." J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1403, p. 264 (T. Cooley ed. 1873). In consenting, Congress certifies that the States are acting within their boundaries in our federal scheme and that the national interest is not offended. Once Congress consents to cooperative state activity, there is no reason to presume that immunity does not attach. Sover- eign immunity, after all, inheres in the permissible exercise of state power. "If congress consent[s], then the states [are] in this respect restored to their original inherent sover- eignty; such consent being the sole limitation imposed by the constitution, when given, [leaves] the states as they were before . . . ." Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 725 (1838); see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6­33, p. 523 (2d ed. 1988). Even if the Court were correct that the States ceded a portion of their power to Congress in ratifying the consent provision, it would not logically or inevitably follow that any particular entity receives no immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 455­ 456 (1976), we held that the States surrendered a portion of their sovereign authority to Congress in ratifying § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite this, we have consistently required " `an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States' " before allowing suits against States to pro- ceed in federal court. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan- lon, 473 U. S. 234, 240 (1985), quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 99 (1984). Assuming, arguendo, that States ceded power to Congress to abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT 58 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting interstate compact realm, our precedents caution that we should be reluctant to infer abrogation in the absence of clear signals from Congress that such a result was, in fact, in- tended. At the least, I would presume the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to interstate entities unless Con- gress clearly and expressly indicates otherwise. The Court ignores these abrogation cases, however, in favor of exactly the opposite presumption. By the Court's reckoning, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable unless we have "good reason" to believe that Congress affirmatively concurs in a finding of immunity. In other words, the base- line is no immunity, even if the State has structured the en- tity in the expectation that immunity will inhere. If, how- ever, Congress manifests a contrary intent, the Eleventh Amendment shields an interstate entity from suit in federal court. Congress, therefore, effectively may dictate the ap- plicability of the Eleventh Amendment in this context. The notion that Congress possesses this power, an extension of dictum in Lake Country, 440 U. S., at 401, has little basis in our precedents. Congress may indeed be able to confer on the States what in fact looks a lot like Eleventh Amendment immunity; but we have never held that Eleventh Amend- ment immunity itself attaches at the whim of Congress. The Court shores up its analysis by observing that each State lacks meaningful power to control an interstate entity. As an initial matter, one wonders how important this insight actually is to the Court's conclusion, given that the opinion elsewhere disclaims reliance on a control inquiry. Ante, at 47­48. In any event, that we may sometimes, or even often, in the application of arm-of-the-state analysis, find too atten- uated a basis for immunity does not mean we should presume such immunity altogether lacking in this context. Two sov- ereign States acting together may, in most situations, be as deserving of immunity as either State acting apart. I see no reason to vary the analysis for interstate and intrastate entities. 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 59 O'Connor, J., dissenting II The Court wisely recognizes that the six-factor test set forth in Lake Country, supra, ostensibly a balancing scheme, provides meager guidance for lower courts when the factors point in different directions. Without any indication from this Court as to the weight to ascribe particular criteria, the Courts of Appeals have struggled, variously adding factors, see Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F. 2d 1, 9 (CA1 1990) (considering seven factors), dis- tilling factors, see Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F. 2d 775, 777 (CA7 1991) (considering four factors), and deeming certain factors dispositive, compare Brown v. East Central Health Dist., 752 F. 2d 615, 617­618 (CA11 1985) (finding state treasury factor determinative), with Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Af- fairs, Inc., 734 F. 2d 730, 732 (CA11 1984) (suggesting that state courts' characterization of entity is most important cri- terion). See generally Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (1992) (summarizing diffuse responses). In light of this confusion, the Court's effort to focus the Lake Country analysis on a single overarching principle is admirable. But its conclusion that the vulnerability of the state treasury is determinative has support neither in our precedents nor in the literal terms of the Eleventh Amend- ment. The Court takes a sufficient condition for Eleventh Amendment immunity, and erroneously transforms it into a necessary condition. In so doing, the Court seriously re- duces the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, thus underpro- tecting the state sovereignty at which the Eleventh Amend- ment is principally directed. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 146 (1993) ("The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity"); Atascadero 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT 60 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 238 ("[T]he significance of this Amendment `lies in its affirmation that the fundamen- tal principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judi- cial authority in Art. III' of the Constitution") (citation omitted). The Court's assertion that the driving concern of the Elev- enth Amendment is protection of state treasuries, see ante, at 48­49, is belied by the text of the Amendment itself. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over "any suit in law or equity" against the States. As we recognized in Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85, 91 (1982), the Eleventh Amendment "by its terms" clearly extends beyond actions seeking money damages. "It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought." Id., at 90. While it may be clear that Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), a money damages action, gave initial impetus to the effort to amend the Constitution, it is equally clear that the product of that effort, the Eleventh Amendment itself, extends far beyond the Chisholm facts. Recognizing this, we have long held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States and state entities re- gardless of the nature of relief requested. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., supra, at 145­146; Cory, supra, at 90­91; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781, 782 (1978). The Court is entirely right, however, to suggest that the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity over entities whose liabilities are funded by state taxpayer dollars. If a State were vulnerable at any time to retroactive damages awards in federal court, its ability to set its own agenda, to control its own internal machinery, and to plan for the future-all essential perquisites of sovereignty-would be grievously impaired. I have no quarrel at all with the many cases cited by the Court for the proposition that if an entity's bills will be footed by the State, the Eleventh Amendment clearly pre- 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 61 O'Connor, J., dissenting cludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F. 3d 996, 999 (CA6 1993) (liability of university tantamount to claim against state treasury); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 888 F. 2d 940, 943­944 (CA1 1989) (70­75% of funds provided by taxpayer dollars). But the converse cannot also be true. The Eleventh Amendment does not turn a blind eye simply because the state treasury is not directly implicated. In my view, the proper question is whether the State possesses sufficient control over an entity performing governmental functions that the entity may properly be called an extension of the State itself. Such control can exist even where the State assumes no liability for the entity's debts. We have always respected state flexibility in setting up and maintaining agencies charged with furthering state objectives. See, e. g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 612 (1937) ("How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a ques- tion for the state itself"). An emphasis on control, rather than impact on the state treasury, adequately protects state managerial prerogatives while retaining a crucial check against abuse. So long as a State's citizens may, if suffi- ciently aggravated, vote out an errant government, Eleventh Amendment immunity remains a highly beneficial provision of breathing space and vindication of state sovereignty. An arm of the State, to my mind, is an entity that under- takes state functions and is politically accountable to the State, and by extension, to the electorate. The critical in- quiry, then, should be whether and to what extent the elected state government exercises oversight over the entity. If the lines of oversight are clear and substantial-for exam- ple, if the State appoints and removes an entity's governing personnel and retains veto or approval power over an enti- ty's undertakings-then the entity should be deemed an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. This test is sufficiently elastic to encompass the Court's treasury fac- 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT 62 HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting tor. It will be a rare case indeed where the state treasury foots the bill for an entity's wrongs but fails to exercise a healthy degree of oversight over that entity. But the con- trol test goes further than the Court's single factor in as- suring state governments the critical flexibility in internal governance that is essential to sovereign authority. See Note, 92 Colum. L. Rev., at 1246­1252 (describing structural innovations among state governments). The Court dismisses consideration of control altogether, ante, at 47­48, noting that States wield ultimate power over cities and counties, units that have never been accorded Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890). This criticism, based on a supposed line-drawing problem, is off the mark. That "po- litical subdivisions exist solely at the whim and behest of their State," Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U. S., at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring), does not mean that state governments actually exercise sufficient oversight to trigger Eleventh Amendment immunity under a control- centered formulation. The inquiry should turn on real, im- mediate control and oversight, rather than on the potential- ity of a State taking action to seize the reins. Virtually every enterprise, municipal or private, flourishes in some sense at the behest of the State. But we have never found the Eleventh Amendment's protections to hinge on this sort of abstraction. The control-centered formulation necessar- ily looks to the structure and function of state law. If the State delegates control and oversight of an entity to munici- palities under state law, the requisite state-level control is lacking, and the Eleventh Amendment does not shield the entity from suit in federal court. III Turning to the instant case, I believe that sufficient indicia of control exist to support a finding of immunity for the Port Authority, and hence, for the PATH. New Jersey and New 513us1$$5J 03-28-98 15:59:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 30 (1994) 63 O'Connor, J., dissenting York each select and may remove 6 of the Port Authority's 12 commissioners. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­5 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6405 (McKinney 1979). The Gover- nors of each State may veto the actions of that State's com- missioners. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­17 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6417 (McKinney 1979). The quorum re- quirements specify that "no action of the port authority shall be binding unless taken at a meeting at which at least three of the members from each state are present, and unless a majority of the members from each state present at such meeting but in any event at least three of the members from each state shall vote in favor thereof." N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­17 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6417 (McKinney 1979). Accordingly, each Governor's veto power is tanta- mount to a full veto power over the actions of the Commis- sion. The Port Authority must make annual reports to the state legislatures, which in turn must approve changes in the Port Authority's rules and any new projects. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1­8 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6408 (Mc- Kinney 1979). Each State, and by extension, each State's electorate, exercises ample authority over the Port Author- ity. Without setting forth a shopping list of considerations that govern the control inquiry, suffice it to say that in this case, the whole is exactly the sum of its parts. I would hold that the Eleventh Amendment shields the PATH and Port Authority from suits in federal court. I respectfully dissent. 513us1$$6z 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 64 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 93­723. Argued October 5, 1994-Decided November 29, 1994 Respondents were convicted under the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which prohibits "knowingly" transport- ing, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing a visual depiction, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and (2), if such depiction "involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," §§ 2252(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A). In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that § 2252 was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it did not require a showing that the defendant knew that one of the performers was a minor. Held: Because the term "knowingly" in §§ 2252(1) and (2) modifies the phrase "the use of a minor" in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), the Act is properly read to include a scienter requirement for age of minority. This Court rejects the most natural grammatical reading, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, under which "knowingly" modifies only the relevant verbs in subsections (1) and (2), and does not extend to the elements of the minority of the performers, or the sexually explicit nature of the material, because they are set forth in independent clauses separated by interruptive punctuation. Some applications of that reading would sweep within the statute's ambit actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material, an anomalous result that the Court will not assume Congress to have intended. Moreover, Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 271, reinforced by Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619, instructs that the standard presump- tion in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statu- tory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, and the mi- nority status of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct under § 2252. The legislative history, although unclear as to whether Congress intended "knowingly" to ex- tend to performer age, persuasively indicates that the word applies to the sexually explicit conduct depicted, and thereby demonstrates that "knowingly" is emancipated from merely modifying the verbs in subsec- tions (1) and (2). As a matter of grammar, it is difficult to conclude that the word modifies one of the elements in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), but not the other. This interpretation is supported by the canon that a 513us1$$6z 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 65 Opinion of the Court statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions. Pp. 67­79. 982 F. 2d 1285, reversed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 79. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 80. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mal- colm L. Stewart, and Joel M. Gershowitz. Stanley Fleishman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Barry A. Fisher and David Grosz.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, as amended, prohibits the interstate transpor- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jimmy Evans of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Robert Marks of Hawaii, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Pedro R. Pierlu- isi of Puerto Rico, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Rosalle Simmonds Ballentine of the Virgin Islands, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the Na- tional Family Legal Foundation by Len L. Munsil; and for the National Law Center for Children and Families et al. by H. Robert Showers and Cathleen A. Cleaver. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Booksellers Founda- tion for Free Expression et al. by Michael A. Bamberger and Margaret S. Determan; for the Law and Linguistics Consortium by Clark D. Cunning- ham; for Morality in Media, Inc., by Paul J. McGeady; and for PHE, Inc., by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and John B. Morris, Jr. 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 66 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court tation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U. S. C. § 2252. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of respondents for violation of this Act. It held that the Act did not require that the defendant know that one of the performers was a minor, and that it was therefore facially unconstitutional. We conclude that the Act is properly read to include such a requirement. Rubin Gottesman owned and operated X-Citement Video, Inc. Undercover police posed as pornography retailers and targeted X-Citement Video for investigation. During the course of the sting operation, the media exposed Traci Lords for her roles in pornographic films while under the age of 18. Police Officer Steven Takeshita expressed an interest in obtaining Traci Lords tapes. Gottesman complied, selling Takeshita 49 videotapes featuring Lords before her 18th birthday. Two months later, Gottesman shipped eight tapes of the underage Traci Lords to Takeshita in Hawaii. These two transactions formed the basis for a federal in- dictment under the child pornography statute. The indict- ment charged respondents with one count each of violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and (a)(2), along with one count of conspiracy to do the same under 18 U. S. C. § 371.1 Evidence at trial suggested that Gottesman had full awareness of Lords' underage performances. United States v. Gottes- man, No. CR 88­295KN, Findings of Fact ¶ 7 (CD Cal., Sept. 20, 1989), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a ("Defendants knew that Traci Lords was underage when she made the films defend- ant's [sic] transported or shipped in interstate commerce"). The District Court convicted respondents of all three counts. On appeal, Gottesman argued, inter alia, that the Act was facially unconstitutional because it lacked a necessary scien- 1 The indictment also charged six counts of violating federal obscenity statutes and two racketeering counts involving the same. Respondents were acquitted of these charges. 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 67 Opinion of the Court ter requirement and was unconstitutional as applied because the tapes at issue were not child pornography. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the District Court for reconsideration in light of United States v. Thomas, 893 F. 2d 1066 (CA9), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 826 (1990). In that case, the Ninth Circuit had held § 2252 did not contain a scienter require- ment, but had not reached the constitutional questions. On remand, the District Court refused to set aside the judgment of conviction. On appeal for the second time, Gottesman reiterated his constitutional arguments. This time, the court reached the merits of his claims and, by a divided vote, found § 2252 fa- cially unconstitutional. The court first held that 18 U. S. C. § 2256 met constitutional standards in setting the age of majority at age 18, substituting lascivious for lewd, and prohibiting actual or simulated bestiality and sadistic or masochistic abuse. 982 F. 2d 1285, 1288­1289 (CA9 1992). It then discussed § 2252, noting it was bound by its conclusion in Thomas to construe the Act as lacking a scienter require- ment for the age of minority. The court concluded that case law from this Court required that the defendant must have knowledge at least of the nature and character of the ma- terials. 982 F. 2d, at 1290, citing Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982); and Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974). The court extended these cases to hold that the First Amendment re- quires that the defendant possess knowledge of the par- ticular fact that one performer had not reached the age of majority at the time the visual depiction was produced. 982 F. 2d, at 1291. Because the court found the statute did not require such a showing, it reversed respondents' convictions. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1163 (1994), and now reverse. Title 18 U. S. C. § 2252 (1988 ed. and Supp. V) provides, in relevant part: 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 68 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court "(a) Any person who- "(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if- "(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con- duct; and "(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; "(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual de- piction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribu- tion in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if- "(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con- duct; and "(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; . . . . . "shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section." The critical determination which we must make is whether the term "knowingly" in subsections (1) and (2) modifies the phrase "the use of a minor" in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A). The most natural grammatical reading, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, suggests that the term "knowingly" modifies only the surrounding verbs: transports, ships, receives, distrib- utes, or reproduces. Under this construction, the word "knowingly" would not modify the elements of the minority of the performers, or the sexually explicit nature of the ma- terial, because they are set forth in independent clauses sep- arated by interruptive punctuation. But we do not think this is the end of the matter, both because of anomalies which 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 69 Opinion of the Court result from this construction, and because of the respective presumptions that some form of scienter is to be implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed, and that a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid sub- stantial constitutional questions. If the term "knowingly" applies only to the relevant verbs in § 2252-transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, and reproducing-we would have to conclude that Congress wished to distinguish between someone who knowingly transported a particular package of film whose contents were unknown to him, and someone who unknowingly transported that package. It would seem odd, to say the least, that Con- gress distinguished between someone who inadvertently dropped an item into the mail without realizing it, and some- one who consciously placed the same item in the mail, but was nonetheless unconcerned about whether the person had any knowledge of the prohibited contents of the package. Some applications of respondents' position would produce results that were not merely odd, but positively absurd. If we were to conclude that "knowingly" only modifies the rele- vant verbs in § 2252, we would sweep within the ambit of the statute actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material. For instance, a retail drug- gist who returns an uninspected roll of developed film to a customer "knowingly distributes" a visual depiction and would be criminally liable if it were later discovered that the visual depiction contained images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Or, a new resident of an apart- ment might receive mail for the prior resident and store the mail unopened. If the prior tenant had requested delivery of materials covered by § 2252, his residential successor could be prosecuted for "knowing receipt" of such materials. Sim- ilarly, a Federal Express courier who delivers a box in which the shipper has declared the contents to be "film" "know- ingly transports" such film. We do not assume that Con- gress, in passing laws, intended such results. Public Citi- 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 70 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court zen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 453­455 (1989); United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981). Our reluctance to simply follow the most grammatical reading of the statute is heightened by our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter re- quirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them. The landmark opinion in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952), discussed the common- law history of mens rea as applied to the elements of the federal embezzlement statute. That statute read: "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States . . . [s]hall be fined." 18 U. S. C. § 641, cited in Morissette, 342 U. S., at 248, n. 2. Perhaps even more obviously than in the statute presently before us, the word "knowingly" in its isolated position suggested that it only attached to the verb "converts," and required only that the defendant intentionally assume dominion over the prop- erty. But the Court used the background presumption of evil intent to conclude that the term "knowingly" also re- quired that the defendant have knowledge of the facts that made the taking a conversion-i. e., that the property be- longed to the United States. Id., at 271. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 438 (1978) ("[F]ar more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement"). Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985), posed a challenge to a federal statute prohibiting certain actions with respect to food stamps. The statute's use of "know- ingly" could be read only to modify "uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses" or it could be read also to modify "in any manner not authorized by [the statute]." Noting that neither interpretation posed constitutional problems, id., at 424, n. 6, the Court held the scienter requirement applied to 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 71 Opinion of the Court both elements by invoking the background principle set forth in Morissette. In addition, the Court was concerned with the broader reading which would "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct." 471 U. S., at 426. Impos- ing criminal liability on an unwitting food stamp recipient who purchased groceries at a store that inflated its prices to such purchasers struck the Court as beyond the intended reach of the statute. The same analysis drove the recent conclusion in Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), that to be criminally liable a defendant must know that his weapon possessed au- tomatic firing capability so as to make it a machinegun as defined by the National Firearms Act. Congress had not expressly imposed any mens rea requirement in the provi- sion criminalizing the possession of a firearm in the absence of proper registration. 26 U. S. C. § 5861(d). The Court first rejected the argument that the statute described a pub- lic welfare offense, traditionally excepted from the back- ground principle favoring scienter. Morissette, supra, at 255. The Court then expressed concern with a statutory reading that would criminalize behavior that a defendant be- lieved fell within "a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals." Staples, 511 U. S., at 610. The Court also emphasized the harsh penalties attach- ing to violations of the statute as a "significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea." Id., at 616. Applying these principles, we think the Ninth Circuit's plain language reading of § 2252 is not so plain. First, § 2252 is not a public welfare offense. Persons do not harbor set- tled expectations that the contents of magazines and film are generally subject to stringent public regulation. In fact, First Amendment constraints presuppose the opposite view. Rather, the statute is more akin to the common-law offenses against the "state, the person, property, or public morals," Morissette, supra, at 255, that presume a scienter require- 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 72 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court ment in the absence of express contrary intent.2 Second, Staples' concern with harsh penalties looms equally large re- specting § 2252: Violations are punishable by up to 10 years in prison as well as substantial fines and forfeiture. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2252(b), 2253, 2254. See also Morissette, supra, at 260. Morissette, reinforced by Staples, instructs that the pre- sumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise in- nocent conduct. Staples held that the features of a gun as technically described by the firearm registration Act was such an element. Its holding rested upon "the nature of the particular device or substance Congress has subjected to regulation and the expectations that individuals may legiti- mately have in dealing with the regulated items." Staples, supra, at 619. Age of minority in § 2252 indisputably pos- sesses the same status as an elemental fact because nonob- scene, sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of 17 are protected by the First Amendment. Alexan- der v. United States, 509 U. S. 544, 549­550 (1993); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 224 (1990); Smith v. California, 361 U. S., at 152.3 In the light of these 2 Morissette's treatment of the common-law presumption of mens rea recognized that the presumption expressly excepted "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defend- ant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent." 342 U. S., at 251, n. 8. But as in the criminalization of pornography produc- tion at 18 U. S. C. § 2251, see infra, at 76, n. 5, the perpetrator confronts the underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascer- tain that victim's age. The opportunity for reasonable mistake as to age increases significantly once the victim is reduced to a visual depiction, unavailable for questioning by the distributor or receiver. Thus we do not think the common-law treatment of sex offenses militates against our construction of the present statute. 3 In this regard, age of minority is not a "jurisdictional fact" that en- hances an offense otherwise committed with an evil intent. See, e. g., United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671 (1975). There, the Court did not 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 73 Opinion of the Court decisions, one would reasonably expect to be free from regu- lation when trafficking in sexually explicit, though not ob- scene, materials involving adults. Therefore, the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct. The legislative history of the statute evolved over a period of years, and perhaps for that reason speaks somewhat indis- tinctly to the question whether "knowingly" in the statute modifies the elements of subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A)-that the visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct-or merely the verbs "transport or ship" in subsection (1) and "receive or distribute . . . [or] reproduce" in subsection (2). In 1959, we held in Smith v. California, supra, that a California statute that dispensed with any mens rea requirement as to the contents of an ob- scene book would violate the First Amendment. Id., at 154. When Congress began dealing with child pornography in 1977, the content of the legislative debates suggest that it was aware of this decision. See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 30935 (1977) ("It is intended that they have knowledge of the type of material . . . proscribed by this bill. The legislative his- tory should be clear on that so as to remove any chance it will lead into constitutional problems"). Even if that were not the case, we do not impute to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as con- strued by this Court. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 319 (1957) ("In [construing the statute] we should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked"). When first passed, § 2252 pun- require knowledge of "jurisdictional facts"-that the target of an assault was a federal officer. Criminal intent serves to separate those who under- stand the wrongful nature of their act from those who do not, but does not require knowledge of the precise consequences that may flow from that act once aware that the act is wrongful. Id., at 685. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 120 (1974) (knowledge that the materials at issue are legally obscene not required). 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 74 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court ished one who "knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, for the purpose of sale or dis- tribution for sale, any obscene visual or print medium" if it involved the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit con- duct. Pub. L. 95­225, 92 Stat. 7 (emphasis added). Assum- ing awareness of Smith, at a minimum, "knowingly" was in- tended to modify "obscene" in the 1978 version. In 1984, Congress amended the statute to its current form, broadening its application to those sexually explicit materi- als that, while not obscene as defined by Miller v. Califor- nia, 413 U. S. 15 (1973),4 could be restricted without violating the First Amendment as explained by New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982). When Congress eliminated the adjec- tive "obscene," all of the elements defining the character and content of the materials at issue were relegated to subsec- tions (1)(a) and (2)(a). In this effort to expand the child por- nography statute to its full constitutional limits, Congress nowhere expressed an intent to eliminate the mens rea re- quirement that had previously attached to the character and content of the material through the word obscene. The Committee Reports and legislative debate speak more opaquely as to the desire of Congress for a scienter require- ment with respect to the age of minority. An early form of the proposed legislation, S. 2011, was rejected principally because it failed to distinguish between obscene and non- obscene materials. S. Rep. No. 95­438, p. 12 (1977). In evaluating the proposal, the Justice Department offered its thoughts: "[T]he word `knowingly' in the second line of section 2251 is unnecessary and should be stricken. . . . Unless `knowingly' is deleted here, the bill might be subject to an interpretation requiring the Government to prove 4 The Miller test for obscenity asks whether the work, taken as a whole, "appeals to the prurient interest," "depicts or describes [sexual conduct] in a patently offensive way," and "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413 U. S., at 24. 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 75 Opinion of the Court the defendant's knowledge of everything that follows `knowingly', including the age of the child. We assume that it is not the intention of the drafters to require the Government to prove that the defendant knew the child was under age sixteen but merely to prove that the child was, in fact, less than age sixteen. . . . "On the other hand, the use of the word `knowingly' in subsection 2252(a)(1) is appropriate to make it clear that the bill does not apply to common carriers or other innocent transporters who have no knowledge of the na- ture or character of the material they are transporting. To clarify the situation, the legislative history might re- flect that the defendant's knowledge of the age of the child is not an element of the offense but that the bill is not intended to apply to innocent transportation with no knowledge of the nature or character of the material involved." Id., at 28­29. Respondents point to this language as an unambiguous reve- lation that Congress omitted a scienter requirement. But the bill eventually reported by the Senate Judiciary Commit- tee adopted some, but not all, of the Department's sugges- tions; most notably, it restricted the prohibition in § 2251 to obscene materials. Id., at 2. The Committee did not make any clarification with respect to scienter as to the age of minority. In fact, the version reported by the Committee eliminated § 2252 altogether. Ibid. At that juncture, Sena- tor Roth introduced an amendment which would be another precursor of § 2252. In one paragraph, the amendment for- bade any person to "knowingly transport [or] ship . . . [any] visual medium depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct." 123 Cong. Rec. 33047 (1977). In an exchange during debate, Senator Percy inquired: "Would this not mean that the distributor or seller must have either, first, actual knowledge that the materials do contain child pornographic depictions or, second, cir- 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 76 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court cumstances must be such that he should have had such actual knowledge, and that mere inadvertence or negli- gence would not alone be enough to render his actions unlawful?" Id., at 33050. Senator Roth replied: "That is absolutely correct. This amendment, limited as it is by the phrase `knowingly,' insures that only those sellers and distributors who are consciously and deliber- ately engaged in the marketing of child pornography . . . are subject to prosecution . . . ." Ibid. The parallel House bill did not contain a comparable provi- sion to § 2252 of the Senate bill, and limited § 2251 prosecu- tions to obscene materials. The Conference Committee adopted the substance of the Roth amendment in large part, but followed the House version by restricting the proscribed depictions to obscene ones. The new bill did restructure the § 2252 provision somewhat, setting off the age of minority requirement in a separate subclause. S. Conf. Rep. No. 95­ 601, p. 2 (1977). Most importantly, the new bill retained the adverb "knowingly" in § 2252 while simultaneously deleting the word "knowingly" from § 2251(a). The Conference Com- mittee explained the deletion in § 2251(a) as reflecting an "in- tent that it is not a necessary element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the actual age of the child." Id., at 5.5 Respondents point to the appearance of "knowingly" in 5 The difference in congressional intent with respect to § 2251 versus § 2252 reflects the reality that producers are more conveniently able to ascertain the age of performers. It thus makes sense to impose the risk of error on producers. United States v. United States District Court for Central District of California, 858 F. 2d 534, 543, n. 6 (CA9 1988). Al- though producers may be convicted under § 2251(a) without proof they had knowledge of age, Congress has independently required both primary and secondary producers to record the ages of performers with independent penalties for failure to comply. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2257(a) and (i) (1988 ed. and Supp. V); American Library Assn. v. Reno, 33 F. 3d 78 (CADC 1994). 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 77 Opinion of the Court § 2251(c) and argue that § 2252 ought to be read like § 2251. But this argument depends on the conclusion that § 2252(c) does not include a knowing requirement, a premise that re- spondents fail to support. Respondents offer in support of their premise only the legislative history discussing an intent to exclude a scienter requirement from § 2251(a). Because §§ 2251(a) and 2251(c) were passed at different times and con- tain different wording, the intent to exclude scienter from § 2251(a) does not imply an intent to exclude scienter from § 2251(c).6 The legislative history can be summarized by saying that it persuasively indicates that Congress intended that the term "knowingly" apply to the requirement that the depic- tion be of sexually explicit conduct; it is a good deal less clear from the Committee Reports and floor debates that Congress intended that the requirement extend also to the age of the performers. But, turning once again to the statute itself, if the term "knowingly" applies to the sexually explicit conduct depicted, it is emancipated from merely modifying the verbs in subsections (1) and (2). And as a matter of grammar it is 6 Congress amended § 2251 to insert subsection (c) in 1986. Pub. L. 99­ 628, 100 Stat. 3510. That provision created new offenses relating to the advertising of the availability of child pornography or soliciting children to participate in such depictions. The legislative history of § 2251(c) does address the scienter requirement: "The government must prove that the defendant knew the character of the visual depictions as depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, but need not prove that the defend- ant actually knew the person depicted was in fact under 18 years of age or that the depictions violated Federal law." H. R. Rep. No. 99­910, p. 6 (1986). It may be argued that since the House Committee Report rejects any requirement of scienter as to the age of minority for § 2251(c), the House Committee thought that there was no such requirement in § 2252. But the views of one Congress as to the meaning of an Act passed by an earlier Congress are not ordinarily of great weight, United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 33, n. 9 (1980), citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 170 (1968), and the views of the committee of one House of another Congress are of even less weight, Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 566 (1988). 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 78 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Opinion of the Court difficult to conclude that the word "knowingly" modifies one of the elements in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), but not the other. A final canon of statutory construction supports the read- ing that the term "knowingly" applies to both elements. Cases such as Ferber, 458 U. S., at 765 ("As with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant"); Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974); and Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 115 (1990), suggest that a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts. It is therefore incum- bent upon us to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the term "knowingly" in § 2252 extends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the performers. As an alternative grounds for upholding the reversal of their convictions, respondents reiterate their constitutional challenge to 18 U. S. C. § 2256. These claims were not en- compassed in the question on which this Court granted cer- tiorari, but a prevailing party, without cross-petitioning, is "entitled under our precedents to urge any grounds which would lend support to the judgment below." Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977). Respondents argue that § 2256 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it makes the age of majority 18, rather than 16 as did the New York statute upheld in New York v. Ferber, supra, and because Congress replaced the term "lewd" with the term "lascivious" in defining illegal exhibition of the gen- itals of children. We regard these claims as insubstantial, 513us1$$6H 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 79 Stevens, J., concurring and reject them for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case. Respondents also argued below that their indictment was fatally defective because it did not contain a scienter require- ment on the age of minority. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue because of its determination that § 2252 was unconstitutional on its face, and we decline to decide it here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Stevens, concurring. In my opinion, the normal, commonsense reading of a subsection of a criminal statute introduced by the word "knowingly" is to treat that adverb as modifying each of the elements of the offense identified in the remainder of the subsection. Title 18 U. S. C. § 2252(a)(1) (1988 ed. and Supp. V) reads as follows: "(a) Any person who- "(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if- "(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con- duct; and "(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct." (Em- phasis added.) Surely reading this provision to require proof of scienter for each fact that must be proved is far more reasonable than adding such a requirement to a statutory offense that con- tains no scienter requirement whatsoever. Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 624 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissent- ing). Indeed, as the Court demonstrates, ante, at 69­70, to give the statute its most grammatically correct reading, and merely require knowledge that a "visual depiction" has been 513us1$$6I 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 80 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Scalia, J., dissenting shipped in interstate commerce, would be ridiculous. Ac- cordingly, I join the Court's opinion without qualification. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. Today's opinion is without antecedent. None of the deci- sions cited as authority support interpreting an explicit stat- utory scienter requirement in a manner that its language simply will not bear. Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), discussed ante, at 71, and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (1978), discussed ante, at 70, applied the background common-law rule of scienter to a statute that said nothing about the matter. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952), discussed ante, at 70, applied that same background rule to a statute that did con- tain the word "knowingly," in order to conclude that "know- ingly converts" requires knowledge not merely of the fact of one's assertion of dominion over property, but also knowl- edge of the fact that that assertion is a conversion, i. e., is wrongful.* Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985), discussed ante, at 70, again involved a statute that did con- tain the word " `knowingly,' " used in such a fashion that it could reasonably and grammatically be thought to apply (1) only to the phrase " `uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or pos- sesses' " (which would cause a defendant to be liable without wrongful intent), or (2) also to the later phrase " `in any man- ner not authorized by [the statute].' " Once again applying the background rule of scienter, the latter reasonable and permissible reading was preferred. There is no way in which any of these cases, or all of them in combination, can be read to stand for the sweeping propo- *The case did not involve, as the Court claims, a situation in which, "even more obviously than in the statute presently before us, the word `knowingly' in its isolated position suggested that it only attached to the verb `converts,' " ante, at 70, and we nonetheless applied it as well to an- other word. The issue was simply the meaning of "knowingly converts." 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 81 Scalia, J., dissenting sition that "the presumption in favor of a scienter require- ment should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct," ante, at 72, even when the plain text of the statute says otherwise. All those earlier cases employ the presumption as a rule of interpreta- tion which applies when Congress has not addressed the question of criminal intent (Staples and Gypsum), or when the import of what it has said on that subject is ambiguous (Morissette and Liparota). Today's opinion converts the rule of interpretation into a rule of law, contradicting the plain import of what Congress has specifically prescribed regarding criminal intent. In United States v. Thomas, 893 F. 2d 1066, 1070 (CA9), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 826 (1990), the Ninth Circuit inter- preted 18 U. S. C. § 2252 to require knowledge of neither the fact that the visual depiction portrays sexually explicit con- duct, nor the fact that a participant in that conduct was a minor. The panel in the present case accepted that inter- pretation. See 982 F. 2d 1285, 1289 (CA9 1992). To say, as the Court does, that this interpretation is "the most gram- matical reading," ante, at 70, or "[t]he most natural grammat- ical reading," ante, at 68, is understatement to the point of distortion-rather like saying that the ordinarily preferred total for two plus two is four. The Ninth Circuit's interpre- tation is in fact and quite obviously the only grammatical reading. If one were to rack his brains for a way to express the thought that the knowledge requirement in subsection (a)(1) applied only to the transportation or shipment of vis- ual depiction in interstate or foreign commerce, and not to the fact that that depiction was produced by use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and was a depiction of that conduct, it would be impossible to construct a sentence structure that more clearly conveys that thought, and that thought alone. The word "knowingly" is contained, not merely in a distant phrase, but in an entirely separate clause from the one into which today's opinion inserts it. The 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 82 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Scalia, J., dissenting equivalent, in expressing a simpler thought, would be the following: "Anyone who knowingly double-parks will be sub- ject to a $200 fine if that conduct occurs during the 4:30- to-6:30 rush hour." It could not be clearer that the scienter requirement applies only to the double-parking, and not to the time of day. So also here, it could not be clearer that it applies only to the transportation or shipment of visual depiction in interstate or foreign commerce. There is no doubt. There is no ambiguity. There is no possible "less natural" but nonetheless permissible reading. I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to ac- knowledge a doctrine of "scrivener's error" that permits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result. See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Even if I were willing to stretch that doctrine so as to give the problematic text a meaning it cannot possibly bear; and even if I were willing to extend the doctrine to criminal cases in which its application would produce conviction rather than acquittal; it would still have no proper bearing here. For the sine qua non of any "scriv- ener's error" doctrine, it seems to me, is that the meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be ab- solutely clear; otherwise we might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake. That condition is not met here. The Court acknowledges that "it is a good deal less clear from the Committee Reports and floor debates that Congress intended that the requirement [of scienter] extend . . . to the age of the performers." Ante, at 77. That is surely so. In fact, it seems to me that the dominant (if not entirely uncon- tradicted) view expressed in the legislative history is that set forth in the statement of the Carter Administration Jus- tice Department which introduced the original bill: "[T]he defendant's knowledge of the age of the child is not an ele- 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 83 Scalia, J., dissenting ment of the offense but . . . the bill is not intended to apply to innocent transportation with no knowledge of the nature or character of the material involved." S. Rep. No. 95­438, p. 29 (1977). As applied to the final bill, this would mean that the scienter requirement applies to the element of the crime that the depiction be of "sexually explicit conduct," but not to the element that the depiction "involv[e] the use of a minor engaging" in such conduct. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 2252(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(A). This is the interpretation that was argued by the United States before the Ninth Circuit. See 982 F. 2d, at 1289. The Court rejects this construction of the statute for two reasons: First, because "as a matter of grammar it is difficult to conclude that the word `knowingly' modifies one of the elements in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), but not the other." Ante, at 77­78. But as I have described, "as a matter of grammar" it is also difficult (nay, impossible) to conclude that the word "knowingly" modifies both of those elements. It is really quite extraordinary for the Court, fresh from having, as it says, ibid., "emancipated" the adverb from the gram- matical restriction that renders it inapplicable to the entire conditional clause, suddenly to insist that the demands of syntax must prevail over legislative intent-thus producing an end result that accords neither with syntax nor with sup- posed intent. If what the statute says must be ignored, one would think we might settle at least for what the statute was meant to say; but alas, we are told, what the statute says prevents this. The Court's second reason is even worse: "[A] statute com- pletely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts." Ante, at 78. In my view (as in the apparent view of the Government before the Court of Appeals) that is not true. The Court derives its "serious constitutional doubts" from the fact that "sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of 17 are protected by the First Amendment," 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 84 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Scalia, J., dissenting ante, at 72. We have made it entirely clear, however, that the First Amendment protection accorded to such materials is not as extensive as that accorded to other speech. "[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhi- bition of material that is on the borderline between pornog- raphy and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance . . . ." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 61 (1976). See also id., at 70­71 ("[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is mani- fest that society's interest in protecting this type of expres- sion is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . .") (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and White and Rehn- quist, JJ.). Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 743 (1978) (While some broadcasts of patently offensive ref- erences to excretory and sexual organs and activities may be protected, "they surely lie at the periphery of First Amend- ment concern"). Let us be clear about what sort of pictures are at issue here. They are not the sort that will likely be found in a catalog of the National Gallery or the Metropoli- tan Museum of Art. " `[S]exually explicit conduct,' " as de- fined in the statute, does not include mere nudity, but only conduct that consists of "sexual intercourse . . . between per- sons of the same or opposite sex," "bestiality," "masturba- tion," "sadistic or masochistic abuse," and "lascivious exhibi- tion of the genitals or pubic area." See 18 U. S. C. § 2256(2). What is involved, in other words, is not the clinical, the artis- tic, nor even the risque´, but hard-core pornography. Indeed, I think it entirely clear that all of what is involved consti- tutes not merely pornography but fully proscribable obscen- ity, except to the extent it is joined with some other material (or perhaps some manner of presentation) that has artistic or other social value. See Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973). (Such a requirement cannot be imposed, of 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 85 Scalia, J., dissenting course, upon fully protected speech: one can shout "Down with the Republic!," "Hooray for Mozart!," or even "Twenty-Three Skidoo!," whether or not that expression is joined with something else of social value.) And whereas what is on one side of the balance in the present case is this material of minimal First Amendment concern, the Court has described what is on the other side-"prevention of sex- ual exploitation and abuse of children"-as "a government objective of surpassing importance." New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 757 (1982). I am not concerned that holding the purveyors and receiv- ers of this material absolutely liable for supporting the ex- ploitation of minors will deter any activity the United States Constitution was designed to protect. But I am concerned that the Court's suggestion of the unconstitutionality of such absolute liability will cause Congress to leave the world's children inadequately protected against the depredations of the pornography trade. As we recognized in Ferber, supra, at 766, n. 19, the producers of these materials are not always readily found, and are often located abroad; and knowledge of the performers' age by the dealers who specialize in child pornography, and by the purchasers who sustain that mar- ket, is obviously hard to prove. The First Amendment will lose none of its value to a free society if those who knowingly place themselves in the stream of pornographic commerce are obliged to make sure that they are not subsidizing child abuse. It is no more unconstitutional to make persons who knowingly deal in hard-core pornography criminally liable for the underage character of their entertainers than it is to make men who engage in consensual fornication criminally liable (in statutory rape) for the underage character of their partners. I would dispose of the present case, as the Ninth Circuit did, by reading the statute as it is written: to provide crimi- nal penalties for the knowing transportation or shipment of a visual depiction in interstate or foreign commerce, and for 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT 86 UNITED STATES v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC. Scalia, J., dissenting the knowing receipt or distribution of a visual depiction so transported or shipped, if that depiction was (whether the defendant knew it or not) a portrayal of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. I would find the statute, as so interpreted, to be unconstitutional since, by imposing crimi- nal liability upon those not knowingly dealing in pornogra- phy, it establishes a severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to its purposes, upon fully protected First Amendment activ- ities. See Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 153­154 (1959). This conclusion of unconstitutionality is of course no ground for going back to reinterpret the statute, making it say some- thing that it does not say, but that is constitutional. Not every construction, but only " `every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconsti- tutionality.' " Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895)) (emphasis added). " ` "Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitu- tional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute . . ." or judicially re- writing it.' " Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 841 (1986) (quoting Aptheker v. Secre- tary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964)). Otherwise, there would be no such thing as an unconstitutional statute. As I have earlier discussed, in the present case no reasonable alternative construction exists, neither any that can be coaxed from the text nor any that can be substituted for the text on "scrivener's error" grounds. I therefore agree with the Ninth Circuit that respondents' conviction cannot stand. I could understand (though I would not approve of) a dis- position which, in order to uphold this statute, departed from its text as little as possible in order to sustain its constitu- tionality-i. e., a disposition applying the scienter require- ment to the pornographic nature of the materials, but not to the age of the performers. I can neither understand nor 513us1$$6K 03-28-98 14:53:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 64 (1994) 87 Scalia, J., dissenting approve of the disposition urged by the United States before this Court and adopted today, which not only rewrites the statute, but (1) rewrites it more radically than its constitu- tional survival demands, and (2) raises baseless constitu- tional doubts that will impede congressional enactment of a law providing greater protection for the child-victims of the pornography industry. The Court today saves a single conviction by putting in place a relatively toothless child- pornography law that Congress did not enact, and by render- ing congressional strengthening of that new law more diffi- cult. I respectfully dissent. 513us1$$7z 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 88 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 93­1151. Argued October 11, 1994-Decided December 6, 1994 Petitioner Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought this civil action against respondents seeking to enforce a provision of the Federal Elec- tion Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). The District Court ruled against respondents. The Court of Appeals reversed and entered its judgment on October 22, 1993. Without first seeking or obtaining the Solicitor General's authorization, the FEC filed in its own name a petition for a writ of certiorari on January 18, 1994, two days before the expiration of the 90-day filing period mandated by 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). The United States filed a brief contending that the FEC lacked statutory authority to represent itself in this case in this Court, but that, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) and its implementing regulation, the Solicitor General had authorized the FEC's petition by letter dated May 26, 1994. This authorization came more than 120 days after the § 2101(c) filing deadline had passed. The FEC filed a brief in response asserting that it has independent statutory authority to represent itself in this Court. Held:1. The FEC may not independently file a petition for certiorari in this Court under 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6). That statute empowers the FEC "to . . . appeal any civil action . . . to enforce the provisions of [the FECA]," but it omits any mention of authority to file a "petition for a writ of certiorari" or otherwise conduct litigation before the Supreme Court. By contrast, 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d) explicitly author- ize the FEC to "appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review" (emphasis added), judgments in actions to enforce the Presidential election fund laws, thereby indicating a congressional intent to restrict the FEC's independent litigating authority in this Court to such actions. The contrasting language in §§ 9040(d) and 437d(a)(6) is particularly telling because these sections were originally enacted as part of the same legislation. The mere existence of sound policy reasons for providing the FEC with independent litigating au- thority in this Court for actions enforcing the FECA does not demon- strate a congressional intent to alter the Solicitor General's prerogative under § 518(a) to conduct and argue the Federal Government's litigation 513us1$$7z 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 89 Syllabus here, since that statutory authority itself represents a policy choice by Congress. Nor is it dispositive that the FEC has represented itself before this Court in several FECA enforcement cases in the past, since none of those cases involved a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the provisions authorizing the FEC to litigate in the federal courts are not the sort of substantive provisions which can be said to be within the agency's province to interpret. Pp. 90­97. 2. The Solicitor General's "after-the-fact" authorization does not re- late back to the date of the FEC's unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. Under governing agency law principles, particularly the doc- trine of ratification, the authorization simply came too late in the day to be effective: The Solicitor General attempted to ratify the FEC's filing on May 26, 1994, but he could not himself have filed a certiorari petition on that date because the 90-day time period for filing a petition had already expired. This result is entirely consistent with, and perhaps required by, § 2101(c). If the Solicitor General were allowed to retroac- tively authorize untimely agency petitions, he would have the unilateral power to extend the 90-day statutory period by days, weeks, or, as here, even months. This would impermissibly blur § 2101(c)'s jurisdictional deadline. Pp. 98­99. Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Reported below: 6 F. 3d 821. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 100. Ginsburg, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Lawrence M. Noble argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard B. Bader and Vivien Clair. Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attor- neys General Dellinger and Hunger, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Douglas N. Letter. Charles J. Cooper argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael A. Carvin and William L. McGrath. 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 90 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holding that the congressionally mandated composition of petitioner Federal Election Commission (FEC), including as it did representatives of the Senate and House as nonvoting members, violated the separation-of-powers principle em- bodied in the Constitution. 512 U. S. 1218 (1994). We do not reach the merits of the question, however, because we conclude that the FEC is not authorized to petition for cer- tiorari in this Court on its own, and that the effort of the Solicitor General to authorize the FEC's petition after the time for filing it had expired did not breathe life into it. The Court of Appeals entered judgment in this case on October 22, 1993. 6 F. 3d 821. The FEC, in its own name, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on January 18, 1994. The FEC neither sought nor obtained the authorization of the Solicitor General before filing its petition. By order dated March 21, 1994, 510 U. S. 1190, we invited the United States to file a brief addressing the question "[w]hether the [FEC] has statutory authority to represent itself in this case in this Court." The United States filed a brief on May 27, 1994, contending that the FEC lacks such statutory author- ity. The United States stated, however, that pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) and its implementing regulation, the Solici- tor General had authorized the FEC's petition by letter dated May 26, 1994. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. The FEC filed a brief in response on May 31, 1994, asserting that it has independent statutory authority to represent itself before this Court in this case. A petition for certiorari in a civil case must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment below. 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). This "90-day limit is mandatory and jurisdic- tional." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 45 (1990). Here, the Court of Appeals entered judgment on October 22, 1993, 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 91 Opinion of the Court and the FEC filed its petition for certiorari on January 18, 1994, two days before the 90-day time period expired. The FEC's petition would appear to be timely. However, if the FEC lacks statutory authority to represent itself in this case before this Court, it cannot independently file a petition for certiorari, but must receive the Solicitor General's authoriza- tion. See 28 CFR § 0.20(a) (1994). The question then be- comes whether the Solicitor General's May 26, 1994, letter authorizing the FEC's petition relates back to the date of the FEC's unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. We first examine the scope of the FEC's independent litigat- ing authority. The FEC is an independent agency established by Con- gress to "administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy" with respect to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. 86 Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 437c(b)(1). The FECA governs various aspects of all federal elections, see 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq., whereas chapters 95 and 96 specifically govern the administration of funds for Presidential election campaigns and the payment of matching funds for Presiden- tial primary campaigns, see 26 U. S. C. § 9001 et seq. (Presi- dential Election Campaign Fund Act), 26 U. S. C. § 9031 et seq. (Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act). The FEC has "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions." 2 U. S. C. § 437c(b)(1); see Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Politi- cal Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 485, 489 (1985). Two separate statutory provisions provide the FEC with independent litigating authority. The first provision, 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6), applies to actions under both the FECA and chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. It gives the FEC power "to initiate . . . , defend . . . or appeal any civil action . . . to enforce the provisions of [the FECA] and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26, through its general counsel." The sec- ond provision, which is contained in 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d) and 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 92 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Opinion of the Court 9040(d), applies only to actions under chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. It authorizes the FEC "on behalf of the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review, judgments or decrees entered with respect to actions in which it appears pursuant to the author- ity provided in this section." The FEC brought this civil enforcement action seeking to establish a violation of 2 U. S. C. § 441b(a), a provision of the FECA. As noted above, 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6) authorizes the FEC to "initiate" and "appeal" an FECA enforcement action such as the present one. Thus, no dispute exists as to the FEC's authority to litigate this case in the District Court or the Court of Appeals; 1 the question here concerns only the FEC's independent litigating authority before this Court when it proceeds under § 437d(a)(6). Title 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) provides in pertinent part: "Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . in which the United States is interested." By regulation, the Attorney General has delegated authority to the Solicitor General: "The following-described matters are assigned to, and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Solici- tor General, in consultation with each agency or official concerned: "(a) Conducting, or assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases, including appeals, petitions for 1 Under 28 U. S. C. §§ 516 and 519, the conduct of litigation on behalf of the United States and its agencies is subject to control of the Attorney General "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law." The FEC's "initia- tion" and "appeal" of this action fall within this "otherwise authorized by law" exception. 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 93 Opinion of the Court and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments, and . . . settlement thereof." 28 CFR § 0.20 (1994). Thus, if a case is one "in which the United States is inter- ested," § 518(a), "it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the Solicitor General or his designee." United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U. S. 693, 700 (1988); cf. United States v. Winston, 170 U. S. 522, 524­525 (1898); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 458 (1869). It is undisputed that this is a case "in which the United States is interested." 28 U. S. C. § 518(a). We have recog- nized, however, that Congress may "exempt litigation from the otherwise blanket coverage of [§ 518(a)]." Providence Journal, 485 U. S., at 705, n. 9. According to the FEC, one such exemption is found in 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6). Bearing in mind the Solicitor General's traditional role in conducting and controlling all Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the United States and its agencies-a role that is critical to the proper management of Government litigation brought before this Court, see id., at 702, n. 7, 706; id., at 709, 713­714 (Stevens, J., dissenting)-we "must . . . scrutiniz[e] and sub- jec[t] [§ 437d(a)(6)] to the ordinary tools of statutory construc- tion to determine whether Congress intended to supersede § 518(a)." Id., at 705, n. 9. Title 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6) gives the FEC power "to initi- ate . . . , defend . . . or appeal any civil action . . . to enforce the provisions of [the FECA] and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26." The statute clearly authorizes the FEC to "appeal," but it omits any mention of authority to file a "peti- tion for a writ of certiorari" or otherwise conduct litigation before the Supreme Court. The FEC argues that the term "appeal" is not defined in the FECA, and that in the absence of such a definition in the statute the term is construed "in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). It then refers to the definition of "appeal" found in Black's Law Dictionary 96 (6th ed. 1990), which includes, inter alia, the following: 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 94 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Opinion of the Court "There are two stages of appeal in the federal and many state court systems; to wit, appeal from trial court to intermediate appellate court and then to Supreme Court." This argument might carry considerable weight if it were not for the cognate provision authorizing the FEC to enforce chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. There, Congress has explic- itly provided that "[t]he [FEC] is authorized on behalf of the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review," judgments or decrees. 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d), 9040(d) (emphasis added). It is difficult, if not impossible, to place these sections alongside one an- other without concluding that Congress intended to restrict the FEC's independent litigating authority in this Court to actions enforcing the provisions of the Presidential election funds under chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. Such a differen- tiation by Congress would be quite understandable, since Presidential influence through the Solicitor General might be thought more likely in cases involving Presidential election fund controversies than in other litigation in which the FEC is involved.2 The FEC argues that 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d) shed no light on the issue whether 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6) gives it independent litigating authority before this Court because the provisions are found in different statutes, were drafted by different Congresses in different years, and were 2 The dissent says it is incongruous "to assume that Congress wanted the FEC to have independent authority to invoke our mandatory [appel- late] jurisdiction when proceeding under § 437h, but not to have the au- thority to invoke our discretionary jurisdiction when proceeding under other sections of the same statute." Post, at 100, n. 1. But Congress could have thought the Solicitor General would better represent the FEC's interests in cases involving our discretionary jurisdiction "because the tra- ditional specialization of that office has led it to be keenly attuned to this Court's practice with respect to the granting or denying of petitions for certiorari." Infra, at 96. 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 95 Opinion of the Court originally written to apply to different agencies of the Gov- ernment. Brief for Petitioner in Response to Solicitor Gen- eral 21. The FEC is only partially correct. Section 9010(d) was first enacted in 1971, and at that time it applied to the Comptroller General. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. 92­178, 85 Stat. 497, 569­570. The Fed- eral Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 established the FEC, see Pub. L. 93­443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280, and enacted § 437d(a)(6). See id., at 1282­1283. The 1974 statute trans- ferred to the FEC the functions previously performed by the Comptroller General under 26 U. S. C. § 9010, see id., at 1293, but it also added § 9040 to Title 26. See id., at 1302. Thus, § 9040(d) was originally enacted in 1974 as part of the same legislation that created § 437d(a)(6). Each of the two sec- tions, with its contrasting language as to litigating authority, was before the Conference Committee whose report was ultimately adopted by both Houses. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93­1438, pp. 967, 989 (1974). Section 9040(d) may have been modeled on § 9010(d), but because both §§ 9040(d) and 437d(a)(6) were designed to deal with the FEC's authority to represent itself in civil enforcement actions, we find the contrasting language to be particularly telling. See United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271, 277 (1975); cf. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 208 (1993) ("Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention- ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We recognize sound policy reasons may exist for providing the FEC with independent litigating authority in this Court for actions enforcing the FECA. Congress' decision to cre- ate the FEC as an independent agency and to charge it with the civil enforcement of the FECA was undoubtedly influ- enced by Congress' belief that the Justice Department, headed by a Presidential appointee, might choose to ignore 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 96 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Opinion of the Court infractions committed by members of the President's own political party. See, e. g., Federal Election Reform, 1973: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priveleges [sic] and Elections and the Senate Committee on Rules and Admin- istration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 17, 177, 186 (1973); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings before the Subcom- mittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Com- merce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 70­71 (1973). The fact that Con- gress had these policies in mind when giving the FEC independent enforcement powers, however, does not demon- strate that it intended to alter the Solicitor General's statu- tory prerogative to conduct and argue the Federal Govern- ment's litigation in the Supreme Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 518(a). That statutory authority, too, represents a policy choice by Congress to vest the conduct of litigation before this Court in the Attorney General, an authority which has by rule and tradition been delegated to the Solicitor General. See 28 CFR § 0.20(a) (1994). This Court, of course, is well served by such a practice, because the traditional specialization of that office has led it to be keenly attuned to this Court's practice with respect to the granting or denying of petitions for certiorari. But the practice also serves the Government well; an individual Government agency necessarily has a more parochial view of the interest of the Government in litigation than does the Solicitor General's office, with its broader view of litigation in which the Government is in- volved throughout the state and federal court systems. Whether review of a decision adverse to the Government in a court of appeals should be sought depends on a number of factors which do not lend themselves to easy categorization. The Government as a whole is apt to fare better if these decisions are concentrated in a single official. See Provi- dence Journal, 485 U. S., at 706. Congress could obviously choose, if it sought to do so, to sacrifice the policy favoring concentration of litigating 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 97 Opinion of the Court authority before this Court in the Solicitor General in favor of allowing the FEC to petition here on its own. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d), 9040(d). But we do not think that § 437d(a)(6) bespeaks such a choice. Nor are we impressed by the FEC's argument that it has represented itself before this Court on several occasions in the past without any ques- tion having been raised regarding its authority to do so under § 437d(a)(6). See, e. g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (finding 2 U. S. C. § 441b unconstitutional as applied); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 (1982) (involving interpretation of 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(C)); Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U. S. 577 (1982) (involving application of 2 U. S. C. § 437h(a)); Federal Election Comm'n v. Demo- cratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S. 27 (1981) (in- volving application of 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3)); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of certain campaign ex- penditure limitations imposed by 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq.). The jurisdiction of this Court was challenged in none of these actions, and therefore the question is an open one before us. See, e. g., Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 63, n. 4 (1989) ("[T]his Court has never considered itself bound [by prior sub silentio holdings] when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us") (cita- tion and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952) (same). And we do not think that the provisions discussed above, authorizing the FEC to litigate in the federal courts, are the sort of provisions that can be said to be within the province of the agency to interpret. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., supra, at 37, re- lied upon by the FEC, dealt with the FEC's interpretation of a substantive provision of the FECA, not with the provisions authorizing independent litigation. 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 98 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Opinion of the Court Because the FEC lacks statutory authority to litigate this case in this Court, it necessarily follows that the FEC cannot independently file a petition for certiorari, but must receive the Solicitor General's authorization. See 28 CFR § 0.20(a) (1994). By letter dated May 26, 1994, the Solicitor General authorized the petition filed by the FEC. The Solicitor Gen- eral's authorization, however, did not come until more than 120 days after the deadline for filing a petition had passed. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). We must determine whether this "after-the-fact" authorization relates back to the date of the FEC's unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. We con- clude that it does not. The question is at least presumptively governed by princi- ples of agency law, and in particular the doctrine of ratifica- tion. "If an act to be effective in creating a right against another or to deprive him of a right must be performed be- fore a specific time, an affirmance is not effective against the other unless made before such time." Restatement (Sec- ond) of Agency § 90 (1958); see also id., Comment a ("The bringing of an action, or of an appeal, by a purported agent can not be ratified after the cause of action or right to appeal has been terminated by lapse of time"). Though in a differ- ent context, we have recognized the rationale behind this rule: "The intervening rights of third persons cannot be de- feated by the ratification. In other words, it is essential that the party ratifying should be able not merely to do the act ratified at the time the act was done, but also at the time the ratification was made." Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, 338 (1874) (emphasis added). Here, the Solicitor General at- tempted to ratify the FEC's filing on May 26, 1994, but he could not himself have filed a petition for certiorari on that date because the 90-day time period for filing a petition had expired on January 20, 1994. His authorization simply came too late in the day to be effective. See, e. g., Nasewaupee v. Sturgeon Bay, 77 Wis. 2d 110, 116­119, 251 N. W. 2d 845, 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 99 Opinion of the Court 848­849 (1977) (refusing to uphold town board's ratification of private attorney's unauthorized commencement of lawsuit where ratification came after the statute of limitations had run); Wagner v. Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 87, 722 P. 2d 250, 255 (1986) (holding invalid city council's attempt to ratify police chief's dismissal of police officer after police officer com- menced a wrongful discharge action). But see Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co., 57 N. J. Super. 196, 154 A. 2d 369 (1959) (upholding city's ratification of unauthorized lawsuit filed on its behalf even though ratification occurred after limitations period had expired). The application of these principles of agency law here pro- duces a result entirely consistent with, and perhaps required by, 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c), the statute governing the time for filing petitions for certiorari. "We have no authority to ex- tend the period for filing except as Congress permits." Jen- kins, 495 U. S., at 45. If the Solicitor General were allowed to retroactively authorize otherwise unauthorized agency petitions after the deadline had expired, he would have the unilateral power to extend the 90-day statutory period for filing certiorari petitions by days, weeks, or, as in this case, even months. Such a practice would result in the blurring of the jurisdictional deadline. But "[t]he time of appealabil- ity, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear." Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 202 (1988). We hold that the FEC may not independently file a peti- tion for certiorari in this Court under 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6), and that the Solicitor General's "after-the-fact" authorization does not relate back to the date of the FEC's unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. We therefore dismiss the peti- tion for certiorari for want of jurisdiction. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 513us1$$7H 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 100 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, dissenting. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) "is an independ- ent administrative agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the [Federal Election Campaign] Act." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 198, n. 2 (1982). Both the plain lan- guage of the governing statute, § 311(a)(6), 88 Stat. 1282, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6), and the unfortunate chapter in our history that gave rise to the creation of the FEC, demonstrate that the FEC's exclusive jurisdiction includes the authority to litigate in this Court without the prior ap- proval of the Solicitor General. Section 437d(a)(6) expressly provides that the FEC has the power "to initiate . . . , defend . . . or appeal any civil action in the name of the Commission to enforce the provi- sions of this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26, through its general counsel." It is undisputed that when the statute was enacted, the FEC had the authority to invoke our mandatory jurisdiction by filing an appeal under § 437h of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.1 Although the term "appeal" may be construed literally to encompass only mandatory review, a far more natural reading of the term as it is used in § 437d(a)(6) would embrace all appellate litigation whether prosecuted by writ of certiorari, writ of mandamus, or notice of appeal. Indeed, 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V), the statute that gives the Attorney 1 Under the original statutory scheme, certain constitutional challenges were to be certified to a court of appeals sitting en banc, with "appeal directly to the Supreme Court." 2 U. S. C. § 437h (1976 ed. and Supp. III). See generally California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182, 188­189 (1981). Thus, even under the majority's interpretation of the word "appeal," the FEC would have had independent litigating authority, at least when proceeding under § 437h. It is incongruous, to say the least, to assume that Congress wanted the FEC to have independ- ent authority to invoke our mandatory jurisdiction when proceeding under § 437h, but not to have the authority to invoke our discretionary jurisdic- tion when proceeding under other sections of the same statute. 513us1$$7I 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 101 Stevens, J., dissenting General authority to conduct litigation in this Court, refers simply to "suits and appeals." Because the term "suits" apparently refers to our original jurisdiction, it appears that the term "appeals" is intended to refer to a broad range of appellate litigation, including both mandatory appeals and petitions for certiorari. The ambiguity in the word "appeal" is apparent even in §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d), the sections on which the majority relies to cabin the authority granted in § 437d(a)(6). In those sections, Congress uses the word "appeal" to describe two different categories of appellate litigation. In the text of those sections, "appeal" is used in contradistinction to "writ of certiorari" to indicate mandatory appeals. But Congress also uses "appeal" as the title to both §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d). See n. 4, infra. As thus used, "appeal" de- scribes an entire category of appellate litigation that includes mandatory appeals and writs of certiorari. I see no reason for assuming that "appeal" in § 437d(a)(6) was intended to incorporate the narrow, rather than the broad, understand- ing of "appeal." The historical context in which Congress adopted § 437d(a)(6) demonstrates that the interpretation that the Court adopts today is unfaithful to the intent of Congress. Section 437d(a)(6) was passed as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA). The 1974 amendments represented a response by Congress to per- ceived abuses arising out of the 1972 Presidential election campaign and culminating in the resignation of President Nixon. Indeed, the legislative history reveals Congress' be- lief that "[p]robably the most significant reform that could emerge from the Watergate scandal is the creation of an in- dependent nonpartisan agency to supervise the enforcement of the laws relating to the conduct of elections." 2 2 See Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Rep. No. 93­981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 564 (1974). 513us1$$7I 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 102 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Stevens, J., dissenting One of the most dramatic events of the entire Watergate scandal was the firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox in October 1973. When Cox threatened to secure a judicial determination that the President was violating a court order to deliver certain Presidential tapes, President Nixon or- dered the Attorney General to fire Cox. Both the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General refused, and in- stead resigned. The President's order to fire Cox was then carried out by the Solicitor General, in his capacity as Acting Attorney General. See generally In re Olson, 818 F. 2d 34, 41­42 (CADC 1987) (per curiam). This incident, which came to be known as the "Saturday Night Massacre," sparked tremendous public outrage, of which Congress was surely aware. Against this background, Congress would not have been likely, less than one year later, to have made the FEC dependent for its Supreme Court litigation on the ap- proval of the Solicitor General. In short, the legislative history of the 1974 amendments shows that Congress intended the FEC to have ample au- thority to oversee Presidential campaigns free of Executive influence. The FEC's authority to conduct civil litigation, including appellate litigation, must be construed in the light of Congress' intent. Given the language and historical context of § 437d(a)(6), it is unsurprising that the FEC has had a long and uninter- rupted history of independent litigation before this Court.3 Though, as the majority notes, ante, at 97, that history does not preclude us from reexamining the FEC's authority, the contemporaneous practice of independent litigation, uninter- rupted in subsequent years, provides confirmation of Con- 3 The FEC has represented itself in cases resulting in decisions on the merits, see ante, at 97, and as amicus curiae, see, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990). Cf. R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 68, n. 56 (7th ed. 1993) (noting FEC's authority to litigate on its own behalf pursuant to § 437d(a)(6)). 513us1$$7I 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 103 Stevens, J., dissenting gress' original intent. See BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U. S. 122, 131 (1983). Moreover, during the ad- ministrations of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, the Attorneys General and Solicitors General of the United States did not object to the FEC's exercise of authority to litigate in this Court without the prior approval of the Solici- tor General. As this Court has noted: " `[J]ust as established practice may shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general statutory lan- guage, so the want of assertion of power by those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally sig- nificant in determining whether such power was actually conferred.' " Ibid., quoting FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 352 (1941). See also FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U. S. 498, 513 (1949) ("Failure to use such an important power for [over 10 years] indicates to us that the Commission did not believe the power existed"). In rejecting the result dictated by language, history, and longstanding practice, the majority relies primarily on the differences between § 437d(a)(6) and 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d), 9040(d).4 The relevant language in § 9010, which originally conferred additional and unusual responsibilities on the Comptroller General of the United States, was enacted in 1971 as part of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act), which authorized public funding of Presidential campaigns.5 As the majority notes, ante, at 95, § 9040(d) was enacted at the same time as § 437d(a)(6), in 1974. The majority suggests that the differences between §§ 9040(d) and 4 Sections 9010(d) and 9040(d) are identical. They read: "(d) Appeal. The Commission is authorized on behalf of the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review, judgments or decrees entered with respect to actions in which it appears pursuant to the authority provided in this section." 5 The 1974 amendment transferred those responsibilities to the FEC. 513us1$$7I 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT 104 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND Stevens, J., dissenting 437d(a)(6) reveal Congress' intent to give the FEC a more limited litigation authority under the latter statute. The differences between §§ 437d(a)(6) and 9040(d) cannot support the weight that the majority wishes them to bear. The striking similarity between §§ 9010 and 9040 suggests that when Congress enacted § 9040, it did little more than copy the provisions of § 9010.6 No evidence whatsoever sug- gests that Congress considered the significance of the word- ing of those sections when it created § 437d(a)(6). The fact that the FEC's authority to file petitions for certiorari is expressed more explicitly in §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d) of Title 26 than in § 437d(a)(6) of Title 2 is thus not a sufficient reason for failing to give the latter provision its ordinary and well- accepted interpretation.7 Furthermore, the majority's reading of the statutes rests on the anomalous premise that Congress decided to give the FEC authority to litigate Fund Act cases in this Court while denying it similar authority in connection with its broader regulatory responsibilities under the FECA. The majority 6 As noted at n. 4, supra, §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d) are identical. The other provisions of those statutes, though not identical, are substantially similar. Compare, e. g., § 9010(b) ("The Commission is authorized through attor- neys and counsel described in subsection (a) to appear in the district courts of the United States to seek recovery of any amounts determined to be payable to the Secretary of the Treasury as a result of examination and audit made pursuant to section 9007") with § 9040(b) ("The Commission is authorized, through attorneys and counsel described in subsection (a), to institute actions in the district courts of the United States to seek recov- ery of any amounts determined to be payable to the Secretary as a result of an examination and audit made pursuant to section 9038"). 7 As an aside, I note that the majority's strict reading of §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d) creates its own oddities. For example, it seems to me that an open question under the Court's narrow reading of the statutes is whether the FEC has the right to file briefs in opposition to the certiorari petitions filed by its adversaries. Compare § 9010(d) (granting the FEC authority to "petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review") with 28 CFR § 0.20 (1994) (delegating to the Solicitor General authority to file "petitions for and in opposition to certiorari") (emphasis added). 513us1$$7I 03-30-98 08:21:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 88 (1994) 105 Stevens, J., dissenting explains this anomaly by hypothesizing that "Presidential in- fluence through the Solicitor General might be thought more likely in cases involving Presidential election fund controver- sies than in other litigation in which the FEC is involved." Ante, at 94. This hypothesis is untenable. Indeed, the Court has previously noted: "[B]oth the Fund Act and FECA play a part in regulat- ing Presidential campaigns. The Fund Act comes into play only if a candidate chooses to accept public funding of his general election campaign, and it covers only the period between the nominating convention and 30 days after the general election. In contrast, FECA applies to all Presidential campaigns, as well as other federal elections, regardless of whether publicly or privately funded." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Con- servative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 491 (1985). Finally, though admittedly important, the 1971 Act was a relatively undramatic piece of legislation, enacted before Watergate seized the national (and congressional) attention. The notion that Congress was motivated by a concern about improper Presidential influence in 1971 when it enacted the Fund Act, but ignored such concerns in 1974 when it enacted FECA, is simply belied by "a page of history." See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). During two decades of FEC litigation we have repeatedly recognized that the FEC's express statutory authority to ini- tiate, defend, or "appeal any civil action" to enforce FECA "through its general counsel" encompasses discretionary ap- pellate review as well as the now almost extinct mandatory appellate review in this Court. Because I remain persuaded that this settled practice was faithful to both the plain lan- guage and the underlying purpose of § 437d(a)(6), I respect- fully dissent. 513us1$$8z 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT 106 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus REICH v. COLLINS, REVENUE COMMISSIONER OF GEORGIA, et al. certiorari to the supreme court of georgia No. 93­908. Argued October 11, 1994-Decided December 6, 1994 Georgia taxed retirement benefits paid by the Federal Government, but exempted those paid by the State, until this Court held, in 1989, that such a scheme violates the Federal Constitution. Georgia then re- pealed its state retiree tax exemption, but did not offer federal retirees refunds for the unconstitutional taxes they had paid before the Court's 1989 decision. Petitioner Reich, a federal retiree, sought redress under a Georgia statute requiring refunds of "illegally assessed" taxes. In affirming the state trial court's denial of such relief, the State Supreme Court held that the refund statute does not apply where the law under which the taxes were assessed and collected was itself subsequently declared to be invalid. It then denied Reich's petition seeking reconsid- eration under McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, and similar cases, which establish that due process requires a "clear and certain" remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law, and that a State may provide that remedy before the disputed taxes are paid (predepri- vation), after they are paid (postdeprivation), or both. Reich petitioned for certiorari, and this Court remanded for further consideration in light of Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, which had relied on McKesson in circumstances similar to this case. In again denying Reich's refund claim, the State Supreme Court reviewed Georgia's pre- deprivation remedies and found those remedies to be "ample." Held: The Georgia Supreme Court erred in relying on Georgia's predepri- vation remedies to deny relief. Although due process, under McKes- son, allows a State to maintain a remedial scheme that is exclusively predeprivation, exclusively postdeprivation, or a hybrid, and to recon- figure its scheme over time to fit changing needs, it may not do what Georgia did here: "bait and switch" by reconfiguring, unfairly, in mid- course. Specifically, Georgia held out what plainly appeared to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy, its tax refund statute, and then declared, only after Reich and others had paid the disputed taxes, that no such remedy exists. In this regard, the State Supreme Court's reliance on predeprivation procedures was entirely beside the point (and thus error), because even assuming the constitutional adequacy of those procedures-an issue not here addressed-no reasonable taxpayer 513us1$$8z 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 106 (1994) 107 Syllabus would have thought that they represented, in light of the apparent appli- cability of the refund statute, the exclusive remedy for unlawful taxes. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449. The case is remanded for the provision of meaningful backward-looking relief con- sistent with due process and the McKesson line of cases. Pp. 110­114. 263 Ga. 602, 437 S. E. 2d 320, reversed and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Carlton M. Henson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Warren R. Calvert, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, and Daniel M. Formby, Senior Assistant Attorney General.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Committee on State Taxation by Kendall L. Houghton and William D. Peltz; for James B. Beam Distilling Co. by Morton Siegel and John L. Taylor, Jr.; for the National Association of Retired Federal Employees et al. by Michael J. Kator; and for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Timothy J. McCormally and Mary L. Fahey. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General of Virginia, David E. Anderson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Catherine C. Ham- mond, Deputy Attorney General, Roger L. Chaffe and Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, and Cynthia W. Comer and Barbara H. Vann, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: James H. Evans of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Bonnie J. Campbell of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Christine O. Grego- ire of Washington, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; and for the National Governors' Association et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles Rothfeld. Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior Dep- uty Attorney General, Thomas F. Moffitt and Norma S. Harrell, Special 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT 108 REICH v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In a long line of cases, this Court has established that due process requires a "clear and certain" remedy for taxes col- lected in violation of federal law. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 285 (1912) (Holmes, J.). A State has the flexibility to provide that remedy before the disputed taxes are paid (predeprivation), after they are paid (postdep- rivation), or both. But what it may not do, and what Geor- gia did here, is hold out what plainly appears to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes have been paid, that no such rem- edy exists. I For many years, numerous States, including Georgia, ex- empted from state personal income tax retirement benefits paid by the State, but not retirement benefits paid by the Federal Government (or any other employer). In March 1989, this Court held that such a tax scheme violates the constitutional intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which dates back to McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), and has been generally codified at 4 U. S. C. § 111. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989). In the aftermath of Davis, most of these States, Georgia included, repealed their special tax exemptions for state re- tirees, but few offered federal retirees any refunds for the unconstitutional taxes they had paid in the years before Davis was decided. Not surprisingly, a great deal of litiga- tion ensued in an effort to force States to provide refunds. The instant suit is part of that litigation. In April 1990, Reich, a retired federal military officer, sued Georgia in Georgia state court, seeking a refund for the tax years 1980 and after. The principal legal basis for Reich's Deputy Attorneys General, and Marilyn R. Mudge, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of North Carolina as amicus curiae. 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 106 (1994) 109 Opinion of the Court lawsuit was Georgia's tax refund statute, which provides: "A taxpayer shall be refunded any and all taxes or fees which are determined to have been erroneously or illegally as- sessed and collected from him under the laws of this state, whether paid voluntarily or involuntarily . . . ." Ga. Code Ann. § 48­2­35(a) (Supp. 1994). The Georgia trial court first decided that, because of § 48­2­35's statute of limitations, Reich's refund request was limited to the tax years 1985 and after. Even as to these later tax years, however, the trial court refused to grant a refund, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. See Reich v. Collins, 262 Ga. 625, 422 S. E. 2d 846 (1992) (Reich I). The Georgia high court explained that it was construing the refund statute not to apply to "the situation where the law under which the taxes are assessed and collected is itself subsequently declared to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid." Id., at 628­629, 422 S. E. 2d, at 849. Reich then petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for re- consideration of its decision on the grounds that even if the Georgia tax refund statute does not require a refund, federal due process does-due process, that is, as interpreted by McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and To- bacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18 (1990), and the long line of cases upon which McKesson depends. See id., at 32­36, citing Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Ben- nett, 284 U. S. 239 (1931); Montana Nat. Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499 (1928); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363 (1930); Ward v. Board of Commr's of Love Cty., 253 U. S. 17 (1920); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, supra; see generally Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, Non- Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1824­1830 (1991). As we said, these cases stand for the proposition that "a denial by a state court of a recov- ery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment," Carpenter, supra, at 369, 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT 110 REICH v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding. (We should note that the sov- ereign immunity States enjoy in federal court, under the Eleventh Amendment, does generally bar tax refund claims from being brought in that forum. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945).) Reich's petition for reconsideration in light of McKesson was denied. He then petitioned for certiorari. While the petition was pending, we decided Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86 (1993), which relied on McKesson in circumstances similar to this case. Accordingly, we re- manded Reich's case to the Georgia Supreme Court for fur- ther consideration in light of Harper. See Reich v. Collins, 509 U. S. 918 (1993). On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court focused on the portion of Harper explaining that, under McKesson, a State is free to provide its "clear and certain" remedy in an exclu- sively predeprivation manner. "[A] meaningful opportunity for taxpayers to withhold contested tax assessments and to challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing," we said, is " `a procedural safeguard [against unlawful depriva- tions] sufficient by itself to satisfy the Due Process Clause.' " See Harper, supra, at 101, quoting McKesson, supra, at 38, n. 21. The court then reviewed Georgia's predeprivation procedures, found them "ample," and denied Reich's refund claim. Reich v. Collins, 263 Ga. 602, 604, 437 S. E. 2d 320, 322 (1993). Reich again petitioned for certiorari, and we granted the writ, 510 U. S. 1109 (1994), to consider whether it was proper for the Georgia Supreme Court to deny Reich relief on the basis of Georgia's predeprivation remedies. II The Georgia Supreme Court is no doubt right that, under McKesson, Georgia has the flexibility to maintain an ex- clusively predeprivation remedial scheme, so long as that 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 106 (1994) 111 Opinion of the Court scheme is "clear and certain." Due process, we should add, also allows the State to maintain an exclusively postdepriva- tion regime, see, e. g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 746­748 (1974), or a hybrid regime. A State is free as well to reconfigure its remedial scheme over time, to fit its changing needs. Such choices are generally a matter only of state law. But what a State may not do, and what Georgia did here, is to reconfigure its scheme, unfairly, in mid-course-to "bait and switch," as some have described it. Specifically, in the mid-1980's, Georgia held out what plainly appeared to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy, in the form of its tax refund statute, and then declared, only after Reich and others had paid the disputed taxes, that no such remedy exists. In this regard, the Georgia Supreme Court's reli- ance on Georgia's predeprivation procedures was entirely be- side the point (and thus error), because even assuming the constitutional adequacy of these procedures-an issue on which we express no view-no reasonable taxpayer would have thought that they represented, in light of the apparent applicability of the refund statute, the exclusive remedy for unlawful taxes. See generally Rakowski, Harper and Its Aftermath, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 445, 474 (1993). Nor can there be any question that, during the 1980's, prior to Reich I, Georgia did appear to hold out a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy. To recall, the Georgia refund statute says that the State "shall" refund "any and all taxes or fees which are determined to have been errone- ously or illegally assessed and collected from [a taxpayer] under the laws of this state, whether paid voluntarily or in- voluntarily . . . ." Ga. Code Ann. § 48­2­35(a) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). In our view, the average taxpayer read- ing this language would think it obvious that state taxes assessed in violation of federal law are "illegally assessed" taxes. Certainly the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit thought this conclusion was obvious when, 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT 112 REICH v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court in a 1986 case, it denied federal court relief to taxpayers raising claims similar to Reich's, in part because it thought Georgia's refund statute applied to the claims. See Waldron v. Collins, 788 F. 2d 736, 738, cert. denied, 479 U. S. 884 (1986). Respondents, moreover, do not point to any Georgia Su- preme Court cases prior to Reich I that put any limiting construction on the statute's sweeping language; indeed, the cases we have found are all entirely consistent with that lan- guage's apparent breadth. See, e. g., Georgia v. Private Truck Council of America, Inc., 258 Ga. 531, 371 S. E. 2d 378 (1988); Henderson v. Carter, 229 Ga. 876, 195 S. E. 2d 4 (1972); Parke, Davis & Co. v. Cook, 198 Ga. 457, 31 S. E. 2d 728 (1944); Wright v. Forrester, 192 Ga. 864, 16 S. E. 2d 873 (1941). Even apart from the statute and the cases, we find it significant that, for obvious reasons, States ordinarily pre- fer that taxpayers pursue only postdeprivation remedies, i. e., that taxpayers "pay first, litigate later." This prefer- ence is significant in that it would seem especially unfair to penalize taxpayers who may have ignored the possibility of pursuing predeprivation remedies out of respect for that preference. In many ways, then, this case bears a remarkable resem- blance to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Harlan, J.). There, an Alabama trial court held the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in contempt for failing to comply with a discovery order to produce its membership lists, and the Alabama Su- preme Court denied review of the constitutionality of the contempt judgment on the grounds that the organization failed earlier to pursue a mandamus action to quash the un- derlying discovery order. The Court found that the Ala- bama high court's refusal to review the contempt judgment was in error. Prior Alabama law, the Court said, showed "unambiguous[ly]" that judicial review of contempt judg- ments had consistently been available, the existence of man- 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 106 (1994) 113 Opinion of the Court damus notwithstanding. Id., at 456. For good measure, the Court also looked at prior Alabama law on mandamus and found nothing "suggest[ing] that mandamus is the ex- clusive remedy" in this situation. Id., at 457 (emphasis in original). Justice Harlan thus concluded: "Novelty in proce- dural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights." Id., at 457­458, citing Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930) (due process violated when state court denied injunc- tion against collection of unlawful taxes on the basis of tax- payer's failure to pursue administrative remedies, where State's prior "settled" law made clear that no such adminis- trative remedies existed); see generally Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1137­ 1139 (1986). Finally, Georgia contends that Reich had no idea (before Davis) that the taxes he was paying throughout the 1980's might be unconstitutional. Even assuming Reich had no idea, however, we are not sure we understand the argument. If the argument is that Reich would not have taken advan- tage of the State's predeprivation remedies no matter how adequate they were (and thus has no standing to complain of those remedies), the argument is beside the point for the same reason that we said that the Georgia Supreme Court's reliance on those remedies was beside the point: Reich was entitled to pursue what appeared to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy, regardless of the State's predepri- vation remedies. Alternatively, if the argument is that Reich needed to have known of the unconstitutionality of his taxes in order to pursue the State's postdeprivation remedy, the argument is wrong. It is wrong because Georgia's re- fund statute has a relatively lengthy statute of limitations period, and, at least until this case, see Reich I, 262 Ga., at 629, 422 S. E. 2d, at 849, contained no contemporaneous pro- 513us1$$8J 03-28-98 15:12:32 PAGES OPINPGT 114 REICH v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court test requirement. Under such a regime, taxpayers need not have taken any steps to learn of the possible unconstitution- ality of their taxes at the time they paid them. Accordingly, they may not now be put in any worse position for having failed to take such steps. For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for the provision of " `meaningful backward-looking relief,' " Harper, 509 U. S., at 101, quoting McKesson, 496 U. S., at 31, consistent with due process and our McKesson line of cases. See, e. g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363 (1930). It is so ordered. 513us1$$9Z 03-28-98 15:13:38 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 115 Syllabus BROWN, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS v. GARDNER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 93­1128. Argued October 31, 1994-Decided December 12, 1994 After respondent veteran had back surgery in a Department of Veterans Affairs facility for a condition unrelated to his military service, he devel- oped pain and weakness in his left leg, which he alleged was the result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U. S. C. § 1151, which requires the VA to compensate for "an injury, or an aggravation of an injury," that occurs "as the result of" VA treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans' Appeals denied the claim on the ground that § 1151, as interpreted by 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3), only covers an injury if it resulted from negligent treatment by the VA or an accident occurring during treatment. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed, holding that § 1151 neither imposes nor authorizes adoption of § 3.358(c)(3)'s fault-or-accident requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Held: Section 3.358(c)(3) is not consistent with the plain language of § 1151, which contains not a word about fault-or-accident. The statutory text and reasonable inferences from it give a clear answer against the Gov- ernment's arguments that a fault requirement is implicit in the terms "injury" and "as a result of." This clear textually grounded conclusion is also fatal to the Government's remaining principal arguments: that Congress ratified the VA's practice of requiring a showing of fault when it reenacted the predecessor of § 1151 in 1934, or, alternatively, that the post-1934 legislative silence serves as an implicit endorsement of the fault-based policy; and that the policy deserves judicial deference due to its undisturbed endurance. Pp. 117­122. 5 F. 3d 1456, affirmed. Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, and Tresa M. Schlecht. 513us1$$9Z 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT 116 BROWN v. GARDNER Opinion of the Court Joseph M. Hannon, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was William S. Mailander.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we decide whether a regulation of the Depart- ment of Veterans Affairs, 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3) (1993), requir- ing a claimant for certain veterans' benefits to prove that disability resulted from negligent treatment by the VA or an accident occurring during treatment, is consistent with the controlling statute, 38 U. S. C. § 1151 (1988 ed., Supp. V). We hold that it is not. I Fred P. Gardner, a veteran of the Korean conflict, received surgical treatment in a VA facility for a herniated disc unre- lated to his prior military service. Gardner then had pain and weakness in his left calf, ankle, and foot, which he al- leged was the result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under § 1151,1 which provides that the VA will com- pensate for "an injury, or an aggravation of an injury," that occurs "as the result of hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment, or the pursuit of a course of vocational rehabilita- tion" provided under any of the laws administered by the VA, so long as the injury was "not the result of such veter- an's own willful misconduct . . . ." The VA and the Board *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Texas by Dan Morales, Attorney General, and Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General; for the National Veterans Legal Services Project by Ronald S. Flagg and Gershon M. Ratner; and for the Paralyzed Veterans of America et al. by Robert L. Nelson, Lawrence B. Hagel, and Irving R. M. Panzer. 1 Section 1151 is invoked typically to provide benefits to veterans for nonservice related disabilities, although it is not so limited by its terms. See Pet. for Cert. 6, n. 3. The statute's history begins in 1924 when Con- gress enacted § 213 of the World War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch. 320, 43 Stat. 623. Section 213 was repealed in 1933, as part of the Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, Tit. I, § 17, 48 Stat. 11­12, and reenacted in nearly the same form in 1934, Act of Mar. 28, 1934, ch. 102, Tit. III, § 31, 48 Stat. 526. 513us1$$9M 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 115 (1994) 117 Opinion of the Court of Veterans' Appeals denied Gardner's claim for benefits, on the ground that § 1151, as interpreted by 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3) (1993), only covers an injury if it "proximately resulted [from] carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instances of indicated fault" on the part of the VA, or from the occurrence during treatment or rehabilitation of an "accident," defined as an "unforeseen, untoward" event. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed, holding that § 1151 neither imposes nor authorizes adoption of the fault-or-accident requirement set out in § 3.358(c)(3), Gardner v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 584 (1991), and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, 5 F. 3d 1456 (1993). We granted certiorari, 511 U. S. 1017, and now affirm. II Despite the absence from the statutory language of so much as a word about fault 2 on the part of the VA, the Gov- ernment proposes two interpretations in attempting to re- veal a fault requirement implicit in the text of § 1151, the first being that fault inheres in the concept of compensable "injury." We think that no such inference can be drawn in this instance, however. Even though "injury" can of course carry a fault connotation, see Webster's New International Dictionary 1280 (2d ed. 1957) (an "actionable wrong"), it just as certainly need not do so, see ibid. ("[d]amage or hurt done to or suffered by a person or thing"). The most, then, that the Government could claim on the basis of this term is the existence of an ambiguity to be resolved in favor of a fault requirement (assuming that such a resolution would be possi- 2 "Fault" is shorthand for fault-or-accident, the test imposed by the regu- lation. Section 3.358(c)(3) leaves the additional burden imposed by the "accident" requirement unclear, defining the term to mean simply an "un- foreseen, untoward" event. Although the appropriate scope of the "acci- dent" requirement is not before us, on one plausible reading of the regula- tion some burden additional to the statutory obligation would be imposed as an alternative to fault. 513us1$$9M 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT 118 BROWN v. GARDNER Opinion of the Court ble after applying the rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor, see King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220­221, n. 9 (1991)). But the Gov- ernment cannot plausibly make even this claim here. Am- biguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context, see id., at 221 ("[T]he meaning of statu- tory language, plain or not, depends on context"), and this context negates a fault reading. Section 1151 provides com- pensability not only for an "injury," but for an "aggravation of an injury" as well. "Injury" as used in this latter phrase refers to a condition prior to the treatment in question, and hence cannot carry with it any suggestion of fault attribut- able to the VA in causing it. Since there is a presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute, Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932), a presumption surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence, it is virtually impossible to read "injury" as laden with fault in the sentence quoted. Textual cross-reference confirms this conclusion. "In- jury" is employed elsewhere in the veterans' benefits stat- utes as an instance of the neutral term "disability," appear- ing within a series whose other terms exemplify debility free from any fault connotation. See 38 U. S. C. § 1701(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V) ("The term `disability' means a disease, injury, or other physical or mental defect"). The serial treatment thus indicates that the same fault-free sense should be at- tributed to the term "injury" itself. Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961) ("[A] word is known by the company it keeps"). Moreover, in analogous statutes dealing with service-connected injuries the term "injury" is again used without any suggestion of fault, as the adminis- trative regulation applicable to these statutes confirms by its failure to impose any fault requirement. Compare 38 U. S. C. § 1110 (1988 ed., Supp. V) ("disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, 513us1$$9M 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 115 (1994) 119 Opinion of the Court or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, . . . during a period of war," is compensable) and 38 U. S. C. § 1131 (1988 ed., Supp. V) ("dis- ability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, . . . dur- ing other than a period of war," is compensable) with 38 CFR § 3.310(a) (1993) ("Disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. When service connection is thus estab- lished for a secondary condition, the secondary condition shall be considered a part of the original condition"). In a second attempt to impose a VA-fault requirement, the Government suggests that the "as a result of" language of § 1151 signifies a proximate cause requirement that incorpo- rates a fault test. Once again, we find the suggestion im- plausible. This language is naturally read simply to impose the requirement of a causal connection between the "injury" or "aggravation of an injury" and "hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment, or the pursuit of a course of vocational rehabilitation." Assuming that the connection is limited to proximate causation so as to narrow the class of compensable cases, that narrowing occurs by eliminating remote conse- quences, not by requiring a demonstration of fault.3 See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Pros- ser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 42 (5th ed. 1984). The eccentricity of reading a fault requirement into the "result 3 We do not, of course, intend to cast any doubt on the regulations inso- far as they exclude coverage for incidents of a disease's or injury's natu- ral progression, occurring after the date of treatment. See 38 CFR § 3.358(b)(2) (1993). VA action is not the cause of the disability in these situations. Nor do we intend to exclude application of the doctrine vo- lenti non fit injuria. See generally M. Bigelow, Law of Torts 39­43 (8th ed. 1907). It would be unreasonable, for example, to believe that Con- gress intended to compensate veterans for the necessary consequences of treatment to which they consented (i. e., compensating a veteran who con- sents to the amputation of a gangrenous limb for the loss of the limb). 513us1$$9M 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT 120 BROWN v. GARDNER Opinion of the Court of" language is underscored by the incongruity of applying it to the fourth category for which compensation is available under § 1151, cases of injury resulting from a veteran's "pur- suit of vocational rehabilitation." If Congress had meant to require a showing of VA fault, it would have been odd to refer to "the pursuit [by the veteran] of vocational rehabilita- tion" rather than to "the provision [by the VA] of voca- tional rehabilitation." The poor fit of this language with any implicit requirement of VA fault is made all the more obvious by the statute's express treatment of a claimant's fault. The same sentence of § 1151 that contains the terms "injury" and "as a result of" restricts compensation to those whose additional disabil- ity was not the result of their "own willful misconduct." This reference to claimant's fault in a statute keeping silent about any fault on the VA's part invokes the rule that "[w]here Congress includes particular language in one sec- tion of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention- ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without some mention of the VA's fault, it would be unreasonable to read the text of § 1151 as imposing a burden of demonstrating it upon seeking com- pensation for a further disability. In sum, the text and reasonable inferences from it give a clear answer against the Government, and that, as we have said, is " `the end of the matter.' " Good Samaritan Hospi- tal v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 409 (1993) (quoting Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984)). Thus this clear textually grounded conclusion in Gardner's favor is fatal to the remaining princi- pal arguments advanced against it. The Government contends that Congress ratified the VA's practice of requiring a showing of fault when it reenacted the predecessor of § 1151 in 1934, or, alternatively, that Con- 513us1$$9M 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 115 (1994) 121 Opinion of the Court gress's legislative silence as to the VA's regulatory practice over the last 60 years serves as an implicit endorsement of its fault-based policy. There is an obvious trump to the re- enactment argument, however, in the rule that "[w]here the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not constitute an adoption of a previous administrative construction." Dema- rest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190 (1991). See also Mas- sachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates v. United States, 377 U. S. 235, 241­242 (1964) (congressional reenactment has no interpretive effect where regulations clearly contradict requirements of statute). But even with- out this sensible rule, the reenactment would not carry the day. Setting aside the disputed question whether the VA used a fault rule in 1934,4 the record of congressional discus- sion preceding reenactment makes no reference to the VA regulation, and there is no other evidence to suggest that Congress was even aware of the VA's interpretive position. "In such circumstances we consider the . . . re-enactment to be without significance." United States v. Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351, 359 (1957). Congress's post-1934 legislative silence on the VA's fault approach to § 1151 is likewise unavailing to the Government. As we have recently made clear, congressional silence " `lacks persuasive significance,' " Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 187 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990)), particularly where administrative regulations are inconsistent with the control- ling statute, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 175, n. 1 (1989) ("Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute"). See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 185­186, n. 21 (1969) ("The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is 4 At the time of the 1934 reenactment, the regulation in effect precluded compensation for the " `usual after[-]results of approved medical care and treatment properly administered.' " See Brief for Respondent 31. 513us1$$9M 03-28-98 15:13:39 PAGES OPINPGT 122 BROWN v. GARDNER Opinion of the Court otherwise impermissible. . . . Congressional inaction fre- quently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis"). Finally, we dispose of the Government's argument that the VA's regulatory interpretation of § 1151 deserves judicial deference due to its undisturbed endurance for 60 years. A regulation's age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute, and the fact, again, that § 3.358(c)(3) flies against the plain language of the statutory text exempts courts from any obligation to defer to it. Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 42­43 (1990); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra, at 842­843. But even if this were a close case, where consistent application and age can enhance the force of administrative interpretation, see Ze- nith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978), the Government's position would suffer from the further fac- tual embarrassment that Congress established no judicial re- view for VA decisions until 1988, only then removing the VA from what one congressional Report spoke of as the agency's "splendid isolation." H. R. Rep. No. 100­963, pt. 1, p. 10 (1988). As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit aptly stated: "Many VA regulations have aged nicely simply because Congress took so long to provide for judicial review. The length of such regulations' unscrutinized and unscruti- nizable existence" could not alone, therefore, enhance any claim to deference. 5 F. 3d, at 1463­1464. III Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 513us1$10Z 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 123 Syllabus NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN certiorari to the supreme court of nebraska No. 93­823. Argued October 11, 1994-Decided December 12, 1994 Respondent, a Nebraska resident, owns shares in mutual funds (Trusts) that earn some of their income by participating in "repurchase agree- ments" (repos) involving federal debt securities. In such a transaction, the party holding the securities (Seller-Borrower) transfers them to the Trusts in return for a specified amount of cash. At a later date, the Trusts deliver the securities back to the Seller-Borrower, who credits to the Trusts an amount equal to the cash transfer plus interest at an agreed-upon rate that bears no relation to the yield on the underlying securities. Ultimately, the Trusts' interest income is distributed to re- spondent in proportion to his shares in the Trusts. After petitioner issued a Revenue Ruling concluding that interest income from repos is subject to Nebraska's income tax, respondent brought this declaratory judgment action in state court, asking that the Revenue Ruling be de- clared invalid as contrary to the Supremacy Clause and to 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a), which, in relevant part, exempts from state taxation interest on "obligations of the United States Government." The court granted the relief, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. Held:1. Nebraska's taxation of the income respondent derived from the repos does not violate § 3124(a). Pp. 128­135. (a) For purposes of § 3124(a), the interest income earned by the Trusts is interest on loans from the Trusts to the Seller-Borrower, not interest on federal securities; in this context, the securities are merely collateral for these loans. Several features of the repos lead to this conclusion: (1) at a repo's commencement, the Trusts pay the Seller- Borrower a fixed sum of money, which is repaid with interest at a rate bearing no relation to either the coupon interest paid or discount inter- est accrued on the federal securities during the term of the repo; (2) the Trusts may liquidate the securities should the Seller-Borrower default on the debt, but, like a lender, they must pay to the Seller-Borrower any proceeds in excess of the amount of the debt plus expenses, and may recover any deficiency from the Seller-Borrower; (3) the market value of the securities must be maintained at 102% of the original pay- ment amount, with the Seller-Borrower delivering cash or additional securities if the value falls below 102%, and the Trusts returning securi- 513us1$10Z 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 124 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Syllabus ties if the value exceeds 102%; and (4) the Seller-Borrower may, during the term of the repo, substitute federal securities of equal market value for the securities initially involved in the transaction. The fact that the Trusts take "delivery" of the federal securities at the repo's commence- ment also is consistent with understanding the repos as loans, since "delivery" perfects the Trusts' security interests in their collateral. Pp. 128­133. (b) Respondent's two objections to this interpretation of § 3124(a) are unpersuasive. It does not matter that the Trusts and Seller- Borrower characterize the repos as sales and repurchases, since the sub- stance and economic realities of the transactions show that the Trusts receive interest on cash they have lent to the Seller-Borrower. Cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561, 582. And, contrary to respondent's argument, this case does not involve the construction or va- lidity of the Nebraska income tax statute's add-back rule. Pp. 133­135. 2. Nebraska's taxation of income from repos involving federal securi- ties does not violate the Supremacy Clause. Respondent has pointed to no statute, revenue ruling, or other manifestation of Nebraska policy that treats "state" repos differently from "federal" repos for tax pur- poses. Nor does the taxation at issue make it more difficult and expen- sive for the Federal Government to finance the national debt. Expert testimony referred to by respondent has no relevance to this case, and respondent has shown no "obvious and appreciable" injury to the Gov- ernment's borrowing power as a result of Nebraska's taxation of the Trusts' repo income, see Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dept. of Reve- nue, 482 U. S. 182, 190, n. 10. Pp. 135­137. 244 Neb. 82, 504 N. W. 2d 800, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. L. Jay Bartel, Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Don Stenberg, Attorney General. Terry R. Wittler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Larry A. Holle.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Timothy G. Laddish, Assistant Attorney General, Joyce E. Hee, Deputy Attorney General, and Patrick J. Kusiak, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: James H. Evans of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Roland W. Burris 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 125 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. We took this case to decide whether States may tax inter- est income derived from repurchase agreements involving federal securities. If the income that taxpayers earn by participating in such agreements constitutes interest on federal securities, then the taxation violates 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a), which exempts interest on "obligations of the United States Government" from taxation by States. On the other hand, if that income constitutes interest on loans to a private party, the taxation is not prohibited by the statute. With respect to the repurchase agreements at issue in this case, we conclude that for purposes of § 3124(a), the interest earned by taxpayers is interest on loans to a private party, not interest on federal securities. Accordingly, we hold that § 3124(a) does not prohibit States from taxing such income. I Respondent is a Nebraska resident who owns shares in two mutual funds, the Trust for Short-Term U. S. Govern- ment Securities and the Trust for U. S. Treasury Obligations (Trusts). The Trusts earn a portion of their income by par- ticipating in "repurchase agreements" that involve debt secu- rities issued by the United States Government and its agen- of Illinois, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harsh- barger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, G. Oliver Koppell of New York, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Susan Brimer Loving of Oklahoma, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Lee Fennell. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for The Dreyfus Corporation by Jeffrey S. Sion; and for the Investment Company Institute by Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Paul Schott Stevens, and Catherine Heron. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., filed a brief for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as amicus curiae. 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 126 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Opinion of the Court cies (federal securities). A typical repurchase agreement used by the Trusts, see App. 65­81, establishes a two-part transaction, commonly called a "repo," between a party who holds federal securities and seeks cash (Seller-Borrower) and a party who has available cash and seeks to earn interest on its idle funds (in this case, the Trusts). In part one of the repo, the Seller-Borrower "transfers" specified federal secu- rities to the Trusts on the records of the Federal Reserve System's commercial book-entry system. Simultaneously, the Trusts transfer a specified amount of cash to the Seller- Borrower's bank account. In part two of the transaction-which occurs at a later date fixed by agreement or, in the absence of any agreement, upon demand of either party-the Trusts "deliver" the fed- eral securities back to the Seller-Borrower on the Federal Reserve's records, and the Seller-Borrower credits the Trusts' bank account in an amount equal to the sum of the original cash transfer plus "interest" at an agreed-upon rate. This interest rate bears no relation to the yield on the under- lying federal securities-either when they were issued by the United States Government or when they later came into the hands of the Seller-Borrower-but is based instead on the current market rate paid on investments with maturities equal to the term of the repo, not to the original or current maturities of the underlying securities.1 After deducting administrative costs, the Trusts distribute this interest income to respondent in proportion to his own- ership of shares in the Trusts. The State of Nebraska gen- erally taxes interest income, but it does not tax "interest or dividends received by the owner of obligations of the United 1 A repurchase agreement is so called because the parties to the agree- ment identify part one of the transaction as a "sale" of federal securities from the Seller-Borrower to the Trusts and part two a "repurchase" of the securities by the Seller-Borrower from the Trusts. Because the accu- racy of these labels is part of the dispute in this case, we use more neutral terms to describe the transaction. 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 127 Opinion of the Court States . . . but exempt from state income taxes under the laws of the United States." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77­2716(1)(a) (Supp. 1994). For purposes of Nebraska's income tax law, if interest would be exempt from tax in the hands of the Trusts, then respondent's proportionate share of such inter- est will be exempt. § 77­2716(1)(b). A decade ago petitioner considered whether the interest income derived from repurchase agreements involving fed- eral securities and then distributed to respondent and simi- larly situated individuals was subject to Nebraska's income tax. Petitioner concluded that it was. Neb. Rev. Rul. 22­ 85­1, Brief for Petitioner 4­5, n. 1. In 1988, respondent brought a declaratory judgment action in the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, asking that Revenue Ruling 22­85­1 be declared invalid as contrary to 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The District Court granted the requested re- lief. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed, concluding that "the income received by [respondent] from repo transactions executed by the [T]rusts involving federal securities is exempt from state taxation under § 3124." Loewenstein v. State, 244 Neb. 82, 90, 504 N. W. 2d 800, 805 (1993). As the Nebraska Supreme Court itself acknowledged, see id., at 88­90, 504 N. W. 2d, at 804­805, several state courts have reached directly contrary conclusions,2 and two Federal 2 See Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. State Tax Commissioners, 575 N. E. 2d 998 (Ind. 1991); Department of Revenue v. Page, 541 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. App. 1989); Capital Preservation Fund, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 145 Wis. 2d 841, 429 N. W. 2d 551 (App. 1988); Andras v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 154 Ill. App. 3d 37, 506 N. E. 2d 439 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 960 (1988). As Justice Caporale pointed out in dissent below, see 244 Neb., at 91­92, 504 N. W. 2d, at 806, at least five other state courts also have reached a result contrary to that of the majority. See Everett v. State Dept. of Rev- enue and Finance, 470 N. W. 2d 13 (Iowa 1991); Comptroller of the Treas- ury, Income Tax Div. v. First United Bank & Trust, 320 Md. 352, 578 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 128 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Opinion of the Court Courts of Appeals have ruled that interest income derived from repos involving municipal bonds is not exempt from federal taxation under § 103(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.3 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 510 U. S. 1176 (1994), and we now reverse. II We begin with the text of 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a). It pro- vides in relevant part: "[O]bligations of the United States Government are ex- empt from taxation by a State or political subdivision of a State. The exemption applies to each form of taxa- tion that would require the obligation, the interest on the obligation, or both, to be considered in computing a tax . . . ." Under this provision, a state tax may consider neither the federal "obligation" itself nor the "interest on the obliga- tion." The obligation itself is "considered" when its value is "taken into account, or included in the accounting," Ameri- A. 2d 192 (1990); Borg v. Department of Revenue of Oregon, 308 Ore. 34, 774 P. 2d 1099 (1989); Massman Constr. Co. v. Director of Revenue of Missouri, 765 S. W. 2d 592 (Mo. 1989); In re Sawyer Estate, 149 Vt. 541, 546 A. 2d 784 (1987). Accord, H. J. Heinz Co. v. Department of Treasury, 197 Mich. App. 210, 494 N. W. 2d 850 (1992) (distinguishing Matz v. Depart- ment of Treasury, 155 Mich. App. 778, 401 N. W. 2d 62 (1986) (per curiam)). 3 See Union Planters Nat. Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F. 2d 115 (CA6), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 827 (1970); American Nat. Bank of Aus- tin v. United States, 421 F. 2d 442 (CA5), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 819 (1970). Accord, First American Nat. Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467 F. 2d 1098 (CA6 1972) (per curiam). Cf. Citizens Nat. Bank of Waco v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 236, 248­251, 551 F. 2d 832, 839­840 (1977) (agreeing that these decisions were correct, but distinguishing them on the facts of the case). The Internal Revenue Service also has concluded that a taxpayer in the position of the Trusts who derives interest income by participating in repurchase agreements does not earn interest on the securities involved in those agreements. See Rev. Rul. 74­27, 1974­1 Cum. Bull. 24; Rev. Rul. 77­59, 1977­1 Cum. Bull. 196; Rev. Rul. 79­108, 1979­1 Cum. Bull. 75. 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 129 Opinion of the Court can Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U. S. 855, 862 (1983), in computing the taxable value of a taxpayer's assets or net worth for the purpose of a property tax or the like. See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 470 U. S. 583, 585­586 (1985) (property tax on bank shares). By contrast, the interest on the obligation is "considered" when that interest is included in computing the taxpayer's net income or earnings for the purpose of an income tax or the like. See, e. g., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 393­394 (1983) (tax on net earn- ings of banks). By participating in repos involving federal securities, the Trusts (and thus respondent) earned interest income, and Nebraska's income tax admittedly considered that interest in computing respondent's taxable income. We must decide whether for purposes of § 3124(a) the interest earned by the Trusts from these repos is interest on "obligations of the United States Government" or interest on loans of cash from the Trusts to the Seller-Borrower. We conclude that it is the latter, and we accordingly hold that Nebraska's taxation of the income derived by respondent from the repos does not violate § 3124(a). An investor may earn interest income from a federal secu- rity in one or both of two ways. First, the investor may receive periodic payments from the United States Govern- ment at the interest rate stated on the face of the security. Such payments are traditionally known as "coupon interest." Second, the investor may acquire the security at a discount from the amount for which it will ultimately be redeemed by the Government at maturity. This discount is also consid- ered interest for purposes of taxation.4 Although "discount 4 For example, Treasury notes and bonds, which have maturities of at least one year, pay coupon interest on a semiannual basis and may be issued at discount, par (face amount), or premium, depending on market conditions. See 31 CFR §§ 356.5(b), (c), 356.30 (1994). Treasury bills, by contrast, have maturities of not more than one year, pay no coupon inter- est, and are always issued at a discount. See § 356.5(a). "For purposes 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 130 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Opinion of the Court interest" accrues during the term of the security, the inves- tor does not receive it in cash until the security is redeemed or transferred to a third party. Our examination of the typical repurchase agreement used by the Trusts convinces us that they did not earn either kind of interest on federal securities. Certainly, none of the in- come the Trusts earn by participating in repos can be attrib- uted to redemptions of the securities or payments of coupon interest by the Government: The Trusts must "pay over to [the Seller-Borrower] as soon as received all principal, in- terest and other sums paid by or on behalf of the issuer in respect of the Securities and collected by the [Trusts]." App. 69. Nor can we conclude that the Trusts receive discount in- terest when the federal securities are transferred back to the Seller-Borrower in part two of the repo. Under the typical repurchase agreement, any individual repo transaction may involve a mix of federal securities with varying maturities, and therefore varying yields. During the term of the repo, these securities earn discount interest based on their respec- tive yields (and on whether they pay coupon interest). The Trusts, however, earn interest from the Seller-Borrower at an agreed-upon rate that is not based on any of these yields, or any combination of them. Thus, the interest that the Trusts earn by participating in the repo will bear no relation to the discount interest earned on federal securities during the same period. We conclude instead that for purposes of § 3124(a), the in- terest income earned by the Trusts is interest on loans from the Trusts to the Seller-Borrower, and that the federal secu- rities are involved in the repo transactions as collateral for of taxation the amount of discount at which Treasury bills are originally sold by the United States shall be considered to be interest." § 309.4. See generally M. Stigum, The Money Market 36­37 (3d ed. 1990) (herein- after Stigum). 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 131 Opinion of the Court these loans. Several features of the repos lead to this con- clusion. First, at the commencement of a repo, the Trusts pay the Seller-Borrower a fixed sum of money; at the repo's termination, the Seller-Borrower repays that sum with "in- terest." As explained above, this repo interest bears no relation to either the coupon interest paid or the discount interest accrued on the federal securities during the term of the repo. Second, if the Seller-Borrower defaults on its obligation to pay its debt, the Trusts may liquidate the federal securities. But like any lender who liquidates collateral, the Trusts may retain the proceeds of liquidation only up to the amount of the debt plus expenses; any excess must be paid to the Seller-Borrower. Moreover, if the proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the debt, the Trusts may recover the deficiency from the Seller-Borrower. Third, if the market value of the federal securities involved in the repo falls below 102% of the amount the Trusts origi- nally paid to the Seller-Borrower, the latter must immedi- ately deliver cash or additional securities to the Trusts to restore the value of the securities held by the Trusts to 102% of the original payment amount. On the other hand, if the market value of the securities rises above 102% of this amount, the Seller-Borrower may require the Trusts to re- turn some of the securities to the Seller-Borrower. These provisions are consistent with a lender-borrower relationship in which a prudent lender desires to protect the value of its collateral, while a prudent borrower attempts to pledge as little collateral as possible. Fourth, the Seller-Borrower may, during the term of the repo, "substitute" federal securities of equal market value for the federal securities initially involved in the transaction. A lender, of course, is indifferent to the particular collateral pledged by the borrower, so long as that collateral has suffi- cient value and liquidity. 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 132 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Opinion of the Court The parties have stipulated that the Trusts (or their agents) take "Delivery" of the federal securities at the com- mencement of a repo. App. 63. But even this fact is con- sistent with understanding repos as loans of cash from the Trusts to the Seller-Borrower: "Delivery" of the securities perfects the Trusts' security interests in their collateral. Under the most recent version of § 8­321(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U. C. C.), "[a] security interest in a secu- rity is enforceable and can attach only if it is transferred to the secured party . . . pursuant to a provision of [§] 8­313(1)." 2C U. L. A. 459 (1991). Section 8­313(1)(a) provides that transfer of a security interest in a security occurs when the secured party "acquires possession of a certificated secu- rity." 5 Id., at 402. Of course, possession of the federal securities allows the Trusts to effect an expeditious, nonjudi- cial liquidation of the securities if the Seller-Borrower de- faults. Cf. U. C. C. § 9­504(1), 3B U. L. A. 127 (1992). The ability to liquidate immediately is obviously critical in the context of repo transactions, which may have a lifespan of only a single day. Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the in- terest income earned by the Trusts from repurchase agree- ments involving federal securities is not interest on "obliga- tions of the United States Government." For purposes of 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a), the income is instead interest on loans from the Trusts to the Seller-Borrower. Because § 3124(a) exempts only the former type of interest from state taxation, 5 The parties have also stipulated that delivery of the federal securities is effected "through the Federal Reserve book entry system." App. 63. Although securities held in that system exist not in the form of certificates but only as entries in the records of a Federal Reserve bank, see generally Stigum 636­638, regulations issued by the Treasury Department and other federal agencies indulge in the fiction that transferees acquire pos- session of certificated securities. See, e. g., 31 CFR § 306.118(a) (1994) (transfer of Treasury notes and bonds); § 350.4(a) (transfer of Treasury bills). Of course, these regulations and their relationship to the U. C. C. are not before us here. 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 133 Opinion of the Court Nebraska did not violate that statute when it taxed respond- ent's interest income.6 III Respondent offers two objections to this interpretation of § 3124(a). We find neither of them persuasive. A The typical repurchase agreement at issue in this case ex- plicitly identifies the original transfer of the federal securi- ties to the Trusts as a "sale" and the subsequent transfer back to the Seller-Borrower as a "repurchase." Respondent maintains we should honor this characterization because the repos were structured by the Trusts and the Seller- Borrower as sales and repurchases for valid business and regulatory reasons independent of tax considerations. Re- spondent relies on our statement in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561, 583­584 (1978): "[W]here . . . there is a genuine multiple-party trans- action with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is im- bued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have mean- ingless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties." We do not believe it matters for purposes of § 3124(a) whether the repo is characterized as a sale and subsequent repurchase. A sale-repurchase characterization presumably would make the Trusts the "owners" of the federal securities 6 It follows from our analysis that it is the Seller-Borrower who earns the interest on the federal securities during the pendency of the repo. Nebraska Revenue Ruling 22­85­1 concludes as much: "The interest earned on the United States government obligations remains the income of the [party] who submitted the securities as collateral for the loan." Brief for Petitioner 4­5, n. 1. 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 134 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Opinion of the Court during the term of the repo. But the dispositive question is whether the Trusts earned interest on "obligations of the United States Government," not whether the Trusts "owned" such obligations. As respondent himself concedes, "[t]he concept of `ownership' is simply not an issue under 31 U. S. C. § 3124." Brief for Respondent 10. Even if it did matter how repos were characterized for purposes of § 3124(a), Frank Lyon Co. does not support re- spondent's position. Whatever the language relied on by re- spondent may mean, our decision in that case to honor the taxpayer's characterization of its transaction as a "sale-and- leaseback" rather than a "financing transaction" was founded on an examination of "the substance and economic realities of the transaction." 435 U. S., at 582. This examination in- cluded identification of 27 specific facts. See id., at 582­583. The substance and economic realities of the Trusts' repo transactions, as manifested in the specific facts discussed above, are that the Trusts do not receive either coupon inter- est or discount interest from federal securities by participat- ing in repos. Rather, in economic reality, the Trusts receive interest on cash they have lent to the Seller-Borrower. Respondent does not specifically dispute this conclusion but argues that repos are characterized as ordinary sales and repurchases for purposes of federal securities, bankruptcy, and banking law as well as commercial and local government law. We need not examine the accuracy of these assertions, for we are not called upon in this case to interpret any of those bodies of law. Our decision today is an interpretation only of 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a)-not the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Bankruptcy Code, or any other body of law. B At oral argument, respondent advanced another argument against the interpretation of § 3124(a) adopted here: Al- though petitioner's Revenue Ruling nominally acknowledges the right of the Seller-Borrower to claim the exemption granted by § 3124(a), Nebraska's income tax scheme will not 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 135 Opinion of the Court allow the Seller-Borrower to realize the full amount of the federal exemption. This would allegedly frustrate Con- gress' purpose in granting the exemption. According to re- spondent, after the Seller-Borrower has subtracted from its taxable income any "interest or dividends received by [it as] the owner of obligations of the United States," pursuant to subsection (a) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77­2716(1) (Supp. 1994), it will then be forced to add back "any interest on indebtedness incurred to carry the [federal] obligations," pursuant to sub- section (e)(i) of § 77­2716(1). Respondent conjectures that the interest paid by the Seller-Borrower to the Trusts in the course of repos may constitute just such interest. Respond- ent therefore hypothesizes that if the Seller-Borrower re- ceives, for example, $100 in interest as the holder of federal securities and pays out $90 to the Trusts in the course of repos involving those securities, Nebraska might give the Seller-Borrower an income tax exemption worth only $10 ($100 minus $90), rather than the $100 exemption that Con- gress arguably intended. There is a short answer to respondent's multilayered hypothesis: this case does not involve the construction or validity of Nebraska's add-back rule as applied in the repo context. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not cite § 77­ 2716(1)(e)(i) in its opinion, and we did not grant certiorari to consider that provision. IV Finally, respondent argues that Nebraska's taxation of income from repos involving federal securities violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. First, respondent contends that Nebraska discriminates against federal ob- ligations because it does not tax income from repos involv- ing Nebraska's own state and local obligations. Although Nebraska Revenue Ruling 22­85­1 concerns repos involving "federal government obligations" and does not mention their Nebraska counterparts, respondent has pointed to no stat- ute, revenue ruling, or other manifestation of Nebraska pol- 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT 136 NEBRASKA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. LOEWENSTEIN Opinion of the Court icy treating "state" repos any different from "federal" repos for tax purposes. Second, respondent cites our decision in Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 482 U. S. 182, 190 (1987), in which we stated that "the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine . . . is based on the proposition that the borrowing power is an essential aspect of the Federal Government's au- thority and, just as the Supremacy Clause bars the States from directly taxing federal property, it also bars the States from taxing federal obligations in a manner which has an adverse effect on the United States' borrowing ability." Ac- cording to respondent, undisputed expert testimony in the record establishes that the taxation at issue in this case will make it more difficult and expensive for the Federal Govern- ment to finance the national debt. This expert testimony essentially consists of a 1986 affi- davit sworn by Peter D. Sternlight, a former official of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In our view, Stern- light's affidavit has no relevance to this case. It concluded only that "an impairment of the repo market would make it less attractive for [government securities] dealers to perform [their] very useful . . . function [of underwriting a sizeable portion of Treasury securities], thus adding to Treasury in- terest costs." App. 42. But the "impairment" that worried Sternlight would result "[i]f repurchase agreements were to lose their present characteristics of flexibility and liquidity," or if repos became "unavailable" to certain kinds of public and private institutional investors. Id., at 42, 43. These possibilities might develop if repos were to be characterized as secured loans for purposes of federal bankruptcy and banking law or of commercial and local government law. Our decision today, however, says nothing about how repos should be characterized for those purposes.7 7 See also Brief for Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Amicus Cu- riae 9­10 ("The Sternlight Affidavit was filed by the New York Fed in 1986 as amicus curiae in [a case] which had nothing to do with state 513us1$10N 03-28-98 15:16:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 123 (1994) 137 Opinion of the Court Disregarding the inapplicable Sternlight affidavit, we find no evidence in the record that the taxation at issue will im- pair the market in federal securities or otherwise impair the borrowing ability of the Federal Government. Rockford Life confirmed the rule that " `when effort is made . . . to establish the unconstitutional character of a particular tax by claiming its remote effect will be to impair the borrowing power of the government, courts . . . ought to have some- thing more substantial to act upon than mere conjecture. The injury ought to be obvious and appreciable.' " 482 U. S., at 190, n. 10 (quoting Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 137­ 138 (1900)). Respondent has shown us no "obvious and appreciable" injury to the borrowing power of the United States Government as a result of Nebraska's taxation of the repo income earned by the Trusts. Rather, he has given us "mere conjecture." In these circumstances, we cannot justifiably conclude that Nebraska's taxation of income de- rived from repos involving federal securities violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. taxation of repo income. . . . Mr. Sternlight did not opine on the economic effect of state taxation of repo transaction income on [the market for] the underlying government securities"); Hearings on H. R. 2852 and H. R. 3418 before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 106­107 (1984) (letter of Peter D. Sternlight) ("[W]hile the Federal Reserve has gone on record as favoring purchase-and-sale characterization of repurchase agree- ments, that statement is limited to a bankruptcy context and should not be taken as an endorsement of purchase-and-sale characterization for tax, accounting, or other purposes" (emphasis added)). 513us1$11Z 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT 138 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. TRANSCON LINES et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 93­1318. Argued November 1, 1994-Decided January 10, 1995 The Interstate Commerce Act grants petitioner Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) authority to set the exclusive means by which com- mon carriers extend credit to shippers. Under the ICC's regulations, credit may be extended for periods of up to 30 days, and, if shippers fail to pay, carriers may assess interest charges and liquidated damages to cover collection costs. In this suit to enjoin the trustee in bankruptcy appointed for respondent motor carrier, Transcon Lines, from collecting liquidated damages from Transcon's former customers, the ICC asserted that Transcon had violated three of the credit regulations' procedural requirements: Its bills did not advise shippers of the consequences of late payment; revised bills were not issued within 90 days after the expiration of the authorized credit period; and damages were applied by a bankruptcy trustee on an aggregate basis. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part, holding that the filed rate doctrine and this Court's decision in Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, barred the ICC from enforcing its credit regulations in a manner that would prevent collection of a filed rate. On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals adhered to that determination. Held: The filed rate doctrine does not bar the injunction the ICC seeks. The Act grants the ICC broad authority to bring civil actions to enforce the statute and regulations or orders issued under it. This Court has specified that seeking a federal-court injunction to require a carrier to comply with the regulations is such an enforcement power. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U. S. 336, 352, 349. Although not without limits, the ICC's judgment that a particular rem- edy is an appropriate exercise of its enforcement authority is entitled to some deference. Two substantial reasons support the conclusion that the remedy chosen in this case is appropriate. First, it is necessary to the effective enforcement of the ICC's regulations. Should the injunc- tion be disallowed, trustees of bankrupt carriers would be immune, in effect, from enforcement of the credit regulations. Second, the remedy serves the intended beneficiaries of the violated regulations: shippers, whom the regulations protect from the imposition of penalties without 513us1$11Z 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 138 (1995) 139 Opinion of the Court warning. Id., at 345­346, distinguished. Neither Maislin nor this Court's other filed rate cases suggest that the doctrine prohibits the ICC from requiring departure from a filed rate when necessary to en- force other specific and valid regulations adopted under the Act. Con- trary to respondents' contention, the ICC is not seeking to enforce a secret, unfiled rate in place of a filed rate, but is seeking to enforce the rate for shipping over the rate for shipping plus collection efforts. Pp. 144­149. 9 F. 3d 64, reversed and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Michael R. Dreeben, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Henri F. Rush, Ellen D. Hanson, and Evelyn G. Kitay. Leonard L. Gumport argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Joseph L. Steinfeld, Jr., Robert B. Walker, John T. Siegler, and Richard S. Berger.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Though recent Acts of Congress have made substantial changes in the regulation of interstate motor carriers, see Negotiated Rates Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 2044; Trucking In- dustry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1683, this case arises under the law in effect before those enactments. We address once again the Interstate Commerce Act's filed rate requirements, 49 U. S. C. §§ 10761(a), 10762(a)(1), and *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Health and Personal Care Distribution Conference, Inc., et al. by Daniel J. Sweeney, Frederic L. Wood, and Nicholas J. DiMichael; and for the Transportation Claims and Prevention Council by William J. Augello and Mary Kay Reynolds. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters by Marc J. Fink, Judith A. Scott, and James A. McCall; and for Lloyd T. Whitaker as Trustee for the Estate of Olym- pia Holding Corp. by Kim D. Mann. 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT 140 ICC v. TRANSCON LINES Opinion of the Court their bearing on the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to enforce related provisions of the Act and regulations adopted under it. Under the filed rate doctrine applicable to the transactions here in question, motor carriers were required to publish their shipping rates in tariffs filed with the ICC and to receive only the published rates. Ibid. Our cases have taught the necessity of strict compliance with this scheme. E. g., Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116 (1990); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Max- well, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915). The question now presented is whether the filed rate doctrine bars the ICC from obtaining injunctive relief to enforce its credit regulations in a manner that would prevent collection of a rate filed in a published tariff. We hold that the filed rate doctrine does not bar the injunction the ICC seeks. I Transcon Lines (Transcon) was once the 12th largest motor carrier in the United States, operating under authori- zation from the ICC. Like many other carriers, Transcon became a victim of the heightened competition resulting from Congress' partial deregulation of the motor carrier industry in 1980. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. In May 1990, Transcon consented to an order for relief pursuant to an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed against it under Chapter 11. The trustee appointed by the Bank- ruptcy Court followed the practice of some other trustees for the estates of bankrupt carriers and sought to collect undercharges from Transcon's former customers. The trustee sought not only to collect unpaid freight charges but also to collect liquidated damages for late payment. Some 3,000 adversary proceedings brought by the trustee against Transcon's former customers are pending, and the ICC estimates the liquidated damages in question total about $15 million. 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 138 (1995) 141 Opinion of the Court The Act bars common carriers subject to the ICC's ju- risdiction from extending credit for their services except "[u]nder regulations of the [ICC] governing the payment for transportation and service and preventing discrimination." 49 U. S. C. §§ 10743(b)(1), 10743(a). By regulations under this express statutory delegation, the ICC has set out in detail the exclusive means by which common carriers can extend credit to shippers. See 49 CFR pt. 1320 (1994). Under the regulations, carriers are authorized to establish credit periods of up to 30 calendar days, §§ 1320.2(c), (d), and, if shippers fail to pay their charges within the estab- lished credit period, to assess service (or interest) charges, § 1320.2(e). Carriers also may assess liquidated damages to cover collection costs, either by a tariff rule or through con- tract terms in their bills of lading. §§ 1320.2(g)(1), (3). Be- fore collecting liquidated damages by tariff rule, however, a carrier must follow specified procedural requirements. First, the timing and conditions of any potential liquidated damages must be described clearly in the carrier's filed tar- iff. § 1320.2(g)(2)(i). Second, the original bill sent to the shipper must set forth any liquidated damages that would be assessed for failure to make timely payment of the freight charges. § 1320.3(c). Third, within 90 days after expiration of the authorized credit period the carrier must "issu[e] a revised freight bill or notice of imposition of collection expense charges for late payment." § 1320.2(g)(2)(vi). Fi- nally, liquidated damages "[s]hall be applied only to the non- payment of original, separate and independent freight bills and shall not apply to aggregate balance-due claims sought for collection on past shipments by a bankruptcy trustee, or any other person or agent . . . ." § 1320.2(g)(2)(iii). Upon satisfying these requirements, carriers may assess liquidated damages through a tariff rule by one of two meth- ods. The first is "to assess liquidated damages as a separate additional charge to the unpaid freight bill." § 1320.2(g)(1) (i). The second is to charge the shipper a "full, nondis- 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT 142 ICC v. TRANSCON LINES Opinion of the Court counted rate instead of the discounted rate [that might other- wise be] applicable." § 1320.2(g)(1)(ii). Transcon used the second, so-called loss-of-discount method to assess liquidated damages. The measure of liquidated damages under this method is prescribed by an ICC regulation. It provides: "The difference between the discount and the full rate constitutes a carrier's liquidated damages for its collec- tion effort. Under this method the tariff shall identify the discount rates that are subject to the condition prec- edent and which require the shipper to make payment by a date certain." Ibid. Transcon's customers had been charged discount rates, ex- pressed as a percentage of a generic bureau rate. To collect liquidated damages, the trustee demanded the nondiscount bureau rate from former customers who had failed to pay their original discount charges on time. The ICC sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California to enjoin the trustee from col- lecting loss-of-discount liquidated damages. It did not al- lege that Transcon had failed to state its liquidated damages provisions in its filed tariff. Transcon had specified in its "rules tariff" that "discounts . . . shall apply only when tariff charges are paid within 90 calendar days from date of ship- ment." ICC TCON 103­A, Item 210, 1 Supplemental Ex- cerpts of Record 41. The ICC did assert, though, that Transcon had violated each of the three other liquidated damages requirements set out above. Transcon's original bills did not advise shippers of the consequences of late pay- ment, as required by § 1320.3(c); revised bills were not issued until several years after the 90-day period provided in § 1320.2(g)(2)(vi); and the loss-of-discount provision was being applied by a bankruptcy trustee on an aggregate basis, contrary to § 1320.2(g)(2)(iii). The requested injunction would prohibit the trustee from pursuing claims in violation of those requirements. 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 138 (1995) 143 Opinion of the Court The District Court granted summary judgment for re- spondents, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, ICC v. Transcon Lines, 990 F. 2d 1503 (1993) (as amended on denial of rehear- ing and rehearing en banc). The Court of Appeals under- stood that the ICC as a general matter is authorized to en- force its credit regulations by seeking an injunction, see 49 U. S. C. §§ 11702(a)(4), (a)(6). It also recognized, or at least implied, that the credit regulations are valid on their face, but said that "[r]egulations, however valid in other contexts, cannot furnish the reason for letting the carrier abandon the filed rate." Transcon, supra, at 1514. Relying on our deci- sion in Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116 (1990), that the filed rate doctrine bars the ICC from interpreting the unreasonable practice rule to prevent collection of a filed rate where a carrier had agreed to a lower one, the court concluded that "[t]he ICC's interpretation of [the liquidated damages] regulations . . . has no greater force than the policy rejected in Maislin." 990 F. 2d, at 1514. It held that "the filed rate doctrine trumps the manner in which the ICC seeks to regulate carrier credit in this case." Ibid. After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, we decided Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258 (1993). The Court addressed whether a shipper's unreasonable rate claim could be raised in a carrier's suit to collect the difference between the amount charged and the higher amount due under the tariff, or whether the shipper's claim had to be raised in a separate proceeding before the ICC. We held the filed rate doctrine does not bar shippers from raising claims and defenses accorded by the Act, even if this results in defeating collection of a filed rate, and allowed the shipper to allege, subject to the ordinary rules governing counterclaims, an unreasonable-rate counterclaim to the carrier's undercharge action. Id., at 262­267. In light of Reiter, we vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment in the instant matter and re- manded for further consideration. 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT 144 ICC v. TRANSCON LINES Opinion of the Court On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier determination. 9 F. 3d 64 (CA9 1993). It found Reiter distinguishable but concluded that, even if it were apposite, Reiter did no more than require a balancing of the carrier's argument based on the filed rate doctrine against the ICC's argument based on the credit regulations. 9 F. 3d, at 66. It thought the balance tilted in favor of disallowing relief. A grant of an injunction would, the Court of Appeals rea- soned, "permit an end-run around the filed rate doctrine" by allowing a carrier and shipper to negotiate a private discount from the filed rate, while denying the injunction would still leave the ICC with "a wide array of tools for enforcing its credit regulations." Id., at 67. We again granted certiorari, 511 U. S. 1029 (1994), and now reverse. II Just as Reiter was in important respects "a sequel to our decision in Maislin," 507 U. S., at 260, this case is a sequel to our decision in Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U. S. 336 (1982). In Commercial Metals, the carrier released goods to the consignee before payment, but failed to investigate the consignee's credit standing, as ICC regulations required, 49 CFR § 1320.1 (1981). See 456 U. S., at 339, 341, and n. 6. When collection against the consignee proved fruitless and the carrier turned to the shipper for payment, the shipper sought to raise the carrier's violation as a defense. We held the defense improper when raised by the shipper, noting our reluctance to grant the shipper an implied remedy when the statutory scheme did not grant an express one. Id., at 345­348. We went on to say, however, that the case would have been quite different had it involved the ICC's seeking injunctive relief, a remedy for which it has specific authority under the Act. We held that "[t]he remedies for a carrier's violations of the regulations are best left to the ICC for such resolution as it thinks proper," and specified that "the ICC has ample authority to police the 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 138 (1995) 145 Opinion of the Court credit practices of carriers . . . [by] seek[ing] a federal-court injunction requiring a carrier to comply with the regulations . . . ." Id., at 352, 349. We conclude that the ICC here is exercising the enforcement powers we acknowledged in Commercial Metals. The Act grants the ICC broad authority to bring civil ac- tions to enforce the statute and regulations or orders issued under it. 49 U. S. C. § 11702. As respondents themselves concede, the trustee is attempting in this case to collect liqui- dated damages in violation of the ICC's credit regulations. See Brief in Opposition 4­5. To the extent the injunction applies to "a bankruptcy trustee" applying liquidated dam- ages "to aggregate balance-due claims sought for collection on past shipments," the ICC seeks a prospective bar to the trustee's violation of 49 CFR § 1320.2(g)(2)(iii) (1994). This aspect of the ICC's suit is, in effect, a compliance action- the precise relief the Court approved in Commercial Metals. To the extent the ICC seeks to enjoin collection of liquidated damages as a remedy for Transcon's lack of notification in the original bills, see 49 CFR § 1320.3(c) (1992), and nonissu- ance of revised bills within 90 days, see § 1320.2(g)(2)(vi), this remedy too is appropriate. The Court's observation in Commercial Metals that the choice of remedies for violation of its regulations is "best left to the ICC," 456 U. S., at 352, was a particular invocation of the general principle that "the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence," Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941); ICC v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 467 U. S. 354, 355 (1984) (ICC "has discretion to fashion remedies in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities") (citing Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 654 (1978)). Although the ICC's authority to determine proper remedies for violations under the Act is not without limits, its judgment that a particular remedy is an appropriate exercise of its enforcement author- ity under 49 U. S. C. § 11702(a)(4) is entitled to some defer- 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT 146 ICC v. TRANSCON LINES Opinion of the Court ence. Two substantial reasons support our conclusion that the remedy chosen by the agency is an appropriate one. First, its remedy appears to the ICC, and to us, necessary to the effective enforcement of its regulations. See Com- mercial Metals, supra, at 350, 352; see also Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U. S. 84, 88 (1962) (remedy allowed where its absence would "plac[e] the ship- per entirely at the mercy of the carrier"). Were we to disal- low the injunction, respondents and other trustees of bank- rupt carriers would be immune, in effect, from enforcement of the credit regulations. Relief limited to prospective in- junctions requiring carriers to provide notice of liquidated damages and to send revised bills could have no effect on bankrupt carriers and their trustees. Nor do the Act's remedies for unlawful rates, see 49 U. S. C. §§ 10704(b)(1), 11705(b)(3), allow for adequate enforcement of the credit regulations, for not every credit violation will result in an unlawful rate. Second, unlike the credit regulation violated in Commer- cial Metals, which was intended to protect carriers, 456 U. S., at 345­346, the requirements for notice of liquidated damages are to protect shippers from the imposition of pen- alties without warning. When a carrier fails to provide no- tice, it is an appropriate remedy for the ICC to bar collection of the liquidated damages, for the remedy serves the regula- tions' intended beneficiaries. Cf. id., at 344­345 (regulations do not "intimate that a carrier's violation of the credit rules [there at issue] automatically precludes it from collecting the lawful freight charge"). In short, whether or not we would allow shippers to de- fend against a carrier's collection action by relying on the carrier's violation of credit regulations, it follows from Com- mercial Metals and our construction of the controlling stat- ute that the ICC has the authority and the discretion to de- termine appropriate remedies for these violations. Where, as here, the remedy involves "a federal-court injunction re- 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 138 (1995) 147 Opinion of the Court quiring a carrier to comply with the regulations," id., at 349; constitutes a reasonable and necessary means to effect en- forcement of the ICC's credit regulations; and protects the intended beneficiaries of the violated regulations, we believe the injunction is authorized under the Act. In Maislin we concluded the ICC's policy and its interpre- tation of the Act were "flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole." 497 U. S., at 131. We rejected the ICC's enforcement policy, just as we had declined to permit general, nonstatutory equitable defenses in a collection suit. Our concern was that the policy would undercut the whole filed rate system, thus permitting shippers to enforce secret, negotiated, unfiled rates and allowing carriers to discrimi- nate in favor of certain customers. Id., at 130­131. Neither Maislin nor our other filed rate cases suggest that the filed rate doctrine prohibits the ICC from requiring de- parture from a filed rate when necessary to enforce other specific and valid regulations adopted under the Act, regula- tions that are consistent with the filed rate system and com- patible with its effective operation. Carriers must comply with the comprehensive scheme provided by the statute and regulations promulgated under it, and their failure to do so may justify departure from the filed rate. In Reiter, for ex- ample, we confirmed that the filed rate doctrine "assuredly does not preclude avoidance of the tariff rate . . . through claims and defenses that are specifically accorded by the [Act] itself." 507 U. S., at 266 (emphasis deleted). Here, of course, the ICC can and does rely upon Commercial Metals, governing the powers of the ICC and not the defenses avail- able to shippers. As we acknowledged in Maislin, the ICC can require that filed rates be " `suspended or set aside' " in various circumstances. 497 U. S., at 126 (quoting Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922)); see also ICC v. American Trucking Assns., supra, at 360 ("[T]he Commission may conduct an investigation into a tar- iff's lawfulness at any time after it has gone into effect," and 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT 148 ICC v. TRANSCON LINES Opinion of the Court where a tariff violates the Act, "the Commission has author- ity to cancel the tariff and require that a reasonable and non- discriminatory rate apply in the future. § 10704(b)(1)"). Any remaining doubts as to the appropriateness of the re- lief sought are dispelled upon close examination of respond- ents' particular contention that an injunction here would dis- place the tariff system by substituting a private agreement for the filed rate. This is not so. The charge that cannot be collected is, as respondents themselves concede, Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, the charge for liquidated damages. The ICC has said in a regulation promulgated under the Act that "[t]he difference between the discount and the full rate constitutes a carrier's liquidated damages for its collection effort." 49 CFR § 1320.2(g)(1)(ii) (1994); see 49 U. S. C. § 10743(b)(1) (Act authorizes the extension of credit-and therefore any liquidated damages resulting from the exten- sion of credit-only pursuant to ICC regulations). The reg- ulation is entitled to deference as an interpretation of the Act. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Thus, the ICC is not seeking to enforce a secret, unfiled rate in place of a filed rate, but is seeking to enforce the rate for shipping over the rate for shipping plus collection efforts. See Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U. S., at 88 (enforcing lower of two filed rates in no manner "hampers the efficient administration of the Act"). III The Act by express terms authorizes the ICC to promul- gate credit regulations. It also gives the ICC "the power to seek a federal-court injunction requiring a carrier to com- ply with [its credit] regulations." Commercial Metals, 456 U. S., at 349 (citation omitted). The injunctive relief sought by the ICC is both necessary and appropriate to effective enforcement of its valid credit regulations, and does not "permi[t] the very price discrimination that the Act by its 513us1$11L 04-04-98 13:50:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 138 (1995) 149 Opinion of the Court terms seeks to prevent." Maislin, 497 U. S., at 130. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 513us1$12Z 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 150 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus TOME v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 93­6892. Argued October 5, 1994-Decided January 10, 1995 Petitioner Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter A. T. when she was four years old. The Government theorized that he com- mitted the assault while A. T. was in his custody and that the crime was disclosed while she was spending vacation time with her mother. The defense countered that the allegations were concocted so A. T. would not be returned to her father, who had primary physical custody. A. T. testified at the trial, and, in order to rebut the implicit charge that her testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother, the Gov- ernment presented six witnesses who recounted out-of-court statements that A. T. made about the alleged assault while she was living with her mother. The District Court admitted the statements under, inter alia, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which provides that prior state- ments of a witness are not hearsay if they are consistent with the wit- ness' testimony and offered to rebut a charge against the witness of "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Tome was con- victed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, adopting the Government's argument that A. T.'s statements were admissible even though they had been made after her alleged motive to fabricate arose. Reasoning that the premotive requirement is a function of relevancy, not the hearsay rules, the court balanced A. T.'s motive to lie against the probative value of one of the statements and determined that the District Court had not erred in admitting the statements. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 3 F. 3d 342, reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II­B, concluding: 1. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits the introduction of a declarant's consist- ent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged fabrication, influence, or motive, conditions that were not established here. Pp. 156­160, 163­166. (a) Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the prevailing common-law rule in existence for more than a century before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted: A prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if 513us1$12Z 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 151 Syllabus the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being but was inadmissible if made afterwards. The Rule's language speaks of rebutting charges of recent fabrication and improper influence and motive to the exclusion of other forms of impeachment, and it bears close similarity to the language used in many of the common-law premotive requirement cases. Pp. 156­160. (b) The Government's argument that the common-law rule is incon- sistent with the Federal Rules' liberal approach to relevancy miscon- ceives the design of the Rules' hearsay provisions. Hearsay evidence is often relevant. But if relevance were the sole criterion of admissibil- ity, it would be difficult to account for the Rules' general proscription of hearsay testimony or the traditional analysis of hearsay that the Rules, for the most part, reflect. The Government's reliance on academic com- mentators critical of excluding a witness' out-of-court statements is also misplaced. The Advisory Committee rejected the balancing approach such commentators proposed when the Rules were adopted. The ap- proach used by the Court of Appeals here creates the precise dangers the Advisory Committee sought to avoid: It involves considerable judi- cial discretion, reduces predictability, and enhances the difficulties of trial preparation because parties will have difficulty knowing in advance whether or not particular out-of-court statements will be admitted. Pp. 163­165. (c) The instant case illustrates some of the important considera- tions supporting the foregoing interpretation. Permitting the intro- duction of prior statements as substantive evidence to rebut every im- plicit charge that a witness' in-court testimony results from recent fabrication or improper influence or motive would shift the trial's whole emphasis to the out-of-court, rather than the in-court, statements. It may be difficult to ascertain when a particular fabrication, influence, or motive arose in some cases. However, a majority of common-law courts were performing this task for over a century, and the Government has presented no evidence that those courts or the courts that adhere to the rule today have been unable to make the determination. Pp. 165­166. 2. The admissibility of A. T.'s statements under Rule 803(24) or any other evidentiary principle is left for the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance. Pp. 166­167. Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II­A, II­C, and III, in which Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II­B, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 167. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 513us1$12Z 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 152 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 169. Joseph W. Gandert argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Tova Indritz and Carol H. Marion. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, and Deborah Watson.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II­B. Various Federal Courts of Appeals are divided over the evidence question presented by this case. At issue is the interpretation of a provision in the Federal Rules of Evi- dence bearing upon the admissibility of statements, made by a declarant who testifies as a witness, that are consistent with the testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of a "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The question is whether out-of- court consistent statements made after the alleged fabrica- tion, or after the alleged improper influence or motive arose, are admissible under the Rule. I Petitioner Tome was charged in a one-count indictment with the felony of sexual abuse of a child, his own daughter, *A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Jimmy Evans of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffery B. Pine of Rhode Island, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Jan Graham of Utah, and Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont. Bruce Robert Rogoff filed a brief for the National Association of Crimi- nal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae. 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 153 Opinion of the Court aged four at the time of the alleged crime. The case having arisen on the Navajo Indian Reservation, Tome was tried by a jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, where he was found guilty of violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2245(2)(A) and (B). Tome and the child's mother had been divorced in 1988. A tribal court awarded joint custody of the daughter, A. T., to both parents, but Tome had primary physical custody. In 1989 the mother was unsuccessful in petitioning the tribal court for primary custody of A. T., but was awarded custody for the summer of 1990. Neither parent attended a further custody hearing in August 1990. On August 27, 1990, the mother contacted Colorado authorities with allegations that Tome had committed sexual abuse against A. T. The prosecution's theory was that Tome committed sexual assaults upon the child while she was in his custody and that the crime was disclosed when the child was spending vaca- tion time with her mother. The defense argued that the al- legations were concocted so the child would not be returned to her father. At trial A. T., then 61 2 years old, was the Government's first witness. For the most part, her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of leading questions. Cross-examination took place over two trial days. The defense asked A. T. 348 questions. On the first day A. T. answered all the questions posed to her on general, background subjects. The next day there was no testimony, and the prosecutor met with A. T. When cross-examination of A. T. resumed, she was questioned about those conversations but was reluc- tant to discuss them. Defense counsel then began question- ing her about the allegations of abuse, and it appears she was reluctant at many points to answer. As the trial judge noted, however, some of the defense questions were impre- cise or unclear. The judge expressed his concerns with the examination of A. T., observing there were lapses of as much as 40­55 seconds between some questions and the answers 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 154 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court and that on the second day of examination the witness seemed to be losing concentration. The trial judge stated, "We have a very difficult situation here." After A. T. testified, the Government produced six wit- nesses who testified about a total of seven statements made by A. T. describing the alleged sexual assaults: A. T.'s baby- sitter recited A. T.'s statement to her on August 22, 1990, that she did not want to return to her father because he "gets drunk and he thinks I'm his wife"; the babysitter re- lated further details given by A. T. on August 27, 1990, while A. T.'s mother stood outside the room and listened after the mother had been unsuccessful in questioning A. T. herself; the mother recounted what she had heard A. T. tell the baby- sitter; a social worker recounted details A. T. told her on August 29, 1990, about the assaults; and three pediatricians, Drs. Kuper, Reich, and Spiegel, related A. T.'s statements to them describing how and where she had been touched by Tome. All but A. T.'s statement to Dr. Spiegel implicated Tome. (The physicians also testified that their clinical ex- aminations of the child indicated that she had been subjected to vaginal penetrations. That part of the testimony is not at issue here.) A. T.'s out-of-court statements, recounted by the six witnesses, were offered by the Government under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The trial court admitted all of the statements over defense counsel's objection, accepting the Government's argument that they rebutted the implicit charge that A. T.'s testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother. The court also admitted A. T.'s August 22d statement to her babysitter under Rule 803(24), and the statements to Dr. Kuper (and apparently also to Dr. Reich) under Rule 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis). The Gov- ernment offered the testimony of the social worker under both Rules 801(d)(1)(B) and 803(24), but the record does not indicate whether the court ruled on the latter ground. No 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 155 Opinion of the Court objection was made to Dr. Spiegel's testimony. Following trial, Tome was convicted and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, adopting the Government's argument that all of A. T.'s out-of-court statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) even though they had been made after A. T.'s alleged motive to fabricate arose. The court reasoned that "the pre-motive requirement is a function of the relevancy rules, not the hearsay rules" and that as a "function of rele- vance, the pre-motive rule is clearly too broad . . . because it is simply not true that an individual with a motive to lie always will do so." 3 F. 3d 342, 350 (1993). "Rather, the relevance of the prior consistent statement is more accu- rately determined by evaluating the strength of the motive to lie, the circumstances in which the statement is made, and the declarant's demonstrated propensity to lie." Ibid. The court recognized that some Circuits require that the consist- ent statements, to be admissible under the Rule, must be made before the motive or influence arose, see, e. g., United States v. Guevara, 598 F. 2d 1094, 1100 (CA7 1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F. 2d 224, 234 (CA2 1978), but cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Miller, 874 F. 2d 1255, 1272 (1989), in support of its balancing approach. Ap- plying this balancing test to A. T.'s first statement to her babysitter, the Court of Appeals determined that although A. T. might have had "some motive to lie, we do not believe that it is a particularly strong one." 3 F. 3d, at 351. The court held that the District Judge had not abused his discre- tion in admitting A. T.'s out-of-court statements. It did not analyze the probative quality of A. T.'s six other out-of-court statements, nor did it reach the admissibility of the state- ments under any other rule of evidence. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1109 (1994), and now reverse. 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 156 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court II The prevailing common-law rule for more than a century before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was that a prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive was ad- missible if the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being, but it was inadmissible if made afterwards. As Justice Story ex- plained: "[W]here the testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date, . . . in order to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent declaration of the party may be admitted." Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 439 (1836) (emphasis added). See also People v. Singer, 300 N. Y. 120, 124­125, 89 N. E. 2d 710, 712 (1949). McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule in a more cate- gorical manner: "[T]he applicable principle is that the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated." E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 49, p. 105 (2d ed. 1972) (hereafter McCormick). See also 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1128, p. 268 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1972) (hereafter Wigmore) ("A consistent statement, at a time prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias . . . will effectively explain away the force of the impeaching evidence" (emphasis in original)). The question is whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies this tem- poral requirement. We hold that it does. A Rule 801 provides: "(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if- "(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testi- fies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross- examination concerning the statement, and the state- ment is . . . 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 157 Opinion of the Court "(B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is of- fered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Rule 801 defines prior consistent statements as nonhear- say only if they are offered to rebut a charge of "recent fabri- cation or improper influence or motive." Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Noting the "troublesome" logic of treating a witness' prior consistent statements as hearsay at all (be- cause the declarant is present in court and subject to cross- examination), the Advisory Committee decided to treat those consistent statements, once the preconditions of the Rule were satisfied, as nonhearsay and admissible as substantive evidence, not just to rebut an attack on the witness' credibil- ity. See Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 773. A consistent statement meeting the requirements of the Rule is thus placed in the same category as a declarant's inconsistent statement made under oath in another proceeding, or prior identification tes- timony, or admissions by a party opponent. See Fed. Rule Evid. 801. The Rules do not accord this weighty, nonhearsay status to all prior consistent statements. To the contrary, admissi- bility under the Rules is confined to those statements offered to rebut a charge of "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive," the same phrase used by the Advisory Commit- tee in its description of the "traditiona[l]" common law of evidence, which was the background against which the Rules were drafted. See Advisory Committee's Notes, supra, at 773. Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited. In the present context, the question is whether A. T.'s out-of-court state- ments rebutted the alleged link between her desire to be with her mother and her testimony, not whether they sug- gested that A. T.'s in-court testimony was true. The Rule 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 158 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court speaks of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told. This limitation is instructive, not only to establish the pre- conditions of admissibility but also to reinforce the signifi- cance of the requirement that the consistent statements must have been made before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose. That is to say, the forms of impeachment within the Rule's coverage are the ones in which the tempo- ral requirement makes the most sense. Impeachment by charging that the testimony is a recent fabrication or results from an improper influence or motive is, as a general matter, capable of direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court consistent statements that predate the al- leged fabrication, influence, or motive. A consistent state- ment that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive. By contrast, prior consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment are involved. McCormick § 49, p. 105 ("When the attack takes the form of impeachment of character, by showing mis- conduct, convictions or bad reputation, it is generally agreed that there is no color for sustaining by consistent statements. The defense does not meet the assault" (footnote omitted)); see also 4 Wigmore § 1131, p. 293 ("The broad rule obtains in a few courts that consistent statements may be admitted after impeachment of any sort-in particular after any im- peachment by cross-examination. But there is no reason for such a loose rule" (footnote omitted)). There may arise instances when out-of-court statements that postdate the alleged fabrication have some probative force in rebutting a charge of fabrication or improper influ- ence or motive, but those statements refute the charged fab- rication in a less direct and forceful way. Evidence that a witness made consistent statements after the alleged motive to fabricate arose may suggest in some degree that the in- court testimony is truthful, and thus suggest in some degree 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 159 Opinion of the Court that that testimony did not result from some improper influ- ence; but if the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) intended to countenance rebuttal along that indirect inferential chain, the purpose of confining the types of impeachment that open the door to rebuttal by introducing consistent statements becomes unclear. If consistent statements are admissible without reference to the timeframe we find imbedded in the Rule, there appears no sound reason not to admit consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well. Whatever objections can be leveled against limiting the Rule to this designated form of impeachment and confining the rebuttal to those statements made before the fabrication or improper influence or motive arose, it is clear to us that the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) were relying upon the common- law temporal requirement. The underlying theory of the Government's position is that an out-of-court consistent statement, whenever it was made, tends to bolster the testimony of a witness and so tends also to rebut an express or implied charge that the testimony has been the product of an improper influence. Congress could have adopted that rule with ease, providing, for instance, that "a witness' prior consistent statements are admissible whenever relevant to assess the witness' truthfulness or accuracy." The theory would be that, in a broad sense, any prior statement by a witness concerning the disputed issues at trial would have some relevance in assessing the accuracy or truthfulness of the witness' in-court testimony on the same subject. The narrow Rule enacted by Congress, how- ever, cannot be understood to incorporate the Government's theory. Our analysis is strengthened by the observation that the somewhat peculiar language of the Rule bears close simi- larity to the language used in many of the common-law cases that describe the premotive requirement. "Rule 801(d)(1) (B) employs the precise language-`rebut[ting] . . . charge[s] . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive'- 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 160 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Kennedy, J. consistently used in the panoply of pre-1975 decisions." Oh- lbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 231, 245. See, e. g., Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet., at 439; Hanger v. United States, 398 F. 2d 91, 104 (CA8 1968); People v. Singer, 300 N. Y. 120, 89 N. E. 2d 710 (1949). The language of the Rule, in its concentration on rebutting charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive to the exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well as in its use of wording that follows the language of the common- law cases, suggests that it was intended to carry over the common-law premotive rule. B Our conclusion that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the common-law premotive requirement is confirmed by an ex- amination of the Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. We have relied on those well-considered Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules. See, e. g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U. S. 681, 688 (1988); United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554, 562 (1988). Where, as with Rule 801(d)(1)(B), "Congress did not amend the Advisory Committee's draft in any way . . . the Commit- tee's commentary is particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted." Beech Air- craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 165­166, n. 9 (1988). The Notes are also a respected source of scholarly commen- tary. Professor Cleary was a distinguished commentator on the law of evidence, and he and members of the Committee consulted and considered the views, criticisms, and sugges- tions of the academic community in preparing the Notes. The Notes disclose a purpose to adhere to the common law in the application of evidentiary principles, absent express provisions to the contrary. Where the Rules did depart from their common-law antecedents, in general the Commit- 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 161 Opinion of Kennedy, J. tee said so. See, e. g., Notes on Rule 804(b)(4), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 790 ("The general common law requirement that a declaration in this area must have been made ante litem motam has been dropped, as bearing more appropriately on weight than admissibility"); Rule 804(b)(2), id., at 789 ("The exception is the familiar dying declaration of the common law, expanded somewhat beyond its traditionally narrow lim- its"); Rule 804(b)(3), ibid. ("The exception discards the com- mon law limitation and expands to the full logical limit"). The Notes give no indication, however, that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) abandoned the premotive requirement. The entire discus- sion of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is limited to the following comment: "Prior consistent statements traditionally have been ad- missible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or im- proper influence or motive but not as substantive evi- dence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received gener- ally." Notes on Rule 801(d)(1)(B), id., at 773. Throughout their discussion of the Rules, the Advisory Committee's Notes rely on Wigmore and McCormick as au- thority for the common-law approach. In light of the cate- gorical manner in which those authors state the premotive requirement, see supra, at 156, it is difficult to imagine that the drafters, who noted the new substantive use of prior con- sistent statements, would have remained silent if they in- tended to modify the premotive requirement. As we ob- served with respect to another provision of the Rules, "[w]ith this state of unanimity confronting the drafters of the Fed- eral Rules of Evidence, we think it unlikely that they in- tended to scuttle entirely [the common-law requirement]." United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984). Here, we do not think the drafters of the Rule intended to scuttle the 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 162 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Kennedy, J. whole premotive requirement and rationale without so much as a whisper of explanation. Observing that Edward Cleary was the Reporter of the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules, the Court has relied upon his writings as persuasive authority on the mean- ing of the Rules. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu- ticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993); Abel, supra, at 51­52. Cleary also was responsible for the 1972 revision of McCor- mick's treatise, which included an examination of the changes introduced by the proposed federal rules to the common-law practice of impeachment and rehabilitation. The discussion, which occurs only three paragraphs after the treatise's cate- gorical description of the common-law premotive rule, also lacks any indication that the proposed rules were abandoning that temporal limitation. See McCormick § 50, p. 107. Our conclusion is bolstered by the Advisory Committee's stated "unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence." See Notes on Rule 801(d)(1), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 773. Rule 801(d), which "enumerates three situations in which the statement is excepted from the category of hearsay," ibid., was expressly contrasted by the Committee with Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) (1953), "which allows any out-of-court statement of a declarant who is present at the trial and available for cross- examination." Notes on Rule 801(d)(1), supra, at 773 (em- phasis added). When a witness presents important testi- mony damaging to a party, the party will often counter with at least an implicit charge that the witness has been under some influence or motive to fabricate. If Rule 801 were read so that the charge opened the floodgates to any prior consist- ent statement that satisfied Rule 403, as the Tenth Circuit concluded, the distinction between rejected Uniform Rule 63(1) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would all but disappear. That Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits prior consistent statements to be used for substantive purposes after the statements are admitted to rebut the existence of an improper influence or 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 163 Opinion of the Court motive makes it all the more important to observe the pre- conditions for admitting the evidence in the first place. The position taken by the Rules reflects a compromise between the views expressed by the "bulk of the case law . . . against allowing prior statements of witnesses to be used generally as substantive evidence" and the views of the majority of "writers . . . [who] ha[d] taken the opposite position." Ibid. That compromise was one that the Committee candidly ad- mitted was a "judgment . . . more of experience than of logic." Ibid. "A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change." Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 521 (1989) (applying that presumption in interpret- ing Federal Rule of Evidence 609). Nothing in the Advisory Committee's Notes suggests that it intended to alter the common-law premotive requirement. C The Government's final argument in favor of affirmance is that the common-law premotive rule advocated by petitioner is inconsistent with the Federal Rules' liberal approach to relevancy and with strong academic criticism, beginning in the 1940's, directed at the exclusion of out-of-court state- ments made by a declarant who is present in court and sub- ject to cross-examination. This argument misconceives the design of the Rules' hearsay provisions. Hearsay evidence is often relevant. "The only way in which the probative force of hearsay differs from the proba- tive force of other testimony is in the absence of oath, de- meanor, and cross-examination as aids in determining credi- bility." Advisory Committee's Introduction to Article VIII, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 771. That does not resolve the matter, however. Relevance is not the sole criterion of admissibil- ity. Otherwise, it would be difficult to account for the Rules' general proscription of hearsay testimony (absent a specific 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 164 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court exception), see Fed. Rule Evid. 802, let alone the traditional analysis of hearsay that the Rules, for the most part, reflect. Ibid. ("The approach to hearsay in these rules is that of the common law. . . . The traditional hearsay exceptions are drawn upon for the exceptions . . ."). That certain out-of- court statements may be relevant does not dispose of the question whether they are admissible. The Government's reliance on academic commentators critical of excluding out-of-court statements by a witness, see Brief for United States 40, is subject to like criticism. To be sure, certain commentators in the years preceding the adoption of the Rules had been critical of the common-law approach to hearsay, particularly its categorical exclusion of out-of-court statements offered for substantive purposes. See, e. g., Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331, 344­345 (1961) (gathering sources). Gen- eral criticism was directed to the exclusion of a declarant's out-of-court statements where the declarant testified at trial. See, e. g., id., at 333 ("[T]reating the out of court statement of the witness himself as hearsay" is a "practical absurdity in many instances"); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Ap- plication of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192­ 196 (1948). As an alternative, they suggested moving away from the categorical exclusion of hearsay and toward a case- by-case balancing of the probative value of particular state- ments against their likely prejudicial effect. See Weinstein, supra, at 338; Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 506 (1934). The Advisory Committee, how- ever, was explicit in rejecting this balancing approach to hearsay: "The Advisory Committee has rejected this approach to hearsay as involving too great a measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, [and] enhancing the difficulties of preparation for trial." Advisory Committee's Introduction, supra, at 771. 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 165 Opinion of the Court Given the Advisory Committee's rejection of both the gen- eral balancing approach to hearsay and of Uniform Rule 63(1), see supra, at 162, the Government's reliance on the views of those who advocated these positions is misplaced. The statement-by-statement balancing approach advo- cated by the Government and adopted by the Tenth Circuit creates the precise dangers the Advisory Committee noted and sought to avoid: It involves considerable judicial discre- tion; it reduces predictability; and it enhances the difficulties of trial preparation because parties will have difficulty know- ing in advance whether or not particular out-of-court state- ments will be admitted. See Advisory Committee's Intro- duction, supra, at 771. D The case before us illustrates some of the important con- siderations supporting the Rule as we interpret it, especially in criminal cases. If the Rule were to permit the introduc- tion of prior statements as substantive evidence to rebut every implicit charge that a witness' in-court testimony re- sults from recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial could shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones. The present case illus- trates the point. In response to a rather weak charge that A. T.'s testimony was a fabrication created so the child could remain with her mother, the Government was permitted to present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more than recount A. T.'s detailed out-of-court state- ments to them. Although those statements might have been probative on the question whether the alleged conduct had occurred, they shed but minimal light on whether A. T. had the charged motive to fabricate. At closing argument be- fore the jury, the Government placed great reliance on the prior statements for substantive purposes but did not once seek to use them to rebut the impact of the alleged motive. We are aware that in some cases it may be difficult to ascertain when a particular fabrication, influence, or motive 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 166 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court arose. Yet, as the Government concedes, a majority of common-law courts were performing this task for well over a century, see Brief for United States 39, and the Govern- ment has presented us with no evidence that those courts, or the judicial circuits that adhere to the rule today, have been unable to make the determination. Even under the Government's hypothesis, moreover, the thing to be rebutted must be identified, so the date of its origin cannot be that much more difficult to ascertain. By contrast, as the Advi- sory Committee commented, see supra, at 164, the Govern- ment's approach, which would require the trial court to weigh all of the circumstances surrounding a statement that suggest its probativeness against the court's assessment of the strength of the alleged motive, would entail more of a burden, with no guidance to attorneys in preparing a case or to appellate courts in reviewing a judgment. III Courts must be sensitive to the difficulties attendant upon the prosecution of alleged child abusers. In almost all cases a youth is the prosecution's only eyewitness. But "[t]his Court cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants might prefer different rules in a particular class of cases." United States v. Salerno, 505 U. S. 317, 322 (1992). When a party seeks to introduce out-of-court statements that contain strong circumstantial indicia of reliability, that are highly probative on the material questions at trial, and that are better than other evidence otherwise available, there is no need to distort the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). If its requirements are met, Rule 803(24) exists for that eventual- ity. We intimate no view, however, concerning the admissi- bility of any of A. T.'s out-of-court statements under that section, or any other evidentiary principle. These matters, and others, are for the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance. 513us1$12L 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 167 Opinion of Scalia, J. Our holding is confined to the requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. These conditions of admissibility were not established here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment of the Court, and join its opinion except for Part II­B. That Part, which is devoted entirely to a discussion of the Advisory Committee's Notes pertinent to Rule 801(d)(1)(B), gives effect to those Notes not only be- cause they are "a respected source of scholarly commentary," ante, at 160, but also because they display the "purpose," ibid., or "inten[t]," ante, at 161, of the draftsmen. I have previously acquiesced in, see, e. g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153 (1988), and indeed myself engaged in, see United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554, 562 (1988), similar use of the Advisory Committee Notes. More mature consideration has persuaded me that is wrong. Hav- ing been prepared by a body of experts, the Notes are as- suredly persuasive scholarly commentaries-ordinarily the most persuasive-concerning the meaning of the Rules. But they bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen, any more than the views of Alexander Hamil- ton (a draftsman) bear more authority than the views of Thomas Jefferson (not a draftsman) with regard to the mean- ing of the Constitution. It is the words of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted-by this Court, or by Congress if it makes a statutory change. See 28 U. S. C. 513us1$12K 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 168 TOME v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Scalia, J. §§ 2072, 2074 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). In my view even the adopting Justices' thoughts, unpromulgated as Rules, have no authoritative (as opposed to persuasive) effect, any more than their thoughts regarding an opinion (reflected in ex- changes of memoranda before the opinion issues) authorita- tively demonstrate the meaning of that opinion. And the same for the thoughts of congressional draftsmen who pre- pare statutory amendments to the Rules. Like a judicial opinion and like a statute, the promulgated Rule says what it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters. The Notes are, to be sure, submitted to us and to the Members of Con- gress as the thoughts of the body initiating the recommenda- tions, see § 2073(d); but there is no certainty that either we or they read those thoughts, nor is there any procedure by which we formally endorse or disclaim them. That being so, the Notes cannot, by some power inherent in the draftsmen, change the meaning that the Rules would otherwise bear. In the present case, the merely persuasive force of the Advisory Committee Notes suffices. Indeed, in my view the case can be adequately resolved without resort to the Advi- sory Committee at all. It is well established that " ` "the body of common law knowledge" ' " must be " ` "a source of guidance" ' " in our interpretation of the Rules. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 52 (1984) (quot- ing Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evi- dence, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 908, 915 (1978))). Rule 801(d)(1)(B) uses language that tracks common-law cases and prescribes a result that makes no sense except on the assumption that that language indeed adopts the common-law rule. As the Court's opinion points out, only the premotive-statement lim- itation makes it rational to admit a prior corroborating state- ment to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper mo- tive, but not to rebut a charge that the witness' memory is playing tricks. 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 169 Breyer, J., dissenting Justice Breyer, with whom The Chief Justice, Jus- tice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. The basic issue in this case concerns not hearsay, but rele- vance. As the majority points out, the common law permit- ted a lawyer to rehabilitate a witness (after a charge of im- proper motive) by pointing to the fact that the witness had said the same thing earlier-but only if the witness made the earlier statement before the motive to lie arose. The reason for the time limitation was that, otherwise, the prior consistent statement had no relevance to rebut the charge that the in-court testimony was the product of the motive to lie. The treatises, discussing the matter under the general heading of "impeachment and support" (McCormick) or "rel- evancy" (Wigmore), and not "hearsay," make this clear, stat- ing, for example, that a " `prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute [a] charge [of recent fabrication, etc.,] unless the consist- ent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated.' " Ante, at 156 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 49, p. 105 (2d ed. 1972) (hereinafter McCormick)). The majority believes that a hearsay-related rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), codifies this absolute timing requirement. I do not. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has nothing to do with relevance. Rather, that Rule carves out a subset of prior consistent statements that were formerly admissible only to rehabilitate a witness (a nonhearsay use that relies upon the fact that the statement was made). It then says that members of that subset are "not hearsay." This means that, if such a statement is admissible for a particular reha- bilitative purpose (to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive), its proponent now may use it substantively, for a hearsay purpose (i. e., as evidence of its truth), as well. 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:10 PAGES OPINPGT 170 TOME v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting The majority is correct in saying that there are different kinds of categories of prior consistent statements that can rehabilitate a witness in different ways, including statements (a) placing a claimed inconsistent statement in context; (b) showing that an inconsistent statement was not made; (c) indicating that the witness' memory is not as faulty as a cross-examiner has claimed; and (d) showing that the witness did not recently fabricate his testimony as a result of an im- proper influence or motive. See United States v. Rubin, 609 F. 2d 51, 68 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring). But, I do not see where, in the existence of several categories, the majority can find the premise, which it seems to think is important, that the reason the drafters singled out one cate- gory (category (d)) was that category's special probative force in respect to rehabilitating a witness. Nor, in any event, do I understand how that premise can help the major- ity reach its conclusion about the common-law timing rule. I doubt the premise because, as McCormick points out, other categories of prior consistent statements (used for rehabilitation) also, on occasion, seem likely to have strong probative force. What, for example, about such statements introduced to rebut a charge of faulty memory (category (c) above)? McCormick says about such statements: "If the witness's accuracy of memory is challenged, it seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support." McCormick § 49, at 105, n. 88 (empha- sis added). Would not such statements (received in evi- dence to rehabilitate) often turn out to be highly probative as well? More important, the majority's conclusion about timing seems not to follow from its "especially probative force" premise. That is because probative force has little to do with the concerns underlying hearsay law. Hearsay law basically turns on an out-of-court declarant's reliability, as tested through cross-examination; it does not normally turn 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 171 Breyer, J., dissenting on the probative force (if true) of that declarant's statement. The "timing" circumstance (the fact that a prior consistent statement was made after a motive to lie arose) may dimin- ish probative force, but it does not diminish reliability. Thus, from a hearsay perspective, the timing of a prior con- sistent statement is basically beside the point. At the same time, one can find a hearsay-related reason why the drafters might have decided to restrict the Rule to a particular category of prior consistent statements. Juries have trouble distinguishing between the rehabilitative and substantive use of the kind of prior consistent statements listed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Judges may give instructions limiting the use of such prior consistent statements to a rehabilitative purpose, but, in practice, juries nonetheless tend to consider them for their substantive value. See 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801(d) (1)(B)[01], p. 801­188 (1994) ("[A]s a practical matter, the jury in all probability would misunderstand or ignore a limiting instruction [with respect to the class of prior consistent statements covered by the Rule] anyway, so there is no good reason for giving one"). It is possible that the Advisory Committee made them "nonhearsay" for that reason, i. e., as a concession "more of experience than of logic." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 773 (also noting that the witness is available for cross-examination in the courtroom in any event). If there was a reason why the drafters excluded from Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s scope other kinds of prior consistent state- ments (used for rehabilitation), perhaps it was that the draft- ers concluded that those other statements caused jury confu- sion to a lesser degree. On this rationale, however, there is no basis for distinguishing between premotive and post- motive statements, for the confusion with respect to each would very likely be the same. In sum, because the Rule addresses a hearsay problem and one can find a reason, unrelated to the premotive rule, for 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:11 PAGES OPINPGT 172 TOME v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting why it does so, I would read the Rule's plain words to mean exactly what they say: If a trial court properly admits a statement that is "consistent with the declarant's testimony" for the purpose of "rebut[ting] an express or implied charge . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive," then that statement is "not hearsay," and the jury may also consider it for the truth of what it says. Assuming Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not codify the absolute timing requirement, I must still answer the question whether, as a relevance matter, the common-law statement of the premotive rule stands as an absolute bar to a trial court's admission of a postmotive prior consistent statement for the purpose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. The majority points to state- ments of the timing rule that do suggest that, for reasons of relevance, the law of evidence never permits their admission. Ante, at 156. Yet, absolute-sounding rules often allow excep- tions. And, there are sound reasons here for permitting an exception to the timing rule where circumstances warrant. For one thing, one can find examples where the timing rule's claim of "no relevancy" is simply untrue. A post- motive statement is relevant to rebut, for example, a charge of recent fabrication based on improper motive, say, when the speaker made the prior statement while affected by a far more powerful motive to tell the truth. A speaker might be moved to lie to help an acquaintance. But, suppose the circumstances also make clear to the speaker that only the truth will save his child's life. Or, suppose the postmotive statement was made spontaneously, or when the speaker's motive to lie was much weaker than it was at trial. In these and similar situations, special circumstances may indicate that the prior statement was made for some reason other than the alleged improper motivation; it may have been made not because of, but despite, the improper motivation. Hence, postmotive statements can, in appropriate circum- stances, directly refute the charge of fabrication based on 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 173 Breyer, J., dissenting improper motive, not because they bolster in a general way the witness' trial testimony, see ante, at 159, but because the circumstances indicate that the statements are not causally connected to the alleged motive to lie. For another thing, the common-law premotive rule was not as uniform as the majority suggests. Cf. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984) (stating that where the common law was unanimous, the drafters of the Federal Rules likely intended to preserve it). A minority of courts recognized that postmotive statements could be relevant to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive under the right circumstances. See, e. g., United States v. Gandy, 469 F. 2d 1134, 1135 (CA5 1972); Copes v. United States, 345 F. 2d 723, 726 (CADC 1964); State v. George, 30 N. C. 324, 328 (1848). I concede that the majority of courts took the rule of thumb as absolute. But, I have searched the cases (and the commentators) in vain for an explanation of why that should be so. See, e. g., McCormick § 49, at 105, and n. 88 (citing cases). One can imagine a possible explanation: Trial judges may find it easier to administer an absolute rule. Yet, there is no indication in any of the cases that trial judges would, or do, find it particularly difficult to administer a more flexible rule in this context. And, there is something to be said for the greater authority that flexibility grants the trial judge to tie rulings on the admissibility of rehabilitative evidence more closely to the needs and circumstances of the particular case. 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 401[01], pp. 401­8 to 401­9 (1994) ("A flexible approach . . . is more apt to yield a sensible result than the application of a mechanical rule"). Furthermore, the majority concedes that the premotive rule, while seemingly bright line, poses its own administrative difficulties. Ante, at 165­166. This Court has acknowledged that the Federal Rules of Evidence worked a change in common-law relevancy rules in the direction of flexibility. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:11 PAGES OPINPGT 174 TOME v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). Article IV of the Federal Rules, which concerns relevance, liberalizes the rules for admission of relevant evidence. See id., at 587. The Rules direct the trial judge generally to admit all evi- dence having "any tendency" to make the existence of a ma- terial fact "more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402. The judge may reject the evidence (assuming compliance with other rules) only if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its tendency to prejudice a party or delay a trial. Rule 403. The codification, as a gen- eral matter, relies upon the trial judge's administration of Rules 401, 402, and 403 to keep the barely relevant, the time wasting, and the prejudicial from the jury. See, e. g., Abel, supra, at 54 ("A district court is accorded a wide discretion in . . . [a]ssessing the probative value of [proffered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility"); 1 Weinstein's Evidence, supra, ¶ 401[01] (discussing broad discretion accorded trial judge); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5162 (1978 and 1994 Supp.). In Daubert, this Court considered the rule of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (CADC 1923), which had excluded scientific evidence that had not gained general acceptance in the relevant field. 509 U. S., at 585­586. Like the premo- tive rule here at issue, the Frye rule was "rigid," setting forth an "absolute prerequisite to admissibility," which the Court said was "at odds with the `liberal thrust' of the Fed- eral Rules." Id., at 588. Daubert suggests that the liberal- ized relevancy provisions of the Federal Rules can supersede a pre-existing rule of relevance, at least where no compelling practical or logical support can be found for the pre-existing rule. It is difficult to find any strong practical or logical considerations for making the premotive rule an absolute condition of admissibility here. Perhaps there are other cir- cumstances in which categorical common-law rules serve the purposes of Rules 401, 402, and 403, and should, accordingly, 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995) 175 Breyer, J., dissenting remain absolute in the law. But, for the reasons stated above, this case, like Daubert, does not present such a cir- cumstance. Thus, considered purely as a matter of rele- vancy law (and as though Rule 801(d)(1)(B) had not been written), I would conclude that the premotive rule did not survive the adoption of the Rules. Irrespective of these arguments, one might claim that, nonetheless, the drafters, in writing Rule 801(d)(1)(B), relied on the continued existence of the common-law relevancy rule, and that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) therefore reflects a belief that the common-law relevancy rule would survive. But, I would reject that argument. For one thing, if the drafters had wanted to insulate the common-law rule from the Rules' lib- eralizing effect, this would have been a remarkably indirect (and therefore odd) way of doing so-both because Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is utterly silent about the premotive rule and because Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is a rule of hearsay, not relevancy. For another thing, there is an equally plausible reason why the drafters might have wanted to write Rule 801(d)(1)(B) the way they did-namely, to allow substantive use of a par- ticular category of prior consistent statements that, when admitted as rehabilitative evidence, was especially impervi- ous to a limiting instruction. See supra, at 171. Accordingly, I would hold that the Federal Rules authorize a district court to allow (where probative in respect to reha- bilitation) the use of postmotive prior consistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive (subject of course to, for example, Rule 403). Where such statements are admissible for this rehabilitative purpose, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), as stated above, makes them ad- missible as substantive evidence as well (provided, of course, that the Rule's other requirements, such as the witness' availability for cross-examination, are satisfied). In most cases, this approach will not yield a different result from a strict adherence to the premotive rule for, in most cases, postmotive statements will not be significantly probative. 513us1$12Q 04-04-98 13:51:11 PAGES OPINPGT 176 TOME v. UNITED STATES Breyer, J., dissenting And, even in cases where the statement is admitted as sig- nificantly probative (in respect to rehabilitation), the effect of admission on the trial will be minimal because the prior consistent statements will (by their nature) do no more than repeat in-court testimony. In this case, the Court of Appeals, applying an approach consistent with what I have described above, decided that A. T.'s prior consistent statements were probative on the question of whether her story as a witness reflected a motive to lie. There is no reason to reevaluate this factbound con- clusion. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 513us1$13Z 11-21-96 17:23:16 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 177 Decree ILLINOIS v. KENTUCKY on bill of complaint No. 106, Orig. Decided May 28, 1991-Decree entered January 17, 1995 Decree entered. Opinion reported: 500 U. S. 380. The motion of the Special Master for compensation and reimbursement of expenses is granted and the Special Mas- ter is awarded a total of $114,708.16 to be paid equally by the parties. The Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed. The Report is adopted. The Special Master is hereby discharged. DECREE It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that: 1. The boundary line between the State of Illinois and the Commonwealth of Kentucky is fixed as geodetically de- scribed in Joint Exhibits 3 through 26 to the Special Master's Report filed with this Court on December 2, 1994. Joint Ex- hibits 3 through 26 are incorporated by reference herein. 2. Copies of this Decree and the Special Master's Report (including Joint Exhibits 3 through 26) shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court, the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, and the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 3. Copies of this Decree and the Special Master's Report (including Joint Exhibits 3 through 26, and paper prints of Joint Exhibits 3 through 26, once they become available) shall be filed with the County Clerk's Office in Illinois and with the County Clerk's Office in the Commonwealth of Ken- tucky in each of the following counties: In Illinois, the counties of Gallatin, Hardin, Pope, Massac, Pulaski, and Alexander, and 513us1$13Z 11-21-96 17:23:16 PAGES OPINPGT 178 ILLINOIS v. KENTUCKY Decree In Kentucky, the counties of Union, Crittenden, Living- ston, McCracken, and Ballard. 4. The State of Illinois and the Commonwealth of Ken- tucky each have concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River. 5. The costs of this proceeding shall be divided between the parties, as recommended by the Special Master. 513us1$14Z 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 179 Syllabus ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER et al., dba DEEBEES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 92­2038. Argued November 7, 1994-Decided January 18, 1995 Petitioner Asgrow Seed Company has protected two varieties of soybean seed under the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA), which ex- tends patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants (plants grown from seed). After respondent farmers planted 265 acres of Asgrow's seed and sold the entire salable crop-enough to plant 10,000 acres-to other farmers for use as seed, Asgrow filed suit, alleg- ing infringement under, inter alia, 7 U. S. C. § 2541(1), for selling or offering to sell the seed, and § 2541(3), for "sexually multiply[ing] the novel varieties as a step in marketing [them] (for growing purposes)." Respondents contended that they were entitled to a statutory exemp- tion from liability under § 2543, which provides in relevant part that "[e]xcept to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under [§ 2541(3)]," a farmer may "save seed . . . and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section: Provided, That" such saved seed can be sold for repro- ductive purposes where both buyer and seller are farmers "whose pri- mary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes." In granting Asgrow summary judgment, the District Court found that the exemption allows a farmer to save and resell to other farmers only the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 2543 permits a farmer to sell up to half of every crop he produces from PVPA-protected seed, so long as he sells the other half for food or feed. Held: A farmer who meets the requirements set forth in § 2543's proviso may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own acreage. Pp. 185­193. (a) Respondents were not eligible for the § 2543 exemption if their planting and harvesting were conducted "as a step in marketing" under § 2541(3), for the parties do not dispute that these actions constituted "sexual multiplication" of novel varieties. Since the PVPA does not define "marketing," the term should be given its ordinary meaning. Marketing ordinarily refers to the act of holding forth property for sale, together with the activities preparatory thereto, but does not require 513us1$14Z 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT 180 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Syllabus that there be extensive promotional or merchandising activities con- nected with the selling. Pp. 185­188. (b) By reason of the proviso, the first sentence of § 2543 allows seed that has been preserved for reproductive purposes (saved seed) to be sold for such purposes. However, the structure of the sentence is such that this authorization does not extend to saved seed that was grown for the purpose of sale (marketing) for replanting, because that would violate § 2541(3). As a practical matter, this means that only seed that has been saved by the farmer to replant his own acreage can be sold. Thus, a farmer who saves seeds to replant his acreage, but changes his plans, may sell the seeds for replanting under the proviso's terms. The statute's language stands in the way of the limitation the Court of Appeals found in the amount of seed that can be sold. Pp. 188­192. 982 F. 2d 486, reversed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 193. Richard L. Stanley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John F. Lynch, Bruce Stein, Law- rence C. Maxwell, and Mary Ellen Morris. Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Barbara C. Biddle, and Wendy M. Keats. William H. Bode argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Luis M. Acosta.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by J. Michael Jakes; and for the American Seed Trade Association by Gary Jay Kushner, John G. Roberts, Jr., and David G. Leitch. Mary Helen Sears filed a brief for Ted Cook as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Rural Advancement Foundation International et al. by David Charles Masselli; and for James G. McDon- ald by Stephen Gordon. 513us1$14Z 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 181 Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq., protects owners of novel seed varieties against unau- thorized sales of their seed for replanting purposes. An ex- emption, however, allows farmers to make some sales of pro- tected variety seed to other farmers. This case raises the question whether there is a limit to the quantity of protected seed that a farmer can sell under this exemption. I In 1970, Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 84 Stat. 1542, 7 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq., in order to provide developers of novel plant varieties with "adequate encouragement for research, and for marketing when appro- priate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties," § 2581. The PVPA extends patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed) which parallels the protection afforded asexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation or grafting) under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act. See 35 U. S. C. §§ 161­164. The developer of a novel variety obtains PVPA coverage by acquiring a certificate of protection from the Plant Vari- ety Protection Office. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2421, 2422, 2481­ 2483. This confers on the owner the exclusive right for 18 years to "exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom." § 2483. Petitioner, Asgrow Seed Company, is the holder of PVPA certificates protecting two novel varieties of soybean seed, which it calls A1937 and A2234. Respondents, Dennis and Becky Winterboer, are Iowa farmers whose farm spans 800 acres of Clay County, in the northwest corner of the 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT 182 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Opinion of the Court State. The Winterboers have incorporated under the name "D-Double-U Corporation" and do business under the name "DeeBee's Feed and Seed." In addition to growing crops for sale as food and livestock feed, since 1987 the Winter- boers have derived a sizable portion of their income from "brown-bag" sales of their crops to other farmers to use as seed. A brown-bag sale occurs when a farmer purchases seed from a seed company, such as Asgrow, plants the seed in his own fields, harvests the crop, cleans it, and then sells the reproduced seed to other farmers (usually in nondescript brown bags) for them to plant as crop seed on their own farms. During 1990, the Winterboers planted 265 acres of A1937 and A2234, and sold the entire salable crop, 10,529 bushels, to others for use as seed-enough to plant 10,000 acres. The average sale price was $8.70 per bushel, com- pared with a then-current price of $16.20 to $16.80 per bushel to obtain varieties A1937 and A2234 directly from Asgrow. Concerned that the Winterboers were making a business out of selling its protected seed, Asgrow sent a local farmer, Robert Ness, to the Winterboer farm to make a purchase. Mr. Winterboer informed Ness that he could sell him soy- bean seed that was "just like" Asgrow varieties A1937 and A2234. Ness purchased 20 bags of each; a plant biologist for Asgrow tested the seeds and determined that they were indeed A1937 and A2234. Asgrow brought suit against the Winterboers in the Fed- eral District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, seek- ing damages and a permanent injunction against sale of seed harvested from crops grown from A1937 and A2234. The complaint alleged infringement under 7 U. S. C. § 2541(1), for selling or offering to sell Asgrow's protected soybean varie- ties; under § 2541(3), for sexually multiplying Asgrow's novel varieties as a step in marketing those varieties for growing purposes; and under § 2541(6), for dispensing the novel varie- 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 183 Opinion of the Court ties to others in a form that could be propagated without providing notice that the seeds were of a protected variety.1 The Winterboers did not deny that Asgrow held valid cer- tificates of protection covering A1937 and A2234, and that they had sold seed produced from those varieties for others to use as seed. Their defense, at least to the §§ 2541(1) and 1 At the time the infringement action was filed, § 2541 provided in full: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringe- ment of the rights of the owner of a novel variety to perform without authority, any of the following acts in the United States, or in commerce which can be regulated by Congress or affecting such commerce, prior to expiration of the right to plant variety protection but after either the issue of the certificate or the distribution of a novel plant variety with the notice under section 2567 of this title: "(1) sell the novel variety, or offer it or expose it for sale, deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other transfer of title or possession of it; "(2) import the novel variety into, or export it from, the United States; "(3) sexually multiply the novel variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; or "(4) use the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from develop- ing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom; or "(5) use seed which had been marked "Unauthorized Propagation Pro- hibited" or "Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited" or progeny thereof to propagate the novel variety; or "(6) dispense the novel variety to another, in a form which can be propa- gated, without notice as to being a protected variety under which it was received; or "(7) perform any of the foregoing acts even in instances in which the novel variety is multiplied other than sexually, except in pursuance of a valid United States plant patent; or "(8) instigate or actively induce performance of any of the foregoing acts." In October 1992, Congress amended § 2541, designating the prior text as subsection (a) and adding a subsection (b), the provisions of which are not relevant here. Curiously, however, the references in § 2543 to the infringement provisions of § 2541 were not amended to reflect this change. For clarity's sake, therefore, we will continue to refer to the infringement provisions under their prior designations, e. g., §§ 2541(1)­(8), rather than their current designations, e. g., §§ 2541(a)(1)­(8). 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT 184 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Opinion of the Court (3) charges, rested upon the contention that their sales fell within the statutory exemption from infringement liability found in 7 U. S. C. § 2543. That section, entitled "Right to save seed; crop exemption," reads in relevant part as follows: "Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 of this title, it shall not infringe any right hereun- der for a person to save seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section: Pro- vided, That without regard to the provisions of section 2541(3) of this title it shall not infringe any right hereun- der for a person, whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive purposes, provided such sale is in compliance with such State laws governing the sale of seed as may be applicable. A bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes or from seed produced by descent on such farm from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes shall not constitute an infringement. . . ." 2 2 Congress has recently amended this section by striking from the first sentence the words " `section: Provided, That' and all that follows through the period and inserting `section.' " Plant Variety Protection Act Amend- ments of 1994, Pub. L. 103­349, 108 Stat. 3136, 3142. That amendment has the effect of eliminating the exemption from infringement liability for farmers who sell PVPA-protected seed to other farmers for reproductive purposes. That action, however, has no bearing on the resolution of the 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 185 Opinion of the Court The Winterboers argued that this language gave them the right to sell an unlimited amount of seed produced from a protected variety, subject only to the conditions that both buyer and seller be farmers "whose primary farming occupa- tion is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproduc- tive purposes," and that all sales comply with state law. As- grow maintained that the exemption allows a farmer to save and resell to other farmers only the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields-a limitation that the Winterboers' sales greatly exceeded. The District Court agreed with Asgrow and granted summary judgment in its favor. 795 F. Supp. 915 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 982 F. 2d 486 (1992). Although "recog- niz[ing] that, without meaningful limitations, the crop ex- emption [of § 2543] could undercut much of the PVPA's incen- tives," id., at 491, the Court of Appeals saw nothing in § 2543 that would limit the sale of protected seed (for reproductive purposes) to the amount necessary to plant the seller's own acreage. Rather, as the Court of Appeals read the statute, § 2543 permits a farmer to sell up to half of every crop he produces from PVPA-protected seed to another farmer for use as seed, so long as he sells the other 50 percent of the crop grown from that specific variety for nonreproductive purposes, e. g., for food or feed. The Federal Circuit denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc by a vote of six judges to five. 989 F. 2d 478 (1993). We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1029 (1994). II It may be well to acknowledge at the outset that it is quite impossible to make complete sense of the provision at issue present case, since the amendments affect only those certificates issued after April 4, 1995, that were not pending on or before that date. See id., §§ 14(a), 15, 108 Stat. 3144, 3145. 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT 186 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Opinion of the Court here. One need go no further than the very first words of its title to establish that. Section 2543 does not, as that title claims and the ensuing text says, reserve any "[r]ight to save seed"-since nothing elsewhere in the Act remotely prohib- its the saving of seed. Nor, under any possible analysis, is the proviso in the first sentence of § 2543 ("Provided, That") really a proviso. With this advance warning that not all mysteries will be solved, we enter the verbal maze of § 2543. The entrance, we discover, is actually an exit, since the provision begins by excepting certain activities from its operation: "Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 of this title, it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by him . . . and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as pro- vided in this section . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Thus, a farmer does not qualify for the exemption from infringement liability if he has "(3) sexually multipl[ied] the novel variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; or (4) use[d] the novel variety in producing (as distin- guished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom." 7 U. S. C. §§ 2541(3)­(4). In 1990, the Winterboers planted 265 acres of Asgrow pro- tected variety seed and collected a harvest of 12,037 bushels of soybeans. The parties do not dispute that this act of planting and harvesting constituted "sexual multiplication" of the novel varieties. See 7 U. S. C. § 2401(f) (defining "sex- ually reproduced" seed to include "any production of a vari- ety by seed"). The Winterboers sold almost all of these beans for use as seed (i. e., "for growing purposes"), without Asgrow's consent. The central question in this case, then, is whether the Winterboers' planting and harvesting were conducted "as a step in marketing" Asgrow's protected seed 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 187 Opinion of the Court varieties for growing purposes. If they were, the Winter- boers were not eligible for the § 2543 exemption, and the Dis- trict Court was right to grant summary judgment to Asgrow. The PVPA does not define "marketing." When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). The Federal Circuit believed that the word "marketing" requires "extensive or coordinated selling activities, such as advertis- ing, using an intervening sales representative, or similar ex- tended merchandising or retail activities." 982 F. 2d, at 492. We disagree. Marketing ordinarily refers to the act of hold- ing forth property for sale, together with the activities pre- paratory thereto (in the present case, cleaning, drying, bag- ging, and pricing the seeds). The word does not require that the promotional or merchandising activities connected with the selling be extensive. One can market apples by simply displaying them on a cart with a price tag; or market a stock by simply listing it on a stock exchange; or market a house (we would normally say "place it on the market") by simply setting a "for sale" sign on the front lawn. Indeed, some dictionaries give as one meaning of "market" simply "to sell." See, e. g., Oxford Universal Dictionary 1208 (3d ed. 1955); Webster's New International Dictionary 1504 (2d ed. 1950). Of course, effective selling often involves exten- sive promotional activities, and when they occur they are all part of the "marketing." But even when the holding forth for sale relies upon no more than word-of-mouth advertising, a marketing of goods is in process. Moreover, even if the word "marketing" could, in one of its meanings, demand ex- tensive promotion, we see no reason why the law at issue here would intend that meaning. That would have the ef- fect of preserving PVPA protection for less valuable plant varieties, but eliminating it for varieties so desirable that they can be marketed by word of mouth; as well as the effect of requiring courts to ponder the difficult question of how much promotion is necessary to constitute marketing. We 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:22 PAGES OPINPGT 188 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Opinion of the Court think that when the statute refers to sexually multiplying a variety "as a step in marketing," it means growing seed of the variety for the purpose of putting the crop up for sale.3 Under the exception set out in the first clause of § 2543, then, a farmer is not eligible for the § 2543 exemption if he plants and saves seeds for the purpose of selling the seeds that they produce for replanting. Section 2543 next provides that, so long as a person is not violating either §§ 2541(3) or (4), "it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Farmers generally grow crops to sell. A harvested soybean crop is typically removed from the farmer's premises in short order and taken to a grain elevator or processor. Some- times, however, in the case of a plant such as the soybean, in which the crop is the seed, the farmer will have a portion of his crop cleaned and stored as seed for replanting his fields next season. We think it clear that this seed saved for re- planting is what the provision under discussion means by 3 The dissent asserts that the Federal Circuit's more demanding inter- pretation of "marketing" is supported by the ancient doctrine disfavoring restraints on alienation of property, see post, at 194­195. The wellspring of that doctrine, of course, is concern for property rights, and in the con- text of the PVPA it is the dissent's interpretation, rather than ours, which belittles that concern. The whole purpose of the statute is to create a valuable property in the product of botanical research by giving the devel- oper the right to "exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it," etc. 7 U. S. C. § 2483. Applying the rule disfavoring restraints on alienation to interpre- tation of the PVPA is rather like applying the rule disfavoring restraints upon freedom of contract to interpretation of the Sherman Act. 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 189 Opinion of the Court "saved seed"-not merely regular uncleaned crop that is stored for later market sale or use as fodder. There are two ways to read the provision, depending upon which words the phrase "for sale as provided in this section" is taken to modify. It can be read "production of a crop . . . for sale as provided in this section"; or alternatively "use such saved seed . . . for sale as provided in this section." The parallelism created by the phrase "for use on his farm" followed immediately by "or for sale as provided in this sec- tion" suggests the former reading. But the placement of the comma, separating "use [of] such saved seed in the produc- tion of a crop for use on his farm," from "or for sale," favors the latter reading. So does the fact that the alternative reading requires the reader to skip the lengthy "Provided, That" clause in order to find out what sales are "provided [for] in this section"-despite the parallelism between "pro- vided" and "Provided," and despite the presence of a colon, which ordinarily indicates specification of what has preceded. It is surely easier to think that at least some of the sales "provided for" are those that are "Provided" after the colon. (It is, of course, not unusual, however deplorable it may be, for "Provided, That" to be used as prologue to an addition rather than an exception. See Springer v. Philippine Is- lands, 277 U. S. 189, 206 (1928); 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 20.22 (5th ed. 1992).) We think the latter reading is also to be preferred because it lends greater meaning to all the provisions. Under the former reading ("production of a crop . . . for sale as provided in this section"), the only later text that could be referred to is the provision for "bona fide sale[s] for other than reproduc- tive purposes" set out in the second sentence of § 2543-the so-called "crop exemption." (The proviso could not be re- ferred to, since it does not provide for sale of crops grown from saved seed, but only for sale of saved seed itself.) But if the "or for sale" provision has such a limited referent, the opening clause's ("Except to the extent that . . .") reservation 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT 190 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Opinion of the Court of § 2541(3) infringement liability (i. e., liability for growing as a step in marketing for reproductive purposes) would be devoid of content, since the provision to which it is attached would permit no sales for reproductive purposes. Under the latter reading, by contrast, the farmer may not "use [his] saved seed . . . for sale" as the proviso allows if the seed was intentionally grown for the purpose of such sale-i. e., "sexually multipl[ied] . . . as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety." 4 A second respect in which our fa- vored reading gives greater meaning to the provision is this: The other reading ("crop . . . for sale as provided in this section") causes the "permission" given in the opening sen- tence to extend only to sales for nonreproductive purposes of the crops grown from saved seed, as opposed to sales of the saved seed itself. But no separate permission would have been required for this, since it is already contained within the crop exemption itself; it serves only as a reminder that crop from saved seed can be sold under that exemp- tion-a peculiarly incomplete reminder, since the saved seed itself can also be sold under that exemption. To summarize: By reason of its proviso the first sentence of § 2543 allows seed that has been preserved for reproductive purposes ("saved seed") to be sold for such purposes. The structure of the sentence is such, however, that this authori- zation does not extend to saved seed that was grown for the very purpose of sale ("marketing") for replanting-because in that case, § 2541(3) would be violated, and the above- 4 This reading also gives meaning to the proviso's statement that "with- out regard to the provisions of section 2541(3) . . . it shall not infringe any right hereunder" for a person to engage in certain sales of saved seed for reproductive purposes (emphasis added). This serves to eliminate the technical argument that a production of seed that was originally in compli- ance with § 2541(3) (because it was not done as a step in marketing for reproductive purposes) could retroactively be rendered unlawful by the later sale permitted in the proviso, because such sale causes the earlier production to have been "a step in the marketing" for reproductive purposes. 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 191 Opinion of the Court discussed exception to the exemption would apply. As a practical matter, since § 2541(1) prohibits all unauthorized transfer of title to, or possession of, the protected variety, this means that the only seed that can be sold under the proviso is seed that has been saved by the farmer to replant his own acreage.5 (We think that limitation is also apparent from the text of the crop exemption, which permits a farm crop from saved seeds to be sold-for nonreproductive pur- poses-only if those saved seeds were "produced by descent on such farm." (Emphasis added.) It is in our view the proviso in § 2543, and not the crop exemption, that authorizes the permitted buyers of saved seeds to sell the crops they produce.) Thus, if a farmer saves seeds to replant his acre- age, but for some reason changes his plans, he may instead sell those seeds for replanting under the terms set forth in the proviso (or of course sell them for nonreproductive pur- poses under the crop exemption). It remains to discuss one final feature of the proviso au- thorizing limited sales for reproductive purposes. The pro- viso allows sales of saved seed for replanting purposes only between persons "whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive pur- poses." The Federal Circuit, which rejected the proposition 5 For crops such as soybeans, in which the seed and the harvest are one and the same, this will mean enough seeds for one year's crop on that acreage. Since the germination rate of a batch of seed declines over time, the soybean farmer will get the year-after-next's seeds from next year's harvest. That is not so for some vegetable crops, in which the seed is not the harvest, and a portion of the crop must be permitted to overripen ("go to seed") in order to obtain seeds. One of the amici in the Court of Ap- peals asserted (and the parties before us did not dispute) that it is the practice of vegetable farmers to "grow" seeds only every four or five years, and to "brown bag" enough seed for four or five future crops. A vegetable farmer who sets aside protected seed with subsequent replant- ings in mind, but who later abandons his plan (because he has sold his farm, for example), would under our analysis be able to sell all his saved seed, even though it would plant (in a single year) four or five times his current acreage. 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT 192 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Opinion of the Court that the only seed sellable under the exemption is seed saved for the farmer's own replanting, sought to achieve some limi- tation upon the quantity of seed that can be sold for repro- ductive purposes by adopting a "crop-by-crop" approach to the "primary farming occupation" requirement of the pro- viso. "[B]uyers or sellers of brown bag seed qualify for the crop exemption," it concluded, "only if they produce a larger crop from a protected seed for consumption (or other nonre- productive purposes) than for sale as seed." 982 F. 2d, at 490. That is to say, the brown-bag seller can sell no more than half of his protected crop for seed. The words of the statute, however, stand in the way of this creative (if some- what insubstantial) limitation. To ask what is a farmer's "primary farming occupation" is to ask what constitutes the bulk of his total farming business. Selling crops for other than reproductive purposes must constitute the preponder- ance of the farmer's business, not just the preponderance of his business in the protected seed. There is simply no way to derive from this text the narrower focus that the Federal Circuit applied. Thus, if the quantity of seed that can be sold is not limited as we have described-by reference to the original purpose for which the seed is saved-then it is barely limited at all (i. e., limited only by the volume or worth of the selling farmer's total crop sales for other than reproductive purposes). This seems to us a most unlikely result. * * * We hold that a farmer who meets the requirements set forth in the proviso to § 2543 may sell for reproductive pur- poses only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of re- planting his own acreage. While the meaning of the text is by no means clear, this is in our view the only reading that comports with the statutory purpose of affording "adequate encouragement for research, and for marketing when appro- priate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties." 7 U. S. C. § 2581. Because we find the sales here were un- 513us1$14K 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 193 Stevens, J., dissenting lawful, we do not reach the second question on which we granted certiorari-whether sales authorized under § 2543 remain subject to the notice requirement of § 2541(6). The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is Reversed. Justice Stevens, dissenting. The key to this statutory puzzle is the meaning of the phrase, "as a step in marketing," as used in 7 U. S. C. § 2541(a)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). If it is synonymous with "for the purpose of selling," as the Court holds, see ante, at 188, then the majority's comprehensive exposition of the statute is correct. I record my dissent only because that phrase conveys a different message to me. There must be a reason why Congress used the word "marketing" rather than the more common term "selling." Indeed, in § 2541(a)(1), contained in the same subsection of the statute as the crucial language, Congress made it an act of infringement to "sell the novel variety." Yet, in § 2541(a)(3), a mere two clauses later, Congress eschewed the word "sell" in favor of "marketing." Because Congress ob- viously could have prohibited sexual multiplication "as a step in selling," I presume that when it elected to prohibit sexual multiplication only "as a step in marketing (for growing pur- poses) the variety," Congress meant something different. Moreover, as used in this statute, "marketing" must be narrower, not broader, than selling. The majority is correct that one meaning of "marketing" is the act of selling and all acts preparatory thereto. See ante, at 187. But Congress has prohibited only one preparatory act-that of sexual mul- tiplication-and only when it is a step in marketing. Under the majority's broad definition of "marketing," prohibiting sexual multiplication "as a step in marketing" can be no broader than prohibiting sexual multiplication "as a step in selling," because all steps in marketing are, ultimately, steps 513us1$14I 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT 194 ASGROW SEED CO. v. WINTERBOER Stevens, J., dissenting in selling. If "marketing" can be no broader than "selling," and if Congress did not intend the two terms to be coexten- sive, then "marketing" must encompass something less than all "selling." The statute as a whole-and as interpreted by the Court of Appeals-indicates that Congress intended to preserve the farmer's right to engage in so-called "brown-bag sales" of seed to neighboring farmers. Congress limited that right by the express requirement that such sales may not consti- tute the "primary farming occupation" of either the buyer or the seller. Moreover, § 2541(a)(3) makes it abundantly clear that the unauthorized participation in "marketing" of protected varieties is taboo. If one interprets "marketing" to refer to a subcategory of selling activities, namely, mer- chandising through farm cooperatives, wholesalers, retailers, or other commercial distributors, the entire statute seems to make sense. I think Congress wanted to allow any ordinary brown-bag sale from one farmer to another; but, as the Court of Appeals concluded, it did not want to permit farmers to compete with seed manufacturers on their own ground, through "extensive or coordinated selling activities, such as advertising, using an intervening sales representative, or similar extended merchandising or retail activities." 982 F. 2d 486, 492 (CA Fed. 1992). This reading of the statute is consistent with our time- honored practice of viewing restraints on the alienation of property with disfavor. See, e. g., Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, 242 (1823) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.).* The seed at issue is part of a crop planted and harvested by a farmer on his own property. Generally the owner of per- * "It would seem to be a consequence of that absolute power which a man possesses over his own property, that he may make any disposition of it which does not interfere with the existing rights of others, and such disposition, if it be fair and real, will be valid. The limitations on this power are those only which are prescribed by law." Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat., at 242. 513us1$14I 03-28-98 15:18:23 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 179 (1995) 195 Stevens, J., dissenting sonal property-even a patented or copyrighted article-is free to dispose of that property as he sees fit. See, e. g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 250­252 (1942); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 350­351 (1908). A statutory restraint on this basic freedom should be expressed clearly and unambiguously. Cf. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530­531 (1972). As the majority recognizes, the meaning of this statute is "by no means clear." Ante, at 192. Accordingly, both be- cause I am persuaded that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the intent of Congress, and because doubts should be resolved against purported restraints on freedom, I would affirm the judgment below. 513us1$15Z 03-30-98 08:23:27 PAGES OPINPGT 196 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 93­1340. Argued November 2, 1994-Decided January 18, 1995 Respondent was convicted on federal drug charges after being cross- examined, over his counsel's objection, about inconsistent statements that he had made during an earlier plea discussion. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that respondent's agreement that any statements he made in the plea discussion could be used at trial for impeachment purposes was unenforceable under Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) (Rules or plea-statement Rules), which exclude from admission into evidence against a criminal defendant statements made during plea bargaining. Held: An agreement to waive the plea-statement Rules' exclusionary pro- visions is valid and enforceable absent some affirmative indication that the defendant entered the agreement unknowingly or involuntarily. Pp. 200­211. (a) Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, the Rules' failure to include an express waiver-enabling clause does not demonstrate Con- gress' intent to preclude waiver agreements such as respondent's. Rather, the Rules were enacted against a background presumption that legal rights generally, and evidentiary provisions specifically, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties. See, e. g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U. S. 1, 10; Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Okla., 220 U. S. 481, 488­489. Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 259, and Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9, distinguished. Respondent bears the responsibility of identifying some affirmative basis for concluding that the Rules depart from the presumption of waivability. Pp. 200­203. (b) The three potential bases offered by respondent for concluding that the Rules are not consonant with the presumption of waivability- (a) that the Rules establish a "guarantee [to] fair procedure" that cannot be waived, (b) that waiver is fundamentally inconsistent with the Rules' goal of encouraging voluntary settlement, and (c) that waiver agree- ments should be forbidden because they invite prosecutorial overreach- ing and abuse-are not persuasive. Instead of the per se rejection of waiver adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the appropriate approach is to permit case-by-case inquiries into whether waiver agreements are the 513us1$15Z 03-30-98 08:23:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 197 Opinion of the Court product of fraud or coercion. Here, respondent conferred with his law- yer after the prosecutor proposed waiver as a condition of proceeding with the plea discussion, and he has never complained that he entered into the waiver agreement at issue unknowingly or involuntarily. Pp. 203­211. 998 F. 2d 1452, reversed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring statement, in which O'Connor and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 211. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opin- ion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 211. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assist- ant Attorney General Harris, and Deputy Solicitor Gen- eral Kneedler. Mark R. Lippman, by appointment of the Court, 511 U. S. 1067, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Crimi- nal Procedure 11(e)(6) provide that statements made in the course of plea discussions between a criminal defendant and a prosecutor are inadmissible against the defendant. The court below held that these exclusionary provisions may not be waived by the defendant. We granted certiorari to re- solve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals, and we now reverse. I On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force agents arrested Gordon Shuster after discovering a methamphet- amine laboratory at his residence in Rainbow, California. Shuster agreed to cooperate with the agents, and a few hours *John J. Cleary filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:27 PAGES OPINPGT 198 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court after his arrest he placed a call to respondent's pager. When respondent returned the call, Shuster told him that a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for $13,000. Shuster arranged to meet respondent later that day. At their meeting, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his "friend." The officer asked respondent if he had "brought the stuff with him," and respondent told the officer it was in his car. The two proceeded to the car, where re- spondent produced a brown paper package containing ap- proximately one pound of methamphetamine. Respondent then presented a glass pipe (later found to contain metham- phetamine residue) and asked the officer if he wanted to take a "hit." The officer indicated that he would first get re- spondent the money; as the officer left the car, he gave a prearranged arrest signal. Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 84 Stat. 1260, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). On October 17, 1991, respondent and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor to discuss the possibility of cooper- ating with the Government. The prosecutor agreed to meet later that day. At the beginning of the meeting, the prose- cutor informed respondent that he had no obligation to talk, but that if he wanted to cooperate he would have to be com- pletely truthful. As a condition to proceeding with the dis- cussion, the prosecutor indicated that respondent would have to agree that any statements he made during the meeting could be used to impeach any contradictory testimony he might give at trial if the case proceeded that far. Respond- ent conferred with his counsel and agreed to proceed under the prosecutor's terms. Respondent then admitted knowing that the package he had attempted to sell to the undercover police officer con- tained methamphetamine, but insisted that he had dealt only in "ounce" quantities of methamphetamine prior to his ar- 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 199 Opinion of the Court rest. Initially, respondent also claimed that he was acting merely as a broker for Shuster and did not know that Shus- ter was manufacturing methamphetamine at his residence, but he later conceded that he knew about Shuster's labora- tory. Respondent attempted to minimize his role in Shus- ter's operation by claiming that he had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week before his arrest. At this point, the Government confronted respondent with surveil- lance evidence showing that his car was on Shuster's prop- erty the day before the arrest, and terminated the meeting on the basis of respondent's failure to provide completely truthful information. Respondent eventually was tried on the methamphet- amine charge and took the stand in his own defense. He maintained that he was not involved in methamphetamine trafficking and that he had thought Shuster used his home laboratory to manufacture plastic explosives for the CIA. He also denied knowing that the package he delivered to the undercover officer contained methamphetamine. Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor cross-examined respondent about the inconsistent statements he had made during the October 17 meeting. Respondent denied having made certain statements, and the prosecutor called one of the agents who had attended the meeting to recount the prior statements. The jury found respondent guilty, and the District Court sentenced him to 170 months in prison. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, over the dissent of Chief Judge Wallace. 998 F. 2d 1452 (1993). The Ninth Circuit held that respondent's agreement to allow admission of his plea statements for purposes of impeachment was un- enforceable and that the District Court therefore erred in admitting the statements for that purpose. We granted cer- tiorari because the Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056, 1067­1068 (1993). 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 200 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court II Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Crimi- nal Procedure 11(e)(6) (Rules or plea-statement Rules) are substantively identical. Rule 410 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who . . . was a partici- pant in the plea discussions: . . . (4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty . . . ." The Ninth Circuit noted that these Rules are subject to only two express exceptions,1 neither of which says anything about waiver, and thus concluded that Congress must have meant to preclude waiver agreements such as respondent's. 998 F. 2d, at 1454­1456. In light of the "precision with which these rules are generally phrased," the Ninth Circuit declined to "write in a waiver in a waiverless rule." Id., at 1456.2 The Ninth Circuit's analysis is directly contrary to the ap- proach we have taken in the context of a broad array of con- stitutional and statutory provisions. Rather than deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of ex- 1 A statement made by a criminal defendant in the course of plea discus- sions is "admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same . . . plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel." Fed. Rule Evid. 410. Accord, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e)(6). 2 Respondent also goes to great lengths to establish a proposition that is not at issue in this case: that the plea-statement Rules do not contain a blanket "impeachment" exception. We certainly agree that the Rules give a defendant the right not to be impeached by statements made during plea discussions, but that conclusion says nothing about whether the de- fendant may relinquish that right by voluntary agreement. 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 201 Opinion of the Court press enabling clause, we instead have adhered to the oppo- site presumption. See Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151, 159 (1873) ("A party may waive any provision, either of a contract or of a statute, intended for his benefit"); Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991) ("The most basic rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver"). A criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution. See, e. g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U. S. 1, 10 (1987) (double jeopardy defense waivable by pretrial agree- ment); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969) (know- ing and voluntary guilty plea waives privilege against com- pulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, and right to confront one's accusers); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465 (1938) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived). Likewise, absent some affirmative indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver, we have presumed that statutory provisions are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties. See, e. g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U. S. 717, 730­ 732 (1986) (prevailing party in civil-rights action may waive its statutory eligibility for attorney's fees). Our cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure are consistent with this approach. The provisions of those Rules are presumptively waivable, though an express waiver clause may suggest that Congress intended to occupy the field and to preclude waiver under other, unstated cir- cumstances. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255 (1993); Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1 (1959). In Crosby, for example, we held that a defendant's failure to appear for any part of his trial did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to be present under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce- dure 43. We noted that the specific right codified in Rule 43 "was considered unwaivable in felony cases" at common law, and that Rule 43 expressly recognized only one excep- tion to the common-law rule. 506 U. S., at 259. In light of the specific common-law history behind Rule 43 and the ex- 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 202 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court press waiver provision in the Rule, we declined to conclude that "the drafters intended the Rule to go further." Id., at 260. Our decision in Smith followed a similar line of reason- ing. It held that waiver of the indictment requirement em- bodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a) is confined to the specific circumstances outlined in the Rule's text: "Rule 7(a) recognizes that this safeguard may be waived, but only in those proceedings which are noncapital." 360 U. S., at 9. Unlike Rules 43 and 7(a), however, the plea-statement Rules make no mention of waiver, and so Crosby and Smith provide no basis for setting aside the usual presumption. The presumption of waivability has found specific applica- tion in the context of evidentiary rules. Absent some "over- riding procedural consideration that prevents enforcement of the contract," courts have held that agreements to waive evidentiary rules are generally enforceable even over a party's subsequent objections. 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5039, pp. 207­208 (1977) (hereinafter Wright & Graham). Courts have "liberally enforced" agreements to waive various exclusionary rules of evidence. Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 138, 139­140 (1933). Thus, at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, agreements as to the admissibility of documentary evidence were rou- tinely enforced and held to preclude subsequent objections as to authenticity. See, e. g., Tupman Thurlow Co. v. S. S. Cap Castillo, 490 F. 2d 302, 309 (CA2 1974); United States v. Wing, 450 F. 2d 806, 811 (CA9 1971). And although hearsay is inadmissible except under certain specific exceptions, we have held that agreements to waive hearsay objections are enforceable. See Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Okla., 220 U. S. 481, 488­ 489 (1911); see also United States v. Bonnett, 877 F. 2d 1450, 1458­1459 (CA10 1989) (party's stipulation to admissibility of document precluded hearsay objection at trial). 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 203 Opinion of the Court Indeed, evidentiary stipulations are a valuable and inte- gral part of everyday trial practice. Prior to trial, parties often agree in writing to the admission of otherwise objec- tionable evidence, either in exchange for stipulations from opposing counsel or for other strategic purposes. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure appear to contemplate that the parties will enter into evidentiary agreements during a pretrial con- ference. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(c)(3); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17.1. During the course of trial, parties frequently de- cide to waive evidentiary objections, and such tactics are routinely honored by trial judges. See 21 Wright & Graham § 5032, at 161 ("It is left to the parties, in the first instance, to decide whether or not the rules are to be enforced. . . . It is only in rare cases that the trial judge will . . . exclude evidence they are content to see admitted"); see also United States v. Coonan, 938 F. 2d 1553, 1561 (CA2 1991) (criminal defendant not entitled "to evade the consequences of an un- successful tactical decision" made in welcoming admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence).3 III Because the plea-statement Rules were enacted against a background presumption that legal rights generally, and evidentiary provisions specifically, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties, we will not interpret 3 Respondent contends that a pretrial agreement to waive the exclusion- ary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is unlike a typical stipulation, which is entered into while the case is in progress, and is more like an extrajudicial agreement made outside the context of litigation. Brief for Respondent 39. While it may be true that extrajudicial contracts made prior to litigation trigger closer judicial scrutiny than stipulations made within the context of litigation, see 21 Wright & Graham § 5039, at 206, there is nothing extrajudicial about the waiver agreement at issue here. The agreement was made in the course of a plea discussion aimed at resolving the specific criminal case that was "in progress" against respondent. 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 204 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court Congress' silence as an implicit rejection of waivability. Re- spondent bears the responsibility of identifying some af- firmative basis for concluding that the plea-statement Rules depart from the presumption of waivability. Respondent offers three potential bases for concluding that the Rules should be placed beyond the control of the parties. We find none of them persuasive. A Respondent first suggests that the plea-statement Rules establish a "guarantee [to] fair procedure" that cannot be waived. Brief for Respondent 12. We agree with respond- ent's basic premise: There may be some evidentiary provi- sions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived without irreparably "discredit[ing] the federal courts." See 21 Wright & Graham § 5039, at 207­208; see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U. S. 153, 162 (1988) (court may decline a defendant's waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel); United States v. Josefik, 753 F. 2d 585, 588 (CA7 1985) ("No doubt there are limits to waiver; if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the defendant's conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept"). But enforcement of agreements like respondent's plainly will not have that effect. The admission of plea statements for impeachment purposes enhances the truth- seeking function of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts. Cf. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 238 (1980) (once a defendant decides to testify, he may be required to face impeachment on cross-examination, which furthers the " `function of the courts of justice to ascertain the truth' ") (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 156 (1958)); Note, 46 Harv. L. Rev., at 142­143 ("[A] contract to deprive the court of relevant testimony . . . stands on a different 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 205 Opinion of the Court ground than one admitting evidence that would otherwise have been barred by an exclusionary rule. One contract is an impediment to ascertaining the facts, the other aids in the final determination of the true situation") (footnote omitted). Under any view of the evidence, the defendant has made a false statement, either to the prosecutor during the plea dis- cussion or to the jury at trial; making the jury aware of the inconsistency will tend to increase the reliability of the ver- dict without risking institutional harm to the federal courts. Respondent nevertheless urges that the plea-statement Rules are analogous to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), which provides that "[a]n alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." Justice Kennedy's con- currence in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 741 (1993), suggested that the guarantees of Rule 24(c) may never be waived by an agreement to permit alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations, and respondent asks us to extend that logic to the plea-statement Rules. But even if we assume that the requirements of Rule 24(c) are "the product of a judgment that our jury system should be given a stable and constant structure, one that cannot be varied by a court with or without the consent of the parties," id., at 742, the plea- statement Rules plainly do not satisfy this standard. Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) "creat[e], in effect, a privilege of the defend- ant," 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 410[05], p. 410­43 (1994), and, like other evidentiary privi- leges, this one may be waived or varied at the defendant's request. The Rules provide that statements made in the course of plea discussions are inadmissible "against" the de- fendant, and thus leave open the possibility that a defendant may offer such statements into evidence for his own tactical advantage. Indeed, the Rules contemplate this result in permitting admission of statements made "in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same . . . plea discussions has been introduced and the statement 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 206 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it." Fed. Rule Evid. 410(i) (emphasis added); accord, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e)(6)(i). Thus, the plea-statement Rules ex- pressly contemplate a degree of party control that is conso- nant with the background presumption of waivability.4 B Respondent also contends that waiver is fundamentally inconsistent with the Rules' goal of encouraging voluntary settlement. See Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 410 (purpose of Rule is "promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compromise"). Because the prospect of waiver may make defendants "think twice" before entering into any plea negotiation, respondent suggests that enforce- ment of waiver agreements acts "as a brake, not as a facilita- tor, to the plea-bargain process." Brief for Respondent 23, n. 17. The Ninth Circuit expressed similar concerns, noting that Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) "aid in obtaining th[e] coopera- tion" that is often necessary to identify and prosecute the leaders of a criminal conspiracy and that waiver of the pro- tections of the Rules "could easily have a chilling effect on the entire plea bargaining process." 998 F. 2d, at 1455. Ac- cording to the Ninth Circuit, the plea-statement Rules "per- mit the plea bargainer to maximize what he has `to sell' " by preserving "the ability to withdraw from the bargain pro- posed by the prosecutor without being harmed by any of his 4 The Ninth Circuit relied on Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 (1945), but that case is easily distinguishable in this regard. Brooklyn Savings Bank held that certain statutory entitlements guaranteed to em- ployees by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 were unwaivable because the structure and legislative history of the Act evinced a specific "legisla- tive policy" of "prevent[ing] private contracts" on such matters. Id., at 706. Respondent has identified nothing in the structure or history of the plea-statement Rules that suggests that they were aimed at preventing private bargaining; in fact, the above discussion suggests that the Rules adopt a contrary view. 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 207 Opinion of the Court statements made in the course of an aborted plea bargaining session." Ibid. We need not decide whether and under what circum- stances substantial "public policy" interests may permit the inference that Congress intended to override the presump- tion of waivability, for in this case there is no basis for concluding that waiver will interfere with the Rules' goal of encouraging plea bargaining. The court below focused entirely on the defendant's incentives and completely ig- nored the other essential party to the transaction: the prose- cutor. Thus, although the availability of waiver may dis- courage some defendants from negotiating, it is also true that prosecutors may be unwilling to proceed without it. Prosecutors may be especially reluctant to negotiate with- out a waiver agreement during the early stages of a criminal investigation, when prosecutors are searching for leads and suspects may be willing to offer information in exchange for some form of immunity or leniency in sentencing. In this "cooperation" context, prosecutors face "painfully delicate" choices as to "whether to proceed and prosecute those sus- pects against whom the already produced evidence makes a case or whether to extend leniency or full immunity to some suspects in order to procure testimony against other, more dangerous suspects against whom existing evidence is flimsy or nonexistent." Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1992). Because prosecutors have limited resources and must be able to answer "sensitive questions about the credibility of the testimony" they receive before entering into any sort of co- operation agreement, id., at 10, prosecutors may condition cooperation discussions on an agreement that the testimony provided may be used for impeachment purposes. See Thompson & Sumner, Structuring Informal Immunity, 8 Crim. Just. 16, 19 (spring 1993). If prosecutors were pre- cluded from securing such agreements, they might well de- cline to enter into cooperation discussions in the first place 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 208 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court and might never take this potential first step toward a plea bargain.5 Indeed, as a logical matter, it simply makes no sense to conclude that mutual settlement will be encouraged by pre- cluding negotiation over an issue that may be particularly important to one of the parties to the transaction. A sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the inter- ested parties to enter into knowing and voluntary negotia- tions without any arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips. To use the Ninth Circuit's metaphor, if the prosecutor is interested in "buying" the reliability assurance that ac- companies a waiver agreement, then precluding waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains. A defendant can "maximize" what he has to "sell" only if he is permitted to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying. And while it is certainly true that prosecutors often need help from the small fish in a conspiracy in order to catch the big ones, that is no reason to preclude waiver altogether. If prosecutors decide that certain crucial information will be gained only by preserving the inadmissibility of plea state- ments, they will agree to leave intact the exclusionary provi- sions of the plea-statement Rules. 5 We cannot agree with the dissent's conclusion that the policies ex- pressed in the Advisory Committee's Notes to the plea-statement Rules indicate congressional animosity toward waivability. The Advisory Com- mittee's Notes always provide some policy justification for the exclusion- ary provisions in the Rules, yet those policies merely justify the default rule of exclusion; they do not mean that the parties can never waive the default rule. Indeed, the dissent is unwilling to accept the logical result of its approach, which would require a wholesale rejection of the back- ground presumption of party control over evidentiary provisions. Hear- say, for example, is generally excluded because it tends to lack "trustwor- thiness," see Advisory Committee's Notes on Article VIII of the Fed. Rules of Evid., 28 U. S. C. App., p. 770, yet even the dissent concedes that the hearsay rules are "waivable beyond any question," post, at 212. Thus, the mere existence of a policy justification for the plea-statement Rules cannot provide a sound basis for rejecting the background presump- tion of waivability. 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 209 Opinion of the Court In sum, there is no reason to believe that allowing nego- tiation as to waiver of the plea-statement Rules will bring plea bargaining to a grinding halt; it may well have the oppo- site effect.6 Respondent's unfounded policy argument thus provides no basis for concluding that Congress intended to prevent criminal defendants from offering to waive the plea-statement Rules during plea negotiation. C Finally, respondent contends that waiver agreements should be forbidden because they invite prosecutorial over- reaching and abuse. Respondent asserts that there is a "gross disparity" in the relative bargaining power of the par- ties to a plea agreement and suggests that a waiver agree- ment is "inherently unfair and coercive." Brief for Re- spondent 26. Because the prosecutor retains the discretion to "reward defendants for their substantial assistance" under the Sentencing Guidelines, respondent argues that defend- ants face an " `incredible dilemma' " when they are asked to accept waiver as the price of entering plea discussions. Ibid. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 193 (1957)). The dilemma flagged by respondent is indistinguishable from any of a number of difficult choices that criminal de- fendants face every day. The plea bargaining process neces- 6 Respondent has failed to offer any empirical support for his apocalyptic predictions, and data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts appear to contradict them. Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case (when, according to the Solicitor General, federal prosecutors in that Circuit used waiver agreements like the one invali- dated by the court below, see Pet. for Cert. 10­11), approximately 92.2% of the convictions in the Ninth Circuit were secured through pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 278 (1992) (Table D­7). During that same period, about 88.8% of the convictions in all federal courts were secured by voluntary pleas. Id., at 276. 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 210 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Opinion of the Court sarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental rights, but we have repeat- edly held that the government "may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea." Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U. S. 212, 219 (1978). "While con- fronting a defendant with the risk of more severe pun- ishment clearly may have a `discouraging effect on the de- fendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'-and permissible- `attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.' " Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynch- combe, 412 U. S. 17, 31 (1973)). The mere potential for abuse of prosecutorial bargaining power is an insufficient basis for foreclosing negotiation alto- gether. "Rather, tradition and experience justify our belief that the great majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their duty." Newton v. Rumery, 480 U. S. 386, 397 (1987) (plural- ity opinion); see also United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14­15 (1926) ("[I]n the absence of clear evi- dence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officers] have properly discharged their official duties"). Thus, al- though some waiver agreements "may not be the product of an informed and voluntary decision," this possibility "does not justify invalidating all such agreements." Newton, supra, at 393 (majority opinion). Instead, the appropriate response to respondent's predictions of abuse is to permit case-by-case inquiries into whether waiver agreements are the product of fraud or coercion. We hold that absent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the ex- clusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable. IV Respondent conferred with his lawyer after the prosecutor proposed waiver as a condition of proceeding with the plea 513us1$15N 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 211 Souter, J., dissenting discussion, and he has never complained that he entered into the waiver agreement at issue unknowingly or involuntarily. The Ninth Circuit's decision was based on its per se rejection of waiver of the plea-statement Rules. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer join, concurring. The Court holds that a waiver allowing the Government to impeach with statements made during plea negotiations is compatible with Congress' intent to promote plea bargain- ing. It may be, however, that a waiver to use such state- ments in the case in chief would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining. As the Government has not sought such a waiver, we do not here explore this question. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. This case poses only one question: did Congress intend to create a personal right subject to waiver by its individual beneficiaries when it adopted Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Crimi- nal Procedure, each Rule providing that statements made during plea discussions are inadmissible against the defend- ant except in two carefully described circumstances? The case raises no issue of policy to be settled by the courts, and if the generally applicable (and generally sound) judicial policy of respecting waivers of rights and privileges should conflict with a reading of the Rules as reasonably construed to accord with the intent of Congress, there is no doubt that congressional intent should prevail. Because the majority ruling is at odds with the intent of Congress and will render the Rules largely dead letters, I respectfully dissent. 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 212 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Souter, J., dissenting At first glance, the question of waivability may seem short on substance, given the unconditional language of the two virtually identical Rules, unsoftened by any provision for waiver or allusion to that possibility: "Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence . . . is not . . . admissible against the defendant who . . . was a participant in . . . plea discussions [of] . . . . . "any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty . . . [subject to two stated exceptions]." Fed. Rule Evid. 410. Believers in plain meaning might be excused for thinking that the text answers the question. But history may have something to say about what is plain, and here history is not silent. If the Rules are assumed to create only a personal right of a defendant, the right arguably finds itself in the company of other personal rights, including constitutional ones, that have been accepted time out of mind as being freely waivable. See, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465 (1938) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived). The possibility that the Rules in question here do create such a personal right must, indeed, be taken seriously if for no other reason than that the Rules of Evidence contain other bars to admissibility equally uncompromising on their face but nonetheless waivable beyond any question. See Fed. Rule Evid. 802 (hearsay); Fed. Rule Evid. 1002 (best evidence). The majority comes down on the side of waivability through reliance on the general presumption in favor of rec- ognizing waivers of rights, including evidentiary rights. To be sure, the majority recognizes that the presumption does not necessarily resolve the issue before us, and the majority opinion describes some counterexamples of rights that are insulated against waiver, at least when waiver is expressly 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 213 Souter, J., dissenting prohibited or limited in terms that speak of waiver expressly. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255 (1993); Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1 (1959). Still, the majority seems to assume that the express-waiver cases describe the only circumstances in which the recognition of waiver is fore- closed, and since the Rules in question here say nothing about "waiver" as such, the majority finds that fact really to be the end of the matter. If there were nothing more to go on here, I, too, would join the majority in relying on the fallback rule of permissi- ble waiver. But there is more to go on. There is, indeed, good reason to believe that Congress rejected the general rule of waivability when it passed the Rules in issue here, and once the evidence of such congressional intent is squarely faced, we have no business but to respect it (or de- flect it by applying some constitutionally mandated require- ment of clear statement). There is, of course, no claim in this case that Congress should be hobbled by any clear state- ment rule, and the result is that we are bound to respect the intent that the Advisory Committee's Notes to the congres- sionally enacted Rules reveal. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U. S. 594, 614­615 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concur- ring in judgment) (citing cases in which Advisory Commit- tee's Notes are taken as authoritative evidence of intent). The fact underlying those Notes, and the fact of which all congressional and judicial action must take account in deal- ing with the possible evidentiary significance of plea discus- sions, is that the federal judicial system could not possibly litigate every civil and criminal case filed in the courts. The consequence of this is that plea bargaining is an accepted feature of the criminal justice system, and, "[p]roperly ad- ministered, it is to be encouraged." Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 260 (1971). Thus the Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 410 explained that "[e]xclusion of offers to plead guilty or nolo has as its purpose the promotion of dis- position of criminal cases by compromise." 28 U. S. C. App., 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 214 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Souter, J., dissenting p. 750. "As with compromise offers generally, . . . free com- munication is needed, and security against having an offer of compromise or related statement admitted in evidence ef- fectively encourages it." Ibid. The Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 11(e)(6) drew the same conclusion about the purpose of that Rule and summed up the object of both Rules as being "to permit the unrestrained candor which produces effective plea discussions between the attorney for the gov- ernment and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se." 18 U. S. C. App., p. 745 (1979 Amend- ment) (internal quotation marks omitted). These explanations show with reasonable clarity that Con- gress probably made two assumptions when it adopted the Rules: pleas and plea discussions are to be encouraged, and conditions of unrestrained candor are the most effective means of encouragement. The provisions protecting a de- fendant against use of statements made in his plea bargain- ing are thus meant to create something more than a personal right shielding an individual from his imprudence. Rather, the Rules are meant to serve the interest of the federal judi- cial system (whose resources are controlled by Congress), by creating the conditions understood by Congress to be effec- tive in promoting reasonable plea agreements. Whether Congress was right or wrong that unrestrained candor is necessary to promote a reasonable number of plea agree- ments, Congress assumed that there was such a need and meant to satisfy it by these Rules. Since the zone of unre- strained candor is diminished whenever a defendant has to stop to think about the amount of trouble his openness may cause him if the plea negotiations fall through, Congress must have understood that the judicial system's interest in candid plea discussions would be threatened by recognizing waivers under Rules 410 and 11(e)(6). See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14­3.4, commentary (2d ed. 1980) (a rule contrary to the one adopted by Congress "would discourage plea negotiations and agreements, for defendants would have 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 215 Souter, J., dissenting to be constantly concerned whether, in light of their plea negotiation activities, they could successfully defend on the merits if a plea ultimately was not entered"). There is, in- deed, no indication that Congress intended merely a regime of such limited openness as might happen to survive market forces sufficient to supplant a default rule of inadmissibility. Nor may Congress be presumed to have intended to permit waivers that would undermine the stated policy of its own Rules. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) ("Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate"). It bears emphasizing that I would not suggest that there is only one reasonable balance possible between society's in- terest in encouraging compromise (which Congress thought to be served most effectively by refusing to recognize waiv- ers of rights under these Rules) and society's interest in pro- viding a vigorous adversary system when cases are tried (which may be served by recognizing waivers). The major- ity may be right that a better balance could have been struck than the one Congress intended. The majority may also be correct as a matter of policy that enough pleas will result even if parties are allowed to make their own rule of admissi- bility by agreement, with prosecutors refusing to talk with- out a defendant's waiver (unless such refusal overloads the system beyond its capacity for trials) and defendants refus- ing to waive (unless they are desperate enough to forgo their option to be tried without fear of compromising statements if the plea negotiations fail). But whether the majority is right or wrong on either score is beside the point; the policy it endorses is not the policy that Congress intended when it enacted the Rules. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 216 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Souter, J., dissenting that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law"). The unlikelihood that Congress intended the modest de- fault rule that the majority sees in Rules 11(e)(6) and 410 looms all the larger when the consequences of the majority position are pursued. The first consequence is that the Rules will probably not even function as default rules, for there is little chance that they will be applied at all. Al- ready, standard forms indicate that many federal prosecutors routinely require waiver of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) rights be- fore a prosecutor is willing to enter into plea discussions. Pet. for Cert. 10­11. See also United States v. Stevens, 935 F. 2d 1380, 1396 (CA3 1991) ("Plea agreements . . . commonly contain a provision stating that proffer information that is disclosed during the course of plea negotiations is . . . admis- sible for purposes of impeachment"). As the Government conceded during oral argument, defendants are generally in no position to challenge demands for these waivers, and the use of waiver provisions as contracts of adhesion has become accepted practice.1 Today's decision can only speed the heretofore illegitimate process by which the exception has been swallowing the Rules. See, e. g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U. S. 365, 377 (1990) (no exception should be made by Court because it would be too difficult to "carve out an exception that would not swal- low the rule"); United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57, 68 (1984) (respondent's suggested exception to the Dunn rule "threat- 1 The argument that the plea-bargaining system still works even though waiver has become the accepted practice does not answer the question whether Congress intended to permit a waiver rule. The Court's obli- gation is to interpret criminal procedure and evidentiary rules according to congressional intent. If the Government believes that the better rule is different from what is currently the law, the Government can petition Congress to change it. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute"). 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995) 217 Souter, J., dissenting ens to swallow the rule"). See also 23 C. Wright & K. Gra- ham, Federal Practice and Procedure 121­122, n. 7.3 (1994 Supp.) ("It would seem strange if the prosecutor could under- mine the judicial policy, now endorsed by Congress, of en- couraging plea bargaining by announcing a policy that his office will only plea bargain with defendants who `waive' the benefits of Rule 410"). Accordingly, it is probably only a matter of time until the Rules are dead letters. The second consequence likely to emerge from today's de- cision is the practical certainty that the waiver demanded will in time come to function as a waiver of trial itself. It is true that many (if not all) of the waiver forms now em- ployed go only to admissibility for impeachment.2 But al- though the erosion of the Rules has begun with this trickle, the majority's reasoning will provide no principled limit to it. The Rules draw no distinction between use of a state- ment for impeachment and use in the Government's case in chief. If objection can be waived for impeachment use, it can be waived for use as affirmative evidence, and if the Gov- ernment can effectively demand waiver in the former in- stance, there is no reason to believe it will not do so just as successfully in the latter. When it does, there is nothing this Court will legitimately be able to do about it. The Court is construing a congressional Rule on the theory that Congress meant to permit its waiver. Once that point is passed, as it is today, there is no legitimate limit on admissi- bility of a defendant's plea negotiation statements beyond what the Constitution may independently impose or the traf- 2 Waiver for impeachment use, however, has been applied broadly. For example, plea statements have been used to impeach a defendant's wit- nesses even where the defendant has chosen not to testify. See United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056, 1069 (CA7 1993) ("[J]ust as the defendant must choose whether to protect the proffer statements by not taking the stand, the defendant must choose whether to protect the proffer by care- fully determining which lines of questioning to pursue with different wit- nesses"), cert. pending sub nom. Suess v. United States, No. 93­7218. 513us1$15M 03-30-98 08:23:28 PAGES OPINPGT 218 UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO Souter, J., dissenting fic may bear. Just what the traffic may bear is an open ques- tion, but what cannot be denied is that the majority opinion sanctions a demand for waiver of such scope that a defendant who gives it will be unable even to acknowledge his desire to negotiate a guilty plea without furnishing admissible evi- dence against himself then and there. In such cases, the possibility of trial if no agreement is reached will be reduced to fantasy. The only defendant who will not damage himself by even the most restrained candor will be the one so desper- ate that he might as well walk into court and enter a naked guilty plea. It defies reason to think that Congress in- tended to invite such a result, when it adopted a Rule said to promote candid discussion in the interest of encouraging compromise. 513us1$16z 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 219 Syllabus AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS et al. certiorari to the supreme court of illinois No. 93­1286. Argued November 1, 1994-Decided January 18, 1995 In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, plaintiffs (re- spondents here), as participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions-particularly, American's imposition of capacity controls (limits on seats available to passengers obtaining tickets with frequent flyer credits) and blackout dates (restrictions on dates such credits could be used). Plaintiffs alleged that application of these changes to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act or Act) and constituted a breach of contract. American answered that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1), preempted plaintiffs' claims. The ADA prohibits States from "enact- [ing] or enforc[ing] any law . . . or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." While the Illinois class-action litigation was sub judice, this Court decided Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374. Morales defined § 1305(a)(1)'s "relating to" language to mean "having a connec- tion with, or reference to, airline `rates, routes, or services,' " id., at 384, and held that National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) guidelines on airline fare advertising were preempted under that defi- nition. The Illinois Supreme Court, post-Morales, ruled that plaintiffs' monetary claims survived for state-court adjudication. Those claims related only "tangential[ly]" or "tenuous[ly]" to "rates, routes, or serv- ices," the Illinois court reasoned, because frequent flyer programs are "peripheral," not "essential," to an airline's operation. Held: The ADA's preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves. Pp. 226­235. (a) Morales does not countenance the Illinois Supreme Court's sepa- ration of "essential" operations from unessential programs. Plaintiffs' complaints, accordingly, state claims "relating to" air carrier "rates" (i. e., American's charges, in the form of mileage credits, for tickets and class-of-service upgrades) and "services" (i. e., access to flights and up- grades unlimited by retrospectively applied capacity controls and black- out dates). P. 226. 513us1$16z 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 220 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Syllabus (b) The full text of the ADA's preemption clause, and the congres- sional purpose to leave largely to the airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation services, impel the conclusion that § 1305(a)(1) preempts plaintiffs' Consumer Fraud Act claims. The Illinois Act is prescriptive, controlling the primary conduct of those fall- ing within its governance; the Act, indeed, is paradigmatic of the state consumer protection laws that underpin the NAAG guidelines. Those guidelines highlight the potential for intrusive regulation of airline busi- ness practices inherent in state consumer protection legislation. The guidelines illustrate that the Illinois Act does not simply give effect to bargains offered by the airlines and accepted by customers, but serves as a means to guide and police airline marketing practices. Pp. 227­228. (c) The ADA, however, does not bar court adjudication of routine breach-of-contract claims. The preemption clause leaves room for suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline's breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings. As persuasively argued by the United States, terms and conditions airlines offer and passengers accept are privately ordered obligations and thus do not fit within the compass of state enactments and directives tar- geted by § 1305(a)(1). A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements-in this instance, to business judg- ments an airline made public about its rates and services. Court en- forcement of private agreements advances the market efficiency that the ADA was designed to promote, and comports with provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA) and related Department of Trans- portation (DOT) regulations that presuppose the vitality of contracts governing air carrier transportation. Such enforcement is responsive to the reality that the DOT lacks the apparatus and resources required to superintend a contract dispute resolution regime. Court adjudica- tion of routine breach-of-contract claims, furthermore, accords due recognition to Congress' retention of the FAA's saving clause, which preserves "the remedies now existing at common law or by statute." Nor can it be maintained that plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims are identical to, and therefore should be preempted to the same extent as, their Consumer Fraud Act claims. The basis for a contract action is the parties' agreement; to succeed under the state Act, one need not show an agreement, but must show an unfair or deceptive practice. Pp. 228­233. (d) American's argument that plaintiffs' claims must fail because they depend on state policies independent of the parties' intent assumes the answer to the very contract construction issue on which plaintiffs' claims turn: Did American, by contract, reserve the right to change the 513us1$16z 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 221 Opinion of the Court value of already accumulated mileage credits, or only to change the rules for credits earned from and after the date of the change? That pivotal question of contract interpretation has not yet had a full airing and remains open for adjudication on remand. Pp. 233­234. 157 Ill. 2d 466, 626 N. E. 2d 205, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Ste- vens, J., joined as to Parts I (except for the last paragraph) and II­B. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 235. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined except for Part I­B, post, p. 238. Scalia, J., took no part in the decision of the case. Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jerold S. Solovy, Marguerite M. Tompkins, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Richard A. Rothman, Bonnie Garone, and Michael J. Rider. Gilbert W. Gordon argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert Marks, Michael J. Freed, Michael B. Hyman, Nicholas E. Chimicles, Ira Neil Rich- ards, and Steven A. Schwartz. Cornelia T. L. Pillard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Robert V. Zener, Jonathan R. Siegel, and Paul M. Geier.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 prohibits States from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law . . . relating to *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Kenneth B. Alexander and Stephen A. Bokat; for the Air Transport Association of America by John G. Roberts, Jr., Walter A. Smith, Jr., Mary E. Downs, John R. Keys, Jr., and Calvin P. Sawyier; and for United Air Lines, Inc., by Kenneth W. Starr, Paul T. Cappuccio, and J. Andrew Langan. 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 222 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1). This case concerns the scope of that preemp- tive provision, specifically, its application to a state-court suit, brought by participants in an airline's frequent flyer program, challenging the airline's retroactive changes in terms and conditions of the program. We hold that the ADA's preemption prescription bars state-imposed regula- tion of air carriers, but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves. I A Until 1978, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1301 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), empowered the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to regulate the interstate airline industry. Although the FAA, pre-1978, authorized the Board both to regulate fares and to take administrative action against deceptive trade practices, the federal legislation originally contained no clause preempting state regulation. And from the start, the FAA has contained a "saving clause," § 1106, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1506, stating: "Nothing . . . in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 92 Stat. 1705, which largely deregulated domestic air transport. "To ensure that the States would not undo fed- eral deregulation with regulation of their own," Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 378 (1992), the ADA included a preemption clause which read in relevant part: "[N]o State . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 223 Opinion of the Court and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier . . . ." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1).1 This case is our second encounter with the ADA's preemp- tion clause. In 1992, in Morales, we confronted detailed Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines, composed by the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). The NAAG guidelines purported to govern, inter alia, the con- tent and format of airline fare advertising. See Morales, 504 U. S., at 393­418 (appendix to Court's opinion setting out NAAG guidelines on air travel industry advertising and marketing practices). Several States had endeavored to enforce the NAAG guidelines, under the States' general consumer protection laws, to stop allegedly deceptive air- line advertisements. The States' initiative, we determined, " `relat[ed] to [airline] rates, routes, or services,' " id., at 378­ 379 (quoting 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1)); consequently, we held, the fare advertising provisions of the NAAG guidelines were preempted by the ADA, id., at 391. For aid in construing the ADA words "relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier," the Court in Morales referred to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which provides for preemption of state laws "insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). Under the ERISA, we had ruled, a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 97 (1983). Morales analogously defined the "relating to" language in the ADA preemption clause as "having a connection with, or reference to, airline `rates, routes, or services.' " Morales, 504 U. S., at 384. 1 Reenacting Title 49 of the U. S. Code in 1994, Congress revised this clause to read: "[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . ." § 41713(b)(1). Congress intended the revision to make no substantive change. Pub. L. 103­272, § 1(a), 108 Stat. 745. 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 224 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court The Morales opinion presented much more, however, in accounting for the ADA's preemption of the state regulation in question. The opinion pointed out that the concerned federal agencies-the Department of Transportation (DOT) 2 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-objected to the NAAG fare advertising guidelines as inconsistent with the ADA's deregulatory purpose; both agencies, Morales ob- served, regarded the guidelines as state regulatory meas- ures preempted by the ADA. See id., at 379 (DOT and FTC); id., at 386 (DOT); id., at 390 (FTC). Morales empha- sized that the challenged guidelines set "binding require- ments as to how airline tickets may be marketed," and "im- posed [obligations that] would have a significant impact upon . . . the fares [airlines] charge." Id., at 388, 390. The opin- ion further noted that the airlines would not have "carte blanche to lie and deceive consumers," for "the DOT retains the power to prohibit advertisements which in its opinion do not further competitive pricing." Id., at 390­391. Morales also left room for state actions "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . to have pre-emptive effect." Id., at 390 (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). B The litigation now before us, two consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, was sub judice when we de- cided Morales. Plaintiffs in both actions (respondents here) are participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer pro- gram, AAdvantage. AAdvantage enrollees earn mileage credits when they fly on American. They can exchange those credits for flight tickets or class-of-service upgrades. Plaintiffs complained that AAdvantage program modifica- tions, instituted by American in 1988, devalued credits AAd- 2 Deceptive trade practices regulatory authority formerly residing in the CAB was transferred to the DOT when the CAB was abolished in 1985. Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98­443, § 3, 98 Stat. 1703; 49 U. S. C. App. § 1551. 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 225 Opinion of the Court vantage members had already earned. Plaintiffs featured American's imposition of capacity controls (limits on seats available to passengers obtaining tickets with AAdvantage credits) and blackout dates (restrictions on dates credits could be used). Conceding that American had reserved the right to change AAdvantage terms and conditions, plaintiffs challenged only the retroactive application of modifications, i. e., cutbacks on the utility of credits previously accumu- lated. These cutbacks, plaintiffs maintained, violated the Il- linois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act or Act), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505 (1992) (formerly codified at Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1211/2, ¶ 261 et seq. (1991)), and constituted a breach of contract. Plaintiffs currently seek only monetary relief.3 In March 1992, several weeks before our decision in Mo- rales, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction. Such a decree, the Illinois court reasoned, would involve regulation of an airline's current rendition of services, a matter preempted by the ADA. That court, however, allowed the breach-of-contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. The ADA's preemption clause, the Illinois court said, ruled out "only those State laws and regulations that specifically relate to and have more than a tangential connection with an airline's rates, routes or services." American Airlines, Inc. v. Wo- lens, 147 Ill. 2d 367, 373, 589 N. E. 2d 533, 536 (1992). After our decision in Morales, American petitioned for certiorari. The airline charged that the Illinois court, in a decision out of sync with Morales, had narrowly construed the ADA's broadly preemptive § 1305(a)(1). We granted the petition, 3 Plaintiffs no longer pursue requests they originally made for injunctive relief, or for punitive damages for alleged breach of contract. See Brief for Respondents 2, n. 2 (plaintiffs do not here contest holding of Illinois courts that injunctive relief is preempted); id., at 6, n. 9 (plaintiffs "concede that punitive damages traditionally have not been recoverable for a simple breach of contract"). 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 226 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and remanded for further consideration in light of Morales. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 506 U. S. 803 (1992). On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court, with one dissent, adhered to its prior judgment. Describing frequent flyer programs as not "essential," 157 Ill. 2d 466, 472, 626 N. E. 2d 205, 208 (1993), but merely "peripheral to the operation of an airline," ibid., the Illinois court typed plaintiffs' state-law claims for money damages as "relat[ed] to American's rates, routes, and services" only "tangential[ly]" or "tenuous[ly]," ibid. We granted American's second petition for certiorari, 511 U. S. 1017 (1994), and we now reverse the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment to the extent that it allowed survival of plaintiffs' Consumer Fraud Act claims; we affirm that judg- ment, however, to the extent that it permits plaintiffs' breach-of-contract action to proceed. In both respects, we adopt the position of the DOT, as advanced in this Court by the United States. II We need not dwell on the question whether plaintiffs' com- plaints state claims "relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." Morales, we are satisfied, does not countenance the Illinois Supreme Court's separation of matters "essen- tial" from matters unessential to airline operations. Plain- tiffs' claims relate to "rates," i. e., American's charges in the form of mileage credits for free tickets and upgrades, and to "services," i. e., access to flights and class-of-service up- grades unlimited by retrospectively applied capacity controls and blackout dates. But the ADA's preemption clause contains other words in need of interpretation, specifically, the words "enact or enforce any law" in the instruction: "[N]o State . . . shall enact or enforce any law . . . relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1). Taking into account all the words Congress placed in § 1305(a)(1), we first consider whether plaintiffs' 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 227 Opinion of the Court claims under the Consumer Fraud Act are preempted, and then turn to plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims. A The Consumer Fraud Act declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppres- sion or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omis- sion of such material fact, or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the `Uniform De- ceptive Trade Practices Act' . . . in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby." Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 815, § 505/2 (1992) (formerly codified at Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1211/2, ¶ 262 (1991)). The Act is prescriptive; it controls the primary conduct of those falling within its governance. This Illinois law, in fact, is paradigmatic of the consumer protection legislation under- pinning the NAAG guidelines. The NAAG Task Force on the Air Travel Industry, on which the Attorneys General of California, Illinois, Texas, and Washington served, see Mo- rales, 504 U. S., at 392, reported that the guidelines created no "new laws or regulations regarding the advertising practices or other business practices of the airline indus- try. They merely explain in detail how existing state laws apply to air fare advertising and frequent flyer pro- grams." Ibid. The NAAG guidelines highlight the potential for intru- sive regulation of airline business practices inherent in state consumer protection legislation typified by the Con- 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 228 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court sumer Fraud Act. For example, the guidelines enforcing the legislation instruct airlines on language appropriate to reserve rights to alter frequent flyer programs, and they include transition rules for the fair institution of capacity controls. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13­14, n. 7. As the NAAG guidelines illustrate, the Consumer Fraud Act serves as a means to guide and police the marketing practices of the airlines; the Act does not simply give effect to bargains offered by the airlines and accepted by airline customers. In light of the full text of the preemption clause, and of the ADA's purpose to leave largely to the airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation services,4 we conclude that § 1305(a)(1) pre- empts plaintiffs' claims under the Consumer Fraud Act. B American maintains, and we agree, that "Congress could hardly have intended to allow the States to hobble [competi- tion for airline passengers] through the application of restric- tive state laws." Brief for Petitioner 27. We do not read the ADA's preemption clause, however, to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings. As persuasively ar- gued by the United States, terms and conditions airlines offer and passengers accept are privately ordered obligations 4 We note again, however, that the DOT retains authority to investigate unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition by air- lines, and may order an airline to cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition. See FAA § 411, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1381(a); Mo- rales, 504 U. S., at 379; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3, and n. 2 (reporting that in 1993, the DOT issued 34 cease-and-desist orders and assessed more than $1.8 million in civil penalties in aviation economic enforcement proceedings). 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 229 Opinion of the Court "and thus do not amount to a State's `enact[ment] or enforce- [ment] [of] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provi- sion having the force and effect of law' within the meaning of [§ ]1305(a)(1)." 5 Brief for United States as Amicus Cu- riae 9. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 526 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("[A] common-law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken should not be regarded as a `requirement . . . imposed under State law' within the meaning of [Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad- vertising Act] § 5(b)."). A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements-in this in- stance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services.6 5 The United States recognizes that § 1305(a)(1), because it contains the word "enforce" as well as "enact," "could perhaps be read to preempt even state-court enforcement of private contracts." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. But the word series "law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision," as the United States suggests, "connotes official, government-imposed policies, not the terms of a private contract." Id., at 16. Similarly, the phrase "having the force and effect of law" is most naturally read to "refe[r] to binding standards of conduct that operate irrespective of any private agreement." Ibid. Finally, the ban on enact- ing or enforcing any law "relating to rates, routes, or services" is most sensibly read, in light of the ADA's overarching deregulatory purpose, to mean "States may not seek to impose their own public policies or theories of competition or regulation on the operations of an air carrier." Ibid. 6 American notes that in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991), the Court read the word "law" in a statutory exemption, 49 U. S. C. § 11341(a), to include "laws that govern the obliga- tions imposed by contract." But that statute and case are not comparable to the statute and case before us. Norfolk & Western concerned the au- thority of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to approve rail car- rier consolidations. A carrier participating in an ICC-approved consolida- tion is exempt "from the antitrust laws and from all other law . . . as necessary to let [the participant] carry out the transaction." 49 U. S. C. § 11341(a). We read the exemption clause to empower the ICC to over- ride, individually, a carrier's obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement. Our reading accorded with the ICC's and "ma[de] sense of the consolidation provisions," 499 U. S., at 132: "If § 11341(a) did not apply 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 230 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court The ADA, as we recognized in Morales, 504 U. S., at 378, was designed to promote "maximum reliance on competitive market forces." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1302(a)(4). Market effi- ciency requires effective means to enforce private agree- ments. See Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 303, 315 (1983) (remedy for breach of contract "is necessary in order to ensure economic effi- ciency"); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 90­91 (4th ed. 1992) (legal enforcement of contracts is more efficient than a purely voluntary system). As stated by the United States: "The stability and efficiency of the market depend fundamen- tally on the enforcement of agreements freely made, based on needs perceived by the contracting parties at the time." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. That reality is key to sensible construction of the ADA. The FAA's text, we note, presupposes the vitality of con- tracts governing transportation by air carriers. Section 411(b), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1381(b), thus authorizes airlines to "incorporate by reference in any ticket or other written in- strument any of the terms of the contract of carriage" to the extent authorized by the DOT. And the DOT's regulations contemplate that, upon the January 1, 1983, termination of domestic tariffs, "ticket contracts" ordinarily would be en- forceable under "the contract law of the States." 47 Fed. Reg. 52129 (1982). Correspondingly, the DOT requires car- riers to give passengers written notice of the time period within which they may "bring an action against the carrier for its acts." 14 CFR § 253.5(b)(2) (1994). American does not suggest that its contracts lack legal force. American sees the DOT, however, as the exclusively competent monitor of the airline's undertakings. American to bargaining agreements . . . , rail carrier consolidations would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve," id., at 133. Similarly in this case, our read- ing of the statutory formulation accords with that of the superintending agency, here, the DOT, and is necessary to make sense of the statute as a whole. 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 231 Opinion of the Court points to the Department's authority to require any airline, in conjunction with its certification, to file a performance bond conditioned on the airline's "making appropriate com- pensation . . . , as prescribed by the [Department], for failure . . . to perform air transportation services in accordance with agreements therefor." FAA § 401(q)(2), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1371(q)(2).7 But neither the DOT nor its predecessor, the CAB, has ever construed or applied this provision to displace courts as adjudicators in air carrier contract disputes. In- stead, these agencies have read the provision to charge them with a less taxing task: In passing on air carrier fitness under FAA § 401(d), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1371(d)(1), the DOT and the CAB have used their performance bond authority to ensure that, when a carrier's financial fitness is marginal, funds will be available to compensate customers if the carrier goes under before providing already-paid-for services. See, e. g., U. S. Bahamas Service Investigation, CAB Order 79­11­ 116, p. 3, 84 CAB Reports 73, 75 (1979) ("We . . . find that Southeast [Airlines] is fit to provide scheduled foreign air transportation. However, because of Southeast's current financial condition its operations present an unacceptable risk of financial loss to consumers. Therefore, we shall re- quire the carrier . . . to procure and maintain a bond for the protection of passengers who have paid for transportation not yet performed."). 7 The preceding subsection, FAA § 401(q)(1), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1371(q)(1), requires an air carrier to have insurance, in an amount prescribed by the DOT, to cover claims for personal injuries and property losses "resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft." See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19­20, and n. 12. American does not urge that the ADA preempts personal injury claims relating to airline operations. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 (acknowledgment by counsel for petitioner that "safety claims," for example, a negligence claim arising out of a plane crash, "would generally not be preempted"); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 12 ("It is . . . unlikely that Section 1305(a) (1) preempts safety-related personal-injury claims relating to airline operations."). 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 232 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court The United States maintains that the DOT has neither the authority nor the apparatus required to superintend a con- tract dispute resolution regime. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. Prior to airline deregulation, the CAB set rates, routes, and services through a cumbersome administrative process of applications and approvals. 72 Stat. 731. When Congress dismantled that regime, the United States emphasizes, the lawmakers indicated no inten- tion to establish, simultaneously, a new administrative proc- ess for DOT adjudication of private contract disputes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. We agree. Nor is it plausible that Congress meant to channel into federal courts the business of resolving, pursuant to judi- cially fashioned federal common law, the range of contract claims relating to airline rates, routes, or services. The ADA contains no hint of such a role for the federal courts. In this regard, the ADA contrasts markedly with the ERISA, which does channel civil actions into federal courts, see ERISA §§ 502(a), (e), 29 U. S. C. §§ 1132(a), (e), under a comprehensive scheme, detailed in the legislation, designed to promote "prompt and fair claims settlement." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 54 (1987); see Ingersoll- Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 143­145 (1990) (find- ing ERISA's comprehensive civil enforcement scheme a "spe- cial feature" supporting preemption of common-law wrongful discharge claims). The conclusion that the ADA permits state-law-based court adjudication of routine breach-of-contract claims also makes sense of Congress' retention of the FAA's saving clause, § 1106, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1506 (preserving "the reme- dies now existing at common law or by statute"). The ADA's preemption clause, § 1305(a)(1), read together with the FAA's saving clause, stops States from imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or serv- ices, but not from affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 233 Opinion of the Court stipulated. This distinction between what the State dic- tates and what the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.8 American suggests that plaintiffs' breach-of-contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims differ only in their labels, so that if Fraud Act claims are preempted, contract claims must be preempted as well. See Reply Brief 6. But a breach of contract, without more, "does not amount to a cause of action cognizable under the [Consumer Fraud] Act and the Act should not apply to simple breach of contract claims." Go- lembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1093, 635 N. E. 2d 452, 460 (1st Dist. 1994). The basis for a contract action is the parties' agreement; to succeed under the consumer protection law, one must show not neces- sarily an agreement, but in all cases, an unfair or deceptive practice. III American ultimately argues that even under the position on preemption advanced by the United States-the one we adopt-plaintiffs' claims must fail because they "inescapably depend on state policies that are independent of the intent of the parties." Reply Brief 3. "The state court cannot reach the merits," American contends, "unless it first invali- dates or limits [American's] express reservation of the right 8 The United States notes in this regard that "[s]ome state-law principles of contract law . . . might well be preempted to the extent they seek to effectuate the State's public policies, rather than the intent of the parties." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Because contract law is not at its core "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing," Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 529 (1992) (plurality opinion), we see no large risk of nonuniform adjudication inherent in "[s]tate-court enforcement of the terms of a uniform agreement prepared by an airline and entered into with its passengers nationwide." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT 234 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of the Court to change AAdvantage Program rules contained in AAdvan- tage contracts." Ibid. American's argument is unpersuasive, for it assumes the answer to the very contract construction issue on which plaintiffs' claims turn: Did American, by contract, reserve the right to change the value of already accumulated mileage credits, or only to change the rules governing credits earned from and after the date of the change? See Brief for Re- spondents 5 (plaintiffs recognize that American "reserved the right to restrict, suspend, or otherwise alter aspects of the Program prospectively," but maintain that American "never reserved the right to retroactively diminish the value of the credits previously earned by members"). That ques- tion of contract interpretation has not yet had a full airing, and we intimate no view on its resolution. Responding to our colleagues' diverse opinions dissenting in part, we add a final note. This case presents two issues that run all through the law. First, who decides (here, courts or the DOT, the latter lacking contract dispute resolu- tion resources for the task)? On this question, all agree to this extent: None of the opinions in this case would foist on the DOT work Congress has neither instructed nor funded the Department to do. Second, where is it proper to draw the line (here, between what the ADA preempts, and what it leaves to private ordering, backed by judicial enforcement)? Justice Stevens reads our Morales decision to demand only minimal preemption; in contrast, Justice O'Connor reads the same case to mandate total preemption.9 The middle course we adopt seems to us best calculated to carry out the congressional design; it also bears the approval of the statute's experienced administrator, the DOT. And while we adhere to our holding in Morales, we do not over- look that in our system of adjudication, principles seldom can 9 Justice O'Connor's "all is pre-empted" position leaves room for per- sonal injury claims, but only by classifying them as matters not "relating to [air carrier] services." See post, at 242­243. 513us1$16P 03-28-98 15:41:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 235 Opinion of Stevens, J. be settled "on the basis of one or two cases, but require a closer working out." Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. Cin. L. Rev. 324, 339 (1940) (Conference on the Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Illinois Su- preme Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia took no part in the decision of the case. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although I agree with the majority that the Airline De- regulation Act of 1978 (ADA) does not pre-empt respond- ents' breach-of-contract claims, I do not agree with the Court's disposition of their consumer-fraud claims. In my opinion, private tort actions based on common-law negli- gence or fraud, or on a statutory prohibition against fraud, are not pre-empted. Under the broad (and in my opinion incorrect 1) interpretation of the words "law . . . relating to rates, routes, or services" that the Court adopted in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374 (1992), direct state regulation of airline advertising is pre-empted; but I would not extend the holding of that case to embrace the private claims that respondents assert in this case. Unlike the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) guidelines reviewed in Morales, the Illinois Con- sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Con- sumer Fraud Act) does not instruct the airlines about how they can market their services. Instead, it merely requires 1 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 419­427 (1992) (dissenting opinion). 513us1$16I 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 236 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of Stevens, J. all commercial enterprises-airlines included-to refrain from defrauding their customers. The Morales opinion said nothing about pre-empting general state laws prohibiting fraud. The majority's extension of the ADA's pre-emptive reach from airline-specific advertising standards to a general background rule of private conduct represents an alarming enlargement of Morales' holding. I see no reason why a state law requiring an airline to honor its contractual commitments is any less a law relating to its rates and services than is a state law imposing a "duty not to make false statements of material fact or to conceal such facts." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 528 (1992) (finding similar claim not to be pre-empted under Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act). In this case, the two claims are grounded upon the exact same con- duct and would presumably have an identical impact upon American's rates, routes, and services. The majority cor- rectly finds that Congress did not intend to pre-empt a claim that an airline breached a private agreement. I see no rea- son why the ADA should pre-empt a claim that the airline defrauded its customers in the making and performance of that very same agreement. I would analogize the Consumer Fraud Act to a codifica- tion of common-law negligence rules. Under ordinary tort principles, every person has a duty to exercise reasonable care toward all other persons with whom he comes into con- tact. Presumably, if an airline were negligent in a way that somehow affected its rates, routes, or services,2 and the vic- tim of the airline's negligence were to sue in state court, the majority would not hold all common-law negligence rules to be pre-empted by the ADA. See ante, at 231, n. 7. Like contract principles, the standard of ordinary care is a general 2 Indeed, every judgment against an airline will have some effect on rates, routes, or services, at least at the margin. In response to adverse judgments, airlines may have to raise rates, or curtail routes or services, to make up for lost income. 513us1$16I 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 237 Opinion of Stevens, J. background rule against which all individuals order their af- fairs. Surely Congress did not intend to give airlines free rein to commit negligent acts subject only to the supervision of the Department of Transportation, any more than it meant to allow airlines to breach contracts with impunity. See ante, at 230­233. And, if judge-made duties are not pre- empted, it would make little sense to find pre-emption of identical rules codified by the state legislature. The duty imposed by the Consumer Fraud Act is to refrain from com- mitting fraud in commercial dealings-it is "the duty not to deceive." Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 529. This is neither a novel nor a controversial proscription. It falls no more heavily upon airlines than upon any other business. It is no more or less a state-imposed "public policy" than a negli- gence rule. In sum, I see no difference between the duty to refrain from deception and the duty of reasonable care, and I see no meaningful difference between the enforcement of either duty and the enforcement of a private agreement. The majority's extension of Morales is particularly unten- able in light of the interpretive presumption against pre- emption. As in Cipollone, I believe there is insufficient evi- dence of congressional intent to supersede laws of general applicability to justify a finding that the ADA pre-empts either the contract or the fraud claim. Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 525­530; see also Morales, 504 U. S., at 419­421 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing presumption against pre-emption as an incident of federalism). Indeed, the presumption against pre-emption is especially appropriate to the ADA be- cause Congress retained the "saving clause" preserving state "remedies now existing at common law or by statute." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1506. Accordingly, while I join the Court's disposition of the breach-of-contract claims,3 I would affirm the entire judg- ment of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 3 Accordingly, I join Part I, except for the last paragraph, and Part II­B of the Court's opinion. 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 238 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Thomas joins as to all but Part I­B, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. In permitting respondents' contract action to go forward, the Court arrives at what might be a reasonable policy judg- ment as to when state law actions against airlines should be pre-empted if we were free to legislate it. It is not, how- ever, consistent with our controlling precedents, and it re- quires some questionable assumptions about the nature of contract law. I would hold that none of respondents' actions may proceed. I A The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) says that "no State . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1).1 We considered the scope of that provision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374 (1992). We noted the similarity of § 1305's lan- guage to the pre-emption provision in ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), and said that, like ERISA's § 1144, § 1305's words "express a broad pre-emptive purpose." 504 U. S., at 383. We concluded that "State enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline `rates, routes, or services' are pre-empted." Id., at 384. Applying Morales to this case, I agree with the Court that respondents' consumer fraud and contract claims are "related to" airline "rates" and "services." See ante, at 226. The Court says, however, that judicial enforcement of a contract's 1 Congress has recently amended this statute to read: "[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U. S. C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994 ed.). Congress intended this amendment to be "without substantive change." See Pub. L. 103­272, § 1(a), 108 Stat. 745. 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 239 Opinion of O'Connor, J. terms, in accordance with state contract law, does not amount to a "State . . . enforc[ing] any law," § 1305, but in- stead is simply a State "hold[ing] parties to their agree- men[t]." See ante, at 229, and n. 5. It therefore concludes that § 1305 does not apply to respondents' contract actions. I cannot agree with that conclusion. I do not understand the Court to say that a State only "enforces" its "law" when some state employee (e. g., an at- torney general, or a judge) orders someone to do something. If that were the meaning of "enforce" in this context, then a diversity action brought by a private party under state law in federal court would never be subject to § 1305 pre- emption, because no state employee is involved, whereas the same action might be pre-empted in state court. That would make little sense, and federal courts have routinely considered § 1305 in determining whether a particular state law claim is pre-empted. E. g., Statland v. American Air- lines, Inc., 998 F. 2d 539, 541­542 (CA7) (contract claim pre- empted), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1012 (1993); West v. North- west Airlines, Inc., 995 F. 2d 148, 151 (CA9 1993) (tort claim for punitive damages pre-empted), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1111 (1994); Cannava v. USAir, Inc., No. 91­30003­F, 1993 WL 565341, *6 (D. Mass., Jan. 7, 1993) (tort and contract claims pre-empted). Consequently, one must read "no State . . . shall . . . enforce any law" to mean that no one may enforce state law against an airline when the "enforcement actio[n] ha[s] a connection with, or reference to, airline `rates, routes, or services.' " Morales, supra, at 384. This ex- plains the Court's conclusion, with which I agree, that pri- vate parties such as respondents may not enforce the Illinois consumer fraud law against petitioner in an action whose subject matter relates to airline rates and services. Ante, at 228. As I read § 1305 and Morales, however, respondents' con- tract claims also must be pre-empted. The Court recog- nizes, ante, at 227, that the "guidelines" at issue in Morales 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 240 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. did not " `create any new laws or regulations' applying to the airline industry; rather, they claim[ed] to `explain in detail how existing state laws apply to air fare advertising and fre- quent flyer programs.' " Morales, 504 U. S., at 379. None- theless, we stated our holding quite clearly: "We hold that the fare advertising provisions of the NAAG guidelines are pre-empted by [§ 1305]." Id., at 391. How can it be that the guidelines, which did not themselves constitute "law," were nonetheless pre-empted by a statute whose coverage is limited to "laws" or other "provision[s] having the force and effect of law"? The answer is that in Morales we held that an action to invoke the State's coercive power against an airline, by means of a generally applicable law, when the subject matter of the action related to airline rates, would constitute "Stat[e] . . . enforce[ment]" of a "law . . . relating to rates, routes, or services." Id., at 383 (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Accordingly, we held that § 1305 pre- empted the action. It is not the case, as Justice Stevens urges, that Morales was limited to "airline-specific advertis- ing standards." Ante, at 236. We examined the content of those standards-which had no binding force on their own- only to ascertain whether they "related to" airline rates (and we thought they "quite obviously" did). Morales, supra, at 387. The only "laws" at issue in Morales were generally applicable consumer fraud statutes, not facially related to airlines, much like the law at issue in respondents' consumer fraud claims here. The Court concludes, however, that § 1305 does not pre- empt enforcement, by means of generally applicable state law, of a private agreement relating to airline rates and serv- ices. I cannot distinguish this case from Morales. In both, the subject matter of the action (the guidelines in Morales, the contract here) relates to airline rates and services. In both, that subject matter has no legal force, except insofar as a generally applicable state law (a consumer fraud law in 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 241 Opinion of O'Connor, J. Morales, state contract law here 2) permits an aggrieved party to invoke the State's coercive power against someone refusing to comply with the subject matter's terms (the re- quirements of the guidelines in Morales, the terms of the contract here). Morales' conclusion that § 1305 pre-empts such an invocation is dispositive here, both of respondents' consumer fraud claims, and of their contract claims. The lower courts seem to agree; as far as I know, no court to have considered ADA pre-emption since we decided Morales has suggested that enforcement of state contract law does not fall within § 1305 if the necessary relation to airline rates, routes, or services exists. See, e. g., Statland v. American Airlines, supra, at 541­542 (contract claims pre-empted); West v. Northwest Airlines, supra, at 151­152 (contract claims not pre-empted because "too tenuously connected" to airline rates or services); Cannava v. USAir, Inc., supra, at *6 (contract claims pre-empted); Schaefer v. Delta Air- lines, No. 92­1170­E(LSP), 1992 WL 558954, *2 (SD Cal., Sept. 18, 1992) (same); Vail v. Pan Am Corp., 260 N. J. Super. 292, 299­300, 616 A. 2d 523, 526­527 (App. Div. 1992) (same); El-Menshawy v. Egypt Air, 276 N. J. Super. 121, 126, 647 A. 2d 491, 493 (Law Div. 1994) (same). The Court argues that the words "law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision" in § 1305 refer only to " `official, government-imposed policies, not the terms of a private con- tract.' " Ante, at 229, n. 5 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17). To be sure, the terms of private con- tracts are not "laws," any more than the guidelines at issue in Morales were "laws." But contract law, and generally applicable consumer fraud statutes, are laws, and Morales held that § 1305 prevents enforcement of "any [state] law" against the airlines when the subject matter of the action 2 See Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 130 (1991) ("A contract has no legal force apart from the law that acknowledges its binding character"), discussed infra, at 243­244. 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 242 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. "relates" to airline rates, routes, or services. Thus, where the terms of a private contract relate to airline rates and services, and those terms can only be enforced through state law, Morales is indistinguishable. As Justice Stevens persuasively argues, there is "no reason why a state law re- quiring an airline to honor its contractual commitments is any less a law relating to its rates and services than is a state law imposing a `duty not to make false statements of material fact or to conceal such facts,' " ante, at 236. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 234, n. 9, my view of Morales does not mean that personal injury claims against airlines are always pre-empted. Many cases decided since Morales have allowed personal injury claims to proceed, even though none has said that a State is not "enforcing" its "law" when it imposes tort liability on an airline. In those cases, courts have found the particular tort claims at issue not to "relate" to airline "services," much as we suggested in Morales that state laws against gambling and prostitution would be too tenuously related to airline services to be pre- empted, see Morales, supra, at 390. E. g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F. 3d 350, 353­356 (CA5 1993) (arguing that " `services' is not coextensive with airline `safety,' " so safety-related tort claim should not be pre-empted; urging en banc review to bring Circuit precedent into conformity with that view), rehearing en banc granted, 12 F. 3d 426 (1994); Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F. 2d 291, 294­295 (CA11 1993) (tort claim for defective aircraft design not pre-empted because not related to airline serv- ices); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F. 2d 1438, 1443, and n. 11, 1444, n. 13 (CA10) (same), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 908 (1993); Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 179, 182 (EDNY 1994) (tort claim against airline for personal in- jury not pre-empted because not related to airline "services" within the meaning of § 1305); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280, 284 (SDNY 1994) (same); Bayne v. Adventure Tours USA, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 206 (ND Tex. 1994) 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 243 Opinion of O'Connor, J. (same); Fenn v. American Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1218, 1222­1223 (SD Miss. 1993) (same); Chouest v. American Air- lines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 412, 416­417 (ED La. 1993) (same); O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (ND Ill. 1993) (same); In re Air Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1363 (ED Mich. 1993) (same); Butcher v. Houston, 813 F. Supp. 515, 518 (SD Tex. 1993) (same). Our recent decision in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117 (1991), is relevant. The question in that case was whether a rail carrier's statutory exemption from "all other law," which we read to mean "all law as necessary to carry out an ICC-approved transaction," id., at 129, exempted the carrier from contractually imposed obliga- tions. We held that it did. We noted that "[a] contract de- pends on a regime of common and statutory law for its effec- tiveness and enforcement," id., at 129­130, that "[a] contract has no legal force apart from the law that acknowledges its binding character," id., at 130, and that " `[l]aws which sub- sist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or incorpo- rated in its terms," ibid. (quoting Farmers and Merchants Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 262 U. S. 649, 660 (1923)). Accordingly, we concluded that "the exemption . . . from `all other law' effects an override of con- tractual obligations . . . by suspending application of the law that makes the contract binding." 499 U. S., at 130. In so concluding, we specifically rejected the Court of Appeals' views that the "all other law" exemption "[n]owhere . . . sa[id] that the ICC may also override contracts," and that it did not exempt the carrier from " `all legal obstacles.' " Brotherhood of R. Carmen v. ICC, 880 F. 2d 562, 567 (CADC 1989); see Norfolk & Western, supra, at 133­134. The Court does not dispute this reading of Norfolk & Western, which in my view makes clear that a State is en- forcing its "law" when it brings its coercive power to bear 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 244 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. on a party who has violated a contractual obligation. We reiterated in Norfolk & Western that "[t]he obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement." 499 U. S., at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.) ("A contract is an agreement, in which a party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular thing. The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his contract"). We there- fore read the words "all other law" in the statutory exemp- tion broadly enough to "suspen[d] application of the law that makes the contract binding." Norfolk & Western, supra, at 130. I would give the words "any law" in § 1305 a similar reading. As support for its theory, the Court cites only a statement in the plurality opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504 (1992); see ante, at 229. The Cipollone plural- ity said that "a common-law remedy for a contractual com- mitment voluntarily undertaken should not be regarded as a `requirement . . . imposed under State law' within the mean- ing of § 5(b)." 505 U. S., at 526. But the plurality elabo- rated on this point in a footnote. In rejecting the argument that specific warranty obligations are "imposed under State law," the plurality agreed that pre-emption might be re- quired "if the Act pre-empted `liability' imposed under state law . . . ; but instead the Act expressly pre-empts only a `requirement or prohibition' imposed under state law." Id., at 526, n. 24. It agreed that contractual requirements are "only enforceable under state law," but argued that those requirements are " `imposed' by the contracting party upon itself." Ibid. The plurality thus distinguished the situation where substantive requirements contained in a contract are enforceable only under state law from the situation where state law itself imposes substantive requirements, and con- cluded that the statute before it pre-empted only the latter kind of state law. Here, as in Cipollone, the requirements 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 245 Opinion of O'Connor, J. at issue are contained in a contract, and have no legal force except insofar as state law makes them enforceable. But we concluded in Morales that § 1305 does pre-empt state law in those circumstances, unlike the statute in Cipollone. The difference between this case and Cipollone is the very differ- ent language in the two pre-emption statutes. The Court also concludes that § 1305 only "stops States from imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services," ante, at 232. In Morales, however, we specifically rejected an interpretation of § 1305 that would have rewritten it to read: No State shall " `regu- late rates, routes, and services.' " See Morales, 504 U. S., at 385­386. There is little distinction between "regulating rates, routes, and services" and "imposing substantive stand- ards with respect to rates, routes, and services," and the Court does not explain how Morales' rejection of the former allows it now to adopt the latter. The Court relies on the statute's "saving clause," 49 U. S. C. App. § 1506, see ante, at 232, but we said in Morales that "[a] general `remedies' sav- ing clause cannot be allowed to supersede the specific sub- stantive pre-emption provision," particularly where, as here, "the `saving' clause is a relic of the pre-ADA/no pre-emption regime." Morales, 504 U. S., at 385. Without question, Morales gave § 1305 a broad pre- emptive sweep. The dissent in that case argued that such a broad interpretation went too far by pre-empting areas of traditional state regulation without a clear expression of congressional intent to do so. Id., at 421­424 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also ante, at 235, 237 (Stevens, J., concur- ring in part and dissenting in part). But the Court rejected the dissent's reading, holding instead that § 1305's language demonstrated a clear "statutory intent" to expressly pre- empt generally applicable state law as long as the "particu- larized application" of that law relates to airline rates, routes, or services. Morales, supra, at 383, 386, and n. 2. 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 246 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. B Congress has recently revisited § 1305, and said that it "d[id] not intend to alter the broad preemption interpreta- tion adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Mo- rales," H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103­677, p. 83 (1994). If the Court nonetheless believes that Morales misread § 1305, the proper course of action would be to overrule that case, de- spite Congress' apparent approval of it. The Court's read- ing of § 1305 is not, in my view, a " `closer working out' " of ADA pre-emption, see ante, at 235; rather, it is a new ap- proach that does not square with our decisions in Morales and Norfolk & Western. Stare decisis has "special force" in the area of statutory interpretation, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, post, at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). It sometimes requires adherence to a wrongly decided precedent. Post, at 283­284. Here, how- ever, Congress apparently does not think that our decision in Morales was wrong, nor do I. In the absence of any " `special justification,' " post, at 284 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984)), for departing from Mo- rales, I would recognize the import of Morales and Nor- folk & Western here, and render the decision that the lan- guage of § 1305, in light of those cases, compels. If, at the end of the day, Congress believes we have erred in interpret- ing § 1305, it remains free to correct our mistake. II Our decisions in Morales and Norfolk & Western suffice to decide this case along the lines I have described. In addi- tion, however, I disagree with the Court's view that courts can realistically be confined, "in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement." Ante, at 233. When they are so confined, the Court says, courts are "simply hold[ing] parties to their agreements," 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 247 Opinion of O'Connor, J. and are not "enforcing" any "law," ante, at 229. The Court also says that " `[s]ome state-law principles of contract law . . . might well be preempted to the extent they seek to effec- tuate the State's public policies, rather than the intent of the parties.' " Ante, at 233, n. 8 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28). The doctrinal underpinnings of the notion that judicial en- forcement of the "intent of the parties" can be divorced from a State's "public policy" have been in serious question for many years. As one author wrote some time ago: "A contract, therefore, between two or more individuals cannot be said to be generally devoid of all public inter- est. If it be of no interest, why enforce it? For note that in enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two individuals to do what they have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of one party against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that should be done are important questions of public policy. . . . [T]he notion that in enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will of the parties rests upon an . . . untenable theory as to what the enforcement of contracts involves." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 562 (1933). More recent authors have expressed similar views. See, e. g., Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Reg- ulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697, 699 (1990) ("Mediating between private ordering and social concerns, contract is a socioeconomic institution that re- quires an array of normative choices. . . . The questions ad- dressed by contract law concern what social norms to use in the enforcement of contracts, not whether social norms will be used at all"). Contract law is a set of policy judgments concerning how to decide the meaning of private agreements, which private agreements should be legally enforceable, and 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 248 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. what remedy to afford for their breach. The Court fails to recognize that when a State decides to force parties to com- ply with a contract, it does so only because it is satisfied that state policy, as expressed in its contract law, will be ad- vanced by that decision. Thus, the Court's allowance that " `[s]ome state-law princi- ples of contract law . . . might well be preempted to the extent they seek to effectuate the State's public policies, rather than the intent of the parties,' " ante, at 233, n. 8 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28), threatens to swallow all of contract law. For example, the Court observes that on remand, the state court will be re- quired to decide whether petitioner reserved the right to alter the terms of its frequent flyer program retroactively, or instead only prospectively. Ante, at 234. The court will presumably decide that question by looking to the usual "rules" of contract interpretation to decide what the con- tract's language means. If the court finds the language to be ambiguous, it might invoke the familiar rule that the con- tract should be construed against its drafter, and thus that respondents should receive the benefit of the doubt. See 2 E. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.11, pp. 265­ 268 (1990) (hereinafter Farnsworth). That rule of contract construction is not essential to a functional contract system. It is a policy choice that our contract system has made. Other such policy choices are that courts should not enforce agreements unsupported by consideration, see 1 Farnsworth § 2.5; but cf. J. Barton, J. Gibbs, V. Li, & J. Merryman, Law in Radically Different Cultures 579 (1983) (other legal systems enforce certain agreements not supported by consideration); that courts should supply "reasonable" terms to fill "gaps" in incomplete contracts, see 2 Farnsworth §§ 7.15­7.17; the method by which courts should decide what terms to supply, see C. Fried, Contract as Promise 60, 69­73 (1981); Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Con- tract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1816, 1820­1823 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 219 (1995) 249 Opinion of O'Connor, J. (1991); Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con- tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87, 91 (1989) (all suggesting different policy considerations that should inform how courts fill contractual gaps); and that a breach of contract entitles the aggrieved party to expecta- tion damages most of the time, but specific performance only rarely, see 3 Farnsworth, ch. 12; but cf. R. David & J. Brier- ley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today 302 (1985) (for- mer Soviet Union routinely awarded specific performance). If courts are not permitted to look to these aspects of con- tract law in airline-related actions, they will find the cases difficult to decide. Even the doctrine of unconscionability, which the United States suggests as an aspect of contract law that "might well be preempted" because it "seek[s] to effectuate the State's public policies, rather than the intent of the parties," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28, cannot be so neatly categorized. On the one hand, refusing to enforce a contract because it is "unfair" seems quintessentially policy oriented. But on the other, "[p]rocedural unconscionability is broadly conceived to encompass not only the employment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power." 1 Farnsworth § 4.28, at 506­507 (footnotes omit- ted). In other words, a determination that a contract is "un- conscionable" may in fact be a determination that one party did not intend to agree to the terms of the contract. Thus, the unconscionability doctrine, far from being a purely "policy-oriented" doctrine that courts impose over the will of the parties, instead demonstrates that state public policy cannot easily be separated from the methods by which courts are to decide what the parties "intended." "[T]he law itself imposes contractual liability on the basis of a complex of moral, political, and social judgments." Fried, supra, at 69. The rules laid down by contract law for determining what the parties intended an agreement to 513us1$16J 03-28-98 15:41:56 PAGES OPINPGT 250 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. v. WOLENS Opinion of O'Connor, J. mean, whether that agreement is legally enforceable, and what relief an aggrieved party should receive, are the end result of those judgments. Our legal system has decided to allow private parties to invoke the coercive power of the State in the effort to enforce those (and only those) private agreements that conform to rules set by those state policies known collectively as "contract law." Courts cannot enforce private agreements without reference to those policies, be- cause those policies define the role of courts in deciding dis- putes concerning private agreements. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court. 513us1$17z 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 251 Syllabus NATIONSBANK OF NORTH CAROLINA, N. A., et al. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE CO. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 93­1612. Argued December 7, 1994-Decided January 18, 1995* Petitioner national bank and its brokerage subsidiary applied to the Comp- troller of the Currency, charged by Congress with superintendence of national banks, to allow the subsidiary to act as an agent in the sale of annuities. Under the proposed plan, bank customers could purchase a "variable annuity"-which invests payments in a designated way and yields income that varies with investment performance-a "fixed" an- nuity-which yields income that does not vary-or a hybrid account. Granting the application, the Comptroller typed the annuity sales "inci- dental" to "the business of banking" under the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh. The Comptroller further concluded that annu- ities are not "insurance" within the meaning of § 92; that provision, by expressly authorizing banks in towns of no more than 5,000 people to sell insurance, arguably implies that banks in larger towns may not sell insurance. Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC), which sells annuities, filed a suit challenging the Comptroller's decision. The District Court upheld the Comptroller's conclusions as a permissi- ble reading of the Act. Reversing the District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals held that § 92 bars banks not located in small towns from selling insurance, and rejected the Comptroller's conclusion that annuities are not insurance under § 92. Held: The Comptroller's determination that national banks may serve as agents in the sale of annuities is a reasonable construction of the Act and therefore warrants judicial deference. Pp. 256­264. (a) If a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, the reviewing court must determine whether the an- swer reached by the agency charged with the statute's enforcement is based on a permissible construction. If an expert administrator's read- ing fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of *Together with No. 93­1613, Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 513us1$17z 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 252 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Syllabus Congress' revealed design, the administrator's judgment is given con- trolling weight. Pp. 256­257. (b) The Court respects as reasonable the Comptroller's conclusion that brokerage of annuities is an "incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking" under § 24 Seventh. In interpreting "the business of banking" to include brokerage of financial investment instruments, the Comptroller better comprehends the Act's terms than does VALIC, whose reading confines national banks to the five activities listed in § 24 Seventh's first sentence and endeavors incidental thereto: discounting and negotiating evidences of debt; receiving deposits; buy- ing and selling money; making loans; and obtaining, issuing, and circulat- ing notes. The section's second sentence, which limits banks' "dealing in securities," recognizes that banks otherwise have the authority the sentence addresses, even though that authority is not specifically enu- merated; Congress thus evidenced its intent to accord banks authority "to carry on the business of banking" through customer services not circumscribed by the five listed activities. The Comptroller therefore has discretion, within reasonable bounds, to permit banking activities beyond those the statute sets forth as exemplary. Here, the Comptrol- ler reasonably concluded that the authority to sell annuities qualifies as part of the authority to purchase and sell financial investment instru- ments. Modern annuities, though more sophisticated than the standard savings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same need. By providing customers with the opportunity to invest in one or more annu- ity options, banks are essentially offering financial investment instru- ments of the kind congressional authorization permits them to broker. Pp. 257­260. (c) The Court further defers to the Comptroller's determination that annuities are properly classified as investments, not "insurance" within § 92's meaning. The Comptroller's classification of annuities, based on the tax deferral and investment features that distinguish them from insurance, is at least a reasonable interpretation of the con- trolling legislation. A key feature of insurance is that it indemnifies loss. As the Comptroller observes, annuities serve an important investment purpose and are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell. And though fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable annuities, fixed annuities too have significant investment features and are functionally similar to debt instruments. Moreover, mindful that fixed annuities are often pack- aged with variable annuities, the Comptroller reasonably chose to clas- sify the two together. In light of the foregoing, the Court need not reach the question whether § 92, by negative implication, precludes 513us1$17z 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 251 (1995) 253 Syllabus national banks in places more populous than 5,000 from selling insur- ance. Pp. 260­264. 998 F. 2d 1295, reversed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for petitioners in No. 93­1613. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Mark B. Stern, Jacob M. Lewis, Julie L. Williams, L. Robert Griffin, and Yvonne D. McIn- tire. Steven S. Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioners in No. 93­1612. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Kurucza and Robert G. Ballen. David Overlock Stewart argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Alan G. Priest, Raymond C. Ortman, Jr., and William A. Wilson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, James T. McIntyre, Richard M. Whiting, and David L. Glass; for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors et al. by David W. Roderer, Eric L. Hirschhorn, Donn C. Meindertsma, J. Thomas Cardwell, Leonard J. Rubin, and M. Brooks Senn; and for the New York Clearing House Association by John L. Warden, Michael M. Wiseman, Theodore Edelman, and Norman R. Nelson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Tom Gallagher, Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner of Florida, et al. by David J. Busch, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, pro se, and Mark F. Kohler, Assistant Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attor- ney General of Maryland, Gary L. Spaeth, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney Gen- eral of North Dakota, Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Maureen G. Glynn, Special Assistant Attorney General; for the Amer- ican Academy of Actuaries by Lauren M. Bloom; for the American Council of Life Insurance by Gary E. Hughes, Allen R. Caskie, and Phillip E. Stano; for the American Land Title Association by Sheldon E. Hochberg; for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners by Susan E. Martin and Ellen Dollase Wilcox; and for the National Association of Life Underwriters et al. by Ann M. Kappler and Scott A. Sinder. 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 254 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of the Court Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated cases present the question whether na- tional banks may serve as agents in the sale of annuities. The Comptroller of the Currency, charged by Congress with superintendence of national banks, determined that federal law permits such annuity sales as a service to bank custom- ers. Specifically, the Comptroller considered the sales at issue "incidental" to "the business of banking" under the Na- tional Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5136, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Comptroller fur- ther concluded that annuities are not "insurance" within the meaning of § 92; that provision, by expressly authorizing banks in towns of no more than 5,000 people to sell insurance, arguably implies that banks in larger towns may not sell in- surance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas upheld the Comptroller's conclusions as a permissible reading of the National Bank Act, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. We are satisfied that the Comptroller's construction of the Act is reasonable and therefore warrants judicial deference. Ac- cordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Petitioner NationsBank of North Carolina, N. A., a na- tional bank based in Charlotte, and its brokerage subsidiary sought permission from the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to 12 CFR § 5.34 (1994), for the brokerage subsid- iary to act as an agent in the sale of annuities. Annuities are contracts under which the purchaser makes one or more premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a series of payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for the life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary. When a purchaser invests in a "variable" annuity, the purchaser's money is invested in a designated way and payments to the purchaser vary with investment performance. In a classic "fixed" annuity, in contrast, payments do not vary. Under 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 251 (1995) 255 Opinion of the Court the contracts NationsBank proposed to sell, purchasers could direct their payments to a variable, fixed, or hybrid account, and would be allowed periodically to modify their choice. The issuers would be various insurance companies. See Letter from J. Michael Shepherd, Senior Deputy Comptrol- ler, to Robert M. Kurucza (Mar. 21, 1990), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 93­1612, pp. 35a­36a (Comptroller's Letter). The Comptroller granted NationsBank's application. He concluded that national banks have authority to broker annu- ities within "the business of banking" under 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh. He further concluded that § 92, addressing insur- ance sales by banks in towns with no more than 5,000 people, did not impede his approval; for purposes of that provision, the Comptroller explained, annuities do not rank as "insur- ance." See Comptroller's Letter 41a­47a. Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC), which sells annuities, challenged the Comptroller's decision. VALIC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking declaratory and injunc- tive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), and 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller and NationsBank. Variable An- nuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re- versed. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F. 2d 1295 (1993). Relying on its decision in Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F. 2d 1010 (1968), the Fifth Circuit first held that § 92 bars banks not located in small towns from selling insurance, and then rejected the Comptroller's view that annuities are not insurance for pur- poses of § 92. See 998 F. 2d, at 1298­1302. Four judges dissented from the failure of the court to grant rehearing en banc. The dissenters maintained that the panel had not accorded due deference to the Comptrol- ler's reasonable statutory interpretations. Variable Annu- 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 256 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of the Court ity Life Ins. Co. v. Clark[e], 13 F. 3d 833, 837­838 (CA5 1994).1 We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1141 (1994). II A Authorizing national banks to "carry on the business of banking," the National Bank Act provides that such banks shall have power- "To exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by dis- counting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bul- lion; by loaning money on personal security; and by ob- taining, issuing, and circulating notes . . . . The busi- ness of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock . . . ." 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V). As the administrator charged with supervision of the Na- tional Bank Act, see §§ 1, 26­27, 481, the Comptroller bears primary responsibility for surveillance of "the business of banking" authorized by § 24 Seventh. We have reiterated: " `It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an ex- tent that warrants the invocation of this principle with 1 The dissenters also observed that 6 of the court's 13 active judges were disqualified from participating in the case. 13 F. 3d, at 834. 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 251 (1995) 257 Opinion of the Court respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.' " Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 403­404 (1987) (quoting Investment Com- pany Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626­627 (1971)). Under the formulation now familiar, when we confront an expert administrator's statutory exposition, we inquire first whether "the intent of Congress is clear" as to "the precise question at issue." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). If so, "that is the end of the matter." Ibid. But "if the stat- ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id., at 843. If the administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment "con- trolling weight." Id., at 844. In authorizing NationsBank to broker annuities, the Comptroller invokes the power of banks to "broker a wide variety of financial investment instruments," Comptroller's Letter 38a, which the Comptroller considers "part of [banks'] traditional role as financial intermediaries," ibid., and there- fore an "incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking." 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh; see also In- terpretive Letter No. 494 (Dec. 20, 1989) (discussing features of financial investment instruments brokerage that bring this activity within the "business of banking") (cited in Comptrol- ler's Letter 38a). The Comptroller construes the § 24 Sev- enth authorization of "incidental powers . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking" as an independent grant of authority; he reads the specific powers set forth thereafter as exemplary, not exclusive. VALIC argues that the Comptroller's interpretation is contrary to the clear intent of Congress because the banking power on which the Comptroller relies-"broker[ing] finan- cial investment instruments"-is not specified in § 24 Sev- 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 258 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of the Court enth. Brief for Respondent 35­45. According to VALIC, the five specific activities listed in § 24 Seventh after the words "business of banking" are exclusive-banks are con- fined to these five activities and to endeavors incidental thereto. Id., at 35­36. VALIC thus attributes no inde- pendent significance to the words "business of banking." We think the Comptroller better comprehends the Act's terms. The second sentence of § 24 Seventh, in limiting banks' "dealing in securities," presupposes that banks have author- ity not circumscribed by the five specifically listed activities. Congress' insertion of the limitation decades after the Act's initial adoption makes sense only if banks already had au- thority to deal in securities, authority presumably encom- passed within the "business of banking" language which dates from 1863. VALIC argues, however, that the limi- tation was imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and that the power Glass-Steagall presupposed was specifically granted in the McFadden Act of 1927. Brief for Respondent 46. While the statute's current wording derives from the Glass-Steagall Act, see Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 184, the earlier McFadden Act does not bolster VALIC's case, for that Act, too, limited an activity already part of the business national banks did. See Act of Feb. 25, 1927, § 2(b), 44 Stat. 1226 ("Provided, That the business of buying and selling investment securities shall hereinafter be limited to buying and selling without recourse . . . ."); see also Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S., at 407­ 408 (even before the McFadden Act, banks conducted securi- ties transactions on a widespread basis); 2 F. Redlich, The Molding of American Banking: Men and Ideas, pt. 2, pp. 389­ 393 (1951) (describing securities activities of prominent early national banks).2 2 We expressly hold that the "business of banking" is not limited to the enumerated powers in § 24 Seventh and that the Comptroller therefore has discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enume- 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 251 (1995) 259 Opinion of the Court B As we have just explained, the Comptroller determined, in accord with the legislature's intent, that "the business of banking" described in § 24 Seventh covers brokerage of fi- nancial investment instruments, and is not confined to the examples specifically enumerated. He then reasonably con- cluded that the authority to sell annuities qualifies as part of, or incidental to, the business of banking. National banks, the Comptroller observed, are authorized to serve as agents for their customers in the purchase and sale of various fi- nancial investment instruments, Comptroller's Letter 38a,3 and annuities are widely recognized as just such investment products. See D. Shapiro & T. Streiff, Annuities 7 (1992) (in contrast to life insurance, "[a]nnuities . . . are primarily investment products"); 1 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insur- ance Law and Practice § 84, p. 295 (1981) ("Annuity contracts must . . . be recognized as investments rather than as insurance."). By making an initial payment in exchange for a future in- come stream, the customer is deferring consumption, setting aside money for retirement, future expenses, or a rainy day. For her, an annuity is like putting money in a bank account, a debt instrument, or a mutual fund. Offering bank ac- counts and acting as agent in the sale of debt instruments and mutual funds are familiar parts of the business of bank- ing. See, e. g., Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Gov- ernors, FRS, 468 U. S. 207, 215 (1984) ("Banks long have arranged the purchase and sale of securities as an accommo- dation to their customers."); First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, 273 U. S. 548, 559­560 (1927) (banks have authority rated. The exercise of the Comptroller's discretion, however, must be kept within reasonable bounds. Ventures distant from dealing in fi- nancial investment instruments-for example, operating a general travel agency-may exceed those bounds. 3 The Comptroller referred to Interpretive Letter No. 494 (Dec. 20, 1989) (approving brokerage of agricultural, oil, and metals futures). 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 260 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of the Court to sell mortgages and other debt instruments they have orig- inated or acquired by discount). In sum, modern annuities, though more sophisticated than the standard savings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same need. By providing customers with the oppor- tunity to invest in one or more annuity options, banks are essentially offering financial investment instruments of the kind congressional authorization permits them to broker. Hence, the Comptroller reasonably typed the permission NationsBank sought as an "incidental powe[r] . . . neces- sary to carry on the business of banking." 4 III A In the alternative, VALIC argues that 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1988 ed., Supp. V) bars NationsBank from selling annuities as agent. That section provides: "In addition to the powers now vested by law in [na- tional banks] any such [bank] located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants . . . may . . . act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State in which said bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by such company . . . ." The parties disagree about whether § 92, by negative im- plication, precludes national banks located in places more populous than 5,000 from selling insurance. We do not reach 4 Assuring that the brokerage in question would not deviate from tradi- tional bank practices, the Comptroller specified that NationsBank "will act only as agent, . . . will not have a principal stake in annuity contracts and therefore will incur no interest rate or actuarial risks." Comptroller's Letter 48a. 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 251 (1995) 261 Opinion of the Court this question because we accept the Comptroller's view that, for the purpose at hand, annuities are properly classified as investments, not "insurance." Again, VALIC contends that the Comptroller's determina- tion is contrary to the plain intent of Congress, or else is unreasonable. In support of its position that annuities are insurance, VALIC notes first that annuities traditionally have been sold by insurance companies. But the sale of a product by an insurance company does not inevitably render the product insurance. For example, insurance companies have long offered loans on the security of life insurance, see 3 Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 1731, p. 562 (1967), but a loan does not thereby become insurance. VALIC further asserts that most States have regulated annuities as insurance and that Congress intended to define insurance under § 92 by reference to state law. Treatment of annuities under state law, however, is contextual. States generally classify annuities as insurance when defining the powers of insurance companies and state insurance regula- tors. See, e. g., 998 F. 2d, at 1300, n. 2 (citing statutes). But in diverse settings, States have resisted lump classification of annuities as insurance. See, e. g., In re New York State Assn. of Life Underwriters, Inc. v. New York State Banking Dept., 83 N. Y. 2d 353, 363, 632 N. E. 2d 876, 881 (1994) (re- jecting "assertion that annuities are insurance which [state- chartered] banks are not authorized to sell," even though state insurance law "includes `annuities' in its description of `kinds of insurance authorized' "); In re Estate of Rhodes, 197 Misc. 232, 237, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 406, 411 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (annuity contracts do not qualify for New York estate tax exemption applicable to insurance); Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 510, 513­516, 98 A. 1072, 1073 (1916) (annuities are not insurance for purposes of tax that insur- ance companies pay on insurance premiums received within 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 262 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of the Court the State); State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Ham, 54 Wyo. 148, 159, 88 P. 2d 484, 488 (1939) (same). As our decisions underscore, a characterization fitting in certain contexts may be unsuitable in others. See, e. g., At- lantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932) ("meaning [of words] well may vary to meet the purposes of the law"; courts properly give words "the mean- ing which the legislature intended [they] should have in each instance"); cf. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Con- flict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against."). Moreover, the federal banking law does not plainly require automatic reference to state law here. The Comptroller has concluded that the federal regime is best served by classifying annu- ities according to their functional characteristics. Congress has not ruled out that course, see Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842; courts, therefore, have no cause to dictate to the Comptroller the state-law constraint VALIC espouses. VALIC further argues that annuities functionally resem- ble life insurance because some annuities place mortality risk on the parties. Under a classic fixed annuity, the purchaser pays a sum certain and, in exchange, the issuer makes peri- odic payments throughout, but not beyond, the life of the purchaser. In pricing such annuities, issuers rely on actuar- ial assumptions about how long purchasers will live. While cognizant of this similarity between annuities and insurance, the Comptroller points out that mortality risk is a less salient characteristic of contemporary products. Many annuities currently available, both fixed and variable, do not feature a life term. Instead they provide for payments over a term of years; if the purchaser dies before the term ends, 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 251 (1995) 263 Opinion of the Court the balance is paid to the purchaser's estate. Moreover, the presence of mortality risk does not necessarily qualify an investment as "insurance" under § 92. For example, VALIC recognizes that a life interest in real property is not insur- ance, although it imposes a mortality risk on the purchaser. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Some conventional debt instruments similarly impose mortality risk. See Note, Reverse Annuity Mortgages and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 143, 145­151 (1979). B VALIC also charges the Comptroller with inconsistency. As evidence, VALIC refers to a 1978 letter from a member of the Comptroller's staff describing annuity investments as insurance arrangements. Brief for Respondent 16­17; see Letter from Charles F. Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Ad- visory Services Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 16, 1978), App. to Brief in Opposition 1a­2a (Byrd Letter). We note, initially, that the proposal disfa- vored in the 1978 letter did not clearly involve a bank selling annuities as an agent, rather than as a principal. See Byrd Letter 1a ("[T]he bank would purchase a group annuity pol- icy from an insurer and then sell annuity contracts as invest- ments in trust accounts."). Furthermore, unlike the Comp- troller's letter to NationsBank here, the 1978 letter does not purport to represent the Comptroller's position. Compare Byrd Letter 1a ("It is my opinion . . . ") with Comptroller's Letter 35a ("The OCC's legal position on this issue was an- nounced in a [prior 1990 letter]. Since I find neither policy nor supervisory reasons to object to this proposal, the Sub- sidiary may proceed."). Finally, any change in the Comp- troller's position might reduce, but would not eliminate, the deference we owe his reasoned determinations. See Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993) (quoting NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 351 (1978)). The Comptroller's classification of annuities, based on the tax deferral and investment features that distinguish them 513us1$17P 03-28-98 15:44:25 PAGES OPINPGT 264 NATIONSBANK OF N. C., N. A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE INS. CO. Opinion of the Court from insurance, in short, is at least reasonable. See Comp- troller's Letter 44a. A key feature of insurance is that it indemnifies loss. See Black's Law Dictionary 802 (6th ed. 1990) (first definition of insurance is "contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party undertakes to compen- sate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified per- ils"). As the Comptroller observes, annuities serve an im- portant investment purpose and are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell. See supra, at 259­260. And though fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable annuities, fixed annuities too have significant investment features and are functionally similar to debt instruments. Moreover, mindful that fixed annuities are often packaged with variable annuities, the Comptroller reasonably chose to classify the two together. * * * We respect as reasonable the Comptroller's conclusion that brokerage of annuities is an "incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking." We further defer to the Comptroller's reasonable determination that 12 U. S. C. § 92 is not implicated because annuities are not insurance within the meaning of that section. Accordingly, the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is Reversed. 513us1$18z 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 265 Syllabus ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS., INC., et al. v. DOBSON et al. certiorari to the supreme court of alabama No. 93­1001. Argued October 4, 1994-Decided January 18, 1995 The termite prevention contract between petitioner exterminators and re- spondent Gwin, a homeowner, specified that any controversy thereunder would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After respondents Dobson, who had purchased Gwin's home, sued in state court following a termite infestation, petitioners asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of a state statute invalidating predispute arbitration agreements, ruling that the federal Act applies only if, at the time the parties entered into the contract and accepted the arbitra- tion clause, they "contemplated" substantial interstate activity. De- spite some such activities, the court found that these parties "contem- plated" a transaction that was primarily local and not "substantially" interstate. Held: Section 2's interstate commerce language should be read broadly to extend the Act's reach to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The use of the words "evidencing" and "involving" does not restrict the Act's application and thereby allow a State to apply its anti- arbitration law or policy. Pp. 270­282. (a) The legal background demonstrates that the Act has the basic pur- pose of overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements and ap- plies in both federal diversity cases and state courts, where it pre-empts state statutes invalidating such agreements. See, e. g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 15­16. It would be inappropriate to over- rule Southland and permit Alabama to apply its antiarbitration statute, since the Court in that case considered the basic arguments now raised, and nothing significant changed subsequently; since, in the interim, pri- vate parties have likely written contracts relying on Southland; and since Congress, both before and after Southland, has enacted legislation extending, not retracting, the scope of arbitration. Pp. 270­273. (b) The statute's language, background, and structure establish that § 2's "involving commerce" words are the functional equivalent of the phrase "affecting commerce," which normally signals Congress' intent to exercise its commerce power to the full, see Russell v. United States, 513us1$18z 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 266 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Syllabus 471 U. S. 858, 859. The linguistic permissibility of this interpretation is demonstrated by dictionary definitions in which "involve" and "affect" mean the same thing. Moreover, the Act's legislative history, to the extent that it is informative, indicates an expansive congressional intent, and this Court has described the Act's reach expansively as coinciding with that of the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., Southland, supra, at 14­15. Finally, a broad interpretation of this language is consistent with the Act's basic purpose, while a narrower interpretation would create a new, unfamiliar test that would unnecessarily complicate the law and breed litigation. For these reasons, the Act's scope can be said to have ex- panded along with the commerce power over the years, even though the Congress that passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has turned out to be so. Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 410; Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457, 470; and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U. S. 198, 200­202, distinguished. Pp. 273­277. (c) Section 2's "evidencing a transaction" phrase means that the "transaction" (that the contract "evidences") must turn out, in fact, to have involved interstate commerce. For several reasons, this "com- merce in fact" interpretation is more faithful to the statute than the "contemplation of the parties" test adopted below and in other courts. First, the latter interpretation, when viewed in terms of the statute's basic purpose, seems anomalous because it invites litigation about what was, or was not, "contemplated," because it too often would turn the validity of an arbitration clause upon the happenstance of whether the parties thought to insert a reference to interstate commerce in their document or to mention it in an initial conversation, and because it fits awkwardly with the rest of § 2. Second, the statute's language permits the "commerce in fact" interpretation. Although that interpretation concededly leaves little work for the word "evidencing," nothing in the Act's history suggests any other, more limiting, task for the language. Third, the force of the basic practical argument underlying the "contem- plation of the parties" test, i. e., that encroaching on powers reserved to the States must be avoided, has diminished following this Court's hold- ings that the Act displaces contrary state law. Finally, despite an ami- cus' claim, it is unclear whether an "objective" version of that test would better protect consumers asked to sign form contracts by businesses. In any event, § 2 authorizes States to invalidate an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," and thereby gives them a method for protecting consumers against unwanted arbitration provisions. Pp. 277­281. 513us1$18z 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 267 Syllabus (d) The parties do not contest that the transaction in this case, in fact, involved interstate commerce. P. 282. 628 So. 2d 354, reversed and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 282. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 284. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opin- ion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 285. H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard G. Taranto, Joseph P. Jones, Jr., and T. Julian Motes. Allan R. Chason argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Kenneth J. Chesebro and Kenneth W. Hooks.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alabama Water and Wastewater Institute et al. by Robert E. Sasser; for the Ameri- can Arbitration Association by Michael F. Hoellering, Rosemary S. Page, Robert B. von Mehren, James H. Carter, Donald Francis Donovan, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, and David W. Rivkin; for the American Bankers Association et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Robert H. Carpenter, and Theodore Fischkin; and for the American Council of Life Insurance by Patricia A. Dunn, Stephen J. Goodman, Richard E. Barnsback, and Phillip E. Stano. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Attorney General of the State of Alabama et al. by James H. Evans, Attorney Gen- eral of Alabama, pro se, and Carol Jean Smith, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, and by the Attorneys General, pro se, for their respective jurisdic- tions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Jere- miah W. Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, T. Travis Med- lock of South Carolina, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, and Jan Graham of Utah; and for the Southern Pov- erty Law Center by J. Richard Cohen, Morris S. Dees, Jr., and Edward Ashworth. 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 268 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the reach of § 2 of the Federal Arbitra- tion Act. That section makes enforceable a written arbitra- tion provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involv- ing commerce." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (emphasis added). Should we read this phrase broadly, extending the Act's reach to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power? Or, do the two italicized words-"involving" and "evidencing"-sig- nificantly restrict the Act's application? We conclude that the broader reading of the Act is the correct one, and we reverse a State Supreme Court judgment to the contrary. I In August 1987, Steven Gwin, a respondent who owned a house in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" (Plan) from the local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, a franchise of Terminix International Company. In the Plan, Allied-Bruce promised "to protect" Gwin's house "against the attack of subterranean termites," to reinspect periodically, to provide any "further treatment found necessary," and to repair, up to $100,000, damage caused by new termite infestations. App. 69. Terminix International "guarantee[d] the fulfillment of the terms" of the Plan. Ibid. The Plan's contract document provided in writing that "any controversy or claim . . . arising out of or relating to the interpretation, performance or breach of any pro- vision of this agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration." Id., at 70 (emphasis added). In the spring of 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Gwin, wishing to sell their house to Mr. and Mrs. Dobson, had Allied-Bruce rein- spect the house. They obtained a clean bill of health. But no sooner had they sold the house and transferred the Plan to Mr. and Mrs. Dobson than the Dobsons found the house swarming with termites. Allied-Bruce attempted to treat 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 269 Opinion of the Court and repair the house, but the Dobsons found Allied-Bruce's efforts inadequate. They therefore sued the Gwins, and (along with the Gwins, who cross-claimed) also sued Allied- Bruce and Terminix in Alabama state court. Allied-Bruce and Terminix, pointing to the Plan's arbitration clause and § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, immediately asked the court for a stay, to allow arbitration to proceed. The court denied the stay. Allied-Bruce and Terminix appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute, Ala. Code § 8­1­41(3) (1993), making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and "unenforceable." 628 So. 2d 354, 355 (1993). To reach this conclusion, the court had to find that the Federal Arbitration Act, which pre-empts conflicting state law, did not apply to the termite contract. It made just that finding. The court considered the federal Act inapplicable because the connection between the termite contract and interstate commerce was too slight. In the court's view, the Act ap- plies to a contract only if " `at the time [the parties entered into the contract] and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity.' " Ibid. (em- phasis in original) (quoting Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F. 2d 382, 387 (CA2) (Lumbard, C. J., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 817 (1961)). De- spite some interstate activities (e. g., Allied-Bruce, like Ter- minix, is a multistate firm and shipped treatment and repair material from out of state), the court found that the parties "contemplated" a transaction that was primarily local and not "substantially" interstate. Several state courts and Federal District Courts, like the Supreme Court of Alabama, have interpreted the Act's lan- guage as requiring the parties to a contract to have "contem- plated" an interstate commerce connection. See, e. g., Burke County Public Schools Bd. of Ed. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N. C. 408, 417­420, 279 S. E. 2d 816, 822­823 (1981); R. J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 270 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court App. 2d 363, 367, 642 P. 2d 127, 130 (1982); Lacheney v. Profitkey Int'l, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 922, 924 (ED Va. 1993). Several federal appellate courts, however, have interpreted the same language differently, as reaching to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power. See, e. g., Foster v. Turley, 808 F. 2d 38, 40 (CA10 1986); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402, 406­407 (CA2 1959), cert. dism'd, 364 U. S. 801 (1960); cf. Snyder v. Smith, 736 F. 2d 409, 417­418 (CA7), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1037 (1984). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 510 U. S. 1190 (1994); and, as we said, we conclude that the broader reading of the statute is the right one. II Before we can reach the main issues in this case, we must set forth three items of legal background. First, the basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbi- trate. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 474 (1989). The origins of those refusals apparently lie in " `an- cient times,' " when the English courts fought " `for extension of jurisdiction-all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of jurisdiction.' " Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U. S. 198, 211, n. 5 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1007 (SDNY 1915), in turn quoting Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811 (1856) (Campbell, L. J.)). American courts initially followed English practice, perhaps just " `stand[ing] . . . upon the antiquity of the rule' " prohibiting arbitration clause enforcement, rather than " `upon its excel- lence or reason.' " Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra, at 211, n. 5 (quoting United States Asphalt Refining Co., supra, at 1007). Regardless, when Congress passed the Arbitra- tion Act in 1925, it was "motivated, first and foremost, by a 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 271 Opinion of the Court . . . desire" to change this antiarbitration rule. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 220 (1985). It intended courts to "enforce [arbitration] agreements into which par- ties had entered," ibid. (footnote omitted), and to "place such agreements `upon the same footing as other contracts,' " Volt Information Sciences, Inc., supra, at 474 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 511 (1974)). Second, some initially assumed that the Federal Arbitra- tion Act represented an exercise of Congress' Article III power to "ordain and establish" federal courts, U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 28, n. 16 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). In 1967, however, this Court held that the Act "is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of `con- trol over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' " Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 405 (1967) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)). The Court considered the following complicated ar- gument: (1) The Act's provisions (about contract remedies) are important and often outcome determinative, and thus amount to "substantive," not "procedural," provisions of law; (2) Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 71­80 (1938), made clear that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases, see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 465 (1965); therefore (3) federal courts must not apply the Fed- eral Arbitration Act in diversity cases. This Court re- sponded by agreeing that the Act set forth substantive law, but concluding that, nonetheless, the Act applied in diversity cases because Congress had so intended. The Court wrote: "Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Con- gress plainly has power to legislate." Prima Paint, supra, at 405. Third, the holding in Prima Paint led to a further ques- tion. Did Congress intend the Act also to apply in state courts? Did the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empt conflict- 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:53 PAGES OPINPGT 272 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court ing state antiarbitration law, or could state courts apply their antiarbitration rules in cases before them, thereby reaching results different from those reached in otherwise similar fed- eral diversity cases? In Southland Corp. v. Keating, supra, this Court decided that Congress would not have wanted state and federal courts to reach different outcomes about the validity of arbitration in similar cases. The Court con- cluded that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state law; and it held that state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements. Id., at 15­16. We have set forth this background because respondents, supported by 20 state attorneys general, now ask us to over- rule Southland and thereby to permit Alabama to apply its antiarbitration statute in this case irrespective of the proper interpretation of § 2. The Southland Court, however, rec- ognized that the pre-emption issue was a difficult one, and it considered the basic arguments that respondents and amici now raise (even though those issues were not thoroughly briefed at the time). Nothing significant has changed in the 10 years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have eroded Southland's authority; and no unforeseen practical problems have arisen. Moreover, in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts relying upon Southland as authority. Further, Congress, both before and after Southland, has enacted legislation extending, not retracting, the scope of arbitration. See, e. g., 9 U. S. C. § 15 (eliminat- ing the Act of State doctrine as a bar to arbitration); 9 U. S. C. §§ 201­208 (international arbitration). For these reasons, we find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established law. We therefore proceed to the basic interpretive questions aware that we are interpreting an Act that seeks broadly to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration agreements and that applies in both federal and state courts. We must de- cide in this case whether that Act used language about inter- state commerce that nonetheless limits the Act's application, 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 273 Opinion of the Court thereby carving out an important statutory niche in which a State remains free to apply its antiarbitration law or policy. We conclude that it does not. III The Federal Arbitration Act, § 2, provides that a "written provision in any maritime transaction or a con- tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevo- cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (emphasis added). The initial interpretive question focuses upon the words "involving commerce." These words are broader than the often-found words of art "in commerce." They therefore cover more than " `only persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce.' " United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271, 276 (1975) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 195 (1974)) (defining "in commerce" as related to the "flow" and defining the "flow" to include "the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the consumer"); see also FTC v. Bunte Broth- ers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351 (1941). But how far beyond the flow of commerce does the word "involving" reach? Is "in- volving" the functional equivalent of the word "affecting"? That phrase-"affecting commerce"-normally signals Con- gress' intent to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the full. See Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858, 859 (1985). We cannot look to other statutes for guidance for the parties tell us that this is the only federal statute that uses the word "involving" to describe an interstate commerce relation. After examining the statute's language, background, and structure, we conclude that the word "involving" is broad 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 274 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court and is indeed the functional equivalent of "affecting." For one thing, such an interpretation, linguistically speaking, is permissible. The dictionary finds instances in which "in- volve" and "affect" sometimes can mean about the same thing. V Oxford English Dictionary 466 (1st ed. 1933) (pro- viding examples dating back to the mid-19th century, where "involve" means to "include or affect in . . . operation"). For another, the Act's legislative history, to the extent that it is informative, indicates an expansive congressional intent. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 96, supra, at 1 (the Act's "control over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physi- cal interstate shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce"); 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924) (the Act "affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and con- tracts in admiralty") (remarks of Rep. Graham); Joint Hear- ings on S. 1005 and H. R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1924) (hereinafter Joint Hearings) (testimony of Charles L. Bernheimer, chairman of the Committee on Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, agree- ing that the proposed bill "relates to contracts arising in in- terstate commerce"); id., at 16 (testimony of Julius H. Cohen, drafter for the American Bar Association of much of the pro- posed bill's language, that the Act reflects part of a strategy to rid the law of an "anachronism" by "get[ting] a Federal law to cover interstate and foreign commerce and admi- ralty"); see also 9 U. S. C. § 1 (defining the word "commerce" in the language of the Commerce Clause itself). Further, this Court has previously described the Act's reach expansively as coinciding with that of the Commerce Clause. See, e. g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 490 (1987) (the Act "embodies Congress' intent to provide for the en- forcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S., at 14­15 (the " `involving commerce' " requirement is a constitutionally "necessary qualification" on the Act's reach, 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 275 Opinion of the Court marking its permissible outer limit); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S., at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring) (endorsing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402, 407 (CA2 1959) (Congress, in enacting the FAA, "took pains to utilize as much of its power as it could")). Finally, a broad interpretation of this language is consist- ent with the Act's basic purpose, to put arbitration provisions on " `the same footing' " as a contract's other terms. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S., at 511. Conversely, a nar- rower interpretation is not consistent with the Act's purpose, for (unless unreasonably narrowed to the flow of commerce) such an interpretation would create a new, unfamiliar test lying somewhere in a no man's land between "in commerce" and "affecting commerce," thereby unnecessarily complicat- ing the law and breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it. We recognize arguments to the contrary: The pre-New Deal Congress that passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has turned out to be the case. But, it is not unusual for this Court in similar circumstances to ask whether the scope of a statute should expand along with the expansion of the Commerce Clause power itself, and to answer the question affirmatively-as, for the reasons set forth above, we do here. See, e. g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U. S. 232, 241 (1980); Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U. S. 738, 743, n. 2 (1976). Further, the Gwins and Dobsons point to two cases con- taining what they believe to be favorable language. In Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922), and then again in Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457 (1924), they say, this Court said that one might draw a distinction between, on the one hand, cases that "involve interstate commerce intrinsically," and, on the other hand, cases "affecting interstate commerce so directly 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 276 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court as to be within the federal regulatory power." Mine Work- ers, supra, at 410 (emphasis added); Leather Workers, supra, at 470 (same). One could read these cases as driving a wedge between "involve" and "affecting." Yet, in these cases, the Court was not construing a statute containing the words "involving commerce." Furthermore, nothing suggests the drafters of the Act looked to these cases as a source. And, these cases themselves use the phrase "involve . . . intrinsically," not the word "involving" alone. In sum, these cases do not support respondents' position. The Gwins and Dobsons, with far better reason, point to a different case, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U. S. 198 (1956). In that case, Bernhardt, a New York resident, had entered into an employment contract (con- taining an arbitration clause) in New York with Polygraphic, a New York corporation. But, Bernhardt "was to perform" that contract after he "later became a resident of Vermont." Id., at 199. This Court was faced with the question whether, in light of Erie, a federal court should apply the Federal Arbitration Act in a diversity case when faced with state law hostile to arbitration. 350 U. S., at 200. The Court did not reach that question, however, for it decided that the contract itself did not "involv[e]" interstate com- merce and therefore fell outside the Act. Id., at 200­202. Since Congress, constitutionally speaking, could have ap- plied the Act to Bernhardt's contract, say the parties, how then can we say that the Act's word "involving" reaches as far as the Commerce Clause itself? The best response to this argument is to point to the way in which the Court reasoned in Bernhardt, and to what the Court said. It said that the reason the Act did not apply to Bernhardt's contract was that there was "no showing that petitioner while performing his duties under the employment contract was working `in' com- merce, was producing goods for commerce, or was en- gaging in activity that affected commerce, within the 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 277 Opinion of the Court meaning of our decisions." Id., at 200­201 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court interpreted the words "involving com- merce" as broadly as the words "affecting commerce"; and, as we have said, these latter words normally mean a full exercise of constitutional power. At the same time, the Court's opinion does not discuss the implications of the "in- terstate" facts to which the respondents now point. For these reasons, Bernhardt does not require us to narrow the scope of the word "involving." And, we conclude that the word "involving," like "affecting," signals an intent to exer- cise Congress' commerce power to the full. IV Section 2 applies where there is "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (emphasis added). The second interpretive question focuses on the italicized words. Does "evidencing a transaction" mean only that the transaction (that the contract "evidences") must turn out, in fact, to have involved interstate commerce? Or, does it mean more? Many years ago, Second Circuit Chief Judge Lumbard said that the phrase meant considerably more. He wrote: "The significant question . . . is not whether, in carrying out the terms of the contract, the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time they entered into it and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated sub- stantial interstate activity. Cogent evidence regarding their state of mind at the time would be the terms of the contract, and if it, on its face, evidences interstate traffic . . . , the contract should come within § 2. In addition, evidence as to how the parties expected the contract to be performed and how it was performed is relevant to whether substantial interstate activity was contemplated." Metro Industrial Painting Corp. 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 278 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F. 2d 382, 387 (1961) (con- curring opinion) (second emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Alabama and several other courts have followed this view, known as the "contemplation of the parties" test. See supra, at 269­270. We find the interpretive choice difficult, but for several reasons we conclude that the first interpretation ("commerce in fact") is more faithful to the statute than the second ("con- templation of the parties"). First, the "contemplation of the parties" interpretation, when viewed in terms of the stat- ute's basic purpose, seems anomalous. That interpretation invites litigation about what was, or was not, "contem- plated." Why would Congress intend a test that risks the very kind of costs and delay through litigation (about the circumstances of contract formation) that Congress wrote the Act to help the parties avoid? See Moses H. Cone Me- morial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 29 (1983) (the Act "calls for a summary and speedy disposition of motions or petitions to enforce arbitration clauses"). Moreover, that interpretation too often would turn the va- lidity of an arbitration clause on what, from the perspective of the statute's basic purpose, seems happenstance, namely, whether the parties happened to think to insert a reference to interstate commerce in the document or happened to men- tion it in an initial conversation. After all, parties to a sales contract with an arbitration clause might naturally think about the goods sold, or about arbitration, but why should they naturally think about an interstate commerce connection? Further, that interpretation fits awkwardly with the rest of § 2. That section, for example, permits parties to agree to submit to arbitration "an existing controversy arising out of" a contract made earlier. Why would Congress want to risk nonenforceability of this later arbitration agreement (even if fully connected with interstate commerce) simply be- cause the parties did not properly "contemplate" (or write 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 279 Opinion of the Court about) the interstate aspects of the earlier contract? The first interpretation, requiring only that the "transaction" in fact involve interstate commerce, avoids this anomaly, as it avoids the other anomalous effects growing out of the "con- templation of the parties" test. Second, the statute's language permits the "commerce in fact" interpretation. That interpretation, we concede, leaves little work for the word "evidencing" (in the phrase "a contract evidencing a transaction") to perform, for every contract evidences some transaction. But, perhaps Con- gress did not want that word to perform much work. The Act's history, to the extent informative, indicates that the Act's supporters saw the Act as part of an effort to make arbitration agreements universally enforceable. They wanted to "get a Federal law" that would "cover" areas where the Constitution authorized Congress to legislate, namely, "interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty." Joint Hearings 16 (testimony of Julius H. Cohen). They urged Congress to model the Act after a New York statute that made enforceable a written arbitration provision "in a written contract," Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N. Y. Laws 803, 804. Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 2 (1923) (testimony of Charles L. Bern- heimer). Early drafts made enforceable a written arbitra- tion provision "in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction involving commerce." S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., § 2 (1922) (emphasis added); S. 1005, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923); H. R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). Mem- bers of Congress, looking at that phrase, might have thought the words "any contract" standing alone went beyond Con- gress' constitutional authority. And, if so, they might have simply connected those words with the later words "transac- tion involving commerce," thereby creating the phrase that became law. Nothing in the Act's history suggests any other, more limiting, task for the language. 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 280 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Opinion of the Court Third, the basic practical argument underlying the "con- templation of the parties" test was, in Chief Judge Lum- bard's words, the need to "be cautious in construing the act lest we excessively encroach on the powers which Congres- sional policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the states." Metro Industrial Painting Corp., supra, at 386 (concurring opinion). The practical force of this argument has diminished in light of this Court's later holdings that the Act does displace state law to the contrary. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S., at 10­16; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S., at 489­492. Finally, we note that an amicus curiae argues for an "ob- jective" ("reasonable person" oriented) version of the "con- templation of the parties" test on the ground that such an interpretation would better protect consumers asked to sign form contracts by businesses. We agree that Congress, when enacting this law, had the needs of consumers, as well as others, in mind. See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924) (the Act, by avoiding "the delay and expense of litigation," will appeal "to big business and little business alike, . . . corporate interests [and] . . . individuals"). Indeed, arbitration's advantages often would seem helpful to individ- uals, say, complaining about a product, who need a less ex- pensive alternative to litigation. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 97­542, p. 13 (1982) ("The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and fu- ture business dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling of times and places of hear- ings and discovery devices . . ."). And, according to the American Arbitration Association (also an amicus here), more than one-third of its claims involve amounts below $10,000, while another third involve claims of $10,000 to $50,000 (with an average processing time of less than six 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 281 Opinion of the Court months). App. to Brief for American Arbitration Associa- tion as Amicus Curiae 26­27. We are uncertain, however, just how the "objective" version of the "contemplation" test would help consumers. Sometimes, of course, it would permit, say, a consumer with potentially large damages claims to disavow a contract's arbi- tration provision and proceed in court. But, if so, it would equally permit, say, local business entities to disavow a con- tract's arbitration provisions, thereby leaving the typical consumer who has only a small damages claim (who seeks, say, the value of only a defective refrigerator or television set) without any remedy but a court remedy, the costs and delays of which could eat up the value of an eventual small recovery. In any event, § 2 gives States a method for protecting con- sumers against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general con- tract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (emphasis added). What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal "foot- ing," directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc., 489 U. S., at 474. For these reasons, we accept the "commerce in fact" inter- pretation, reading the Act's language as insisting that the "transaction" in fact "involv[e]" interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection. 513us1$18Q 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 282 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON O'Connor, J., concurring V The parties do not contest that the transaction in this case, in fact, involved interstate commerce. In addition to the multistate nature of Terminix and Allied-Bruce, the termite-treating and house-repairing material used by Allied-Bruce in its (allegedly inadequate) efforts to carry out the terms of the Plan, came from outside Alabama. Consequently, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, concurring. I agree with the Court's construction of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. As applied in federal courts, the Court's interpretation comports fully with my understanding of con- gressional intent. A more restrictive definition of "evidenc- ing" and "involving" would doubtless foster prearbitration litigation that would frustrate the very purpose of the stat- ute. As applied in state courts, however, the effect of a broad formulation of § 2 is more troublesome. The reading of § 2 adopted today will displace many state statutes care- fully calibrated to protect consumers, see, e. g., Mont. Code Ann. § 27­5­114(2)(b) (1993) (refusing to enforce arbitration clauses in consumer contracts where the consideration is $5,000 or less), and state procedural requirements aimed at ensuring knowing and voluntary consent, see, e. g., S. C. Code Ann. § 15­48­10(a) (Supp. 1993) (requiring that notice of arbitration provision be prominently placed on first page of contract). I have long adhered to the view, discussed below, that Congress designed the Federal Arbitration Act to apply only in federal courts. But if we are to apply the Act in state courts, it makes little sense to read § 2 differ- ently in that context. In the end, my agreement with the Court's construction of § 2 rests largely on the wisdom of maintaining a uniform standard. 513us1$18J 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 283 O'Connor, J., concurring I continue to believe that Congress never intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state courts, and that this Court has strayed far afield in giving the Act so broad a compass. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 21­36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 494­495 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); York International v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 465 U. S. 1016 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from remand). We have often said that the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute is fun- damentally a question of congressional intent. See, e. g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 516 (1992); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 78­79 (1990); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 299 (1988); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Indeed, we have held that " `[w]here . . . the field which Con- gress is said to have pre-empted' includes areas that have `been traditionally occupied by the States,' congressional in- tent to supersede state laws must be `clear and manifest.' " English, supra, at 79, quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Yet, over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, build- ing instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation. See Perry v. Thomas, supra, at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend"). I have no doubt that Congress could enact, in the first instance, a federal arbitra- tion statute that displaces most state arbitration laws. But I also have no doubt that, in 1925, Congress enacted no such statute. Were we writing on a clean slate, I would adhere to that view and affirm the Alabama court's decision. But, as the Court points out, more than 10 years have passed since Southland, several subsequent cases have built upon its rea- soning, and parties have undoubtedly made contracts in reli- 513us1$18J 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 284 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Scalia, J., dissenting ance on the Court's interpretation of the Act in the interim. After reflection, I am persuaded by considerations of stare decisis, which we have said "have special force in the area of statutory interpretation," Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172­173 (1989), to acquiesce in today's judgment. Though wrong, Southland has not proved un- workable, and, as always, "Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Ibid. Today's decision caps this Court's effort to expand the Fed- eral Arbitration Act. Although each decision has built logi- cally upon the decisions preceding it, the initial building block in Southland laid a faulty foundation. I acquiesce in today's judgment because there is no "special justification" to overrule Southland. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). It remains now for Congress to correct this interpretation if it wishes to preserve state autonomy in state courts. Justice Scalia, dissenting. I have previously joined two judgments of this Court that rested upon the holding of Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984). See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987). In neither of those cases, however, did any party ask that Southland be overruled, and it was therefore not necessary to consider the question. In the present case, by contrast, one of respond- ents' central arguments is that Southland was wrongly de- cided, and their request for its overruling has been sup- ported by an amicus brief signed by the attorneys general of 20 States. For the reasons set forth in Justice Thomas' opinion, which I join, I agree with the respondents (and belatedly with Justice O'Connor) that Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act. I do not believe that proper application of stare decisis prevents correction of the mistake. Adhering to Southland 513us1$18K 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 285 Thomas, J., dissenting entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes. Abandoning it does not impair reliance interests to a degree that justifies this evil. Primary behavior is not affected: No rule of conduct is retroactively changed, but only (perhaps) the forum in which violation is to be determined and reme- died. I doubt that many contracts with arbitration clauses would have been forgone, or entered into only for signifi- cantly higher remuneration, absent the Southland guaran- tee. Where, moreover, reliance on Southland did make a significant difference, rescission of the contract for mistake of law would often be available. See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 616 (1960 ed. and Supp. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1979). I shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland. I will, however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it, since Southland will not be- come more correct over time, the course of future lawmaking seems unlikely to be affected by its existence, cf. Pennsyl- vania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 34­35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and the accumu- lated private reliance will not likely increase beyond the level it has already achieved (few contracts not terminable at will have more than a 5-year term). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judg- ment of the Court. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting. I disagree with the majority at the threshold of this case, and so I do not reach the question that it decides. In my view, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply in state courts. I respectfully dissent. I In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984), this Court concluded that § 2 of the FAA "appl[ies] in state as 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 286 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Thomas, J., dissenting well as federal courts," id., at 12, and "withdr[aws] the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration," id., at 10. In my view, both aspects of South- land are wrong. A Section 2 of the FAA declares that an arbitration clause contained in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca- tion of any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2; see also § 1 (defining "commerce," as relevant here, to mean "commerce among the several States or with foreign nations"). On its face, and considered out of context, § 2 draws no apparent distinction between federal courts and state courts. But not until 1959-nearly 35 years after Congress enacted the FAA-did any court suggest that § 2 applied in state courts. See Rob- ert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402, 407 (CA2 1959), cert. dism'd, 364 U. S. 801 (1960). No state court agreed until the 1960's. See, e. g., REA Express v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 447 S. W. 2d 721, 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (stating that the FAA applies but noting that it had been waived in the case at hand); cf. Rubewa Products Co. v. Watson's Quality Turkey Products, Inc., 242 A. 2d 609, 613 (D. C. 1968) (same). This Court waited until 1984 to con- clude, over a strong dissent by Justice O'Connor, that § 2 extends to the States. See Southland, supra, at 10­16. The explanation for this delay is simple: The statute that Congress enacted actually applies only in federal courts. At the time of the FAA's passage in 1925, laws governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements were generally thought to deal purely with matters of procedure rather than substance, because they were directed solely to the mecha- nisms for resolving the underlying disputes. As then-Judge Cardozo explained: "Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is not a definition of 513US1 Unit: $U18 [01-06-00 06:57:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 287 Thomas, J., dissenting the rights and wrongs out of which differences grow." Berk- ovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N. Y. 261, 270, 130 N. E. 288, 290 (1921) (holding the New York arbitration statute of 1920, from which the FAA was copied, to be purely proce- dural).1 It would have been extraordinary for Congress to 1 See also, e. g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 323 (SDNY 1921) ("Arbitration statutes or judicial recognition of the enforce- ability of such provisions do not confer a substantive right, but a remedy for the enforcement of the right which is created by the agreement of the parties"), aff'd, 5 F. 2d 218 (CA2 1924); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265, 276 (1926) ("[W]hether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a question of the law of proce- dure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction wherein the remedy is sought. That the enforcement of arbitration contracts is within the law of procedure as distinguished from substantive law is well settled by the decisions of our courts" (footnote omitted)); Baum & Pressman, The En- forcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 428, 430 (1931) (referring uncritically to "the preva- lent notions that arbitration legislation affects merely the remedy or pro- cedural aspects and not substance"); 2 J. Beale, Conflict of Laws 1245­1246 (1935) ("American courts, without exception, hold that arbitration agree- ments pertain to remedy or procedure. Consequently, the law of the for[u]m determines their enforceability . . ." (footnote omitted)); cf. Alexan- dria Canal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. 83, 87­88 (1847) (whether a court should grant the parties' motion to refer a lawsuit to a panel of arbitrators, and then should enter judgment on the arbitrators' award, was "not [a ques- tion] upon the rights of the respective parties, but upon the mode of pro- ceeding by which they were determined," and hence was governed by the law of the forum). The prevalent view that arbitration statutes were purely procedural does conflict with this Court's reasoning in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 (1924), a case that in other respects undermines Southland's position. See infra, Part I­B. Without analyzing the ques- tion, our opinion in Red Cross Line assumed that the threshold validity of an arbitration agreement (like the validity of other sorts of contracts) is a matter of "substantive" law. See 264 U. S., at 122­123. But our actual holding-that the remedies available to enforce a valid arbitration agree- ment do not involve "substantive" law, see id., at 124­125-was perfectly consistent with the customary view. As discussed below, moreover, the FAA's text clearly reflects Congress' view that the statute it enacted was purely procedural. 513US1 Unit: $U18 [01-06-00 06:58:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN 288 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Thomas, J., dissenting attempt to prescribe procedural rules for state courts. See, e. g., Ex parte Gounis, 304 Mo. 428, 437, 263 S. W. 988, 990 (1924) (describing the rule that Congress cannot "regulate or control [state courts'] modes of procedure" as one of the "general principles which have come to be accepted as set- tled constitutional law"). And because the FAA was en- acted against this general background, no one read it as such an attempt. See, e. g., Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 428, 459 (1931) (noting that the FAA "does not purport to extend its teeth to state proceed- ings," though arguing that it constitutionally could have done so); 6 S. Williston & G. Thompson, Law of Contracts 5368 (rev. ed. 1938) ("Inasmuch as arbitration acts are deemed procedural, the [FAA] applies only to the federal courts . . ." (footnote omitted)); cf. Southland, 465 U. S., at 25­29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing "unambiguous" legislative history to this effect). Indeed, to judge from the reported cases, it appears that no state court was even asked to enforce the statute for many years after the passage of the FAA. Federal courts, for their part, refused to apply state arbitration statutes in cases to which the FAA was inapplicable. See, e. g., Califor- nia Prune & Apricot Growers' Assn. v. Catz American Co., 60 F. 2d 788 (CA9 1932). Their refusal was not the out- growth of this Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), which held that certain categories of state judicial decisions were not "laws" for purposes of the Rules of Deci- sions Act and hence were not binding in federal courts; even under Swift, state statutes unambiguously constituted "laws." Rather, federal courts did not apply the state arbi- tration statutes because the statutes were not considered substantive laws. See California Prune, supra, at 790 ("It is undoubtedly true that a federal court in proper cases may enforce state laws; but this principle is applicable only when the state legislation invoke[d] creates or establishes a sub- 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 289 Thomas, J., dissenting stantive or general right"). In short, state arbitration stat- utes prescribed rules for the state courts, and the FAA pre- scribed rules for the federal courts. It is easy to understand why lawyers in 1925 classified arbitration statutes as procedural. An arbitration agree- ment is a species of forum-selection clause: Without laying down any rules of decision, it identifies the adjudicator of disputes. A strong argument can be made that such forum- selection clauses concern procedure rather than substance. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 73 (district court, with consent of the parties, may refer case to magistrate for resolution), 53 (district court may refer issues to special master). And if a contractual provision deals purely with matters of judi- cial procedure, one might well conclude that questions about whether and how it will be enforced also relate to procedure. The context of § 2 confirms this understanding of the FAA's original meaning. Most sections of the statute plainly have no application in state courts, but rather pre- scribe rules either for federal courts or for arbitration pro- ceedings themselves. Thus, § 3 provides: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbi- tration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, provid- ing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed- ing with such arbitration." 9 U. S. C. § 3 (emphasis added). Section 4 addresses the converse situation, in which a party breaches an arbitration agreement not by filing a lawsuit but rather by refusing to submit to arbitration: 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 290 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Thomas, J., dissenting "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agree- ment for arbitration may petition any United States dis- trict court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admi- ralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. . . . The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accord- ance with the terms of the agreement." (Emphasis added.) The Act then turns its attention to the covered arbitration proceedings themselves, treating the arbitration forum as an extension of the federal courts. Section 7, for instance, pro- vides that the fees for witnesses "shall be the same as the fees of witnesses before masters of the United States courts"; it adds that if a witness neglects a summons to appear at an arbitration hearing, "upon petition the United States district court for the district in which such arbitrators . . . are sitting may compel the attendance of such person . . . or punish said person . . . for contempt in the same manner provided by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States." Likewise, when the arbitrator eventually issues an award, either party (absent contrary directions in the agreement) may apply to "the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made" for an order confirming the award. § 9. The district court may also vacate or mod- ify the award in a few specified circumstances, §§ 10­11, but 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 291 Thomas, J., dissenting generally it will simply enter a confirmatory judgment, § 9, which is then docketed and given the same effect as a judg- ment in an ordinary civil case, § 13. Despite the FAA's general focus on the federal courts, of course, § 2 itself contains no such explicit limitation. But the text of the statute nonetheless makes clear that § 2 was not meant as a statement of substantive law binding on the States. After all, if § 2 really was understood to "creat[e] federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbi- tration agreements," Southland, supra, at 15, n. 9, then the breach of an arbitration agreement covered by § 2 would give rise to a federal question within the subject-matter jurisdic- tion of the federal district courts. See 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Yet the ensuing provisions of the Act, without expressly tak- ing away this jurisdiction, clearly rest on the assumption that federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce arbitration agreements only when they would have had jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. See 9 U. S. C. §§ 3, 4, 8. In other words, the FAA treats arbitration simply as one means of resolving disputes that lie within the jurisdiction of the fed- eral courts; it makes clear that the breach of a covered arbi- tration agreement does not itself provide any independent basis for such jurisdiction. Even the Southland majority was forced to acknowledge this point, conceding that § 2 "does not create any independent federal-question jurisdic- tion under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or otherwise." 465 U. S., at 15, n. 9. But the reason that § 2 does not give rise to federal- question jurisdiction is that it was enacted as a purely proce- dural provision. For the same reason, it applies only in the federal courts. The distinction between "substance" and "procedure" ac- quired new meaning after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). Thus, in 1956 we held that for Erie purposes, the question whether a court should stay litigation brought in breach of an arbitration agreement is one of "substantive" law. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 292 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Thomas, J., dissenting U. S. 198, 203­204. But this later development could not change the original meaning of the statute that Congress enacted in 1925. Although Bernhardt classified portions of the FAA as "substantive" rather than "procedural," it does not mean that they were so understood in 1925 or that Con- gress extended the FAA's reach beyond the federal courts. When Justice O'Connor pointed out the FAA's original meaning in her Southland dissent, see 465 U. S., at 25­30, the majority offered only one real response. If § 2 had been considered a purely procedural provision, the majority rea- soned, Congress would have extended it to all contracts rather than simply to maritime transactions and "contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving [interstate or foreign] commerce." See id., at 14. Yet Congress might well have thought that even if it could have called upon federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements in every single case that came before them, there was no federal interest in doing so unless interstate commerce or maritime transactions were involved. This conclusion is far more plausible than South- land's idea that Congress both viewed § 2 as a statement of substantive law and believed that it created no federal- question jurisdiction. Even if the interstate commerce requirement raises uncer- tainty about the original meaning of the statute, we should resolve the uncertainty in light of core principles of federal- ism. While "Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States" as long as it "is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution," we assume that "Congress does not exercise [this power] lightly." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991). To the extent that federal statutes are ambiguous, we do not read them to dis- place state law. Rather, we must be "absolutely certain" that Congress intended such displacement before we give pre-emptive effect to a federal statute. Id., at 464. In 1925, the enactment of a "substantive" arbitration statute 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 293 Thomas, J., dissenting along the lines envisioned by Southland would have displaced an enormous body of state law: Outside of a few States, predispute arbitration agreements either were wholly unenforceable or at least were not subject to specific performance. See generally Note to Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 47 L. R. A. (n.s.) 337 (1914) (detailed listing of state cases). Far from being "absolutely certain" that Con- gress swept aside these state rules, I am quite sure that it did not. B Suppose, however, that the first aspect of Southland was correct: § 2 requires States to enforce the covered arbitration agreements and pre-empts all contrary state law. There still would be no textual basis for Southland's suggestion that § 2 requires the States to enforce those agreements through the remedy of specific performance-that is, by forc- ing the parties to submit to arbitration. A contract surely can be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" even though it can be enforced only through actions for damages. Thus, on the eve of the FAA's enactment, this Court described execu- tory arbitration agreements as being "valid" and as creating "a perfect obligation" under federal law even though federal courts refused to order their specific performance. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 120­123 (1924).2 To be sure, §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA require that federal courts specifically enforce arbitration agreements. These provisions deal, respectively, with the potential plaintiffs and the potential defendants in the underlying dispute: § 3 holds 2 At the time, indeed, federal courts would award only nominal damages for the breach of such agreements. See Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foder- stof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 F. 935, 937 (CA2 1918), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. The Atlanten, 252 U. S. 313 (1920); Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 99 F. 787, 790­791 (SDNY), aff'd, 102 F. 926 (CA2 1900). 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 294 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Thomas, J., dissenting the plaintiffs to their promise not to take their claims straight to court, while § 4 holds the defendants to their promise to submit to arbitration rather than making the other party sue them. Had this case arisen in one of the "courts of the United States," it is § 3 that would have been relevant. Upon proper motion, the court would have been obliged to grant a stay pending arbitration, unless the contract between the parties did not "evidenc[e] a trans- action involving [interstate] commerce." See Bernhardt, supra, at 202 (holding that § 3 is limited to the arbitration agreements that § 2 declares valid). Because this case arose in the courts of Alabama, however, petitioners are forced to contend that § 2 imposes precisely the same obligation on all courts (both federal and state) that § 3 imposes solely on federal courts. Though Southland supports this argument, it simply cannot be correct, or § 3 would be superfluous. Alabama law brings these issues into sharp focus. Citing "public policy" grounds that reach back to Bozeman v. Gil- bert, 1 Ala. 90 (1840), Alabama courts have declared that pre- dispute arbitration agreements are "void." See, e. g., Wells v. Mobile County Bd. of Realtors, 387 So. 2d 140, 144 (Ala. 1980). But a separate state statute also includes "[a]n agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration" among the obligations that "cannot be specifically enforced" in Alabama. Ala. Code § 8­1­41 (1975). Especially in light of the Greg- ory v. Ashcroft presumption, § 2-even if applicable to the States-is most naturally read to pre-empt only Alabama's common-law rule and not the state statute; the statute does not itself make executory arbitration agreements invalid, re- vocable, or unenforceable, any more than the inclusion of "[a]n obligation to render personal service" in the same stat- utory provision means that employment contracts are invalid in Alabama. In the case at hand, the specific-enforcement statute appears to provide an adequate ground for the denial of petitioners' motion for a stay. 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 295 Thomas, J., dissenting II Rather than attempting to defend Southland on its merits, petitioners rely chiefly on the doctrine of stare decisis in urg- ing us to adhere to our mistaken interpretation of the FAA. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 3­6. In my view, that doc- trine is insufficient to save Southland. The majority (ante, at 272­273) and Justice O'Connor (ante, at 283­284) properly focus on whether overruling Southland would frustrate the legitimate expectations of people who have drafted and executed contracts in the be- lief that even state courts will strictly enforce arbitration clauses. I do not doubt that innumerable contracts contain- ing arbitration clauses have been written since 1984, or that arbitrable disputes might yet arise out of a large proportion of these contracts. Some of these contracts might well have been written differently in the absence of Southland. Still, I see no reason to think that the costs of overruling South- land are unacceptably high. Certainly no reliance interests are involved in cases like the present one, where the applica- bility of the FAA was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. In many other cases, moreover, the parties will simply comply with their arbi- tration agreement, either on the theory that they should live up to their promises or on the theory that arbitration is the cheapest and best way of resolving their dispute. In a fair number of the remaining cases, the party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement will be able to get into federal court, where the FAA will apply. And even if access to fed- eral court is impossible (because § 2 creates no independent basis for federal-question jurisdiction), many cases will arise in States whose own law largely parallels the FAA. Only Alabama, Mississippi, and Nebraska still hold all executory arbitration agreements to be unenforceable, though some other States refuse to enforce particular classes of such agreements. See Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT 296 ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON Thomas, J., dissenting Arbitration Law?, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 385, 401­403, and n. 93 (1992). Quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984), Jus- tice O'Connor nonetheless acquiesces in the majority's judgment "because there is no `special justification' to over- rule Southland." Ante, at 284. Even under this approach, the necessity of "preserv[ing] state autonomy in state courts," ibid., seems sufficient to me. But suppose that stare decisis really did require us to abide by Southland's holding that § 2 applies to the States. The doctrine still would not require us to follow Southland's suggestion that § 2 requires the specific enforcement of the arbitration agreements that it covers. We accord no prece- dential weight to mere dicta, and this latter suggestion was wholly unnecessary to the decision in Southland. The arbi- tration agreement at issue there, if valid at all with respect to the particular claims in dispute, clearly was subject to specific performance under state law; indeed, the state trial court had already compelled arbitration for all the other claims raised in the complaint. See Southland, 465 U. S., at 4; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 1281.2, 1281.4 (West 1982). Accordingly, the only question properly before the South- land Court was whether § 2 pre-empted a separate state law declaring the arbitration agreement "void" as applied to the remaining claims. See 465 U. S., at 10 (discussing Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 31512 (West 1977)). The same can be said for Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987), in which we again held that § 2 pre-empted a California statute that (as we had observed in a prior case, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen- ner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117, 133 (1973)) made certain arbitration clauses "unenforceable." We have subse- quently reserved judgment about the extent to which state courts must enforce arbitration agreements through the mechanisms that §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA prescribe for the federal courts. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 513us1$18N 03-28-98 15:48:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 265 (1995) 297 Thomas, J., dissenting U. S. 468, 477 (1989). Cf. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F. 2d 1199, 1210 (CA5 1991) ("We conclude from the Supreme Court's opinions that state courts do not necessarily have to grant stays of conflicting litigation or compel arbitration in compliance with the FAA's sections 3 and 4"). In short, we have never actually held, as opposed to stating or implying in dicta, that the FAA requires a state court to stay lawsuits brought in violation of an arbitration agreement covered by § 2. Because I believe that the FAA imposes no such obligation on state courts, and indeed that the statute is wholly inappli- cable in those courts, I would affirm the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment. 513us2$19z 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 298 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus SCHLUP v. DELO, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORRECTIONAL CENTER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 93­7901. Argued October 3, 1994-Decided January 23, 1995 Petitioner Schlup, a Missouri prisoner, was convicted of participating in the murder of a fellow inmate and sentenced to death. In this, his sec- ond federal habeas petition, he alleged that constitutional error at his trial deprived the jury of critical evidence that would have established his innocence. The District Court declined to reach the petition's mer- its, holding that Schlup could not satisfy the threshold showing of "ac- tual innocence" required by Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333, 336, under which a petitioner must demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found" him guilty. Held: The standard of Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478-which requires a habeas petitioner to show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," id., at 496- rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard, governs the miscar- riage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his constitutional claims. Pp. 313­332. (a) In contrast to the actual innocence claim asserted in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390-that the execution of an innocent person con- victed in an error-free trial violates the Eighth Amendment-Schlup's claim is accompanied by an assertion of constitutional error at trial: the ineffectiveness of his counsel and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution. As such, his conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of respect as one that is the product of an error-free trial, and his evidence of innocence need carry less of a burden. In Herrera, the evidence of innocence would have had to be strong enough to make the execution "constitutionally intolerable" even if the conviction was the product of a fair trial, while here the evidence must establish sufficient doubt about Schlup's guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial. Pp. 313­317. (b) The societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources dictate that a habeas court may not ordinarily reach the merits of successive or abusive claims, absent a showing of cause 513us2$19z 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 299 Syllabus and prejudice. However, since habeas corpus is, at its core, an equita- ble remedy, a court must adjudicate even successive claims when re- quired to do so by the ends of justice. Thus, in a trio of cases, this Court firmly established an exception for fundamental miscarriages of justice. Carrier, 477 U. S., at 495; Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436; Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527. To ensure that the fundamental mis- carriage of justice exception would remain "rare" and be applied only in the "extraordinary case," while at the same time ensuring that relief would be extended to those who are truly deserving, the Court has explicitly tied the exception to the petitioner's innocence. Carrier and Kuhlmann also expressed the standard of proof that should govern consideration of such claims: The petitioner must show that the con- stitutional error "probably" resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent. The Sawyer Court made no attempt to reconcile its more exacting standard of proof with Carrier's use of "probably." Pp. 317­323. (c) Carrier, rather than Sawyer, properly strikes the balance between the societal interests and the individual interest in justice, when the claimed injustice is that constitutional error has resulted in the convic- tion of one who is actually innocent. Though challenges to the propri- ety of imposing a death sentence are routinely asserted in capital cases, a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare and must be supported by new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial, evidence obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases. Thus, the threat to judicial resources, finality, and comity posed by actual innocence claims is sig- nificantly less than that posed by sentencing claims. More importantly, the individual interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the context of actual innocence, since the quintessential miscarriage of jus- tice is the execution of an innocent person. The less exacting Carrier standard of proof reflects the relative importance attached to the ulti- mate decision. Application of the stricter Sawyer standard would give insufficient weight to the correspondingly greater injustice that is impli- cated by an actual innocence claim. Pp. 323­327. (d) To satisfy Carrier's "actual innocence" standard, a petitioner must show that, in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus on actual innocence means that a district court is not bound by the admissibility rules that would govern at trial, but may consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either wrongly excluded or unavailable at trial. The district court must make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly in- structed jurors would do, and it is presumed that a reasonable juror 513us2$19z 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 300 SCHLUP v. DELO Syllabus would consider fairly all of the evidence presented and would conscien- tiously obey the trial court's instructions requiring proof beyond a rea- sonable doubt. The Carrier standard, although requiring a substantial showing, is by no means equivalent to the standard governing review of insufficient evidence claims. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, dis- tinguished. In applying the Carrier standard to Schlup's request for an evidentiary hearing, the District Court must assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial. The court is not required to test the new evidence by a standard appropriate for deciding a motion for summary judgment, but may consider how the submission's timing and the affi- ants' likely credibility bear on the probable reliability of that evidence. Pp. 327­332. 11 F. 3d 738, vacated and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a con- curring opinion, post, p. 332. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 334. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 342. Sean D. O'Brien argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Anthony G. Amsterdam, Randy Hertz, and Timothy K. Ford. Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stephen D. Hawke and Frank A. Jung, Assistant At- torneys General.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorney General, and Mark L. Krotoski, Special Assistant Attor- ney General, James H. Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Roland W. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 301 Opinion of the Court Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Lloyd E. Schlup, Jr., a Missouri prisoner cur- rently under a sentence of death, filed a second federal habeas corpus petition alleging that constitutional error de- prived the jury of critical evidence that would have estab- lished his innocence. The District Court, without conduct- ing an evidentiary hearing, declined to reach the merits of the petition, holding that petitioner could not satisfy the threshold showing of "actual innocence" required by Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992). Under Sawyer, the peti- tioner must show "by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner" guilty. Id., at 336. The Court of Ap- peals affirmed. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Sawyer standard provides adequate protection against the kind of miscarriage of justice that would result from the execution of a person who is actually innocent. I On February 3, 1984, on Walk 1 of the high security area of the Missouri State Penitentiary, a black inmate named Ar- thur Dade was stabbed to death. Three white inmates from Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Jan Graham, Attorney General of Utah, James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General of Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., and Eric M. Freedman filed a brief of amici curiae for Five Innocent Former Death Row Inmates et al. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 302 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court Walk 2, including petitioner, were charged in connection with Dade's murder. At petitioner's trial in December 1985, the State's evidence consisted principally of the testimony of two corrections of- ficers who had witnessed the killing. On the day of the mur- der, Sergeant Roger Flowers was on duty on Walk 1 and Walk 2, the two walks on the lower floor of the prison's high security area. Flowers testified that he first released the inmates on Walk 2 for their noon meal and relocked their cells. After unlocking the cells to release the inmates on Walk 1, Flowers noticed an inmate named Rodnie Stewart moving against the flow of traffic carrying a container of steaming liquid. Flowers watched as Stewart threw the liquid in Dade's face. According to Flowers, Schlup then jumped on Dade's back, and Robert O'Neal joined in the at- tack. Flowers shouted for help, entered the walk, and grabbed Stewart as the two other assailants fled. Officer John Maylee witnessed the attack from Walk 7, which is three levels and some 40­50 feet above Walks 1 and 2.1 Maylee first noticed Schlup, Stewart, and O'Neal as they were running from Walk 2 to Walk 1 against the flow of traf- fic. According to Maylee's testimony, Stewart threw a con- tainer of liquid at Dade's face, and then Schlup jumped on Dade's back. O'Neal then stabbed Dade several times in the chest, ran down the walk, and threw the weapon out a window. Maylee did not see what happened to Schlup or Stewart after the stabbing. The State produced no physical evidence connecting Schlup to the killing, and no witness other than Flowers and Maylee testified to Schlup's involvement in the murder.2 1 Maylee was unavailable to testify at Schlup's trial. Testimony from Maylee's pretrial deposition was admitted in evidence and was read to the jury. 2 In contrast, the evidence of the involvement of Stewart and O'Neal in Dade's murder was substantial. Stewart, for example, was apprehended 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 303 Opinion of the Court Schlup's defense was that the State had the wrong man.3 He relied heavily on a videotape from a camera in the prison- ers' dining room. The tape showed that Schlup was the first inmate to walk into the dining room for the noon meal, and that he went through the line and got his food. Approxi- mately 65 seconds after Schlup's entrance, several guards ran out of the dining room in apparent response to a distress call. Twenty-six seconds later, O'Neal ran into the dining room, dripping blood.4 Shortly thereafter, Schlup and O'Neal were taken into custody. Schlup contended that the videotape, when considered in conjunction with testimony that he had walked at a normal pace from his cell to the dining room,5 demonstrated that he could not have participated in the assault. Because the videotape showed conclusively that Schlup was in the dining room 65 seconds before the guards responded to the distress call, a critical element of Schlup's defense was determin- ing when the distress call went out. Had the distress call sounded shortly after the murder, Schlup would not have had time to get from the prison floor to the dining room, and by Flowers during the struggle itself. And when O'Neal was taken into custody, his clothes were covered with blood and he was bleeding from lacerations on his right hand. 3 Schlup did not testify at the guilt phase of the trial. At the sentencing hearing, Schlup did testify and maintained his innocence of the offense. He continued to maintain his innocence even after the jury had sentenced him to death. 4 After stabbing Dade, O'Neal broke a window with his hand and threw the knife out the window. That resulted in multiple lacerations to his right hand. Before leaving the prison floor, O'Neal paused briefly at a utilities sink on Walk 2 to try to wash off the blood, and then continued on to the dining room. O'Neal was followed into the dining room by inmate Randy Jordan, who is identified in some affidavits attesting to petitioner's innocence as the third participant in the crime. See infra, at 308­309. However, Jordan's name was not mentioned at Schlup's trial. 5 Schlup's cell was at the end of Walk 2, closest to the dining room. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 304 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court thus he could not have participated in the murder. Con- versely, had there been a delay of several minutes between the murder and the distress call, Schlup might have had suf- ficient time to participate in the murder and still get to the dining room over a minute before the distress call went out.6 The prosecutor adduced evidence tending to establish that such a delay had in fact occurred. First, Flowers testified that none of the officers on the prison floor had radios, thus implying that neither he nor any of the other officers on the floor was able to radio for help when the stabbing occurred. Second, Flowers testified that after he shouted for help, it took him "a couple [of] minutes" to subdue Stewart.7 Flow- ers then brought Stewart downstairs, encountered Captain James Eberle, and told Eberle that there had been a "dis- turbance." 8 Eberle testified that he went upstairs to the prison floor, and then radioed for assistance. Eberle esti- mated that the elapsed time from when he first saw Flowers 6 A necessary element of Schlup's defense was that Flowers and Maylee were mistaken in their identification of Schlup as one of the participants in the murder. Schlup suggested that Flowers had taken a visitor to Schlup's cell just 30 minutes before the murder. Schlup argued that Flowers had therefore had Schlup "on the brain," Trial Tr. 493­494, thus explaining why, in the confusion surrounding the murder, Flowers might have mistakenly believed that he had seen Schlup. Schlup argued that Maylee's identification was suspect because Maylee was three floors away from the murder and did not have an unobstructed view of the murder scene. Schlup further suggested that Maylee's identi- fication of Schlup had been influenced by a postincident conversation be- tween Maylee and another officer who had talked to Flowers. Schlup also argued that there were inconsistencies between the descrip- tion of the murder provided by Flowers and that provided by Maylee. For example, Maylee testified that he saw Schlup, Stewart, and O'Neal running together against the flow of traffic, and that the three men had stopped when they encountered Dade. See id., at 332. Flowers noticed only Stewart running against the flow of traffic, and he testified that O'Neal and Schlup were at the other end of the walk on the far side of Dade. See id., at 249. 7 Id., at 243. 8 Id., at 245. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 305 Opinion of the Court until he radioed for help was "approximately a minute." 9 The prosecution also offered testimony from a prison investi- gator who testified that he was able to run from the scene of the crime to the dining room in 33 seconds and to walk the distance at a normal pace in a minute and 37 seconds. Neither the State nor Schlup was able to present evidence establishing the exact time of Schlup's release from his cell on Walk 2, the exact time of the assault on Walk 1, or the exact time of the radio distress call. Further, there was no evidence suggesting that Schlup had hurried to the dining room.10 After deliberating overnight, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Following the penalty phase, at which the victim of one of Schlup's prior offenses testified extensively about the sordid details of that offense,11 the jury sentenced Schlup to death. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Schlup's conviction and death sentence, State v. Schlup, 724 S. W. 2d 236 (Mo. 1987), and this Court denied certiorari, Schlup v. Missouri, 482 U. S. 920 (1987).12 9 Id., at 212, 214­215. 10 In fact, the evidence presented was to the contrary. Two inmates, Bernard Bailey and Arthur St. Peter, testified that they were behind Schlup in line on the way to the dining room and that they had all walked at a normal pace. Lieutenant Robert Faherty, the corrections officer on duty in the corridor leading from the prison floor to the dining room, testi- fied that Schlup was the first inmate into the corridor on the day of the murder. Faherty also testified that he saw Schlup pause and yell some- thing out one of the windows in the corridor, and that he told Schlup to move on. Faherty testified that nothing else unusual had occurred while Schlup was in the corridor. On the other hand, both Maylee's testimony and the videotape establish that O'Neal ran from Walk 1 to the dining room. 11 Schlup had been convicted of sodomy and assault in connection with a series of attacks on a cellmate while he was being held in a county jail. 12 The other alleged participants in the crime were convicted in earlier, separate trials. O'Neal, who did the stabbing, was sentenced to death, see State v. O'Neal, 718 S. W. 2d 498 (Mo. 1986); Stewart, who was appre- hended by Flowers at the scene, was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 306 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court II On January 5, 1989, after exhausting his state collateral remedies,13 Schlup filed a pro se petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, asserting the claim, among others, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and to call witnesses who could establish Schlup's innocence.14 The District Court concluded that Schlup's ineffectiveness claim was procedurally barred, and it denied relief on that claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.15 The Court of Appeals affirmed, though it did not rely on the alleged proce- dural bar. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F. 2d 631 (CA8 1991). Instead, based on its own examination of the record, the Court found that trial counsel's performance had not been constitutionally ineffective, both because counsel had re- viewed statements that Schlup's potential witnesses had given to prison investigators, and because the testimony of those witnesses "would be repetitive of the testimony to be presented at trial." Id., at 639.16 But cf. 11 F. 3d 738, 746, without eligibility for probation or parole, see State v. Stewart, 714 S. W. 2d 724 (Mo. App. 1986). 13 The denial of Schlup's motion for postconviction relief was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court on October 18, 1988. See Schlup v. State, 758 S. W. 2d 715 (Mo. 1988). 14 Schlup identified three nonparticipant witnesses who he claimed had witnessed the murder: Van Robinson, Lamont Griffin Bey, and Ricky McCoy. Schlup also faulted trial counsel for failing to interview Randy Jordan, whom Schlup identified as the third participant in the murder. 15 Schlup had presented the ineffectiveness claim in his state postconvic- tion motion, but had failed to raise it on appeal. See Schlup v. Armon- trout, No. 89­0020C(3), 1989 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 18285, *11­*13 (ED Mo., May 31, 1989). Schlup's first federal habeas petition also raised several other claims, all of which were denied either as procedurally barred or on the merits. 16 The Court of Appeals also addressed Schlup's other claims. Over Judge Heaney's dissent, the court rejected Schlup's claim that his counsel had been ineffective for failing to adduce available mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F. 2d, at 639. The court 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 307 Opinion of the Court n. 3 (CA8 1993) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (challenging the con- clusion that such testimony would have been "repetitive"). The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, Schlup v. Armontrout, 945 F. 2d 1062 (1991), and we denied a petition for certiorari, 503 U. S. 909 (1992). On March 11, 1992, represented by new counsel, Schlup filed a second federal habeas corpus petition. That petition raised a number of claims, including that (1) Schlup was actu- ally innocent of Dade's murder, and that his execution would therefore violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993); (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview alibi witnesses; and (3) the State had failed to disclose critical exculpatory evi- dence. The petition was supported by numerous affidavits from inmates attesting to Schlup's innocence. The State filed a response arguing that various procedural bars precluded the District Court from reaching the merits of Schlup's claims and that the claims were in any event mer- itless. Attached to the State's response were transcripts of inmate interviews conducted by prison investigators just five days after the murder. One of the transcripts contained an interview with John Green, an inmate who at the time was the clerk for the housing unit. In his interview, Green stated that he had been in his office at the end of the walks when the murder occurred. Green stated that Flowers had also rejected Schlup's separate claim challenging the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing in the District Court. Schlup had requested such a hearing to develop evidence so that he could in turn challenge the failure of the state court to grant his request for a continuance of his state postconviction proceedings. Schlup had requested that continuance to ob- tain additional evidence to support his claim of innocence. The Court of Appeals held that Schlup's challenge to the state court's failure to grant a continuance was not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. Id., at 642. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 308 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court told him to call for help, and that Green had notified base of the disturbance shortly after it began.17 Schlup immediately filed a traverse arguing that Green's affidavit provided conclusive proof of Schlup's innocence. Schlup contended that Green's statement demonstrated that a call for help had gone out shortly after the incident. Be- cause the videotape showed that Schlup was in the dining room some 65 seconds before the guards received the dis- tress call, Schlup argued that he could not have been in- volved in Dade's murder. Schlup emphasized that Green's statement was not likely to have been fabricated, because at the time of Green's interview, neither he nor anyone else would have realized the significance of Green's call to base. Schlup tried to buttress his claim of innocence with affidavits from inmates who stated that they had witnessed the event and that Schlup had not been present.18 Two of those affi- 17 "BROOKS: John, whenever you saw Dade fall what did you do then? "GREEN: I stepped out of the office and I heard Sgt. Flowers calling for officers cause they had had a fight. Couldn't get nobody so he told me to call base to notify them of the fight and that's what I did. "DEARIXON: That's all I have, John. Thank you very much." Re- sponse to Order To Show Cause Why a Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not Be Granted, Exhibit T (Transcripts of Inmate Interviews), p. 31. If the total time required for Green to respond to Flowers' instruction and for the base to send out a distress call in response to Green's call amounted to a mere 15­17 seconds, O'Neal running at top speed would have had 8­10 seconds to wash his hands and still would have been able to arrive in the dining room some 26 seconds after the distress call. 18 In the District Court, Schlup attempted to supplement the record with several detailed affidavits from inmates attesting to his innocence. For example, Lamont Griffin Bey, a black inmate, submitted an affidavit in which he stated: "The first thing I saw of the fight was Rodney [sic] Stewart throw liquid in Arthur Dade's face, and O'Neal stab him. . . . I knew Lloyd Schlup at that time, but we were not friends. Lloyd Schlup was not present at the scene of the fight." Affidavit of Lamont Griffin Bey, pp. 2­3 (Apr. 7, 1993). Griffin Bey also stated: "When this happened, there was a lot of racial tension in the prison. . . . I would not stick my neck out to help a white person under these circumstances normally, but 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 309 Opinion of the Court davits suggested that Randy Jordan-who occupied the cell between O'Neal and Stewart in Walk 2, and who, as noted above, see n. 4, supra, is shown on the videotape arriving at lunch with O'Neal-was the third assailant. On August 23, 1993, without holding a hearing, the District Court dismissed Schlup's second habeas petition and vacated the stay of execution that was then in effect. The District Court concluded that Schlup's various filings did not provide adequate cause for failing to raise his new claims more promptly. Moreover, the court concluded that Schlup had failed to meet the Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992), standard for showing that a refusal to entertain those claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. In its discussion of the evidence, the court made no separate com- ment on the significance of Green's statement.19 On September 7, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, again calling the court's attention to I am willing to testify because I know Lloyd Schlup is innocent." Id., at 4. Similarly, inmate Donnell White swore an affidavit in which he stated: "Three white guys were coming the opposite way. One of them had a tumbler of something that he threw in [Dade's] face. One or two of the other ones started sticking [Dade] with an ice-pick-type knife." Affidavit of Donnell White, at 1 (Apr. 21, 1993). White further stated: "I have seen Lloyd Schlup, and I know who he is. He is definitely not one of the guys I saw jump Arthur Dade . . . . I know that one of the three men involved has never been prosecuted, and I know that Lloyd Schlup is innocent. I barely know Lloyd Schlup, and I have no reason to lie for him. I told the investigators that I didn't see anything because I didn't want to get in- volved." Id., at 3. Though the District Court ultimately denied Schlup's motion to supple- ment the record, the inmate affidavits are part of the record on appeal. 19 The District Court focused primarily on the "suspect" nature of affi- davits that are produced after a long delay, cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 423­424 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and that come from in- mates. The court concluded that the affidavits presented by Schlup, when considered against the positive identifications made by Flowers and Maylee, failed to constitute a sufficiently persuasive showing of actual innocence. App. 79. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 310 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court Green's statement. Two days later, Schlup filed a supple- mental motion stating that his counsel had located John Green 20 and had obtained an affidavit from him. That affi- davit confirmed Green's postincident statement that he had called base shortly after the assault. Green's affidavit also identified Jordan rather than Schlup as the third assailant.21 20 Green had been released from prison on January 29, 1986. Green Affidavit, at 4 (Sept. 7, 1993). 21 Green's affidavit stated: "I looked down one walk, and I saw Randy Jordan holding Arthur Dade. Jordan was standing behind Dade, and had Dade's arms pinned to his sides from behind. I saw Robert O'Neal stab Dade several times in the chest while Jordan was holding him. "Dade broke loose and ran straight toward me. I saw him collide with Rodnie Stewart and fall to the ground near the paint storage area. Ser- geant Flowers hollered for help. I think there was so much noise that he didn't think the other guards in the Housing Unit heard him, so he told me to call base. He was on his way to break up the fight when he told me to call base. I immediately went into the office, picked up the phone, and called base. "A sergeant at the base picked up the phone. I told him there was a fight in Housing Unit 5A. He said something like, `OK,' and I hung up the phone." Id., at 2­3. Green stated that his call to base came "within seconds of Dade hitting the ground. It could not have been more than a half minute or a minute after he was stabbed by Jordan and O'Neal. It happened very fast." Id., at 4. Green also explained why he had earlier denied witnessing the murder: "I told [investigators] I didn't [see the murder] because I was concerned about my safety. I know that Jordan and O'Neal were in the Aryan Brotherhood, and if I said I saw them do it, they could easily have me killed." Id., at 3­4. Green continued: "If I had been contacted before Schlup's trial, I would have told his attorney that he was not there when Dade was stabbed, and I would have testified that I called base within seconds after Dade hit the ground. I might have been reluctant to snitch on Jordan and O'Neal. I'm not afraid now because I haven't been in prison for more than 71/2 years, and I have been working steadily ever since. I have no intention of going back to prison." Id., at 6. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 311 Opinion of the Court The District Court denied the motion and the supplemental motion without opinion. Petitioner then sought from the Court of Appeals a stay of execution pending the resolution of his appeal. Relying on Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 (1986), Schlup argued that the District Court should have entertained his second habeas corpus petition, because he had supplemented his constitutional claim "with a colorable claim of factual innocence." Id., at 454. On October 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the stay application. In an opinion that was subsequently vacated, the majority held that petitioner's claim of innocence was governed by the standard announced in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992), and it concluded that under that stand- ard, the evidence of Schlup's guilt that had been adduced at trial foreclosed consideration of petitioner's current constitu- tional claims.22 Judge Heaney dissented. Relying on Green's affidavit, the videotape, and the affidavits of four other eyewitnesses, Judge Heaney concluded that the petitioner had met both the Kuhlmann standard and a proper reading of the Sawyer standard.23 Cf. infra, at 331. He believed that the District Court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing in which the affiants would have been subjected to examina- tion by the State so "their credibility could be accurately determined." 24 In the meantime, petitioner's counsel obtained an affidavit from Robert Faherty, the former lieutenant at the prison whom Schlup had passed on the way to lunch on the day of the murder and who had reprimanded Schlup for shouting out the window. See n. 10, supra. Faherty's affidavit stated that Schlup had been in Faherty's presence for at least 22 Schlup v. Delo, No. 93­3272, 1993 WL 409815, *3 (CA8, Oct. 15, 1993). 23 Id., at *7. 24 Id., at *5. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 312 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court two and a half minutes; that Schlup was walking at a lei- surely pace; and that Schlup "was not perspiring or breath- ing hard, and he was not nervous." Affidavit of Robert Fah- erty ¶¶ 4, 6 (Oct. 26, 1993).25 On November 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals vacated its earlier opinion and substituted a more comprehensive analy- sis of the law to support its decision to deny Schlup's request for a stay. 11 F. 3d 738. The majority adhered to its earlier conclusion that Sawyer stated the appropriate standard for evaluating Schlup's claim of actual innocence. 11 F. 3d, at 740. The opinion also contained an extended discussion of Schlup's new evidence. The court noted in particular that Green's new affidavit was inconsistent in part with both his prison interview and his testimony at the Stewart trial. Id., at 742. The court viewed Faherty's affidavit as simply "an effort to embellish and expand upon his testimony" and con- cluded "that a habeas court should not permit retrial on such a basis." Id., at 743. Judge Heaney again dissented, concluding that Schlup had "presented truly persuasive evidence that he is actually inno- cent," and that the District Court should therefore have ad- dressed the merits of Schlup's constitutional claims. Id., at 744. Judge Heaney also argued that Schlup's ineffective- ness claim was substantial. He noted that Schlup's trial counsel failed to conduct individual interviews with Griffin Bey, McCoy, or any of the other inmates who told investiga- tors that they had seen the killing. Moreover, counsel failed to interview Green about his statement that he had called 25 Faherty had testified at Schlup's trial, but he had not been asked about the significant details of his encounter with Schlup that are recited in his affidavit. Faherty Affidavit ¶ 9 (Oct. 26, 1993). Faherty left the Depart- ment of Corrections in 1989. He stated in his affidavit that he had been prompted to come forward after hearing about Schlup's case through an article in the local newspaper. Id., ¶ 11. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 313 Opinion of the Court base. In fact, counsel apparently failed to conduct individ- ual interviews with any of the potential witnesses to the crime. Judge Heaney adhered to his conclusion that Schlup's counsel was ineffective, even though counsel allegedly had reviewed 100 interviews conducted by prison investigators.26 Judge Heaney argued that counsel's review of the interview transcripts-rather than demonstrating counsel's effective- ness-made counsel's failure to conduct his own interviews with Green and the few inmates who admitted seeing the attack even more troubling. See id., at 747, n. 5. Judge Heaney concluded that Schlup's case should be remanded to the District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and, if appropriate, to address the merits of Schlup's constitutional claims. On November 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied a sug- gestion for rehearing en banc. Dissenting from that denial, three judges joined an opinion describing the question whether the majority should have applied the standard an- nounced in Sawyer v. Whitley, supra, rather than the Kuhl- mann standard as "a question of great importance in habeas corpus jurisprudence." 11 F. 3d, at 755. We granted cer- tiorari to consider that question. 511 U. S. 1003 (1994).27 III As a preliminary matter, it is important to explain the dif- ference between Schlup's claim of actual innocence and the 26 The transcripts of the individual interviews conducted by the prison investigators were relatively brief: The entire written transcript of the investigators' interview with Green, for example, takes up less than one page. The vast majority of the interviews consisted of simple statements that the interviewee had not seen Dade's killing. 27 Though the Court of Appeals denied Schlup's motion for a stay of execution, the Governor of Missouri granted a stay one day before Schlup's execution date. The Governor then ordered a Board of Inquiry to conduct clemency proceedings. Those proceedings are apparently continuing. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 314 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court claim of actual innocence asserted in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993). In Herrera, the petitioner advanced his claim of innocence to support a novel substantive constitu- tional claim, namely, that the execution of an innocent person would violate the Eighth Amendment.28 Under petitioner's theory in Herrera, even if the proceedings that had resulted in his conviction and sentence were entirely fair and error free, his innocence would render his execution a "consti- tutionally intolerable event." Id., at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Schlup's claim of innocence, on the other hand, is proce- dural, rather than substantive. His constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), and the withholding of evi- dence by the prosecution, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution. Schlup, how- ever, faces procedural obstacles that he must overcome be- fore a federal court may address the merits of those constitu- tional claims. Because Schlup has been unable to establish "cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse his failure to pre- sent his evidence in support of his first federal petition, see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 493­494 (1991),29 Schlup may obtain review of his constitutional claims only if he falls 28 In Herrera, we assumed for the sake of argument that "in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of `actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and war- rant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." 506 U. S., at 417. 29 Schlup argued in the District Court that the lack of diligence of his appointed postconviction counsel, coupled with problems created by the State, established cause and prejudice. See App. 38­43 (state postcon- viction proceedings); id., at 43­45 (proceedings on first federal habeas). That argument was rejected by the District Court and the Court of Ap- peals, and petitioner does not renew it in this Court. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 315 Opinion of the Court within the "narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamen- tal miscarriage of justice," id., at 494. Schlup's claim of in- nocence is offered only to bring him within this "narrow class of cases." Schlup's claim thus differs in at least two important ways from that presented in Herrera. First, Schlup's claim of in- nocence does not by itself provide a basis for relief. Instead, his claim for relief depends critically on the validity of his Strickland and Brady claims.30 Schlup's claim of innocence is thus "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gate- way through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Herrera, 506 U. S., at 404; see also 11 F. 3d, at 740.31 More importantly, a court's assumptions about the validity of the proceedings that resulted in conviction are fundamen- tally different in Schlup's case than in Herrera's. In Her- rera, petitioner's claim was evaluated on the assumption that the trial that resulted in his conviction had been error free. In such a case, when a petitioner has been "tried before a jury of his peers, with the full panoply of protections that our Constitution affords criminal defendants," 506 U. S., at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring), it is appropriate to apply an 30 In light of our conclusion that the courts below applied the wrong standard in evaluating Schlup's gateway innocence claim, see infra, at 326­327, we need not express a view concerning the merits of Schlup's underlying constitutional claims. 31 In his submissions to the federal courts, Schlup has consistently ar- gued that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend- ments because he is actually innocent. That Herrera claim was rejected in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals. In the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, three judges stated that they were per- suaded by Judge Heaney's dissent that there was "at least a substantial likelihood" that Schlup could meet even the extraordinarily high showing required by Herrera. We denied certiorari on Schlup's Herrera claim, and accordingly we express no opinion as to its merits. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 316 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court " `extraordinarily high' " standard of review, id., at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring).32 Schlup, in contrast, accompanies his claim of innocence with an assertion of constitutional error at trial. For that reason, Schlup's conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of respect as one, such as Herrera's, that is the prod- uct of an error-free trial. Without any new evidence of in- nocence, even the existence of a concededly meritorious con- stitutional violation is not in itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim. However, if a petitioner such as Schlup presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claims. Consequently, Schlup's evidence of innocence need carry less of a burden. In Herrera (on the assumption that peti- tioner's claim was, in principle, legally well founded), the evi- dence of innocence would have had to be strong enough to make his execution "constitutionally intolerable" even if his conviction was the product of a fair trial. For Schlup, the evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a miscar- riage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial. Our rather full statement of the facts illustrates the fore- going distinction between a substantive Herrera claim and Schlup's procedural claim. Three items of evidence are par- ticularly relevant: the affidavit of black inmates attesting to the innocence of a white defendant in a racially motivated killing; the affidavit of Green describing his prompt call for 32 In Herrera, it was not necessary to determine the appropriate stand- ard of review because petitioner had failed to make "a truly persuasive demonstration of `actual innocence' " under any reasonable standard. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 317 Opinion of the Court assistance; and the affidavit of Lieutenant Faherty describ- ing Schlup's unhurried walk to the dining room. If there were no question about the fairness of the criminal trial, a Herrera-type claim would have to fail unless the federal ha- beas court is itself convinced that those new facts unques- tionably establish Schlup's innocence. On the other hand, if the habeas court were merely convinced that those new facts raised sufficient doubt about Schlup's guilt to undermine con- fidence in the result of the trial without the assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error, Schlup's threshold showing of innocence would justify a review of the merits of the constitutional claims. IV As this Court has repeatedly noted, "[a]t common law, res judicata did not attach to a court's denial of habeas relief." McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 479. Instead, " `a renewed applica- tion could be made to every other judge or court in the realm, and each court or judge was bound to consider the question of the prisoner's right to a discharge independently, and not to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge.' " Ibid., quoting W. Church, Writ of Habeas Cor- pus § 386, p. 570 (2d ed. 1893). The Court has explained the early tolerance of successive petitions, in part, by the fact that the writ originally per- formed only the narrow function of testing either the juris- diction of the sentencing court or the legality of Executive detention. See McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 478; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 78 (1977).33 The scope of the writ later expanded beyond its original narrow purview to encompass 33 As this Court noted in Wainwright v. Sykes, there have been "diver- gent discussions of the historic role of federal habeas corpus." 433 U. S., at 77, n. 6. One recent commentator has offered a new perspective on the history of the writ. See Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachro- nistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997 (1992). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 318 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court review of constitutional error that had occurred in the pro- ceedings leading to conviction. See McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 478­479; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79. That broad- ening of the scope of the writ created the risk that repeti- tious filings by individual petitioners might adversely affect the administration of justice in the federal courts. Such fil- ings also posed a threat to the finality of state-court judg- ments and to principles of comity and federalism. See, e. g., McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 491; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 487 (1986). To alleviate the increasing burdens on the federal courts and to contain the threat to finality and comity, Congress attempted to fashion rules disfavoring claims raised in sec- ond and subsequent petitions. For example, in 1966, Con- gress amended 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) "to introduce `a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceed- ings.' " Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S., at 450, quoting S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966) (Senate Re- port); see also McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 486. Similarly, in 1976, Congress promulgated Rule 9(b) of the Rules Govern- ing Habeas Corpus Proceedings in part to deal with the problem of repetitive filings. These same concerns resulted in a number of recent deci- sions from this Court that delineate the circumstances under which a district court may consider claims raised in a second or subsequent habeas petition. In those decisions, the Court held that a habeas court may not ordinarily reach the merits of successive claims, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 (1986), or abusive claims, McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 493, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977).34 The application of cause and 34 A " `successive petition' raises grounds identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S., at 444, n. 6 (plurality opinion). An "abusive petition" occurs "where a prisoner files a petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, or engages in other conduct that `disentitle[s] him 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 319 Opinion of the Court prejudice to successive and abusive claims conformed to this Court's treatment of procedurally defaulted claims. Car- rier, 477 U. S. 478; see also McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 490­491 ("The doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ implicate nearly identical concerns flowing from the signifi- cant costs of federal habeas corpus review"). See generally Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 338­340. The net result of this con- gressional and judicial action has been the adoption in habeas corpus of a " `qualified application of the doctrine of res judi- cata.' " McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 486, quoting Senate Re- port, at 2.35 At the same time, the Court has adhered to the principle that habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy. This Court has consistently relied on the equitable nature of habeas corpus to preclude application of strict rules of res judicata. Thus, for example, in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), this Court held that a habeas court must adjudicate even a successive habeas claim when required to do so by the "ends of justice." Id., at 15­17; see also Mc- Cleskey, 499 U. S., at 495. The Sanders Court applied this equitable exception even to petitions brought under 28 to the relief he seeks.' " Ibid., quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17­19 (1963). 35 This Court has repeatedly noted the interplay between statutory lan- guage and judicially managed equitable considerations in the development of habeas corpus jurisprudence. For example, in McCleskey, the Court noted that the doctrine of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus "refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions." 499 U. S., at 489. Similarly, in Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court noted its "his- toric willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." 433 U. S., at 81; see also Kuhlmann, 477 U. S., at 446­447 (explaining that the Court has both expanded and limited the scope of the writ); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633 (1993) ("We have filled the gaps of the habeas corpus statute with respect to other matters"). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 320 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court U. S. C. § 2255, though the language of § 2255 contained no reference to an "ends of justice" inquiry. 373 U. S., at 12­15. We firmly established the importance of the equitable in- quiry required by the ends of justice in "a trio of 1986 deci- sions" handed down on the same day. Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 339 (referring to Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, and Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527). In Kuhlmann, seven Members of this Court squarely rejected the argument that in light of the 1966 amendments, "federal courts no longer must consider the `ends of justice' before dismissing a successive petition." 477 U. S., at 451 (plurality opinion); id., at 468­471 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id., at 476­477 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 339 (noting that in Kuhlmann, "[w]e held that despite the removal of [the reference to the ends of justice] from 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) in 1966, the miscarriage of justice exception would allow successive claims to be heard"). Thus, while recognizing that successive petitions are gener- ally precluded from review, Justice Powell's plurality opinion expressly noted that there are "limited circumstances under which the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitu- tional claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the countervailing interests served by according finality to the prior judgment." 477 U. S., at 452. Similarly, writing for the Court in Carrier, Justice O'Connor observed that the Court had adopted the cause and prejudice standard in part because of its confidence that that standard would pro- vide adequate protection to " `victims of a fundamental mis- carriage of justice,' " 477 U. S., at 495­496, quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 135 (1982); however, Justice O'Connor also noted that the Court has candidly refused to "pretend that this will always be true," Carrier, 477 U. S., at 496. For that reason, " `[i]n appropriate cases,' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice `must yield to the imperative of correcting a funda- 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 321 Opinion of the Court mentally unjust incarceration.' " Id., at 495, quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 135; see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S., at 537. In subsequent cases, we have consistently re- affirmed the existence and importance of the exception for fundamental miscarriages of justice. See, e. g., Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 339­340; McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 494­495; Dugger v. Adams, 489 U. S. 401, 414 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). To ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice ex- ception would remain "rare" and would only be applied in the "extraordinary case," while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those who were truly deserving, this Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner's innocence. In Kuhl- mann, for example, Justice Powell concluded that a prisoner retains an overriding "interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for which he was in- carcerated. That interest does not extend, however, to pris- oners whose guilt is conceded or plain." 477 U. S., at 452. Similarly, Justice O'Connor wrote in Carrier that "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default." 477 U. S., at 496; see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S., at 537, quoting Carrier, 477 U. S., at 496. The general rule announced in Kuhlmann, Carrier, and Smith, and confirmed in this Court's more recent decisions, rests in part on the fact that habeas corpus petitions that advance a substantial claim of actual innocence are ex- tremely rare.36 Judge Friendly's observation a quarter of a 36 Indeed, neither party called our attention to any decision from a Court of Appeals in which a petitioner had satisfied any definition of actual inno- cence. Though some such decisions exist, see, e. g., Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F. 2d 706, 713­714 (CA8), reaff'd in relevant part on rehearing, 939 F. 2d 586 (CA8 1991), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 1050 (1992); Bliss v. Lockhart, 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 322 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court century ago that "the one thing almost never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime" remains largely true today.37 Explicitly tying the miscarriage of justice exception to innocence thus accommo- dates both the systemic interests in finality, comity, and con- servation of judicial resources, and the overriding individual interest in doing justice in the "extraordinary case," Carrier, 477 U. S., at 496. In addition to linking miscarriages of justice to innocence, Carrier and Kuhlmann also expressed the standard of proof that should govern consideration of those claims. In Car- rier, for example, the Court stated that the petitioner must show that the constitutional error "probably" resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent. The Kuhl- mann plurality, though using the term "colorable claim of factual innocence," elaborated that the petitioner would be required to establish, by a " `fair probability,' " that " `the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.' " 477 U. S., at 454, 455, n. 17. In the years following Kuhlmann and Carrier, we did not expound further on the actual innocence exception. In those few cases that mentioned the standard, the Court con- tinued to rely on the formulations set forth in Kuhlmann and Carrier. In McCleskey, for example, while establishing that cause and prejudice would generally define the situa- tions in which a federal court might entertain an abusive petition, the Court recognized an exception for cases in which the constitutional violation "probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime." 499 U. S., at 494, citing Carrier, 477 U. S., at 485. 891 F. 2d 1335, 1342 (CA8 1987) (relying on Carrier's actual innocence exception as an alternative ground of decision), independent research con- firms that such decisions are rare. 37 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 145 (1970). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 323 Opinion of the Court Then, in Sawyer, the Court examined the miscarriage of justice exception as applied to a petitioner who claimed he was "actually innocent of the death penalty." In that opin- ion, the Court struggled to define "actual innocence" in the context of a petitioner's claim that his death sentence was inappropriate. The Court concluded that such actual inno- cence "must focus on those elements which render a defend- ant eligible for the death penalty." 505 U. S., at 347. How- ever, in addition to defining what it means to be "innocent" of the death penalty, the Court departed from Carrier's use of "probably" and adopted a more exacting standard of proof to govern these claims: The Court held that a habeas peti- tioner "must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty." 505 U. S., at 336 (emphasis added).38 No attempt was made in Sawyer to reconcile this stricter standard with Carrier's use of "probably." V In evaluating Schlup's claim of innocence, the Court of Ap- peals applied Eighth Circuit precedent holding that Sawyer, rather than Carrier, supplied the proper legal standard. The court then purported to apply the Sawyer standard. Schlup argues that Sawyer has no application to a petitioner who claims that he is actually innocent of the crime, and that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sawyer in any event. Re- spondent contends that the Court of Appeals was correct in both its selection and its application of the Sawyer standard. Though the Court of Appeals seems to have misapplied Saw- yer,39 we do not rest our decision on that ground because we 38 Even the high standard of proof set forth in Sawyer falls short of the Jackson standard governing habeas review of claims of insufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 324 (1979) ("[N]o ra- tional trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added). See infra, at 330. 39 See infra, at 331. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 324 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court conclude that in a case such as this, the Sawyer standard does not apply. As we have stated, the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception seeks to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case. We conclude that Carrier, rather than Sawyer, prop- erly strikes that balance when the claimed injustice is that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime. Claims of actual innocence pose less of a threat to scarce judicial resources and to principles of finality and comity than do claims that focus solely on the erroneous imposition of the death penalty. Though challenges to the propriety of imposing a sentence of death are routinely asserted in capital cases, experience has taught us that a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. See supra, at 321­322. To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his alle- gations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence- whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful. Even under the pre- Sawyer regime, "in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected." 40 The threat to judicial resources, finality, and comity posed by claims of actual innocence is thus significantly less than that posed by claims relating only to sentencing. Of greater importance, the individual interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the context of actual inno- cence. The quintessential miscarriage of justice is the exe- 40 Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 377 (1993); see also id., at 377, n. 370 (collecting cases). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 325 Opinion of the Court cution of a person who is entirely innocent.41 Indeed, con- cern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system. That concern is reflected, for example, in the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also T. Starkie, Evidence 756 (1824) ("The maxim of the law is . . . that it is better that ninety-nine . . . offenders should escape, than that one inno- cent man should be condemned"). See generally Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 979, 980­ 981 (1993). The overriding importance of this greater individual inter- est merits protection by imposing a somewhat less exacting standard of proof on a habeas petitioner alleging a fundamen- tal miscarriage of justice than on one alleging that his sen- tence is too severe. As this Court has noted, "a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder con- cerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370 (Har- lan, J., concurring); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (1979). The standard of proof thus reflects "the rel- ative importance attached to the ultimate decision." Ibid. Though the Sawyer standard was fashioned to reflect the relative importance of a claim of an erroneous sentence, ap- plication of that standard to petitioners such as Schlup would give insufficient weight to the correspondingly greater injus- tice that is implicated by a claim of actual innocence. The 41 See, e. g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U. S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 750, n. 4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496, 509, n. 12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 294 (1983); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357­358 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303­304, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 326 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of executing one who is actually innocent thus requires application of the Carrier standard.42 We recognize, as the State has reminded us, that in Saw- yer the Court applied its new standard not only to the pen- alty phase of the case but also to Sawyer's responsibility for arson, one of the elements of the offense of first-degree mur- der.43 This fact does not require application of the Sawyer standard to a case such as Schlup's. Though formulated as an element of the offense of first-degree murder, the arson functioned essentially as a sentence enhancer. That claim, therefore, is readily distinguishable from a claim, like the one raised by Schlup, that the petitioner is actually innocent. Fealty to the doctrine of stare decisis does not, therefore, preclude application of the Carrier standard to the facts of this case.44 Accordingly, we hold that the Carrier "probably resulted" standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a peti- 42 By our references to Winship, of course, we do not suggest that Schlup comes before a habeas court in the same situation as one who has merely been accused of a crime. Having been convicted by a jury of a capital offense, Schlup no longer has the benefit of the presumption of inno- cence. Cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S., at 399 (O'Connor, J., concurring). To the contrary, Schlup comes before the habeas court with a strong-and in the vast majority of the cases conclusive-presumption of guilt. Our reference to Winship is intended merely to demonstrate that it is quite consistent with our jurisprudence to give content through a burden of proof to the understanding that fundamental injustice would result from the erroneous conviction and execution of an innocent person. 43 See Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 342, n. 8, 349­350. 44 Nor do we believe that confining Sawyer's more rigorous standard to claims involving eligibility for the sentence of death is anomalous. Our recognition of the significant difference between the injustice that results from an erroneous conviction and the injustice that results from an errone- ous sentence is reflected in our decisions that permit reduced procedural protections at sentencing. See, e. g., Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 327 Opinion of the Court tioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of ac- tual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his constitutional claims. VI The Carrier standard requires the habeas petitioner to show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." 477 U. S., at 496. To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evi- dence. The petitioner thus is required to make a stronger showing than that needed to establish prejudice.45 At the same time, the showing of "more likely than not" imposes a lower burden of proof than the "clear and convincing" stand- ard required under Sawyer. The Carrier standard thus ensures that petitioner's case is truly "extraordinary," Mc- Cleskey, 499 U. S., at 494, while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest injustice. Carrier requires a petitioner to show that he is "actually innocent." As used in Carrier, actual innocence is closely related to the definition set forth by this Court in Sawyer. To satisfy the Carrier gateway standard, a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Several observations about this standard are in order. The Carrier standard is intended to focus the inquiry on actual innocence. In assessing the adequacy of petitioner's showing, therefore, the district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. Instead, the emphasis on "actual innocence" allows the reviewing tri- bunal also to consider the probative force of relevant evi- 45 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984); United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (Blackmun, J.); id., at 685 (White, J., concurring). 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT 328 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court dence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial. In- deed, with respect to this aspect of the Carrier standard, we believe that Judge Friendly's description of the inquiry is appropriate: The habeas court must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence "in light of all the evi- dence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial." 46 The consideration in federal habeas proceedings of a broader array of evidence does not modify the essential meaning of "innocence." The Carrier standard reflects the proposition, firmly established in our legal system, that the line between innocence and guilt is drawn with reference to a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). Indeed, even in Sawyer, with its emphasis on eligibility for the death penalty, the Court did not stray from the under- standing that the eligibility determination must be made with reference to reasonable doubt. Thus, whether a court is assessing eligibility for the death penalty under Sawyer, or is deciding whether a petitioner has made the requisite showing of innocence under Carrier, the analysis must incorporate the understanding that proof beyond a reason- able doubt marks the legal boundary between guilt and innocence.47 46 38 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 160. 47 Actual innocence, of course, does not require innocence in the broad sense of having led an entirely blameless life. Indeed, Schlup's situation provides a good illustration. At the time of the crime at issue in this case, Schlup was incarcerated for an earlier offense, the sordid details of which he acknowledged in his testimony at the punishment phase of his trial. Such earlier criminal activity has no bearing on whether Schlup is actually innocent of Dade's murder. As we have explained, supra, at 313­317, Schlup's claim of innocence is fundamentally different from the claim advanced in Herrera. The stand- ard that we apply today, therefore, will not foreclose the application of factual innocence to the analysis of such claims. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 329 Opinion of the Court The meaning of actual innocence as formulated by Sawyer and Carrier does not merely require a showing that a rea- sonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what rea- sonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a peti- tioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evi- dence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We note finally that the Carrier standard requires a peti- tioner to show that it is more likely than not that "no reason- able juror" would have convicted him. The word "reason- able" in that formulation is not without meaning. It must be presumed that a reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented. It must also be presumed that such a juror would conscientiously obey the instructions of the trial court requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.48 48 The Chief Justice suggests that the Carrier standard is "a classic mixing of apples and oranges." Post, at 339. That standard, however, is no more a mixing of apples and oranges than is the standard adopted by the Court in Sawyer. See Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 336 (requiring that peti- tioner show "by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty"). Though it is true that " `[m]ore likely than not' " is a "quintessential charge to a finder of fact," post, at 339, that is equally true of the "clear and convincing evidence" component of the Sawyer formulation. There is thus no reason to believe that the Carrier standard is any more likely than the Sawyer standard to be "a source of confusion." Post, at 339. Nor do we accept The Chief Justice's description of the Carrier standard as a "hybrid." Post, at 339. Finders of fact are often called upon to make predictions about the likely actions of hypothetical "reason- able" actors. Thus, the application of "more likely than not" to the habeas court's assessment of the actions of reasonable jurors is neither illogical nor unusual. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 330 SCHLUP v. DELO Opinion of the Court Though the Carrier standard requires a substantial show- ing, it is by no means equivalent to the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), that governs review of claims of insufficient evidence. The Jackson standard, which focuses on whether any rational juror could have convicted, looks to whether there is sufficient evidence which, if credited, could support the conviction. The Jack- son standard thus differs in at least two important ways from the Carrier standard. First, under Jackson, the as- sessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review. In contrast, under the gateway stand- ard we describe today, the newly presented evidence may indeed call into question the credibility of the witnesses pre- sented at trial. In such a case, the habeas court may have to make some credibility assessments. Second, and more fundamentally, the focus of the inquiry is different under Jackson than under Carrier. Under Jackson, the use of the word "could" focuses the inquiry on the power of the trier of fact to reach its conclusion. Under Carrier, the use of the word "would" focuses the inquiry on the likely behavior of the trier of fact. Indeed, our adoption of the phrase "more likely than not" reflects this distinction. Under Jackson, the question whether the trier of fact has power to make a finding of guilt requires a binary response: Either the trier of fact has power as a matter of law or it does not. Under Carrier, in contrast, the habeas court must consider what reasonable triers of fact are likely to do. Under this probabilistic in- quiry, it makes sense to have a probabilistic standard such as "more likely than not." 49 Thus, though under Jackson the mere existence of sufficient evidence to convict would be determinative of petitioner's claim, that is not true under Carrier. 49 The "clear and convincing" standard adopted in Sawyer reflects this same understanding of the relevant inquiry. 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 331 Opinion of the Court We believe that the Eighth Circuit's erroneous application of the Sawyer standard below illustrates this difference. In determining that Schlup had failed to satisfy the Sawyer standard, the majority noted that "two prison officials, who were eyewitnesses to the crime, positively identified Mr. Schlup as one of the three perpetrators of the murder. This evidence was clearly admissible and stands unrefuted except to the extent that Mr. Schlup now questions its credibility." 11 F. 3d, at 741. The majority then continued: "[E]ven if we disregard the source of the new evidence, the eleventh-hour nature of the information, and a pres- entation coming almost six years after the trial; it is simply not possible to say that the appellant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitu- tional error no reasonable jury would have found him guilty." Ibid. However, Schlup's evidence includes the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses that Schlup was not involved in the crime. Moreover, Schlup has presented statements from Green and Faherty that cast doubt on whether Schlup could have participated in the murder and still arrived at the din- ing room 65 seconds before the distress call was received. Those new statements may, of course, be unreliable. But if they are true-as the Court of Appeals assumed for the pur- pose of applying its understanding of the Sawyer standard- it surely cannot be said that a juror, conscientiously following the judge's instructions requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would vote to convict. Under a proper application of either Sawyer or Carrier, petitioner's showing of innocence is not insufficient solely because the trial record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. In this case, the application of the Carrier standard arises in the context of a request for an evidentiary hearing. In applying the Carrier standard to such a request, the District 513us2$19I 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 332 SCHLUP v. DELO O'Connor, J., concurring Court must assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial. Obviously, the court is not required to test the new evidence by a standard appropriate for deciding a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Agosto v. INS, 436 U. S. 748, 756 (1978) ("[A] district court generally cannot grant summary judgment based on its assessment of the credibility of the evidence presented"); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 249 (1986) ("[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and de- termine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial"). Instead, the court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence. Because both the Court of Appeals and the District Court evaluated the record under an improper standard, further proceedings are necessary. The fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, together with the District Court's ability to take tes- timony from the few key witnesses if it deems that course advisable, convinces us that the most expeditious procedure is to order that the decision of the Court of Appeals be va- cated and that the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, concurring. I write to explain, in light of the dissenting opinions, what I understand the Court to decide and what it does not. The Court holds that, in order to have an abusive or successive habeas claim heard on the merits, a petitioner who cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" in light of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Ante, at 327. This standard is 513us2$19J 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 333 O'Connor, J., concurring higher than that required for prejudice, which requires only "a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (1984). Instead, a petitioner does not pass through the gateway erected by Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986), if the district court believes it more likely than not that there is any juror who, acting reasonably, would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And the Court's standard, which focuses the inquiry on the likely behavior of jurors, is substantively different from the ra- tionality standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979). Jackson, which emphasizes the authority of the fact- finder to make conclusions from the evidence, establishes a standard of review for the sufficiency of record evidence-a standard that would be ill suited as a burden of proof, see Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 624­626 (1993). The Court today does not sow confusion in the law. Rather, it properly balances the dictates of justice with the need to ensure that the actual innocence exception remains only a " `safety valve' for the `extraordinary case,' " Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, the Court does not, and need not, decide whether the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is a discretionary remedy. It is a paradigmatic abuse of dis- cretion for a court to base its judgment on an erroneous view of the law. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990). Having decided that the district court com- mitted legal error, and thus abused its discretion, by relying on Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992), instead of Mur- ray v. Carrier, supra, the Court need not decide the ques- tion-neither argued by the parties nor passed upon by the Court of Appeals-whether abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review. In reversing the judgment of the Court 513us2$19J 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 334 SCHLUP v. DELO Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting of Appeals, therefore, the Court does not disturb the tradi- tional discretion of district courts in this area, nor does it speak to the standard of appellate review for such judgments. With these observations, I join the Court's opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Ken- nedy and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. The Court decides that the threshold standard for a show- ing of "actual innocence" in a successive or abusive habeas petition is that set forth in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986), rather than that set forth in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992). For reasons which I later set out, I believe the Sawyer standard should be applied to claims of guilt or innocence as well as to challenges to a petitioner's sentence. But, more importantly, I believe the Court's exegesis of the Carrier standard both waters down the standard suggested in that case, and will inevitably create confusion in the lower courts. On February 3, 1984, three white inmates attacked and killed a black inmate named Arthur Dade. At trial, testi- mony by Sergeant Roger Flowers and Officer John Maylee indicated that inmate Rodnie Stewart threw a container of steaming liquid into Dade's face, petitioner jumped on Dade's back rendering him defenseless, and inmate Robert O'Neal proceeded to stab Dade to death. Petitioner's trial counsel attempted to discredit both eyewitness identifications. As to Sergeant Flowers, counsel argued that Flowers had brought a visitor into petitioner's cell less than an hour be- fore the stabbing, and, therefore, Flowers had Schlup "on the brain." Trial Tr. 493­494. Trial counsel attempted to dis- credit Officer Maylee's identification by arguing that Maylee was too far from the scene to properly view the incident. Through discovery, petitioner's trial counsel uncovered a videotape in which petitioner is the first inmate to enter the cafeteria. One minute and five seconds after petitioner 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 335 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting enters the cafeteria, a group of guards run out in appar- ent response to a distress call. Twenty-six seconds later, O'Neal is seen entering the cafeteria. Petitioner's trial counsel argued that the videotape established that petitioner could not have committed the murder because there was in- sufficient time for him to commit the crime and arrive at the cafeteria one minute and five seconds prior to the distress call. Petitioner's trial counsel also presented two alibi wit- nesses who testified that petitioner had walked in front of them to the cafeteria without incident. The jury considered this conflicting evidence, determined that petitioner's story was not credible, and convicted him of capital murder. During the sentencing component of trial, the prosecution presented evidence that there were two stat- utory aggravating factors that warranted imposition of the death penalty: petitioner committed the murder in a place of lawful confinement, and petitioner had a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. As to the second aggravating factor, the prosecution presented testimony that for two weeks, petitioner had brutally beaten, tortured, and sodomized a cellmate in a county jail. The prosecution also presented testimony that petitioner was convicted of aggra- vated assault for slitting a cellmate's throat. On cross- examination, petitioner presented his version of the prior incidents. The jury considered this evidence, rejected peti- tioner's story, and returned a sentence of death. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed petition- er's conviction and death sentence. Petitioner then filed state collateral proceedings claiming, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present additional alibi witnesses and for failing to investigate fully the circumstances of the murder. The Missouri Circuit Court determined that petitioner's counsel provided effec- tive assistance of counsel. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 336 SCHLUP v. DELO Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting Petitioner then filed his first federal habeas petition claim- ing that his trial counsel was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Though he previously refused to identify Randy Jordan as the alleged third participant in the murder, petitioner faulted his trial counsel for failing to call Randy Jordan as a witness.1 The District Court denied re- lief. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded on the merits that petitioner's trial counsel had not been ineffective at the guilt or penalty phases of trial.2 Petitioner sought review of the panel's decision by the en banc court. No Eighth Circuit judge questioned the panel's conclusion that petitioner's trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of trial. Petitioner filed a second federal habeas petition, again claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Petitioner supplemented this filing with an affidavit from a former inmate, John Green. Green's affidavit related to the timing of the distress call. In his most recent statement, Green swore that Ser- geant Flowers "was on his way to break up the fight when he told me to call base. I immediately went into the office, picked up the phone, and called base." App. 122.3 Under 1 The Missouri Circuit Court found that "[d]efense counsel did not inter- view Randy Jordan, whom Petitioner now alleges was the third participant in the murder with which the Petitioner was charged, because the Peti- tioner while maintaining someone else committed the acts attributed to him, refused to give the name of that person to his counsel." Schlup v. Delo, Respondent's Exhibit J, pp. 49­50. 2 Senior Circuit Judge Heaney took issue only with the majority's conclu- sion that petitioner's trial counsel had rendered effective assistance at the penalty phase of trial. Cf. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F. 2d 631, 642 (1991) ("I disagree with the court's conclusion that Schlup was not prejudiced by his counsel's ineffectiveness during the penalty phase") (dissenting opinion). 3 On the day of the incident Green told prison investigators that he had not observed the murder. At Stewart's trial, while under oath, Green testified that he saw no actual fight take place and made no mention of his call to base. App. 140. Green now also swears that he "called base . . . within seconds of Dade hitting the ground." Id., at 123. 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 337 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting this timing sequence, petitioner submitted that he "ha[d] produced proof, which could not have been fabricated, that the call to which the guards [in the cafeteria] responded came seconds after the stabbing." Id., at 100­101. Fur- ther, petitioner claimed that "Green's testimony thus makes it impossible, under any view of the evidence, for Schlup to have participated in Dade's murder: for thirty seconds to a minute before the distress call, the videotape plainly shows Lloyd Schlup in the prison dining room, quietly getting his lunch." Brief for Petitioner 12. Thus, petitioner's claim of "actual innocence" depends, in part, on the assumption that the officers in the cafeteria responded to Green's distress call "within seconds" of Dade hitting the ground.4 The District Court denied petitioner's second habeas peti- tion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. While on appeal, petitioner supplemented his habeas petition with an additional affidavit from Robert Faherty, a former prison guard who previously testified at petitioner's trial. A di- vided panel of the Eighth Circuit applied the Sawyer stand- ard to petitioner's gateway claim of "actual innocence" and determined that petitioner failed to meet that standard. The Eighth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari to determine when, absent a showing of cause 4 One problem with this theory is that O'Neal, an undisputed participant in the murder, entered the cafeteria 26 seconds after the guards responded to the distress call. As respondent explained at oral argument: "[I]f you believe that [Green] radioed in immediately upon the time of the body falling . . . then you look at the videotape, and there is only 26 seconds between the time that that call was supposedly made by Green and the time that O'Neal comes into the cafeteria downstairs, and all of the evi- dence in this case shows it's impossible for O'Neal, the admitted murderer . . . to have run down, . . . broken a window, thrown the knife out the window, come back, washed his hands . . . and go[ne] down to the cafeteria, if you hold Green's present statement as controlling, the murder never occurred." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30­31 (emphasis added). Thus, as the Court acknowledges, ante, at 308, n. 17, there was a delay between the time of the murder and the time that the guards in the cafeteria responded to the distress call. 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 338 SCHLUP v. DELO Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting and prejudice, a district court may consider the merits of an abusive or successive habeas petition. 511 U. S. 1003 (1994). In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 (1986), the Court examined when a federal court could entertain a successive habeas petition. A plurality of the Court determined that the " `ends of justice' " required a district court to entertain the merits of an otherwise defaulted petition where the prisoner supplemented his constitutional claim with a show- ing of factual innocence. Id., at 454. After citing Judge Friendly's definition of factual innocence, the plurality summarily determined that the District Court should not have entertained Wilson's petition because the evidence of guilt in his case had been " `nearly overwhelming.' " Id., at 455. In Carrier, the Court determined that a federal court could not review a procedurally defaulted habeas petition un- less the petitioner demonstrated both cause for the default as well as prejudice resulting from the constitutional error. 477 U. S., at 492.5 The Carrier Court, however, left open the possibility that in a truly extraordinary case, a federal habeas court might excuse a failure to establish cause and prejudice where " `a constitutional violation has probably re- sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.' " Ante, at 327, quoting 477 U. S., at 496 (emphasis added). In Sawyer, we described in some detail the showing of actual innocence required when a habeas petitioner brings an otherwise abusive, successive, or procedurally defaulted claim challenging the imposition of his death sentence, rather than his guilt of the crime. 505 U. S., at 339­347. There the Court emphasized that innocence of the death penalty, 5 The Court explicitly rejected the contention that "cause need not be shown if actual prejudice is shown," even where the constitutional claims "call[ed] into question the reliability of an adjudication of legal guilt." 477 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 129 (1982). 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 339 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting like its " `actual innocence' " counterpart, is "a very narrow exception," and that in order to be "workable it must be subject to determination by relatively objective standards." Id., at 341. Thus, we concluded that a habeas petitioner who challenged his sentence in an otherwise defaulted peti- tion must show "by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would [have found the petitioner] eligible for the death penalty." Id., at 348. We have never until today had to similarly flesh out the standard of "actual innocence" in the context of a habeas petitioner claiming innocence of the crime. Thus, I agree that the question of what threshold standard should govern is an open one. As I have said earlier, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Carrier, and not Sawyer, provides the proper standard. But far more troubling than the choice of Carrier over Sawyer is the watered down and confusing version of Carrier which is served up by the Court. As the Court notes, to satisfy Carrier a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that " `a constitutional violation has prob- ably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually inno- cent.' " Ante, at 327 (quoting Carrier, supra, at 496). The Court informs us that a showing of "actual innocence" re- quires a habeas petitioner to "show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence." Ante, at 327. But this is a classic mixing of apples and oranges. "More likely than not" is a quintessential charge to a finder of fact, while "no rea- sonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence" is an equally quintessential conclusion of law similar to the standard that courts constantly employ in de- ciding motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases. The hybrid which the Court serves up is bound to be a source of confusion. Because new evidence not presented at trial will almost always be involved in these claims of actual inno- cence, the legal standard for judgment of acquittal cannot 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 340 SCHLUP v. DELO Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting be bodily transposed for the determination of "actual inno- cence," but the sensible course would be to modify that famil- iar standard, see infra, at 341­342, rather than to create a confusing hybrid. In the course of elaborating the Carrier standard, the Court takes pains to point out that it differs from the stand- ard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), for review of the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the con- stitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Jackson, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose- cution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen- tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., at 319. This standard requires a solely retrospective analy- sis of the evidence considered by the jury and reflects a healthy respect for the trier of fact's "responsibility . . . to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Ibid. The Court fails to acknowledge expressly the similarities between the standard it has adopted and the Jackson stand- ard. A habeas court reviewing a claim of actual innocence does not write on a clean slate. Cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983) ("Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials"); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 416 (1993) ("[I]n state criminal proceedings the trial is the paramount event for determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant"); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90 (1977) ("Society's resources have been concentrated at [the state trial] in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens"). Therefore, as the Court acknowledges, a petitioner making a claim of actual innocence under Carrier falls short of satisfy- ing his burden if the reviewing court determines that any juror reasonably would have found petitioner guilty of the crime. See ante, at 329; cf. Jackson, supra, at 318­319. 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 341 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting The situation presented by a claim of actual innocence in a federal habeas petition is obviously different from that pre- sented in Jackson because the habeas court analyzing an "ac- tual innocence" claim is faced with a body of evidence that has been supplemented since the original trial. The review- ing court must somehow predict the effect that this new evi- dence would have had on the deliberations of reasonable ju- rors. It must necessarily weigh this new evidence in some manner, and may need to make credibility determinations as to witnesses who did not appear before the original jury. This new evidence, however, is not a license for the review- ing court to disregard the presumptively proper determina- tion by the original trier of fact. I think the standard enunciated in Jackson, properly modi- fied because of the different body of evidence that must be considered, faithfully reflects the language used in Carrier. The habeas judge should initially consider the motion on the basis of the written submissions made by the parties. As the Court suggests, habeas courts will be able to resolve the great majority of "actual innocence" claims routinely without any evidentiary hearing. See ante, at 324. This fact is im- portant because, as we noted in Sawyer: "In the every day context of capital penalty proceedings, a federal district judge typically will be presented with a successive or abu- sive habeas petition a few days before, or even on the day of, a scheduled execution, and will have only a limited time to determine whether a petitioner has shown that his case falls within the `actual innocence' exception if such a claim is made." 505 U. S., at 341 (footnote omitted). But in the highly unusual case where the district court believes on the basis of written submissions that the neces- sary showing of "actual innocence" may be made out, it should conduct a limited evidentiary hearing at which the affiants whose testimony the court believes to be crucial to the showing of actual innocence are present and may be cross-examined as to veracity, reliability, and all of the other 513us2$19H 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 342 SCHLUP v. DELO Scalia, J., dissenting elements that affect the weight to be given the testimony of a witness. After such a hearing, the district court would be in as good a position as possible to make the required determination as to the showing of actual innocence. The present state of our habeas jurisprudence is less than ideal in its complexity, but today's decision needlessly adds to that complexity. I believe that by adopting the Sawyer standard both for attacks on the sentence and on the judg- ment of conviction, we would take a step in the direction of simplifying this jurisprudence. See Keeney v. Tamayo- Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 10 (1992) (noting the importance of uni- formity in the law of habeas corpus). The Sawyer standard strikes the proper balance among the State's interest in fi- nality, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 491­492 (1991), the federal courts' respect for principles of federalism, see, e. g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion), and "the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side-a sufficient showing of actual innocence," Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 700 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent- ing in part). The Court of Appeals fully analyzed petition- er's new evidence and determined that petitioner fell way short of " `showing by clear and convincing evidence [that] no reasonable juror would find him [guilty of murder].' " 11 F. 3d 738, 743 (CA8 1993) (quoting Sawyer, supra, at 348). I agree and therefore would affirm. But if we are to adopt the Carrier standard, it should not be the confusing exegesis of that standard contained in the Court's opinion. It should be based on a modified version of Jackson v. Virginia, with a clearly defined area in which the district court may exercise its discretion to hold an eviden- tiary hearing. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. A federal statute entitled "Finality of Determination"-to be found at § 2244 of Title 28 of the United States Code- 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 343 Scalia, J., dissenting specifically addresses the problem of second and subsequent petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. The reader of to- day's opinion will be unencumbered with knowledge of this law, since it is not there discussed or quoted, and indeed is only cited en passant. See ante, at 318, 320. Rather than asking what the statute says, or even what we have said the statute says, the Court asks only what is the fairest standard to apply, and answers that question by looking to the various semiconsistent standards articulated in our most recent de- cisions-minutely parsing phrases, and seeking shades of meaning in the interstices of sentences and words, as though a discursive judicial opinion were a statute. I would pro- ceed differently. Within the very broad limits set by the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, the federal writ of habeas corpus is governed by statute. Section 2244 controls this case; the disposition it announces is plain enough, and our decisions contain nothing that would justify departure from that plain meaning. Section 2244(b) provides: "When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an appli- cation for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent applica- tion for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the ap- plication alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier ap- plication for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 344 SCHLUP v. DELO Scalia, J., dissenting A long sentence, but not a difficult one. A federal district court that receives a second or subsequent petition for the writ of habeas corpus, when a prior petition has been denied on the merits, "need not . . . entertai[n]" (i. e., may dismiss) the petition unless it is neither (to use our shorthand terminology) successive nor abusive. See also Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) ("A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief . . ."). Today, however, the Court obliquely but unmistakably pronounces that a succes- sive or abusive petition must be entertained and may not be dismissed so long as the petitioner makes a sufficiently persuasive showing that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" has occurred. Ante, at 316 ("[I]f a petitioner such as Schlup presents [adequate] evidence of innocence . . . the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits"); ante, at 319­321.1 That conclusion flatly contradicts the statute, and is not required by our precedent. Our earliest cases, from an era before Congress legislated rules to govern the finality of habeas adjudication, held that successive or abusive petitions were "to be disposed of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought," and that when weighing those considerations the district court could give "controlling weight" to "a prior refusal to discharge on a like application." Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 231 (1924) (successive peti- 1 The claim that "the Court does not, and need not, decide whether the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is a discretionary remedy," ante, at 333 (O'Connor, J., concurring), is not in my view an accurate description of what the Court's opinion says. Of course the concurrence's merely making the claim causes it to be an accurate description of what the Court today holds, since the narrower ground taken by one of the Justices comprising a five-Justice majority becomes the law. Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 345 Scalia, J., dissenting tion); see also Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U. S. 239, 240­ 241 (1924) (abusive petition). In Salinger the Court par- ticularly noted: "Here the prior refusal to discharge [the prisoner] was by a court of coordinate jurisdiction and was affirmed in a considered opinion by a Circuit Court of Ap- peals. Had the District Court disposed of the later applica- tions on that ground, its discretion would have been well exercised and we should sustain its action without saying more." 265 U. S., at 232. Section 2244 is no more and no less than a codification of this approach. It is one of the disheartening ironies of today's decision that the Court not merely disregards a statute, but in doing so denies district judges the very discretion that the Court itself freely en- trusted to them before Congress spoke. In 1948 Congress for the first time addressed the problem of repetitive petitions by enacting the predecessor of the current § 2244, which provided as follows: "No circuit or district judge shall be required to enter- tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States, or of any State, if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior appli- cation for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition pre- sents no new ground not theretofore presented and de- termined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964 ed.) (emphasis added). This provision was construed in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), and (with unimpeachable logic) was held to mean that "[c]ontrolling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus [under 28 U. S. C. § 2254] only if (1) the same ground presented in the subse- quent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 346 SCHLUP v. DELO Scalia, J., dissenting the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." Id., at 15. Thus, there appeared for the first time in our deci- sions the notion that a habeas court has "the duty" to reach the merits of a subsequent petition "if the ends of justice demand," id., at 18­19-and it appeared for the perfectly good reason that the statute, as then written, imposed such a duty. And even as to that duty the Sanders Court added a "final qualification" that the Court today would do well to remember: "The principles governing . . . denial of a hearing on a successive application are addressed to the sound discre- tion of the federal trial judges. Theirs is the major re- sponsibility for the just and sound administration of the federal collateral remedies, and theirs must be the judg- ment as to whether a second or successive application shall be denied without consideration of the merits." Id., at 18. Three years after Sanders, however, Congress amended § 2244 to establish different finality rules for federal prisoner petitions (filed under § 2255) and state prisoner petitions (filed under § 2254). Section 2244(a), which addresses peti- tions by federal prisoners, retains the "ends of justice" pro- viso from the old statute; but § 2244(b) omits it, thus restrict- ing the district courts' obligation to entertain petitions by state prisoners to cases where the petition is neither succes- sive nor abusive. One might have expected that this not- so-subtle change in the statute would change our interpreta- tion of it, and that we would modify Sanders by holding that a district court could exercise its discretion to give control- ling weight to the prior denial-which was of course pre- cisely what Salinger envisioned. Yet when the new version of § 2244(b) was first construed, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 (1986), a plurality of the Court announced that it would "continue to rely on the 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 347 Scalia, J., dissenting reference in Sanders to the `ends of justice,' " 477 U. S., at 451, and concluded that "the `ends of justice' require federal courts to entertain [successive] petitions only where the pris- oner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence." Id., at 454. That conclusion contains two complementary propositions. The first is that a habeas court may not reach the merits of a barred claim unless actual innocence is shown; this was the actual judg- ment of the opinion (one cannot say the holding, since the opinion was a mere plurality). See id., at 455 (stating that the District Court and Court of Appeals should have dis- missed the successive petition because the petitioner's claim of innocence was meritless). The second is that a habeas court must hear a claim of actual innocence and reach the merits of the petition if the claim is sufficiently persuasive; this was the purest dictum. It is the Court's prerogative to adopt that dictum today, but to adopt it without analysis, as though it were binding precedent, will not do. The Kuhl- mann plurality opinion lacks formal status as authority, and, as discussed below, no holding of this Court binds us to it. A decision to follow it must be justified by reason, not simply asserted by will. And if reasons are to be given, justification of the Kuhl- mann opinion will be found difficult indeed. The plurality's central theory is that "the permissive language of § 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain successive peti- tions under some circumstances," so that "[u]nless [the] `rare instances' [in which successive petitions will be entertained] are to be identified by whim or caprice, district judges must be given guidance for determining when to exercise the lim- ited discretion granted them by § 2244(b)." See 477 U. S., at 451. What the plurality then proceeds to do, however, is not to "guide" the discretion, but to eliminate it entirely, dividing the entire universe of successive and abusive petitions into those that must not be entertained (where there is no show- ing of innocence) and those that must be entertained (where 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 348 SCHLUP v. DELO Scalia, J., dissenting there is such a showing). This converts a statute redolent of permissiveness ("need not entertain") into a rigid command.2 The Kuhlmann plurality's concern about caprice is met- as it is met for all decisions committed by law to the discre- tion of lower courts-by applying traditional "abuse-of- discretion" standards. A judge who dismisses a successive petition because he misconceives some question of law, be- cause he detests the petitioner's religion, or because he would rather play golf, may be reversed. A judge who dis- misses a successive petition because it is the petitioner's twenty-second, rather than his second, because its "only pur- pose is to vex, harass, or delay," Sanders, supra, at 18, or because the constitutional claims can be seen to be frivolous on the face of the papers-for any of the numerous considera- tions that have "a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought," Salinger, 265 U. S., at 231 (emphasis added)-may not be commanded to reach the merits because "the ends of justice" require. Here as elsewhere in the law, to say that a district judge may not abuse his discretion is merely to say that the action in question (dismissing a suc- cessive petition) may not be done without considering rele- vant factors and giving a "justifying reason," Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182 (1962). See also American Dredg- ing Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 455 (1994). It is a failure of logic, and an arrogation of authority, to "guide" that discre- tion by holding that what Congress authorized the district court to do may not be done at all. The Court's assumption that the requirement imposed by the Kuhlmann plurality should be taken as law can find no support in our subsequent decisions. To be sure, some cases restate the supposed duty in the course of historical surveys of the area. See, e. g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 2 The present case does not, of course, present the question whether the Kuhlmann plurality was wrong to identify a category of petitions that must not be entertained-a disposition that is at least compatible with the text of § 2244(b). 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 349 Scalia, J., dissenting 467, 495 (1991) ("Kuhlmann . . . required federal courts to entertain successive petitions when a petitioner supple- ments a constitutional claim with a `colorable showing of factual innocence' "). But if we are to lavish upon the ver- biage of our opinions the detailed attention more appropri- ately reserved for the statute itself, more of the cases (and some of the same cases) have described the miscarriage-of- justice doctrine as a rule of permission rather than a rule of obligation. See, e. g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333, 339 (1992) ("[Kuhlmann held that] the miscarriage of justice ex- ception would allow successive claims to be heard"); Mc- Cleskey, 499 U. S., at 494 ("Federal courts retain the author- ity to issue the writ [in cases of fundamental miscarriage of justice]"); id., at 494­495 ("If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may none- theless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim"); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 496 (1986) ("[W]here a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal ha- beas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a show- ing of cause for the procedural default") (emphasis added in all quotations). Of course the latter cases provide as much or as little au- thority for the right reading of the statute as the former provide for the wrong reading. The truth is that there is simply nothing in this scattering of phrases, this handful of silences and assumptions, by which even the conscience most scrupulous in matters of stare decisis could count itself bound either way; for in no case after Kuhlmann has the question whether § 2244(b) creates an obligation to entertain successive or abusive petitions been necessary to the deci- sion. In both Sawyer and McCleskey the Court affirmed the judgments of lower courts that had dismissed the petition. See Sawyer, supra, at 338; McCleskey, supra, at 503. Those decisions could not, and did not, announce as a 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT 350 SCHLUP v. DELO Scalia, J., dissenting holding that refusal to entertain a petition can be revers- ible error. Rather than advancing a different reading of the statute, the Court gives in essence only one response to all of this: that the law of federal habeas corpus is a product of "the interplay between statutory language and judicially man- aged equitable considerations." Ante, at 319, n. 35. This sort of vague talk might mean one of two things, the first inadequate, the second unconstitutional. It might mean that the habeas corpus statute is riddled with gaps and ambigu- ities that we have traditionally filled or clarified by a process of statutory interpretation that shades easily into a sort of federal common law. See, e. g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633 (1993). That is true enough. There assuredly are, however, many legal questions on which the habeas cor- pus statute is neither silent nor ambiguous; and unless the question in this case is one on which the statute is silent or ambiguous (in which event the Court should explain why that is so), the response is irrelevant. On the other hand, the Court's response might mean something altogether dif- ferent and more alarming: that even where the habeas stat- ute does speak clearly to the question at hand, it is but one "consideratio[n]," ante, at 319, n. 35, relevant to resolution of that question. Given that federal courts have no inherent power to issue the writ, Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94­95 (1807), that response would be unconstitutional. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. There is thus no route of escape from the Court's duty to confront the statute today. I would say, as the statute does, that habeas courts need not entertain successive or abusive petitions. The courts whose decisions we review declined to entertain the petition, and I find no abuse of discretion in the record. (I agree with The Chief Justice that they were correct to use Sawyer v. Whitley, supra, as the legal standard for determining claims of actual innocence. See 513us2$19K 04-09-98 16:25:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995) 351 Scalia, J., dissenting ante, at 334.) 3 Therefore, "we should sustain [their] action without saying more." Salinger, 265 U. S., at 232. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 3 Even if they were wrong in that, it would not be correct to conclude that the judgment must necessarily be reversed. See ante, at 333­334 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Our habeas cases have not so held. See Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U. S. 239, 241 (1924) (affirming even though "the courts below erred in applying the inflexible doctrine of res judicata" to dismiss an abusive petition, because "it does not follow that the judgment should be reversed; for it plainly appears that the situation was one where, according to a sound judicial discretion, controlling weight must have been given to the prior refusal"). 513us2$20Z 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT 352 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 93­1543. Argued November 2, 1994-Decided January 23, 1995 Alleging that her discharge by respondent Nashville Banner Publishing Company violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), petitioner McKennon filed suit seeking a variety of legal and equitable remedies available under the ADEA, including backpay. After she admitted in her deposition that she had copied several of the Banner's confidential documents during her final year of employment, the District Court granted summary judgment for the company, holding that McKennon's misconduct was grounds for her termination and that neither backpay nor any other remedy was available to her under the ADEA. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same rationale. Held: An employee discharged in violation of the ADEA is not barred from all relief when, after her discharge, her employer discovers evi- dence of wrongdoing that, in any event, would have led to her termina- tion on lawful and legitimate grounds had the employer known of it. Pp. 356­363. (a) Such after-acquired evidence is not a complete bar to ADEA recovery. Even if the employee's misconduct may be considered to be supervening grounds for termination, the ADEA violation that prompted the discharge cannot be altogether disregarded. The Act's remedial provisions, 29 U. S. C. § 626(b); see also § 216(b), are designed both to compensate employees for injuries caused by prohibited dis- crimination and to deter employers from engaging in such discrim- ination. The private litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both of these objectives, and it would not accord with this scheme if after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing barred all relief. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 284­287, distinguished. Pp. 356­360. (b) Nevertheless, after-acquired evidence of the employee's wrongdo- ing must be taken into account in determining the specific remedy, lest the employer's legitimate concerns be ignored. Because the ADEA simply prohibits discrimination, and does not constrain employers from exercising significant other prerogatives and discretions in the usual course of hiring, promoting, and discharging employees, employee wrongdoing is relevant in taking due account of such lawful preroga- 513us2$20Z 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 352 (1995) 353 Syllabus tives and the employer's corresponding equities arising from the wrong- doing. Pp. 360­361. (c) The proper boundaries of remedial relief in cases of this type must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. However, as a general rule, nei- ther reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy. It would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds. The proper measure of backpay presents a more difficult problem. Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, it cannot be re- quired to ignore the information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if it might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. The beginning point in formulating a remedy should therefore be calculation of backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered. The court can also consider any extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party. Pp. 361­362. (d) Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone had the employer known of it at the time of the discharge. The concern that employers might routinely undertake extensive dis- covery into an employee's background or job performance to resist ADEA claims is not insubstantial, but the courts' authority to award attorney's fees under §§ 216(b) and 626(b) and to invoke the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will likely deter most abuses. Pp. 362­363. 9 F. 3d 539, reversed and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Michael E. Terry argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Eric Schnapper. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Kent L. Jones, Dennis J. Dimsey, Mark L. Gross, James R. Neely, Jr., Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Carolyn L. Wheeler. 513us2$20Z 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT 354 McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO. Opinion of the Court R. Eddie Wayland argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Elizabeth B. Marney.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether an employee discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is barred from all relief when, after her discharge, the employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing that, in any event, would have led to the employee's termination on law- ful and legitimate grounds. I For some 30 years, petitioner Christine McKennon worked for respondent Nashville Banner Publishing Company. She was discharged, the Banner claimed, as part of a work force reduction plan necessitated by cost considerations. McKen- non, who was 62 years old when she lost her job, thought another reason explained her dismissal: her age. She filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle Dis- trict of Tennessee, alleging that her discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1988 *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by William F. Sheehan, Steven R. Shapiro, Helen Hersh- koff, Michael A. Cooper, Norman Redlich, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Sharon R. Vinick, and Cathy Ventrell-Monsees; and for the Women's Legal Defense Fund et al. by Judith L. Lichtman and Donna R. Lenhoff. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Zachary D. Fasman, Charles A. Sha- nor, Kelly J. Koelker, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Douglas S. McDowell, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Lee T. Paterson, Dwight H. Vincent, John F. Sturm, Rene´ P. Milam, and Peter G. Stone. Jeffrey Robert White, Nancy Erika Smith, and Neil Mullin filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as amici curiae. 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 352 (1995) 355 Opinion of the Court ed. and Supp. V). The ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer: "to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). McKennon sought a variety of legal and equitable reme- dies available under the ADEA, including backpay. App. 10a­11a. In preparation of the case, the Banner took McKennon's deposition. She testified that, during her final year of em- ployment, she had copied several confidential documents bearing upon the company's financial condition. She had ac- cess to these records as secretary to the Banner's comptrol- ler. McKennon took the copies home and showed them to her husband. Her motivation, she averred, was an appre- hension she was about to be fired because of her age. When she became concerned about her job, she removed and copied the documents for "insurance" and "protection." Deposi- tion, Dec. 18, 1991, Record, Docket Entry No. 39, Vol. 2, p. 241. A few days after these deposition disclosures, the Banner sent McKennon a letter declaring that removal and copying of the records was in violation of her job responsibil- ities and advising her (again) that she was terminated. The Banner's letter also recited that had it known of McKennon's misconduct it would have discharged her at once for that reason. For purposes of summary judgment, the Banner conceded its discrimination against McKennon. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Banner, holding that McKennon's misconduct was grounds for her termination and that neither backpay nor any other remedy was available to her under the ADEA. 797 F. Supp. 604 (MD Tenn. 1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same rationale. 9 F. 3d 539 (1993). We 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT 356 McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO. Opinion of the Court granted certiorari, 511 U. S. 1106 (1994), to resolve conflict- ing views among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether all relief must be denied when an employee has been discharged in violation of the ADEA and the employer later discovers some wrongful conduct that would have led to dis- charge if it had been discovered earlier. Compare Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F. 3d 1403 (CA8 1994); O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F. 3d 176 (CA10 1994); 9 F. 3d 539 (CA6 1993) (case below); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F. 2d 250 (CA7 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F. 2d 409 (CA6 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F. 2d 700 (CA10 1988); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F. 2d 614 (CA4), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 832 (1984), with Mardell v. Har- leysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F. 3d 1221 (CA3 1994); Kristufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co., Toastmaster Div., 985 F. 2d 364 (CA7 1993); Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F. 2d 1174 (CA11 1992), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 32 F. 3d 1489 (1994). We now reverse. II We shall assume, as summary judgment procedures re- quire us to assume, that the sole reason for McKennon's ini- tial discharge was her age, a discharge violative of the ADEA. Our further premise is that the misconduct re- vealed by the deposition was so grave that McKennon's im- mediate discharge would have followed its disclosure in any event. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found no basis for contesting that proposition, and for purposes of our review we need not question it here. We do question the legal conclusion reached by those courts that after- acquired evidence of wrongdoing which would have resulted in discharge bars employees from any relief under the ADEA. That ruling is incorrect. The Court of Appeals considered McKennon's misconduct, in effect, to be supervening grounds for termination. That 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 352 (1995) 357 Opinion of the Court may be so, but it does not follow, as the Court of Appeals said in citing one of its own earlier cases, that the misconduct renders it " `irrelevant whether or not [McKennon] was dis- criminated against.' " 9 F. 3d, at 542, quoting Milligan- Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F. 2d 302, 305 (CA6 1992), cert. granted, 509 U. S. 943, cert. dism'd, 509 U. S. 903 (1993). We conclude that a violation of the ADEA cannot be so altogether disregarded. The ADEA, enacted in 1967 as part of an ongoing congres- sional effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, re- flects a societal condemnation of invidious bias in employ- ment decisions. The ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (race, color, sex, na- tional origin, and religion); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V) (disability); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a) (union activities); the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d) (sex). The ADEA incorporates some fea- tures of both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which has led us to describe it as "something of a hy- brid." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 578 (1978). The substantive, antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon the prohibitions of Title VII. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985); Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 584. Its remedial provisions incorporate by reference the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). When con- fronted with a violation of the ADEA, a district court is au- thorized to afford relief by means of reinstatement, backpay, injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and attorney's fees. Ibid.; see also Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 584. In the case of a willful violation of the Act, the ADEA authorizes an award of liquidated damages equal to the backpay award. 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). The Act also gives federal courts the 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT 358 McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO. Opinion of the Court discretion to "grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]." Ibid. The ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a common purpose: "the elimination of discrimination in the workplace." Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 756 (1979). Congress designed the remedial measures in these statutes to serve as a "spur or catalyst" to cause employers "to self-examine and to self- evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to elim- inate, so far as possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417­418 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976). Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensation for injuries caused by the prohibited discrimination is another. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 418; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra, at 763­764. The ADEA, in keeping with these purposes, contains a vital ele- ment found in both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act: It grants an injured employee a right of action to obtain the authorized relief. 29 U. S. C. § 626(c). The private liti- gant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives of the ADEA. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 45 (1974) ("[T]he private litigant [in Title VII] not only re- dresses his own injury but also vindicates the important con- gressional policy against discriminatory employment prac- tices"); see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 364 (1977). It would not accord with this scheme if after- acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operates, in every instance, to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the Act. The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee establishes that an employer has discrimi- nated against him or her. The disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that violate national policies re- 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 352 (1995) 359 Opinion of the Court specting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself impor- tant, for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the Act's operation or entrenched resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one measure of the success of the Act. The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon two of its earlier decisions, Johnson v. Honeywell Information Sys- tems, Inc., 955 F. 2d 409 (CA6 1992); Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F. 2d 302 (CA6 1992), and the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F. 2d 700 (1988). Consulting those authorities, it declared that it had "firmly endorsed the principle that after-acquired evidence is a complete bar to any recovery by the former employee where the employer can show it would have fired the employee on the basis of the evidence." 9 F. 3d, at 542. Summers, in turn, relied upon our decision in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), but that deci- sion is inapplicable here. In Mt. Healthy we addressed a mixed-motives case, in which two motives were said to be operative in the employ- er's decision to fire an employee. One was lawful, the other (an alleged constitutional violation) unlawful. We held that if the lawful reason alone would have sufficed to justify the firing, the employee could not prevail in a suit against the employer. The case was controlled by the difficulty, and what we thought was the lack of necessity, of disentangling the proper motive from the improper one where both played a part in the termination and the former motive would suf- fice to sustain the employer's action. Id., at 284­287. That is not the problem confronted here. As we have said, the case comes to us on the express assumption that an unlawful motive was the sole basis for the firing. McKen- non's misconduct was not discovered until after she had been 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT 360 McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO. Opinion of the Court fired. The employer could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason. Mixed-motive cases are inapposite here, except to the impor- tant extent they underscore the necessity of determining the employer's motives in ordering the discharge, an essential element in determining whether the employer violated the federal antidiscrimination law. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (em- ployer's legitimate reason for discharge in mixed-motive case will not suffice "if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision"); id., at 260­261 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg- ment). As has been observed, "proving that the same deci- sion would have been justified . . . is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made." Id., at 252 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id., at 260­261 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Our inquiry is not at an end, however, for even though the employer has violated the Act, we must consider how the after-acquired evidence of the employee's wrongdoing bears on the specific remedy to be ordered. Equity's maxim that a suitor who engaged in his own reprehensible conduct in the course of the transaction at issue must be denied equitable relief because of unclean hands, a rule which in conventional formulation operated in limine to bar the suitor from invok- ing the aid of the equity court, 2 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Eq- uity Jurisprudence § 397, pp. 90­92 (5th ed. 1941), has not been applied where Congress authorizes broad equitable re- lief to serve important national policies. We have rejected the unclean hands defense "where a private suit serves im- portant public purposes." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. In- ternational Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138 (1968) (Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts). That does not mean, however, the employee's own misconduct is irrelevant to all the reme- 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 352 (1995) 361 Opinion of the Court dies otherwise available under the statute. The statute con- trolling this case provides that "the court shall have juris- diction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, includ- ing without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for [amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter]." 29 U. S. C. § 626(b); see also § 216(b). In giving effect to the ADEA, we must recognize the duality between the legitimate interests of the employer and the important claims of the employee who invokes the national employment policy mandated by the Act. The employee's wrongdoing must be taken into account, we conclude, lest the employer's legitimate concerns be ignored. The ADEA, like Title VII, is not a general regulation of the workplace but a law which prohibits discrimination. The statute does not constrain employers from exercising significant other prerogatives and discretions in the course of the hiring, promoting, and dis- charging of their employees. See Price Waterhouse v. Hop- kins, supra, at 239 ("Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice"). In determining appropriate remedial action, the employee's wrongdoing becomes rele- vant not to punish the employee, or out of concern "for the relative moral worth of the parties," Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., supra, at 139, but to take due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has arising from the employee's wrongdoing. The proper boundaries of remedial relief in the general class of cases where, after termination, it is discovered that the employee has engaged in wrongdoing must be addressed by the judicial system in the ordinary course of further deci- sions, for the factual permutations and the equitable consid- erations they raise will vary from case to case. We do con- clude that here, and as a general rule in cases of this type, 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT 362 McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO. Opinion of the Court neither reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate rem- edy. It would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have termi- nated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds. The proper measure of backpay presents a more difficult problem. Resolution of this question must give proper rec- ognition to the fact that an ADEA violation has occurred which must be deterred and compensated without undue in- fringement upon the employer's rights and prerogatives. The object of compensation is to restore the employee to the position he or she would have been in absent the discrimina- tion, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S., at 764, but that principle is difficult to apply with precision where there is after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to termination on legitimate grounds had the employer known about it. Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. The beginning point in the trial court's formulation of a remedy should be calcula- tion of backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered. In determin- ing the appropriate order for relief, the court can consider taking into further account extraordinary equitable circum- stances that affect the legitimate interests of either party. An absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay, however, would undermine the ADEA's objective of forcing employ- ers to consider and examine their motivations, and of penaliz- ing them for employment decisions that spring from age discrimination. Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evi- dence of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrong- doing was of such severity that the employee in fact would 513us2$20L 04-04-98 13:55:16 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 352 (1995) 363 Opinion of the Court have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge. The concern that employers might as a routine matter undertake exten- sive discovery into an employee's background or perform- ance on the job to resist claims under the Act is not an insub- stantial one, but we think the authority of the courts to award attorney's fees, mandated under the statute, 29 U. S. C. §§ 216(b), 626(b), and to invoke the appropriate provi- sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will deter most abuses. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 513us2$21z 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT 364 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Per Curiam DUNCAN, WARDEN v. HENRY on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94­941. Decided January 23, 1995 Respondent, a rector and dean of a church day school, was convicted in a California court of sexually molesting a student. At trial, he objected to testimony by the parent of another child who claimed to have been molested 20 years earlier. On direct appeal, he argued that this error was a "miscarriage of justice" under the State Constitution, but the state appellate court found the error harmless. Respondent then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that the evidentiary error violated federal due process, an argument that he had not made in the state proceedings. The District Court found that he had exhausted his state remedies and granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Respondent did not exhaust his state remedies. If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270; Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4. Since respond- ent did not raise his federal due process argument in the state court, that court understandably confined its analysis to the application of state law. Certiorari granted; 33 F. 3d 1037, reversed. Per Curiam. Respondent, a rector and dean of a church day school, was tried and convicted in state court of sexually molesting a 5-year-old student. At trial, respondent objected to testi- mony by the parent of another child who claimed to have been molested 20 years previously. His objection was based on Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 352 (West 1966). On direct ap- peal, he pursued his evidentiary objection and requested the appellate court to find that the error was a "miscarriage of justice" under the California Constitution. California ap- 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 364 (1995) 365 Per Curiam plies this provision in determining whether or not an error was harmless. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P. 2d 243 (1956). The California Court of Appeal found the error harmless and affirmed respondent's conviction. Peo- ple v. Henry, No. CR23041 (2d Dist. 1990), App. D to Pet. for Cert. 6. Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas cor- pus in federal court, alleging that the evidentiary error amounted to a denial of due process under the United States Constitution. The District Court granted the petition and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Henry v. Estelle, 33 F. 3d 1037 (1994). The court held that respond- ent had exhausted his state remedies even though he had not claimed a violation of any federal constitutional right in the state proceedings: "In his direct appeal in state court, Henry did not label his claim a federal due process violation; he argued rather that Hackett's testimony was erroneously ad- mitted because irrelevant and inflammatory, and that its admission resulted in a `miscarriage of justice' under the California Constitution. However, to state a federal due process claim it is not necessary to invoke `the talis- manic phrase "due process of law" ' or cite `book and verse on the federal constitution' . . . ." Id., at 1040 (citations omitted). In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the " `opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quo- tation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the pris- 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT 366 DUNCAN v. HENRY Souter, J., concurring in judgment oners are asserting claims under the United States Constitu- tion. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an eviden- tiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. Accord, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4 (1982). Picard and Harless control the outcome in this case. Re- spondent did not apprise the state court of his claim that the evidentiary ruling of which he complained was not only a violation of state law, but denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The failure is especially pronounced in that respondent did specifically raise a due process objection before the state court based on a different claim-that the pleading was uncertain as to when the offense occurred. App. D to Pet. for Cert. 8. The California Court of Appeal analyzed the evidentiary error by asking whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its proba- tive value, not whether it was so inflammatory as to prevent a fair trial. 33 F. 3d, at 1046. As recognized by dissenting Judge Brunetti, those standards are no more than " `some- what similar,' " id., at 1047, not "virtually identical" as claimed by Justice Stevens, post, at 369. Both Picard and Harless emphasized that mere similarity of claims is in- sufficient to exhaust. Picard, supra, at 276; Harless, supra, at 6. The state court, when presented with respondent's claim of error under the California Evidentiary Code, under- standably confined its analysis to the application of state law. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment because respondent's "miscar- riage of justice" claim in state court was reasonably under- 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 364 (1995) 367 Stevens, J., dissenting stood to raise a state-law issue of prejudice, not a federal issue of due process. Consequently, no federal claim was "fairly presented to the state courts" within the meaning of Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971). Justice Stevens, dissenting. Today's opinion sets forth a new rule of law that is a sub- stantial departure from our precedents. In my opinion, it is unwise for the Court to announce a new rule without first hearing argument on the issue. The Court's opinion is espe- cially distressing because it creates an exacting pleading re- quirement that serves no legitimate purpose in our habeas corpus jurisprudence. In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971), after full briefing and argument, the Court issued an opinion carefully explain- ing the rule that a state prisoner must exhaust his state- court remedies before applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus. We held that the exhaustion requirement is satis- fied when "the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts." Id., at 275. We made it clear, however, that the prisoner need not place the correct label on his claim, or even cite the Federal Constitution, as long as the substance of the federal claim has been fairly presented. As we explained: "Obviously there are instances in which `the ultimate question for disposition,' United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 359 F. 2d 749, 751 (CA7 1966), will be the same despite variations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its support. A ready example is a challenge to a confession predicated upon psychological as well as physical coercion." Id., at 277. Thus, until today, prisoners have not been required to exhaust their federal claims "by citing `book and verse on the federal constitution.' " Id., at 278 (citation omitted). Rather, the rule has been simply that 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT 368 DUNCAN v. HENRY Stevens, J., dissenting they must present "the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim . . . to the state courts." Ibid. Today the Court tightens the pleading screws by adding the requirement that the state courts "must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Ante, at 365­366. As support for that proposition the Court cites Picard and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4 (1982), but neither case is in point. In the former, the Court pointed out that the claim asserted in state court-that an indictment was invalid under Massachusetts law-was different from the equal pro- tection claim first raised in federal court; in the latter, the Court carefully explained why it concluded that the state-law basis for objecting to a jury instruction differed from the federal rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). While I disagreed with the view that Harless' federal claim had not been fairly presented to the state courts, see 459 U. S., at 9­12 (dissenting opinion), I surely did not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the exhaustion doctrine includes an exact labeling requirement. Nor have the Courts of Appeals demonstrated any such understanding of Harless or Picard. To the contrary, the Circuits have analyzed the exhaustion question without rigidly insisting that a prisoner invoke the "talismanic" language of federal law. See Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F. 2d 261, 263 (CA9 1986); see also, e. g., Hawkins v. West, 706 F. 2d 437, 439­440 (CA2 1983); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F. 2d 44, 50 (CA3 1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1036 (1990); West v. Wright, 931 F. 2d 262, 266 (CA4 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U. S. 277 (1992); Satter v. Leapley, 977 F. 2d 1259, 1262 (CA8 1992); Bowser v. Boggs, 20 F. 3d 1060, 1063 (CA10), cert. denied, post, p. 926; Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F. 2d 1250, 1252­1253 (CA10), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1112 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 364 (1995) 369 Stevens, J., dissenting (1989); Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F. 2d 512, 518­519 (CA11 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1071 (1984). The new rule the Court announces today is hypertechnical and unwise. It will prolong litigation without serving any valid purpose. The example of a challenge to a coerced con- fession cited in Picard, 404 U. S., at 277, illustrates the point. If a prisoner presents all his evidence to a state court, and if the standard for judging the voluntariness of a confession under state law is the same as under federal law, the state court has had a fair opportunity to pass on the claim regard- less of whether the prisoner relies on both the State and Federal Constitutions or just the former. If the state courts have considered and rejected such a claim on state-law grounds, nothing is to be gained by requiring the prisoner to present the same claim under a different label to the same courts that have already found it insufficient. The cost of needless litigation is, however, significant both to the judicial system, see Harless, 459 U. S., at 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and to persons like respondent who are imprisoned despite their meritorious federal claims. In the case before us today, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the exhaustion issue. On the merits, respondent presented the Court of Appeals with a federal due process claim, the crux of which was that the testimony of Thomas Hackett, a witness for the prosecution, was so inflammatory and irrelevant as to render his trial fun- damentally unfair. Cf. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 75 (1991) (severely prejudicial evidentiary errors may violate due process). Respondent had challenged the admission of Hackett's testimony on direct appeal in state court. 33 F. 3d 1037, 1040 (CA9 1994). To be sure, he had cited only state law. Ibid. As carefully explained by the Court of Appeals, however, the standards for addressing respondent's state-law claims were virtually identical to those applied in 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT 370 DUNCAN v. HENRY Stevens, J., dissenting federal court on habeas review. Id., at 1041­1042. Thus, after full discussion of the issue, the Ninth Circuit concluded that respondent had exhausted his claims.1 1 The contrast between the Ninth Circuit's thoughtful opinion and this Court's cursory disposition of an important issue is best illustrated by quoting the lower court's reasoning in full: "To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have fairly presented the substance of his federal claim to the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 277­78 . . . (1971). The purpose of this `fair presentation' requirement is to `provide the state courts with a "fair op- portunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.' Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4, 6 . . . (1982) (quoting Picard, 404 U. S. at 276­77 . . .). We have held that a federal claim `is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theory upon which his claim is based.' Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F. 2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986). "There is no doubt that Henry presented the `operative facts' to the California court. The question is whether he presented the `legal theory.' Henry's federal habeas claim is that the erroneous admission of evidence at his state criminal trial, followed by the jury instruction, violated his federal constitutional right to due process and was so prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. In his direct appeal in state court, Henry did not label his claim a federal due process violation; he argued rather that Hackett's testimony was erroneously admitted because irrele- vant and inflammatory, and that its admission resulted in a `miscarriage of justice' under the California Constitution. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 13. However, to state a federal due process claim it is not necessary to invoke `the talismanic phrase "due process of law" ' or cite `book and verse on the federal constitution;' petitioner need only make `essentially the same arguments' before the state and federal courts to exhaust a claim. Tama- pua, 796 F. 2d at 262­63. Thus, under Picard and Anderson, exhaustion requires only that petitioner present `the substance of the federal claim' in state court. Id. at 262. We find that Henry has done so, regarding both his argument that the erroneous admission of the testimony and the instructional error were a violation of his federal due process right and his argument that the error was so prejudicial as to warrant reversal. "As to the first point, it is well established that denial of due process in a state criminal trial `is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. [The court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.' Lisenba v. 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 364 (1995) 371 Stevens, J., dissenting Judge Brunetti dissented from the majority's analysis, but on a ground that is entirely different from that ad- vanced by this Court in what appears to be its hold- California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 . . . (1941). Henry's federal due process claim is that the admission of Hackett's testimony, along with the instruc- tions concerning it, deprived him of a fair trial. He argues that Hackett's testimony was not probative of any material issue in his case unless the jury assumed a fact about which it had heard no testimony: that Hackett's son's accusation was true. He further argues that the jury instructions encouraged the jury to make this impermissible, highly prejudicial as- sumption. His claim is thus that `there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw' from Hackett's testimony, and that it is `of such [inflamma- tory] quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.' Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F. 2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, [70] . . . (1991) (inflammatory evidence that is irrelevant may work a due process violation). "Henry made `essentially the same arguments,' Tamapua, 796 F. 2d at 262, in his opening brief to the California Court of Appeal. He claimed that Hackett's testimony was `not relevant-it had no tendency to prove or disprove any disputed fact that was of consequence to the determination of the action.' He added that the jury instruction `compounded the error' because, in encouraging the jury to see Hackett's testimony as relevant, it `as much as said that defendant had molested [Hackett's son] 20 years before.' The Court of Appeal agreed, and wrote in its disposition that Hackett's testimony, while `inherently inflammatory,' had `no probative value at all.' "We reach the same conclusion as to the essential identity of Henry's state and federal arguments regarding the prejudicial effect of the error. Under California law, a miscarriage of justice is reversible only when `it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.' Watson, 299 P. 2d at 254. The federal standard, recently set forth by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, [507 U. S. 619] (1993), is phrased somewhat differently, but is essentially the same test; the Supreme Court held that in reviewing a collateral challenge based on a `trial-type' constitutional error, a federal court will not reverse the conviction unless the error ` "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." ' Id., at 623 . . . (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 776 . . . (1946)). "The errors that occurred at Henry's trial-the introduction of Hackett's testimony and the subsequent jury instruction-were clearly errors of the 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT 372 DUNCAN v. HENRY Stevens, J., dissenting ing.2 He did not merely argue that there was no exhaustion because the prisoner had failed to cite the Federal Consti- tution. Rather, he carefully explained his view that the federal claim differed from the state claim because it was governed by the harmless-error standard in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), rather than a California standard similar to Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993). I am inclined to believe that the majority had the better of the argument because the Brecht standard would apply in the federal habeas proceeding. But the important point of the dissent is that, like the majority, it correctly perceived the exhaustion question as whether the claim had been fairly presented to the state courts, not whether re- spondent had attached the correct label. `trial type' because they `occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury.' Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 307 . . . (1991). There- fore, under the new Brecht harmless error standard, we must inquire whether the testimony had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence' on the verdict. This standard is similar to the Watson standard used by California courts; under both tests, reversal is required if the error had a significant inculpatory impact. When the California Court of Appeal determined that it was not `reasonably probable' that Henry would have been acquitted had the Hackett testimony not been introduced (the Wat- son standard), it effectively determined that the testimony had not had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence' on the outcome (the Brecht standard). "Henry has thus made `essentially the same arguments' before the state and federal courts regarding both the existence of federal constitutional error and the prejudicial impact thereof. We hold that he has exhausted his state post-conviction remedies." 33 F. 3d, at 1040­1042 (footnote omitted). 2 At the end of its opinion, the Court seems to back away from any ironclad labeling requirement by endorsing Judge Brunetti's view that re- spondent's federal claim was different in important respects from the ar- gument that was presented in state court. If the Court seeks to reverse the Ninth Circuit on these grounds, without overruling the rule of Harless and Picard, much of the language in the Court's opinion is nothing more than unnecessary dicta. The confusion on this critical point is itself a reason to avoid summary disposition of this case. 513us2$21H 03-30-98 12:50:52 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 364 (1995) 373 Stevens, J., dissenting This Court should not abruptly terminate thoughtful de- bate among conscientious Circuit judges by summarily an- nouncing a new rule. If we are to depart from the standard set forth in Picard and Harless, we should do so only after thorough consideration with the benefit of full briefing and argument. I respectfully dissent. 513us2$22Z 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 374 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 93­1525. Argued November 7, 1994-Decided February 21, 1995 Petitioner Lebron, who creates billboard displays that comment on public issues, filed suit claiming, inter alia, that respondent National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) had violated his First Amendment rights by rejecting a display for an Amtrak billboard because of its political nature. The District Court ruled that Amtrak, because of its close ties to the Federal Government, was a Government actor for First Amendment purposes, and that its rejection of the display was unconsti- tutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that Amtrak was, by the terms of the legislation that created it, not a Government entity, and concluding that the Government was not so involved with Amtrak that the latter's decisions could be considered federal action. Held: Where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of that corporation's directors, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment. Pp. 378­400. (a) It is proper for this Court to consider the argument that Amtrak is part of the Government, even though Lebron disavowed it in both lower courts and did not explicitly raise it until his brief on the merits here. It is not a new claim, but a new argument to support his First Amendment claim, see, e. g., Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534­535; it was passed upon below, see, e. g., United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 41; and it was fairly embraced within both the question presented and the argument set forth in the petition. Pp. 378­383. (b) Amtrak was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA) to avert the threatened extinction of passenger trains in the interest of "the public convenience and necessity." The legislation es- tablishes detailed goals for Amtrak, sets forth its structure and powers, and assigns the appointment of a majority of its board of directors to the President. Pp. 383­386. (c) There is a long history of corporations created and participated in by the United States for the achievement of governmental objectives. Like some other Government corporations, Amtrak's authorizing stat- 513us2$22Z 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 375 Syllabus ute provides that it "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government," 84 Stat. 1330; see also 45 U. S. C. § 541. Pp. 386­391. (d) Although § 541 is assuredly dispositive of Amtrak's governmental status for purposes of matters within Congress's control-e. g., whether it is subject to statutes like the Administrative Procedure Act-and can even suffice to deprive it of all those inherent governmental powers and immunities that Congress has the power to eliminate-e. g., sovereign immunity from suit-it is not for Congress to make the final determina- tion of Amtrak's status as a Government entity for purposes of deter- mining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions. The Constitution constrains governmental action by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346­347, and under whatever congressional label, Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 536, 539. National Rail- road Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407, 410, and National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 470 U. S. 451, 470, distinguished. Pp. 392­394. (e) Amtrak is an agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution. This conclusion accords with the public, judicial, and congressional understanding over the years that Government-created and -controlled corporations are part of the Government itself. See, e. g., Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 83; Government Corporation Control Act, § 304(a), 59 Stat. 602. A contrary holding would allow government to evade its most solemn constitutional obligations by simply resorting to the corporate form, cf. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230, 231. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907, 908, and Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 152, distinguished. Pp. 394­399. 12 F. 3d 388, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 400. David D. Cole argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were R. Bruce Rich and Gloria C. Phares. 513us2$22Z 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 376 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court Kevin T. Baine argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Nicole K. Seligman, Stephen C. Rog- ers, and Louis R. Cohen.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we consider whether actions of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly known as Am- trak, are subject to the constraints of the Constitution. I Petitioner, Michael A. Lebron, creates billboard displays that involve commentary on public issues, and that seem- ingly propel him into litigation. See, e. g., Lebron v. Wash- ington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 749 F. 2d 893 (CADC 1984). In August 1991, he contacted Transportation Displays, Incorporated (TDI), which manages the leasing of the billboards in Amtrak's Pennsylvania Station in New York City, seeking to display an advertisement on a billboard of colossal proportions, known to New Yorkers (or at least to the more Damon Runyonesque among them) as "the Spectac- ular." The Spectacular is a curved, illuminated billboard, approximately 103 feet long and 10 feet high, which domi- nates the main entrance to Penn Station's waiting room and ticket area. On November 30, 1992, Lebron signed a contract with TDI to display an advertisement on the Spectacular for two months beginning in January 1993. The contract provided that "[a]ll advertising copy is subject to approval of TDI and [Amtrak] as to character, text, illustration, design and opera- tion." App. 671. Lebron declined to disclose the specific content of his advertisement throughout his negotiations *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Stephen R. Shapiro, Marjorie Heins, and Arthur N. Eisenberg; and for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by James F. Fitzpatrick, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Lawrence S. Ottinger. 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 377 Opinion of the Court with TDI, although he did explain to TDI that it was gener- ally political. On December 2, he submitted to TDI (and TDI later forwarded to Amtrak) an advertisement described by the District Court as follows: "The work is a photomontage, accompanied by consider- able text. Taking off on a widely circulated Coors beer advertisement which proclaims Coors to be the `Right Beer,' Lebron's piece is captioned `Is it the Right's Beer Now?' It includes photographic images of convivial drinkers of Coors beer, juxtaposed with a Nicaraguan village scene in which peasants are menaced by a can of Coors that hurtles towards them, leaving behind a trail of fire, as if it were a missile. The accompanying text, appearing on either end of the montage, criticizes the Coors family for its support of right-wing causes, partic- ularly the contras in Nicaragua. Again taking off on Coors' advertising which uses the slogan of `Silver Bul- let' for its beer cans, the text proclaims that Coors is `The Silver Bullet that aims The Far Right's political agenda at the heart of America.' " 811 F. Supp. 993, 995 (SDNY 1993). Amtrak's vice president disapproved the advertisement, in- voking Amtrak's policy, inherited from its predecessor as landlord of Penn Station, the Pennsylvania Railroad Com- pany, "that it will not allow political advertising on the [S]pectacular advertising sign." App. 285. Lebron then filed suit against Amtrak and TDI, claiming, inter alia, that the refusal to place his advertisement on the Spectacular had violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. After expedited discovery, the District Court ruled that Amtrak, because of its close ties to the Federal Govern- ment, was a Government actor, at least for First Amendment purposes, and that its rejection of Lebron's proposed adver- tisement as unsuitable for display in Penn Station had vio- lated the First Amendment. The court granted Lebron an 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 378 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court injunction and ordered Amtrak and TDI to display Lebron's advertisement on the Spectacular. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 12 F. 3d 388 (1993). The panel's opinion first noted that Amtrak was, by the terms of the legislation that created it, not a Government entity, id., at 390; and then concluded that the Federal Government was not so involved with Amtrak that the latter's decisions could be considered federal action, id., at 391­392. Chief Judge Newman dis- sented. We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1105 (1994). II We have held once, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au- thority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961), and said many times, that ac- tions of private entities can sometimes be regarded as gov- ernmental action for constitutional purposes. See, e. g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 546 (1987); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1004 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 172 (1972). It is fair to say that "our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency." Edmonson v. Leesville Con- crete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It may be unnecessary to traverse that difficult terrain in the present case, since Lebron's first argument is that Amtrak is not a private entity but Government itself. Before turning to the merits of this argument, however, it is necessary to discuss the propriety of reaching it. Lebron did not raise this point below; indeed, he expressly disavowed it in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. See Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Proposed Conclusions of Law in No. 92­CIV­9411 (SDNY), p. 12, n. 1, reprinted in App. in No. 93­7127 (CA2), p. 1297; Brief for Appellee in No. 93­7127 (CA2), p. 30, n. 39. In those courts Lebron argued that Amtrak's actions were subject to constitutional requirements because Amtrak, al- 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 379 Opinion of the Court though a private entity, was closely connected with federal entities. It was not until after we granted certiorari that Lebron first explicitly presented-in his brief on the mer- its-the alternative argument that Amtrak was itself a fed- eral entity. Our traditional rule is that "[o]nce a federal claim is prop- erly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise argu- ments they made below." Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992); see also Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 198 (1899). Lebron's contention that Amtrak is part of the Gov- ernment is in our view not a new claim within the meaning of that rule, but a new argument to support what has been his consistent claim: that Amtrak did not accord him the rights it was obliged to provide by the First Amendment. Cf. Yee, supra, at 534­535. In fact, even if this were a claim not raised by petitioner below, we would ordinarily feel free to address it, since it was addressed by the court below. Our practice "permit[s] review of an issue not pressed so long as it has been passed upon . . . ." United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 41 (1992). See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083, 1099, n. 8 (1991); Stevens v. Depart- ment of Treasury, 500 U. S. 1, 8 (1991). Respondent asserts that, in addition to not having been raised below, the issue of whether Amtrak is a Government entity was not presented in the petition for certiorari. As this Court's Rule 14.1(a) and simple prudence dictate, we will not reach questions not fairly included in the petition. "The Court decides which questions to consider through well- established procedures; allowing the able counsel who argue before us to alter these questions or to devise additional questions at the last minute would thwart this system." Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 646 (1992). Here, however, we are satisfied that the argument that Amtrak is a Government entity is fairly embraced within the question 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 380 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court set forth in the petition for certiorari 1-which explicitly presents neither the "Government entity" theory nor the "closely connected to Government" theory of First Amend- ment application, but rather the facts that would support both. The argument in the petition, moreover, though couched in terms of a different but closely related theory, fairly embraced the argument that Lebron now advances. See Pet. for Cert. 16­18. The dissent contends that the "Government entity" ques- tion in the present case occupies the same status, insofar as Rule 14.1(a) is concerned, as the "physical taking" question which we deemed excluded in Yee v. Escondido, supra. It gives two reasons for that equivalence: First, the fact that Lebron prefaced his question presented by the phrase, "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding." App. to Pet. for Cert. i. The dissent asserts that this is similar to the preface in Yee, which had the effect of limiting the ques- tion to the precise ground relied upon by the Court of Ap- peal. Post, at 402. But the preface in Yee was not at all similar. What we said caused the question presented to be limited to the physical-taking issue was not the fact that that was the only ground addressed by the lower-court-said-to- be-in-error; but rather the fact that that was the only ground of decision in two previous Court of Appeals cases, departure 1 Certiorari was sought and granted in this case on the following question: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Amtrak's asserted policy barring the display of political advertising messages in Pennsylva- nia Station, New York, was not state action, where: "(a) the United States created Amtrak, endowed it with governmental powers, owns all its voting stock, and appoints all members of its Board; "(b) the United States-appointed Board approved the advertising policy challenged here; "(c) the United States keeps Amtrak afloat every year by subsidizing its losses; and "(d) Pennsylvania Station was purchased for Amtrak by the United States and is shared with several other governmental entities." 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 381 Opinion of the Court from which was said by the question presented to be the issue in the appeal.2 503 U. S., at 536­537. The dissent's second reason for believing that Yee governs the Rule 14.1(a) issue here is that the structural relationship between the clearly presented question and the assertedly included question in the two cases is the same. As the dis- sent correctly analyzes Yee, it involved one "umbrella claim" (government taking of property without just compensation) and "two distinct questions" that were "[s]ubsidiary to that claim" (whether a physical taking had occurred, and whether a regulatory taking had occurred). Post, at 401. But the questions in Yee were "distinct" in two important ways that the claims here are not. First of all, it was possible to con- sider the existence of a physical taking without assuming (as one of the premises of the inquiry) the nonexistence of a regulatory taking; whereas here it is quite impossible to con- sider whether the Government connections are sufficient to convert private-entity Amtrak into a Government actor without first assuming that Amtrak is a private entity. The opinion in Yee did not have to begin: "Assuming that no regu- latory taking has occurred, . . . ." But the portion of today's dissent addressing the merits of this case must begin: "Accepting Lebron's concession that Amtrak is a private entity, . . . ." Post, at 408. The question of private-entity status is, in other words, a prior question. The second respect in which the issues here are less "distinct" than in Yee is that the factors relevant to their resolution overlap. In Yee, what would go to show a regulatory taking and 2 The question presented in Yee read as follows: " `Two federal courts of appeal have held that the transfer of a premium value to a departing mobilehome tenant, representing the value of the right to occupy at a reduced rate under local mobilehome rent control ordinances, constitute[s] an impermissible taking. Was it error for the state appellate court to disregard the rulings and hold that there was no taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments?' " 503 U. S., at 536­537. 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 382 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court what would go to show a physical taking were quite different. Here, however, those very elements that we would be considering in determining whether Amtrak-the- private-entity is so closely connected with the Government as to be a Government actor (for example, the constitution of its board) also bear upon whether it is in fact a private entity at all. When a question is, like this one, both prior to the clearly presented question and dependent upon many of the same factual inquiries, refusing to regard it as em- braced within the petition may force us to assume what the facts will show to be ridiculous, a risk that ought to be avoided. The recent decision of ours that invites comparison with the dissent's insistence that the "Government entity" ques- tion is "precluded," post, at 400, is not Yee, but United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439 (1993). There, in a case raising the ques- tion of the proper interpretation of 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1926 ed.), we upheld the propriety of the Court of Appeals' considering the prior question whether 12 U. S. C. § 92 had been inad- vertently repealed-even though the parties themselves had failed to raise that question, not only (as here) in the court below, but even in the initial briefs and oral arguments be- fore the Court of Appeals itself. That is to say, the situation there, at the court of appeals level, was what the situation would be before us here, if (1) the dissent were correct that Rule 14.1(a) was not complied with, and (2) in addition, even the petitioner's principal brief and oral argument had failed to raise the "Government entity" issue. Even so, we held in Independent Insurance Agents that it was proper for the Court of Appeals to request supplemental briefing upon, and to decide, the statutory repeal question, and we then went on to inquire into that question ourselves. Our opinion was unanimous, not a single Justice protesting that the judges of the Court of Appeals, or of this Court, had constituted 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 383 Opinion of the Court themselves " `as [a] self-directed boar[d] of legal inquiry' " or had "exhibit[ed] little patience," post, at 408.3 III Before proceeding to consider Lebron's contention that Amtrak, though nominally a private corporation, must be regarded as a Government entity for First Amendment purposes, we examine the nature and history of Amtrak and of Government-created corporations in general. A Congress established Amtrak in order to avert the threat- ened extinction of passenger trains in the United States. 3 The dissent sees no more in Independent Ins. Agents than a narrow holding that the Court of Appeals' decision to reach the statutory repeal issue was not so imprudent as to be reversible for abuse of discretion. Even that is a damaging concession, given the dissent's apparent position that allowing a litigant "to resuscitate [a] claim that he himself put to rest" always violates "prudential" rules. Post, at 406. But in fact the language of the Independent Ins. Agents opinion is much more approving of the Court of Appeals' action than that. It declines even to brush aside the Court of Appeals' (questionable) contention that there was "a `duty' to address the status of section 92," saying only that "[w]e need not decide" that question. 508 U. S., at 448. And it goes on to state that the Court of Appeals acted "without any impropriety," and that its decision to con- sider the issue was "certainly no abuse of its discretion." Ibid. (emphasis added). If we had not thought that the Court of Appeals' entertainment of the statutory repeal question was, not merely unreversible, but appro- priate, we would not have rendered ourselves complicit in the enterprise by exercising our own discretion to grant certiorari on that question. (There was no particular need to intervene, since the Court of Appeals had upheld the law.) The dissent also seeks to characterize Independent Ins. Agents as no more than an application of "the traditional principle that there can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law." Post, at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was indeed an application of that principle insofar as concerned the claim that the appellants' right to assert repeal of the statute had been forfeited. But forfeit was not the only point decided in the case: not every nonforfeited claim merits consider- ation on appeal. 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 384 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court The statute that created it begins with the congressional finding, redolent of provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, see, e. g., 49 U. S. C. §§ 10901, 10903, 10922 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), that "the public convenience and necessity require the continuance and improvement" of railroad passenger service. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), § 101, 84 Stat. 1328 (emphasis added). In the current version of the RPSA, 45 U. S. C. § 501 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), the congressional findings are followed by a section entitled "Goals," which begins, "The Congress hereby establishes the following goals for Amtrak," and includes items of such de- tail as the following: "(3) Improvement of the number of passenger miles generated systemwide per dollar of Federal funding by at least 30 percent within the two-year period beginning on October 1, 1981. "(4) Elimination of the deficit associated with food and beverage services by September 30, 1982. . . . . . "(6) Operation of Amtrak trains, to the maximum extent feasible, to all station stops within 15 minutes of the time established in public timetables for such operation. . . . . . "(8) Implementation of schedules which provide a systemwide average speed of at least 60 miles per hour . . . ." § 501a. Later sections of the statute authorize Amtrak's incorpora- tion, §§ 541­542, set forth its structure and powers, §§ 543­ 545, and outline procedures under which Amtrak will relieve private railroads of their passenger-service obligations and provide intercity and commuter rail passenger service itself, §§ 561­566. See generally National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 470 U. S. 451, 453­456 (1985). As initially conceived, Amtrak was to be 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 385 Opinion of the Court "a for profit corporation," 84 Stat. 1330, but Congress later modified this language to provide, less optimistically per- haps, that Amtrak "shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation," § 541. Amtrak is incorporated under the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, D. C. Code Ann. § 29­301 et seq. (1981 and Supp. 1994), but is subject to the provisions of that Act only insofar as the RPSA does not provide to the con- trary, see § 541. It does provide to the contrary with re- spect to many matters of structure and power, including the manner of selecting the company's board of directors. The RPSA provides for a board of nine members, six of whom are appointed directly by the President of the United States. The Secretary of Transportation, or his designee, sits ex officio. § 543(a)(1)(A). The President appoints three more directors with the advice and consent of the Senate, § 543(a)(1)(C), selecting one from a list of individuals recom- mended by the Railway Labor Executives Association, § 543(a)(1)(C)(i), one "from among the Governors of States with an interest in rail transportation," § 543(a)(1)(C)(ii), and one as a "representative of business with an interest in rail transportation," § 543(a)(1)(C)(iii). These directors serve 4-year terms. § 543(a)(2)(A). The President appoints two additional directors without the involvement of the Senate, choosing them from a list of names submitted by various commuter rail authorities. § 543(a)(1)(D). These directors serve 2-year terms. § 543(a)(2)(B). The holders of Am- trak's preferred stock select two more directors, who serve 1-year terms. § 543(a)(1)(E). Since the United States pres- ently holds all of Amtrak's preferred stock, which it received (and still receives) in exchange for its subsidization of Am- trak's perennial losses, see § 544(c), the Secretary of Trans- portation selects these two directors. The ninth member of the board is Amtrak's president, § 543(a)(1)(B), who serves as the chairman of the board, § 543(a)(4), is selected by the other eight directors, and serves at their pleasure, § 543(d). 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 386 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court Amtrak's four private shareholders have not been entitled to vote in selecting the board of directors since 1981.4 By § 548 of the RPSA, Amtrak is required to submit three different annual reports to the President and Congress. One of these, a "report on the effectiveness of this chapter in meeting the requirements for a balanced national trans- portation system, together with any legislative recommenda- tions," is made part of the Department of Transportation's annual report to Congress. § 548(c). B Amtrak is not a unique, or indeed even a particularly un- usual, phenomenon. In considering the question before us, it is useful to place Amtrak within its proper context in the long history of corporations created and participated in by the United States for the achievement of governmental objectives. The first was the Bank of the United States, created by the Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191, which authorized the United States to subscribe 20 percent of the corporation's stock, id., at 196. That Bank expired pursuant to the terms of its authorizing Act 20 years later. A second Bank of the United States, the bank of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), and Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), was incorporated by the Act of April 10, 1816, 3 4 Originally, Amtrak's board comprised 15 directors: 7 selected by the shareholders and 8 (one of whom had to be the Secretary of Transpor- tation) appointed by the President of the United States. See RPSA §§ 303(a) and (c), 84 Stat. 1330­1331. In 1973, Congress increased the number of directors to 17, the number of Presidential appointees to 9, and made the Secretary of Transportation a director ex officio. See Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, § 3(a), 87 Stat. 548. In 1976, the number of Presidential appointees (apart from the Secretary of Transportation) was reduced to eight and Amtrak's president made a director ex officio. See Rail Transportation Improvement Act, § 103, 90 Stat. 2615. Amtrak's board was given its current size and membership in 1981. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, § 1174, 95 Stat. 689. 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 387 Opinion of the Court Stat. 266, which provided that the United States would sub- scribe 20 percent of the Bank's capital stock, ibid., and in addition that the President would appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 5 of the Bank's 25 directors, the rest to be elected annually by shareholders other than the United States, id., at 269. The second Bank's charter expired of its own force, despite fierce efforts by the Bank's supporters to renew it, in 1836. See generally R. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Bank War 155­175 (1967). During the remainder of the 19th century, the Federal Government continued to charter private corpo- rations, see, e. g., Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365 (Northern Pacific Railroad Company), but only once participated in such a venture itself: the Union Pacific Railroad, chartered in 1862 with the specification that two of its directors would be ap- pointed by the President of the United States. Act of July 1, 1862, § 1, 12 Stat. 491. See F. Leazes, Jr., Accountability and the Business State 117, n. 8 (1987) (hereinafter Leazes). The Federal Government's first participation in a corpo- rate enterprise in which (as with Amtrak) it appointed a ma- jority of the directors did not occur until the present century. In 1902, to facilitate construction of the Panama Canal, Con- gress authorized the President to purchase the assets of the New Panama Canal Company of France, including that com- pany's stock holdings in the Panama Railroad Company, a private corporation chartered in 1849 by the State of New York. See Act of June 28, 1902, 32 Stat. 481; see also Gen- eral Accounting Office, Reference Manual of Government Corporations, S. Doc. No. 86, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 176 (1945) (hereinafter GAO Corporation Manual). The United States became the sole shareholder of the Panama Railroad, and continued to operate it under its original charter, with the Secretary of War, as the holder of the stock, electing the Railroad's 13 directors. Id., at 177; Joint Committee on Re- duction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, S. Doc. No. 227, 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 388 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 (1944) (hereinafter Reduction of Expenditures). The first large-scale use of Government-controlled corpo- rations came with the First World War. In 1917 and 1918, Congress created, among others, the United States Grain Corporation, the United States Emergency Fleet Corpora- tion, the United States Spruce Production Corporation, and the War Finance Corporation. See Leazes 20. These enti- ties were dissolved after the war ended. See Reduction of Expenditures 1. The Great Depression brought the next major group of Government corporations, which proved to be more endur- ing. These were primarily directed to stabilizing the econ- omy and to making distress loans to farms, homeowners, banks, and other enterprises. See R. Moe, CRS Report for Congress, Administering Public Functions at the Margins of Government: The Case of Federal Corporations 6­7 (1983). The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), to take the premier example, was initially authorized to make loans to banks, insurance companies, railroads, land banks, and ag- ricultural credit organizations, including loans secured by the assets of failed banks. See Act of Jan. 22, 1932, § 5, 47 Stat. 6­7. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), was established to hold and liquidate the assets of failed banks, and to insure bank deposits. See Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1811 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). And a few corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), brought the Gov- ernment into the commercial sale of goods and services. See Act of May 18, 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 831 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The growth of federal corporations during the Depression and the World War II era was not limited to the numerous entities specifically approved by Congress. In 1940, Con- gress empowered the RFC to create corporations without specific congressional authorization. See Act of June 25, 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 389 Opinion of the Court 1940, § 5, 54 Stat. 573­574. The RFC proceeded to do so with gusto, incorporating on its own the Defense Plant Cor- poration, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Metals Re- serve Company (which itself created several subsidiaries), the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the Rubber Develop- ment Corporation, and the War Damage Corporation, among others. See GAO Corporation Manual 32, 38, 169, 182, 219, 279. Other corporations were formed, sometimes under state law, without even the general congressional authoriza- tion granted the RFC. For example, the Defense Homes Corporation was organized under Maryland law by the Sec- retary of the Treasury, using emergency funds allocated to the President, id., at 28 ("It is not clear what, if any, specific Federal statutory authority was relied upon for the creation of the Defense Homes Corporation"); and the Tennessee Val- ley Associated Cooperatives, Inc., was chartered under Ten- nessee law by the TVA, id., at 244 ("There has been found no Federal statute specifically authorizing the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority to organize a corporation"). By 1945, the General Accounting Office's Reference Manual of Government Corporations listed 58 government corporations, with total assets (in 1945 dollars) of $29.6 billion. See id., at iii, v­vi. By the end of World War II, Government-created and -controlled corporations had gotten out of hand, in both their number and their lack of accountability. Congress moved to reestablish order in the Government Corporation Control Act (GCCA), 59 Stat. 597, as amended, 31 U. S. C. § 9101 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). See Pritchett, The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 495 (1946). The GCCA required that specified corporations, both wholly owned and partially owned by the Government, be audited by the Comptroller General. See 59 Stat. 599, 600. Additionally, the wholly owned corporations were re- quired, for the first time, to submit budgets which would be included in the budget submitted annually to Congress by 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 390 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court the President. Id., at 598; see also Leazes 22­23. The GCCA also ordered the dissolution or liquidation of all government corporations created under state law, except for those that Congress should act to reincorporate; and prohibited creation of new Government corporations with- out specific congressional authorization. 59 Stat. 602; cf. 31 U. S. C. § 9102. Thus, in the years immediately following World War II, many Government corporations were dissolved, and to our knowledge only one, the Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop- ment Corporation, was created. See Leazes 25, 27. In the 1960's, however, the allure of the corporate form was felt again, and new entities proliferated. Many of them followed the traditional model, often explicitly designated as Govern- ment agencies and located within the existing Government structure. See, e. g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, § 105, 83 Stat. 809 (creating the Overseas Private Investment Cor- poration as "an agency of the United States under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State"), as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 2191 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). Beginning in 1962, however, the Government turned to sponsoring corporations that it specifically designated not to be agencies or establish- ments of the United States Government, and declined to sub- ject to the control mechanisms of the GCCA. The first of these, the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), was incorporated under the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, D. C. Code Ann. § 29­301 et seq. (1981 and Supp. 1994), see 47 U. S. C. § 731 et seq., with the purpose of entering the private sector, but doing so with Government- conferred advantages, see Moe, supra, at 22. Comsat was capitalized entirely with private funds. See Seidman, Government-sponsored Enterprise in the United States, in The New Political Economy: The Public Use of the Private Sector 92 (B. Smith ed. 1975). In contrast to the corpora- tions that had in the past been deemed part of the Govern- ment, Comsat's board was to be controlled by its private 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 391 Opinion of the Court shareholders; only 3 of its 15 directors were appointed by the President, § 733(a). The Comsat model, which was seen as allowing the Gov- ernment to act unhindered by the restraints of bureaucracy and politics, see Moe, CRS Report, at 22, 24, was soon fol- lowed in creating other corporations. But some of these new "private" corporations, though said by their charters not to be agencies or instrumentalities of the Government, see, e. g., 47 U. S. C. § 396(b) (Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)); 42 U. S. C. § 2996d(e)(1) (Legal Services Corporation (LSC)), and though not subjected to the restrictions of the GCCA, were (unlike Comsat) managed by boards of directors on which Government appointees had not just a few votes but voting control. See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, § 201, 81 Stat. 369 (CPB's entire board appointed by Presi- dent); Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. 379 (same for LSC). Amtrak is yet another variation upon the Comsat theme. Like Comsat, CPB, and LSC, its authorizing statute declares that it "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government." 84 Stat. 1330; see 45 U. S. C. § 541. Unlike Comsat, but like CPB and LSC, its board of directors is controlled by Government appointees. And unlike all three of those "private" corporations, it has been added to the list of corporations covered by the GCCA, see 31 U. S. C. § 9101 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). As one perceptive observer has concluded with regard to the post-Comsat Government- sponsored "private" enterprises: "There is no valid basis for distinguishing between many government-sponsored enterprises and other types of government activities, except for the fact that they are designed [designated?] by law as `not an agency and instrumentality of the United States Government.' Comparable powers and immunities could be granted to such agencies without characterizing them as non- government." Seidman, supra, at 93. 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 392 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court IV Amtrak claims that, whatever its relationship with the Federal Government, its charter's disclaimer of agency sta- tus prevents it from being considered a Government entity in the present case. This reliance on the statute is misplaced. Section 541 is assuredly dispositive of Amtrak's status as a Government entity for purposes of matters that are within Congress's control-for example, whether it is subject to stat- utes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Govern- ment entities, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), the Federal Advi- sory Committee Act, 5 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq., and the laws governing Government procurement, see 41 U. S. C. § 5 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). And even beyond that, we think § 541 can suffice to deprive Amtrak of all those inherent pow- ers and immunities of Government agencies that it is within the power of Congress to eliminate. We have no doubt, for example, that the statutory disavowal of Amtrak's agency status deprives Amtrak of sovereign immunity from suit, see Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 560 (NJ 1982), and of the ordinarily presumed power of Government agencies au- thorized to incur obligations to pledge the credit of the United States, see, e. g., Debt Obligations of Nat. Credit Union Admin., 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 262, 264 (1982). But it is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak's status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions. If Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the Con- stitution regards as the Government, congressional pro- nouncement that it is not such can no more relieve it of its First Amendment restrictions than a similar pronouncement could exempt the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Fourth Amendment. The Constitution constrains govern- mental action "by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346­347 (1880). And under whatever congres- 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 393 Opinion of the Court sional label. As we said of the Reconstruction Finance Cor- poration in deciding whether debts owed it were owed the United States Government: "That the Congress chose to call it a corporation does not alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than what it actually is . . . ." Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 536, 539 (1946). Amtrak points to two of our opinions that characterize Amtrak as a nongovernmental entity. The first is National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407, 410 (1992), which describes the corporation as "not an agency or instrumentality of the United States Government." But the governmental or nongovernmental nature of Amtrak had no conceivable relevance to the issues before the Court in Boston & Maine. The quoted character- ization, similar to that contained in the statute, was merely set forth at the beginning of the opinion, in describing the factual background of the case. It is hard to imagine weaker dictum. The second case is National Railroad Passenger Corpora- tion v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 470 U. S. 451 (1985). There the governmental character of Amtrak was margin- ally relevant. The railroads opposing Amtrak in the case argued that a subsequent statute reneging on the Govern- ment's own obligations was subject to a "more rigorous standard of review" under the Due Process Clause than a statute impairing private contractual obligations. Id., at 471. The Court said it did not have to consider that ques- tion because the contracts in question were "not between the railroads and the United States but simply between the railroads and the nongovernmental corporation, Amtrak." Id., at 470. But it develops, later in the opinion, that the Court would not have had to consider that question anyway, since it concluded that the contracts (whether those of the United States or not) did not incur the obligation alleged. The effect of the apparent reliance upon Amtrak's nongov- 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 394 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court ernmental character was at most to enable the Court to make, later in the opinion, without applying the "more rigor- ous standard" urged by the railroads, the superfluous argu- ment that "[e]ven were the Court of Appeals correct that the railroads have a private contractual right . . . we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Due Process Clause limited Congress' power to [affect that right as it did]." Id., at 476. Moreover, for the purpose at hand in Atchison it was quite proper for the Court to treat Con- gress's assertion of Amtrak's nongovernmental status in § 541 as conclusive. As we have suggested above, even if Amtrak is a Government entity, § 541's disavowal of that sta- tus certainly suffices to disable that agency from incurring contractual obligations on behalf of the United States. For these reasons, we think that Atchison's assumption of Am- trak's nongovernmental status (a point uncontested by the parties in the case, since it was not Amtrak's governmental character that the railroads relied upon to establish an obli- gation of the United States) does not bind us here. V The question before us today is unanswered, therefore, by governing statutory text or by binding precedent of this Court. Facing the question of Amtrak's status for the first time, we conclude that it is an agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights guar- anteed against the Government by the Constitution. This conclusion seems to us in accord with public and judi- cial understanding of the nature of Government-created and -controlled corporations over the years. A remarkable fea- ture of the heyday of those corporations, in the 1930's and 1940's, was that, even while they were praised for their sta- tus "as agencies separate and distinct, administratively and financially and legally, from the government itself, [which] has facilitated their adoption of commercial methods of ac- counting and financing, avoidance of political controls, and 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 395 Opinion of the Court utilization of regular procedures of business management," it was fully acknowledged that they were a "device" of "gov- ernment," and constituted "federal corporate agencies" apart from "regular government departments." Pritchett, 40 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., at 495. The Reference Manual of Government Corporations, prepared in 1945 by the Comptroller General, contains as one of its Tables "Corporations arranged accord- ing to supervising or interested Government department or agency," see GAO Corporation Manual x­xi. This lists the 58 then-extant Government corporations under the various departments and agencies, from the Agriculture Department to the War Department, and then concludes the list with five "Independent corporations"-analogous, one supposes, to the "independent agencies" of the Executive Branch proper. The whole tenor of the Manual is that these corporations are part of the Government. This Court has shared that view. For example, in Recon- struction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81 (1941), Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, described the RFC, whose organic statute did not state it to be a Government instrumentality, as, nonetheless, "a corpo- rate agency of the government," and said that "it acts as a governmental agency in performing its functions." Id., at 83. In Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 536 (1946), we had little difficulty finding that the RFC was "an agency selected by Government to accomplish purely governmental purposes," id., at 539, and was thus entitled to the benefit of a statute giving the Court of Claims jurisdic- tion over "counterclaims . . . on the part of the Government of the United States," 28 U. S. C. § 250(2) (1940 ed.). Like- wise in Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U. S. 517 (1940), we found that the Inland Waterways Corporation, which similarly was not specifically designated in its charter as an instrumentality of the United States, see Act of June 3, 1924, 43 Stat. 360, was an agency of the United States, so that its funds were "public moneys" for which national banks 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 396 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court could give security under § 45 of the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 113, 309 U. S., at 523­524. Justice Frank- furter wrote for the Court: "So far as the powers of a national bank to pledge its assets are concerned, the form which Government takes-whether it appears as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, or the Inland Water- ways Corporation-is wholly immaterial. The motives which lead Government to clothe its activities in corpo- rate form are entirely unrelated to the problem of safe- guarding governmental deposits . . . ." Id., at 523. Even Congress itself appeared to acknowledge, at least until recent years, that Government-created and -controlled corporations were part of the Government. The GCCA, dis- cussed above, which brought to an end the era of uncon- trolled growth of Government corporations, provided that, without explicit congressional authorization, no corporation should be acquired or created by "any officer or agency of the Federal Government or by any Government corporation for the purpose of acting as an agency or instrumentality of the United States . . . ." § 304(a), 59 Stat. 602 (emphasis added). That was evidently intended to restrict the cre- ation of all Government-controlled policy-implementing cor- porations, and not just some of them. And the companion provision that swept away many of the extant corporations said that no wholly owned government corporation created under state law could continue "as an agency or instru- mentality of the United States," § 304(b), 59 Stat. 602. Once again, that was evidently meant to eliminate policy- implementing government ownership of all state corpora- tions, and not just some of them. From the 1930's onward, many of the statutes creating Government-controlled corpo- rations said explicitly that they were agencies or instrumen- talities of the United States, see, e. g., Act of June 9, 1947, § 1, 61 Stat. 130, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 635 (creating the 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 397 Opinion of the Court Export-Import Bank of Washington as "an agency of the United States of America"); Federal Crop Insurance Act, § 503, 52 Stat. 72, 7 U. S. C. § 1503 (creating Federal Crop Insurance Corporation as "an agency of and within the De- partment of Agriculture"), and until 1962 none said other- wise. As we have described above, moreover, those later statutes, relatively few in number, took that statement, per- haps too uncritically, from an earlier statute pertaining to a corporation (Comsat) that was genuinely private and not Government controlled. That Government-created and -controlled corporations are (for many purposes at least) part of the Government itself has a strong basis, not merely in past practice and under- standing, but in reason itself. It surely cannot be that gov- ernment, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form. On that thesis, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), can be resurrected by the simple device of having the State of Louisiana operate segregated trains through a state-owned Amtrak. In Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230 (1957) (per curiam), we held that Girard College, which had been built and maintained pursuant to a privately erected trust, was nevertheless a governmental actor for constitu- tional purposes because it was operated and controlled by a board of state appointees, which was itself a state agency. Id., at 231. Amtrak seems to us an a fortiori case. Amtrak was created by a special statute, explicitly for the furtherance of federal governmental goals. As we have described, six of the corporation's eight externally named directors (the ninth is named by a majority of the board it- self) are appointed directly by the President of the United States-four of them (including the Secretary of Transpor- tation) with the advice and consent of the Senate. See §§ 543(a)(1)(A), (C)­(D). Although the statute restricts most of the President's choices to persons suggested by certain 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 398 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION Opinion of the Court organizations or persons having certain qualifications, those restrictions have been tailor-made by Congress for this en- tity alone. They do not in our view establish an absence of control by the Government as a whole, but rather constitute a restriction imposed by one of the political branches upon the other. Moreover, Amtrak is not merely in the tempo- rary control of the Government (as a private corporation whose stock comes into federal ownership might be); it is established and organized under federal law for the very pur- pose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal governmental appointees. It is in that respect no different from the so-called independ- ent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission or the Securities Exchange Commission, which are run by Presidential appointees with fixed terms. It is true that the directors of Amtrak, unlike commissioners of independent regulatory agencies, are not, by the explicit terms of the statute, removable by the President for cause, and are not impeachable by Congress. But any reduction in the immediacy of accountability for Amtrak directors vis-a - vis regulatory commissioners seems to us of minor conse- quence for present purposes-especially since, by the very terms of the chartering Act, Congress's "right to repeal, alter, or amend this chapter at any time is expressly re- served." 45 U. S. C. § 541. Respondent appeals to statements this Court made in a case involving the second Bank of the United States, Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904 (1824). There we allowed the Planters' Bank, in which the State of Georgia held a noncontrolling interest, see Act of Dec. 19, 1810, § 1, reprinted in Digest of Laws of State of Georgia 34­35 (O. Prince ed. 1822); Act of Dec. 3, 1811, § 1, id., at 35, to be sued in federal court despite the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that "[t]he State does not, by becom- ing a corporator, identify itself with the corporation," 9 Wheat., at 907. "The government of the Union," we said, 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 399 Opinion of the Court "held shares in the old Bank of the United States; but the privileges of the government were not imparted by that cir- cumstance to the bank. The United States was not a party to suits brought by or against the bank in the sense of the constitution." Id., at 908. But it does not contradict those statements to hold that a corporation is an agency of the Government, for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government rather than the "privileges of the government," when the State has specifically created that corporation for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and not merely holds some shares but controls the operation of the corpora- tion through its appointees. Respondent also invokes our decision in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974), which found the Consolidated Rail Corporation, or Conrail, not to be a federal instrumentality, despite the President's power to ap- point, directly or indirectly, 8 of its 15 directors. See id., at 152, n. 40; Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, § 301, 87 Stat. 1004. But we specifically observed in that case that the directors were placed on the board to protect the United States' interest "in assuring payment of the obligations guar- anteed by the United States," and that "[f]ull voting control . . . will shift to the shareholders if federal obligations fall below 50% of Conrail's indebtedness." 419 U. S., at 152. Moreover, we noted, "[t]he responsibilities of the federal di- rectors are not different from those of the other directors- to operate Conrail at a profit for the benefit of its sharehold- ers," ibid.-which contrasts with the public interest "goals" set forth in Amtrak's charter, see 45 U. S. C. § 501a. Am- trak is worlds apart from Conrail: The Government exerts its control not as a creditor but as a policymaker, and no provision exists that will automatically terminate control upon termination of a temporary financial interest.5 5 Section 543(c) purports to divide the authority to select seven directors between the common stockholders and the preferred stockholders upon conversion of one-fourth or more of Amtrak's outstanding preferred stock 513us2$22K 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 400 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting * * * We hold that where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmen- tal objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment. We express no opinion as to whether Amtrak's refusal to display Lebron's advertisement violated that Amendment, but leave it to the Court of Appeals to decide that. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re- versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, dissenting. The Court holds that Amtrak is a Government entity and therefore all of its actions are subject to constitutional chal- lenge. Lebron, however, expressly disavowed this argu- ment below, and consideration of this broad and unexpected question is precluded because it was not presented in the petition for certiorari. The question on which we granted certiorari is narrower: Whether the alleged suppression of Lebron's speech by Amtrak, as a concededly private entity, should be imputed to the Government. Because Amtrak's decision to reject Lebron's billboard proposal was a matter of private business judgment and not of Government coercion, I would affirm the judgment below. I This Court's Rule 14.1(a) provides: "Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be consid- ered by the Court." While "[t]he statement of any question to common stock. This subsection was originally enacted in 1970, and has not since been amended. It is irreconcilable with the revised provision for a nine-member board, § 543(a)(1). 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 401 O'Connor, J., dissenting presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary ques- tion," ibid., questions that are merely "related" or "comple- mentary" to the question presented are not "fairly included therein." Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 537­538 (1992) (emphasis deleted). In Yee, we held that a regulatory taking argument, while subsidiary to the umbrella question whether a taking had occurred, was only complementary to the physi- cal taking inquiry set forth in the petition and thus was barred under Rule 14.1(a). See id., at 535. Here, state ac- tion is the umbrella claim. Subsidiary to that claim, but complementary to each other, are two distinct questions: whether Amtrak is a Government entity, and whether Am- trak's conduct as a private actor is nevertheless attributable to the Government. We granted certiorari on the following question, set forth in the petition: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Amtrak's asserted policy barring the display of political advertising messages in Pennsylvania Station, New York, was not state action, where: "(a) the United States created Amtrak, endowed it with governmental powers, owns all its voting stock, and appoints all the members of its Board; "(b) the United States-appointed Board approved the advertising policy challenged here; "(c) the United States keeps Amtrak afloat every year by subsidizing its losses; and "(d) Pennsylvania Station was purchased for Amtrak by the United States and is shared with several other governmental entities." Pet. for Cert. i. The question asks whether the challenged policy "was not state action" and therefore may, at first blush, appear to present the umbrella inquiry. Yee suggests otherwise. The petition there recited two decisions by the Courts of Appeals and asked: "Was it error for the state appellate court to dis- 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 402 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting regard the rulings and hold that there was no taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments?" Instead of focusing on whether "there was no taking," we read the question as a whole. Since the decisions by the Courts of Appeals and the lower court opinion involved only physical takings, we concluded: "Fairly construed, then, petitioners' question pre- sented is the equivalent of the question, `Did the court below err in finding no physical taking?' " 503 U. S., at 537. Just so here. The question asks whether the lower court erred and thus directs our attention to the decisions below. The District Court, in its thorough order, explicitly noted Lebron's theory of the case: "Plaintiff does not contend that Amtrak is a governmental agency. What plaintiff contends is that the federal government is sufficiently entwined in Amtrak's operations and authority that the particular ac- tions at issue must be deemed governmental action." 811 F. Supp. 993, 999 (SDNY 1993). Before the Court of Ap- peals, in order to distinguish a long line of cases which held that Amtrak is not a Government agency, Lebron stated: "Since Lebron does not contend that Amtrak is a govern- mental entity per se, but rather is so interrelated to state entities that it should be treated as a state actor here, these cases are inapposite." Brief for Michael A. Lebron in No. 93­7127 (CA2), p. 30, n. 39. The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, substan- tively discussed only the second question that Lebron argues here-whether Amtrak's conduct in this case implicates "the presence of government action in the activities of private entities." 12 F. 3d 388, 390 (CA2 1993). To introduce its analysis, the Court of Appeals did state that "[t]he Rail Pas- senger Service Act of 1970 . . . created Amtrak as a private, for-profit corporation under the District of Columbia Busi- ness Corporation Act," ibid., relying on Congress' character- ization of the corporation in 45 U. S. C. § 541. In so assert- ing, the Court of Appeals did not " `pas[s] upon' " the question such that it is now a proper basis for reversal, ante, at 379, 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 403 O'Connor, J., dissenting but rather merely identified the question that the court had to address and focused the inquiry on the precise argument presented by Lebron. This observation by the Court of Ap- peals is much like-indeed, much less extensive than-our discussion of Amtrak's status as a private corporation in Na- tional Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 470 U. S. 451, 453­456 (1985). I agree with the Court that Atchison does not bind us, ante, at 393­394, but, by the same token, I do not see how the court below could be said to have addressed the issue. A passing observation could not constitute binding precedent; so, too, it could not serve as the basis for reversal. The question set forth in the petition focused on the specific action by Amtrak, not on the general nature of the corporation as a private or public entity. Lebron asked whether "Amtrak's asserted policy barring the display of political advertising messages in Pennsylvania Station, New York, was not state action." App. to Pet. for Cert. i. The list that follows this question, while partially concerning Am- trak's nature as an entity, went to support the thrust of the query, which is whether these enumerated attributes render Amtrak's advertising policy state action. Lebron's empha- sis on the specific action challenged is the crucial difference between his alternative arguments for state action. The first inquiry-whether Amtrak is a Government entity-fo- cuses on whether Amtrak is so controlled by the Government that it should be treated as a Government agency, and all of its decisions considered state action. The second inquiry takes Lebron at his word that Amtrak is not a Government entity and instead focuses on the State's influence on particu- lar actions by Amtrak as a private actor. Fairly construed, the question presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the advertising policy of Amtrak, as a private entity, is not attributable to the Fed- eral Government despite the corporation's links thereto. This question is closely related and complementary to, but 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 404 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting certainly not inclusive of, the question answered by the Court today, which is whether those links render Amtrak the functional equivalent of a Government agency. In my view, the latter question is barred by Rule 14.1(a). Relying on United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independ- ent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439 (1993), the Court argues that it properly addresses whether Amtrak is a Government entity because that inquiry is "prior to the clearly presented question," namely, whether Amtrak's deci- sion is attributable to the Government. Ante, at 382. In- dependent Ins. Agents, however, held only that the Court of Appeals had authority to consider a waived claim sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.* That is quite different from the purpose for which the Court now marshals the case, which is to justify its consideration of a waived question in the first instance. As explained below, I do not question the Court's authority, only its prudence. In any event, the dispute in Independent Ins. Agents centered on the interpretation of a statute that may not have existed, and, as the Court recognizes, ante, at 383, n. 3, the decision simply applied the traditional principle that "[t]here can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law." South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 267 (1877). Here, one need not assume the existence of any predicate legal rule to accept Lebron's word that Amtrak is a private entity. The mere fact that one question must be answered before another does not insulate the former from Rule 14.1(a) and other waiver rules. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), *The Court would read more into the decision, because we "decline[d] even to brush aside the Court of Appeals' (questionable) contention that there was `a "duty" to address the status of section 92,' saying only that `[w]e need not decide' that question." Ante, at 383, n. 3. But by (pru- dently) reserving the question, the Court could not have implied its an- swer. And our "complicit[y] in the [Court of Appeals'] enterprise," ibid., exists only if one indulges in the unlikely inference that we held more than what we said we did. 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 405 O'Connor, J., dissenting we held that Fourth Amendment claims are not ordinarily cognizable in federal habeas proceedings and distinguished several cases by noting that "the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not presented in the petition[s] for certiorari." Id., at 481, n. 15. We thus recognized that those decisions properly avoided the question of cognizabil- ity, which question, of course, is logically anterior to the mer- its of the Fourth Amendment claims presented. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211 (1981), we held that the Government had conceded that the petitioner had a Fourth Amendment interest in the searched home, an inquiry that precedes the question that was preserved, whether the search was reasonable. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 97, n. 4 (1991), because the ques- tion was neither litigated below nor included in the petition, we assumed the existence of a cause of action under § 20(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 before addressing the requirements of such an action. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 476 (1979) (assuming same). Finally, in McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. 257 (1991), the Court held that a state legislator did not violate the anti- extortion Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951, by accepting cam- paign contributions without an explicit exchange of improper promises. The Court reached this question only after de- clining to consider whether the Act applies to local officials at all, because that question was neither argued below nor included in the petition for certiorari. McCormick, 500 U. S., at 268, n. 6; see also id., at 280 (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting the assumption, because the argument was waived, that the Hobbs Act is a "federal `payment for official action' statute" even though "I think it well to bear in mind that the statute may not exist"). The Court does not take issue with these cases but argues further that, because the question whether Amtrak is a Gov- ernment entity is "dependent upon many of the same factual inquiries [as the clearly presented question], refusing to re- 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 406 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting gard it as embraced within the petition may force us to as- sume what the facts will show to be ridiculous, a risk which ought to be avoided." Ante, at 382. A certain circularity inheres in this logic, because the Court must first answer the omitted question in order to determine whether its answer turns on "the same factual inquiries" as the clearly presented question. As for the facts, the record is shaped by the parties' arguments below. Perhaps serendipity has given the Court a factual record adequate to decide a ques- tion other than that advanced below, but there is no guaran- tee of such convergence. It is rather unfair to hold a party to a record that it may have developed differently in re- sponse to a different theory of the case. It is this risk of unfairness, rather than the fear of seeming "ridiculous," that we should avoid. Rule 14.1(a), of course, imposes only a prudential limita- tion, but one that we disregard "only in the most exceptional cases." Stone v. Powell, supra, at 481, n. 15; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551, n. 5 (1980). This is not one of them. As noted before, not only did Lebron disavow the argument that Amtrak is a Government entity below, he did so in order to distinguish troublesome cases. Lebron's postpetition attempt to resuscitate the claim that he himself put to rest is precisely the kind of bait-and-switch strategy that waiver rules, prudential or otherwise, are sup- posed to protect against. In Steagald, supra, at 211, for example, we stated unequivocally that "the Government, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence, has lost its right to challenge petitioner's assertion that he pos- sessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched home." I see no difference here. The Rule's prudential limitation on our power of review serves two important purposes, both of which the Court dis- serves by deciding that Amtrak is a Government entity. First, the Rule provides notice and enables the respondent to sharpen its arguments in opposition to certiorari. "By 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 407 O'Connor, J., dissenting forcing the petitioner to choose his questions at the outset, Rule 14.1(a) relieves the respondent of the expense of unnec- essary litigation on the merits and the burden of opposing certiorari on unpresented questions." Yee, 503 U. S., at 536. Lebron argues that Amtrak has waived its Rule 14.1(a) argu- ment by failing to object in the brief in opposition to certio- rari. But that is exactly the point: The question set forth did not fairly include an argument that Amtrak is a Govern- ment agency, and, indeed, the petition was devoted to whether Amtrak's private decision should be imputed to the State. Even at pages 16­18, the petition did not "fairly em- brac[e] the argument that Lebron now advances," ante, at 380, but rather argued that the composition of Amtrak's board "renders an otherwise private entity a state actor," Pet. for Cert. 16 (emphasis added)-thus specifically repeating the concession he now wishes to withdraw. Amtrak could not respond to a point not argued and did not waive an argument that was not at issue. Not until the merits brief did Amtrak have notice that Lebron would contradict his persistent as- sertion that the corporation was a private entity. Second, the Rule assists the management of our cases. "Rule 14.1(a) forces the parties to focus on the questions the Court has viewed as particularly important, thus enabling us to make efficient use of our resources." Yee, supra, at 536. We normally grant only petitions that present an im- portant question of law on which the lower courts are in conflict. Here, the lower courts have generally held that Amtrak is not a Government entity, see, e. g., Anderson v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 754 F. 2d 202, 204 (CA7 1985); Ehm v. National Railroad Passenger Corpo- ration, 732 F. 2d 1250, 1255 (CA5), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 982 (1984), and none of our cases suggest otherwise. Even where the lower courts are in clear conflict, we often defer consideration of novel questions of law to permit further de- velopment. Despite the prevalence of publicly owned corpo- rations, whether they are Government agencies is a question 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 408 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting seldom answered, and then only for limited purposes. See Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 536, 539 (1946); National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchi- son, T. & S. F. R. Co., 470 U. S., at 471. Answering this question today merely opens the back door to premature adjudication of similarly broad and novel theories in the future. Weeding out such endeavors, Rule 14.1(a), like other waiver rules, rests firmly upon a limited view of our judicial power. See, e. g., Carducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (Scalia, J.) ("The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbi- ters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them"). "The doctrine of judicial restraint teaches us that patience in the judicial resolution of conflicts may sometimes produce the most desirable result." Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 183 (1982). Whether the result of today's decision is desirable I do not decide. But I think it clear that the Court has exhib- ited little patience in reaching that result. II Accepting Lebron's concession that Amtrak is a private entity, I must "traverse th[e] difficult terrain," ante, at 378, that the Court sees fit to avoid, and answer the question that is properly presented to us: whether Amtrak's decision to ban Lebron's speech, although made by a concededly private entity, is nevertheless attributable to the Government and therefore considered state action for constitutional purposes. Reflecting the discontinuity that marks the law in this area, we have variously characterized the inquiry as whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 (1974); whether the State, by encouraging the challenged conduct, could be thought "responsible for those 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 409 O'Connor, J., dissenting actions," Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1005 (1982); and whether "the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] `fairly attributable to the State,' " Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 838 (1982), quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 937 (1982). Whatever the semantic formu- lation, I remain of the view that the conduct of a private actor is not subject to constitutional challenge if such con- duct is "fundamentally a matter of private choice and not state action." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Lebron relies heavily on Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). There, the Court perceived a symbiotic relationship between a racially segregated res- taurant and a state agency from which the restaurant leased public space. Noting that the State stood to profit from the discrimination, the Court held that the government had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with" the private restaurant that it was in effect "a joint partici- pant in the challenged activity." Id., at 725. Focusing on this language, Lebron argues that various features of Am- trak's structure and management-its statutory genesis, the heavy reliance on federal subsidies, and a board appointed by the President-places it in a symbiotic relationship with the Government such that the decision to ban Lebron's speech should be imputed to the State. Our decision in Burton, however, was quite narrow. We recognized "the limits of our inquiry" and emphasized that our decision depended on the "peculiar facts [and] circum- stances present." Id., at 726. We have since noted that Burton limited its "actual holding to lessees of public prop- erty," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 358, and our recent decisions in this area have led commentators to doubt its continuing vitality, see, e. g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18­3, p. 1701, n. 13 (2d ed. 1988) ("The only surviving explanation of the result in Burton may be that found in Justice Stewart's concurrence"). 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 410 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting In Jackson, we held that a private utility's termination of service to a customer is not subject to due process challenge, even though the termination was made pursuant to a state law. In doing so, we made clear that the question turns on whether the challenged conduct results from private choice: "Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so `state action' for pur- poses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 419 U. S., at 357 (footnote omitted). The rule applies even where the private entity makes its decision in an environment heavily regu- lated by the government. Rendell-Baker, supra, involved a private school for troubled students who were transferred there by authority of a state law, and for whose education the State paid the school. Public funds comprised 90% to 99% of the school budget. The school fired petitioners, and a state grievance board reviewed that personnel action. De- spite the school's pervasive ties to the State, we held that the discharge decisions were not subject to constitutional challenge because those actions "were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation." Id., at 841. We noted that "in contrast to the extensive regulation of the school generally, the various regulators showed relatively little in- terest in the school's personnel matters." Ibid. Likewise, in Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, we held that the decisions of a regulated hospital to discharge its patients were not subject to constitutional challenge. Although various Medicaid reg- ulations and benefit adjustment procedures may have en- couraged the hospital's decisions to discharge its patients early, we held that the State was not "responsible for those actions" because such actions "ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State." Id., at 1005, 1008. See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 547 (1987) ("There is no evidence that the Federal Government coerced 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 411 O'Connor, J., dissenting or encouraged the USOC in the exercise of its right [to deny use of its copyright]"). These cases differ markedly from the "interdependence" or "joint participation" analysis of Burton and stand for the principle that, unless the government affirmatively influenced or coerced the private party to undertake the challenged action, such conduct is not state action for con- stitutional purposes. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., supra, is not to the contrary. In that case, the Court held that a private attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge is attributable to the government and therefore subject to constitutional inquiry. Although the opinion cited Burton, see 500 U. S., at 621, 624, it emphasized that a private party exercising a peremptory challenge enjoys the "overt, sig- nificant assistance of the court," id., at 624. The decision therefore is an application of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 19 (1948), which focused on the use of the State's coercive power, through its courts, to effect the litigant's allegedly unconstitutional choice. Moreover, Edmonson stressed that a litigant exercising a peremptory challenge performs a "tra- ditional function of the government," 500 U. S., at 624, a the- ory of state action established by Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946), that is independent from Burton and not relevant to this case. Relying thus on Shelley and Marsh, Edmonson did not necessarily extend the "interdependence" rationale of Bur- ton beyond the limited facts of that case. Given the perva- sive role of government in our society, a test of state action predicated upon public and private "interdependence" sweeps much too broadly and would subject to constitutional challenge the most pedestrian of everyday activities, a prob- lem that the Court recognized in Burton itself, see 365 U. S., at 725­726. A more refined inquiry is that established by Jackson, Rendell-Baker, Blum, and San Francisco Arts & Athletics: The conduct of a private entity is not subject to constitutional scrutiny if the challenged action results from 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT 412 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION O'Connor, J., dissenting the exercise of private choice and not from state influence or coercion. Applying this principle to the facts before us, I see no basis to impute to the Government Amtrak's decision to disapprove Lebron's advertisement. Although a number of factors indicate the Government's pervasive influence in Amtrak's management and operation, none suggest that the Government had any effect on Amtrak's decision to turn down Lebron's proposal. The advertising policy that alleg- edly violates the First Amendment originated with a prede- cessor to Amtrak, the wholly private Pennsylvania Railroad Company. A 1967 lease by that company, for example, pro- hibited "any advertisement which in the judgement of Licen- sor is or might be deemed to be slanderous, libelous, unlaw- ful, immoral, [or] offensive to good taste . . . ." App. 326, ¶ 19. Amtrak simply continued this policy after it took over. The specific decision to disapprove Lebron's advertising was made by Amtrak's Vice President of Real Estate and Opera- tions Development, who, as a corporate officer, was neither appointed by the President nor directed by the President- appointed board to disapprove Lebron's proposal. Lebron nevertheless contends that the board, through its approval of the advertising policy, controlled the adverse ac- tion against him. This contention rests on the faulty prem- ise that Amtrak's directors are state actors simply because they were appointed by the President; it assumes that the board members sit as public officials and not as business directors, thus begging the question whether Amtrak is a Government agency or a private entity. In any event, even accepting Lebron's premise that the board's approval has constitutional significance, the factual record belies his con- tention. The particular lease that permitted Amtrak to dis- allow Lebron's billboard was neither reviewed nor approved directly by the board. In fact, minutes of meetings dating back to 1985 showed that the board approved only one con- tract between Amtrak and Transportation Displays, Incor- 513us2$22J 04-01-98 17:46:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995) 413 O'Connor, J., dissenting porated, the billboard leasing company that served as Am- trak's agent, and even then it is not clear whether the board approved the contract or merely delegated authority to exe- cute the licensing agreement. App. 402. In short, nothing in this case suggests that the Government controlled, co- erced, or even influenced Amtrak's decision, made pursuant to corporate policy and private business judgment, to disap- prove the advertisement proposed by Lebron. Presented with this question, the Court of Appeals prop- erly applied our precedents and did not impute Amtrak's de- cision to the Government. I would affirm on this basis and not reverse the Court of Appeals based on a theory that is foreign to this case. Respectfully, I dissent. 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 414 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 93­768. Argued December 5, 1994-Decided February 21, 1995 The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 29 U. S. C. §§ 1381­1461, permits an employer withdrawing from an under- funded multiemployer pension plan to "amortize" the charge it is re- quired to pay to cover its fair share of the plan's unfunded liabilities by making installment payments to the plan. Following the August 14, 1981, withdrawal of respondent Schlitz from petitioner multiemployer pension plan (Plan), a dispute arose as to when, for purposes of calculat- ing Schlitz's amortization schedule, interest began to accrue on the com- pany's withdrawal charge. The Plan claimed that accrual began on the last day of the plan year preceding withdrawal, December 31, 1980, the "valuation date" as of which the withdrawal charge was determined. Schlitz, however, argued for January 1, 1982, the first day of the plan year following withdrawal. Under the Plan's reading, Schlitz's last an- nual installment would be substantially greater than it would under Schlitz's own reading. The District Court disagreed with Schlitz, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: MPPAA calculates its installment schedule on the assumption that interest begins accruing on the first day of the plan year following with- drawal. Pp. 421­431. (a) For computation purposes, § 1399(c)(1)(A)(i)-which (the parties agree) governs this case and which authorizes an employer "to amortize the [withdrawal] amount in . . . annual payments . . . , calculated as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs and as if each subsequent payment were made on the first day of each subsequent plan year"- causes interest to accrue over subsequent plan years, but not during the withdrawal year itself. Although the statute does not mention interest directly, the word "amortize" assumes interest charges. However, the word does not indicate that interest accrues during the withdrawal year. One generally does not pay interest on a debt of the kind here at issue until that debt arises-i. e., until its principal is outstanding. Under the statute, the withdrawing employer's debt does not arise at the end of the year preceding the year of withdrawal. Rather, § 1399(c)(1) (A)(i)'s instruction to calculate payments as if the "first payment" were 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 415 Opinion of the Court made on the "first day" of the year following withdrawal demonstrates that the debt must be treated as if it arose at that time. The Plan's contrary reading of the statute cannot be easily reconciled with statu- tory provisions permitting an employer to pay the amount owed in a lump sum and thereby avoid paying amortization interest, § 1399(c)(4), and defining a withdrawing employer's basic liability without reference to interest during the withdrawal year, §§ 1381(b)(1), 1391. Pp. 422­425. (b) The several arguments of the Plan and its amici-(1) that allow- ing a withdrawing employer to avoid interest during the withdrawal year works against the statute's basic objective of requiring the em- ployer to pay a fair share of the plan's underfunding; (2) that the stat- ute's language actually favors calculating interest from the last day of the plan year before withdrawal; and (3) that the legislative history demonstrates that Congress expressly rejected the idea of a "funding gap" between the valuation date at the end of the plan year before withdrawal and the beginning of the year following withdrawal-are not persuasive. Pp. 425­430. 3 F. 3d 994, affirmed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Michael G. Bruton argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Neil K. Quinn, Robert Marc Chem- ers, and Mary Anne H. Capron. Richard K. Willard argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Sara E. Hauptfuehrer, James W. Greer, and David C. Hertel.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 94 Stat. 1208, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1381­1461, provides that an employer who withdraws from an underfunded multi- employer pension plan must pay a charge sufficient to cover that employer's fair share of the plan's unfunded liabilities. The statute permits the employer to pay that charge in lump *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund by Thomas C. Nyhan and Terence G. Craig; and for the National Coordinating Committee for Multi- employer Plans by K. Peter Schmidt and Philip W. Horton. 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 416 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court sum or to "amortize" it, making payments over time. This case focuses upon a withdrawing employer who amortizes the charge, and it asks when, for purposes of calculating the amortization schedule, interest begins to accrue on the amor- tized charge. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, for purposes of computation, interest begins to ac- crue on the first day of the year after withdrawal. We agree and affirm its judgment. I We shall briefly describe the general purpose of MPPAA, the basic way MPPAA works, and the relevant interest- related facts of the case before us. A MPPAA's General Purpose MPPAA helps solve a problem that became apparent after Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Secu- rity Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. ERISA helped assure private-sector workers that they would receive the pensions that their employers had prom- ised them. See, e. g., Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 605­609 (1993). To do so, among other things, ERISA required employers to make contributions that would produce pension plan assets sufficient to meet future vested pension liabilities; it mandated termination insurance to protect workers against a plan's bankruptcy; and, if a plan became insolvent, it held any employer who had withdrawn from the plan during the previous five years liable for a fair share of the plan's underfunding. See 26 U. S. C. § 412 (mini- mum funding standards); 29 U. S. C. § 1082 (same); 29 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. (termination insurance); 29 U. S. C. § 1364 (with- drawal liability). Unfortunately, this scheme encouraged an employer to withdraw from a financially shaky plan and risk paying its share if the plan later became insolvent, rather than to re- 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 417 Opinion of the Court main and (if others withdrew) risk having to bear alone the entire cost of keeping the shaky plan afloat. Consequently, a plan's financial troubles could trigger a stampede for the exit doors, thereby ensuring the plan's demise. See Con- nolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211, 216 (1986); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 722­723, n. 2 (1984); see also 29 U. S. C. § 1001a(a)(4); H. R. Rep. No. 96­869, pt. 1, pp. 54­55 (1980); D. McGill & D. Grubbs, Fundamentals of Private Pensions 618­619 (6th ed. 1989). MPPAA helped eliminate this problem by changing the strategic considera- tions. It transformed what was only a risk (that a with- drawing employer would have to pay a fair share of under- funding) into a certainty. That is to say, it imposed a withdrawal charge on all employers withdrawing from an underfunded plan (whether or not the plan later became insolvent). And, it set forth a detailed set of rules for determining, and collecting, that charge. B MPPAA's Basic Approach The way in which MPPAA calculates interest is related to the way in which that statute answers three more general, and more important, questions: First, how much is the with- drawal charge? MPPAA's lengthy charge-determination section, § 1391, sets forth rules for calculating a withdraw- ing employer's fair share of a plan's underfunding. See 29 U. S. C. § 1391. It explains (a) how to determine a plan's total underfunding; and (b) how to determine an employer's fair share (based primarily upon the comparative number of that employer's covered workers in each earlier year and the related level of that employer's contributions). One might expect § 1391 to calculate a withdrawal charge that equals the withdrawing employer's fair share of a plan's underfunding as of the day the employer withdraws. But, instead, § 1391 instructs a plan to make the withdrawal 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 418 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court charge calculation, not as of the day of withdrawal, but as of the last day of the plan year preceding the year during which the employer withdrew-a day that could be up to a year earlier. See §§ 1391(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i), (c)(3)(A), and (c)(4)(A). Thus (assuming for illustrative pur- poses that a plan's bookkeeping year and the calendar year coincide), the withdrawal charge for an employer withdraw- ing from an underfunded plan in 1981 equals that employer's fair share of the underfunding as calculated on December 31, 1980, whether the employer withdrew the next day (January 1, 1981) or a year later (December 31, 1981). The reason for this calculation date seems one of administrative conven- ience. Its use permits a plan to base the highly complex calculations upon figures that it must prepare in any event for a report required under ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1082(c) (9), thereby avoiding the need to generate new figures tied to the date of actual withdrawal. Second, how may the employer pay the withdrawal charge? The statute sets forth two methods: (a) payment in a lump sum; and (b) payment in installments. The statute's lump-sum method is relatively simple. A withdrawing em- ployer may pay the entire liability when the first payment falls due; pay installments for a while and then discharge its remaining liability; or make a partial balloon payment and afterwards pay installments. See 29 U. S. C. § 1399(c)(4). The statute's installment method is more complex. The statutory method is unusual in that the statute does not ask the question that a mortgage borrower would normally ask, namely, what is the amount of each of my monthly payments? What size monthly payment will amortize, say, a 7% 30-year loan of $100,000? Rather, the statute fixes the amount of each payment and asks how many such payments there will have to be. To put the matter more precisely, (1) the statute fixes the amount of each annual payment at a level that (roughly speaking) equals the withdrawing employer's typi- cal contribution in earlier years; (2) it sets an interest rate, 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 419 Opinion of the Court equal to the rate the plan normally uses for its calculations; and (3) it then asks how many such annual payments it will take to "amortize" the withdrawal charge at that interest rate. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1399(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(C). It is as if Brown, who owes Smith $1,000, were to ask, not, "How much must I pay each month to pay off the debt (with 7% interest) over two years?"-but, rather, "Assuming 7% interest, how many $100 monthly payments must I make to pay off that debt?" To bring the facts closer to those of this case, assume that an employer withdraws from an under- funded plan in mid-1981; that the withdrawal charge (calcu- lated as of the end of 1980) is $23.3 million; that the employer normally contributes about $4 million per year to the plan; and that the plan uses a 7% interest rate. In that case, the statute asks: "How many annual payments of about $4 mil- lion does it take to pay off a debt of $23.3 million if the in- terest rate is 7%?" The fact that the statute poses the installment-plan question in this way, along with an addi- tional feature of the statute, namely, that the statute forgives all debt outstanding after 20 years, 29 U. S. C. § 1399(c)(1)(B), suggests that maintaining level funding for the plan is an important goal of the statute. The practical effect of this concern with maintaining level payments is that any amorti- zation interest § 1399(c)(1)(A)(i) may cause to accrue is added to the end of the payment schedule (unless forgiven by § 1399(c)(1)(B)). Third, when must the employer pay? The statute could not make the employer pay the calculated sum (or begin to pay that sum) on the date in reference to which one calcu- lates the withdrawal charge, for that date occurs before the employer withdraws. (It is the last day of the preceding plan year, i. e., December 31, 1980, for an employer who with- draws in 1981.) The statute, of course, might make the withdrawing employer pay (or begin payment) on the date the employer actually withdraws. But, it does not do so. Rather, the statute says that a plan must draw up a schedule 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 420 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court for payment and "demand payment" as "soon as practicable" after withdrawal. 29 U. S. C. § 1399(b)(1). It adds that "[w]ithdrawal liability shall be payable . . . no more than 60 days after the date of the demand." § 1399(c)(2). Thus, a plan that calculates quickly might demand pay- ment the day after withdrawal and make the charge "pay- able" within 60 days thereafter. A plan that calculates slowly might not be able to demand payment for many months after withdrawal. For example, in the case of the employer who withdraws on August 14, 1981, incurring a withdrawal charge of $23.3 million (calculated as of Decem- ber 31, 1980), the lump sum of $23.3 million, or the first of the installment payments of roughly $4 million, will become "payable" to the plan "no later than 60 days" after the plan sent the withdrawing employer a demand letter. The day of the first payment may thus come as soon as within 60 days after August 15, 1981, or it may not come for many months thereafter, depending upon the plan's calculating speed. C This Case The facts of this case approximate those of our example. Three brewers, Schlitz, Pabst, and Miller, contributed for many years to a multiemployer pension plan (Plan). On Au- gust 14, 1981, Schlitz withdrew from the Plan. See App. 151­152. By the end of September 1981, the Plan completed its calculations, created a payment schedule, and sent out a demand for payment (thereby making the first installment payment "payable") "on or before November 1, 1981." Id., at 153, 154. From the outset, the parties agreed that the annual installment payment amounted to $3,945,481, and that the relevant interest rate was 7% per year. After various controversies led to arbitration and a court proceeding be- tween Schlitz and the Plan, the courts and parties eventually determined that the withdrawal charge (calculated as of the 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 421 Opinion of the Court last day of the previous plan-bookkeeping year, December 31, 1980) amounted to $23.3 million. But the parties disagreed whether interest accrued during 1981, the year in which Schlitz withdrew. The Plan claimed that, for purposes of calculating the installment schedule, in- terest started accruing on the last day of the plan year pre- ceding withdrawal (December 31, 1980). Schlitz, on the other hand, argued that accrual began on the first day of the plan year following withdrawal (January 1, 1982). Under either reading, the number of annual payments is eight. But, under the Plan's reading, the final payment would amount to $3,499,361, whereas, in Schlitz's reading, that pay- ment would amount to $880,331. The arbitrator in this case agreed with Schlitz's reading. See 9 EBC 2385, 2405 (1988). The District Court, reviewing the arbitration award, disagreed, No. 88­C­908 (ED Wis., June 6, 1991), reprinted in App. 25, 62­69, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court, 3 F. 3d 994 (1993). Because the Seventh Circuit's decision conflicts with a holding of the Third Circuit, Huber v. Casa- blanca Industries, Inc., 916 F. 2d 85, 95­100 (1990), cert. dism'd, 506 U. S. 1088 (1993), this Court granted certiorari, 512 U. S. 1234 (1994). Our conclusion, like that of the Sev- enth Circuit, is that, for purposes of computation, interest does not start accruing until the beginning of the plan year after withdrawal. II At first glance, the statutory provision that (the parties agree) governs this case seems silent on the issue of withdrawal-year interest. Indeed, it does not mention in- terest directly at all. Rather, it says that a withdrawing employer "shall pay the amount determined under section 1391 . . . over the period of years necessary to amortize the amount in level annual payments determined under sub- 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 422 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court paragraph (C), calculated as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs and as if each subsequent payment were made on the first day of each subsequent plan year." 29 U. S. C. § 1399(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). After considering the parties' arguments, which focus upon the emphasized language, we have become convinced that, for purposes of computation, this provision, although causing interest to accrue over subsequent plan years, does not cause interest to accrue during the withdrawal year itself. A The Plan points out, and we agree, that the word "amor- tize" normally assumes interest charges. After all, the very idea of amortizing, say, a mortgage loan, involves paying the principal of the debt over time along with interest. But the Plan (supported by the Government, which is taking a view of the matter contrary to the view the Pension Benefit Guar- anty Corporation took in the Huber case, see 916 F. 2d, at 96) goes on to claim that the word "amortize" indicates that interest accrues during the withdrawal year as well as dur- ing subsequent years. We do not agree with that claim. In our view, one generally does not pay interest on a debt until that debt arises-that is to say, until the principal of the debt is outstanding. And the instruction to calculate payment as if the first payment were made at the beginning of the fol- lowing year tells us to treat the debt as if it arose at that time (i. e., the first day of the year after withdrawal), not as if it arose one year earlier. For one thing, unless a loan is involved, one normally ex- pects a debtor to make a first payment at the time the debt arises, not one payment cycle later. Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer arranges to pay a large tax debt in four quar- terly installments. Would one not expect the taxpayer to make the first payment on April 15, the day the tax debt 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 423 Opinion of the Court becomes due? Similarly, would one not expect a buyer of, say, a business to make the first payment (a down payment) at the time of the closing? By way of contrast, when a loan is involved (say, when one borrows money on a home mort- gage and repays it in installments), interest accrual normally does begin before the first payment. That is because the borrower has had the use of the money for one cycle before the first payment. In the case of a loan, it would seem point- less, and would simply generate an unnecessary back-and- forth transfer of money, for a first repayment to take place on the very day the lender disburses the loan proceeds. The "first payment" at issue here, however, looks more like a tax or purchase-money installment than a loan installment. Under the statute, the withdrawing employer's debt does not arise at the end of the year preceding the year of withdrawal. In fact, the employer may not have withdrawn from the plan at the beginning of the year, but instead may have continued to make its ordinary contribution until well into the year. In any event, the statute makes clear that the withdrawing employer owes nothing until its plan demands payment, which will inevitably happen some time after the beginning of the year. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1399(b)(1), (c)(2). In fact, the withdrawing employer cannot determine, or pay, the amount of its debt until the plan has calculated that amount-which must take place some time after the beginning of the with- drawal year. All these features make it difficult to find any analogy in withdrawal liability to a loan. For another thing, we cannot easily reconcile the Plan's reading of the statute with the statutory provision that per- mits an employer to pay the amount owed in a lump sum. That provision says that a withdrawing employer "shall be entitled to prepay the outstanding amount of the unpaid annual withdrawal liability payments deter- mined under [§ 1399(c)(1)(C)], plus accrued interest, if any, in whole or in part, without penalty." § 1399(c)(4). 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 424 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court We read this provision to permit an employer, by paying a lump sum, to avoid paying the amortization interest that § 1399(c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise cause to accrue. (Under any other reading, the prepayment provision would not cre- ate much of an "entitle[ment]." Moreover, the prepayment provision refers to "payments determined under [§ 1399(c)(1) (C)]"-not § 1399(c)(1)(A), the provision that causes amortiza- tion interest to accrue.) It would seem odd if the prepay- ment provision enabled an employer to avoid all interest ex- cept the interest accruing during the year of withdrawal. And, if interest accrued from the last day of the year before withdrawal, there would hardly ever be a time that no inter- est was due. Such a reading would thus make it very diffi- cult to give meaning to the words "if any" in the phrase "plus accrued interest, if any." (The Third Circuit suggested that these words might refer to a lump-sum payment made imme- diately after a scheduled installment. See Huber, 916 F. 2d, at 99. We agree that they could, theoretically. But, realis- tically speaking, it seems unlikely that Congress inserted "if any" to deal with such an unusual event.) Further, the interpretation under which interest would ac- crue from the last day of the year before withdrawal is diffi- cult to reconcile with the statutory language that defines a withdrawing employer's basic liability. Section 1381(a) says that the withdrawing employer becomes "liable to the plan in the amount determined under this part to be the withdrawal liability." Section 1381(b)(1) defines "withdrawal liability" as "the amount determined under section 1391." Yet, § 1391 says nothing about a year's worth of interest. Why then read the provision here at issue so that it inevitably and al- ways creates liability in the amount of the withdrawal charge plus one year's interest, irrespective of when the employer, in fact, withdraws and how or when the employee begins to pay? Finally, the provision here at issue asks one to calculate the installment payments as if the "first payment" was made, 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 425 Opinion of the Court not on the last day of the withdrawal year, but on the "first day" of the next year, i. e., one year plus one day after the withdrawal charge calculation date. This choice of time (a year and a day) would be an odd way to signal that one is to treat the first payment as if it occurred at the end of a cycle. B The Plan (and supporting amici) make several arguments in support of a reading in which, for purposes of calculation, interest starts accruing on the last day of the year before withdrawal. But we are not persuaded. First, the Plan argues that our interpretation works against the basic objective of the statute, requiring a with- drawing employer to pay a fair share of the underfunding. Under our interpretation, says the Plan, the withdrawing employer will fail to pay a year's worth of interest on the withdrawal charge, thereby requiring the remaining employ- ers to make up what, in fact, was part of the withdrawing employer's fair share. Suppose, for example, that an under- funded plan needed exactly $20 million as of the end of 1980 to create a sum that would grow to just the amount needed to pay then-vested benefits falling due, say, in 1999. By the end of 1981 that same plan would need more money; indeed, if we assume the $20 million would have grown 7% each year, it would need 7% more to pay those same vested 1999 bene- fits. Thus, if the withdrawing employer's fair share of the $20 million is $3 million as of the end of 1980, its fair share must have grown to $3,210,000 by the end of 1981. Why, asks the Plan, should the remaining employers have to make up for this missing $210,000? One answer to the Plan's question is that the $210,000 will not necessarily be missing. For one thing, until the em- ployer withdraws, it will be required to make contributions that should contain a component designed to reduce under- funding. See 26 U. S. C. § 412(b)(2); 29 U. S. C. § 1082. For another thing, if a plan moves quickly, it may be able to force 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 426 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court a withdrawing employer to begin making installment pay- ments even before the end of the withdrawal year. Either way, to charge such an employer a full year's worth of inter- est would overcharge that employer and thereby provide the remaining employers with a kind of underfunding-reduction windfall. Another answer is that we are not convinced that MPPAA aims to make withdrawing employers pay an actuarially per- fect fair share, namely, a set of payments in amounts that, when invested, would theoretically produce (on the plan's ac- tuarial assumptions) a sum precisely sufficient to pay (the employer's proportional share of) a plan's estimated vested future benefits. For one thing, the statute forgives de mini- mis amounts. See 29 U. S. C. § 1389. For another thing, it forgives all annual installment payments after 20 years, see § 1399(c)(1)(B)-and that means that, if an employer's normal annual contribution was low compared to the withdrawal charge, the presence or absence of withdrawal-year interest (which shows up at the end of the payment schedule, see supra, at 419) will make no difference (for the last payments will never be made). Finally, in making the first installment "payable" only after a plan demands it, MPPAA contem- plates that an employer sometimes may pay its actual first installment long after the withdrawal year-as was the case in Huber, supra, at 88 (21/2-year delay)-in which case no interpretation of the statute can avoid an employer's actually paying something less than its fair share of interest. Second, the Plan argues that the statute's language favors its interpretation. It refers to a dictionary that defines an amortization plan as " `one where there are partial payments of the principal, and accrued interest, at stated periods for a definite time, at the expiration of which the entire indebt- edness will be extinguished,' " Brief for Petitioner 27 (quot- ing Black's Law Dictionary 76 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added), and to another definition that says that, " `[i]f a loan is being repaid by the amortization method, each payment 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 427 Opinion of the Court is partially repayment of principal and partially payment of interest,' " Brief for Petitioner 27 (quoting S. Kellison, The Theory of Interest 169 (2d ed. 1991)) (emphasis added). These definitions accurately describe the repayment of loans. But, they do not seem to focus upon whether or not one would normally include interest in the first installment of an amortized payment of a debt that is not a loan. We have no reason to believe they intend to define away the issue before us here. The Plan adds that our reading of the statute makes the first "as if" clause in § 1399(c)(1)(A)(i) superfluous because, "if Congress had not intended to include interest in the first payment, it could have simply provided that the presumed payment schedule should be calculated as if payments were made annually." Brief for Petitioner 38. It seems to us that the premise of this argument is that, without contrary indication, one would expect that, in the case of an indebted- ness of the kind here at issue, interest would not start accru- ing before the first payment is due-a premise with which we agree, see supra, at 422­423. More importantly, had Congress not used the words "as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs," the reader might have thought that interest would begin to accrue immediately upon withdrawal, a reading that has some intuitive appeal, see 3 F. 3d, at 1004 ("An assessment of interest between the date of withdrawal and the date on which payments begin . . . would not be troubling"). But, the first "as if" clause makes clear that interest does not begin accruing on that date. (The same concern may explain the second "as if" clause in § 1399(c)(1)(A)(i), concerning subsequent payments. Without that clause, one might think that one should calcu- late the amortization schedule as if the first payment is made out of order, and as if each successive payment is made on the anniversary of the date of withdrawal.) 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 428 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court We recognize that Congress might have been more spe- cific. For example, it could have said: "Calculate amortiza- tion as if the first payment is made on the date the employ- er's withdrawal liability is due" (had it intended interest to start accruing on that date); or: "Calculate amortization as if each payment is made on the last day of the year at the beginning of which it is due" (had it intended interest to start accruing one cycle before the first payment is due). In- stead, Congress said that one should calculate amortization "as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs." And, that actual language, as we have said, offers more support for our interpretation than for the alternative. Were we to read the actual language as does the Plan, we would have to analogize the valuation date (the last day of the year preceding withdrawal) to the date on which liability arises; to the date on which the debt becomes "payable"; or to the date on which the employer withdraws. But, in fact, the calculation date is none of those things; it is a date chosen simply for ease of administration; and ease of administration does not require choosing the same date for interest-accrual purposes. See 3 F. 3d, at 1004 ("Establishing a simple rule for calculating funding shortfalls has nothing to do with interest"). Third, the Plan points to legislative history. The Plan says that the original bill provided that interest would not begin accruing until the date of withdrawal. And, the Plan points out, just like the version that ultimately became law, the bill located the valuation date (the date as of which the withdrawing employer's share in the plan's underfunding is determined) at the end of the plan year before withdrawal. Thus, the Plan says, the original bill contemplated a "funding gap"-from the valuation date to the withdrawal date. Be- cause the section providing that interest started accruing on the withdrawal date did not make it into the statute as en- 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 429 Opinion of the Court acted, the Plan argues, Congress expressly rejected the idea of a "gap." Brief for Petitioner 41. For the reasons stated above, see supra, at 426­427, we doubt that our reading, as a practical matter, will cause a significant gap to occur. But, regardless, if we were to con- sider legislative history in this case, we would find that it undermines, rather than supports, the Plan's reading. The Plan's rendering is incomplete, for the relevant statutory provisions went through not two but four versions: (1) the original bill, calling for a valuation on the last day of the year before withdrawal and for interest accrual beginning on the date of withdrawal, see S. 1076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1979) (add- ing ERISA §§ 4201(d)(1)(A), (e)(5)), reprinted in 125 Cong. Rec. 9800, 9803 (1979); H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1979) (adding ERISA §§ 4201(d) (1)(A), (e)(5)), reprinted in Hearings on the Multiem- ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1979 before the Task Force on Welfare and Pension Plans of the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3, 21, 25 (1979) (hereinafter Task Force Hearings); (2) a second version, which moved the valuation date to the end of the withdrawal year and also said that inter- est shall be determined "as if each payment were made at the end of the year in which it is due" (thus appar- ently indicating that interest would start accruing one year before the first payment fell due), see H. R. 3904, supra, § 104 (adding ERISA §§ 4201(e) (2)(E), (f)(2)(C), (f)(3)(A), (f)(4)(A), (i)(2)(A) (ii)), re- printed in Task Force Hearings 246­247, 249, 251, 252, 256; (3) a third version, which kept the valuation date at the end of the withdrawal year but changed the interest- 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT 430 MILWAUKEE BREWERY WORKERS' PENSION PLAN v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO. Opinion of the Court accrual language to the "as if" clauses found in the statute as we now know it, see H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1980) (adding ERISA §§ 4201(e)(2)(E)(i), (f)(2)(C)(i), (f) (3)(A), (f)(4)(A), (i)(2)(A)(i)), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96­869, pt. 1, pp. 12­15 (1980); H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1980) (adding ERISA §§ 4201(e)(2)(E)(i), (f)(2)(C)(i), (f)(3)(A), (f)(4)(A), 4202(c)(1)(A)(i)), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96­869, pt. 2, pp. 129­131, 135­136 (1980); and (4) a final version, which moved the valuation date back to the end of the year preceding withdrawal but re- tained the third version's interest-accrual language, see H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1980) (adding ERISA §§ 4211(b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i)(I), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4)(A)(i), 4219(c)(1)(A)(i)), reprinted in 126 Cong. Rec. 23003, 23014, 23016 (1980). This history suggests two things, neither of which helps the Plan. First, throughout the bill's history, the valuation date and interest-accrual date moved about in an apparently uncoordinated way. This somewhat undermines the Plan's suggestion that Congress was very concerned about the interplay between the two. It certainly dispels the notion that the final version should primarily be viewed as a rejec- tion of the "funding gap" found in the original bill. Second, the evolution of the "as if" clause from "as if each payment were made at the end of the year in which it is due" to "as if the payment were made on the first day of the plan year [following withdrawal]" suggests that Congress replaced a scheme in which interest starts accruing a full payment cycle before the first payment with a scheme in which inter- est starts accruing on the first day of the year following withdrawal. 513us2$23Q 01-04-97 17:58:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 414 (1995) 431 Opinion of the Court III We consequently hold that MPPAA calculates its install- ment schedule on the assumption that interest begins accru- ing on the first day of the year following withdrawal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. 513us2$24Z 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 432 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus O'NEAL v. McANINCH, WARDEN certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 93­7407. Argued October 31, 1994-Decided February 21, 1995 In proceedings on Robert O'Neal's federal habeas corpus petition challeng- ing his state-court convictions for murder and other crimes, the Sixth Circuit assumed that O'Neal had established constitutional "trial" error with regard to one of the jury instructions, but disregarded that error on the ground that it was "harmless." After setting forth the harm- lessness standard normally used by federal habeas courts-whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," see, e. g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 627- the Sixth Circuit stated that the habeas petitioner must bear the "bur- den of establishing" whether the error was prejudicial under that stand- ard. As a practical matter, the court's burden-of-proof statement ap- parently means that the petitioner must lose if a reviewing judge is in grave doubt about the effect on the jury of this kind of error, i. e., if, in the judge's mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he or she feels in virtual equipoise as to the error's harmlessness. Held: When a federal habeas court finds a constitutional trial error and is in grave doubt about whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," the error is not harmless, and the petitioner must win. Pp. 436­445. (a) The foregoing legal conclusion rests upon three considerations. First, it is supported by precedent. See, e. g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 764­765; Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24. Brecht, supra, at 637, and Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 116, distin- guished. The State's view that appellants' "burden" of showing "preju- dice" in civil cases applies to habeas proceedings fails to take into ac- count the stakes involved in a habeas proceeding. Unlike the civil cases cited by the State, the errors being considered by a habeas court oc- curred in a criminal proceeding, and therefore, although habeas is a civil proceeding, someone's custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake. Moreover, precedent suggests that civil and criminal harmless- error standards do not differ in their treatment of grave doubt as to the harmlessness of errors affecting substantial rights. Compare, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 61. Second, the Court's conclusion is consistent with the basic purposes underlying the writ of habeas corpus. A legal rule requiring issuance of the writ will, 513us2$24Z 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 433 Syllabus at least often, avoid the grievous wrong of holding a person in custody in violation of the Constitution and will thereby both protect individuals from unconstitutional convictions and help to guarantee the integrity of the criminal process by assuring that trials are fundamentally fair. In contrast, although denying the writ in cases of grave uncertainty would help protect the State's interest in the finality of its judgments and would promote federal-state comity, such a rule would also virtually guarantee that many, in fact, would be wrongly imprisoned or executed, and would tell judges who believe individuals are quite possibly being held in unlawful custody that they cannot grant relief. Third, the rule adopted herein has certain administrative virtues: It is consistent with the way that courts have long treated important trial errors and avoids the need for judges to read lengthy records to determine prejudice in every habeas case. These factors are not determinative, but offer a practical caution against a rule that, in respect to precedent and pur- pose, would run against the judicial grain. Pp. 437­444. (b) Contrary to the State's argument, there is nothing in the language of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), that tells a court to treat a violation as harmless when it is in grave doubt about harmless- ness. Indeed, there is no significant support for either side in any of the language of the relevant statutes or Rules. In these circumstances, the Court properly undertakes the foregoing examination, looking first to the considerations underlying its habeas jurisprudence, and then de- termining whether the proposed rule will advance or inhibit these con- siderations by weighing the marginal costs and benefits of its application on collateral review. See Brecht, supra, at 633. Pp. 444­445. 3 F. 3d 143, vacated and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 445. Thomas R. Wetterer, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 511 U. S. 1067, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gloria Eyerly, Gregory L. Ayers, and John A. Bay. Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Lee Fisher, Attorney General, Simon B. Karas, and Stuart A. Cole and Timothy J. Mangan, Assistant Attorneys General. 513us2$24Z 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 434 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Opinion of the Court James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, and Deputy Solicitor General Wallace.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Reviewing courts normally disregard trial errors that are harmless. This case asks us to decide whether a federal ha- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Larry W. Yackle, Steven R. Shapiro, and James S. Liebman; and for Timothy Scott Sherman by Andrew L. Frey, Roy T. Englert, Jr., James G. Duncan, and Stuart J. Robinson. A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Maryland et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Tarra DeShields-Minnis, Assistant Attorney General, and Eleni M. Con- stantine, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: James H. Evans of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale H. Norton of Colorado, John M. Bailey of Connecticut, Charles Oberly of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Bonnie J. Camp- bell of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, G. Oliver Koppel of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Pedro R. Pierluisi of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Charles Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Rosalie Sim- monds Ballentine of the Virgin Islands, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming. Lawrence J. Fleming and Harry R. Reinhart filed a brief for the Na- tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae. 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 435 Opinion of the Court beas court should consider a trial error harmless when the court (1) reviews a state-court judgment from a criminal trial, (2) finds a constitutional error, and (3) is in grave doubt about whether or not that error is harmless. We recognize that this last mentioned circumstance, "grave doubt," is un- usual. Normally a record review will permit a judge to make up his or her mind about the matter. And indeed a judge has an obligation to do so. But we consider here the legal rule that governs the special circumstance in which rec- ord review leaves the conscientious judge in grave doubt about the likely effect of an error on the jury's verdict. (By "grave doubt" we mean that, in the judge's mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equi- poise as to the harmlessness of the error.) We conclude that the uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict (i. e., as if it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"). I Robert O'Neal filed a federal habeas corpus petition chal- lenging his state-court convictions for murder and other crimes. The Federal District Court agreed with several of his claims of constitutional trial error. On appeal the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the District Court, with one impor- tant exception. That exception focused on possible jury "confusion" arising out of a trial court instruction about the state of mind necessary for conviction combined with a re- lated statement by a prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit as- sumed, for argument's sake, that the instruction (taken to- gether with the prosecutor's statement) had indeed violated the Federal Constitution by misleading the jury. Nonethe- less, the court disregarded the error on the ground that it was "harmless." O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F. 3d 143, 147 (1993). The court's opinion sets forth the standard normally ap- plied by a federal habeas court in deciding whether or not this kind of constitutional "trial" error is harmless, namely, 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 436 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Opinion of the Court whether the error " ` "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." ' " Id., at 145 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 627 (1993) (quoting, and adopting, standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 776 (1946))). But, rather than ask directly whether the record's facts satisfied this stand- ard, the court seemed to refer to a burden of proof. Its opin- ion says that the habeas petitioner must bear the "burden of establishing" whether the error was prejudicial. 3 F. 3d, at 145. As a practical matter, this statement apparently means that, if a judge is in grave doubt about the effect on the jury of this kind of error, the petitioner must lose. Thus, O'Neal might have lost in the Court of Appeals, not because the judges concluded that the error was harmless, but because the record of the trial left them in grave doubt about the effect of the error. This Court granted certiorari to decide what the law re- quires in such circumstances. We repeat our conclusion: When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had "sub- stantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," that error is not harmless. And, the peti- tioner must win. II As an initial matter, we note that we deliberately phrase the issue in this case in terms of a judge's grave doubt, in- stead of in terms of "burden of proof." The case before us does not involve a judge who shifts a "burden" to help con- trol the presentation of evidence at a trial, but rather in- volves a judge who applies a legal standard (harmlessness) to a record that the presentation of evidence is no longer likely to affect. In such a case, we think it conceptually clearer for the judge to ask directly, "Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially influenced the jury's decision?" than for the judge to try to put the same question in terms 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 437 Opinion of the Court of proof burdens (e. g., "Do I believe the party has borne its burden of showing . . . ?"). As Chief Justice Traynor said: "Whether or not counsel are helpful, it is still the respon- sibility of the . . . court, once it concludes there was error, to determine whether the error affected the judg- ment. It must do so without benefit of such aids as pre- sumptions or allocated burdens of proof that expedite fact-finding at the trial." R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 26 (1970) (hereinafter Traynor). The case may sometimes arise, however, where the record is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error. See id., at 22­23. This is the narrow circumstance we address here. III Our legal conclusion-that in cases of grave doubt as to harmlessness the petitioner must win-rests upon three con- siderations. First, precedent supports our conclusion. As this Court has stated, "the original common-law harmless- error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error [here, the State] . . . to prove that there was no injury . . . ." Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967) (citing 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 21 (3d ed. 1940)). When this Court considered the doubt-as-to-harmlessness question in the context of direct review of a nonconstitutional trial error, it applied the same rule. In Kotteakos v. United States, the Court wrote: "If, when all is said and done, the [court's] conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 438 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Opinion of the Court conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand." 328 U. S., at 764­ 765 (emphasis added). Id., at 776 (holding that error is not harmless if it had "sub- stantial and injurious effect or influence" upon the jury). That is to say, if a judge has "grave doubt" about whether an error affected a jury in this way, the judge must treat the error as if it did so. See also United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 741 (1993) (stating that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) the Government bears the "burden of showing the absence of prejudice"); United States v. Lane, 474 U. S. 438, 449 (1986) (quoting Kotteakos as providing the proper harmless-error standard in cases of misjoinder and quoting " `grave doubt' " language). When this Court considered the same question in the con- text of direct review of a constitutional trial error, it applied the same rule. See Chapman, 386 U. S., at 24 (holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). Indeed, the Chapman Court wrote that "constitu- tional error . . . casts on someone other than the person prej- udiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless." Ibid. We must concede that in Brecht v. Abrahamson this Court, in the course of holding that the more lenient Kot- teakos harmless-error standard, rather than the stricter Chapman standard, normally governs cases of habeas re- view of constitutional trial errors, stated that habeas peti- tioners "are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in `actual preju- dice.' " Brecht, 507 U. S., at 637 (emphasis added). This language, however, is not determinative. The issue in Brecht involved a choice of substantive harmless-error stand- ards: the stricter Chapman, or the less strict Kotteakos, 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 439 Opinion of the Court measure of harmlessness. Both of those cases had resolved the issue now before us the same way, placing the risk of doubt on the State. Moreover, the sentence from Brecht quoted above appears in a paragraph that adopts the very Kotteakos standard that we now apply. That paragraph does not explain why the Court would make an exception to the "grave doubt" portion of the Kotteakos standard. Fur- thermore, the Brecht opinion, in this respect, did not speak for a Court majority. Four Members of the Court, support- ing application of Chapman's standard, dissented. And Jus- tice Stevens, while a Member of the majority, stated ex- plicitly that the Kotteakos standard applied in its entirety. 507 U. S., at 640 (concurring opinion) (agreeing, in part, be- cause that standard "places the burden on prosecutors to explain why those errors were harmless"). We further acknowledge that this Court, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943), said: "He who seeks to have a judgment set aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted." Id., at 116. But this pre-Kotteakos language, in context, referred to what the preceding sentence in Palmer described as "[m]ere `technical errors.' " 318 U. S., at 116. Kotteakos itself makes clear that "technical errors" may be different. It quotes an excerpt from the House Report accompanying the harmless-error statute (then 28 U. S. C. § 391) that says the statute casts " `upon the party seeking a new trial the burden of show- ing that any technical errors that he may complain of have affected his substantial rights.' " Kotteakos, 328 U. S., at 760 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 913, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1919)). The Report, however, (as Kotteakos immediately points out) goes on to say that if the error is not "technical," if, instead, 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 440 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Opinion of the Court " `the error is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, [then] the burden of sustaining a verdict will, notwithstanding this legislation rest upon the one who claims under it.' " H. R. Rep. No. 913, supra, at 1. The "grave doubt" language of Kotteakos itself makes clear that important trial errors, including any "constitutional vio- lation, . . . fall in" this last mentioned category, and not "in the `technical' category" that the House Report described. Brecht, supra, at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287, 294 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (describing technical errors as those concerned with the "mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minu- tiae of procedure"). We also have examined the precedent upon which the State relies to support its view that appellants bear a "bur- den" of showing "prejudice" in civil cases. See, e. g., Er- skine v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 814 F. 2d 266 (CA6 1987); Flanigan v. Burlington Northern Inc., 632 F. 2d 880 (CA8 1980); Creekmore v. Crossno, 259 F. 2d 697 (CA10 1958). The State contends that, because a habeas proceeding, tech- nically speaking, is a civil proceeding, see, e. g., Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 269 (1978), this standard applies here. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 61. One problem with this argument lies in its failure to take into account the stakes involved in a habeas proceeding. Unlike the civil cases cited by the State, the errors being considered by a habeas court occurred in a criminal proceed- ing, and therefore, although habeas is a civil proceeding, someone's custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake. And, as we have explained, when reviewing errors from a criminal proceeding, this Court has consistently held that, if the harmlessness of the error is in grave doubt, relief must be granted. We hold the same here. 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 441 Opinion of the Court Moreover, precedent suggests that civil and criminal harmless-error standards do not differ in their treatment of grave doubt as to the harmlessness of errors affecting sub- stantial rights. In Kotteakos, the Court interpreted the then-existing harmless-error statute, 28 U. S. C. § 391, now codified with minor change at 28 U. S. C. § 2111. See Kot- teakos, 328 U. S., at 759 (explaining that the statute "grew out of widespread and deep conviction" that appellate courts had become " `impregnable citadels of technicality' ") (citation omitted). That statute, by its terms, applied to both civil and criminal cases, and Kotteakos made no distinction, at least with respect to the question at issue here, between the two types of cases. See id., at 757, n. 9; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2883, p. 276 (1973) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Similarly, the current harmless-error statute "traces its lineage" to § 391, and ap- plies in both civil and criminal proceedings. See McDon- ough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U. S. 548, 554, n. 4 (1984). And, more important for present purposes, the current harmless-error sections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce- dure (which use nearly identical language) both refer to § 391 as their statutory source. Compare Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a) (providing that "[a]ny error . . . which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded") with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 61 (providing that the court "must disregard any error . . . which does not affect the substantial rights of the par- ties"); see Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a), 18 U. S. C. App., p. 833 (referring to former § 391 as a source); Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 61, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 676 (same). In fact, in recent cases, we have interpreted the nearly identical language of Rule 52(a) as treating instances of grave doubt just as we treat them here. See Olano, 507 U. S., at 740­741, 743; Lane, 474 U. S., at 449 (quoting Kotteakos, supra, at 765). 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 442 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Opinion of the Court For these reasons, even if, for argument's sake, we were to assume that the civil standard for judging harmlessness ap- plies to habeas proceedings (despite the fact that they review errors in state criminal trials), it would make no difference with respect to the matter before us. For relevant author- ity rather clearly indicates that, either way, the courts should treat similarly the matter of "grave doubt" regarding the harmlessness of errors affecting substantial rights, and as Kotteakos provides. Second, our conclusion is consistent with the basic pur- poses underlying the writ of habeas corpus. As we have said, we are dealing here with an error of constitutional dimension-the sort that risks an unreliable trial outcome and the consequent conviction of an innocent person. See Brecht, 507 U. S., at 654 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). We also are assuming that the judge's conscientious answer to the question, "But, did that error have a `substantial and injuri- ous effect or influence' on the jury's decision?" is, "It is ex- tremely difficult to say." In such circumstances, a legal rule requiring issuance of the writ will, at least often, avoid a grievous wrong-holding a person "in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States." 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such a rule thereby both protects individuals from unconstitutional convictions and helps to guarantee the integrity of the criminal process by assuring that trials are fundamentally fair. See Traynor 23 ("In the long run there would be a closer guard against error at the trial, if . . . courts were alert to reverse, in case of doubt, for error that could have contaminated the judgment"). By way of contrast, the opposite rule, denying the writ in cases of grave uncertainty, would virtually guarantee that many, in fact, will be held in unlawful custody-contrary to the writ's most basic traditions and purposes. And, it would tell judges who believe individuals are quite possibly being held "in custody in violation of the Constitution" that they cannot grant relief. 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 443 Opinion of the Court We concede that this opposite rule (denying the writ) would help protect the State's interest in the finality of its judgments and would promote federal-state comity. It would avoid retrials, some of which, held so late in the day, may lead to freedom for some petitioners whose initial con- victions were in fact unaffected by the errors that took place at their initial trials. The State's interest in avoiding retrial of this latter category of individuals is legitimate and impor- tant. But this interest is somewhat diminished by the legal circumstance that the State normally bears responsibility for the error that infected the initial trial. And, if one assumes (1) that in cases of grave doubt, the error is at least as likely to have been harmful in fact as not, and (2) that retrial will often (or even sometimes) lead to reconviction, then that state interest is further diminished by a factual circum- stance: the number of acquittals wrongly caused by grant of the writ and delayed retrial (the most serious harm affecting the State's legitimate interests) will be small when compared with the number of persons whom this opposite rule (denying the writ) would wrongly imprison or execute. On balance, we must doubt that the law of habeas corpus would hold many people in prison "in violation of the Constitution," for fear that otherwise a smaller number, not so held, may even- tually go free. Third, our rule has certain administrative virtues. It is consistent with the way that courts have long treated impor- tant trial errors. See, e. g., Olano, supra; Lane, supra; Chapman, 386 U. S., at 24; Kotteakos, supra; see also 11 Wright & Miller § 2883. In a highly technical area such as this one, consistency brings with it simplicity, a body of exist- ing case law available for consultation, see Brecht, supra, at 638, and a consequently diminished risk of further, error- produced, proceedings. Moreover, our rule avoids the need for judges to read lengthy records to determine prejudice in every habeas case. These factors are not determinative, but offer a practical caution against a legal rule that, in respect 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 444 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Opinion of the Court to precedent and purpose, would run against the judicial grain. IV The State makes one additional argument. It points to language in the habeas corpus statute that says the federal courts "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas cor- pus . . . only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in cus- tody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). See § 2241(c)(3). If a "violation of the Constitution" is harm- less, the State adds, then there is no causal connection be- tween "violation" and "custody," and the prisoner is not "in custody in violation of the Constitution." And, by analogy to tort law, the State contends that, because the habeas peti- tioner is in the position of plaintiff, he must prove this causal connection. Whatever force there may be to this argument is countered by the equally persuasive analogy to affirmative defenses, on which the party in the position of defendant (here the State) bears the risk of equipoise. And, to read the statute as the State suggests would run counter to the principle of Kotteakos that when an error's natural effect is to prejudice substantial rights and the court is in grave doubt about the harmlessness of that error, the error must be treated as if it had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the verdict. See Kotteakos, 328 U. S., at 764­765, 776. We do not see what in the language of the statute tells a court that it should treat a violation as harmless when it is in grave doubt about its harmlessness. One might as easily infer the opposite-that the statute leaves the matter of harmlessness as a kind of affirmative defense-from the ab- sence, in the Habeas Corpus Rules' form petition, of any space for a "lack of harmlessness" allegation. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 2(c) (providing in part that a habeas peti- tion "shall be in substantially the form annexed to these 513us2$24Q 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 445 Thomas, J., dissenting rules"). Or, one might as easily infer neutrality on the point from the statute's command that the court dispose of the petition "as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243. Ultimately, we find no significant support for either side in any of this language. When faced with such gaps in the ha- beas statute, we have "look[ed] first to the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence, and then determine[d] whether the proposed rule would advance or inhibit these considerations by weighing the marginal costs and benefits of its application on collateral review." Brecht, 507 U. S., at 633. We have done that in this case, and for the reasons set forth above, see supra, at 442­443, we conclude that, when a habeas court is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error that affects substantial rights, it should grant relief. V For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia join, dissenting. In my view, a federal habeas court may not upset the re- sults of a criminal trial unless it concludes both that the trial was marred by a violation of the Constitution or a federal statute and that this error was harmful. Because the Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. I Though the majority begins with an examination of prece- dent construing the federal harmless-error statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2111, the proper place to begin is with the statute governing habeas relief for prisoners in state custody. After all, the petitioner does not seek relief under the harmless-error statute. 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 446 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Thomas, J., dissenting Where a state prisoner is concerned, a writ of habeas cor- pus may issue only when that prisoner is "in custody in viola- tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). It is not enough that the habeas petitioner is in custody and that some viola- tion of the Constitution or a federal statute occurred at trial; as amicus curiae the Solicitor General correctly argues, the statute requires a causal link between the violation and the custody. Quite obviously, a habeas petitioner who proves that a trivial ("harmless") error occurred at trial will not secure habeas relief because such an error could not be said to have been a cause of the custody. Notwithstanding the error, the petitioner would have been in custody lawfully and thus relief is unwarranted. Even the majority implicitly agrees that causation is necessary, for otherwise it would have no need to discuss harmful errors as opposed to mere errors. The habeas petitioner comes to federal court as a plaintiff. Because the plaintiff "seeks to change the present state of affairs," he "naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion." 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 337, p. 428 (4th ed. 1992). Part of that burden is the requirement that the plaintiff show that the defendant's actions caused harm. In other areas of the law, the plaintiff almost invariably bears the burden of persuasion with re- spect to whether the defendant's actions caused harm. See, e. g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642, 669 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the ordinary civil trial, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant has harmed her"); 2 Restatement (Sec- ond) of Torts § 433B(1), p. 441 (1965) ("[T]he burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff"). Establishing causation is thus an essential element of the plaintiff's case in chief. Under the majority's rationale, however, the habeas petitioner need not prove causation at all; once a prisoner 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 447 Thomas, J., dissenting establishes error, the government must affirmatively per- suade the court of the harmlessness of that error. Ante, at 444. Without explaining why it favors habeas plaintiffs over other plaintiffs, the Court thus treats the question of causa- tion as an affirmative defense. Requiring the habeas petitioner to bear the risk of non- persuasion not only accords with the usual rules of litigation, but also is compelled by what we have said about the nature of habeas relief. "When the process of direct review . . . comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality at- taches to the conviction and sentence." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983). We have acknowledged that the "writ strikes at finality," one of the "law's very objects," Mc- Cleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 491 (1991), and that when a habeas petitioner obtains a new trial, the government is put at a disadvantage "through the `erosion of memory' and `dis- persion of witnesses' that occur with the passage of time," Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 453 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 127­128 (1982)). Our habeas cases indicate that upsetting the final- ity of judgments should be countenanced only in rare in- stances. See, e. g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633 (1993) (noting that "the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy"). We have ample cause to be wary of the writ. Our crimi- nal law does not routinely punish the innocent. Instead, our Constitution requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). As a re- sult, the overwhelming majority of the innocent will never reach the habeas stage, since they will not have been found guilty at trial. Appeals and possible state postconviction relief further reduce the possibility that an innocent is in custody. The presumption of finality that we apply in ha- beas proceedings is therefore well founded. Our habeas jurisprudence has also been informed by a proper recognition of the affront to a State when federal 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 448 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Thomas, J., dissenting courts conduct habeas review. Habeas review " `disturbs the State's significant interest in repose for concluded litiga- tion, denies society the right to punish some admitted offend- ers, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.' " Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 210 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). See also McCleskey, supra, at 491; Engle, supra, at 128. Where the habeas court cannot say that an error resulted in harm, it seems particularly disrespect- ful to resolve doubts against the propriety of state-court judgments. Our "harmless-error" inquiry in the habeas context con- cerns whether an error " `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Brecht, supra, at 627 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 776 (1946)). As alluded to earlier, supra, at 446, this test consists of a causation inquiry-was the error a cause of the conviction. Thus, like all plaintiffs, the habeas plaintiff must show causation if he is to succeed. II The Court derives its contrary rule from cases construing the harmless-error statute, the purposes underlying the writ of habeas corpus, and the virtue of administrative consis- tency that stems from following established precedent. The Court's analysis is unpersuasive. A The Court begins by examining harmless-error practice in the context of direct criminal appeals. I do not quarrel with the majority's conclusion that once an error has been shown on direct appeal, the government must demonstrate that it was harmless if the conviction is to stand. See ante, at 437­438 (citing Kotteakos, supra, at 764­765, 776; Chap- man v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967); and United States 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 449 Thomas, J., dissenting v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 741 (1993)). Still, neither the harmless-error statute (which was the subject of Kotteakos) nor the rules governing harmless errors in district courts (discussed in Olano) apply to habeas review of errors that occurred in a prior case. See 28 U. S. C. § 2111; Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 61. To be sure, we have borrowed the applicable standard for judging harmlessness in habeas from cases interpreting the federal harmless-error statute. See, e. g., Brecht, supra, at 631. Applying harmless-error analysis makes sense, be- cause a trivial error could not be said to cause custody and thus warrant habeas relief. But the harmless-error statute and rules do not apply of their own force in the habeas cases, and so the harmless-error precedents relied upon by the ma- jority are certainly not dispositive. Indeed, Brecht itself- despite adopting the standard for harmlessness set out in Kotteakos-departed from Kotteakos by placing the burden upon the habeas petitioner to "establish" that this standard has been met. See 507 U. S., at 637. If we are to look at cases examining the harmless-error statute, I would think that civil cases would be of greater relevance. As the Court admits, habeas is a civil proceed- ing. See ante, at 440 (citing Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 269 (1978)). Although the Court acknowledges that Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943), put the burden on the party claiming prejudice to demonstrate it, the Court dismisses Palmer as a pre- Kotteakos case about technical errors. See ante, at 439. But Kotteakos did not purport to overrule Palmer. Nor is it true that the rule in Palmer is limited to cases involving technical errors. Palmer merely quoted former 28 U. S. C. § 391 (the predecessor to the modern § 2111, and the statute at issue in Kotteakos as well), which itself referred to "tech- nical errors." Palmer held that the party seeking relief from a judgment because of an erroneous ruling "carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted"; it did not say 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 450 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Thomas, J., dissenting that only those challenging "technically" erroneous rulings were so encumbered. See 318 U. S., at 116. Accordingly, most of the Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue place the burden of showing prejudice on the civil appellant, just as Palmer did. See, e. g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores (No. 471), 891 F. 2d 1177, 1180 (CA5 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Killough, 848 F. 2d 1523, 1527 (CA11 1988); United States v. Seaboard Surety Co., 817 F. 2d 956, 964 (CA2), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 855 (1987); see also ante, at 440 (citing cases from the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits). But see Barth v. Gelb, 2 F. 3d 1180, 1188 (CADC 1993) (quot- ing the "grave doubt" language of Kotteakos, supra, at 765). The Court concludes that Palmer and these cases may be disregarded because the federal harmless-error statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2111, makes no distinction between civil and crimi- nal cases; since the rule in the criminal context places the burden of persuasion on the government, the Court decides that the same should be true in the civil context. Ante, at 441­442. But the majority's syllogism could just as easily be turned against the result it reaches. Authority in the civil context assigns the risk of nonpersuasion to the party alleg- ing error, and since the statute draws no distinction between civil and criminal cases, we might just as easily conclude that the civil rule should be followed in the criminal context. The Court's reasoning yields no determinate answer. As indicated above, however, the harmless-error provi- sions do not actually apply in habeas cases anyway. We have no occasion to harmonize the harmless-error cases by overruling Palmer and by rejecting the practice that pre- vails in the majority of the Courts of Appeals that have con- sidered the issue, as the Court does today. B The Court's second claim is that its "conclusion is consist- ent with the basic purposes underlying the writ of habeas corpus." Ante, at 442. As part of its argument, the Court 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 451 Thomas, J., dissenting lays claim to the moral high ground: "[W]e are dealing here with an error of constitutional dimension-the sort that risks an unreliable trial outcome and the consequent conviction of an innocent person." Ibid. The Court suggests that when there is a grave doubt about the harmfulness of an error, "a legal rule requiring issuance of the writ will, at least often, avoid a grievous wrong-holding a person `in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.' " Ibid. (quoting 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a)). The Court concedes that there are other interests at stake-a State's interest in the finality of its judgments and the promotion of federal-state comity, see ante, at 443-but goes on to set these principles aside. The Court concludes that the State's interest in finality, while "legitimate and im- portant," ibid., is diminished by the fact that "the number of acquittals wrongly caused by grant of the writ and delayed retrial . . . will be small when compared with the number of persons whom [the] opposite rule . . . would wrongly im- prison or execute," ibid. Despite its rhetoric, the Court itself is merely balancing the costs and benefits associated with disturbing judgments when a court is in grave doubt about harm. The Court de- cides that the possibility of unlawful custody should lead to the adoption of its grave doubt rule. But because the Court draws the line at "grave doubt" rather than "significant doubt" or "any doubt," it is not willing to go as far as it must in order to ensure that no one is unlawfully imprisoned. Thus, under the majority's assumptions, even its own rule will guarantee that "many, in fact, will be held in unlawful custody." Ante, at 442. It is important to recognize, moreover, that when the Court discusses erroneous imprisonments and executions, it is not addressing questions of innocence or guilt. The standard for judging harmlessness in habeas cases certainly does not turn on the innocence of the habeas petitioner. In fact, the Court's rule applies only when the habeas court can- 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT 452 O'NEAL v. McANINCH Thomas, J., dissenting not make up its mind about whether a jury would have enter- tained any reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. Though the majority seems to suggest otherwise, it certainly will not be true that in half of such cases, the State will have unjustly imprisoned an innocent person. C Citing Kotteakos, Chapman, and other cases, the Court concludes that its rule will be easier to administer because it is consistent with the way courts have treated grave doubts about harm. Ante, at 443. As indicated above, Palmer and the majority view in the Courts of Appeals pro- vide an equally attractive rule that is consistent with long- standing practice. As for the Court's assertion that its rule eliminates "the need for judges to read lengthy records to determine prejudice in every habeas case," ante, at 443, I thought it settled that "it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole" when conducting a harmless-error analysis, United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). Surely a judge cannot, in the midst of read- ing a record, declare himself to be in grave doubt, stop re- viewing, and issue the writ. Because further review may always disturb the judge's current view of the error, the judge cannot stop until he finishes reviewing the relevant portions of the record. Indeed, given that further review always has the potential to resolve any grave doubt, one is tempted to require a judge to continue to read and reread the relevant portions of the record until his grave doubts dissipate. III Fortunately, the rule announced today will affect only a minuscule fraction of cases. Even when there is a close question about whether an error was harmful, the conscien- tious judge ordinarily should make a ruling as to harm. The Court's rule is not a means for judges to escape difficult deci- sions; it applies only in that "special circumstance" in which 513us2$24N 03-28-98 19:23:11 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995) 453 Thomas, J., dissenting a judge, after a thorough review of the record, remains in equipoise. See ante, at 435. The rule has such limited application that it most likely will have no effect on this case. The majority suggests that O'Neal "might have lost in the Court of Appeals, not because the judges concluded that [any supposed] error was harm- less, but because the record of the trial left them in grave doubt about the effect of the error." Ante, at 436. The Sixth Circuit did observe that "[t]he habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing . . . prejudice." O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F. 3d 143, 145 (1993). But the Court of Appeals did not refer again to this burden and did not appear to rely on it in reaching a decision. See id., at 147. That we chose this case to establish a "grave doubt" rule is telling: Cases in which habeas courts are in equipoise on the issue of harm- lessness are astonishingly rare. Though the question that the Court decides today will have very limited application, I believe that the Court gives the wrong answer to that question. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 513us2$25Z 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 454 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus UNITED STATES et al. v. NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 93­1170. Argued November 8, 1994-Decided February 22, 1995 After § 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was amended to prohibit a Member of Congress, federal officer, or other Government employee from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance or speech or writing an article, respondents-including individual members of, and a union representing, a class composed of all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16 who, but for § 501(b), would receive hono- raria-filed a suit challenging the statute as an unconstitutional abridg- ment of their freedom of speech. The speeches and articles for which respondents had received honoraria in the past concerned matters such as religion, history, dance, and the environment; with few exceptions, neither their subjects nor the persons or groups paying for them had any connection with respondents' official duties. In granting respond- ents' motion for summary judgment, the District Court held § 501(b) unconstitutional insofar as it applies to Executive Branch employees and enjoined the Government from enforcing it against any such employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing, inter alia, that the Gov- ernment's failure as to many respondents to identify some sort of nexus between the employee's job and either the expression's subject matter or the payor's character undercut its proffered concern about actual or apparent improprieties in the receipt of honoraria. Held: Section 501(b) violates the First Amendment. Pp. 464­480. (a) The honoraria ban imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech under the First Amendment. Where, as here, Government em- ployees seek to exercise their right as citizens to comment on matters of public interest, and are not attempting simply to speak as employees upon personal matters, the Government must be able to satisfy a balanc- ing test of the type set forth in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568, in order to maintain a statutory restriction on the employees' speech. See Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 564. However, because § 501(b) constitutes a wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expres- sion by a massive number of potential speakers, the Government's bur- den here is even greater than it was in Pickering and its progeny, which 513us2$25Z 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 455 Syllabus usually involved individual disciplinary actions taken in response to par- ticular government employees' actual speech. Specifically, the Govern- ment must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression's "necessary impact on the actual operation" of the Government, Pickering, 391 U. S., at 571. Although § 501(b) neither prohibits any speech nor discrimi- nates among speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their mes- sages, its prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a signifi- cant burden on respondents' expressive activity by inducing them to curtail their expression if they wish to continue their employment. Moreover, the ban imposes a far more significant burden on them than on the relatively small group of lawmakers whose past receipt of hono- raria assertedly motivated its enactment. The large-scale disincentive to expression also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what Government employees would otherwise have writ- ten and said. Pp. 464­470. (b) The Government has failed to show how the interests it asserts to justify § 501(b) are served by applying the honoraria ban to respondents. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, distinguished. Although the asserted concern that federal officers not misuse or appear to misuse power by accepting compensation for their unofficial and nonpolitical writing and speaking activities is undeniably powerful, the Government cites no evidence of misconduct related to honoraria by the vast rank and file of federal employees below grade GS­16. The limited evidence of actual or apparent impropriety by Members of Congress and high- level executives cannot justify extension of the honoraria ban to that rank and file, an immense class of workers with negligible power to confer favors on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles. Moreover, while operational efficiency is undoubtedly a vital governmental interest, several features of the text of the ban and of the pertinent regulations cast serious doubt on the Government's sub- mission that Congress perceived honoraria as so threatening to the effi- ciency of the entire federal service as to render the ban a reasonable response to the threat. First, the total exemption of payments for "any series of appearances, speeches, or articles" unrelated to the employee's official duties or status from § 505(3)'s definition of "honorarium" under- mines application of the ban to individual speeches and articles with no nexus to Government employment. Second, the definition's limitation of "honoraria" to payments for expressive activities, as opposed to other services that a Government employee might perform in his or her spare time, requires a justification far stronger than the mere speculation 513us2$25Z 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 456 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Syllabus about serious harms advanced by the Government. Finally, the regula- tions' exclusions from the coverage of the statutory terms "appearance, speech or article" of a wide variety of performances and writings that would normally appear to have no nexus with an employee's job are more consistent with the presumption that the federal work force con- sists of dedicated and honorable civil servants than with the honoraria ban's dubious application not merely to policymakers, whose loss of honoraria was offset by a salary increase, but to all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16. Pp. 470­477. (c) Insofar as the judgment below grants relief to senior federal exec- utives who are not parties to this case, it is reversed as overinclusive. However, in light of this Court's obligation to avoid judicial legislation and its inability to correctly identify the exact terms of any nexus re- quirement that Congress would have adopted in a more limited hono- raria ban, the Court refuses to modify the remedy further by crafting such a nexus requirement. Pp. 477­480. 990 F. 2d 1271, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opin- ion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 480. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 489. Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor Gen- eral Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Michael R. Dreeben, John C. Hoyle, and Alfred Mollin. Gregory O'Duden argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Elaine Kaplan, Barbara A. Atkin, Mark D. Roth, Anne Wagner, John Vanderstar, Ste- ven R. Shapiro, and Arthur B. Spitzer.* *Stephen F. Black and W. Hardy Callcott filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Freedom to Read Foundation et al. by R. Bruce Rich, Paul M. Smith, Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., Julie M. Carpenter, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Lawrence S. Ottinger; for Public Citizen, Inc., by Alan B. Morrison; for the Senior Executives Association by George J. Shaw, Jr., and William L. Bransford; and for Peter Bollen by Stephen S. Ostrach. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 457 Opinion of the Court Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1989 Congress enacted a law that broadly prohibits fed- eral employees from accepting any compensation for making speeches or writing articles. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. We must decide whether that statutory prohibition comports with the Constitution's com- mand that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." We hold that it does not. I In 1967 Congress authorized the appointment every four years of a special Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries, whose principal function would be to rec- ommend appropriate levels of compensation for the top posi- tions in all three branches of the Federal Government. Each of the first five Quadrennial Commissions recom- mended significant salary increases, but those recommenda- tions went largely ignored. The Report of the 1989 Quad- rennial Commission, however, was instrumental in leading to the enactment of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,1 which contains the provision challenged in this case. The 1989 Quadrennial Commission's report noted that in- flation had decreased the salary levels for senior Government officials, measured in constant dollars, by approximately 35% since 1969. The report "also found that because their salaries are so inadequate, many members of Congress are supplementing their of- ficial compensation by accepting substantial amounts of 1 103 Stat. 1760, 5 U. S. C. App. § 101 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V). The 1989 statute is a comprehensive amendment of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1824. The provisions of the Act governing outside income, including honoraria, are codified at 5 U. S. C. App. § 501 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 458 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court `honoraria' for meeting with interest groups which de- sire to influence their votes. Albeit to a less troubling extent, the practice of accepting honoraria also extends to top officials of the Executive and Judicial branches." Fairness for Our Public Servants: Report of The 1989 Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Sala- ries vi (Dec. 1988). Accordingly, the Commission recommended that "salary lev- els for top officials be set at approximately the same amount in constant dollars" as those in effect in 1969 and further that "Congress enact legislation abolishing the practice of accepting honoraria in all three branches." Ibid. The President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Re- form subsequently issued a report that endorsed the Quad- rennial Commission's views. The President's Commission recommended enacting a ban on receipt of honoraria "by all officials and employees in all three branches of government." To Serve With Honor: Report of the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform 36 (Mar. 1989). Explaining the breadth of its proposal, it added: "In recommending this ban, we also recognize, as did the Quadrennial Commission, that the statutory definition of honoraria must be broad enough to- `close present and potential loopholes such as receipt of consulting, profes- sional or similar fees; payments for serving on boards; travel; sport, or other entertainment expenses not rea- sonably necessary for the appearance involved; or any other benefit that is the substantial equivalent of an honorarium.' " Ibid. (quoting Fairness for Our Public Servants, at 24). Although not adopted in their entirety, the two Commis- sions' recommendations echo prominently in the Ethics Re- form Act of 1989. Section 703 of that Act provided a 25% pay increase to Members of Congress, federal judges, and 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 459 Opinion of the Court certain high-level Executive Branch employees above the salary grade GS­15.2 See 103 Stat. 1768. Another sec- tion-the one at issue here-amended § 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to create an "Honoraria Prohi- bition," which reads: "An individual may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a Member, officer or employee." Id., at 1760. Section 505 of the Ethics Reform Act defined "officer or employee" to include nearly all employees of the Federal Government and "Member" to include any Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner to Congress. The Con- gressional Operations Appropriations Act, 1992, adopted in 1991,3 extended both the salary increase and the prohibition against honoraria to the Senate. The 1989 Act defined "hon- orarium" to encompass any compensation paid to a Govern- ment employee for "an appearance, speech or article." 4 The 1992 Appropriations Act amended that definition to exclude any series of appearances, speeches, or articles unrelated to the employee's official duties or status. The definition now reads as follows: "(3) The term `honorarium' means a payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance, speech 2 The General Schedule, abbreviated "GS," is the basic pay schedule for employees of the Federal Government. 5 U. S. C. § 5332 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Executive Branch positions to which the statute gave the salary increase are on the Executive Schedule, a separate pay scale above the General Schedule. See 103 Stat. 1768. 3 105 Stat. 447, 5 U. S. C. § 5318 note (1988 ed., Supp. V). 4 The original definition read as follows: "(3) The term `honorarium' means a payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance, speech or article by a Member, officer or employee, excluding any actual and nec- essary travel expenses incurred by such individual (and one relative) to the extent that such expenses are paid or reimbursed by any other person, and the amount otherwise determined shall be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the extent that such expenses are not paid or reim- bursed." 103 Stat. 1761, 1762. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 460 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court or article (including a series of appearances, speeches, or articles if the subject matter is directly related to the individual's official duties or the payment is made be- cause of the individual's status with the Government) by a Member, officer or employee, excluding any actual and necessary travel expenses incurred by such individual (and one relative) to the extent that such expenses are paid or reimbursed by any other person, and the amount otherwise determined shall be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the extent that such expenses are not paid or reimbursed." 5 U. S. C. App. § 505(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). Section 503(2) of the Ethics Reform Act provides that the statutory provisions governing honoraria for employees of the Executive Branch shall be subject to rules and regula- tions issued by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) and administered by designated agency ethics officials. 5 CFR § 2636.201 et seq. (1994). OGE's regulations permit reim- bursement of certain expenses associated with appearances, speeches, and articles. The regulations also confine the reach of each of those terms. Thus, a performance using "an artistic, athletic or other such skill or talent" is not an "appearance"; reading a part in a play or delivering a sermon is not a "speech"; and works of "fiction, poetry, lyrics, or script" are not "article[s]." §§ 2636.203(b), (d). The regula- tions permit teaching a course involving multiple presenta- tions at an accredited program or institution. The Attorney General may enforce the prohibition against honoraria by a civil action to recover a penalty of not more than the larger of $10,000 or the amount of the honorarium. If an employee has accepted an honorarium in good-faith reli- ance on an opinion of either the OGE or the ethics officer of her employing agency, she is not subject to the civil penalty. 5 U. S. C. App. § 504 (1988 ed., Supp. V). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 461 Opinion of the Court II Two unions and several career civil servants employed full time by various Executive departments and agencies filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the constitutionality of the honoraria ban. Pursuant to a stipulation with the Government, the District Court certified respondent National Treasury Em- ployees Union as the representative of a class composed of all Executive Branch employees "below grade GS­16, who- but for 5 U. S. C. app. 501(b)-would receive `honoraria,' as defined in 5 U. S. C. app. 505(3)." App. 124­125.5 All of the individual respondents save one are members of the class; the exception is a grade GS­16 lawyer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who has published articles about Russian history. Each of the individual respondents alleges that he or she has in the past received compensation for writing or speak- ing on various topics in full compliance with earlier ethics regulations. The record contains a number of affidavits de- scribing respondents' past activities that the honoraria ban would now prohibit. A mail handler employed by the Postal Service in Arlington, Virginia, had given lectures on the Quaker religion for which he received small payments that were "not much, but enough to supplement my income in a way that makes a difference." Id., at 47. An aerospace engineer employed at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, had lectured on black history for a fee of $100 per lecture. Id., at 63. A microbiologist at the Food and Drug Administration had earned almost $3,000 per year writing articles and making radio and television appearances reviewing dance performances. Id., at 77. A tax examiner 5 In 1993, employees in the certified class earned between $11,903 (GS­1, step 1) and $86,589 (GS­15, step 10). 5 U. S. C. § 5332 (1988 ed., Supp. V). According to OPM, the mean grade was GS­9, which paid workers be- tween $27,789 and $36,123. Office of Personnel Management, Demo- graphic Profile of the Federal Workforce, App. 2, p. 79 (Sept. 1992). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 462 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court employed by the Internal Revenue Service in Ogden, Utah, had received comparable pay for articles about the environ- ment. Id., at 67. The District Court granted respondents' motion for sum- mary judgment, held the statute "unconstitutional insofar as it applies to Executive Branch employees of the United States government," and enjoined the Government from en- forcing the statute against any Executive Branch employee. 788 F. Supp. 4, 13­14 (1992). The court acknowledged that Congress' interest in promoting "the integrity of, and popu- lar confidence in and respect for, the federal government" is "vital." Id., at 9. The court also characterized § 501(b) as a content-neutral restriction on the speech of "government employees who, as a condition of their employment, have re- linquished certain First Amendment prerogatives . . . ." Id., at 10. Nevertheless, the court concluded that "regulatory legislation having the effect of suppressing freedom of ex- pression to the slightest degree" could "go no farther than necessary to accomplish its objective." Ibid. The court found the statute both overinclusive, because it restricts so much speech, and underinclusive, because it prohibits hono- raria for some forms of speech and not others. Id., at 11. Concluding from the legislative history that Congress had been concerned mainly about appearances of impropriety among its own Members, the court found the application of § 501(b) to the parties before it severable from the remainder of the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 990 F. 2d 1271 (CADC 1993). It noted that, even though § 501(b) prohibits no speech, the denial of compensation places a significant bur- den on employees. The court held that the Government's strong, undisputed interest "in protecting the integrity and efficiency of public service and in avoiding even the appear- ance of impropriety created by abuse of the practice of re- ceiving honoraria" does not justify a substantial burden on speech that does not advance that interest. Id., at 1274. The court emphasized that the Government's failure as to 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 463 Opinion of the Court many respondents to identify "some sort of nexus between the employee's job and either the subject matter of the ex- pression or the character of the payor" undercut its prof- fered concern about actual or apparent improprieties. Id., at 1275.6 Stressing the absence of evidence of either corrup- tion or the appearance of corruption among lower level fed- eral employees receiving honoraria with no connection to their employment, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had failed to justify the ban's burden on their speech. Id., at 1277. The court rejected the Government's argument that administrative and enforcement difficulties justify § 501(b)'s broad prophylactic rule.7 6 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that "even some of the plaintiffs receive payments that might at least raise an eyebrow," citing a business editor for the Voice of America who received payment for business analy- sis and a GS­7 "tax examining assistant" as to whom payment of any honorarium might raise some concern "[i]n view of the universality of citi- zens' subjection to the Internal Revenue Service." 990 F. 2d, at 1275­ 1276. Another plaintiff whose expressive activities appear to come within a nexus to Government employment is the Treasury Employees' Union itself, which complains that the honoraria ban has hindered publica- tion of its chapters' newsletters. App. 58­62. 7 "As summarized in testimony before the Senate Committee on Govern- mental Affairs, the prior regulations allowed honoraria so long as the speaker or writer held a rank lower than GS­16 and all of the following questions could be answered negatively: "(1) Is the honorarium offered for carrying out government duties or for an activity that focuses specifically on the employing agency's responsi- bilities, policies and programs? "(2) Is the honorarium offered to the government employee or family member because of the official position held by the employee? "(3) Is the honorarium offered because of the government information that is being imparted? "(4) Is the honorarium offered by someone who does business with or wishes to do business with the employee in his or her official capacity? "(5) Were any government resources or time used by the employee to produce the materials for the article or speech or make the appearance? "S. Rep. No. 29, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1991). While some of the limits may have an amorphous quality about them (such as the one pur- porting to probe the motive of the honorarium's offeror), there appears no 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 464 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court Turning to the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that § 501(b)'s application to Executive Branch employees is severable from the remain- der of the statute. The legislative history convinced the court that Congress had adopted the honoraria ban primarily in response to the growing concern about payments to its own Members; moreover, the statute itself disclosed that "the honorarium ban was adopted as part of a package of which a key ingredient was a sharp increase in the salary of members of Congress, judges, and a limited class of senior executive branch officials." Id., at 1278 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court fashioned a remedy that, in effect, rewrote the statute by eliminating the words "officer or employee" from § 501(b) "except in so far as those terms en- compass members of Congress, officers and employees of Congress, judicial officers and judicial employees." Id., at 1279.8 Over two dissents, the Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc. 3 F. 3d 1555 (1993). We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1029 (1994). III Federal employees who write for publication in their spare time have made significant contributions to the marketplace of ideas. They include literary giants like Nathaniel Haw- thorne and Herman Melville, who were employed by the Customs Service; Walt Whitman, who worked for the De- actual experience of difficulty, and one can hypothesize rules of thumb that could constrain government discretion." 990 F. 2d, at 1276­1277. 8 In dissent, Judge Sentelle maintained that the statute was constitu- tional. He also objected to the court's remedy. In his opinion, the major- ity's severance of the statutory provisions relating to the Executive Branch was "nothing less than judicial legislation," 990 F. 2d, at 1296 (cita- tion and internal quotation marks omitted), and its reluctance to invalidate the honoraria ban as to Members of Congress would have been "better served by striking the statute down as applied" to the plaintiff class. Id., at 1298. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 465 Opinion of the Court partments of Justice and Interior; and Bret Harte, an em- ployee of the mint.9 Respondents have yet to make compa- rable contributions to American culture, but they share with these great artists important characteristics that are rele- vant to the issue we confront. Even though respondents work for the Government, they have not relinquished "the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest." Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). They seek compensation for their expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as Government employees. They claim their employment status has no more bearing on the quality or market value of their literary output than it did on that of Hawthorne or Melville. With few exceptions, the content of respondents' messages has nothing to do with their jobs and does not even arguably have any adverse impact on the efficiency of the offices in which they work. They do not address audiences composed of co-workers or supervisors; instead, they write or speak for segments of the general public. Neither the character of the authors, the subject matter of their expression, the effect of the con- tent of their expression on their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they address has any relevance to their employment. In Pickering and a number of other cases we have recog- nized that Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitu- tional if applied to the public at large. See, e. g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507 (1980). When a court is re- quired to determine the validity of such a restraint, it must "arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], 9 See A. Turner, Nathaniel Hawthorne: A Biography 170­187 (1980); N. Arvin, Herman Melville 259­260 (1950); G. Allen, The Solitary Singer: A Critical Biography of Walt Whitman 319­321, 408 (1985); H. Merwin, The Life of Bret Harte 33­34 (1911). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 466 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering, 391 U. S., at 568. In such cases, which usually have involved disciplinary ac- tions taken in response to a government employee's speech, we have applied Pickering's balancing test only when the employee spoke "as a citizen upon matters of public con- cern" rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest." Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 147 (1983) (emphasis added). Thus, private speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employ- ee's own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government em- ployer. Id., at 148­149. If, however, the speech does in- volve a matter of public concern, the government bears the burden of justifying its adverse employment action. Ran- kin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 388 (1987); 10 see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661, 674 (1994). Respondents' expres- sive activities in this case fall within the protected category of citizen comment on matters of public concern rather than employee comment on matters related to personal status in the workplace. The speeches and articles for which they re- ceived compensation in the past were addressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their Government employment. The sweep of § 501(b) makes the Government's burden heavy. Unlike Pickering and its progeny, this case does not 10 Rankin is the only case in which we directly applied the Pickering balance to speech whose content had nothing to do with the workplace. The employee in that case was fired based on a statement in the workplace about an assassination attempt on the President. Satisfied that the state- ment was not a threat to kill the President, which the First Amendment would not have protected, we concluded that the statement involved a matter of public concern and that the firing violated the First Amendment. 483 U. S., at 386­387, 392. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 467 Opinion of the Court involve a post hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's public responsibilities. Cf. Wa- ters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). Rather, the Government asks us to apply Pickering to Congress' whole- sale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential speakers.11 In Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 564 (1973), we established that the Government must be able to satisfy a balancing test of the Pickering form to maintain a statutory restriction on employee speech. Because the discussion in that case essen- tially restated in balancing terms our approval of the Hatch Act in Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947), we did not determine how the components of the Pickering balance should be analyzed in the context of a sweeping statutory impediment to speech.12 11 The dissent seems to regard the honoraria ban as less onerous than our applications of Pickering to the speech of individual employees be- cause the ban "is unrelated to the message or the viewpoint expressed by the government employee." Post, at 500. Our Pickering cases only per- mit the Government to take adverse action based on employee speech that has adverse effects on "the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro- moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ- ees." 391 U. S., at 568. That certain messages may be more likely than others to have such adverse effects does not render Pickering's restriction on speech viewpoint based. Even a teacher's persistent advocacy in favor of the actions of the school board, cf. ibid., or an employee's exhortation against an attempt on the President's life, cf. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378 (1987), could provide proper grounds for adverse action if the government employer could demonstrate that such expression disrupted workplace efficiency. The honoraria ban as applied to respondents bur- dens speech far more than our past applications of Pickering because the ban deters an enormous quantity of speech before it is uttered, based only on speculation that the speech might threaten the Government's interests. 12 Two decades ago, a three-Justice plurality invoked Pickering in the course of upholding against vagueness and overbreadth challenges a provi- sion of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (1970 ed.), that al- lowed the discharge of certain federal employees "only for such cause as 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 468 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court We normally accord a stronger presumption of validity to a congressional judgment than to an individual executive's disciplinary action. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 671, and n. 2 (1994) (Stevens, J., con- curring in part and concurring in judgment). The wide- spread impact of the honoraria ban, however, gives rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 54­55 (1994).13 In addition, unlike an adverse action taken in re- sponse to actual speech, this ban chills potential speech be- fore it happens. Cf. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). For these reasons, the Government's bur- den is greater with respect to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary ac- tion. The Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression's "necessary impact on the actual operation" of the Government. Pickering, 391 U. S., at 571. Although § 501(b) neither prohibits any speech nor dis- criminates among speakers based on the content or view- point of their messages, its prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive activity. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. will promote the efficiency of the [civil] service." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 160­161 (1974). The plaintiff in that case stood accused of sev- eral work-related misdeeds, including making false and defamatory state- ments against co-workers. The plurality characterized the employee's false accusation that his superiors had accepted a bribe as "not protected by the First Amendment." Id., at 158­159. Thus, the Arnett plurality merely cited Pickering to support a general statute's post hoc application to a single employee's arguably unprotected speech. 13 As of September 30, 1992, the Federal Government employed 1,680,516 workers between grades GS­1 and GS­15. Office of Personnel Manage- ment, Demographic Profile of the Federal Workforce, App. 2, p. 79 (Sept. 1992). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 469 Opinion of the Court State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105 (1991); see also Ar- kansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 227­ 231 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575 (1983). Publishers com- pensate authors because compensation provides a significant incentive toward more expression.14 By denying respond- ents that incentive, the honoraria ban induces them to curtail their expression if they wish to continue working for the Government.15 The ban imposes a far more significant burden on respond- ents than on the relatively small group of lawmakers whose past receipt of honoraria motivated its enactment. The ab- sorbing and time-consuming responsibilities of legislators and policymaking executives leave them little opportunity for research or creative expression on subjects unrelated to their official responsibilities. Such officials often receive in- vitations to appear and talk about subjects related to their work because of their official identities. In contrast, invita- tions to rank-and-file employees usually depend only on the market value of their messages. The honoraria ban is un- likely to reduce significantly the number of appearances by high-ranking officials as long as travel expense reimburse- ment for the speaker and one relative is available as an alternative form of remuneration. See supra, at 460. In 14 This proposition is self-evident even to those who do not fully accept Samuel Johnson's cynical comment: " `No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.' " J. Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson LL. D. 302 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952). 15 Several respondents indicated that the ban would compel them to dis- continue their previously compensated expressive activities. App. 46, 50­ 51, 55, 66, 69, 74. In at least one case, a newspaper refused to continue publishing a respondent's work if he could not accept pay for it. Id., at 78. Despite the OGE regulations' provision for recovery of certain ex- penses related to expressive activity, see supra, at 460, several respond- ents also reported that the ban would prevent or complicate their recover- ing other necessary expenses, creating a further disincentive to speak and write. App. 45­46, 55­56, 65, 74­75, 81, 84, 88. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 470 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court contrast, the denial of compensation for lower paid, nonpol- icymaking employees will inevitably diminish their expres- sive output. The large-scale disincentive to Government employees' ex- pression also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 756­757 (1976). We have no way to measure the true cost of that burden, but we cannot ignore the risk that it might deprive us of the work of a future Melville or Hawthorne.16 The honoraria ban imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech under the First Amendment. IV Because the vast majority of the speech at issue in this case does not involve the subject matter of Government em- ployment and takes place outside the workplace, the Govern- ment is unable to justify § 501(b) on the grounds of immediate workplace disruption asserted in Pickering and the cases that followed it. Cf., e. g., Waters, 511 U. S., at 664. In- stead, the Government submits that the ban comports with the First Amendment because the prohibited honoraria were "reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the effi- ciency of the public service." Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 101 (1947). In Mitchell we upheld the prohibition of the Hatch Act, 5 U. S. C. § 7324(a)(2), on partisan political activity by all classi- fied federal employees, including, for example, a skilled me- 16 These authors' familiar masterworks would survive the honoraria ban as currently administered. Besides exempting all books, the OGE regula- tions protect fiction and poetry from the ban's coverage, see infra, at 476, although the statute's language is not so clear. But great artists deal in fact as well as fiction, and some deal in both. See, e. g., Allen, The Soli- tary Singer, at 41­55 (discussing Walt Whitman's speeches and nonfiction newspaper writing). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 471 Opinion of the Court chanic at the mint named Poole who had no policymaking authority. We explained that "[t]here are hundreds of thou- sands of United States employees with positions no more in- fluential upon policy determination than that of Mr. Poole. Evidently what Congress feared was the cumulative effect on employee morale of political activity by all employees who could be induced to participate actively." 330 U. S., at 101. In Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973), we noted that enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939 reflected "the conviction that the rapidly expanding Govern- ment work force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine." Id., at 565. An equally important concern was "to further serve the goal that employment and ad- vancement in the Government service not depend on po- litical performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pres- sure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs." Id., at 566. Thus, the Hatch Act aimed to protect employees' rights, notably their right to free expression, rather than to restrict those rights.17 Like the Hatch Act, the honoraria ban af- fects hundreds of thousands of federal employees. Unlike partisan political activity, however, honoraria hardly appear to threaten employees' morale or liberty. Moreover, Con- gress effectively designed the Hatch Act to combat demon- strated ill effects of Government employees' partisan politi- cal activities. In contrast, the Government has failed to show how it serves the interests it asserts by applying the honoraria ban to respondents. 17 Cf. Arnett, 416 U. S., at 159 (Lloyd-La Follette Act's purpose was "to give myriad different federal employees performing widely disparate tasks a common standard of job protection"). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 472 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court The Government's underlying concern is that federal offi- cers not misuse or appear to misuse power by accepting com- pensation for their unofficial and nonpolitical writing and speaking activities. This interest is undeniably powerful, but the Government cites no evidence of misconduct related to honoraria in the vast rank and file of federal employees below grade GS­16.18 Instead of a concern about the "cumu- lative effect" of a widespread practice that Congress deemed to "menace the integrity and the competency of the service," Mitchell, 330 U. S., at 103, the Government relies here on limited evidence of actual or apparent impropriety by legisla- tors and high-level executives, together with the purported administrative costs of avoiding or detecting lower level em- ployees' violations of established policies. As both the District Court and the Court of Appeals noted, the Government has based its defense of the ban on abuses of honoraria by Members of Congress. 990 F. 2d, at 18 The Government cites a report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to support its assertion that the ban is necessary to prevent widespread improprieties. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Sub- committee on Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Employee Conduct Standards: Some Outside Activities Present Conflict-of-Interest Issues (Feb. 1992) (herein- after GAO Report); see Brief for United States 22­23. The GAO Report found that ethics officials at several large agencies had approved 545 out- side speaking activities between 1988 and 1990. GAO Report 8. Over one-third of the total approved activities dealt with subject matter, or involved duties, similar to the employees' Government work. Id., at 58. The GAO Report's conclusions and recommendations dealt exclusively with the problems of outside activities "that were focused specifically on the agencies' responsibilities and/or related directly to the employees' du- ties." Id., at 13­14. The GAO Report's examples of instances that gave rise to serious concerns about real or apparent impropriety were two cases in which high-level employees (a chemist and a physicist) engaged in con- sulting activities related to the subject matter of their jobs. Id., at 10. Its 112 pages contain not one mention of any real or apparent impropriety related to a lower level employee or to any employee engaged in writing or speaking or in any conduct unrelated to his or her Government job. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 473 Opinion of the Court 1278; 788 F. Supp., at 13.19 Congress reasonably could as- sume that payments of honoraria to judges or high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch might generate a similar appearance of improper influence. Congress could not, how- ever, reasonably extend that assumption to all federal em- ployees below grade GS­16, an immense class of workers with negligible power to confer favors on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles. A federal employee, such as a supervisor of mechanics at the mint, might impair efficiency and morale by using political criteria to judge the performance of his or her staff. But one can envision scant harm, or appearance of harm, resulting from the same employee's accepting pay to lecture on the Quaker religion or to write dance reviews. Although operational efficiency is undoubtedly a vital gov- ernmental interest, e. g., Rankin, 483 U. S., at 384, several fea- tures of the honoraria ban's text cast serious doubt on the Gov- ernment's submission that Congress perceived honoraria as so threatening to the efficiency of the entire federal service as to render the ban a reasonable response to the threat. Cf. Waters, 511 U. S., at 677­678. The first is the rather strange parenthetical reference to "a series of appearances, speeches, or articles" that the 1991 amendment inserted in the defini- tion of the term "honorarium." The amended definition ex- cludes such a series from the prohibited category unless "the subject matter is directly related to the individual's official duties or the payment is made because of the individual's status with the Government." See supra, at 460. In other words, accepting pay for a series of articles is prohibited if, and only if, a nexus exists between the author's employment and either the subject matter of the expression or the iden- 19 Portending this reliance, the primary discussion of honoraria in the 1989 Quadrennial Commission's Report appeared as a subtopic in the "Legislative Branch" section. Fairness for Our Public Servants: The Report of The 1989 Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries 24 (Dec. 1988). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 474 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court tity of the payor. For an individual article or speech, in contrast, pay is taboo even if neither the subject matter nor the payor bears any relationship at all to the author's duties. Congress' decision to provide a total exemption for all un- related series of speeches undermines application of the ban to individual speeches and articles with no nexus to Govern- ment employment. Absent such a nexus, no corrupt bargain or even appearance of impropriety appears likely. The Gov- ernment's only argument against a general nexus limitation is that a wholesale prophylactic rule is easier to enforce than one that requires individual nexus determinations. See Brief for United States 21­23. The nexus limitation for se- ries, however, unambiguously reflects a congressional judg- ment that agency ethics officials and the OGE can enforce the statute when it includes a nexus test. A blanket burden on the speech of nearly 1.7 million federal employees re- quires a much stronger justification than the Government's dubious claim of administrative convenience. The definition's limitation of "honoraria" to expressive ac- tivities also undermines the Government's submission that the breadth of § 501 is reasonably necessary to protect the efficiency of the public service. Both Commissions that rec- ommended the ban stressed the importance of defining hono- raria in a way that would close "potential loopholes such as receipt of consulting, professional or similar fees; payments for serving on boards; travel; sport, or other entertainment expenses not reasonably necessary for the appearance in- volved; or any other benefit that is the substantial equivalent of an honorarium." See supra, at 458. Those recommenda- tions reflected a considered judgment that compensation for "an appearance, speech or article" poses no greater danger than compensation for other services that a Government em- ployee might perform in his or her spare time.20 Congress, 20 The Government relies heavily on the reports of both the Quadrennial Commission and the President's Commission in defending § 501(b). See Brief for United States 3­5, 19­20. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 475 Opinion of the Court however, chose to restrict only expressive activities. One might reasonably argue that expressive activities, because they occupy a favored position in the constitutional firma- ment, should be exempt from even a comprehensive ban on outside income. Imposing a greater burden on speech than on other off-duty activities assumed to pose the same threat to the efficiency of the federal service is, at best, anomalous. The fact that § 501 singles out expressive activity for spe- cial regulation heightens the Government's burden of justifi- cation. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U. S., at 583. As we noted last Term when reviewing the Federal Communica- tions Commission's must-carry rules for cable television systems, "[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent antici- pated harms, it must do more than simply `posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.' . . . It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way." Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U. S., at 664. That case dealt with a direct regulation of communication by private entities, but its logic applies as well to the special burden § 501 imposes on the expressive rights of the multitude of employees it reaches. As Justice Brandeis reminded us, a "reasonable" burden on expression requires a justification far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms. "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. . . . To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced." Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376 (1927) (concurring opinion).21 21 "[W]e have consistently given greater deference to government pre- dictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large." Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opin- ion). However, the cases in which we have done so generally have in- 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 476 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court The Government has not persuaded us that § 501(b) is a rea- sonable response to the posited harms. We also attach significance to the OGE regulations that limit the coverage of the statutory terms "appearance, speech or article." 5 CFR § 2636.203 (1994). The regula- tions exclude a wide variety of performances and writings that would normally appear to have no nexus with an em- ployee's job, such as sermons, fictional writings, and athletic competitions, see supra, at 460, countermanding the Com- missions' recommendation that an even more inclusive hono- raria ban would be appropriate. See supra, at 458. The exclusions, of course, make the task of the OGE and agency ethics officials somewhat easier, but they "diminish the credi- bility of the Government's rationale" that paying lower level employees for speech entirely unrelated to their work jeopar- dizes the efficiency of the entire federal service. City of Ladue, 512 U. S., at 52. We recognize our obligation to defer to considered congressional judgments about matters such as appearances of impropriety, but on the record of this case we must attach greater weight to the powerful and realistic presumption that the federal work force consists of dedicated and honorable civil servants. The exclusions in the OGE regulations are more consistent with that presumption than volved isolated instances of speech that had already happened. See, e. g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 151­152 (1983). We deferred to the Government's predictions in upholding the Hatch Act, see Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100­101 (1947), but that statute's employee- protective rationale provided much stronger justification for a proscriptive rule than does the Government's interest in workplace efficiency. See supra, at 470­471. Deferring to the Government's speculation about the pernicious effects of thousands of articles and speeches yet to be written or delivered would encroach unacceptably on the First Amendment's pro- tections. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Politi- cal Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 498 (1985) (statute restricting political contributions violated First Amendment where "exchange of political fa- vors for uncoordinated expenditures remain[ed] a hypothetical possibility and nothing more"). 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 477 Opinion of the Court with the honoraria ban's dubious application not merely to policymakers, whose loss of honoraria was offset by a salary increase, but to all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16 as well. These anomalies in the text of the statute and regulations underscore our conclusion: The speculative benefits the hono- raria ban may provide the Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted burden on respondents' freedom to engage in expressive activities. Section 501(b) violates the First Amendment. V After holding § 501(b) invalid because it was not as care- fully tailored as it should have been, the Court of Appeals approved a remedy that is itself arguably overinclusive. The relief granted by the District Court and upheld by the Court of Appeals enjoined enforcement of the entire hono- raria ban as applied to the entire Executive Branch of the Government.22 That injunction provides relief to senior ex- ecutives who are not parties to this case. It also prohibits enforcement of the statute even when an obvious nexus ex- ists between the employee's job and either the subject mat- ter of his or her expression or the interest of the person paying for it. As an alternative to its request for outright reversal, the Government asks us to modify the judgment by upholding the statute as it applies, first, to employees not party to this action and, second, to situations in which a nexus is present. For three reasons, we agree with the Government's first suggestion-that the relief should be limited to the parties before the Court. First, although the occasional case re- quires us to entertain a facial challenge in order to vindicate 22 The Court of Appeals did not reach the ban's applications to employees of the Legislative and Judicial Branches because its analysis of the legisla- tive history convinced it that, had Congress believed the ban unconstitu- tional as to the Executive Branch, it still would have applied the ban to the other branches. 990 F. 2d, at 1279. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 478 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court a party's right not to be bound by an unconstitutional stat- ute, see, e. g., Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 965­967, and n. 13 (1984), we neither want nor need to provide relief to nonparties when a narrower remedy will fully protect the litigants. See Board of Trust- ees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 484­485 (1989). In this case, granting full relief to respondents- who include all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16-does not require passing on the applicability of § 501(b) to Executive Branch employees above grade GS­15, including those high-level employees who received a 25% salary increase that offsets the honoraria ban's disincentive to speak and write. Second, the Government conceivably might advance a different justification for an honoraria ban limited to more senior officials, thus presenting a different constitutional question than the one we decide today.23 Our policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346­347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), therefore counsels against deter- mining senior officials' rights in this case. Third, as the Court of Appeals recognized, its remedy required it to tam- per with the text of the statute,24 a practice we strive to avoid. 23 The parties to whom the lower courts granted relief include a single GS­16 employee. See supra, at 461. The rationale we have set forth for our holding does not necessarily apply to him. However, the Government does not request, as part of its suggested alternative to outright reversal, that we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment as to that one employee. Accordingly, we leave that part of the court's judgment intact. 24 The Court of Appeals said: "We cannot, as a technical matter, achieve the intended severance simply by striking the words `officer or employee' from § 501(b), as that would invalidate the ban beyond the executive branch. . . . However, given the far greater congressional interest in banning honoraria for the legislative and judicial branches, we think it a proper form of severance to strike `officer or employee' from § 501(b) except in so far as those terms encompass members of Congress, officers and employees of Congress, judicial officers and judicial employees." 990 F. 2d, at 1279. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 479 Opinion of the Court Our obligation to avoid judicial legislation also persuades us to reject the Government's second suggestion-that we modify the remedy by crafting a nexus requirement for the honoraria ban. We cannot be sure that our attempt to re- draft the statute to limit its coverage to cases involving an undesirable nexus between the speaker's official duties and either the subject matter of the speaker's expression or the identity of the payor would correctly identify the nexus Con- gress would have adopted in a more limited honoraria ban. We cannot know whether Congress accurately reflected its sense of an appropriate nexus in the terse, 33-word paren- thetical statement with which it exempted series of speeches and articles from the definition of honoraria in the 1992 amendment, see supra, at 460; in an elaborate, nearly 600- word provision with which it later exempted Department of Defense military school faculty and students from the ban; 25 or in neither. The process of drawing a proper nexus, even more than the defense of the statute's application to senior employees, would likely raise independent constitutional con- cerns whose adjudication is unnecessary to decide this case. Cf. supra, at 478. We believe the Court of Appeals properly left to Congress the task of drafting a narrower statute.26 25 See § 542 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 106 Stat. 2413­2414. 26 The dissent condemns our refusal to rewrite the statute. Post, at 501­ 503. It notes that, when we considered a challenge to a federal statute that banned expressive displays in the Supreme Court building and on the public sidewalks around it, we had no difficulty striking down the statute only as it applied to the public sidewalks. See United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 180­183 (1983). Drawing a line between a building and sidewalks with which we are intimately familiar, based on settled First Amendment principles, see id., at 180, is a relatively simple matter. In contrast, drawing one or more lines between categories of speech covered by an overly broad statute, when Congress has sent inconsistent signals as to where the new line or lines should be drawn, involves a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain. 513us2$25I 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 480 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of O'Connor, J. Insofar as the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirms the injunction against enforcement of § 501(b) against re- spondents, it is affirmed; insofar as it grants relief to parties not before the Court, it is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Although I agree that aspects of the honoraria ban run afoul of the First Amendment, I write separately for two reasons. First, I wish to emphasize my understanding of how our precedents, beginning with Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), and culminating in its most recent application, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661 (1994), direct the Court's conclusion. Second, I write to express my disagreement with the Court's remedy, which in my view paints with too broad a brush. I The time-tested Pickering balance, most recently applied in Waters, provides the governing framework for analysis of all manner of restrictions on speech by the government as employer. Under Pickering, the Court must balance "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [govern- ment], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the pub- lic services it performs through its employees." 391 U. S., at 568. In contrast to some of our prior decisions, this case presents no threshold question whether the speech is of pub- lic, or merely private, concern. Respondents challenge the ban as it applies to off-hour speech bearing no nexus to Gov- ernment employment-speech that by definition does not re- late to "internal office affairs" or the employee's status as an employee. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 149 (1983). 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 481 Opinion of O'Connor, J. In setting out the employees' interests in this case, the Court draws a meaningful distinction between the ex ante prohibition of certain kinds of speech and the ex post punish- ment of discrete, unforeseeable disturbances. See ante, at 466­468. There is some force to the Court's observation, because ex ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments, carry risks of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. Nevertheless, reliance on the ex ante/ex post distinction is not a substitute for the case-by-case application of Pickering. There are many circumstances in which the Government as employer is likely to prefer the codification of its policies as workplace rules (which, incidentally, provide notice to em- ployees) to the ad hoc, on-the-job reactions that have been standard fare in many of our employment cases. In most such circumstances, the Government will be acting well within its bounds. I see little constitutional difference, for example, between a rule prohibiting employees from being " `rude to customers,' " see Waters, supra, at 673, and the upbraiding or sanctioning of an employee post hoc for iso- lated acts of impudence. To draw the line based on a dis- tinction between ex ante rules and ex post punishments, in my view, overgeneralizes and threatens undue interference with "the government's mission as employer," 511 U. S., at 674. Given the breadth and intrusiveness of the honoraria ban in this case, however, I agree with the Court that significant weight must be placed on the employees' side of the scale in the Pickering balance. We recognized in Simon & Schus- ter, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 115 (1991), that the imposition of financial burdens may have a direct effect on incentives to speak. See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 585 (1983) (observing that the threat of burdensome taxes "can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment"). Although the honoraria ban certainly does not curtail all of the non-work-related speech 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 482 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of O'Connor, J. of the nearly two million members of respondent class, it doubtless inhibits some speech on matters of substantial pub- lic interest. In my view, the impact of the honoraria ban upon this class of employees' interests in speaking out as citizens, rather than as employees, cannot be gainsaid. The Government advances two categories of interests in support of the honoraria ban. First, the Government sub- mits its interests in promoting the efficiency of public service and in avoiding the appearance of impropriety created by abuse of the practice of receiving honoraria. We have cred- ited these objectives as both salutary and significant on sev- eral occasions. See, e. g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Na- tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 210 (1982); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 788, n. 26 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26­29 (1976). Although they lend support to the Government's efforts to put a stop to honoraria paid for work-related speech, these interests have less force in justifying a ban that prohibits honoraria paid for speech on matters wholly unrelated to the work- place. Perhaps recognizing this, the Government maintains that it has an additional interest in resisting evasion of its rule and sparing administrative resources. According to the Government, apparently innocuous payments may be made for illicit purposes, and the difficulty inherent in distinguish- ing the innocuous from the illicit mandates a broad prophy- lactic ban. Balancing is difficult to undertake unless one side of the scale is relatively insubstantial. The Government argues that the Court should defer broadly to its determination that the benefits of the ban outweigh its costs. The Government relies on Waters, in which a plurality of the Court observed that "we have consistently given greater deference to gov- ernment predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large." 511 U. S., at 673. But this principle has its limits, as the Waters plu- 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 483 Opinion of O'Connor, J. rality went on to recognize. As the magnitude of intrusion on employees' interests rises, so does the Government's bur- den of justification. Cf. Connick, 461 U. S., at 150 ("[T]he State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies de- pending upon the nature of the employee's expression"); id., at 151­152 (finding "a wide degree of deference" appropriate where employee's speech touched only peripherally on mat- ters of public concern). Thus, in Waters, the plurality noted that "[i]n many such situations the government may have to make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it may be punished." 511 U. S., at 674. This case presents one such situation. The Court makes a persuasive case that the Government has made no such showing and that the Government's as- serted interests are insufficiently weighty to justify a ban that curbs so much employee speech. See ante, at 470­477. In promulgating the ban, Congress relied on the reports of two blue-ribbon panels that suggested the prudence of a wide-ranging prohibition. Neither report noted any prob- lems, anecdotal or otherwise, stemming from the receipt of honoraria by rank-and-file Executive Branch employees. Neither report, therefore, tends to substantiate the Govern- ment's administrative efficiency argument, which presumes that abuses may be so widespread as to justify a prophylactic rule. Congress assuredly was inspired by a worthy interest, but it made no effort to establish a connection between its interest and the large-scale inhibition of non-work-related speech by the respondent class. Our cases do not support the notion that the bare assertion of a laudable purpose justi- fies wide-ranging intrusions on First Amendment liberties. In Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973), perhaps the closest analogue to this case, we upheld provisions of the Hatch Act, 5 U. S. C. § 7324(a)(2), against a First Amendment challenge only after canvassing nearly a century of concrete experience with the evils of the political spoils system. Cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 484 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of O'Connor, J. 468 U. S. 364, 401, n. 27 (1984) (noting that the Hatch Act "evolved over a century of governmental experience with less restrictive alternatives that proved to be inadequate to maintain the effective operation of government"). I also agree with the Court that loopholes in the current ethical regime tend to cast doubt upon the gravity of the problem of honoraria abuse, or at least doubt upon the weight of the problem as perceived by Congress and the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 52­53 (1994). Thus, in a provision that detracts seriously from the Government's administrative convenience rationale, the statute permits the author of a series of three speeches or publications (but not of a single speech or publication) to receive an honorarium if the series has no nexus to Government employment. See 5 U. S. C. App. § 505(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). Under OGE regulations, employees may receive honoraria for poems, but not for speeches on poetry. See 5 CFR § 2636.203(d) (1992). Em- ployees may be compensated for writing chapters in books, but not for writing the same piece if published as an article. Ibid. Congress is not required to address every aspect of a problem whenever it decides to act. But the patchwork na- ture of this regime might reasonably lead one to question the strength of the Government's asserted interests in a broad, prophylactic ban. The Government, when it acts as employer, possesses sub- stantial leeway; in appropriate circumstances, it may re- strain speech that the Constitution would otherwise protect. The Government's prerogatives in this area stem from its public-serving mission as employer. As the plurality ob- served last year in Waters, "[w]hen someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her." 511 U. S., at 675. In this case, however, the Government has exceeded the limits 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 485 Opinion of O'Connor, J. of its latitude. The bare assertion of interest in a wide- ranging prophylactic ban here, without any showing that Congress considered empirical or anecdotal data pertaining to abuses by lower echelon Executive Branch employees, cannot suffice to outweigh the substantial burden on the 1.7 million affected employees. I agree with the Court that § 501 is unconstitutional to the extent that it bars this class of employees from receiving honoraria for expressive activi- ties that bear no nexus to Government employment. II The class before us is defined by pay scale, not by its mem- bers' propensity to write articles without nexus to Govern- ment employment. As to any member of the class, the hono- raria ban may have unconstitutional applications. But the ban may be susceptible of constitutional application to every member of the class, as well. We do not decide the ques- tion-a far harder case for respondents, in my view- whether it is constitutional to apply the honoraria ban to speech by this class that bears a relationship to Government employment. I believe that the Court overlooks this nuance when it enjoins all enforcement of § 501 against the class, any one of whose members may, in the future, receive honoraria for work-related activities. I would give respondents relief tailored to what they request: invalidation of the statute in- sofar as it applies to honoraria they receive for speech with- out nexus to Government employment. See Brief for Re- spondents 45­46 (noting that respondents' central aim "could also be achieved by a remedy similar to the one urged by the government-by holding the ban invalid as applied to respondents' writing and speaking activities [that] have no nexus to their federal employment"). I agree with the Court's assertion that the remedy in this case is properly limited to the parties before us. We have long characterized overbreadth analysis as "strong medi- cine," to be "employed by the Court sparingly and only as a 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 486 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of O'Connor, J. last resort." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973). Accordingly, we have observed that "[i]t is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily." Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 484­485 (1989); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 768 (1982) (footnotes omitted) ("By focusing on the fac- tual situation before us, and similar cases necessary for de- velopment of a constitutional rule, we face `flesh-and-blood' legal problems with data `relevant and adequate to an in- formed judgment' "). The class before us, though defined broadly, consists of people who stand to benefit generally from the invalidation of this statute as applied. Because, as respondents freely admit, their central objective may be achieved by an as-applied challenge, see Brief for Respond- ents 45­46, I agree that the Court has little warrant to venture into the more difficult and uncertain overbreadth terrain. Like the dissent, however, I believe that the Court im- poses an unduly broad remedy when it enjoins enforcement of the entire provision as to respondent class. There is a commonsense appeal to the Government's argument that, having deemed a particular application of a statute unconsti- tutional, a court should not then throw up its hands and de- spair of delineating the area of unconstitutionality. See Brief for United States 38; Reply Brief for United States 15. On its face, the statute contains an exception for a "series" of speeches, appearances, and articles unless "the subject matter is directly related to the individual's official duties or the payment is made because of the individual's status with the Government." 5 U. S. C. App. § 505(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). I see no reason why the nexus principle underlying this general provision cannot serve as the appropriate remedial line. The Court assumes that it would venture into judicial leg- islation were it to invalidate the provision as it applies to 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 487 Opinion of O'Connor, J. no-nexus speech. But it is equally, if not more, inconsistent with congressional intent to strike a greater portion of the statute than is necessary to remedy the problem at hand. Although our jurisprudence in this area is hardly a model of clarity, this Court has on several occasions declared a statute invalid as to a particular application without striking the entire provision that appears to encompass it. In United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983), for example, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute making it unlawful to "parade, stand, or move in processions or as- semblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds," or "to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement." 40 U. S. C. § 13k. Finding the statute's extension to public fora inadequately justified, the Court deemed the provision unconstitutional as applied to the side- walks surrounding the Supreme Court. Grace, supra, at 183. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), the Court invalidated a state provision permitting police officers to use " `all the necessary means to effect the arrest' " of a fleeing or forcibly resisting defendant only insofar as it authorized the use of deadly force against an unarmed, nondangerous suspect. Id., at 4, 22. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491 (1985), the Court invalidated a state ob- scenity statute "only insofar as the word `lust' is taken to include normal interest in sex." Id., at 504­505. In Brockett, the Court declared: "[W]here the parties chal- lenging the statute are those who desire to engage in pro- tected speech that the overbroad statute purports to punish, or who seek to publish both protected and unprotected mate- rial[,] . . . [t]he statute may forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact." Id., at 504. Of course, we also noted that "[p]artial invalida- tion would be improper if it were contrary to legislative in- tent in the sense that the legislature had passed an insever- able Act or would not have passed it had it known the 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 488 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Opinion of O'Connor, J. challenged provision was invalid." Id., at 506. In Brockett itself, the state statute contained a severability clause an- nouncing that the remainder of the Act would continue in effect should "any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance" be held invalid. Id., at 506, n. 14. Because the opinions in Grace and Garner made no mention of the existence of statutory severability clauses, these cases can perhaps best be explained as having involved implied severability. After delineating the range of the statute's impermissible applications, the Court implicitly concluded that the legislatures at issue-Congress in Grace and the Tennessee Legislature in Garner-would have pre- ferred that the remainder of the statutes continue intact. These cases are entirely consistent with our severability precedents, in which we have held that "Congress' silence is just that-silence-and does not raise a presumption against severability." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678, 686 (1987). As the Court of Appeals noted below, "[s]ection 501(b) does not contain a severability clause, and the legislative history yields no direct evidence of intent concerning severability." 990 F. 2d 1271, 1278 (CADC 1993). Under Alaska Airlines, this fact is by no means dispositive; the operative question instead is whether Congress would have promulgated § 501(b) had it known that it could not lawfully proscribe hon- oraria of employees below GS­16 for activities unrelated to Government employment. See 480 U. S., at 684; Stern, Sep- arability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 82­83 (1937) (in dealing with the question of severable applications, the Court asks "whether the legisla- tive body would intend the law to be given effect to whatever extent was constitutionally possible"). I think this question can be answered in the affirmative here. In severing this particular application, we leave the provision intact as to high-level Executive Branch employees and to the Legisla- tive and Judicial Branches. Common sense suggests, and 513us2$25J 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 489 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting legislative history confirms, that these Government employ- ees, not the parties to this case, were the statute's principal targets. See, e. g., 990 F. 2d, at 1278 (describing floor de- bates at which speakers continually referred to abuses by "Members of Congress" as the impetus for reform). As for employees below GS­16, it seems to me clear that Congress would have barred tax examiners from receiving honoraria for lectures on tax policy even if it could not bar the same examiners from receiving honoraria for articles on low- cholesterol cooking. The balance of the provision serves a laudable purpose and is capable of functioning independently once the improper application is excised. Cf. Alaska Air- lines, supra, at 684. In sum, I agree with the Court that § 501 is unconstitu- tional insofar as it bars the respondent class of Executive Branch employees from receiving honoraria for non-work- related speeches, appearances, and articles. In contrast to the Court, I would hold § 501 invalid only to that extent. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. I believe that the Court's opinion is seriously flawed in two respects. First, its application of the First Amendment understates the weight that should be accorded to the gov- ernmental justifications for the honoraria ban and overstates the amount of speech that actually will be deterred. Sec- ond, its discussion of the impact of the statute that it strikes down is carefully limited to only a handful of the most ap- pealing individual situations, but when it deals with the rem- edy it suddenly shifts gears and strikes down the statute as applied to the entire class of Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16. I therefore dissent. I In 1991, in the aftermath of recommendations by two dis- tinguished commissions, Congress adopted its present ban 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 490 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting on the receipt of honoraria. Congress defined an "honorar- ium" as "a payment of money or any thing of value for an ap- pearance, speech or article (including a series of appear- ances, speeches, or articles if the subject matter is di- rectly related to the individual's official duties or the payment is made because of the individual's status with the Government) by a Member, officer or employee, ex- cluding, any actual and necessary travel expenses in- curred by such individual (and one relative) to the extent that such expenses are paid or reimbursed by any other person, and the amount otherwise determined shall be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the extent that such expenses are not paid or reimbursed." 5 U. S. C. App. § 505(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The ban neither prohibits anyone from speaking or writing, nor does it penalize anyone who speaks or writes; the only stricture effected by the statute is a denial of compensation. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105 (1991), we evaluated the constitu- tionality of New York's "Son of Sam" law, which regulated an accused or convicted criminal's receipt of income gener- ated by works that described his crime. Id., at 108. We concluded that the law implicated First Amendment con- cerns because it "impose[d] a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content." Id., at 116. Because the "Son of Sam" law was content based, we required the State to demonstrate that the regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and was narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id., at 118. We determined that the State had failed to meet its burden because the statute was overbroad. Id., at 123. Unlike the law at issue in Simon & Schuster, the honoraria ban is neither content nor viewpoint based. Ante, at 468; cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989); 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 491 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 47­48 (1986). As a result, the ban does not raise the specter of Government control over the marketplace of ideas. Cf. Simon & Schus- ter, supra, at 116. To the extent that the honoraria ban im- plicates First Amendment concerns, the proper standard of review is found in our cases dealing with the Government's ability to regulate the First Amendment activities of its employees. A public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment. See Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 140 (1983). We have emphasized, however, that "the State's interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees `differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with reg- ulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.' " Ibid. (quoting Pickering, supra, at 568). The proper resolution of these competing interests requires " `a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' " 461 U. S., at 140 (quot- ing Pickering, supra, at 568). Just last Term, a plurality of the Court explained: "The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment decisions, then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and effi- ciently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordi- nate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate." Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661, 675 (1994). 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 492 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting In conducting this balance, we consistently have given sub- stantial weight to government employers' reasonable predic- tions of disruption, even when the speech involved was on a matter of public concern. Id., at 673­674 (plurality opinion). As we noted in Connick, " `the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs.' " 461 U. S., at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result)). These principles are reflected in our cases involving gov- ernmental restrictions on employees' rights to engage in par- tisan political activity.1 In Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947), we examined § 9(a) of the Hatch Act, which prohibited officers and employees in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, with exceptions, from taking " `any active part in political management or in political cam- paigns.' " Id., at 78. We analyzed § 9(a)'s strictures as ap- plied to the partisan political activities of an industrial em- ployee at the United States Mint, and concluded that "[f]or regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regu- lated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public serv- ice." Id., at 101. Despite the fact that § 9(a) barred three- million public employees from taking "effective part in cam- paigns that may bring about changes in their lives, their fortunes, and their happiness," id., at 107 (Black, J., dissent- ing), we held that if in Congress' judgment "efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classi- 1 In Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371 (1882), we upheld a statute that pro- hibited certain Government employees from giving or receiving money for political purposes to or from other Government employees. Ibid. The evident purpose of the statute was to "promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service." Id., at 373. "The decisive principle was the power of Congress, within reasonable limits, to regulate, so far as it might deem necessary, the political conduct of its employees." Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 96 (1947) (analyzing Ex parte Curtis, supra). 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 493 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting fied employees in politics as party officers or workers," there was no constitutional objection, id., at 99. More than 25 years later, we again addressed the consti- tutionality of § 9(a) of the Hatch Act. In Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973), we "unhesi- tatingly reaffirm[ed] the Mitchell holding," id., at 556, be- cause "neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidate[d] a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees," ibid. We applied the balancing approach set forth in Pickering to the Hatch Act's sweeping limitation on partisan political activity, and determined that the balance struck by Congress was "sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act." 413 U. S., at 564. We concluded that "[p]erhaps Congress at some time w[ould] come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service," but we were in no position to dispute Congress' current view of the matter. Id., at 567. Although protection of employees from pressure to per- form political chores certainly was a concern of the Hatch Act, see ante, at 471, it was by no means the only, or even the most important, concern.2 See Letter Carriers, supra, at 566. Rather, the Court recognized that a major thesis of the Hatch Act was that "to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal em- ployees . . . not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan politi- cal campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the 2 Prior to the Hatch Act, Congress had prohibited Civil Service employ- ees from " `us[ing] [their] official authority or influence to coerce the politi- cal action of any person or body.' " Mitchell, supra, at 79­80, n. 4 (quoting Civil Service Act, ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 404). 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:46:59 PAGES OPINPGT 494 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting hazards to fair and effective government." 413 U. S., at 565. The Court emphasized that "it is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of repre- sentative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." Ibid. Thus, the Hatch Act served as a safeguard to both the actual and perceived impartiality and effective- ness of the Federal Government. See Mitchell, supra, at 95­96; Letter Carriers, supra, at 564­567. Applying these standards to the honoraria ban, I cannot say that the balance that Congress has struck between its interests and the interests of its employees to receive com- pensation for their First Amendment expression is unreason- able. Cf. Letter Carriers, supra, at 564; Pickering, 391 U. S., at 568. The Court largely ignores the Government's foremost in- terest-prevention of impropriety and the appearance of im- propriety-by focusing solely on the burdens of the statute as applied to several carefully selected Executive Branch employees whose situations present the application of the statute where the Government's interests are at their lowest ebb: a mail handler employed by the Postal Service who lec- tured on the Quaker religion; an aerospace engineer who lec- tured on black history; a microbiologist who reviewed dance performances; and a tax examiner who wrote articles about the environment. Ante, at 461­462. Undoubtedly these are members of the class, but they by no means represent the breadth of the class which includes all " `employee[s]' . . . below grade GS­16, who-but for 5 U. S. C. app. 501(b)- would receive `honoraria', as defined in 5 U. S. C. app. 505(3)." App. 124­125. Nothing in the class certification limits the receipt of honoraria to the activities engaged in by the several employees discussed by the Court. See, e. g., 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 495 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting ante, at 463, n. 6. This artificially narrow prism of class members, however, is the focus of the Court's entire First Amendment discussion. The class definition speaks of anyone who would receive an honorarium but for the statute. App. 124­125. An un- known number of these individuals would receive honoraria where there is a nexus between their speech and their Gov- ernment employment. There is little doubt that Congress reasonably could conclude that its interests in preventing im- propriety and the appearance of impropriety in the federal work force outweigh the employees' interests in receiving compensation for expression that has a nexus to their Gov- ernment employment. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Na- tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 210 (1982) ("The governmental interest in preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption of elected representatives has long been recognized"). The Court relies on cases involving restrictions on the speech of private actors to argue that the Government is required to produce "evidence of misconduct related to hono- raria in the vast rank and file of federal employees below grade GS­16." Ante, at 472; ante, at 475­476, and n. 21.3 The Court recognizes, however, that we " `have consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predic- tions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large.' " Ante, at 475, n. 21 (quoting Waters, 511 U. S., at 673 (plurality opinion)). 3 Ironically, the Court engages in unsupported factfinding to justify its conclusion. Thus, its First Amendment analysis is replete with observa- tions such as "[w]ith few exceptions, the content of respondents' messages has nothing to do with their jobs and does not even arguably have any adverse impact on the efficiency of the offices in which they work," ante, at 465; and "[b]ecause the vast majority of the speech at issue in this case does not involve the subject matter of Government employment and takes place outside the workplace, the Government is unable to justify § 501(b) on the grounds of immediate workplace disruption." Ante, at 470. 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT 496 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting Prior to enactment of the current honoraria ban, Congress was informed by two distinguished commissions that its pre- vious limitations on honoraria were inadequate. The 1989 Quadrennial Commission recommended that "Congress enact legislation abolishing the practice of accepting honoraria in all three branches." Fairness for Our Public Servants: Re- port of the 1989 Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries vi (Dec. 1988). To Serve With Honor: Re- port of the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform (Mar. 1989) (hereinafter Wilkey Commission) echoed many of the Quadrennial Commission's concerns: "We recognize that speeches by federal officials can help inform the public or particular groups and may encourage interchange between the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, we can see no justification for perpetuating the current system of honoraria. Hono- raria paid to officials can be a camouflage for efforts by individuals or entities to gain the officials' favor. The companies that pay honoraria and related travel ex- penses frequently deem these payments to be normal business expenses and likely believe that these pay- ments enhance their access to public officials who re- ceive them. . . . "Although we are aware of no special problems associ- ated with receipt of honoraria within the judiciary, the Commission-in the interest of alleviating abuses in the legislative branch and in applying equitable limitations across the government-joins the Quadrennial Commis- sion in recommending the enactment of legislation to ban the receipt of honoraria by all officials and employ- ees in all three branches of government." Id., at 35­36 (emphasis added). The Wilkey Commission "recognize[d] that banning hono- raria would have a substantial financial cost to many offi- cials," id., at 36, but determined that "the current ailment is 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 497 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting a serious one and that this medicine is no more bitter than is needed to cure the patient," ibid. The Wilkey Commis- sion also was aware that its recommendations covered not only high-level federal employees,4 but it "regard[ed] the cur- rent state of affairs as to honoraria in particular as unaccept- able in the extreme, and believe[d] that [the Government could not] wait until an unspecified date in the future to end this harmful practice." Id., at 38.5 The Court concedes that in light of the abuses of honoraria by its Members, Congress could reasonably assume that "payments of honoraria to judges or high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch might generate a similar appearance of improper influence," ante, at 473, but it concludes that Congress could not extend this presumption to federal em- 4 "The Commission also considered whether it was appropriate to impose a flat ban on outside earned income by all federal employees, or in the alternative, by the highest paid federal employees. In view of the diverse circumstances of federal employees, we felt that an across-the-board ban on outside earned income was unnecessary and too harsh." Wilkey Com- mission 38. 5 The Court discusses a report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to refute the argument that there is some evidence of misconduct related to honoraria in the rank and file of federal employees below grade GS­16. Ante, at 472, n. 18 (citing General Accounting Office, Report to the Chair- man, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Employee Conduct Standards: Some Outside Activities Present Conflict-of-Interest Issues (Feb. 1992) (hereinafter GAO Report)). The GAO audited 11 agencies' controls over outside activities by employees. Id., at 2. The GAO Re- port reflects that under the prior regime, some agencies exhibited "overly permissive approval policies," ibid., and "five agencies approved some out- side activities, such as speaking and consulting, that appeared to violate the standard of conduct prohibiting the use of public office for private gain," ibid. Nine of the eleven agencies reviewed had "approved outside activities in situations that involved potential violations of standard-of- conduct regulations or conflict-of-interest statutes." Id., at 58. Never- theless, the Court maintains that there is no evidence of even the appear- ance of impropriety by employees below grade GS­16. Cf. ante, at 472, n. 18. 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT 498 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting ployees below grade GS­16. The theory underlying the Court's distinction-that federal employees below grade GS­16 have negligible power to confer favors on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles-is seriously flawed. Tax examiners, bank examiners, enforce- ment officials, or any number of federal employees have sub- stantial power to confer favors even though their compensa- tion level is below grade GS­16. Furthermore, we rejected the same distinction in Public Workers v. Mitchell: "There is a suggestion that administrative workers may be barred, constitutionally, from political manage- ment and political campaigns while the industrial work- ers may not be barred, constitutionally, without an act `narrowly and selectively drawn to define and punish the specific conduct.' . . . Congress has determined that the presence of government employees, whether industrial or administrative, in the ranks of political party workers is bad. Whatever differences there may be between administrative employees of the government and in- dustrial workers in its employ are differences in detail so far as the constitutional power under review is con- cerned. Whether there are such differences and what weight to attach to them, are all matters of detail for Congress." 330 U. S., at 102. Congress was not obliged to draw an infinitely filigreed stat- ute to deal with every subtle distinction between various groups of employees. See Letter Carriers, 413 U. S., at 556; Mitchell, supra, at 99. The Court dismisses the Hatch Act experience as irrele- vant, because it aimed to protect employees' rights, notably their right to free expression, rather than to restrict those rights. Ante, at 471. This is, indeed, a strange charac- terization of § 9(a) of the Hatch Act. It prohibited officers 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 499 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting and employees in the Executive Branch of the Federal Gov- ernment from taking " `any active part in political manage- ment or in political campaigns.' " Mitchell, supra, at 78. The penalty for violation was dismissal from office. 330 U. S., at 79. Since the right to participate in a political cam- paign is surely secured in the abstract by the First Amend- ment, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam), it can hardly be said that the Act protected the rights of workers who wished to engage in partisan political activity. One of the purposes of the Act was assuredly to free employees who did not wish to become engaged in poli- tics from requests by their superiors to contribute money or time, but to the extent the Act protected these employees it undoubtedly limited the First Amendment rights of those who did wish to take an active part in politics. The Government's related concern regarding the difficul- ties that would attach in administering a case-by-case analy- sis of the propriety of particular honoraria also supports the honoraria ban's validity. As we emphasized in Waters, "[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as effec- tively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer." 511 U. S., at 675. Congress reasonably determined that the prior ethics regime, which required these case-by-case determinations, was inadequate. See App. 257 ("[T]he current state of affairs as to honoraria [is] unacceptable in the extreme"). As a subsequent 1992 GAO Report confirmed, individual ethics officers and various agencies gave differing interpretations to the nexus require- ment, and some "approved activities that were questionable as to the appropriateness of accepting compensation." GAO Report, at 9. The Court observes that because a nexus limitation is re- tained for a series of speeches, it cannot be that difficult to enforce. Ante, at 474. The exception that the honoraria ban 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT 500 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting makes for a "series of appearances, speeches, or articles," far from undermining the statute's basic purpose, demonstrates that Congress was sensitive to the need for inhibiting as lit- tle speech consistent with its responsibility of ensuring that its employees perform their duties impartially and that there is no appearance of impropriety. Reply Brief for United States 12­13. One is far less likely to undertake a "series" of speeches or articles without being paid than he is to make a single speech or write a single article without being paid. Congress reasonably could have concluded that the number of cases where an employee wished to deliver a "series" of speeches would be much smaller than the number of requests to give individual speeches or write individual articles. Unlike our prototypical application of Pickering which normally involves a response to the content of employee speech, the honoraria ban prohibits no speech and is unre- lated to the message or the viewpoint expressed by the Gov- ernment employee.6 Cf. Waters, supra, at 664­666 (plurality opinion) (analyzing termination of an employee based upon statements critical of the employer); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 381­382 (1987) (analyzing termination of an employee based upon a comment about an attempted assassi- nation of President Reagan); Pickering, 391 U. S., at 564 (an- alyzing termination of an employee based upon a letter criti- cal of the school board). Furthermore, the honoraria ban exempts from its prohibition travel and other expenses re- 6 The Court's fanciful example of an employer terminating an employee because of the disruptive effect of the employee's expression even where the employer agrees with the expression, ante, at 467, n. 11, does not detract from the fact that viewpoint and content neutrality are important factors in evaluating the reasonableness of the public employer's action. See, e. g., Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 564 (1973) ("The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view. . . . Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls"). 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 501 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting lated to employee speech. See 5 U. S. C. App. § 505(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V); 5 CFR § 2636.203 (1994). Because there is only a limited burden on respondents' First Amendment rights, Congress reasonably could have determined that its paramount interests in preventing impropriety and the ap- pearance of impropriety in its work force justified the hono- raria ban. See Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, supra; Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947). There is a special irony to the Court's decision. In order to combat corruption and to regain the public's trust, the Court essentially requires Congress to resurrect a bureauc- racy that it previously felt compelled to replace and to equip it with resources sufficient to conduct case-by-case determi- nations regarding the actual and apparent propriety of hono- raria by all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16. I believe that a proper application of the Pickering test to this content-neutral restriction on the receipt of compensa- tion compels the conclusion that the honoraria ban is consist- ent with the First Amendment. See Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973). II One would expect, at the conclusion of its discussion in Parts I­IV, for the Court to hold the statute inapplicable on First Amendment grounds to persons such as the postal worker who lectures on the Quaker religion, and others of similar ilk. But the Court in Part V, in what may fairly be described as an O. Henry ending, holds the statute inapplica- ble to the entire class before the Court: all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16 who would receive honoraria but for the statute. Under the Court's "as applied" remedy, § 501(b) would not apply regardless of whether there was a nexus between the compensation and the individual's em- ployment. Even if I agreed that application of the honoraria ban to expressive activity unrelated to an employee's Gov- 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT 502 UNITED STATES v. TREASURY EMPLOYEES Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting ernment employment violated the First Amendment, I could not agree with the Court's remedy.7 In United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983), we analyzed the constitutionality of 40 U. S. C. § 13k (1982 ed.), as applied to the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court. Section 13k prohibited, "among other things, the `display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement' in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds." 461 U. S., at 172­173 (quoting § 13k). We concluded that there was insufficient justification for § 13k's prohibition against carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public side- walks surrounding the building. Id., at 183. As a remedy, we held that § 13k was "unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks." Ibid.; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 763 (1993) (striking down a ban on solicitation by certified public accountants as applied to the "business context"). Although the Court limits its analysis to only those appli- cations of the honoraria ban where there is no nexus between the honoraria and Government employment, the Court pro- hibits application of the honoraria ban to all Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16 even where there is a nexus between the honoraria and the employees' Govern- ment employment. Ante, at 479­480.8 Even respondents acknowledge that the central aim of their litigation could "be achieved by a remedy similar to the one urged by the gov- ernment-by holding the ban invalid as applied to respond- 7 Lost in the shuffle of the Court's remedy is Peter Crane, a GS­16 law- yer from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and a respondent before the Court. Ante, at 461. Although the rationale behind the Court's hold- ing does not necessarily apply to Crane, see ante, at 478, n. 23, the Court's holding apparently does. 8 Because the Court has rewritten the honoraria ban so that it no longer applies to Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16, I certainly could not condemn the Court for its refusal to rewrite the statute. Cf. ante, at 479, n. 26. I simply challenge the Court's failure to tailor its remedy to match its selective analysis. 513us2$25H 04-01-98 17:47:00 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 454 (1995) 503 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting ents' writing and speaking activities, which have no nexus to their federal employment." Brief for Respondents 45­46. Consistent with our approach in Grace, supra, if I were to conclude that § 501(b) violated the First Amendment, I would affirm the Court of Appeals only insofar as its judgment af- firmed the injunction against the enforcement of § 501(b) as applied to Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16 who seek honoraria that are unrelated to their Government employment. 513us2$26Z 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 504 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Syllabus HARRIS v. ALABAMA certiorari to the supreme court of alabama No. 93­7659. Argued December 5, 1994-Decided February 22, 1995 Alabama law vests capital sentencing authority in the trial judge, but re- quires the judge to "consider" an advisory jury verdict. After convict- ing petitioner Harris of capital murder, the jury recommended that she be imprisoned for life without parole, but the trial judge sentenced her to death upon concluding that the statutory aggravating circumstance found and considered outweighed all of the mitigating circumstances. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting Harris' argument that the capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it does not specify the weight the judge must give to the jury's recommendation and thus permits the arbitrary impo- sition of the death penalty. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. Held: The Eighth Amendment does not require the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must give to an advisory jury verdict. Pp. 508­515. (a) Because the Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence, see, e. g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 465, it is not offended when a State further requires the judge to con- sider a jury recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight. Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is much like Florida's, ex- cept that a Florida sentencing judge is required to give the jury's recom- mendations "great weight," see Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla.), while an Alabama judge is not. Although this Court has spoken favorably of the so-called Tedder standard, see, e. g., Spaziano, supra, at 465, it has also made clear that the hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a State chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results, see, e. g., 468 U. S., at 465. To impose the Tedder standard here would offend established principles governing the criteria to be considered by the sentencer, see, e. g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 179, and would place within constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest within the State's discretion to administer its criminal justice system. Pp. 508­511. (b) Harris' arguments for requiring that "great weight" be given to the jury's advice are unpersuasive. First, Alabama cases reversing death sentences for prejudicial errors committed before the advisory jury do not demonstrate that the jury's role is in fact determinative, but 513us2$26Z 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 505 Opinion of the Court simply that a sentence imposed by the judge is invalid if the recommen- dation on which it partially rests was rendered erroneously. Second, although statistics demonstrate that there have been only 5 cases in which an Alabama judge rejected an advisory verdict of death, com- pared to 47 instances where the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury recommendation of life, these numbers do not tell the whole story because they do not indicate, for example, how many cases in which a jury recommendation of life was adopted would have ended differently had the judge not been required to consider the jury's advice. More- over, the statistics say little about whether the Alabama scheme is con- stitutional, a question which turns not solely on numerical tabulations of sentences, but rather on whether the penalties imposed are the prod- uct of properly guided discretion and not of arbitrary whim. Finally, apparent disparities in the weight given to jury verdicts in specific Ala- bama cases do not indicate that the judges have divergent understand- ings of the statutory requirement that such verdicts be considered; they simply reflect the fact that, in the subjective weighing process, the em- phasis given to each decisional criterion must of necessity vary to ac- count for the particular circumstances in each case. In any event, Har- ris does not show how these disparities affect her case. Pp. 511­515. 632 So. 2d 543, affirmed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 515. Ruth E. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief was Bryan A. Stevenson. P. David Bjurberg, Assistant Attorney General of Ala- bama, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James H. Evans, Attorney General. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Alabama law vests capital sentencing authority in the trial judge, but requires the judge to consider an advisory jury verdict. We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's ar- gument that Alabama's capital sentencing statute is uncon- stitutional because it does not specify the weight the judge must give to the jury's recommendation and thus permits arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 506 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court I A defendant convicted of capital murder in Alabama is entitled to a sentencing hearing before the trial jury, Ala. Code § 13A­5­46 (1994), unless jury participation is waived by both parties and approved by the court, § 13A­5­44. The State must prove statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and must disprove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any mitigating circumstance the defendant may proffer. § 13A­5­45(g). The jury then renders an advisory verdict. If it finds that aggravating factors, if any, outweigh mitigating circumstances, then the jury recommends death; otherwise, the verdict is life imprisonment without parole. § 13A­5­46(e). The jury may recommend death only if 10 jurors so agree, while a verdict of life imprisonment requires a simple majority. § 13A­5­46(f). The recommendation and vote tally are reported to the judge. The judge then must consider all available evidence and file a written statement detailing the defendant's crime, list- ing specific aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposing a sentence. Section 13A­5­47(e) provides: "In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist, and in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the jury contained in its advisory verdict, unless such a verdict has been waived pursuant to Section 13A­5­46(a) or 13A­5­ 46(g). While the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court." If the defendant is sentenced to death, his conviction and sentence are automatically reviewed by an appellate court and, if affirmed, a writ of certiorari is granted by the Ala- bama Supreme Court as a matter of right. In addition to reviewing the record for errors, the appellate courts must 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 507 Opinion of the Court independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circum- stances and determine whether the death penalty is dis- proportionate to sentences rendered in comparable cases. § 13A­5­53(b). Petitioner Louise Harris was married to the victim, a dep- uty sheriff, and was also having an affair with Lorenzo Mc- Carter. She asked McCarter to find someone to kill her hus- band, and McCarter to that end approached a co-worker, who refused and reported the solicitation to his supervisor. Mc- Carter then found willing accomplices in Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood, who were paid $100 and given a vague prom- ise of more money upon performance. On the appointed night, as her husband left for work on the night shift, Harris called McCarter on his beeper to alert him. McCarter and Hood sat in a car parked on a nearby street, and Sockwell hid in the bushes next to a stop sign. As the victim stopped his car at the intersection, Sockwell sprang forth and shot him, point blank, with a shotgun. Harris was arrested after questioning, and McCarter agreed to bear witness to the con- spiracy in exchange for the prosecutor's promise not to seek the death penalty. McCarter testified that Harris had asked him to kill her husband so they could share in his death bene- fits, which totaled about $250,000. The jury convicted Harris of capital murder. At the sen- tencing hearing, a number of witnesses attested to her good background and strong character. She was rearing seven children, held three jobs simultaneously, and participated actively in her church. The jury recommended, by a 7 to 5 vote, that she be imprisoned for life without parole. The trial judge then considered her sentence, finding the exist- ence of one aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and one statutory mitigator, that Harris had no prior criminal record. The trial judge also found as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that Harris was a hardworking, respected member of her church and community. Noting that Harris had planned the crime 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 508 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court and financed its commission and stood to benefit the most from her husband's murder, the judge concluded that "the one statutory aggravating circumstance found and consid- ered far outweighs all of the non-statutory mitigating cir- cumstances, and that the sentence ought to be death." App. 7. In separate proceedings, all the conspirators were con- victed of capital murder. McCarter and Hood received prison terms of life without parole; Sockwell, the triggerman, was sentenced to death after the trial judge rejected a jury recommendation, again by a 7 to 5 vote, of life imprisonment. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Harris' conviction and sentence. 632 So. 2d 503 (1992). It noted that Alabama's death penalty statute is based on Florida's sentencing scheme, which we have held to be constitutional, see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 457­467 (1984); Prof- fitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 252 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). One difference is that jury recommendations are to be given "great weight" by the sentencing judge in Florida, see Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), whereas Alabama only requires the judge to "consider" the advisory verdict. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Harris' contention that Florida's so-called Tedder standard is constitutionally required, how- ever. 632 So. 2d, at 538. As the statute prescribes, the court then reviewed the record for prejudicial errors and independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating cir- cumstances. Finding no errors and concluding that death was the proper sentence, the court affirmed. Id., at 542­ 543. The Alabama Supreme Court also affirmed, discussing an unrelated claim. 632 So. 2d 543 (1993). We granted certiorari. 512 U. S. 1234 (1994). II Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is much like that of Florida. Both require jury participation in the sentenc- ing process but give ultimate sentencing authority to the 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 509 Opinion of the Court trial judge. Ala. Code § 13A­5­47(e) (1994); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1985). A sentence of death in both States is subject to automatic appellate review. Ala. Code § 13A­ 5­55 (1994); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(4) (1985). In Florida, as in Alabama, the reviewing courts must independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine the propriety of the death sentence, Ala. Code § 13A­5­53(b)(2) (1994); Harvard v. State, 375 So. 2d 833 (Fla.), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 956 (1977), and must decide whether the penalty is excessive or disproportionate compared to similar cases, Ala. Code § 13A­5­53(b)(3) (1994); Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 909 (1984). The two States differ in one important respect. The Flor- ida Supreme Court has opined that the trial judge must give "great weight" to the jury's recommendation and may not override the advisory verdict of life unless "the facts sug- gesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, supra, at 910. The same deference inures to a jury recommendation of death. See Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839, n. 1 (Fla. 1988) (collecting cases). The Alabama capital sentencing statute, by contrast, requires only that the judge "consider" the jury's recommendation, and Alabama courts have refused to read the Tedder standard into the statute. See Ex parte Jones, 456 So. 2d 380, 382­383 (Ala. 1984). This distinction between the Alabama and Florida schemes forms the controversy in this case-whether the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution requires the sentenc- ing judge to ascribe any particular weight to the verdict of an advisory jury. We have held Florida's capital sentencing statute to be constitutional. See Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Spaziano v. Florida, supra. In Spaziano, we addressed the specific question whether Florida could, consistent with the Consti- tution, vest sentencing authority in the judge and relegate the jury to an advisory role. While acknowledging that sen- 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 510 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court tencing power resides with the jury in most States, we made clear that the "Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." Id., at 464. We therefore rejected the contention that "placing the responsibility on a trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency that Florida must be re- quired to alter its scheme and give final authority to the jury to make the life-or-death decision." Id., at 465; see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 648 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990). Asserting that the death penalty serves no function in "rehabilitation," "incapacitation," or "deterren[ce]," Justice Stevens argues that a jury "should bear the responsibility to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death in particular cases." Post, at 517, 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). What purpose is served by capital punishment and how a State should imple- ment its capital punishment scheme-to the extent that those questions involve only policy issues-are matters over which we, as judges, have no jurisdiction. Our power of ju- dicial review legitimately extends only to determine whether the policy choices of the community, expressed through its legislative enactments, comport with the Constitution. As we have noted elsewhere, "while we have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as legislators." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 174­175 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In various opinions on the Florida statute we have spoken favorably of the deference that a judge must accord the jury verdict under Florida law. While rejecting an ex post facto challenge in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977), we noted the "crucial protection" provided by the standard of Tedder v. State, supra, at 910. In the same fashion, in 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 511 Opinion of the Court dismissing Spaziano's argument that the Tedder standard was wrongly applied by the lower courts in his case, we stated: "This Court already has recognized the significant safe- guard the Tedder standard affords a capital defendant in Florida. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294­295 (1977). See also Proffitt, 428 U. S., at 249 (joint opin- ion). We are satisfied that the Florida Supreme Court takes that standard seriously and has not hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role." Spaziano, supra, at 465. These statements of approbation, however, do not mean that the Tedder standard is constitutionally required. As we stated in Spaziano immediately following the passage quoted above: "Our responsibility, however, is not to second- guess the deference accorded the jury's recommendation in a particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process is not arbitrary or discriminatory." 468 U. S., at 465. We thus made clear that, our praise for Tedder notwithstanding, the hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a State chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results. See also Proffitt, 428 U. S., at 252­253 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Consistent with established constitutional law, Alabama has chosen to guide the sentencing decision by requiring the jury and judge to weigh aggravating and mitigating circum- stances. Harris does not challenge this legislative choice. And she objects to neither the vesting of sentencing author- ity in the judge nor the requirement that the advisory ver- dict be considered in the process. What she seeks instead is a constitutional mandate as to how that verdict should be considered; relying on Florida's standard, she suggests that the judge must give "great weight" to the jury's advice. 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 512 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court We have rejected the notion that "a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sen- tencing proceeding is constitutionally required." Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 179 (1988). Equally settled is the corollary that the Constitution does not require a State to ascribe any specific weight to particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered by the sentencer. See, e. g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U. S. 299, 306­307 (1990); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 113­115 (1982); Proffitt, supra, at 257­258 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). To require that "great weight" be given to the jury recommendation here, one of the criteria to be considered by the sentencer, would offend these established principles and place within constitutional ambit microman- agement tasks that properly rest within the State's discre- tion to administer its criminal justice system. We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment does not require the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must accord an advisory jury verdict. Harris argues that, under Alabama law, the verdict is more than advisory and that the jury in fact enjoys the key sen- tencing role, subject only to review by the judge. For sup- port, she points to Alabama cases reversing death sentences where prejudicial errors were committed before the advisory jury. See Ex parte Williams, 556 So. 2d 744, 745 (Ala. 1987). Unless the jury played a key role, so goes the argument, reversal would not be warranted because the sentencing judge was not exposed to the same harmful error. The flaw in this contention is that reversal is proper so long as the jury recommendation plays a role in the judge's decision, not necessarily a determinative one. If the judge must consider the jury verdict in sentencing a capital defendant, as the statute plainly requires, then it follows that a sentence is invalid if the recommendation upon which it partially rests was rendered erroneously. In Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992), the advisory jury, but not the sentencing 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 513 Opinion of the Court judge, was presented with an invalid aggravating factor. We summarily reversed the death sentence, explaining that "Florida has essentially split the weighing process in two. Initially, the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating circum- stances, and the result of that weighing process is then in turn weighed within the trial court's process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id., at 1082. Error is committed when the jury considers an invalid factor and its verdict is in turn considered by the judge: "This kind of indirect weighing of an invalid aggravating factor creates the same potential for arbitrariness as the direct weighing of an invalid aggravating factor, and the result, therefore, was error." Ibid. (citation omitted). Such consequential error attaches whenever the jury recommendation is consid- ered in the process, not only when it is given great weight by the judge. We have observed in the Florida context that permitting the trial judge to reject the jury's advisory verdict may af- ford capital defendants "a second chance for life with the trial judge," Dobbert, 432 U. S., at 296. In practice, how- ever, Alabama's sentencing scheme has yielded some ostensi- bly surprising statistics. According to the Alabama Prison Project, there have been only 5 cases in which the judge rejected an advisory verdict of death, compared to 47 in- stances where the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury recommendation of life. Statistics compiled by the Ala- bama Prison Project (Nov. 29, 1994) (lodged with the Clerk of this Court). But these numbers do not tell the whole story. We do not know, for instance, how many cases in which a jury recommendation of life imprisonment is adopted would have ended differently had the judge not been re- quired to consider the jury's advice. Without such a subjec- tive look into the minds of the decisionmakers, the decep- tively objective numbers afford at best an incomplete picture. Even assuming that these statistics reflect a true view of capital sentencing in Alabama, they say little about 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 514 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court whether the scheme is constitutional. That question turns not solely on a numerical tabulation of actual death sentences as compared to a hypothetical alternative, but rather on whether the penalties imposed are the product of properly guided discretion and not of arbitrary whim. If the Ala- bama statute indeed has not had the effect that we or its drafters had anticipated, such unintended results would be of little constitutional consequence. An ineffectual law is for the state legislature to amend, not for us to annul. Harris draws our attention to apparent disparities in the weight given to jury verdicts in different cases in Alabama. For example, the trial judge here did not specify his reason for rejecting the jury's advice but in another case wrote that he accorded "great weight" to the recommendation, State v. Coral, No. CC­88­741 (Montgomery Cty., June 26, 1992), Al- abama Capital Sentencing Orders, p. 72 (lodged with the Clerk of this Court). In rejecting the jury verdict, other judges have commented variously that there was a "reason- able basis" to do so, State v. Parker, No. CC­88­105 (Colbert Cty., Dec. 3, 1991), Alabama Capital Sentencing Orders, at 408, that the verdict was "unquestionably a bizarre result," Ex parte Hays, 518 So. 2d 768, 777 (Ala. 1986), or that "if this were not a proper case for the death penalty to be imposed, a proper case can scarcely be imagined," State v. Frazier, No. CC­85­3291 (Mobile Cty., July 31, 1990), Alabama Capital Sentencing Orders, at 139. Juxtaposing these statements, Harris argues that the Alabama statute permits judges to reject arbitrarily the advisory verdict, thereby abusing their sentencing discretion. But these statements do not indicate that the judges have divergent understandings of the statutory requirement that the jury verdicts be considered; they simply illustrate how different judges have "considered" the jury's advice. There is no reason to expect that the advisory verdicts will be treated uniformly in every case. The Alabama statute pro- vides that the weighing process "shall not be defined to mean 513us2$26J 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 515 Stevens, J., dissenting a mere tallying of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the purpose of numerical comparison," Ala. Code § 13A­ 5­48 (1994), which is no less than what the Constitution re- quires, see Proffitt, 428 U. S., at 258 (joint opinion of Stew- art, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The disparate treatment of jury verdicts simply reflects the fact that, in the subjective weighing process, the emphasis given to each decisional criterion must of necessity vary in order to account for the particular circumstances of each case. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S., at 112 ("[A] consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency"). In any event, Harris does not show how the various statements affect her case. She does not bring an equal protection claim, and she does not contest the lower courts' conclusion that her sentence is proportionate to that imposed in similar cases. The sentiments expressed in unrelated cases do not render her punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment. The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence. It is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. Alabama's capital sentencing statute is unique. In Ala- bama, unlike any other State in the Union, the trial judge has unbridled discretion to sentence the defendant to death-even though a jury has determined that death is an inappropriate penalty, and even though no basis exists for believing that any other reasonable, properly instructed jury would impose a death sentence. Even if I accepted the rea- soning of Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 457­465 (1984), which I do not, see id., at 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I would conclude that the com- 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 516 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Stevens, J., dissenting plete absence of standards to guide the judge's consideration of the jury's verdict renders the statute invalid under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment. I Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that death is a fundamentally different kind of penalty from any other that society may impose.1 State legislatures' assignments of sen- tencing authority exemplify the distinction. In every State except Oklahoma, the trial judge rather than the jury is re- sponsible for sentencing in noncapital cases. The opposite consensus, however, prevails in capital cases. In 33 of the 37 States that authorize capital punishment, the jury partici- pates in the sentencing decision. In 29 of those States, the jury's decision is final; in the other 4-Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana-the judge has the power to override the jury's decision. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases, 46 Ala. L. Rev. 5, 9­10 (1994). Thus, 33 of the 37 state legislatures that have enacted death penalty statutes have given the jury sentenc- ing responsibilities that differ from the prevailing view of the jury's role in noncapital cases. The Federal Government also provides for jury sentencing in capital cases.2 These legislative decisions reflect the same judgment ex- pressed in England in 1953 after a 4-year study by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment: "The question whether there are grounds for relieving the prisoner from the liability to be sentenced to death 1 See, e. g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U. S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v. Mis- sissippi, 494 U. S. 738, 750, n. 4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496, 509, n. 12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 289, 294 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 637­ 638 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357­358 (1977) (plurality opinion). 2 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1966­1967. 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 517 Stevens, J., dissenting is a question of quite a different order from the question whether he should serve a shorter or a longer term of imprisonment, and involves much deeper moral and so- cial issues. The lesson of history is that, when a crimi- nal offence is punishable by death, in practice juries will not confine their attention to the issue of guilt and ig- nore the sentence which conviction entails. In the past, British juries, by perverse verdicts and by petitions, did at least as much as the campaigns of the reformers to bring the law into conformity with the developing moral conceptions of the community, especially in the field of capital punishment. It may well be argued that the men and women of the jury may be regarded as a micro- cosm of the community, who will reflect the changing attitudes of society as a whole to the infliction of capital punishment, and that there could therefore be no more appropriate body to decide whether the fellow-citizen whom they have found guilty of murder should suffer the penalty of death prescribed by the law or should receive a lesser punishment." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949­1953, Report 200 (1953). In ordinary, noncapital sentencing decisions, judges con- sider society's interests in rehabilitating the offender, in in- capacitating him from committing offenses in the future, and in deterring others from committing similar offenses. In capital sentencing decisions, however, rehabilitation plays no role; incapacitation is largely irrelevant, at least when the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is available; 3 and the assumption that death provides a greater deterrent than other penalties is unsupported by 3 In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), although we noted that inca- pacitation had been advanced as a rationale for upholding the death pen- alty, id., at 183, n. 28 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), the joint opinion placed no reliance on incapacitation as an acceptable justification. See California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 1023, and n. 9 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 518 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Stevens, J., dissenting persuasive evidence.4 Instead, the interest that we have identified as the principal justification for the death penalty is retribution: "[C]apital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 54­56 (1980). A capital sen- tence expresses the community's judgment that no lesser sanction will provide an adequate response to the defend- ant's outrageous affront to humanity. Gregg, 428 U. S., at 184. A representative cross section of the community should bear the responsibility to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death" in particular cases. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 519 (1968) (footnote omitted). An expression of community out- rage carries the legitimacy of law only if it rests on fair and careful consideration, as free as possible from passion or prejudice. Although the public's apparent zeal for legisla- tion authorizing capital punishment might cast doubt on citi- zens' capacity to apply such legislation fairly, I am convinced that our jury system provides reliable insulation against the passions of the polity. Voting for a political candidate who vows to be "tough on crime" differs vastly from voting at the conclusion of an actual trial to condemn a specific individ- ual to death. Jurors' responsibilities terminate when their case ends; they answer only to their own consciences; they rarely have any concern about possible reprisals after their work is done. More importantly, they focus their attention on a particular case involving the fate of one fellow citizen, rather than on a generalized remedy for a global category of faceless violent criminals who, in the abstract, may appear unworthy of life. A jury verdict expresses a collective judg- 4 See, e. g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 478­479 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); H. Zeisel, The Limits of Law Enforcement 60­63 (1982); Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 49­54 (1980). 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 519 Stevens, J., dissenting ment that we may fairly presume to reflect the considered view of the community. The Constitution does not permit judges to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused without her consent. The same reasons that underlie that prohibition apply to life-or- death sentencing decisions. The Framers of our Constitu- tion "knew from history and experience that it was neces- sary to protect . . . against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). As we explained in Duncan: "[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust ple- nary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence." Ibid. Community participation is as critical in life-or-death sen- tencing decisions as in those decisions explicitly governed by the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be "too responsive" is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty.5 Ala- 5 This climate is evident in political attacks on candidates with reserva- tions about the death penalty. For example, challengers for United States Senate seats in the recent elections routinely savaged their incumbent opponents for supporting federal judicial nominees perceived to be "soft" on capital punishment. See, e. g., Lehigh & Phillips, Romney, Kennedy Air Another Round of Attack Ads, Boston Globe, Oct. 31, 1994, Metro/ Region section, p. 21; Lesher, Huffington Attacks Rival on Judges, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 30, 1994, p. A3; Political Notebook, Memphis Com- mercial Appeal, Oct. 8, 1994, p. 3B (Frist-Sasser race). Some Senators have also made the death penalty a litmus test in judicial confirmation 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 520 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Stevens, J., dissenting bama trial judges face partisan election every six years. Ala. Code § 17­2­7 (1987). The danger that they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George III. II In my opinion, total reliance on judges to pronounce sentences of death is constitutionally unacceptable. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 708 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the addition of an advisory jury may ameliorate concerns about judicial sentencing in some cases, more often that addition makes the scheme much worse, es- pecially when, as in Alabama, the jury's verdict carries no necessary weight. If Alabama's statute expressly provided for a death sen- tence upon a verdict by either the jury or the judge, I have no doubt it would violate the Constitution's command that no defendant "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; cf. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430, 444­446 (1981). The Alabama scheme has the same practical effect. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 513, Ala- bama trial judges almost always adopt jury verdicts recom- mending death; a prosecutor who wins before the jury can be confident that the defendant will receive a death sentence. A prosecutor who loses before the jury gets a second, fresh opportunity to secure a death sentence. She may present the judge with exactly the same evidence and arguments hearings. See, e. g., Lewis, G. O. P. To Challenge Judicial Nominees Who Oppose Death Penalty, N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1993, p. A26; Vick, Barkett's Foes Show Strength Even in Defeat, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 18, 1994, p. 5B. As one commentator has written: "Most experts on penal systems agree that capital punishment does not deter capital crime. But the pub- lic believes that it does, and politicians have been switching longstanding positions to accommodate that view. . . . This . . . is the democratic system." Wills, Read Polls, Heed America, N. Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1994, section 6 (mag- azine), p. 48. 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 521 Stevens, J., dissenting that the jury rejected. The defendant's life is twice put in jeopardy, once before the jury and again in the repeat per- formance before a different, and likely less sympathetic, deci- sionmaker. A scheme that we assumed would "provid[e] capital defendants with more, rather than less, judicial pro- tection," Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 295 (1977),6 has perversely devolved into a procedure that requires the de- fendant to stave off a death sentence at each of two de novo sentencing hearings. Not surprisingly, given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death penalty. This has long been the case,7 and the recent experi- ence of judicial overrides confirms it. Alabama judges have vetoed only five jury recommendations of death, but they have condemned 47 defendants whom juries would have spared.8 The Court acknowledges this "ostensibly surpris- 6 I have always believed the legislative decision to authorize an override was intended to protect the defendant from the risk of an erroneous jury decision to impose the death penalty. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 252­253 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). States have in the past argued that the override would serve to protect defendants. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent in Dobbert v. Florida, O. T. 1976, No. 76­5306, p. 17 ("It cannot be said that Florida's new [override] procedure reduces the possibility of mercy. In fact, it is enhanced"). 7 See H. Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes Towards Capital Punish- ment 37­50 (1968). 8 Statistics from Florida and Indiana confirm that judges tend to over- ride juries' life recommendations far more often than their death recom- mendations. Between 1972 and early 1992, Florida trial judges imposed death sentences over 134 juries' recommendations of life imprisonment. See Radelet and Mello, Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1992). Dur- ing the same period, Florida judges overrode only about 51 death recom- mendations. Id., at 210­211. In Indiana, between 1980 and early 1994, judges had used overrides to impose eight death sentences and only four life sentences. Memorandum from Paula Sites, Legal Director, Indiana Public Defender Council, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 8, 1994) (lodged with the Clerk of this Court). The even more extreme disparity in Ala- bama may well be attributable to Alabama's unique failure to adopt the 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 522 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Stevens, J., dissenting ing" fact, ante, at 513, but dismisses it as inconclusive, be- cause "[w]e do not know . . . how many cases in which a jury recommendation of life imprisonment is adopted would have ended differently had the judge not been required to consider the jury's advice," ibid. This attempt to shrug off the real- ity of Alabama capital sentencing misses the point. Perhaps Alabama judges would be even more severe, and their sen- tences even more frequently inconsistent with the communi- ty's sense of justice, if Alabama provided for no jury verdicts at all. But the proper frame of reference is not a sentencing scheme with no jury; rather, it is a sentencing scheme with no judge-the scheme maintained by 29 of 37 States with capital punishment. In that comparison, the fact that Ala- bama trial judges have overridden more than nine juries' life recommendations for every vetoed death recommendation is conclusive indeed. Death sentences imposed by judges, especially against jury recommendations, sever the critical "link between contemporary community values and the penal system." Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 519, n. 15. They result in the execution of defendants whom the community would spare. Death sentences imposed by judges over contrary jury verdicts do more than countermand the community's judg- ment: They express contempt for that judgment. Judicial overrides undermine the jury system's central tenet that "sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility." Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Overrides also sac- rifice the legitimacy of jury verdicts, at potentially great cost. Whereas the public presumes that a death sentence imposed by a jury reflects the community's judgment that death is the appropriate response to the defendant's crime, the same presumption does not attach to a lone government more stringent standard that governs overrides in the other States. See infra, at Part III. 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 523 Stevens, J., dissenting official's decree. Indeed, government-sanctioned executions unsupported by judgments of a fair cross section of the citi- zenry may undermine respect for the value of human life itself and unwittingly increase tolerance of killing.9 As Jus- tice Brandeis reminded us, "Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious." Olm- stead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). Unless the imposition of the death penalty con- sistently rests on the most scrupulous regard for fair proce- dure and the application of accepted community standards, it may well teach a lesson that aggravates the very dangers it was intended to deter. 9 Research has provided evidence that executions actually increase the level of violence in society. For example, a controlled, 56-year study in New York State revealed that an average of two additional homicides oc- curred in the month following an execution. See Bowers & Pierce, Deter- rence or Brutalization: What Is the Effect of Executions?, 26 Crime and Delinquency 453 (1980). A 10-year study in California produced less con- clusive but similar results. See Graves, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in California, in The Death Penalty in America 322, 327­331 (H. Bedau ed. 1967). Experienced prosecutors recognize this reality. Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1995, p. A25 ("[B]y their brutalizing and dehumanizing effect on society, execu- tions cause more murders than they prevent"). A court's unilateral de- cree of a death sentence surely magnifies the risk of such perverse conse- quences. This Court's recent refusal to stay an execution provides an illustration. After a jury had sentenced the defendant, the prosecutor announced that a different person had pulled the trigger. Nevertheless, the State executed the condemned man without giving him a chance to present this information to a jury. See Jacobs v. Scott, post, at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution). Six days later, a news account described death penalty supporters' lack of concern about the danger of executing innocent people. "One [proponent of capital pun- ishment] likened the death penalty to a childhood vaccine approved by the government with full knowledge that at least one child, somewhere, would die from an adverse reaction." Verhovek, When Justice Shows Its Darker Side, N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1995, section 4, p. 6. 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:14 PAGES OPINPGT 524 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Stevens, J., dissenting III If the Court correctly held in Spaziano that the Constitu- tion's concerns with regularity and fairness do not bar judges from imposing death sentences over contrary jury verdicts, one would at least expect the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to re- quire that such schemes maintain strict standards to regular- ize and constrain the judge's discretion. The Court today refuses to impose any standard, holding that to do so would be "micromanagement." Ante, at 512. But this case in- volves far more than a mundane administrative detail. Alabama stands alone among the States in its refusal to constrain its judges' power to condemn defendants over con- trary jury verdicts. The Florida statute upheld in Spazi- ano, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, requires the prosecutor to satisfy a more stringent standard before the judge than before the jury, prohibiting a judicial override unless the facts supporting the death sentence are "so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could dif- fer." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975). If that standard is satisfied, a judge may rationally presume that the jury's verdict did not fairly reflect the judgment of the community. Delaware and Indiana impose similar require- ments for overrides. See Pennell v. State, 604 A. 2d 1368, 1377­1378 (Del. 1992); Martinez-Chavez v. State, 534 N. E. 2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989). We have repeatedly cited the Tedder standard with ap- proval, suggesting that the Constitution requires such a con- straint on a jury override provision. See Spaziano, 468 U. S., at 465; Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S., at 294­295; Prof- fitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 252 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Today the Court dis- misses those statements. After Justice Blackmun stated in his opinion for the Court in Spaziano that "[w]e are satisfied that the Florida Supreme Court takes [Tedder] seriously 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:15 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 504 (1995) 525 Stevens, J., dissenting and has not hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role," he added, as the majority notes, that "[o]ur responsibility, however, is not to second-guess the deference accorded the jury's recommendation in a particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process is not arbitrary or discriminatory." 468 U. S., at 465. The majority reads this second statement to mean that "the hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a State chooses to place upon the jury's advice." Ante, at 511. That reading is overly ambi- tious at best. The question whether the Constitution re- quires the Tedder rule goes squarely to "the result of the process." The Spaziano Court declined to upset the result in the "particular case" before it based on the way the Flor- ida Supreme Court had applied Tedder in that case. It did not announce that it would have reached the same result had Florida abjured Tedder entirely; rather, it appears to have made Tedder's role in the Florida scheme a necessary consid- eration in its evaluation of Florida overrides. The Court's reading of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Spaziano is tenable, but a more likely reading is that his opinion meant to echo our previous suggestions that a jury override scheme is unconstitutional without Tedder. I would follow those suggestions and recognize Tedder as a constitutional imperative. As I have explained, an unfet- tered judicial override of a jury verdict for life imprisonment cannot be taken to represent the judgment of the community. A penalty that fails to reflect the community's judgment that death is the appropriate sentence constitutes cruel and un- usual punishment under our reasoning in Gregg. Remark- ably, the Court attempts to bolster its holding by citing our reversal of a Florida death sentence for error before the ad- visory jury. Ante, at 512­513, citing Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992). The Court forgets that the difference between Florida and Alabama is precisely what is at stake in this case. The Constitution compelled Espinosa for the 513us2$26I 03-30-98 09:01:15 PAGES OPINPGT 526 HARRIS v. ALABAMA Stevens, J., dissenting same ultimate reason it compels Tedder: The community's undistorted judgment must decide a capital defendant's fate.10 Proper attention to Espinosa would lead the Court to reject the conclusion it reaches today. In reaching its result the Court also fails to consider our longstanding principle that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958). The Spaziano Court held that the rejection of capital jury sentencing by all but seven States, and of capital jury overrides by all but (at that time) three, did not demonstrate an "evolving standard" disfavor- ing overrides. Spaziano, 468 U. S., at 463­464. Surely, however, the rejection of standardless overrides by every State in the Union but Alabama is a different matter. Cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 789­793 (1982). The Court today casts a cloud over the legitimacy of our capital sentencing jurisprudence. The most credible justi- fication for the death penalty is its expression of the commu- nity's outrage. To permit the State to execute a woman in spite of the community's considered judgment that she should not die is to sever the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring. The absence of any rudder on a judge's free-floating power to negate the community's will, in my judgment, renders Alabama's capital sentencing scheme fundamentally unfair and results in cruel and unusual punishment. I therefore respectfully dissent. 10 Of course, the majority is correct to reaffirm the importance of reme- dying prejudicial error before advisory juries. When the Court next has occasion to review an Alabama jury-related error and the sentencing judge has not revealed the degree of her reliance on the jury's advice, the major- ity apparently will be content to presume that the error, and the jury decision it tainted, mattered to the result. 513us2$27Z 04-01-98 17:48:45 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 527 Syllabus JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 93­762. Argued October 12, 1994-Decided February 22, 1995* After the Chicago River flooded a freight tunnel under the river and the basements of numerous buildings, petitioner corporation and other vic- tims brought tort actions in state court against respondent Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. and petitioner Chicago. They claimed that in the course of driving piles from a barge into the riverbed months earlier, Great Lakes had negligently weakened the tunnel, which had been im- properly maintained by the city. Great Lakes then filed this action, invoking federal admiralty jurisdiction and seeking, inter alia, the pro- tection of the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act. That Act would permit the admiralty court to decide whether Great Lakes had committed a tort and, if so, to limit its liability to the value of the barges and tug involved if the tort was committed without the privity or knowl- edge of the vessels' owner. The District Court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The District Court has federal admiralty jurisdiction over Great Lakes's Limitation Act suit. Pp. 531­548. (a) A party seeking to invoke such jurisdiction over a tort claim must satisfy conditions of both location and connection with maritime activity. In applying the location test, a court must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. 46 U. S. C. App. § 740. In applying the connection test, a court first must assess the "general features of the type of incident involved" to determine if the incident has "a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce." Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 363, 364, n. 2. If so, the court must determine whether the character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id., at 365, 364, and n. 2. Pp. 531­534. (b) The location test is readily satisfied here. The alleged tort was committed on a navigable river, and petitioners do not seriously dispute that Great Lakes's barge is a "vessel" for admiralty tort purposes. *Together with No. 93­1094, City of Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 513us2$27Z 04-01-98 17:48:45 PAGES OPINPGT 528 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Syllabus There is no need or justification for imposing an additional jurisdictional requirement that the damage done must be close in time and space to the activity that caused it. A nonremoteness requirement is not sup- ported by the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act's language, and the phrase "caused by" used in that Act indicates that the proper stand- ard is proximate cause. Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 373 U. S. 206, 210, distinguished. Pp. 534­538. (c) The maritime connection test is also satisfied here. The incident's "general features" may be described as damage by a vessel in navigable water to an underwater structure. There is little question that this is the kind of incident that has "a potentially disruptive impact on mari- time commerce." Damaging the structure could lead to a disruption in the water course itself and, as actually happened here, could lead to restrictions on navigational use during repairs. There is also no ques- tion that the activity giving rise to the incident-repair or maintenance work on a navigable waterway performed from a vessel-shows a sub- stantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Even the asser- tion that the city's alleged failure to properly maintain and operate the tunnel system was a proximate cause of the flood damage does not take this suit out of admiralty. Under Sisson, the substantial relationship test is satisfied when at least one alleged tortfeasor was engaging in activity substantially related to traditional maritime activity and such activity is claimed to have been a proximate cause of the incident. There is no merit to the argument that the activity should be character- ized at a hypergeneralized level, such as "repair and maintenance," to eliminate any hint of maritime connection, or to the argument that Sisson is being given too expansive a reading. Pp. 538­543. (d) There are theoretical, as well as practical, reasons to reject the city's proposed multifactor test for admiralty jurisdiction where most of the victims, and one of the tortfeasors, are land based. The Sisson tests are directed at the same objectives invoked to support a multifac- tor test, the elimination of admiralty jurisdiction where the rationale for the jurisdiction does not support it. In the Extension Act, Congress has already made a judgment that a land-based victim may properly be subject to admiralty jurisdiction; surely a land-based joint tortfeasor has no claim to supposedly more favorable treatment. Moreover, con- trary to the city's position, exercise of admiralty jurisdiction does not result in automatic displacement of state law. A multifactor test would also be hard to apply, jettisoning relative predictability for the open- ended rough-and-tumble of factors, inviting complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal. Pp. 543­548. 3 F. 3d 225, affirmed. 513us2$27Z 04-01-98 17:48:45 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 529 Opinion of the Court Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 548. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 549. Stevens and Breyer, JJ., took no part in the decision of the cases. Ben Barnow argued the cause for petitioner in No. 93­762. With him on the briefs were Alan M. Goldberg, Albert Cuel- ler, Robert A. Holstein, Aron D. Robinson, William J. Harte, Philip B. Kurland, and Alan S. Madans. Lawrence Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioner in No. 93­1094. With him on the briefs were Susan S. Sher, Benna Ruth Solomon, Stuart D. Fullerton, Theodore R. Tetzlaff, Barry Sullivan, Russ M. Strobel, and Michael F. Sturley. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. in both cases. With him on the brief were David G. Leitch, Douglas M. Reimer, Carl W. Schwarz, Stewart W. Karge, William P. Schuman, Jeffrey E. Stone, Duane M. Kelley, and Jack J. Crowe. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel running under the river and thence into the basements of buildings in the downtown Chicago Loop. Allegedly, the flooding resulted from events several months earlier, when respondent Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company had used a crane, sitting on a barge in the river next to a bridge, to drive piles into the riverbed above the tunnel. The issue before us is whether a court of the United States has admiralty jurisdiction to determine and limit the extent of Great Lakes's tort liability. We hold this suit to be within federal admiralty jurisdiction. Richard Ruda filed a brief for the National Conference of State Leg- islatures et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Warren J. Marwedel, Dennis Minichello, and Charles D. Hooper filed a brief for the Maritime Law Association of the United States as amicus curiae. 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:45 PAGES OPINPGT 530 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court I The complaint, together with affidavits subject to no objec- tion, alleges the following facts. In 1990, Great Lakes bid on a contract with petitioner city of Chicago to replace wooden pilings clustered around the piers of several bridges spanning the Chicago River, a navigable waterway within the meaning of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871). See Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683 (1883). The pilings (called dolphins) keep ships from bumping into the piers and so protect both. After winning the contract, Great Lakes carried out the work with two barges towed by a tug. One barge carried pilings; the other carried a crane that pulled out old pilings and helped drive in new ones. In August and September 1991, Great Lakes replaced the pilings around the piers projecting into the river and sup- porting the Kinzie Street Bridge. After towing the crane- carrying barge into position near one of the piers, Great Lakes's employees secured the barge to the riverbed with spuds, or long metal legs that project down from the barge and anchor it. The workers then used the crane on the barge to pull up old pilings, stow them on the other barge, and drive new pilings into the riverbed around the piers. About seven months later, an eddy formed in the river near the bridge as the collapsing walls or ceiling of a freight tun- nel running under the river opened the tunnel to river water, which flowed through to flood buildings in the Loop. After the flood, many of the victims brought actions in state court against Great Lakes and the city of Chicago, claiming that in the course of replacing the pilings Great Lakes had negligently weakened the tunnel structure, which Chicago (its owner) had not properly maintained. Great Lakes then brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court, invoking federal admiralty jurisdiction. Count I of the complaint seeks the protection of the Limitation of Ves- sel Owner's Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq., a statute that would, in effect, permit the admi- 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 531 Opinion of the Court ralty court to decide whether Great Lakes committed a tort and, if so, to limit Great Lakes's liability to the value of the vessels (the tug and two barges) involved if the tort was committed "without the privity or knowledge" of the vessels' owner, 46 U. S. C. App. § 183(a). Counts II and III of Great Lakes's complaint ask for indemnity and contribution from the city for any resulting loss to Great Lakes. The city, joined by petitioner Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., one of the state-court plaintiffs, filed a motion to dismiss this suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1). The District Court granted the motion, the Sev- enth Circuit reversed, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Chicago, 3 F. 3d 225 (1993), and we granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1108 (1994). We now affirm. II The parties do not dispute the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that jurisdiction as to Counts II and III (indemnity and con- tribution) hinges on jurisdiction over the Count I claim. See 3 F. 3d, at 231, n. 9; see also 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1988 ed., Supp. V) (supplemental jurisdiction); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 14(a) and (c) (impleader of third parties). Thus, the issue is simply whether or not a federal admiralty court has jurisdic- tion over claims that Great Lakes's faulty replacement work caused the flood damage. A A federal court's authority to hear cases in admiralty flows initially from the Constitution, which "extend[s]" federal ju- dicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris- diction." U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2. Congress has embod- ied that power in a statute giving federal district courts "original jurisdiction . . . of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . ." 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). The traditional test for admiralty tort jurisdiction asked only whether the tort occurred on navigable waters. If it did, admiralty jurisdiction followed; if it did not, admiralty 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 532 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court jurisdiction did not exist. See, e. g., Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13902) (CC Me. 1813) (Story, J., on Circuit). This ostensibly simple locality test was complicated by the rule that the injury had to be "wholly" sustained on naviga- ble waters for the tort to be within admiralty. The Ply- mouth, 3 Wall. 20, 34 (1866) (no jurisdiction over tort action brought by the owner of warehouse destroyed in a fire that started on board a ship docked nearby). Thus, admiralty courts lacked jurisdiction over, say, a claim following a ship's collision with a pier insofar as it injured the pier, for admi- ralty law treated the pier as an extension of the land. Mar- tin v. West, 222 U. S. 191, 197 (1911); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316, 319 (1908). This latter rule was changed in 1948, however, when Con- gress enacted the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 62 Stat. 496. The Act provided that "[t]he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." 46 U. S. C. App. § 740. The purpose of the Act was to end concern over the some- times confusing line between land and water, by investing admiralty with jurisdiction over "all cases" where the injury was caused by a ship or other vessel on navigable water, even if such injury occurred on land. See, e. g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 373 U. S. 206, 209­210 (1963); Execu- tive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 260 (1972). After this congressional modification to gather the odd case into admiralty, the jurisdictional rule was qualified again in three decisions of this Court aimed at keeping a different class of odd cases out. In the first case, Executive Jet, supra, tort claims arose out of the wreck of an airplane that collided with a flock of birds just after takeoff on a do- 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 533 Opinion of the Court mestic flight and fell into the navigable waters of Lake Erie. We held that admiralty lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims. We wrote that "a purely mechanical application of the locality test" was not always "sensible" or "consonant with the purposes of maritime law," id., at 261, as when (for example) the literal and universal application of the locality rule would require admiralty courts to adjudicate tort dis- putes between colliding swimmers, id., at 255. We held that "claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable in admiralty" despite the location of the harm, unless "the wrong bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional mari- time activity." Id., at 268. The second decision, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668 (1982), dealt with tort claims arising out of the colli- sion of two pleasure boats in a navigable river estuary. We held that admiralty courts had jurisdiction, id., at 677, even though jurisdiction existed only if "the wrong" had "a sig- nificant connection with traditional maritime activity," id., at 674. We conceded that pleasure boats themselves had little to do with the maritime commerce lying at the heart of the admiralty court's basic work, id., at 674­675, but we nonethe- less found the necessary relationship in "[t]he potential disruptive impact [upon maritime com- merce] of a collision between boats on navigable waters, when coupled with the traditional concern that admi- ralty law holds for navigation . . . ," id., at 675. In the most recent of the trilogy, Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358 (1990), we held that a federal admiralty court had juris- diction over tort claims arising when a fire, caused by a de- fective washer/dryer aboard a pleasure boat docked at a ma- rina, burned the boat, other boats docked nearby, and the marina itself. Id., at 367. We elaborated on the enquiry exemplified in Executive Jet and Foremost by focusing on two points to determine the relationship of a claim to the objectives of admiralty jurisdiction. We noted, first, that 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 534 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court the incident causing the harm, the burning of docked boats at a marina on navigable waters, was of a sort "likely to disrupt [maritime] commercial activity." 497 U. S., at 363. Second, we found a "substantial relationship" with "tradi- tional maritime activity" in the kind of activity from which the incident arose, "the storage and maintenance of a vessel . . . on navigable waters." Id., at 365­367. After Sisson, then, a party seeking to invoke federal admi- ralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connec- tion with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. 46 U. S. C. App. § 740. The con- nection test raises two issues. A court, first, must "assess the general features of the type of incident involved," 497 U. S., at 363, to determine whether the incident has "a poten- tially disruptive impact on maritime commerce," id., at 364, n. 2. Second, a court must determine whether "the general character" of the "activity giving rise to the incident" shows a "substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id., at 365, 364, and n. 2. We now apply the tests to the facts of this suit. B The location test is, of course, readily satisfied. If Great Lakes caused the flood, it must have done so by weakening the structure of the tunnel while it drove in new pilings or removed old ones around the bridge piers. The weakening presumably took place as Great Lakes's workers lifted and replaced the pilings with a crane that sat on a barge sta- tioned in the Chicago River. The place in the river where the barge sat, and from which workers directed the crane, is in the "navigable waters of the United States." Escanaba Co., 107 U. S., at 683. Thus, if Great Lakes committed a tort, it must have done it while on navigable waters. 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 535 Opinion of the Court It must also have done it "by a vessel." Even though the barge was fastened to the river bottom and was in use as a work platform at the times in question, at other times it was used for transportation. See 3 F. 3d, at 229. Petitioners do not here seriously dispute the conclusion of each court below that the Great Lakes barge is, for admiralty tort purposes, a "vessel." The fact that the pile driving was done with a crane makes no difference under the location test, given the maritime law that ordinarily treats an "appurtenance" attached to a vessel in navigable waters as part of the vessel itself. See, e. g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202, 210­211 (1971); Gutierrez, 373 U. S., at 209­210.1 Because the injuries suffered by Grubart and the other flood victims were caused by a vessel on navigable water, the location enquiry would seem to be at an end, "notwith- standing that such damage or injury [was] done or consum- mated on land." 46 U. S. C. App. § 740. Both Grubart and Chicago nonetheless ask us to subject the Extension Act to limitations not apparent from its text. While they concede that the Act refers to "all cases of damage or injury," they argue that "all" must not mean literally every such case, no matter how great the distance between the vessel's tortious activity and the resulting harm. They contend that, to be 1 Grubart argues, based on Margin v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 812 F. 2d 973, 975 (CA5 1987), that an appurtenance is considered part of the vessel only when it is defective. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 93­762, pp. 34­35 (Grubart Brief). Margin, however, does not so hold. It dealt with a land-based crane that lowered a ship's hatch cover dangerously close to a welder working on a dock, and its result turned not on the condition of the hatch cover, the putative appurtenance, but on the fact that the plain- tiff did not allege that "vessel negligence proximately caused his injury." 812 F. 2d, at 977. Indeed, the argument that Congress intended admiralty jurisdiction to extend to injuries caused by defective appurtenances, but not to appurtenances in good condition when operated negligently, makes no sense. See Gutierrez, 373 U. S., at 210 ("There is no distinction in admiralty between torts committed by the ship itself and by the ship's personnel while operating it . . ."). 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 536 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court within the Act, the damage must be close in time and space to the activity that caused it: that it must occur "reasonably contemporaneously" with the negligent conduct and no "far- ther from navigable waters than the reach of the vessel, its appurtenances and cargo." Brief for Petitioner in No. 93­ 1094, p. 45 (City Brief). For authority, they point to this Court's statement in Gutierrez, supra, that jurisdiction is present when the "impact" of the tortious activity "is felt ashore at a time and place not remote from the wrongful act." Id., at 210.2 The demerits of this argument lie not only in its want of textual support for its nonremoteness rule, but in its disre- gard of a less stringent but familiar proximity condition tied to the language of the statute. The Act uses the phrase "caused by," which more than one Court of Appeals has read as requiring what tort law has traditionally called "proxi- mate causation." See, e. g., Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F. 2d 974, 979 (CA4 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1055 (1976); Adams v. Harris County, 452 F. 2d 994, 996­997 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 968 (1972). This classic tort notion normally eliminates the bizarre, cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928), and its use should obviate not only the complication but even the need for further temporal or spatial limitations. Nor is reliance on familiar proximate causation inconsistent with Gutierrez, which used its nonremote language, not to an- nounce a special test, but simply to distinguish its own facts (the victim having slipped on beans spilling from cargo con- tainers being unloaded from a ship) from what the Court called "[v]arious far-fetched hypotheticals," such as injury to someone slipping on beans that continue to leak from the 2 At oral argument, counsel for the city undercut this argument by con- ceding that admiralty jurisdiction would govern claims arising from an incident in which a ship on navigable waters slipped its moorings, drifted into a dam, and caused a breach in the dam that resulted in flooding of surrounding territory. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 537 Opinion of the Court containers after they had been shipped from Puerto Rico to a warehouse in Denver. 373 U. S., at 210. See also Victory Carriers, supra, at 210­211. The city responds by saying that, as a practical matter, the use of proximate cause as a limiting jurisdictional princi- ple would undesirably force an admiralty court to investigate the merits of the dispute at the outset of a case when it determined jurisdiction.3 The argument, of course, assumes that the truth of jurisdictional allegations must always be determined with finality at the threshold of litigation, but that assumption is erroneous. Normal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements, see, e. g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 285 (1993); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682­683 (1946), and any litigation of a contested subject-matter juris- dictional fact issue occurs in comparatively summary proce- 3 The city in part bases its assertion about the practical effects of a proximate cause rule on a reading of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 54­56 (1932), which, according to the city, held that the Longshoremen's and Har- bor Workers' Compensation Act could not constitutionally apply to an em- ployee absent a finding that he was actually injured on navigable waters. Thus, the city argues, a construction of the Extension Act that would permit the assertion of federal jurisdiction over land-based injuries absent a finding, on the merits, of actual causation "would raise serious constitu- tional questions." See City Brief 41­42. Even if the city's interpretation of Crowell is correct, it is not dispositive here. Constitutional difficulties need not arise when a court defers final determination of facts upon which jurisdiction depends until after the first jurisdictional skirmish. In the standing context, for example, we have held that "the Constitution does not require that the plaintiff offer . . . proof [of the facts showing that the plaintiff sustained actual injury] as a threshold matter in order to invoke the District Court's jurisdiction." Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 66 (1987). We see no reason why a different rule should apply here, and find ourselves in the company of the city's own amici. See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae 18­ 19, n. 9 (suggesting that "a court need not decide the merits of causation issues to resolve a jurisdictional challenge"). 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 538 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court dure before a judge alone (as distinct from litigation of the same fact issue as an element of the cause of action, if the claim survives the jurisdictional objection). See 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.07[2.­1] (2d ed. 1994); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1990). There is no reason why this should not be just as true for proximate causation as it is for the maritime nature of the tortfeasor's activity giving rise to the incident. See Sisson, 497 U. S., at 365. There is no need or justification, then, for imposing an additional nonre- moteness hurdle in the name of jurisdiction. C We now turn to the maritime connection enquiries, the first being whether the incident involved was of a sort with the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. In Sisson, we described the features of the incident in general terms as "a fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable waters," id., at 363, and determined that such an incident "plainly satis- f[ied]" the first maritime connection requirement, ibid., be- cause the fire could have "spread to nearby commercial ves- sels or ma[d]e the marina inaccessible to such vessels" and therefore "[c]ertainly" had a "potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce," id., at 362. We noted that this first prong went to potential effects, not to the "particular facts of the incident," noting that in both Executive Jet and Fore- most we had focused not on the specific facts at hand but on whether the "general features" of the incident were "likely to disrupt commercial activity." 497 U. S., at 363. The first Sisson test turns, then, on a description of the incident at an intermediate level of possible generality. To speak of the incident as "fire" would have been too general to differentiate cases; at the other extreme, to have de- scribed the fire as damaging nothing but pleasure boats and their tie-up facilities would have ignored, among other things, the capacity of pleasure boats to endanger commer- 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 539 Opinion of the Court cial shipping that happened to be nearby. We rejected both extremes and instead asked whether the incident could be seen within a class of incidents that posed more than a fanci- ful risk to commercial shipping. Following Sisson, the "general features" of the incident at issue here may be described as damage by a vessel in naviga- ble water to an underwater structure. So characterized, there is little question that this is the kind of incident that has a "potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce." As it actually turned out in this suit, damaging a structure beneath the riverbed could lead to a disruption in the water course itself, App. 33 (eddy formed above the leak); and, again as it actually happened, damaging a structure so situ- ated could lead to restrictions on the navigational use of the waterway during required repairs. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 93­1094, p. 22a (District Court found that after the flood "[t]he river remained closed for over a month," "[r]iver traffic ceased, several commuter ferries were stranded, and many barges could not enter the river system . . . because the river level was lowered to aid repair efforts"). Cf. Pennzoil Pro- ducing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F. 2d 1465 (CA5 1991) (admiralty suit when vessel struck and ruptured gas pipeline and gas exploded); Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Drill- ing Rig Rowan/Odessa, 761 F. 2d 229, 233 (CA5 1985) (admi- ralty jurisdiction when vessel struck pipeline, "a fixed struc- ture on the seabed"); Orange Beach Water, Sewer, and Fire Protection Authority v. M/V Alva, 680 F. 2d 1374 (CA11 1982) (admiralty suit when vessel struck underwater pipeline). In the second Sisson enquiry, we look to whether the gen- eral character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime ac- tivity. We ask whether a tortfeasor's activity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable waters is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply in 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 540 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court the suit at hand. Navigation of boats in navigable waters clearly falls within the substantial relationship, Foremost, 457 U. S., at 675; storing them at a marina on navigable wa- ters is close enough, Sisson, supra, at 367; whereas in flying an airplane over the water, Executive Jet, 409 U. S., at 270­ 271, as in swimming, id., at 255­256, the relationship is too attenuated. On like reasoning, the "activity giving rise to the incident" in this suit, Sisson, supra, at 364, should be characterized as repair or maintenance work on a navigable waterway per- formed from a vessel. Described in this way, there is no question that the activity is substantially related to tradi- tional maritime activity, for barges and similar vessels have traditionally been engaged in repair work similar to what Great Lakes contracted to perform here. See, e. g., Shea v. Rev-Lyn Contracting Co., 868 F. 2d 515, 518 (CA1 1989) (bridge repair by crane-carrying barge); Nelson v. United States, 639 F. 2d 469, 472 (CA9 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (repair of wave suppressor from a barge); In re New York Dock Co., 61 F. 2d 777 (CA2 1932) (pile driving from crane-carrying barge in connection with the building of a dock); In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 196 F. 921, 923­924 (EDNY 1912) (pile driving from crane-carrying barge close to water's edge), rev'd on other grounds, 204 F. 248 (CA2 1913); cf. In re The V­14813, 65 F. 2d 789, 790 (CA5 1933) ("There are many cases holding that a dredge, or a barge with a pile driver, employed on navigable waters, is subject to maritime jurisdiction . . . § 7.54"); Lawrence v. Flatboat, 84 F. 200 (SD Ala. 1897) (pile driving from crane-carrying barge in connection with the erection of bulkheads), aff'd sub nom. Southern Log Cart & Supply Co. v. Lawrence, 86 F. 907 (CA5 1898). The city argues, to the contrary, that a proper application of the activity prong of Sisson would consider the city's own alleged failure at properly maintaining and operating the tunnel system that runs under the river. City Brief 48­49. If this asserted proximate cause of the flood victims' injuries 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 541 Opinion of the Court were considered, the city submits, its failure to resemble any traditional maritime activity would take this suit out of admiralty. The city misreads Sisson, however, which did not consider the activities of the washer/dryer manufacturer, who was possibly an additional tortfeasor, and whose activities were hardly maritime; the activities of Sisson, the boat owner, sup- plied the necessary substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Likewise, in Foremost, we said that "[b]ecause the `wrong' here involves the negligent operation of a vessel on navigable waters, we believe that it has a suf- ficient nexus to traditional maritime activity to sustain admi- ralty jurisdiction . . . ." 457 U. S., at 674. By using the word "involves," we made it clear that we need to look only to whether one of the arguably proximate causes of the inci- dent originated in the maritime activity of a tortfeasor: as long as one of the putative tortfeasors was engaged in tradi- tional maritime activity the allegedly wrongful activity will "involve" such traditional maritime activity and will meet the second nexus prong. Thus, even if we were to identify the "activity giving rise to the incident" as including the acts of the city as well as Great Lakes, admiralty jurisdiction would nevertheless attach. That result would be true to Sisson's requirement of a "substantial relationship" between the "activity giving rise to the incident" and traditional mari- time activity. Sisson did not require, as the city in effect asserts, that there be a complete identity between the two. The substantial relationship test is satisfied when at least one alleged tortfeasor was engaging in activity substantially related to traditional maritime activity and such activity is claimed to have been a proximate cause of the incident. Petitioners also argue that we might get a different result simply by characterizing the "activity" in question at a dif- ferent level of generality, perhaps as "repair and mainte- nance," or as "pile driving near a bridge." The city is, of course, correct that a tortfeasor's activity can be described 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 542 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court at a sufficiently high level of generality to eliminate any hint of maritime connection, and if that were properly done Sis- son would bar assertion of admiralty jurisdiction. But to suggest that such hypergeneralization ought to be the rule would convert Sisson into a vehicle for eliminating admiralty jurisdiction. Although there is inevitably some play in the joints in selecting the right level of generality when applying the Sisson test, the inevitable imprecision is not an excuse for whimsy. The test turns on the comparison of traditional maritime activity to the arguably maritime character of the tortfeasor's activity in a given case; the comparison would merely be frustrated by eliminating the maritime aspect of the tortfeasor's activity from consideration.4 Grubart makes an additional claim that Sisson is being given too expansive a reading. If the activity at issue here is considered maritime related, it argues, then virtually "every activity involving a vessel on navigable waters" would be "a traditional maritime activity sufficient to invoke maritime jurisdiction." Grubart Brief 6. But this is not fatal criticism. This Court has not proposed any radical alteration of the traditional criteria for invoking admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases, but has simply followed the lead of the lower federal courts in rejecting a location rule so rigid as to extend admiralty to a case involving an airplane, not a vessel, engaged in an activity far removed from anything traditionally maritime. See Executive Jet, 409 U. S., at 268­ 274; see also Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F. 2d 1121, 1127 (CA5 1972) (no jurisdiction over claim 4 The city also proposes that we define the activity as "the operation of an underground tunnel connected to Loop buildings." City Brief 49­50. But doing this would eliminate the maritime tortfeasor's activity from consideration entirely. This (like the choice of a supreme level of general- ity, described in the text) would turn Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358 (1990), on its head, from a test to weed out torts without a maritime connection into an arbitrary exercise for eliminating jurisdiction over even vessel- related torts connected to traditional maritime commerce. 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 543 Opinion of the Court for personal injury by motorist who was rear-ended while waiting for a ferry on a floating pontoon serving as the fer- ry's landing); Chapman v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F. 2d 962 (CA6 1967) (no admiralty jurisdiction over claim of swim- mer who injured himself when diving off pier into shallow but navigable water). In the cases after Executive Jet, the Court stressed the need for a maritime connection, but found one in the navigation or berthing of pleasure boats, despite the facts that the pleasure boat activity took place near shore, where States have a strong interest in applying their own tort law, or was not on all fours with the maritime ship- ping and commerce that has traditionally made up the busi- ness of most maritime courts. Sisson, 497 U. S., at 367; Foremost, 457 U. S., at 675. Although we agree with peti- tioners that these cases do not say that every tort involving a vessel on navigable waters falls within the scope of admi- ralty jurisdiction no matter what, they do show that ordi- narily that will be so.5 III Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of escaping the case law, petitioners ask us to change it. In cases "involving land based parties and injuries," the city would have us adopt a condition of jurisdiction that "the totality of the circumstances reflects a federal in- terest in protecting maritime commerce sufficiently weighty to justify shifting what would otherwise be state-court litigation into federal court under the federal law of admiralty." City Brief 32. 5 Because we conclude that the tort alleged in Count I of Great Lakes's complaint satisfies both the location and connection tests necessary for admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1), we need not consider respondent Great Lakes's alternative argument that the Extension of Ad- miralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 740, provides an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the complaint. 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 544 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court Grubart and the city say that the Fifth Circuit has applied a somewhat similar "four-factor test" looking to "the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and instrumen- talities involved; the causation and the type of injury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law." Kelly v. Smith, 485 F. 2d 520, 525 (CA5 1973); see also Molett v. Pen- rod Drilling Co., 826 F. 2d 1419, 1426 (CA5 1987) (adding three more factors: the "impact of the event on maritime shipping and commerce"; "the desirability of a uniform na- tional rule to apply to such matters"; and "the need for admi- ralty `expertise' in the trial and decision of the case"), cert. denied sub nom. Columbus-McKinnon, Inc. v. Gearench, Inc., 493 U. S. 1003 (1989). Although they point out that Sisson disapproved the use of four-factor or seven-factor tests "where all the relevant entities are engaged in similar types of activity," this rule implicitly left the matter open for cases like this one, where most of the victims, and one of the tortfeasors, are based on land. See 497 U. S., at 365, n. 3 ("Different issues may be raised by a case in which one of the instrumentalities is engaged in a traditional maritime activity, but the other is not"). The city argues that there is a good reason why cases like this one should get different treatment. Since the basic rationale for federal admiralty jurisdiction is "protection of maritime commerce through uniform rules of decision," the proposed jurisdictional test would improve on Sisson in limiting the scope of admiralty jurisdiction more exactly to its rationale. A multiple factor test would minimize, if not eliminate, the awkward possibil- ity that federal admiralty rules or procedures will govern a case, to the disadvantage of state law, when admiralty's pur- pose does not require it. Cf. Foremost, supra, at 677­686 (Powell, J., dissenting). Although the arguments are not frivolous, they do not per- suade. It is worth recalling that the Sisson tests are aimed at the same objectives invoked to support a new multifactor test, the elimination of admiralty jurisdiction where the ra- 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 545 Opinion of the Court tionale for the jurisdiction does not support it. If the tort produces no potential threat to maritime commerce or occurs during activity lacking a substantial relationship to tradi- tional maritime activity, Sisson assumes that the objectives of admiralty jurisdiction probably do not require its exercise, even if the location test is satisfied. If, however, the Sisson tests are also satisfied, it is not apparent why the need for admiralty jurisdiction in aid of maritime commerce somehow becomes less acute merely because land-based parties hap- pen to be involved. Certainly Congress did not think a land-based party necessarily diluted the need for admiralty jurisdiction or it would have kept its hands off the primitive location test. Of course, one could claim it to be odd that under Sisson a land-based party (or more than one) may be subject to ad- miralty jurisdiction, but it would appear no less odd under the city's test that a maritime tortfeasor in the most tradi- tional mould might be subject to state common-law jurisdic- tion. Other things being equal, it is not evident why the first supposed anomaly is worse than the second. But other things are not even equal. As noted just above, Congress has already made the judgment, in the Extension Act, that a land-based victim may properly be subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Surely a land-based joint tortfeasor has no claim to supposedly more favorable treatment. Nor are these the only objections to the city's position. Contrary to what the city suggests, City Brief 10, 14­15, 25­ 26, 30, exercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction does not re- sult in automatic displacement of state law. It is true that, "[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of sub- stantive admiralty law." East River S. S. Corp. v. Trans- america Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986). But, to characterize that law, as the city apparently does, as "federal rules of decision," City Brief 15, is "a destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government in 513US2 Unit: $U27 [01-06-00 06:44:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN 546 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Opinion of the Court their regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmo- nious system. But this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope." Romero v. International Terminal Op- erating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 373 (1959) (footnote omitted). See East River, supra, at 864­865 ("Drawn from state and federal sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules" (footnote omitted)). Thus, the city's proposal to synchronize the jurisdictional enquiry with the test for determining the applicable substantive law would discard a fundamental feature of admiralty law, that federal admiralty courts sometimes do apply state law. See, e. g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 451­452 (1994); see also 1 S. Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 112, p. 7­49 (7th ed. 1994).6 6 We will content ourselves simply with raising a question about another of the city's assumptions, which does not go to anything dispositive for us. It is true that this Court has said that "the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce," Fore- most Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668, 674 (1982); see Sisson, 497 U. S., at 367; see id., at 364, n. 2, a premise that recently has been questioned, see Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117 (1993). How- ever that may be, this Court has never limited the interest in question to the "protection of maritime commerce through uniform rules of decision," as the city would have it. City Brief 19. Granted, whatever its precise purpose, it is likely that Congress thought of uniformity of substantive law as a subsidiary goal conducive to furthering that purpose. See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 S. Ct. Rev. 158, 163 ("[A] uniform law was apparently one reason for the establishment of the admiralty jurisdiction in 1789" (footnote omitted)). But we are un- willing to rule out that the first Congress saw a value in federal admiralty courts beyond fostering uniformity of substantive law, stemming, say, from a concern with local bias similar to the presupposition for diversity juris- diction. See The Federalist No. 80, p. 538 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamil- 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 547 Opinion of the Court Finally, on top of these objections going to the city's prem- ises there is added a most powerful one based on the practi- cal consequences of adopting a multifactor test. Although the existing case law tempers the locality test with the added requirements looking to potential harm and traditional activ- ity, it reflects customary practice in seeing jurisdiction as the norm when the tort originates with a vessel in navigable waters, and in treating departure from the locality principle as the exception. For better or worse, the case law has thus carved out the approximate shape of admiralty jurisdiction in a way that admiralty lawyers understand reasonably well. As against this approach, so familiar and relatively easy, the proposed four- or seven-factor test would be hard to apply, jettisoning relative predictability for the open-ended rough- and-tumble of factors, inviting complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal. Consider, for example, just one of the factors under the city's test, requiring a district court at the beginning of every purported admiralty case to determine the source (state or federal) of the applicable substantive law. The dif- ficulty of doing that was an important reason why this Court in Romero, supra, was unable to hold that maritime claims fell within the scope of the federal-question-jurisdiction stat- ute, 28 U. S. C. § 1331. 358 U. S., at 375­376 ("[S]ound judi- cial policy does not encourage a situation which necessitates constant adjudication of the boundaries of state and federal competence"). That concern applies just as strongly to ton) ("maritime causes . . . so commonly affect the rights of foreigners"); 1 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 124 (1911); 2 id., at 46; see generally D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 95­103 (1970). After all, if uniformity of substantive law had been Congress's only concern, it could have left admiralty jurisdiction in the state courts subject to an appeal to a national tribunal (as it did with federal-question jurisdiction until 1875, and as the Articles of Confederation had done with cases of prize and capture). 513us2$27M 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 548 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. O'Connor, J., concurring cases invoking a district court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1333, under which the jurisdictional enquiry for maritime torts has traditionally been quite uncomplicated. Reasons of practice, then, are as weighty as reasons of theory for rejecting the city's call to adopt a multifactor test for admiralty jurisdiction for the benefit of land-based par- ties to a tort action. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals cor- rectly held that the District Court had admiralty jurisdiction over the respondent Great Lakes's Limitation Act suit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer took no part in the decision of these cases. Justice O'Connor, concurring. I concur in the Court's judgment and opinion. The Court properly holds that, when a court is faced with a case involv- ing multiple tortfeasors, some of whom may not be maritime actors, if one of the putative tortfeasors was engaged in traditional maritime activity alleged to have proximately caused the incident, then the supposedly wrongful activ- ity "involves" traditional maritime activity. The possible involvement of other, nonmaritime parties does not affect the jurisdictional inquiry as to the maritime party. Ante, at 541. I do not, however, understand the Court's opinion to suggest that, having found admiralty jurisdiction over a par- ticular claim against a particular party, a court must then exercise admiralty jurisdiction over all the claims and par- ties involved in the case. Rather, the court should engage in the usual supplemental jurisdiction and impleader inquiries. See 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1988 ed., Supp. V); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 14; see also ante, at 531. I find nothing in the Court's opin- ion to the contrary. 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 549 Thomas, J., concurring in judgment Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the majority's conclusion that 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) grants the District Court jurisdiction over the great Chicago flood of 1992. But I write separately because I cannot agree with the test the Court applies to determine the boundaries of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In- stead of continuing our unquestioning allegiance to the multifactor approach of Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358 (1990), I would restore the jurisdictional inquiry to the simple ques- tion whether the tort occurred on a vessel on the navigable waters of the United States. If so, then admiralty jurisdic- tion exists. This clear, bright-line rule, which the Court ap- plied until recently, ensures that judges and litigants will not waste their resources in determining the extent of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. I This action requires the Court to redefine once again the line between federal admiralty jurisdiction and state power due to an ambiguous balancing test. The fact that we have had to revisit this question for the third time in a little over 10 years indicates the defects of the Court's current ap- proach. The faults of balancing tests are clearest, and per- haps most destructive, in the area of jurisdiction. Vague and obscure rules may permit judicial power to reach beyond its constitutional and statutory limits, or they may discour- age judges from hearing disputes properly before them. Such rules waste judges' and litigants' resources better spent on the merits, as this action itself demonstrates. It is especially unfortunate that this has occurred in admiralty, an area that once provided a jurisdictional rule almost as clear as the 9th and 10th verses of Genesis: "And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was so. And God 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 550 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Thomas, J., concurring in judgment called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the waters called he Seas: and God saw that it was good." The Holy Bible, Genesis 1:9­10 (King James Version). As recently as 1972, courts and parties experienced little difficulty in determining whether a case triggered admiralty jurisdiction, thanks to the simple "situs rule." In The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 36 (1866), this Court articulated the situs rule thus: "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." This simple, clear test, which Justice Story pronounced while riding cir- cuit, see Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13,902) (CC Me. 1813), did not require alteration until 1948, when Congress included within the admiralty jurisdiction torts caused on water, but whose effects were felt on land. See Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. C. App. § 740. The simplicity of this test was marred by modern cases that tested the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction with ever more unusual facts. In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249 (1972), we held that a plane crash in Lake Erie was not an admiralty case within the meaning of § 1333(1) because the tort did not "bear a significant relation- ship to traditional maritime activity." Id., at 268. What subsequent cases have failed to respect, however, is Execu- tive Jet's clear limitation to torts involving aircraft. As we said: "One area in which locality as the exclusive test of admiralty tort jurisdiction has given rise to serious problems in application is that of aviation. . . . [W]e have concluded that maritime locality alone is not a sufficient predicate for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases." Id., at 261 (emphasis added). Our identification of the "significant relationship" factor oc- curred wholly in the context of a discussion of the difficulties 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 551 Thomas, J., concurring in judgment that aircraft posed for maritime law. In fact, while we rec- ognized the extensive criticism of the strict locality rule, we noted that "for the traditional types of maritime torts, the traditional test has worked quite satisfactorily." Id., at 254. Thus, Executive Jet, properly read, holds that if a tort oc- curred on board a vessel on the navigable waters, the situs test applies, but if the tort involved an airplane, then the "significant relationship" requirement is added. Although it modified the strict locality test, Executive Jet still retained a clear rule that I could apply comfortably to the main business of the admiralty court. Nonetheless, the simplicity and clarity of this approach met its demise in Fore- most Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668 (1982). That case involved the collision of two pleasure boats on the navigable waters, a tort that some commentators had argued did not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction because it did not impli- cate maritime commerce. See, e. g., Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 661 (1963). The Court could have resolved the case and found jurisdic- tion simply by applying the situs test. Instead, responding to the arguments that admiralty jurisdiction was limited to commercial maritime activity, the Court found that the tort's "significant connection with traditional maritime activity" and the accident's "potential disruptive impact" on maritime commerce prompted an exercise of federal jurisdiction. 457 U. S., at 674­675. It is clear that Foremost overextended Executive Jet, which had reserved the significant relationship inquiry for aviation torts. As Justice Scalia noted in Sisson, Execu- tive Jet is better "understood as resting on the quite simple ground that the tort did not involve a vessel, which had tra- ditionally been thought required by the leading scholars in the field." 497 U. S., at 369­370 (opinion concurring in judg- ment). Executive Jet did not in the least seek to alter the strict locality test for torts involving waterborne vessels. Foremost, however, converted Executive Jet's exception into 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 552 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Thomas, J., concurring in judgment the rule. In addition to examining situs, Foremost required federal courts to ask whether the tort bore a significant rela- tionship to maritime commerce, and whether the accident had a potential disruptive impact on maritime commerce. 457 U. S., at 673­675. The lower courts adopted different approaches as they sought to apply Foremost's alteration of the Executive Jet test. See Sisson, 497 U. S., at 365, n. 4 (citing cases). Sisson then affirmed the inherent vagueness of the Fore- most test. Sisson involved a marina fire that was caused by a faulty washer/dryer unit on a pleasure yacht. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several vessels in addition to the marina. In finding admiralty jurisdiction, the Court held that the federal judicial power would extend to such cases only if: (1) in addition to situs, (2) the "incident" poses a potential hazard to maritime commerce, and (3) the "activ- ity" giving rise to the incident bears a substantial relation- ship to traditional maritime activity. 497 U. S., at 362­364. The traditional situs test also would have sustained a finding of jurisdiction because the fire started on board a vessel on the waterways. Thus, what was once a simple question- did the tort occur on the navigable waters-had become a complicated, multifactor analysis. The disruption and confusion created by the Foremost- Sisson approach is evident from the post-Sisson decisions of the lower courts and from the majority opinion itself. Faced with the task of determining what is an "incident" or "ac- tivity" for Sisson purposes, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits simply reverted to the multifactor test they had employed before Sisson. See Price v. Price, 929 F. 2d 131, 135­136 (CA4 1991); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F. 3d 877, 885­886 (CA5 1993); Delta Country Ventures, Inc. v. Magana, 986 F. 2d 1260, 1263 (CA9 1993). The District Court's opinion in this action is typical: While nodding to Sisson, the court focused its entire attention on a totality-of- the-circumstances test, which includes factors such as "the 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 553 Thomas, J., concurring in judgment functions and roles of the parties" and the "traditional con- cepts of the role of admiralty law." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 93­1094, p. 32a. Such considerations have no place in the Sisson test and should have no role in any jurisdictional inquiry. The dangers of a totality-of-the-circumstances ap- proach to jurisdiction should be obvious. An undefined test requires courts and litigants to devote substantial resources to determine whether a federal court may hear a specific case. Such a test also introduces undesirable uncertainty into the affairs of private actors-even those involved in common maritime activities-who cannot predict whether or not their conduct may justify the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Although the majority makes an admirable attempt to clarify what Sisson obscures, I am afraid that its analysis cannot mitigate the confusion of the Sisson test. Thus, faced with the "potential to disrupt maritime commerce" prong, ante, at 538, the majority must resort to "an interme- diate level of possible generality" to determine the " `general features' " of the incident here, ibid. The majority does not explain the origins of "levels of generality," nor, to my knowledge, do we employ such a concept in other areas of jurisdiction. We do not use "levels of generality" to charac- terize residency or amount in controversy for diversity pur- poses, or to determine the presence of a federal question. Nor does the majority explain why an "intermediate" level of generality is appropriate. It is even unclear what an in- termediate level of generality is, and we cannot expect that district courts will apply such a concept uniformly in similar cases. It is far from obvious how the undefined interme- diate level of generality indicates that the "incident" for Sis- son purposes is that of a vessel damaging an underwater structure. The majority also applies levels of generality to the next prong of Sisson-whether the tortfeasor is engaged in "ac- tivity" that shows a "substantial relationship to traditional 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 554 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Thomas, J., concurring in judgment maritime activity." The majority decides that the activity is repair work by a vessel on a navigable waterway. But, as the petitioners rightly argue, the "activity" very well could be bridge repair or pile driving. One simply cannot tell due to the ambiguities intrinsic to Sisson and to the un- certainty as to the meaning of levels of generality. The ma- jority's response implicitly acknowledges the vagueness in- herent in Sisson: "Although there is inevitably some play in the joints in selecting the right level of generality when applying the Sisson test, the inevitable imprecision is not an excuse for whimsy." Ante, at 542. The Court cannot pro- vide much guidance to district courts as to the correct level of generality; instead, it can only say that any level is probably sufficient so long as it does not lead to "whimsy." When it comes to these issues, I prefer a clearer rule, which this Court has demanded with respect to federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, the "play in the joints" and "imprecision" that the Court finds "inevitable" easily could be avoided by returning to the test that prevailed before Foremost. In its effort to create an elegant, general test that could include all maritime torts, Sisson has only dis- rupted what was once a simple inquiry. II It should be apparent that this Court does not owe Sisson the benefit of stare decisis. As shown above, Sisson and Foremost themselves overextended Executive Jet and devi- ated from a long tradition of admiralty jurisprudence. More importantly, the new test of Sisson and Foremost did not produce greater clarity or simplicity in exchange for depart- ing from a century of undisturbed practice. Instead, as dis- cussed earlier, the two cases have produced only confusion and disarray in the lower courts and in this Court as well. It would seem that in the area of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, vagueness and ambiguity are grounds enough to revisit an unworkable prior decision. 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 527 (1995) 555 Thomas, J., concurring in judgment In place of Sisson I would follow the test described at the outset. When determining whether maritime jurisdiction exists under § 1333(1), a federal district court should ask if the tort occurred on a vessel on the navigable waters. This approach won the approval of two Justices in Sisson, see 497 U. S., at 373 (Scalia, J., joined by White, J., concurring in judgment). Although Justice Scalia's Sisson concurrence retained a "normal maritime activities" component, it recog- nized that anything a vessel does in the navigable waters would meet that requirement, and that "[i]t would be more straightforward to jettison the `traditional maritime activity' analysis entirely." Id., at 374. I wholly agree and have chosen the straightforward approach, which, for all of its simplicity, would have produced the same results the Court arrived at in Executive Jet, Foremost, Sisson, and this ac- tion. Although this approach "might leave within admiralty jurisdiction a few unusual actions," 497 U. S., at 374, such freakish cases will occur rarely. In any event, the resources needed to resolve them "will be saved many times over by a clear jurisdictional rule that makes it unnecessary to decide" what is a traditional maritime activity and what poses a threat to maritime commerce. Id., at 374­375. In this action, a straightforward application of the pro- posed test easily produces a finding of admiralty jurisdiction. As the majority quite ably demonstrates, the situs require- ment is satisfied because the tort was caused by a "spud barge" on the Chicago River. Ante, at 534­536. Although the accident's effects were felt on land, the Extension of Ad- miralty Jurisdiction Act brings the event within § 1333(1). While I agree with the majority's analysis of this question, I disagree with its decision to continue on to other issues. A simple application of the situs test would yield the same result the Court reaches at the end of its analysis. This Court pursues clarity and efficiency in other areas of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and it should demand no less in admiralty and maritime law. The test I have pro- 513us2$27N 04-01-98 17:48:46 PAGES OPINPGT 556 JEROME B. GRUBART, INC. v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO. Thomas, J., concurring in judgment posed would produce much the same results as the Sisson analysis without the need for wasteful litigation over thresh- old jurisdictional questions. Because Sisson departed from a century of precedent, is unworkable, and is easily replaced with a bright-line rule, I concur only in the judgment. 513us2$28z 03-28-98 19:38:32 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 557 Syllabus ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPART- MENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. GREEN et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94­197. Argued January 17, 1995-Decided February 22, 1995 The Federal Government partially reimburses States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs that either comply with all federal prescriptions or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Respondents, new residents of California, challenged the constitutionality of a California statute limiting new resi- dents, for the first year they live in the State, to the benefits paid in the State from which they came; respondents maintain that the payment differential between new and long-term residents burdens interstate migration and thus violates the right to travel recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. The District Court enjoined the payment differential, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: No justiciable controversy is before this Court because the case in its current posture is not ripe. The state statute provides that the dif- ferential will not take effect absent an HHS waiver. The HHS waiver in effect at the time the lower courts ruled was vacated by the Court of Appeals in a separate proceeding. The Secretary did not seek this Court's review of that Court of Appeals decision. Absent a new HHS waiver, the State will continue to treat respondents the same way it treats long-term California residents. Thus, the parties have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural. This impediment to dispositive adjudication requires that the prior judg- ments in this case be vacated. 26 F. 3d 95, vacated and remanded. Theodore Garelis, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland III, Assistant Attorney General, Dennis Eckhart, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Andrea Lynn Hoch, Deputy Attorney General. 513us2$28z 03-28-98 19:38:32 PAGES OPINPGT 558 ANDERSON v. GREEN Per Curiam Kathleen M. Sullivan argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Sarah E. Kurtz, Hope G. Naka- mura, Peter H. Reid, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Grace A. Gal- ligher, and Steven Shapiro.* Per Curiam. Under Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., the Federal Government partially reimburses States for welfare pro- grams that either comply with all federal prescriptions or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 42 U. S. C. § 1315. California seeks to change its AFDC program by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in California, to the benefits paid in the State from which they came. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1994). Green and other new residents who receive AFDC benefits challenged the consti- tutionality of this California statute in a federal court action; they maintain that the payment differential between new and long-term residents burdens interstate migration and thus violates the right to travel recognized in Shapiro v. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Minnesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, and Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, and Deborah J. La Fetra; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and David A. Price. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bar Association by George E. Bushnell, Jr., Paul M. Smith, and Marc Goldman; for Catholic Charities U. S. A. et al. by Daniel Marcus; for Law Professors by Jonathan D. Varat; for the National Welfare Rights and Reform Union by Timothy J. Casey and Christopher D. Lamb; and for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Martha F. Davis and Deborah A. Ellis. William Perry Pendley filed a brief for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae. 513us2$28P 03-28-98 19:38:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 557 (1995) 559 Per Curiam Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and its progeny. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Cali- fornia enjoined the payment differential, 811 F. Supp. 516, 523 (1993), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 26 F. 3d 95 (1994). We granted Cali- fornia's petition for certiorari. Post, p. 922 . We now find, however, that no justiciable controversy is before us, because the case in its current posture is not ripe. The California statute provides that the payment differen- tial shall not take effect absent receipt by the State of an HHS waiver. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 11450.03(b) (West Supp. 1994). HHS originally granted a waiver, which was in effect when the District Court and Court of Appeals ruled. But "ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing," and "it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the [decision under review] that must govern." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 140 (1974). After the Court of Appeals ruled in this case, it vacated the HHS waiver in a separate proceeding, concluding that the Secretary had not adequately considered objections to Cali- fornia's program. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d 1057, 1073­1076 (CA9 1994). The Secretary did not seek this Court's review of the Beno decision. California acknowledges that even if it prevails here, the payment differential will not take effect. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3­6. Absent favorable action by HHS on a renewed application for a waiver, California will continue to treat Green and others similarly situated the same way it treats long-term California residents. The parties have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 (1969) (per cu- riam) (after this Court noted probable jurisdiction, Colorado Legislature reduced to two months challenged six-month residency requirement for voting in Presidential elections; revival of controversy consequently became too speculative to warrant Court's passing on substantive issues). 513us2$28P 03-28-98 19:38:32 PAGES OPINPGT 560 ANDERSON v. GREEN Per Curiam In view of the impediment to dispositive adjudication, we direct the vacation of prior judgments in this case. As we explained earlier this Term, in deciding whether to disturb prior judgments in a case rendered nonjusticiable, we have inquired, pivotally, "whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the [nonjusticiability] by volun- tary action." U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, ante, at 25. Unlike settlement, see ibid., or a losing party's decision to forgo appeal, see Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 83 (1987), California's loss of the federal ap- proval necessary to implement its program was not volun- tary. Vacatur is appropriate, therefore, to "clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and [to] eliminat[e] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance." United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 40 (1950). Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court with directions to order the vacation of the District Court's judgment and the dismissal of the case. It is so ordered. 513us2$29Z 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 561 Syllabus GUSTAFSON et al. v. ALLOYD CO., INC., fka ALLOYD HOLDINGS, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 93­404. Argued November 2, 1994-Decided February 28, 1995 Petitioners (collectively Gustafson), the sole shareholders of Alloyd, Inc., sold substantially all of its stock to respondents and other buyers in a private sale agreement. The purchase price included a payment re- flecting an estimated increase in the company's net worth from the end of the previous year through the closing, since hard financial data were unavailable. The contract provided that if a year-end audit and finan- cial statements revealed variances between estimated and actual in- creased value, the disappointed party would receive an adjustment. As a result of the audit, respondents were entitled to recover an adjust- ment, but instead sought relief under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Act), which gives buyers an express right of rescission against sellers who make material misstatements or omissions "by means of a prospectus." In granting Gustafson's motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that § 12(2) claims can only arise out of initial stock offerings and not a private sale agreement. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case in light of its intervening decision that the inclusion of the term "communication" in the Act's definition of prospectus meant that the latter term includes all written communications offering a security for sale, and, thus, a § 12(2) right of action applies to private sale agreements. Held: Section 12(2) does not extend to a private sale contract, since a contract, and its recitations, that are not held out to the public are not a "prospectus" as the term is used in the 1933 Act. Pp. 567­584. (a) On the assumptions that must be made as the case reaches this Court, respondents would have a right to obtain rescission if Gustafson's misstatements were made "by means of a prospectus or oral communica- tion" related to a prospectus. Three sections of the 1933 Act are critical in resolving the issue whether the contract is a "prospectus": § 2(10), which defines a prospectus as "any prospectus, notice, circular, adver- tisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television" that offers any security for sale or confirms its sale; § 10, which specifies what information must be contained in a prospectus; and § 12, which imposes liability based on misstatements in a prospectus. The term 513us2$29Z 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 562 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Syllabus "prospectus" should be construed, if at all possible, to give it a consist- ent meaning throughout the Act. Pp. 567­568. (b) The contract in this case is not a "prospectus" as that term is defined in § 10. Whatever else "prospectus" may mean, § 10 confines it to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must include "information contained in the registration statement." By and large, only public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders require the preparation and filing of such a statement. Thus, it follows that a prospectus is confined to such offerings. Since there is no dispute that the contract in question was not required to carry information contained in a registration statement, it also follows that the contract is not a prospectus under § 10. Pp. 568­570. (c) The term "prospectus" has the same meaning and refers to the same types of communications in both §§ 10 and 12. The normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same meaning applies here. The Act's structure and § 12's language reinforce this view. In addition, since the primary innovation of the Act was the creation of federal duties-for the most part registration and disclosure obligations-in connection with public offerings, it is reasonable to conclude that the liability provisions were designed primarily to provide remedies for violations of these obligations rather than to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional liabilities that are quite independent of them. Congress would have been specific had it intended "prospectus" to have a different meaning in § 12. Pp. 570­573. (d) The term "communication" in § 2(10)'s definition of "prospectus" does not mean that any written communication offering a security for sale is a "prospectus" for purposes of § 12. "Communication" is but one word in a list, which read in its entirety yields the interpretation that "prospectus" refers to a document soliciting the public to acquire securi- ties. Respondents' argument to the contrary is inconsistent with two rules of statutory construction. First, this Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant. However, reading "communication" to include every written communication would render "notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter" redundant, since each is a form of written communication. A word is also known by the company it keeps. From the terms used in the list, it is apparent that "communi- cation" refers to documents of wide dissemination. Similarly, the list includes radio and television communications but not face-to-face or tele- phonic conversations. Moreover, at the time the 1933 Act was passed, "prospectus" was a term of art understood to refer to a document solicit- ing the public to acquire securities. Pp. 573­576. 513us2$29Z 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 563 Syllabus (e) The holding in this case draws support from the decision in United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, that § 17(a)-which makes unlawful fraudulent transfers of securities-extends beyond the regulation of public offerings. That decision was based on § 17(a)'s language-which suggested no limitation of the scope of liability-and its legislative his- tory-which showed that Congress made a deliberate departure from the Act's general scheme in § 17(a). In contrast, § 12(2)'s reference to "prospectus" limits its coverage to public offerings, and nothing in its legislative history hints that it was intended to effect expansion of the Act's coverage. Pp. 576­578. (f) Statements by commentators and judges written after the Act was passed are not reliable indicators of what Congress intended. By and large, the writings presented in support of respondents' construc- tion of the Act are of little value in determining the issue presented here: the extent of § 12(2)'s coverage. The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress contemplated that § 12(2) would apply only to public offerings by an issuer or controlling shareholder, and nothing in that history suggests that Congress intended to create a formal prospectus required to comply with both §§ 10 and 12, and a second, less formal prospectus, to which only § 12 would be applicable. Pp. 578­584. Reversed and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 584. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 596. Donald W. Jenkins argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Harold C. Wheeler, Debra A. Winiarski, Thomas P. Desmond, and Jennifer R. Evans. Robert J. Kopecky argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Brian D. Sieve, Kenneth W. Starr, and Paul T. Cappuccio. Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae urging affirm- ance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Simon M. Lorne, Paul 513us2$29Z 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 564 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court Gonson, Jacob H. Stillman, Brian D. Bellardo, and Mark Pennington.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 buyers have an express cause of action for rescission against sellers who make material misstatements or omissions "by means of a prospectus." The question presented is whether this right of rescission extends to a private, secondary transaction, on the theory that recitations in the purchase agreement are part of a "prospectus." I Petitioners Gustafson, McLean, and Butler (collectively Gustafson) were in 1989 the sole shareholders of Alloyd, Inc., a manufacturer of plastic packaging and automatic heat seal- ing equipment. Alloyd was formed, and its stock was is- sued, in 1961. In 1989, Gustafson decided to sell Alloyd and engaged KPMG Peat Marwick to find a buyer. In response to information distributed by KPMG, Wind Point Partners II, L. P., agreed to buy substantially all of the issued and outstanding stock through Alloyd Holdings, Inc., a new cor- poration formed to effect the sale of Alloyd's stock. The shareholders of Alloyd Holdings were Wind Point and a number of individual investors. In preparation for negotiating the contract with Gustafson, Wind Point undertook an extensive analysis of the company, relying in part on a formal business review prepared by *Robert L. Schnell, Jr., Wendy J. Wildung, and Stuart J. Kaswell filed a brief for the Securities Industry Association, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Patrick E. Cafferty and Jonathan W. Cuneo filed a brief for the Na- tional Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Karen M. O'Brien filed a brief for North American Securities Adminis- trators Association, Inc., as amicus curiae. 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 565 Opinion of the Court KPMG. Alloyd's practice was to take inventory at year's end, so Wind Point and KPMG considered taking an earlier inventory to use in determining the purchase price. In the end they did not do so, relying instead on certain estimates and including provisions for adjustments after the trans- action closed. On December 20, 1989, Gustafson and Alloyd Holdings exe- cuted a contract of sale. Alloyd Holdings agreed to pay Gus- tafson and his coshareholders $18,709,000 for the sale of the stock plus a payment of $2,122,219, which reflected the esti- mated increase in Alloyd's net worth from the end of the previous year, the last period for which hard financial data were available. Article IV of the purchase agreement, en- titled "Representations and Warranties of the Sellers," included assurances that the company's financial statements "present fairly . . . the Company's financial condition" and that between the date of the latest balance sheet and the date the agreement was executed "there ha[d] been no mate- rial adverse change in . . . [Alloyd's] financial condition." App. 115, 117. The contract also provided that if the year- end audit and financial statements revealed a variance be- tween estimated and actual increased value, the disappointed party would receive an adjustment. The year-end audit of Alloyd revealed that Alloyd's actual earnings for 1989 were lower than the estimates relied upon by the parties in negotiating the adjustment amount of $2,122,219. Under the contract, the buyers had a right to recover an adjustment amount of $815,000 from the sellers. Nevertheless, on February 11, 1991, the newly formed com- pany (now called Alloyd Co., the same as the original com- pany) and Wind Point brought suit in the United States Dis- trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking outright rescission of the contract under § 12(2) of the Securi- ties Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Act). Alloyd (the new com- pany) claimed that statements made by Gustafson and his coshareholders regarding the financial data of their company 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 566 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court were inaccurate, rendering untrue the representations and warranties contained in the contract. The buyers further alleged that the contract of sale was a "prospectus," so that any misstatements contained in the agreement gave rise to liability under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Pursuant to the ad- justment clause, the defendants remitted to the purchasers $815,000 plus interest, but the adjustment did not cause the purchasers to drop the lawsuit. Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F. 2d 682 (1991), the District Court granted Gustafson's motion for summary judgment, holding "that section 12(2) claims can only arise out of the initial stock offerings." App. 20. Although the sellers were the controlling shareholders of the original company, the District Court concluded that the private sale agreement "cannot be compared to an initial offering" because "the purchasers in this case had direct ac- cess to financial and other company documents, and had the opportunity to inspect the seller's property." Id., at 21. On review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of that court's intervening decision in Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co. Inc., 993 F. 2d 578 (1993). In Pacific Dunlop the court reasoned that the inclusion of the term "communication" in the Act's definition of prospectus meant that the term "prospectus" was defined "very broadly" to include all written communications that offered the sale of a security. Id., at 582. Rejecting the view of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ballay, the Court of Appeals decided that § 12(2)'s right of action for rescission "applies to any communication which offers any security for sale . . . including the stock purchase agreement in the present case." 993 F. 2d, at 595. We granted certio- rari to resolve this Circuit conflict, 510 U. S. 1176 (1994), and we now reverse. 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 567 Opinion of the Court II The rescission claim against Gustafson is based upon § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2). In relevant part, the section provides that any person who "offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, "shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consid- eration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security." As this case reaches us, we must assume that the stock pur- chase agreement contained material misstatements of fact made by the sellers and that Gustafson would not sustain its burden of proving due care. On these assumptions, Alloyd would have a right to obtain rescission if those misstate- ments were made "by means of a prospectus or oral commu- nication." The Courts of Appeals agree that the phrase "oral communication" is restricted to oral communications 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 568 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court that relate to a prospectus. See Pacific Dunlop, supra, at 588; Ballay, supra, at 688. The determinative question, then, is whether the contract between Alloyd and Gustafson is a "prospectus" as the term is used in the 1933 Act. Alloyd argues that "prospectus" is defined in a broad manner, broad enough to encompass the contract between the parties. This argument is echoed by the dissents. See post, at 585­586 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 596 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). Gustafson, by contrast, maintains that prospectus in the 1933 Act means a communication soliciting the public to purchase securities from the issuer. Brief for Petitioners 17­18. Three sections of the 1933 Act are critical in resolving the definitional question on which the case turns: § 2(10), which defines a prospectus; § 10, which sets forth the information that must be contained in a prospectus; and § 12, which im- poses liability based on misstatements in a prospectus. In seeking to interpret the term "prospectus," we adopt the premise that the term should be construed, if possible, to give it a consistent meaning throughout the Act. That prin- ciple follows from our duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 713 (1975); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974). A We begin with § 10. It provides, in relevant part: "Except to the extent otherwise permitted or re- quired pursuant to this subsection or subsections (c), (d), or (e) of this section- "(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a foreign government or political sub- division thereof, shall contain the information contained in the registration statement . . . ; "(2) a prospectus relating to a security issued by a foreign government or political subdivision thereof shall 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 569 Opinion of the Court contain the information contained in the registration statement . . . ." 15 U. S. C. § 77j(a). Section 10 does not provide that some prospectuses must contain the information contained in the registration state- ment. Save for the explicit and well-defined exemptions for securities listed under § 3, see 15 U. S. C. § 77c (exempting certain classes of securities from the coverage of the Act), its mandate is unqualified: "[A] prospectus . . . shall contain the information contained in the registration statement." Although § 10 does not define what a prospectus is, it does instruct us what a prospectus cannot be if the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent meaning throughout. There is no dispute that the contract in this case was not required to contain the information con- tained in a registration statement and that no statutory ex- emption was required to take the document out of § 10's cov- erage. Cf. 15 U. S. C. § 77c. It follows that the contract is not a prospectus under § 10. That does not mean that a doc- ument ceases to be a prospectus whenever it omits a re- quired piece of information. It does mean that a document is not a prospectus within the meaning of that section if, absent an exemption, it need not comply with § 10's require- ments in the first place. An examination of § 10 reveals that, whatever else "pro- spectus" may mean, the term is confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must include the "informa- tion contained in the registration statement." By and large, only public offerings by an issuer of a security, or by control- ling shareholders of an issuer, require the preparation and filing of registration statements. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77d, 77e, 77b(11). It follows, we conclude, that a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders. This much (the meaning of prospectus in § 10) seems not to be in dispute. Where the courts are in disagreement is 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 570 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court with the implications of this proposition for the entirety of the Act, and for § 12 in particular. Compare Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F. 2d, at 688­689 (suggesting that the term "prospectus" is used in a consistent manner in both §§ 10 and 12), with Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F. 2d, at 584 (rejecting that view). We conclude that the term "prospectus" must have the same meaning under §§ 10 and 12. In so holding, we do not, as the dissent by Justice Ginsburg suggests, make the mistake of treating § 10 as a definitional section. See post, at 597. Instead, we find in § 10 guidance and instruction for giving the term a consistent meaning throughout the Act. The 1933 Act, like every Act of Congress, should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions. Only last Term we adhered to the "normal rule of statutory con- struction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." De- partment of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332, 342 (1994) (internal quotation marks and cita- tions omitted); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil- liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 230 (1993); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). That principle applies here. If the contract be- fore us is not a prospectus for purposes of § 10-as all must and do concede-it is not a prospectus for purposes of § 12 either. The conclusion that prospectus has the same meaning, and refers to the same types of communications (public offers by an issuer or its controlling shareholders), in both §§ 10 and 12 is reinforced by an examination of the structure of the 1933 Act. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act together require a seller to file a registration statement and to issue a prospec- tus for certain defined types of sales (public offerings by an issuer, through an underwriter). See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77d, 77e. Sections 7 and 10 of the Act set forth the information re- quired in the registration statement and the prospectus. 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 571 Opinion of the Court See §§ 77g, 77j. Section 11 provides for liability on account of false registration statements; § 12(2) for liability based on misstatements in prospectuses. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l. Following the most natural and symmetrical reading, just as the liability imposed by § 11 flows from the requirements imposed by §§ 5 and 7 providing for the filing and content of registration statements, the liability imposed by § 12(2) can- not attach unless there is an obligation to distribute the pro- spectus in the first place (or unless there is an exemption). Our interpretation is further confirmed by a reexamina- tion of § 12 itself. The section contains an important guide to the correct resolution of the case. By its terms, § 12(2) exempts from its coverage prospectuses relating to the sales of government-issued securities. See 15 U. S. C. § 77l (ex- cepting securities exempted by § 77c(a)(2)). If Congress in- tended § 12(2) to create liability for misstatements contained in any written communication relating to the sale of a secu- rity-including secondary market transactions-there is no ready explanation for exempting government-issued securi- ties from the reach of the right to rescind granted by § 12(2). Why would Congress grant immunity to a private seller from liability in a rescission suit for no reason other than that the seller's misstatements happen to relate to securities issued by a governmental entity? No reason is apparent. The anomaly disappears, however, when the term "prospectus" relates only to documents that offer securities sold to the public by an issuer. The exemption for government-issued securities makes perfect sense on that view, for it then be- comes a precise and appropriate means of giving immunity to governmental authorities. The primary innovation of the 1933 Act was the creation of federal duties-for the most part, registration and disclosure obligations-in connection with public offerings. See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 195 (1976) (the 1933 Act "was designed to provide investors with full disclo- sure of material information concerning public offerings"); 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 572 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 752 (1975) ("The 1933 Act is a far narrower statute [than the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)] chiefly con- cerned with disclosure and fraud in connection with offerings of securities-primarily, as here, initial distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issuers"); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 777­778 (1979) ("[T]he 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings"); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119, 122, n. 5 (1953) (" `[T]he bill does not affect transactions beyond the need of public protection in order to prevent recurrences of demon- strated abuses' "), quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1933). We are reluctant to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional liabilities that are quite independent of the new substantive obligations the Act imposes. It is more reasonable to interpret the liability provisions of the 1933 Act as designed for the primary purpose of providing remedies for violations of the obligations it had created. Indeed, §§ 11 and 12(1)-the statutory neighbors of § 12(2)- afford remedies for violations of those obligations. See § 11, 15 U. S. C. § 77k (remedy for untrue statements in regis- tration statements); § 12(1), 15 U. S. C. § 77l(1) (remedy for sales in violation of § 5, which prohibits the sale of unregis- tered securities). Under our interpretation of "prospectus," § 12(2) in similar manner is linked to the new duties created by the Act. On the other hand, accepting Alloyd's argument that any written offer is a prospectus under § 12 would require us to hold that the word "prospectus" in § 12 refers to a broader set of communications than the same term in § 10. The Court of Appeals was candid in embracing that conclusion: "[T]he 1933 Act contemplates many definitions of a prospec- tus. Section 2(10) gives a single, broad definition; section 10(a) involves an isolated, distinct document-a prospectus within a prospectus; section 10(d) gives the Commission au- thority to classify many." Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 573 Opinion of the Court Allen & Co., 993 F. 2d, at 584. The dissents take a similar tack. In the name of a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, the dissents discover in the Act two different species of prospectuses: formal (also called § 10) prospec- tuses, subject to both §§ 10 and 12, and informal prospec- tuses, subject only to § 12 but not to § 10. See post, at 598­ 599 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.); see also post, at 588­589 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Nowhere in the statute, however, do the terms "formal prospectus" or "informal prospectus" appear. Instead, the Act uses one term-"prospectus"- throughout. In disagreement with the Court of Appeals and the dissenting opinions, we cannot accept the conclusion that this single operative word means one thing in one sec- tion of the Act and something quite different in another. The dissenting opinions' resort to terms not found in the Act belies the claim of fidelity to the text of the statute. Alloyd, as well as Justice Thomas in his dissent, respond that if Congress had intended § 12(2) to govern only initial public offerings, it would have been simple for Congress to have referred to the § 4 exemptions in § 12(2). See Brief for Respondents 25­26; post, at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The argument gets the presumption backwards. Had Con- gress meant the term "prospectus" in § 12(2) to have a differ- ent meaning than the same term in § 10, that is when one would have expected Congress to have been explicit. Con- gressional silence cuts against, not in favor of, Alloyd's argu- ment. The burden should be on the proponents of the view that the term "prospectus" means one thing in § 12 and another in § 10 to adduce strong textual support for that conclusion. And Alloyd adduces none. B Alloyd's contrary argument rests to a significant extent on § 2(10), or, to be more precise, on one word of that section. Section 2(10) provides that "[t]he term `prospectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 574 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court communication, written or by radio or television, which of- fers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any secu- rity." 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10). Concentrating on the word "communication," Alloyd argues that any written communi- cation that offers a security for sale is a "prospectus." In- serting its definition into § 12(2), Alloyd insists that a mate- rial misstatement in any communication offering a security for sale gives rise to an action for rescission, without proof of fraud by the seller or reliance by the purchaser. In Al- loyd's view, § 2(10) gives the term "prospectus" a capacious definition that, although incompatible with § 10, nevertheless governs in § 12. The flaw in Alloyd's argument, echoed in the dissenting opinions, post, at 587 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 597 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.), is its reliance on one word of the definitional section in isolation. To be sure, § 2(10) defines a prospectus as, inter alia, a "communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or con- firms the sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10). The word "communication," however, on which Alloyd's entire argument rests, is but one word in a list, a word Alloyd reads altogether out of context. The relevant phrase in the definitional part of the statute must be read in its entirety, a reading which yields the inter- pretation that the term "prospectus" refers to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities. We find that definition controlling. Alloyd's argument that the phrase "communication, written or by radio or television," trans- forms any written communication offering a security for sale into a prospectus cannot consist with at least two rather sen- sible rules of statutory construction. First, the Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redun- dant. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538­539 (1955). If "communication" included every written commu- nication, it would render "notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter" redundant, since each of these are forms of writ- 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 575 Opinion of the Court ten communication as well. Congress with ease could have drafted § 2(10) to read: "The term `prospectus' means any communication, written or by radio or television, that offers a security for sale or confirms the sale of a security." Con- gress did not write the statute that way, however, and we decline to say it included the words "notice, circular, adver- tisement, [and] letter" for no purpose. The constructional problem is resolved by the second prin- ciple Alloyd overlooks, which is that a word is known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis). This rule we rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving "unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961). The rule guided our earlier interpretation of the word "security" under the 1934 Act. The 1934 Act defines the term "secu- rity" to mean, inter alia, "any note." We concluded, never- theless, that in context "the phrase `any note' should not be interpreted to mean literally `any note,' but must be under- stood against the background of what Congress was attempt- ing to accomplish in enacting the Securities Acts." Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U. S. 56, 63 (1990). These considera- tions convince us that Alloyd's suggested interpretation is not the correct one. There is a better reading. From the terms "prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, [or] letter," it is apparent that the list refers to documents of wide dissemination. In a similar manner, the list includes communications "by radio or television," but not face-to-face or telephonic conversa- tions. Inclusion of the term "communication" in that list suggests that it too refers to a public communication. When the 1933 Act was drawn and adopted, the term "pro- spectus" was well understood to refer to a document solicit- ing the public to acquire securities from the issuer. See Black's Law Dictionary 959 (2d ed. 1910) (defining "prospec- tus" as a "document published by a company . . . or by per- 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 576 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court sons acting as its agents or assignees, setting forth the na- ture and objects of an issue of shares . . . and inviting the public to subscribe to the issue"). In this respect, the word "prospectus" is a term of art, which accounts for congres- sional confidence in employing what might otherwise be re- garded as a partial circularity in the formal, statutory defi- nition. See 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10) ("The term `prospectus' means any prospectus . . ."). The use of the term "prospec- tus" to refer to public solicitations explains as well Congress' decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1933) ("The statements for which [liable persons] are responsible, although they may never actually have been seen by the prospective purchaser, because of their wide dis- semination, determine the market price of the security . . ."). The list of terms in § 2(10) prevents a seller of stock from avoiding liability by calling a soliciting document something other than a prospectus, but it does not compel the conclu- sion that Alloyd urges us to reach and that the dissenting opinions adopt. Instead, the term "written communication" must be read in context to refer to writings that, from a functional standpoint, are similar to the terms "notice, circu- lar, [and] advertisement." The term includes communica- tions held out to the public at large but that might have been thought to be outside the other words in the definitional section. C Our holding that the term "prospectus" relates to public offerings by issuers and their controlling shareholders draws support from our earlier decision interpreting the one provi- sion of the Act that extends coverage beyond the regulation of public offerings, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act.* See United *Section 17(a) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any secur- ities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or com- 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 577 Opinion of the Court States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768 (1979). In Naftalin, though noting that "the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings," the Court held that § 17(a) was "intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market trading." The Court justified this holding-which it termed "a major departure from th[e] limitation [of the 1933 Act to new offerings]"-by reference to both the statutory language and the unambigu- ous legislative history. Id., at 777­778. The same consider- ations counsel in favor of our interpretation of § 12(2). The Court noted in Naftalin that § 17(a) contained no lan- guage suggesting a limitation on the scope of liability under § 17(a). See id., at 778 ("[T]he statutory language . . . makes no distinctions between the two kinds of transactions"). Most important for present purposes, § 17(a) does not contain the word "prospectus." In contrast, as we have noted, § 12(2) contains language, i. e., "by means of a prospectus or oral communication," that limits § 12(2) to public offerings. Just as the absence of limiting language in § 17(a) resulted in broad coverage, the presence of limiting language in § 12(2) requires a narrow construction. Of equal importance, the legislative history relied upon in Naftalin showed that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure from the general scheme of the Act in this one instance, and "made abundantly clear" its intent that § 17(a) have broad coverage. See ibid. (quoting legislative history munication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly- "(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or "(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or "(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a). 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 578 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court stating that " `fraud or deception in the sale of securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether . . . or not it is of the class of securities exempted under sections 11 or 12,' " S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1933)). No com- parable legislative history even hints that § 12(2) was in- tended to be a freestanding provision effecting expansion of the coverage of the entire statute. The intent of Con- gress and the design of the statute require that § 12(2) liabil- ity be limited to public offerings. D It is understandable that Congress would provide buyers with a right to rescind, without proof of fraud or reliance, as to misstatements contained in a document prepared with care, following well-established procedures relating to inves- tigations with due diligence and in the context of a public offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders. It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market. It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those engaged in casual communi- cations not to omit some fact that would, if included, qualify the accuracy of a statement. Under Alloyd's view any ca- sual communication between buyer and seller in the after- market could give rise to an action for rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the seller or reliance on the part of the buyer. In many instances buyers in practical effect would have an option to rescind, impairing the stabil- ity of past transactions where neither fraud nor detrimental reliance on misstatements or omissions occurred. We find no basis for interpreting the statute to reach so far. III The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as ami- cus, and Justice Ginsburg in dissent, rely on what they 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 579 Opinion of the Court call the legislative background of the Act to support Alloyd's construction. With a few minor exceptions, however, their reliance is upon statements by commentators and judges written after the Act was passed, not while it was under consideration. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 19­23; post, at 599­601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Material not available to the lawmakers is not considered, in the normal course, to be legislative history. After-the-fact statements by proponents of a broad interpretation are not a reliable indicator of what Congress intended when it passed the law, assuming extratextual sources are to any extent reliable for this purpose. The SEC does quote one contemporaneous memorandum prepared by Dean Landis. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 13­14 (citing James M. Landis, Reply to Investment Bankers Association Objections of May 5, 1933, p. 5). The statement is quite consistent with our construction. Landis observed that, in contrast to the liabilities imposed by the Act " `that flow from the fact of non-registration or registra- tion,' " dealings may violate § 12(2) " `even though they are not related to the fact of registration.' " See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 13 (emphasis added). This, of course, is true. The liability imposed by § 12(2) has nothing to do with the fact of registration, that is, with the failure to file a regis- tration statement that complies with §§ 7 and 11 of the Act. Instead, the liability imposed by § 12(2) turns on misstate- ments contained in the prospectus. And, one might point out, securities exempted by § 3 of the Act do not require registration, although they are covered by § 12. Landis' ob- servation has nothing to do with the question presented here: whether a prospectus is a document soliciting the pub- lic to purchase securities from the issuer. The SEC also relies on a number of writings, the most prominent a release by the Federal Trade Commission, stat- ing that § 12(2) applied to securities outstanding on the ef- fective date of the 1933 Act. See id., at 19­20. Again, this 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 580 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court is an issue not in dispute. Although the Act as passed ex- empted securities from registration if sold by the issuer within 60 days of the passage of the Act, see 1933 Securities Act, § 3(a)(1), the limitation did not apply to § 12(2). See 15 U. S. C. § 77l. Instead, actions brought under § 12(2) are subject to the limitation of actions provision in § 13. See 15 U. S. C. § 77m (one year from the date of discovery). A buyer who discovered a material omission in a prospectus after the passage of the Act could sue for rescission under § 12(2) even though the prospectus had been issued before enactment of the statute. This tells us nothing one way or the other, however, about whether the term "prospectus" is limited to a document soliciting the public to purchase securi- ties from the issuer. In large measure the writings on which both the SEC and Justice Ginsburg rely address a question on which there is no disagreement, that is, "to what securities does § 12(2) apply?" We agree with the SEC that § 12(2) applies to every class of security (except one issued or backed by a governmental entity), whether exempted from registration or not, and whether outstanding at the time of the passage of the Act or not. The question before us is the coverage of § 12(2), and the writings offered by the SEC are of little value on this point. If legislative history is to be considered, it is preferable to consult the documents prepared by Congress when deliber- ating. The legislative history of the Act concerning the pre- cise question presented supports our interpretation with much clarity and force. Congress contemplated that § 12(2) would apply only to public offerings by an issuer (or a con- trolling shareholder). The House Report stated: "The bill affects only new offerings of securities . . . . It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities unless such redistribution takes on the characteristics of a new offering." H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1933). The ob- servation extended to § 12(2) as well. Part II, § 6 of the 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 581 Opinion of the Court House Report is entitled "Civil Liabilities." See id., at 9. It begins: "Sections 11 and 12 create and define the civil lia- bilities imposed by the act . . . . Fundamentally, these sec- tions entitle the buyer of securities sold upon a registration statement . . . to sue for recovery of his purchase price." Ibid. It will be recalled that as to private transactions, such as the Alloyd purchase, there will never have been a regis- tration statement. If § 12(2) liability were imposed here, it would cover transactions not within the contemplated reach of the statute. Even more important is the Report's discussion, and justi- fication, of the liabilities arising from omissions and misstate- ments in "the prospectus": "The Committee emphasizes that these liabilities at- tach only when there has been an untrue statement of material fact or an omission to state a material fact in the registration statement or the prospectus-the basic information by which the public is solicited. All who sell securities with such a flaw, who cannot prove that they did not know-or who in the exercise of due care could not have known-of such misstatement or omis- sion, are liable under sections 11 and 12. For those whose moral responsibility to the public is particularly heavy, there is a correspondingly heavier legal liabil- ity-the persons signing the registration statement, the underwriters, the directors of the issuer, the account- ants, engineers, appraisers, and other professionals pre- paring and giving authority to the prospectus-all these are liable to the buyer . . . if they cannot prove [the use of due care]. This throws upon originators of secur- ities a duty of competence as well as innocence . . . ." Ibid. The House Report thus states with clarity and with specific reference to § 12 that § 12 liability is imposed only as to a document soliciting the public. 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 582 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Opinion of the Court In light of the care that Congress took to justify the impo- sition of liability without proof of either fraud or reliance on "those whose moral responsibility to the public is particu- larly heavy"-the "originators of securities"-we cannot con- clude that Congress would have extended that liability to every private or secondary sale without a whisper of expla- nation. The conspicuous absence in the legislative history is not the absence of an explicit statement that § 12(2) applied only to public offerings, see post, at 600 (Ginsburg, J., dis- senting), but the lack of any explicit reference to the creation of liability for private transactions. Justice Ginsburg argues that the omission from the 1933 Act of the phrase "offering to the public" that appeared in the definition of "prospectus" in the British Companies Act of 1929 suggests that the drafters of the American bill in- tended to expand its coverage. See post, at 599­600 (dis- senting opinion). We consider it more likely that the omis- sion reflected instead the judgment that the words "offering to the public" were redundant in light of the understood meaning of "prospectus." Far from suggesting an intent to depart in a dramatic way from the balance struck in the Brit- ish Companies Act, the legislative history suggests an intent to maintain it. In the context of justifying the "civil liabili- ties" provisions that hold "all those responsible for state- ments upon the face of which the public is solicited . . . to standards like those imposed by law upon a fiduciary," the House Report stated: "The demands of this bill call for the assumption of no impossible burden, nor do they involve any leap into the dark. Similar requirements have for years at- tended the business of issuing securities in other industrial- ized nations." H. R. Rep. No. 85, at 5. So, too, the Report provided: "The committee is fortified in these sections [that is, §§ 11 and 12] by similar safeguards in the English Compa- nies Act of 1929. What is deemed necessary for sound fi- nancing in conservative England ought not be unnecessary 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 583 Opinion of the Court for the more feverish pace which American finance has devel- oped." Id., at 9. These passages confirm that the civil lia- bility provisions of the 1933 Act, §§ 11 and 12, impose obliga- tions on those engaged in "the business of issuing securities," in conformance, not in contradiction to, the British example. Nothing in the legislative history, moreover, suggests Con- gress intended to create two types of prospectuses, a formal prospectus required to comply with both §§ 10 and 12, and a second, less formal prospectus, to which only § 12 would be applicable. The Act proceeds by definitions more stable and precise. The legislative history confirms what the text of the Act dictates: § 10's requirements govern all prospectuses defined by § 2(10) (although, as we pointed out earlier, cer- tain classes of securities are exempted from § 10 by operation of § 3). In discussing § 10, the House Report stated: "Section 10 of the bill requires that any `prospectus' used in connection with the sale of any securities, if it is more than a mere announcement of the name and price of the issue offered and an offer of full details upon re- quest [the exception codified at § 2(10)(b)], must include a substantial portion of the information required in the `registration statement.' . . . " `Prospectus' is defined in section 2(1) [now § 2(10)] to include `any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or other communication offering any security for sale.' "The purpose of these sections is to secure for po- tential buyers the means of understanding the intrica- cies of the transaction into which they are invited." Id., at 8. Nothing in the Report suggests that Congress thought that § 10 would apply only to formal prospectuses required to be produced by § 5. See 15 U. S. C. § 77e. Cf. post, at 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Report undermines the dis- 513us2$29L 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 584 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Thomas, J., dissenting sents' self-contradicting conclusion that the contract here is a prospectus under § 2(10) even though not subject to the requirements of § 10. * * * In sum, the word "prospectus" is a term of art referring to a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder. The contract of sale, and its recitations, were not held out to the public and were not a prospectus as the term is used in the 1933 Act. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. From the majority's opinion, one would not realize that § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Act) was involved in this case until one had read more than halfway through. In contrast to the majority's approach of inter- preting the statute, I believe the proper method is to begin with the provision actually involved in this case, § 12(2), and then turn to the 1933 Act's definitional section, § 2(10), before consulting the structure of the Act as a whole. Be- cause the result of this textual analysis shows that § 12(2) applies to secondary or private sales of a security as well as to initial public offerings, I dissent. I A As we have emphasized in our recent decisions, " `[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a stat- ute is the language itself.' " Landreth Timber Co. v. Lan- dreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685 (1985) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 585 Thomas, J., dissenting concurring)). See also Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173­ 175 (1994). Unfortunately, the majority has decided to in- terpret the word "prospectus" in § 12(2) by turning to sources outside the four corners of the statute, rather than by adopting the definition provided by Congress. Section 12(2) creates a cause of action when the seller of a security makes a material omission or misstatement to the buyer by means of a prospectus or oral communication. If the seller acted negligently in making the misstatements, the buyer may sue to rescind the sale. I agree with the major- ity that the only way to interpret § 12(2) as limited to initial offerings is to read "by means of a prospectus or oral commu- nication" narrowly. I also agree that in the absence of any other statutory command, one could understand "prospec- tus" as "a term of art which describes the transmittal of in- formation concerning the sale of a security in an initial distri- bution." But the canon that "we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning" applies only "[i]n the absence of [a statutory] definition." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). There is no reason to seek the meaning of "prospectus" outside of the 1933 Act, because Congress has supplied just such a definition in § 2(10). That definition is extraordi- narily broad: "When used in this subchapter, unless the context other- wise requires- . . . . . "(10) The term `prospectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any secu- rity for sale or confirms the sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10). For me, the breadth of these terms forecloses the majority's position that "prospectus" applies only in the context of ini- 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 586 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Thomas, J., dissenting tial distributions of securities. Indeed, § 2(10)'s inclusion of a prospectus as only one of the many different documents that qualify as a "prospectus" for statutory purposes indi- cates that Congress intended "prospectus" to be more than a mere "term of art." Likewise, Congress' extension of pro- spectus to include documents that merely confirm the sale of a security underscores Congress' intent to depart from the term's ordinary meaning. Section 2(10)'s definition obvi- ously concerns different types of communications rather than different types of transactions. Congress left the job of ex- empting certain classes of transactions to §§ 3 and 4, not to § 2(10). We should use § 2(10) to define "prospectus" for the 1933 Act, rather than, as the majority does, use the 1933 Act to define "prospectus" for § 2(10). The majority seeks to avoid this reading by attempting to create ambiguities in § 2(10). According to the majority, the maxim noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps) indicates that the circulars, advertisements, letters, or other communications referred to by § 2(10) are limited by the first word in the list: "prospectus." Thus, we are told that these words define the forms a prospectus may take, but the covered communications still must be "prospectus- like" in the sense that they must relate to an initial public offering. Noscitur a sociis, however, does not require us to construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of the terms. See Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 514, 519 (1923); cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U. S. 56, 64 (1990). The majority uses the canon in an effort to create doubt, not to reduce it. The canon applies only in cases of ambigu- ity, which I do not find in § 2(10). "Noscitur a sociis is a well established and useful rule of construction where words are of obscure or doubtful meaning; and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to remove the obscurity or doubt by reference to the associated words." Russell, supra, at 520. There is obvious breadth in "notice, circular, advertisement, 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 587 Thomas, J., dissenting letter, or communication, written or by radio or television." To read one word in a long list as controlling the meaning of all the other words would defy common sense; doing so would prevent Congress from giving effect to expansive words in a list whenever they are combined with one word with a more restricted meaning. Section 2(10)'s very ex- haustiveness suggests that "prospectus" is merely the first item in a long list of covered documents, rather than a brood- ing omnipresence whose meaning cabins that of all the fol- lowing words. The majority also argues that a broad defi- nition of prospectus makes much of § 2(10) redundant. See ante, at 574­575. But the majority fails to see that "commu- nication, written or by radio or television," is a catchall. It operates as a safety net that Congress used to sweep up anything it had forgotten to include in its definition. This is a technique Congress employed in several other provisions of the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1) ("term `security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a `security' "); § 77b(9) ("term `write' or `written' shall in- clude printed, lithographed, or any means of graphic commu- nication"); § 78c(a)(6) ("term `bank' means (A) a banking in- stitution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution"). In fact, it is the majority's approach that creates redundancies. The majority cannot account for Congress' decision to begin its definition of "prospectus" with the term "prospectus," which is then followed by the rest of § 2(10)'s list. As a result, the majority must conclude that the use of the term is a "partial circularity," ante, at 576, a reading that deprives the word of its meaning. B The majority correctly argues that other sections of the 1933 Act employ a narrower understanding of "prospectus" 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 588 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Thomas, J., dissenting as a document related to an initial public offering. See § 10 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77j(a)(3) (detailing information required in prospectus); § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77e(b) (requiring prospectus to be sent to buyers). In fact, the majority builds its entire argument on the proposition that it must give "prospectus" the same meaning in both §§ 10 and 12. Since § 10 assumes a narrower definition of prospectus, the majority believes that its definition must con- trol that of § 12. Although the majority denies that it reads § 10 as a definitional section, it admits that § 10 "does instruct us what a prospectus cannot be if the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme." Ante, at 569. I agree with the majority that §§ 5 and 10 cannot embrace fully the broad definition of prospectus supplied by § 2(10) and used by § 12(2). I also recognize the general presump- tion that a given term bears the same meaning throughout a statute. See Brown v. Gardner, ante, at 118. But this presumption is overcome when Congress indicates other- wise. Here, there are several indications that Congress did not use the word "prospectus" in the same sense through- out the statute. First, § 2(10) defines "prospectus" to in- clude not only a document that "offers any security for sale" (which is consistent with the majority's reading), but also one that "confirms the sale of any security." But the major- ity does not claim that § 10 uses the term "prospectus" to include confirmation slips. It would be radical to say that every confirmation slip must contain all the information that § 10 requires; only the documents accompanying an initial public offering must contain that information. Despite the majority's protestations, it is absolutely clear that the 1933 Act uses "prospectus" in two different ways. As a result, any justification for the majority's twisted reading of § 2(10) disappears. Second, this understanding is reinforced by § 2's preface that its definitions apply "unless the context otherwise re- 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 589 Thomas, J., dissenting quires," 15 U. S. C. § 77b. This phrase indicates that Con- gress intended simply to provide a "default" meaning for "prospectus." Further, nothing in § 12(2) indicates that the "context otherwise requires" the use of a definition of "pro- spectus" other than the one provided by § 2(10). If any- thing, it is § 10's "context" that seems to require the use of a definition that is different from that of § 2(10). Third, the dual use of "prospectus" in § 2(10), which both defines "prospectus" broadly and uses it as a term of art, makes clear that the statute is using the word in at least two different senses, and paves the way for such variations in the ensuing provisions. To adopt the majority's argument would force us to eliminate § 2(10) in favor of some narrower, common-law definition of "prospectus." Our mandate to in- terpret statutes does not allow us to recast Congress' handi- work so completely. The majority transforms § 10 into the tail that wags the 1933 Act dog. An analogy will illustrate the point. Sup- pose that the Act regulates cars, and that § 2(10) of the Act defines a "car" as any car, motorcycle, truck, or trailer. Sec- tion 10 of this hypothetical statute then declares that a car shall have seatbelts, and § 5 states that it is unlawful to sell cars without seatbelts. Section 12(2) of this Act then cre- ates a cause of action for misrepresentations that occur dur- ing the sale of a car. It is reasonable to conclude that §§ 5 and 10 apply only to what we ordinarily refer to as "cars," because it would be absurd to require motorcycles and trail- ers to have seatbelts. But the majority's reasoning would lead to the further conclusion that § 12(2) does not cover sales of motorcycles, when it is clear that the Act includes such sales. C Contrary to the majority's conclusion, it seems to me that the surrounding text of § 12(2) supports my reading. On its face, § 12(2) makes none of the usual distinctions between initial public offerings and aftermarket trading, or between 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 590 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Thomas, J., dissenting public trading and privately negotiated sales. The provision does not mention initial public offerings, as do other provi- sions of the Act. See, e. g., § 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2) (exempting "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"). Nor did Congress limit § 12(2) to issu- ers, as it chose to do with other provisions that are limited to initial distributions. See § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77k(a)(2) (holding liable for a false registration statement "every person who was a director of . . . or partner in the issuer" at time of filing). Instead, § 12(2) refers more broadly to "any person who . . . offers or sells a security." 1 If, as the majority suggests, Congress had intended to limit § 12(2) to initial public offerings, it presumably would have used words such as "issuer," "public offering," or "private," or "resale," or at least discussed trading on the exchanges or the liability of dealers, underwriters, and issuers. But on this score, § 12(2) is notable for its silence. I assume that when Congress chose to define liability under the securities laws, it used precise language that it was familiar with to make its meaning clear. Just last Term, in holding that § 10(b) of the 1934 Act did not create liability for aiders and abettors, we said: "If . . . Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words `aid' and `abet' in the statutory text. But it did not." Central Bank of Denver, 511 U. S., at 177. This rule of construction can cut both ways. If in Central Bank of Denver Congress' failure to use "aid" or "abet" lim- ited liability under the securities laws, then here the absence of "public offering," "issuers," or some similar limitation surely suggests that Congress sought to extend § 12(2) to private and secondary transactions. 1 "Sell" is defined broadly to include "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value," while "offer" refers to "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U. S. C. § 77b(3). 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 591 Thomas, J., dissenting The dearth of limiting language in § 12(2) is all the more striking in light of the 1933 Act's detailed exemption provi- sions. Section 4 of the 1933 Act, appropriately entitled "Exempted Transactions," specifically excludes from § 5's registration requirements both "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer" and "transac- tions by an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U. S. C. §§ 77d(1) and (2). If Congress had intended § 12(2) to govern only initial public offerings, it would have been simple for Congress to have referred to the § 4 exemptions in § 12(2). As we have noted, "although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act . . . exempts transactions not involving any public offer- ing from the Act's registration provisions, there is no compa- rable exemption from the antifraud provisions." Landreth Timber Co., 471 U. S., at 692. Section 12(2)'s explicit excep- tion only for government securities shows that Congress knew how to exempt certain securities and transactions when it wanted to. The majority argues that § 4's exemption suggests a con- trary conclusion. Ante, at 573. According to the majority, if Congress had intended § 12(2) to apply to private, second- ary transactions, it would have said so explicitly. This rea- soning goes too far, for it would render § 4 superfluous. After all, if the majority applied its approach to § 5 (which prohibits the sale of a security without first registering the security or without first sending a prospectus), then it would conclude-even in the absence of § 4-that § 5 refers only to initial offerings. But this would have precluded any need to include § 4 at all. The majority claims that under my reading, "there is no ready explanation for exempting" government securities from § 12(2). Ante, at 571. But Congress could have con- cluded that it was unnecessary to impose liability on the pri- vate or secondary sellers of a government security because information concerning government securities is already available either from the markets or from government enti- 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 592 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Thomas, J., dissenting ties. Or Congress could have chosen not to burden govern- ment securities with the costs that might accrue from addi- tional liabilities on initial or secondary sales. II The majority argues that the 1933 Act's central focus on initial public offerings requires us to read its provisions as extending only to those distributions. We have recognized, however, that not all of the provisions of the 1933 Act are limited to initial public offerings, nor are all of the provisions of the 1934 Act limited to secondary transactions. Thus, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Securities and Exchange Commis- sion (SEC) Rule 10b­5 reach both initial and secondary dis- tributions. Similarly, we have held that § 17 of the 1933 Act reaches beyond initial distributions to aftermarket trading. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768 (1979). In reaching our holding in Naftalin, we rejected two argu- ments relevant here. First, we were not swayed by the con- tention that the structure of the 1933 Act limited § 17 to new issues. As we noted, the statutory language "makes no dis- tinctions between the two kinds of transactions [initial distri- butions and ordinary market trading]." Id., at 778. Sec- ond, the 1934 Act's prohibition of fraud in the secondary sale of securities did not lead us to infer that the 1933 Act's provi- sions apply solely to new offerings. " `The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortu- nate.' " Ibid. (quoting SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 468 (1969)). Here, § 12(2) contains no distinction between initial and secondary transactions, or public and private sales. Thus, if the majority wished to remain faithful to Naftalin, it would hold that the provision reaches both secondary and private transactions. To be sure, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b­5 provide a cause of action for misstatements made in connection with secondary and pri- vate securities transactions. However, "it is hardly a novel 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 593 Thomas, J., dissenting proposition that the [1933 and 1934 Acts] `prohibit some of the same conduct.' " Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 383 (1983). Naftalin counsels the Court to reject arguments that we should read § 12(2) narrowly in order to avoid redundancy in securities regulation. 441 U. S., at 778. In fact, it is quite possible that the Congress of 1933­1934 originally intended no overlap between § 12(2) and the 1934 Act, but instead expected § 12(2) to serve as the only cause of action for the private or secondary sale of securities. As we have noted before, neither the text of § 10(b) nor that of SEC Rule 10b­5 provides for private claims, and "we have made no pretense that it was Congress' design to provide the remedy afforded." Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 359 (1991). Only § 12(2) explicitly provided a broad remedy for private or aftermarket sales. It seems unlikely that Congress would have failed to provide any cause of action for investors based on misstatements in market transactions. 9 L. Loss & J. Seligman, Securities Regulation 4220 (3d ed. 1992). Instead of reading Naftalin properly, the majority at- tempts to narrow the case to its facts. According to the majority, Naftalin requires that no provision of the 1933 Act should be interpreted to extend liability to secondary trans- actions unless either the statutory language or the legisla- tive history clearly indicate that Congress intends to do so. If anything, Naftalin implements the opposite rule: that a provision of the 1933 Act extends to both initial offerings and secondary trading unless the text makes a "distinctio[n] between the two kinds of transactions." 441 U. S., at 778. In any event, the statutory language seems clear enough to me.2 2 The majority responds that the legislative history must also clearly indicate that Congress intended to expand liability. Naftalin itself im- posed no such requirement. Moreover, the legislative history relied upon by the majority and by the Court in Naftalin does not support the conclu- 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 594 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Thomas, J., dissenting III The majority's analysis of § 12(2) is motivated by its policy preferences. Underlying its reasoning is the assumption that Congress could never have intended to impose liability on sellers engaged in secondary transactions. Adopting a chiding tone, the majority states that "[w]e are reluctant to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional liabilities that are quite independent of the new substantive obligations that the Act imposes." Ante, at 572. Yet, this is exactly what Congress did in § 17(a) of the 1933 Act as well as in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Later, the majority says: "It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liabil- ity for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market." Ante, at 578. It is not the usual practice of this Court to require Congress to explain why it has chosen to pursue a certain policy. Our job simply is to apply the policy, not to question it. I share the majority's concern that extending § 12(2) to secondary and private transactions might result in an un- wanted increase in securities litigation. But it is for Con- gress, and not for this Court, to determine the desired level of securities liability. As we said last Term in Central Bank of Denver, policy considerations " `cannot override our inter- pretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result `so bizarre' that Con- sion that Congress wanted to extend § 17(a) to secondary sales. The pas- sage cited by the majority and by Naftalin, S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1933), see ante, at 577­578, was unrelated to § 17(a), and instead discussed a Senate proposal which was replaced by the House bill as the basis for the 1933 Act. In fact, the §§ 11 and 12 referred to in the Senate Report were originally extensive exemption, rather than liability, provi- sions that did not survive the legislative process. See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 20­24 (1933). The majority's approach seriously undermines this Court's holding and methodology in Naftalin. 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 595 Thomas, J., dissenting gress could not have intended it.' " 511 U. S., at 188 (quot- ing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 191 (1991)). The majority is concerned that a contrary reading would have a drastic impact on the thousands of private and sec- ondary transactions by imposing new liabilities and new transaction costs. But the majority forgets that we are only enforcing Congress' decision to impose such standards of conduct and remedies upon sellers. If the majority believes that § 12(2)'s requirements are too burdensome for the secu- rities markets, it must rely upon the other branches of Gov- ernment to limit the 1933 Act. Unfortunately, the majority's decision to pursue its policy preferences comes at the price of disrupting the process of statutory interpretation. The majority's method turns on its head the commonsense approach to interpreting legal doc- uments. The majority begins by importing a definition of "prospectus" from beyond the four corners of the 1933 Act that fits the precise use of the term in § 10. Initially ig- noring the definition of "prospectus" provided at the be- ginning of the statute by Congress, the majority finally dis- cusses § 2(10) to show that it does not utterly preclude its preferred meaning. Only then does the majority decide to parse the language of the provision at issue. However, when one interprets a contract provision, one usually begins by reading the provision, and then ascertaining the meaning of any important or ambiguous phrases by consulting any definitional clauses in the contract. Only if those inquiries prove unhelpful does a court turn to extrinsic definitions or to structure. I doubt that the majority would read in so narrow and peculiar a fashion most other statutes, particu- larly one intended to restrict causes of action in securities cases. The majority's methodology also has the effect of frus- trating Congress' will. In the majority's view, there seems to be little reason for Congress to have defined "prospec- 513us2$29N 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 596 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Ginsburg, J., dissenting tus," or to have included a § 2 definition at all. If all the key words of the 1933 Act are to be defined by the meanings imparted to them by the securities industry, there should be no need for Congress to attempt to define them by stat- ute. The majority does not permit Congress to implement its intent unless it does so exactly as the Court wants it to. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. A seller's misrepresentation made "by means of a pro- spectus or oral communication" is actionable under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2). To limit the scope of this civil liability provision, the Court maintains that a communication qualifies as a prospectus only if made during a public offering.1 Communications during either secondary trading or a private placement are not "prospec- tuses," the Court declares, and thus are not covered by § 12(2). As Justice Thomas persuasively demonstrates, the stat- ute's language does not support the Court's reading. Sec- tion 12(2) contains no terms expressly confining the provision to public offerings, and the statutory definition of "prospec- tus"-"any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any secu- rity," § 2(10), 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10)-is capacious. The Court presents impressive policy reasons for its con- struction, but drafting history and the longstanding schol- arly and judicial understanding of § 12(2) caution against judicial resistance to the statute's defining text. I would leave any alteration to Congress. 1 I understand the Court's definition of a public offering to encompass both transactions that must be registered under § 5, 15 U. S. C. § 77e, and transactions that would have been registered had the securities involved not qualified for exemption under § 3, 15 U. S. C. § 77c. 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 597 Ginsburg, J., dissenting I To construe a legislatively defined term, courts usually start with the defining section. Section 2(10) defines pro- spectus capaciously as "any prospectus, notice, circular, ad- vertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security," 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10). The items listed in the defining provision, notably "letters" and "com- munications," are common in private and secondary sales, as well as in public offerings. The § 2(10) definition thus does not confine the § 12(2) term "prospectus" to public offerings. The Court bypasses § 2(10), and the solid support it gives the Court of Appeals' disposition. Instead of beginning at the beginning, by first attending to the definition section, the Court starts with § 10, 15 U. S. C. § 77j, a substantive provision. See ante, at 568­569. The Court correctly ob- serves that the term "prospectus" has a circumscribed mean- ing in that context. A prospectus within the contemplation of § 10 is a formal document, typically a document composing part of a registration statement; a § 10 prospectus, all agree, appears only in public offerings. The Court then proceeds backward; it reads into the literally and logically prior definition section, § 2(10), the meaning "prospectus" has in § 10. To justify its backward reading-proceeding from § 10 to § 2(10) and not the other way round-the Court states that it "cannot accept the conclusion that [the operative word `prospectus'] means one thing in one section of the Act and something quite different in another." See ante, at 573. Our decisions, however, constantly recognize that "a char- acterization fitting in certain contexts may be unsuitable in others." NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable An- nuity Life Ins. Co., ante, at 262. In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427 (1932), we held that the word "trade" has a more encompassing meaning in 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 598 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Ginsburg, J., dissenting § 3 than in § 1 of the Sherman Act, see id., at 433­435, and explained: "Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that iden- tical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. . . . But the pre- sumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent. . . . "It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legisla- ture intended it should have in each instance." Id., at 433. See also Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to as- sume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against."). According "prospectus" discrete meanings in § 10 and § 12(2) is consistent with Congress' specific instruction in § 2 that definitions apply "unless the context otherwise re- quires," 15 U. S. C. § 77b. As the Court of Appeals con- strued the Act, § 2(10)'s definition of "prospectus" governs § 12(2), which accommodates without strain the definition's broad reach; by contrast, the specific context of § 10 requires a correspondingly specific reading of "prospectus." Indeed, in the Investment Company Act of 1940, Congress explicitly recognized that the Securities Act uses "prospec- tus" in two different senses-one in § 10, and another in the rest of the Act: 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 599 Ginsburg, J., dissenting " `Prospectus,' as used in [§ 22 of the Investment Com- pany Act], means a written prospectus intended to meet the requirements of section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and currently in use. As used elsewhere, `prospectus' means a prospectus as defined in the Securi- ties Act of 1933." § 2(31), 54 Stat. 794, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80a­2(31).2 II Most provisions of the Securities Act govern only public offerings, and the legislative history pertaining to the Act as a whole shares this orientation. See ante, at 580 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1933)). Section 17(a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), however, is not limited to public offerings; that enforcement provision, this Court has recognized, also covers secondary trading. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768 (1979). The drafting his- tory is at least consistent with the conclusion that § 12(2), like § 17(a), is not limited to public offerings. The drafters of the Securities Act modeled this federal legislation on the British Companies Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (1929). See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 34 (1959) (Landis and the other drafters "determined to take as the base of [their] work the English Companies Act"); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119, 123 (1953) (charac- terizing the Companies Act as a "statutory anteceden[t]" of federal securities laws). The Companies Act defined "pro- spectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or other invitation, offering to the public for subscription or purchase any shares or debentures of a company," 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, § 380(1) (1929) (emphasis added). Though the drafters of the Securities Act borrowed the first four 2 Although the Court finds our reading of § 2(10) redundant, see ante, at 574­575, the Court recognizes that Congress built redundancy into the definition by defining a "prospectus" as a "prospectus." See ante, at 575­576. 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 600 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Ginsburg, J., dissenting terms of this definition, they did not import from the British legislation the language limiting prospectuses to communica- tions "offering [securities] to the public." This conspicuous omission suggests that the drafters intended the defined term "prospectus" to reach beyond communications used in public offerings.3 The House Conference Report, which explains the Act in its final form, describes § 12(2) in broad terms, and nowhere suggests that the provision is limited to public offerings: "The House bill (sec. 12) imposes civil liability for using the mails or the facilities of interstate commerce to sell securities (including securities exempt, under sec- tion 3, from other provisions of the bill) by means of representations which are untrue or are misleading by reason of omissions of material facts." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 26­27 (1933) (empha- sis added). Nor does the Report mention the word "prospectus," even though one would expect that word to figure prominently if it were the significant limitation the Court describes. See also Rapp, The Proper Role of Securities Act Section 12(2) as an Aftermarket Remedy for Disclosure Violations, 47 Bus. Law. 711, 719­724 (1992) (offering detailed analysis of legisla- tive history).4 3 Though the Court cites legislative history to show Congress' intent to follow, rather than depart from, the British statute, these sources suggest an intention to afford at least as much protection from fraud as the British statute provides. See ante, at 582­583 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1933)) ("What is deemed necessary for sound financing in conservative England ought not be unnecessary for the more feverish pace which American finance has developed."). Congress' provision for liability beyond "offering[s] to the public," however, suggests a legislative conclusion that the "feverish pace" of American finance called for greater protection from fraud than the British Act supplied. 4 Though House Report No. 85 affords support for the reading advanced by the Court, it predates the Conference Report. Moreover, I do not share the Court's view that Report No. 85 speaks with clarity and specific- 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 601 Ginsburg, J., dissenting Commentators writing shortly after passage of the Act un- derstood § 12(2) to cover resales and private sales, as well as public offerings. Felix Frankfurter, organizer of the team that drafted the statute, firmly stated this view. See Frank- furter, The Federal Securities Act: II, 8 Fortune 53, 108 (1933) (Act "seeks to terminate the facilities of the mails and of interstate commerce for dishonest or unfair dealings in the sale of all private or foreign government securities, new or old") (emphasis added). William O. Douglas expressed the same understanding. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L. J. 171, 183 (1933) (noting that, except for transactions involving securities exempt under § 3(a)(2), 15 U. S. C. § 77c(a)(2), no securities or transac- tions are exempt from § 12(2)). Most subsequent commentators have agreed that § 12(2), like § 17(a), is not confined to public offerings. See, e. g., H. Bloomenthal, Securities Law Handbook § 14.05, pp. 14­13, 14­38 (1991); 2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud § 5.2(600) (1993); 1 T. Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation § 7.5, p. 318 (2d ed. 1990); 17A J. Hicks, Civil Liabilities: Enforcement and Litigation under the 1933 Act § 6.01[3], pp. 6­12 to 6­39 (1994); 9 L. Loss & J. Seligman, Securities Regulation 4217­4222 (3d ed. 1992); Maynard, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A ity to the question at hand-§ 12(2)'s scope. See ante, at 581. In suggest- ing that registration statements and prospectuses are "the basic informa- tion by which the public is solicited," and that the Act's liability provisions penalize the "originators of securities," see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 9 (1933), the Report does not focus on § 12(2), but on "[s]ections 11 and 12" in general. Ibid. The Report's broad address thus takes in § 11, 15 U. S. C. § 77k, which is directed at misstatements in registration statements, and § 12(1), 15 U. S. C. § 77l(1), which targets sales and offers to sell securities in violation of the Act's registration provisions. There is no dispute that the latter two provisions apply only to public offerings- or, to be precise, to transactions subject to registration. The dominant point made by the Report, moreover, is that the civil liability sections are exacting. 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:02 PAGES OPINPGT 602 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Ginsburg, J., dissenting Remedy for Fraudulent Postdistribution Trading?, 20 Sec. Reg. L. J. 152 (1992); Rapp, supra, at 711; Comment, Apply- ing Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act to the Aftermar- ket, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 955 (1990). But see Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. Law. 1 (1992). While Courts of Appeals have divided on § 12(2)'s applica- tion to secondary transactions,5 every Court of Appeals to consider the issue has ruled that private placements are sub- ject to § 12(2). See Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F. 2d 350, 360­361 (CA2 1992), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 952 (1993); Haralson v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 919 F. 2d 1014, 1032 (CA5 1990); Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F. 2d 1093, 1099 (CA5 1973); Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co. Inc., 993 F. 2d 578, 587 (CA7 1993) (exemptions in § 4, 15 U. S. C. § 77d, do not limit § 12(2)'s reach); see also Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F. 2d 359 (CA4 1986) (applying § 12(2) to private sale). "[L]ongstanding acceptance by the courts [of a judicial interpretation], coupled with Congress' failure to reject" that interpretation, "argues significantly in favor of accept[ing]" it. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 733 (1975). The drafters of the Uniform Securities Act, in 1956, mod- eled § 410(a)(2) of that Act 6 on § 12(2) of the federal Securi- 5 Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co. Inc., 993 F. 2d 578 (CA7 1993) (applying § 12(2) to secondary transactions), cert. granted, 510 U. S. 1083, cert. dism'd, 510 U. S. 1160 (1994), with First Union Dis- count Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Milos, 997 F. 2d 835, 842­844 (CA11 1993) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to secondary transactions); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F. 2d 682 (CA3) (same), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 820 (1991). 6 Section 410(a)(2) imposes liability on "[a]ny person who" "(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the un- truth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995) 603 Ginsburg, J., dissenting ties Act. Notably, the Uniform Act drafters did not read § 12(2) as limited to public offerings. Accordingly, they did not so limit § 410(a)(2). Bloomenthal, supra, § 14.05, at 14­ 38 to 14­39; see also § 410(a)(2) comment, 7B U. L. A. 644 (1985) (describing as comparable scope of § 410(a)(2) and scope of Uniform Securities Act § 101, the Uniform Act's analog to Securities Act § 17(a)).7 Section 410, it is true, does not contain the "prospectus or oral communication" language, perhaps because "prospectus" is not a defined term in the Uniform Securities Act. See § 401, 7B U. L. A. 578­581 (1985) (listing definitions). There is scant doubt, however, that the drafters of Uniform Act § 410(a)(2) in- tended the provision to have the same meaning as Securi- ties Act § 12(2). See § 410(a)(2) comment, 7B U. L. A. 644 ("This clause is almost identical with § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . ."); L. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 147 (1976) ("The resemblance [of § 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Act] to § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2), will once more make for an inter- changeability of federal and state judicial preceden[ts] in this very important area."). * * * In light of the text, drafting history, and longstanding scholarly and judicial understanding of § 12(2), I conclude that § 12(2) applies to a private resale of securities. If adjustment is in order, as the Court's opinion powerfully did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission . . . ." 7B U. L. A. 643 (1985). 7 State adaptations of § 410(a)(2) have been applied consistently beyond public offerings; they have been read to cover secondary transactions, see, e. g., Banton v. Hackney, 557 So. 2d 807 (Ala. 1989); Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S. C. 6, 249 S. E. 2d 486 (1978); S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P. 2d 217 (Utah 1974), as well as private transactions, see, e. g., Towery v. Lucas, 128 Ore. App. 555, 876 P. 2d 814 (1994); Jenkins v. Jacobs, 748 P. 2d 1318 (Colo. App. 1987); Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P. 2d 159 (Wyo. 1982); Foelker v. Kwake, 279 Ore. 379, 568 P. 2d 1369 (1977). 513us2$29P 04-04-98 14:01:03 PAGES OPINPGT 604 GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO. Ginsburg, J., dissenting suggests it is,8 Congress is equipped to undertake the alter- ation. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court's opinion and judgment. 8 Section 12(2) did not become prominent in Securities Act litigation until this Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976), that an action for civil damages under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b­5, 17 CFR § 240.10b­5 (1975), requires proof of sci- enter. See Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 910 (1992). Though the Court of Appeals' reading of § 12(2) shows fidelity to the statute Congress passed, this Court's opinion makes noteworthy practical and policy points. As the Court observes, ante, at 578, under the Court of Appeals' reading, § 12(2) would equip buyers with a rescission remedy for a negligent misstatement or omission even if the slip did not cause the buyer's disenchantment with the investment. And, in light of the "free writing" provision of § 2(10)(a), 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10)(a) (a communication will not be deemed a "prospectus" if its recipient was previously sent a prospectus meeting the requirements of § 10), the Court of Appeals' read- ing, ironically, would leave a seller more vulnerable in private transactions than in public ones. 03-07-98 20:36:34 513ordnot3 Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 604 and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita- tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS FOR OCTOBER 3, 1994, THROUGH FEBRUARY 27, 1995 October 3, 1994 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­1510. Alabama v. Brown. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452 (1994). Reported below: 630 So. 2d 481. No. 93­1707. Schmidt et al. v. Espy, Secretary of Agri- culture. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the posi- tion presently asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States filed August 1, 1994. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1352. No. 93­1748. Solomon et al. v. Resolution Trust Corpo- ration, as Receiver for Nassau Savings & Loan Assn., F. A.; and No. 93­1757. Pattullo et al. v. Resolution Trust Cor- poration, as Receiver for Nassau Savings & Loan Assn., F. A. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U. S. 79 (1994). Reported below: 18 F. 3d 111. No. 93­1896. Woods v. Candela. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid- eration in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994). Re- ported below: 13 F. 3d 574. No. 93­1915. Altimus et al. v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). Reported below: 124 Ore. App. 61, 862 P. 2d 109. No. 93­1985. Arizona v. Cook. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid- eration in light of United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688 (1993). Reported below: 177 Ariz. 595, 870 P. 2d 413. 801 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 802 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­45. Lawson et al. v. Murray et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994). Reported below: 136 N. J. 32, 642 A. 2d 338. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. McGee et al. v. Los Angeles County et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Mester v. Saiki et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Nauss v. United States; No. - ­ ­­­. Legear v. Nix; No. - ­ ­­­. Godboldo v. Burt, Warden; No. - ­ ­­­. Laughter v. Belk-Simpson; No. - ­ ­­­. Burns v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; No. - ­ ­­­. Ghafari v. Gacek et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Gill v. Williams; No. - ­ ­­­. Ransome v. Bowling et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Hernandez v. Riley, Superintendent of Fishkill Correctional Facility; No. - ­ ­­­. Boatright v. Reich, Secretary of Labor, et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Vda de Mendoza et al. v. United States; and No. - ­ ­­­. Srinivasan v. El Monte High School Dis- trict. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Fuller v. Norfolk Southern Corp. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [511 U. S. 1015] denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Jemzura v. Bulsiewicz et al. Motion to di- rect the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time and for other relief denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Cazes v. Tennessee. Motion for leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted. No. - ­ ­­­. Rodriguez v. New Mexico. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 803 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. - ­ ­­­. Doe v. United States. Motion of petitioner for leave to file a redacted petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. D­926. In re Disbarment of McBride. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 497 U. S. 1055.] No. D­1362. In re Disbarment of Sneed. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 510 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1391. In re Disbarment of Castro. Further consid- eration of response to the rule to show cause deferred. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1104.] No. D­1408. In re Disbarment of Leslie. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1202.] No. D­1413. In re Disbarment of Kilpatrick. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1232.] No. D­1460. In re Disbarment of Friedman. It is ordered that Theodore H. Friedman, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 8, Orig. Arizona v. California et al. Motion of West Bank Homeowners Association for leave to intervene referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 510 U. S. 987.] No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River Master for award of compensation and fees granted, and the River Master is awarded a total of $5,403.75 for the period April 1 through June 30, 1994, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 512 U. S. 1202.] No. 105, Orig. Kansas v. Colorado. Motion of the Special Master for interim fees and expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded $92,240.78 to be paid as follows: 40% by Kan- sas, 40% by Colorado, and 20% by the United States. Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed by the parties within 30 days. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 510 U. S. 1174.] 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 804 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 111, Orig. Texas et al. v. New York. Motion of Mas- sachusetts to dismiss its amended complaint without prejudice denied. Amended complaint of Massachusetts dismissed. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 512 U. S. 1202.] No. 121, Orig. Louisiana v. Mississippi et al. Motion of the Houston defendants for leave to file a supplemental answer granted. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 510 U. S. 1174.] No. 92­519. Johnson, Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, et al. v. De Grandy et al., 512 U. S. 997. Motion of appellants Bolley Johnson et al. to retax costs granted. No. 92­1450. Waters et al. v. Churchill et al., 511 U. S. 661. Motion of respondents to retax costs denied. No. 93­723. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 510 U. S. 1163.] Motion of National Law Center for Children and Families et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for additional time for oral argument denied. No. 93­1633. Swan et al. v. Peterson, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Charles R. Nesson for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 93­1857. Carpenters District Council of New Or- leans and Vicinity et al. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir.; No. 93­2068. Kimberlin v. Quinlan et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.; No. 94­12. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir.; No. 94­35. Alabama et al. v. Poarch Band of Creek Indi- ans et al. C. A. 11th Cir.; No. 94­189. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir.; and No. 94­219. Florida et al. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States. No. 93­1882. Swanson et al. v. North Carolina et al. Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of National Association of Retired Federal Employees et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 93­1911. Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Cor- rectional Facility v. Conner et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 805 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 of respondent DeMont R. D. Conner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. No. 93­8730. Giles v. Alabama, 512 U. S. 1213. Respondent is requested to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days. No. 93­9122. Rodenbaugh v. Ott (two cases). C. A. 3d Cir.; and No. 94­5059. Jones v. Schulze, Director, Missouri De- partment of Social Services, Division of Family Services, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petition- ers are allowed until October 24, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 93­9758. Ferran et al. v. Town of Nassau, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.; No. 94­5291. Baasch v. Reyer et al. C. A. 2d Cir.; and No. 94­5769. Bailey v. Bailey. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 24, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit peti- tions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­3. Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al. v. Hyde. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion of Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 94­197. Anderson, Director, California Department of Social Services, et al. v. Green et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of United States Justice Foundation and Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. No. 93­9439. In re Zolicoffer; No. 93­9670. In re Vargas; No. 93­9738. In re Seagrave; No. 94­5261. In re Hutchings von Ludwitz; No. 94­5336. In re Crumb; No. 94­5545. In re Martinez; No. 94­5581. In re Harrell; No. 94­5608. In re Gossage et al.; No. 94­5685. In re Jones; and 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 806 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5885. In re Tucker. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 93­9051. In re Reeder; No. 93­9070. In re Shows; No. 93­9077. In re Green; No. 93­9202. In re Gosch; No. 93­9216. In re Drew; No. 93­9481. In re Reddeck; No. 93­9482. In re White; No. 93­9568. In re Gunderson; No. 93­9585. In re White; No. 93­9784. In re Crawford; No. 94­299. In re Morrison; No. 94­5178. In re Berry; No. 94­5194. In re De Castro; No. 94­5255. In re Littrell; No. 94­5256. In re Montgomery; No. 94­5318. In re Zzie; No. 94­5381. In re Cooper; and No. 94­5382. In re Cooper. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 93­1969. In re City of Henderson et al. Motion of petitioner for show cause order denied. Petition for writ of man- damus denied. No. 94­146. In re Johnson; and No. 94­5097. In re Kamal. Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. No. 93­9352. In re Shawley; and No. 93­9614. In re Wright. Petitions for writs of prohibi- tion denied. Certiorari Denied No. 93­248. Johnson v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 991 F. 2d 126. No. 93­1441. Walsh v. Delaware et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 50. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 807 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1479. Cruttenden & Co. et al. v. Lynch et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 Cal. App. 4th 802, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636. No. 93­1483. Harrison et al. v. Federal Deposit Insur- ance Corporation; and No. 93­1485. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Cocke et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 396. No. 93­1484. Peters v. Polk County Memorial Hospital. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 229. No. 93­1547. In re Smith. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 723. No. 93­1550. Corwin, Registrar of Voters for the City and County of San Francisco, et al. v. Mark et al.; and No. 93­1846. Mark et al. v. Corwin, Registrar of Voters for the City and County of San Francisco, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2 F. 3d 989. No. 93­1603. City of Clearwater, Florida, et al. v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc.; andNo. 93­1604. City of Clearwater, Florida, et al. v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 93­1603, 2 F. 3d 1509; No. 93­1604, 2 F. 3d 1514. No. 93­1630. Restivo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 274. No. 93­1632. Eng v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 165. No. 93­1644. Burchard et ux. v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1105. No. 93­1651. Patrick v. Securities and Exchange Commis- sion. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 66. No. 93­1662. Mobile Freezers, Inc. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 57. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 808 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­1670. Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1311. No. 93­1672. Pahdopony v. Department of the Interior. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 93­1678. Warda v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 533. No. 93­1679. Britenbach v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 830 and 1092. No. 93­1684. Hirano v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 597. No. 93­1686. Nellis et al. v. Air Line Pilots Association International. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 50. No. 93­1690. Scott v. Alaska. Ct. App. Alaska. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­1696. Smith v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1089. No. 93­1700. Snow et al. v. Harnischfeger Corp. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1154. No. 93­1703. Mainlands Section 1 and 2 Civic Assn., Inc. v. Massaro et ux., Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Massaro, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 1472. No. 93­1711. Roush v. KFC National Management Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 392. No. 93­1729. Nyhuis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 731. No. 93­1734. Stephens v. Miller, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 998. No. 93­1735. Smith et ux. v. Jefferson Pilot Life Insur- ance Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 562. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 809 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1736. Pugh v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 157 Ill. 2d 1, 623 N. E. 2d 255. No. 93­1743. Hoskins v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 361. No. 93­1765. Cole v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 39. No. 93­1767. Atonio et al. v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1485. No. 93­1768. H. R. v. E. O. et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 A. 2d 670. No. 93­1776. Hall et al. v. Green et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 695. No. 93­1779. Calvo v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 630 So. 2d 548. No. 93­1784. Patterson et al. v. Newspaper & Mail De- liverers Union et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 13 F. 3d 33. No. 93­1787. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1150. No. 93­1790. Belsito v. New York. App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 9th and 10th Jud. Dists. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1793. Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Tolley et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 602. No. 93­1794. Union Tank Car Co. v. Various Plaintiffs in Class. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 255, 626 N. E. 2d 85. No. 93­1795. Steinfeld v. Hoddick, Guardian of the Es- tate of Steinfeld. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Ill. 2d 1, 630 N. E. 2d 801. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 810 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­1796. Holmberg et al. v. City of Ramsey. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 140. No. 93­1802. Gupton v. Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 203. No. 93­1803. Moore et al. v. Kennison. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1806. Men-Guer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1220. No. 93­1809. Dance et al. v. Aviel. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1111. No. 93­1811. Mareno v. County of Westchester. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 390. No. 93­1817. Mock v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1324. No. 93­1820. Sejpal et al. v. Corson, Mitchell, Tom- have & McKinley, M. D. S., Inc., et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 428 Pa. Super. 648, 627 A. 2d 210. No. 93­1821. Myers, Warden, et al. v. Jiminez. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1474. No. 93­1825. Black Hills Institute of Geological Re- search et al. v. Department of Justice. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 737. No. 93­1827. Lokay v. American Real Estate Corp. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1829. Kirsh v. Scott, Warden. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1425. No. 93­1830. Spencer v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 368. No. 93­1831. Adams v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Mich. 903, 512 N. W. 2d 316. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:01 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 811 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1832. Langley v. Jackson State University et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1070. No. 93­1835. 1605 Book Center, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tri- bunal of New York et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 240, 631 N. E. 2d 86. No. 93­1836. Peeler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 181. No. 93­1839. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 12 F. 3d 353. No. 93­1840. Hudson v. Varney et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 N. Y. 2d 888, 632 N. E. 2d 463. No. 93­1842. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1215. No. 93­1843. Landers Seed Co., Inc., et al. v. Champaign National Bank et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 15 F. 3d 729. No. 93­1845. Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1346. No. 93­1847. Ching Luen Enterprises Co. v. Mason et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 535. No. 93­1848. Daneshvar v. University of West Virginia Board of Trustees. Cir. Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­1849. Hunkins, Individually and dba Muse Ten Center, et al. v. City of Minneapolis et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 N. W. 2d 542. No. 93­1850. CHoPP Computer Corp., Inc. v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1344. No. 93­1851. Durr et al. v. Intercounty Title Company of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1183. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 812 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­1852. Owens et al. v. Hewell et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 410. No. 93­1854. Kabealo v. Huntington National Bank. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 822. No. 93­1855. Korman, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 931. No. 93­1860. Austex, Ltd. v. Texas et al.; Munday Enter- prises v. Texas et al.; Edwards, Individually and as Inde- pendent Executrix of the Estate of Edwards, et al. v. Texas et al.; Allen et al. v. Texas et al.; and Centennial Mortgage Corp. v. Texas et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 867 S. W. 2d 769 (first case); 868 S. W. 2d 319 (second case); 868 S. W. 2d 321 (third case); 870 S. W. 2d 1 (fourth case); 867 S. W. 2d 783 (fifth case). No. 93­1863. Markoff v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 641. No. 93­1865. Jenkins v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 627 N. E. 2d 789. No. 93­1866. Redner v. Henderson, Sheriff of Hills- borough County, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1867. Martin County, Florida v. Wouters et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 924. No. 93­1869. Jennings Water, Inc. v. CSL Utilities, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 130. No. 93­1872. Camacho v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1083. No. 93­1873. Long v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 206. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 813 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1874. Russo et al. v. Casey et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1089. No. 93­1876. Luong v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 645. No. 93­1877. Stock v. Universal Foods Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 411. No. 93­1879. Erndt et al. v. Pre-Vest, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1880. City of Castle Rock et al. v. Huson. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1551. No. 93­1881. Ruark et al. v. Boatwright et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 213. No. 93­1884. Jenkin v. Electro-Tec Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 410. No. 93­1885. Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Manufac- turing, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 295. No. 93­1886. T. I. Construction Co., Inc. v. Kiewit East- ern Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 123. No. 93­1887. Masini Soler v. Solicitor General of Puerto Rico et al. Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1889. American Express Bank Ltd. v. Sheerbon- net Ltd. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 46. No. 93­1890. Cemex, S. A. v. United States et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 398. No. 93­1892. Fiore, dba Municipal & Industrial Disposal Co. v. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 404. No. 93­1893. Stroud v. Shaw, Administratrix of the Estate of Bowen, Deceased, et al.; and 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 814 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­9. Shaw, Administratrix of the Estate of Bowen, Deceased, et al. v. Stroud et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 791. No. 93­1894. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1103. No. 93­1897. Berger v. City of Cleveland. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 Ohio App. 3d 102, 631 N. E. 2d 1085. No. 93­1899. Perez et al. v. New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­1900. Harper v. Harman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 1455. No. 93­1902. Puerto Rico Port Authority v. Brother- hood of Office & Commercial Workers et al. Super. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1903. Ross et al. v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 980 F. 2d 648. No. 93­1908. Senanayake v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 93­1909. Rodriguez et al. v. Secretary of the Treas- ury of Puerto Rico et al. Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1910. Breedlove v. Phillips et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1913. Santosuosso v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1435. No. 93­1914. Williams et al. v. Burnham Broadcasting Co., dba WVUE­TV 8. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 629 So. 2d 1335. No. 93­1916. Rosa et al. v. Warner Electrical Con- tracting et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 P. 2d 1210. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 815 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1917. Shong-Ching Tong v. Assured Thrift & Loan Assn. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1918. Lankford v. Doe. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 443. No. 93­1921. Aleotti v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1922. Maryland v. Simmons. Ct. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 333 Md. 547, 636 A. 2d 463. No. 93­1923. Ayuda, Inc., et al. v. Reno, Attorney Gen- eral of the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 246. No. 93­1924. Mitchell v. Allstate Life Insurance Co., Northbrook, Illinois, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 937. No. 93­1925. Musemeche v. Charter National Bank- Westheimer. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1079. No. 93­1926. National Rifle Association of America v. Handgun Control Federation of Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 559. No. 93­1927. Omnitech International, Inc. v. Clorox Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1316. No. 93­1928. Moretti v. Zisa et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 643. No. 93­1929. Venezia v. Robinson. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 209. No. 93­1930. Boutte v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 855. No. 93­1931. Fowler v. VanMeter et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 59. No. 93­1932. Etim et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 73. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 816 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­1933. Martinez-Moncivais v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1030. No. 93­1934. Sneed v. Departmental Disciplinary Com- mittee for the First Judicial Department. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 App. Div. 2d 118, 600 N. Y. S. 2d 453. No. 93­1936. Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition et al. v. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1246. No. 93­1938. Hammond v. Withrow, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1219. No. 93­1939. Lions v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1093. No. 93­1941. Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Cullen & Cullen. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 28. No. 93­1942. Femling et al. v. Farnworth. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 283, 869 P. 2d 1378. No. 93­1943. Sheppard v. Beerman, Individually and as Justice of the Supreme Court of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 147. No. 93­1944. Assar v. Crescent Counties Foundation for Medical Care et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 13 F. 3d 215. No. 93­1945. East Dayton Tool & Die Co. et al. v. Pen- sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1122. No. 93­1946. Gooden v. Neal et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 925. No. 93­1947. Barnette v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1553. No. 93­1948. Cromley v. Board of Education of Lockport Township High School District 205 et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1059. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 817 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1949. Med-Therapy Rehabilitation Services, Inc., et al. v. Diversicare Corporation of America. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 410. No. 93­1950. Donovan et vir, Parents of Donovan v. Sha- lala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1442. No. 93­1951. Dykstra v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 397. No. 93­1952. Allen v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. App. 4th 846, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26. No. 93­1953. Annapolis Road, Ltd. v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 98 Md. App. 733. No. 93­1954. Lingenfelter v. Domanico et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 536 Pa. 549, 640 A. 2d 415. No. 93­1956. Dr. K et al. v. State Board of Physician Quality Assurance. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 Md. App. 103, 632 A. 2d 453. No. 93­1957. Dillon v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1227. No. 93­1959. Krouse v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 627 A. 2d 489. No. 93­1961. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 426. No. 93­1962. Weber v. San Ramon Valley Unified School District et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1963. Horowitz v. State Bar of Texas. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1964. American Bonding Co. v. Trustees of the Carpenters for Southern Nevada Health and Welfare 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 818 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. Trust et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Nev. 1530, 893 P. 2d 392. No. 93­1965. Edenfield et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 995 F. 2d 197. No. 93­1966. Gunawansa v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 422. No. 93­1967. Jackson v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1426. No. 93­1968. Rotuotsoa v. City of Mukilteo. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1970. Martin v. Busey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 416. No. 93­1972. Lopez v. Behles, Trustee; and Lopez v. Behles, Trustee, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1497 (first case); 25 F. 3d 1055 (second case). No. 93­1973. Eckard v. Eckard. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 333 Md. 531, 636 A. 2d 455. No. 93­1974. Tracy, Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 195, 625 N. E. 2d 597. No. 93­1976. Haney v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1367. No. 93­1977. Williams et vir v. Richmond County, Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 93­1978. Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. Magnu- son et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 155. No. 93­1979. Brader v. Landis Manufacturing Systems, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 300. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 819 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1980. Stanton et al. v. Bayliner Marine Corp. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 Wash. 2d 64, 866 P. 2d 15. No. 93­1981. Results, Inc. v. Lavalco, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 14. No. 93­1982. Aviles v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 419 Pa. Super. 345, 615 A. 2d 398. No. 93­1983. Parrish v. Riverview Nursing Home, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 93­1986. Murphy Exploration & Production Co. v. Davis. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1237. No. 93­1988. Rabin v. United States Intelligence et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1989. Benigni v. Maas et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1102. No. 93­1990. Transpac Drilling Venture, 1983­63 by Crestwood Hospitals, Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 383. No. 93­1991. Anderson v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 431. No. 93­1992. Martin-Musumeci v. Law Offices of Her- bert Hafif Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 28. No. 93­1994. Hay's Western Wear, Inc. v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 624 So. 2d 975. No. 93­1996. Durham v. Xerox Corp. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 836. No. 93­1997. Golden Valley Lutheran College et al. v. City of Golden Valley. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 820 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­1998. Stapleton et al. v. Cowley et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 180. No. 93­1999. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Savage. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 434, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305. No. 93­2000. Patz et al. v. Hollidaysburg Trust Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1430. No. 93­2001. Granoff v. United States; and No. 93­9135. Ward v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 409. No. 93­2002. Banks, t/a Job Protectors Former Adminis- trative Law Judges v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 634 A. 2d 433. No. 93­2003. Legarda v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 496. No. 93­2004. Friedman v. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 App. Div. 2d 280, 609 N. Y. S. 2d 578. No. 93­2005. Plakas, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Plakas, Deceased v. Drinski et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1143. No. 93­2007. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Cor- rectional Facility v. Mayo. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 528. No. 93­2008. Shay et al. v. Mahler et al. Cir. Ct. Berke- ley County, W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2009. Leadership Software, Inc. v. Kepner- Tregoe, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 527. No. 93­2010. Melkonian v. Melkonian. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 626 So. 2d 285. No. 93­2011. Matthews v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 121. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 821 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­2012. Carr v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 738. No. 93­2015. Dempsey et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 832. No. 93­2016. Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 17 F. 3d 684. No. 93­2017. Christiano v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 228 Conn. 456, 637 A. 2d 382. No. 93­2019. Morse v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 259, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816. No. 93­2020. Perkins v. Western Surety Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 935. No. 93­2022. Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 965. No. 93­2023. Woodward v. Lorton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2024. Freedom Republicans, Inc., et al. v. Fed- eral Election Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 412. No. 93­2025. Spaletta v. County of Mendocino Employ- ees Retirement Assn. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2026. Lewis v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 391. No. 93­2027. Linn et ux. v. Pitts et ux. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 Ore. App. 277, 858 P. 2d 1352. No. 93­2028. Stuart v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 822 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­2029. General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union Number 5 v. Formosa Plastics Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1079. No. 93­2031. Tom Mistick & Sons, Inc. v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 536 Pa. 10, 637 A. 2d 607. No. 93­2032. Kinter et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 301. No. 93­2033. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co. v. City of Baton Rouge. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 715. No. 93­2034. Short v. Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 790. No. 93­2035. Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1032. No. 93­2036. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, Judge, Circuit Court of West Virginia, Kanawha County, et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 W. Va. 695, 441 S. E. 2d 658. No. 93­2037. Alfredo A. v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (California, Real Party in Inter- est). Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 1212, 865 P. 2d 56. No. 93­2038. Herrmann v. IUE AFL­CIO Pension Fund et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1049. No. 93­2039. White v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 S. W. 2d 50. No. 93­2040. Schenley Press, Inc. v. Maryland Comp- troller of the Treasury. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 Md. App. 745. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 823 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­2041. Carney v. Department of Justice. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 807. No. 93­2043. McDonough v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 643. No. 93­2044. Shaw v. Masters et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 93­2045. James City County, Virginia v. Environmen- tal Protection Agency et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1330. No. 93­2046. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Shores, Personal Representative of the Estate of Johnson. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 315 S. C. 347, 433 S. E. 2d 913. No. 93­2047. Guthrie v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 397. No. 93­2048. Henderson et ux. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 204. No. 93­2049. Wrenn v. Vanderbilt University Hospital et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1224. No. 93­2050. Societe d'Analyses et d'Etudes Breton- neau v. Resolution Trust Corporation, as Conservator for Lincoln Savings & Loan, F. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1441. No. 93­2051. Anderson v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 18. No. 93­2054. Blackburn v. Tudor. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 1452, 626 N. E. 2d 692. No. 93­2055. Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Association of America et al. v. Ringer, Acting Registrar of Copyrights, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 17 F. 3d 344. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 824 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­2056. Reichstein v. Nalico International Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1541. No. 93­2057. Elshinnawy v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 642. No. 93­2058. W. R. Grace & Co. et al. v. MDU Resources Group, dba Montana Dakota Utilities Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1274. No. 93­2059. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2060. Philips v. Von Holdt et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1105. No. 93­2061. Green, Executor of the Estate of Irving, Deceased v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 996 F. 2d 318. No. 93­2062. Dyna Corp. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 397. No. 93­2063. Mauri v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 35. No. 93­2064. Torgerson et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 179. No. 93­2065. Maine v. Graves. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 638 A. 2d 734. No. 93­2066. Battaglia v. County of Schenectady, New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1092. No. 93­2071. Pinellas County, Florida v. CH2M Hill Southeast, Inc. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 68. No. 93­2072. Biltmore Square Associates et al. v. City of Asheville. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 113 N. C. App. 459, 439 S. E. 2d 211. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 825 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­2074. Ojai Unified School District et al. v. Jack- son, a Minor, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 4 F. 3d 1467. No. 93­2075. Ferro v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 1, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747. No. 93­2076. Baby K, Through Her Guardian ad Litem, Mr. K, et al. v. Ms. H. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 590. No. 93­2077. Hansen v. Oregon et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 93­2078. Trimiew et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 93­2079. Auriti v. Segal et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­2080. Henderson et al. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, Through Stone, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 93­2081. Reimann et al. v. Huddleston, Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 883 S. W. 2d 135. No. 93­2082. Association of Christian Academies and Colleges of Puerto Rico et al. v. Puerto Rico Department of Education et al. Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2083. Campbell v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2084. Benjamin v. Adam et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 426 Pa. Super. 543, 627 A. 2d 1186. No. 93­2085. Evans v. California Department of Motor Vehicles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 958, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 826 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­2086. Brandt-Erichsen v. Department of the In- terior et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 999 F. 2d 1376. No. 93­2087. In re Banks, t/a Job Protectors Former Ad- ministrative Law Judges. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2088. In re Banks, t/a Job Protectors Former Ad- ministrative Law Judges. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2089. Schwenke v. Utah State Bar. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 865 P. 2d 1350. No. 93­2090. Asam v. Harwood. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 93­2091. Fleming v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1325. No. 93­2093. High Country Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 1244. No. 93­2094. In re Garringer. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 626 N. E. 2d 809. No. 93­2095. Panama City Medical Diagnostics, Ltd. v. Stuart, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Florida Department of Professional Regulation, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1541. No. 93­2100. Humphries v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1427. No. 93­7741. Johns v. Illinois; No. 93­7766. Levin v. Illinois; No. 93­8068. Carter v. Illinois; and No. 93­8076. Knoop v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 157 Ill. 2d 138, 623 N. E. 2d 317. No. 93­7972. Corwin v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 870 S. W. 2d 23. No. 93­8053. Price et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 207. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 827 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­8224. Bagnoli v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 90. No. 93­8286. Gollehon v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 262 Mont. 1, 864 P. 2d 249. No. 93­8308. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1025. No. 93­8463. Bryant v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 218. No. 93­8464. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 165. No. 93­8467. Butts v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1500. No. 93­8473. Ward v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 242 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 657 N. E. 2d 99. No. 93­8491. Turner v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 262 Mont. 39, 864 P. 2d 235. No. 93­8553. Matos v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­8563. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 993 F. 2d 680. No. 93­8631. Carroll v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 410. No. 93­8674. Harris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 597. No. 93­8678. Alebord v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1558. No. 93­8679. Dobbs et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 408. No. 93­8690. Detrick v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 9 F. 3d 114. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 828 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­8698. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 385. No. 93­8708. Lunsford v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Ill. 2d 23, 630 N. E. 2d 794. No. 93­8712. Lariscy et ux. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 413. No. 93­8722. Washington v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1128. No. 93­8735. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 208. No. 93­8747. Waring v. Delo, Superintendent, Missouri Department of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 753. No. 93­8752. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1545. No. 93­8754. Smith v. Lucas, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 359. No. 93­8755. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 817. No. 93­8758. Church v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 59. No. 93­8762. Kross v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 751. No. 93­8770. Gorby v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 So. 2d 544. No. 93­8777. Stamboulides v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1231. No. 93­8785. Blakemore v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1228. No. 93­8792. Lowe v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 181. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 829 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­8798. Wilson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 179 Wis. 2d 660, 508 N. W. 2d 44. No. 93­8822. Dai Quoc Lu v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­8828. Allen v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farm- ington Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1151. No. 93­8833. Bocage v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1090. No. 93­8834. Brown v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1246. No. 93­8836. Ceaser v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 58. No. 93­8849. Carroll v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1431. No. 93­8868. Swain v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1094. No. 93­8873. Santos v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 App. Div. 2d 378, 602 N. Y. S. 2d 362. No. 93­8875. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 699. No. 93­8879. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 802. No. 93­8883. Coble v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 871 S. W. 2d 192. No. 93­8885. Rippee v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 603. No. 93­8886. Michelletti v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 838. No. 93­8903. Gastiaburo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 582. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 830 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­8923. Jabaay v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 14 F. 3d 604. No. 93­8951. Benavides Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1214. No. 93­8956. Blackburn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 353. No. 93­8962. Chukwura v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1420. No. 93­8967. Freeman v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 953. No. 93­8968. Ornelas-Rodriguez v. United States; and No. 93­9205. Lopez-Gutierrez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1339. No. 93­8972. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1103. No. 93­8976. Kent v. Bechtel Group, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 27. No. 93­8984. Arnold v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 873 S. W. 2d 27. No. 93­8995. Marks v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1096. No. 93­8999. Lampkin v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Ill. App. 3d 361, 622 N. E. 2d 42. No. 93­9000. Muller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 120. No. 93­9001. Murrell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1215. No. 93­9002. Zeigler v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 48. No. 93­9004. Mitchell v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. 513ORD Unit: $PT1 [01-06-00 06:47:37] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 831 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9006. Varner v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farm- ington Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1229. No. 93­9007. Moss v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9014. Gholson v. Wright, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 409. No. 93­9021. Wessels v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 746. No. 93­9023. Christian v. Vasquez, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 808. No. 93­9028. Longworth v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 313 S. C. 360, 438 S. E. 2d 219. No. 93­9033. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 937. No. 93­9037. Walker v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 414. No. 93­9039. Allen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 206. No. 93­9045. Holdren v. Trent, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 57. No. 93­9048. Northington v. Michigan Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Mich. 980, 518 N. W. 2d 481. No. 93­9052. Lyle v. Michigan Department of Correc- tions. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Mich. 956, 514 N. W. 2d 767. No. 93­9054. Robertson v. Jones. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 219. No. 93­9055. Richardson v. Franklin. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 67 Ohio St. 3d 1480, 620 N. E. 2d 853. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 832 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9058. Tanner et al. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9059. Leonard v. New York Department of Cor- rectional Services et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9064. Soule v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1108. No. 93­9068. Taylor v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 So. 2d 1038. No. 93­9071. Warman v. Sommerset County Commission- ers et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9073. Hammond v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9076. Gaster v. Catoe, Deputy Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1429. No. 93­9078. Green v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9079. Hunt v. Bennett et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1263. No. 93­9081. Jones v. Jive Publishing et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9085. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1106. No. 93­9088. Thompson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9089. Uplinger v. White, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1229. No. 93­9090. Knight v. West Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 595. No. 93­9096. Delbridge et al. v. Franco et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9097. Awofolu v. City of Los Angeles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 995 F. 2d 230. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 833 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9102. Castro Vasquez v. Myers, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 33. No. 93­9103. Hardy v. Pennsylvania. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 152 Pa. Commw. 648, 619 A. 2d 1092. No. 93­9106. Herzog v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 409. No. 93­9108. Evans v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 333 Md. 660, 637 A. 2d 117. No. 93­9110. Cross v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 535 Pa. 38, 634 A. 2d 173. No. 93­9113. Baker v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1102. No. 93­9117. Dehler v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9118. Brown v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9121. Robedeaux v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 866 P. 2d 417. No. 93­9123. Boyd v. Wright, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1433. No. 93­9126. Agbada v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1544. No. 93­9128. Apelt v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 176 Ariz. 369, 861 P. 2d 654. No. 93­9133. Sullivan v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 636 A. 2d 931. No. 93­9134. Stone v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 934. No. 93­9136. Gilliam v. Smith, Warden, et al. Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, Md. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 834 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9139. Staples v. Lukemire et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 410. No. 93­9140. Hood v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9144. Stein v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 1361. No. 93­9145. Rodenbaugh v. Knisley et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9146. Newby v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1143. No. 93­9148. Morris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1214. No. 93­9149. Gonzalez Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1215. No. 93­9150. Mitchell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9151. Woods v. Burton, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9152. Vey v. Colville et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9157. Fleming v. Rocha, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1084. No. 93­9158. Hickey et al. v. Wellesley School Commit- tee et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 44. No. 93­9160. Doerr v. County of San Bernardino, Cali- fornia, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9164. Clark v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 960. No. 93­9165. Apelt v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 176 Ariz. 349, 861 P. 2d 634. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 835 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9166. Bartel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1105. No. 93­9169. Reese v. Vankirk et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 411. No. 93­9170. Randolph v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. App. 4th 1836, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723. No. 93­9172. Olszewski v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 416 Mass. 707, 625 N. E. 2d 529. No. 93­9173. Young v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9174. Purlantov v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9175. Northington v. Burress, Judge, Michigan Circuit Court, 44th Circuit. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 444 Mich. 983, 518 N. W. 2d 481. No. 93­9176. Pressley v. Hair. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 166. No. 93­9177. Rheuark v. Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9178. Simmons v. Louisiana (three cases). Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 635 So. 2d 1103 (first case); 634 So. 2d 856 (second and third cases). No. 93­9179. Buck v. Reisman et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9181. Adlington v. Houston. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 93­9182. Childs v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 997 F. 2d 881. No. 93­9183. Day v. Waits et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1098. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 836 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9184. Abdus-Sabir v. Johnson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 57. No. 93­9185. Crescenzi v. Scherling et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9186. Whitley v. City of Tampa, Florida, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 239. No. 93­9193. Hicks v. Wright et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 8. No. 93­9195. Rice v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 413. No. 93­9196. Odom v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 949. No. 93­9197. Wash v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 215, 861 P. 2d 1107. No. 93­9199. Althoff et vir v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 93­9201. Gosch v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 93­9203. Grant v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 67 Ohio St. 3d 465, 620 N. E. 2d 50. No. 93­9204. Hernandez v. Coughlin, Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 133. No. 93­9207. Ellison v. Makel, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1219. No. 93­9208. Hernandez-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1216. No. 93­9212. Williams v. Service Electrical Supply Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 645. No. 93­9214. Bowen v. Kernan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 393. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 837 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9217. Crandall v. Burton, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1231. No. 93­9218. Boyd v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 64. No. 93­9221. Echenique v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1221. No. 93­9222. Humiston v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. App. 4th 460, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515. No. 93­9223. Graves v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9224. Shurn v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 866 S. W. 2d 447. No. 93­9225. Sloan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 936. No. 93­9228. Derrick v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 412. No. 93­9230. Weaver v. School Board of Leon County. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 624 So. 2d 761. No. 93­9231. Whitney v. Cruz et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 9. No. 93­9233. Sanford v. Hildreth et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9234. Thandiwe v. Compton, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9235. Ghent v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9238. Erger v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 24. No. 93­9239. Davis et al. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 642. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 838 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9242. Sands et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 728. No. 93­9245. Stuckey v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9247. Warren v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 93­9248. Sanders v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 225. No. 93­9249. Horner v. United States; and No. 93­9397. Julian v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1452. No. 93­9250. Jones v. Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 294, 870 P. 2d 1. No. 93­9251. Hayes v. Burton, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1231. No. 93­9256. Berry v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9258. Lynch et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 93­9259. McKenzie v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 21. No. 93­9260. Moran v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 52. No. 93­9263. Shelton v. Lorusso, Judge, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 9. No. 93­9264. Shelton v. Estate of Freeman. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 App. Div. 2d 897, 606 N. Y. S. 2d 1019. No. 93­9265. Ponce-Santoyo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1216. No. 93­9268. Meredith v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 211 Ga. App. 213, 438 S. E. 2d 644. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 839 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9269. Preuss v. District of Columbia. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9270. Baker v. Miller et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9273. Lonay v. Stookey et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 631. No. 93­9274. Hunger et al. v. Leininger, Superintend- ent, Illinois State Board of Education, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 664. No. 93­9275. Hamilton v. Morrison, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9276. Ewing v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Mich. 907, 512 N. W. 2d 320. No. 93­9282. Bent v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 165 and 166. No. 93­9283. Webb v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 494, 862 P. 2d 779. No. 93­9286. Martin v. Wilkinson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1220. No. 93­9287. Maciel v. Ylst, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 28. No. 93­9288. Leonard v. Rose's Department Store. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 A. 2d 74. No. 93­9289. Melendez v. Arizona Department of Eco- nomic Security et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 12 F. 3d 1107. No. 93­9290. McDonald v. Boydston et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 465. No. 93­9291. Sanders v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 264 Mont. 529, 872 P. 2d 336. No. 93­9292. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 13. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 840 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9293. Dick v. Yellow Cab Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9296. Baker v. Kelley et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9300. Ynfante v. United States; and No. 93­9328. DeLeon v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 993 F. 2d 913. No. 93­9301. Perez-Torres v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 403. No. 93­9303. Munoz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1098. No. 93­9305. Occhino v. Lannon et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 23. No. 93­9308. Gibbs v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Affirmative Action Unit. Ct. App. Okla. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9309. Booker Harper v. Pearson, Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Arkansas, Craighead County. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9311. Kraft v. Ekco Housewares Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1225. No. 93­9313. Gilbert v. California Public Utilities Commission et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9314. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 801, 633 N. E. 2d 491. No. 93­9317. Newton v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. No. 93­9318. Leake v. Northern Virginia Association of Realtors. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 595. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 841 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9321. Gregory v. Lawhorn, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 594. No. 93­9325. Long v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9326. Moore v. Jones, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9327. White v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 P. 2d 424. No. 93­9331. Townley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 52. No. 93­9334. Mendez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 417. No. 93­9339. Vincent v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 598. No. 93­9340. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 93­9341. De Vonish v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 107. No. 93­9347. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 809. No. 93­9348. Prentzel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1555. No. 93­9349. Metallo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. No. 93­9350. Osiris v. Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 Ore. 459, 871 P. 2d 122. No. 93­9351. Smith v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9353. Smith v. Dixon, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 956. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:02 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 842 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9354. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 32. No. 93­9355. Carroll v. Crist, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 25. No. 93­9356. Worsham v. Price et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 216. No. 93­9359. Dawson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 936. No. 93­9360. Allen v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 868 P. 2d 379. No. 93­9362. Scott v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 177 Ariz. 131, 865 P. 2d 792. No. 93­9363. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 32. No. 93­9366. Mitchell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9367. Gomez-Pabon v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 7. No. 93­9368. Love v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 App. Div. 2d 1024, 608 N. Y. S. 2d 916. No. 93­9369. Macias v. Anderson, Judge, Office of Hear- ing and Appeals, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 239. No. 93­9371. Dotson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 183 Wis. 2d 431, 516 N. W. 2d 20. No. 93­9372. Musser v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1222. No. 93­9373. Browner v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 628 A. 2d 642. No. 93­9374. Espinueva v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 430. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 843 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9375. Kneller v. Kneller. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9376. Gulbenkian v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9378. Kimberlin v. United States; and No. 93­9461. Fuller v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1156. No. 93­9379. Barton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1228. No. 93­9380. Gaerttner v. Love, Superintendent, Penn- sylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9381. Gattis v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 A. 2d 808. No. 93­9382. King v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­9383. Hibbler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9384. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 397. No. 93­9385. Wyant v. Ohio; and No. 94­5135. Blazer v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 162, 624 N. E. 2d 722. No. 93­9386. Solis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. App. 4th 264, 25 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 184. No. 93­9387. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 20. No. 93­9388. Pearsall v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 A. 2d 966. No. 93­9389. Roane v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 844 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9391. Hordge v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 52. No. 93­9393. Johnson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 1, 859 P. 2d 673. No. 93­9394. Hunes v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 274 Ark. 268, 623 S. W. 2d 835. No. 93­9395. Ellington v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 394. No. 93­9396. Averhart v. Shettle et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1225. No. 93­9398. Graibe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 93­9399. Garrett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 468. No. 93­9400. Gary v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1123. No. 93­9401. Espinoza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 31. No. 93­9402. Hudson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 157 Ill. 2d 401, 626 N. E. 2d 161. No. 93­9403. Aquil v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9404. Phelps v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1334. No. 93­9405. Carson et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 576. No. 93­9406. Talk v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 369. No. 93­9407. Shaffer v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9408. Cole v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 845 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9409. Bigg v. Selective Service System. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 102. No. 93­9410. Dyer v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1421. No. 93­9411. Rogers v. Alabama; and No. 93­9560. Musgrove v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 1360. No. 93­9412. Quang Ly Tran v. City of Columbus, Ohio, et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9413. Osorio v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 236. No. 93­9414. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 801. No. 93­9415. Mosavi et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9416. Marcum v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 599. No. 93­9417. Hurst v. University of Washington et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1440. No. 93­9418. Flowers v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9419. Sims v. New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9420. Crowell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1452. No. 93­9421. Densmore v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9422. Brown v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 322, 862 P. 2d 710. No. 93­9423. McLeod v. Loudoun County Department of Social Services et al. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9424. Shelton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 13. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 846 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9425. St. Louis v. McClellan, Superintendent, Southport Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1090. No. 93­9426. Mujihadeen v. McWherter, Regional Ad- ministrator, West Tennessee Region. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1220. No. 93­9427. McManus v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1439. No. 93­9428. Williamson et al. v. King County, Washing- ton. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9429. Lockett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 14. No. 93­9430. Shaffer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 413. No. 93­9432. Dooley v. Morgan, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9435. Robinson v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9436. Voth v. Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9437. Cole v. Ogorzolka et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 23. No. 93­9438. Robbins v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9440. Rodenbaugh v. Curto. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1431. No. 93­9442. Cannon v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9443. Whitaker v. Superior Court of California, Alameda County. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1111. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 847 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9445. Jefferson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9446. Fields v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1227. No. 93­9447. Little v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 12. No. 93­9448. Haynes v. Hartman et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1433. No. 93­9449. Pargo v. First Realty Property Manage- ment, Ltd., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1437. No. 93­9450. Luna v. Court of Appeals of Ohio, Huron County. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1421, 631 N. E. 2d 161. No. 93­9451. Curtis v. Bulldog Leasing Co., Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 So. 2d 1060. No. 93­9452. Crawford v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 52. No. 93­9453. Brown v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9454. Schubert v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 625 N. E. 2d 505. No. 93­9455. Sims v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 20. No. 93­9456. Alvarez v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9457. Lewis v. Seidman, Chairman, Board of Di- rectors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 2d 587. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 848 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9458. Germinaro v. Amoco Oil Co., Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1091. No. 93­9459. Roundtree v. Miller et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9460. Grayson v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 93­9462. Minnifield v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 15. No. 93­9463. Morris v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9465. Wilkes v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 631 A. 2d 880. No. 93­9466. Carter v. Gunter et al.; and No. 93­9467. Carter v. Padoven et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 404. No. 93­9468. Everetts v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 627 A. 2d 981. No. 93­9469. Johnson v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9470. Garceau v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 140, 862 P. 2d 664. No. 93­9471. DeBardeleben v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9472. Burger v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 93­9473. Collins v. Kincheloe, Superintendent, Spring Creek Correctional Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 26. No. 93­9475. Barragan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 29. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 849 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9476. Thomas et ux. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9477. Seymour v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 Md. App. 745. No. 93­9479. Samuels v. Mann, Superintendent, Shawan- gunk Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 522. No. 93­9480. Sandoval v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9485. Edwards v. Ylst, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1551. No. 93­9486. Lord v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 123 Wash. 2d 296, 868 P. 2d 835. No. 93­9487. Michel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1096. No. 93­9489. Gibson v. North American Free Trade Agreement. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9490. Christopher v. Stone. Cir. Ct. Monongalia County, W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9491. Custard v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 34. No. 93­9492. Avalos-Zarate v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 34. No. 93­9493. Blodgett v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 510 N. W. 2d 910. No. 93­9494. Casares-Cardenas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1283. No. 93­9495. Roach v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 935. No. 93­9497. Poole v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 20. No. 93­9498. Dean v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 30. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 850 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9499. Cudjo v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 585, 863 P. 2d 635. No. 93­9500. Neal v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 93­9501. Yacks v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 20. No. 93­9502. Bennett v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 21. No. 93­9503. Douglas v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9504. Mason v. Meiners. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1228. No. 93­9505. Barlow v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 85. No. 93­9507. Buckhalton v. Benson, Warden, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9508. Solan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9509. Brewer v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 App. Div. 2d 579, 606 N. Y. S. 2d 292. No. 93­9510. Burke v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 93­9511. Chiles v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 254 Kan. 888, 869 P. 2d 707. No. 93­9513. Edmonds v. Thompson, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1433. No. 93­9514. Griffith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 865. No. 93­9515. Lee v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 40. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 851 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9516. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police De- partment et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 15 F. 3d 1086. No. 93­9517. Veneri v. Domovich, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9518. Saelee v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1095. No. 93­9519. Figers v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 22. No. 93­9520. Gholson v. Murray, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 11. No. 93­9521. Garrison v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­9522. Summerlin v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9523. Gocken v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9524. Winston v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9525. Smith v. Lucas, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 638. No. 93­9526. Alter v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1221. No. 93­9527. Boyd v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1441. No. 93­9529. Schwarz v. California Department of Cor- rections et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9530. Adkins v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 522. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 852 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9531. Bitton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 35. No. 93­9532. Campbell v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 953. No. 93­9533. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 408. No. 93­9534. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 907. No. 93­9535. Baines v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 303. No. 93­9536. Clark v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1337. No. 93­9537. Bryant v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9539. McLaurin v. Cowhey et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9540. Allen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 16. No. 93­9541. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1116. No. 93­9542. Washington v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 230. No. 93­9543. Schindler v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­9544. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 93­9545. Webber v. Franklin County, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. No. 93­9546. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 93­9547. Faulkner v. Makel, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 853 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9549. Grado v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 34. No. 93­9550. Jones v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 263 Ga. 904, 440 S. E. 2d 161. No. 93­9551. Cofield v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9552. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­9554. Meraz-Peru v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1197. No. 93­9555. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1185. No. 93­9556. Oliva v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1125. No. 93­9557. Reaves v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 711. No. 93­9558. Meo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1093. No. 93­9559. Robertson v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 S. W. 2d 701. No. 93­9561. Rivera v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1232. No. 93­9562. Bryson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 412. No. 93­9563. Givens v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 35. No. 93­9565. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1536. No. 93­9566. Carter v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1150. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 854 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9567. McCoy v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1093. No. 93­9569. Head v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 626 A. 2d 1382. No. 93­9570. Freedlander v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 12. No. 93­9571. Jordan, aka Woods v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 A. 2d 373. No. 93­9572. Everett v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9573. Jimenez v. General Motors Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 601. No. 93­9574. Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 66 and 70. No. 93­9576. Jestice v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9578. Lang v. Department of Health and Human Services. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 2d 936. No. 93­9579. Leppard v. Chapleau, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1433. No. 93­9580. Lee v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings Assn. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1215. No. 93­9581. Lloyd v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1090. No. 93­9582. Emerson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 974 F. 2d 687. No. 93­9583. Fugarino v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 855 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9584. Acuna v. Doe, Medical Staff at Marion County Superior Court Jail, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9586. Roberts v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 868 P. 2d 712. No. 93­9587. Reed v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 72. No. 93­9588. Myerson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 153. No. 93­9589. Tempelman et ux. v. Potvin et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 45. No. 93­9590. Andrisani v. Saugus Colony Ltd. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9591. Styers v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 177 Ariz. 104, 865 P. 2d 765. No. 93­9592. Ballard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 935. No. 93­9594. Bilal v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1441. No. 93­9595. Ayala v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 303. No. 93­9596. Cancio v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 467. No. 93­9598. Guzman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1442. No. 93­9599. Poole v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 630 A. 2d 1109. No. 93­9600. Peterson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 93­9601. Reyes-Mogollon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1442. No. 93­9603. Lankford v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 31. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 856 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9604. Lewis v. Thompson, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9605. Mitchell v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9606. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 93­9607. Siqueiros v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 93­9608. Vasquez-Venegas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 93­9609. Arrington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 425. No. 93­9610. Condren v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1190. No. 93­9611. Frangenberg v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 100. No. 93­9612. In re Fromal. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9613. Emerson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 93­9615. Sack v. St. Francis Hospital et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 93­9616. Flattum v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 93­9617. Johnson v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9619. Lennick v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 814. No. 93­9620. Rogers v. Reed-Fleming et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9621. Scott v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 236. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 857 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9622. Trujillo-Acosta v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 990 F. 2d 1265. No. 93­9623. Trantino v. Rothstein. Sup. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 228 Conn. 854, 635 A. 2d 813. No. 93­9624. Batten v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9625. Scott v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1238. No. 93­9626. Buckles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 93­9627. Abdullah v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 571. No. 93­9628. Brown v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 337. No. 93­9629. Banic v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 93­9631. Bisby v. Zenon, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1439. No. 93­9632. Baker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 94. No. 93­9633. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1442. No. 93­9634. Samson v. Thompson, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 424. No. 93­9635. Bass v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 93­9636. Bray v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 93­9637. Bradley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1447. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 858 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9638. McDonald v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1437. No. 93­9639. McNair v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 410. No. 93­9640. Rodenbaugh v. Singer. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1431. No. 93­9641. Quintanilla v. Orange County Personnel Division of Sheriff Coroner Department et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1440. No. 93­9642. Prince v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9643. Mack v. Department of the Army et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9644. Reynolds v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1115. No. 93­9647. Bouler v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 425. No. 93­9648. Burnside v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 93­9649. Showell v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 A. 2d 1109. No. 93­9650. Agha v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 25. No. 93­9651. Harris v. Padu. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9654. Enogwe v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1215. No. 93­9655. Ferdik v. McFadden, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9656. Harrell v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 182 Wis. 2d 408, 513 N. W. 2d 676. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 859 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9657. Hubbard v. Voinovich, Governor of Ohio, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1402, 629 N. E. 2d 1365. No. 93­9658. Friday v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 93­9659. Harrington v. Straw, Director, Defense Logistics Agency. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9660. Hensler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 936. No. 93­9661. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1434. No. 93­9662. Aguilar v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 117 N. M. 501, 873 P. 2d 247. No. 93­9663. Dubuc v. Musseman, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 405. No. 93­9664. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1445. No. 93­9665. Chavers v. Prunty, Acting Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9666. Weidrick v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 32. No. 93­9667. Villamonte v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 35. No. 93­9668. Stewart v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9669. Shaw v. Department of the Army. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 137. No. 93­9671. DeFelice v. Berton et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 121. No. 93­9672. Sanchez v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 29. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 860 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9676. Marcus v. Levin. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 847, 634 N. E. 2d 605. No. 93­9677. Pettigrew v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1229. No. 93­9678. Richardson v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 334 Md. 212, 638 A. 2d 753. No. 93­9679. Merrill v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 465. No. 93­9680. Hernan Montes v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­9681. Rodriguez v. Alford, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 239. No. 93­9682. Marquez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1442. No. 93­9683. McMillan v. Gomez, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 465. No. 93­9684. McNeely v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 886. No. 93­9685. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 413. No. 93­9686. Coronel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 93­9687. Crawford v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1173. No. 93­9688. Washington v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 A. 2d 75. No. 93­9691. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 30. No. 93­9692. Ferguson v. Lewis, Director, Arizona De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9693. Harding v. Neal, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 A. 2d 837. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 861 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9694. Spence v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1446. No. 93­9695. Brown et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 425. No. 93­9696. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 35. No. 93­9697. Branch v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 403. No. 93­9700. Mouneu v. Duncan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9701. Morris v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9702. Pierro v. City of Bakersfield et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9703. Humphrey v. Brigano, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9704. Smith v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 93­9705. McDowell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 93­9706. Rosas v. Maywood, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1078. No. 93­9707. Cain v. Vickers et al. Ct. App. Mo., Southern Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9708. Bowe v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 20. No. 93­9709. Gibbs v. Haskell, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9710. Barnes v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 876 S. W. 2d 316. No. 93­9711. Cruce v. United States; and No. 93­9712. Burger v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 70. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 862 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9713. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1438. No. 93­9715. Windom v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1190. No. 93­9716. Minier-Contreras v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 726. No. 93­9717. Muldrow v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1332. No. 93­9718. Harshefi et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 426. No. 93­9719. Frank v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 93­9721. Hunt v. California (two cases). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9723. Allen v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 408. No. 93­9724. Brown v. Snow et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1445. No. 93­9725. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 467. No. 93­9726. Tucker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. No. 93­9727. Brown v. Snow et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1445. No. 93­9728. Whalen v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 Nev. 1421, 875 P. 2d 1083. No. 93­9730. Vernon v. Rosemeyer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Greensburg, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9731. Canape v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 Nev. 864, 859 P. 2d 1023. No. 93­9732. Bowling v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 873 S. W. 2d 175. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 863 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9733. Burtrum v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1299. No. 93­9734. Luan Van Hoang v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 S. W. 2d 694. No. 93­9735. West v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 119. No. 93­9736. Santiago v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1092. No. 93­9737. Searles v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1464. No. 93­9739. Stewart v. Irby-Wynter et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9740. Stringer v. McMillin et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 93­9741. Agee v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. No. 93­9742. Davis v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 App. Div. 2d 61, 605 N. Y. S. 2d 244. No. 93­9743. Chambers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 93­9744. Gossage v. Barbour, Superintendent, Twin Rivers Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 93­9745. Kennedy v. Little et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 237. No. 93­9746. Ellis v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 867 P. 2d 1289. No. 93­9747. Estrada v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 93­9750. Bass v. Hodges et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1428. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 864 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9752. Dulaney v. Wildman et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1219. No. 93­9753. Howard v. Wood, Superintendent, Washing- ton State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 394. No. 93­9754. Freiboth v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 667 N. E. 2d 179. No. 93­9755. Hunt v. Grinker, Commissioner, New York City Department of Social Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 221. No. 93­9756. Hewlett v. Green, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9757. Staknis, aka Fialk v. Estate of Moore. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 Wis. 2d 469, 514 N. W. 2d 54. No. 93­9759. Lovejoy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 601. No. 93­9760. Puig-Infante v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 929. No. 93­9761. Medlock v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 185. No. 93­9762. Russell v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9763. Davis v. Hanrahan. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 309. No. 93­9764. Besinga v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1356. No. 93­9766. Wigerman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 560. No. 93­9767. Stevenson v. Hale Mahaolu. Int. Ct. App. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Haw. App. 630, 875 P. 2d 226. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 865 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­9768. Moazzam v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 93­9770. Aumada v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. No. 93­9771. Dingler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 470. No. 93­9772. York v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1091. No. 93­9774. Maros v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 93­9775. Lenihan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 93­9776. Aguilar v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 117 N. M. 501, 873 P. 2d 247. No. 93­9778. Gwynn v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1184. No. 93­9779. Fraser v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 470. No. 93­9782. Ortiz v. Hoke. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 323, 632 N. E. 2d 861. No. 93­9783. Pearson v. Southerland et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9785. Thomas v. McMackin, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9786. Cousino v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9788. Bohuk v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 269 N. J. Super. 581, 636 A. 2d 105. No. 93­9791. Fulton v. Allmond, Associate Judge, Dis- trict Court of Texas, Galveston County, et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 866 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9792. Smith v. Oregon State Bar. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 Ore. 47, 861 P. 2d 1013. No. 93­9793. Cooper v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9794. Brooks-Bey v. Harrison et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 555. No. 93­9796. Dillman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 384. No. 94­1. Harris v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union (Radio Officers Union) et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1280. No. 94­4. Freedman et al. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Park Ridge, Bergen County, et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5. Richardson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 29. No. 94­6. Texas v. Bowman, Judge, County Criminal Court Number Four, Tarrant County, Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 S. W. 2d 421. No. 94­8. Nakell v. Attorney General of North Caro- lina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 319. No. 94­10. Greco v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 71 Wash. App. 1027. No. 94­11. Velez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­14. Mosay et al. v. Buffalo Brothers Manage- ment, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 739. No. 94­15. Watergate at Landmark Condominium v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 635. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 867 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­16. Farmer et al. v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 212 Ga. App. 372, 442 S. E. 2d 251. No. 94­17. Stephens v. Ivey et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 212 Ga. App. 407, 442 S. E. 2d 248. No. 94­19. Waters v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 29. No. 94­21. Duke et al. v. Smith, Secretary of State of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­24. Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 928. No. 94­25. Ambassador Books & Video, Inc., et al. v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 858. No. 94­26. Bautista Rivera v. Court of Appeal of Cali- fornia, First Appellate District. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­27. Bowser v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 425 Pa. Super. 24, 624 A. 2d 125. No. 94­28. Tate v. Gilliam, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­29. Davis v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 113 N. C. App. 203, 438 S. E. 2d 759. No. 94­30. Coddington, Personally and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Coddington, Deceased v. Wabash Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1083. No. 94­31. Riggins et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1223. No. 94­34. Goodman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1060. No. 94­36. Anderson v. Busman et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Cer- tiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 868 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­37. Greenfield v. City of Miami Beach, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­40. Jackson v. Brigle et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 280. No. 94­41. Martin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 943 and 18 F. 3d 1515. No. 94­46. Bernard v. City of Dallas Water Department et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 94­47. Campbell v. Williams. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 804. No. 94­49. Solar-Kist Corp. v. Clotilde, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 137. No. 94­50. Ritchie et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 592. No. 94­51. Jones v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 94­52. Blake et al. v. Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc., et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 417 Mass. 467, 631 N. E. 2d 985. No. 94­53. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, Affilated with the United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL­CIO v. Independent Sprinkler Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1563. No. 94­54. Simpson et al. v. Department of Revenue of Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 Ore. 579, 870 P. 2d 824. No. 94­55. Cinel v. Connick et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1338. No. 94­57. HTC Industries, Inc. v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1103. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 869 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­59. Cox v. Newton et al. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 878 S. W. 2d 105. No. 94­60. Byrd v. Presentment Agency. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 App. Div. 2d 348, 605 N. Y. S. 2d 896. No. 94­61. Fellin v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 432 Pa. Super. 684, 635 A. 2d 202. No. 94­62. Woodard v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 631 So. 2d 1065. No. 94­63. Martinson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. No. 94­65. Fodor v. Time Warner, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 27. No. 94­67. Reed v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 94­69. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Del Monte Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 753. No. 94­71. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. S­W Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 970. No. 94­73. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Okla- homa Corporation Commission. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 873 P. 2d 1001. No. 94­74. Gardell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 395. No. 94­75. Knapp v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­76. Velasquez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 555, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320. No. 94­77. Foules v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 258 Ill. App. 3d 645, 630 N. E. 2d 895. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 870 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­79. Mitchell v. Thompson, Individually and as Sheriff of Kankakee County, Illinois, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 425. No. 94­80. Wilson, Personal Representative of the Es- tate of Wilson, Deceased v. Municipality of Anchorage et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 398. No. 94­83. DeSalvo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1216. No. 94­85. Ramirez v. Pacific Maritime Assn. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1088. No. 94­88. Israel v. Israel. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Ill. App. 3d 1115, 661 N. E. 2d 1204. No. 94­89. Johnson v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1104. No. 94­90. Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­91. Pomponio v. Board of Supervisors of Fauquier County, Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1319. No. 94­92. Fulk, Administrator of the Estate of Tur- ner, Deceased, et al. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 120. No. 94­93. Torres Maldonado et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 95. No. 94­99. Kawaoka et ux. v. City of Arroyo Grande et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1227. No. 94­100. Faulkner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 745. No. 94­101. Mann et al. v. Conlin. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 100. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 871 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­103. Adcox et al. v. Teledyne, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1381. No. 94­104. Regaldo v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 S. W. 2d 7. No. 94­107. Vercoe v. FirsTier Bank, N. A., Omaha, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 907. No. 94­110. Pri-Har v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­111. Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission of Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 873 S. W. 2d 200. No. 94­114. Davis v. New Jersey Bell. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1429. No. 94­117. Graves v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1231. No. 94­118. D-Landco et al. v. Oklahoma Department of Transportation. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­119. Rankins et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 548. No. 94­120. Bricker et ux. v. Rockwell Hanford Opera- tions et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 598 and 22 F. 3d 871. No. 94­121. Schenck v. Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability of Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 318 Ore. 402, 870 P. 2d 185. No. 94­122. Lawrence C. v. Timothy L. et al. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 P. 2d 374. No. 94­124. Forsyth et al. v. Vines et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1527. No. 94­125. Marine Towing, Inc., et al. v. Sphere Drake Insurance plc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 666. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 872 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­126. Weatherly v. Federal Debt Management, Inc. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 S. W. 2d 171. No. 94­127. Thesenvitz et al. v. Kaiser Engineers Han- ford Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1090. No. 94­128. Givan-Hammoud v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 661 N. E. 2d 1202. No. 94­129. Perl v. Hunegs. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­130. Bacon v. Wilson. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­131. Trevino v. Leeds et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­132. Stephenson et al. v. Western Farmers Elec- tric Cooperative of Anadarko, Oklahoma. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 873 P. 2d 311. No. 94­133. Dietrich et ux. v. Sun Exploration & Pro- duction Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 21 F. 3d 427. No. 94­137. Seal v. Seal. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­142. Amburgey v. City of Costa Mesa et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­143. Nelson et al. v. Massachusetts et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 Mass. App. 1105, 629 N. E. 2d 1017. No. 94­145. Cathedral of Joy Baptist Church et al. v. Village of Hazel Crest et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 713. No. 94­147. Utah et al. v. Salt Lake County Water Con- servancy District. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 14 F. 3d 1489. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 873 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­148. Gomez et al. v. Housing Authority of City of El Paso et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1169. No. 94­150. Bowles v. District of Columbia. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­151. Illinois v. Page Books, Inc., dba Bachelor's Library Adult Bookstore. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 235 Ill. App. 3d 765, 601 N. E. 2d 273. No. 94­152. Otis et al. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 514 N. W. 2d 90. No. 94­153. Commercial Union Assurance Co., plc, et al. v. Milken et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 608. No. 94­154. Members of the California Regional Water Quality Control Board et al. v. Committee to Save the Mokelumne River. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 13 F. 3d 305. No. 94­155. Ezeoke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1547. No. 94­156. DiGirlamo v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 816. No. 94­157. Witter et ux. v. Nesbit. Ct. App. Tenn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 878 S. W. 2d 116. No. 94­159. O'Brien v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 301. No. 94­163. Kansas v. Valenzuela. Ct. App. Kan. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 Kan. App. 2d xliv, 870 P. 2d 50. No. 94­164. Madison County Fiscal Court et al. v. Horn, by His Limited Conservator, Parks. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 653. No. 94­165. Srinivasan v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (Rio Hondo Community College Dis- 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 874 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. trict, Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­166. Ramirez v. Pacific Maritime Assn. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1088. No. 94­170. Rosenfeld v. River Place East Housing Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 833. No. 94­174. Mitchell v. United States; and Seaver v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 131 (first case); 40 M. J. 293 (second case). No. 94­175. Biegeleisen v. Jacobson. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 App. Div. 2d 56, 603 N. Y. S. 2d 148. No. 94­176. Telelect, Inc. v. Fenstermacher. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­177. Bamford et al. v. Upper Republican Natu- ral Resources District. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 245 Neb. 299, 512 N. W. 2d 642. No. 94­178. Thompson et al. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 94­180. Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 94­181. Sowashee Venture v. EB, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1077. No. 94­184. Mirman v. Supreme Court of New Jersey et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 122. No. 94­185. Andrews v. Alaska Operating Engineers- Employers Training Trust Fund. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 871 P. 2d 1142. No. 94­186. Ragland v. Minter. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 875 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­187. Bradley v. West Virginia. Cir. Ct. Wood County, W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­188. Miller, Administratrix of Estate of Miller, Deceased v. Keystone Insurance Co. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 535 Pa. 531, 636 A. 2d 1109. No. 94­191. Rumsey et al. v. New York State Depart- ment of Correctional Services et al.; and No. 94­232. New York State Department of Correc- tional Services et al. v. Rumsey et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 83. No. 94­192. Moldea v. New York Times Co. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 310. No. 94­193. Bright et al. v. QSP, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1300. No. 94­194. Craig, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Craig, Deceased v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 472. No. 94­195. Parke-Hayden, Inc. v. Loews Theatre Man- agement Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­196. Grove North America, Division of Kidde In- dustries, Inc. v. Lowe et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 94­198. Kile v. Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Placer (Trepantis, Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­199. Parsons et al., Co-Executors of the Estate of Bowden, Deceased v. Delaware Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Social Services. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 A. 2d 837. No. 94­200. Higgins et al. v. Fegley. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1126. No. 94­205. Field v. Easton et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 876 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­206. Wright, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, et al. v. Frances J., by Her Guardian, Murphy. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 337. No. 94­209. Morales, Attorney General of Texas, et al. v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1032. No. 94­210. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­213. Moore v. Felger et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1054. No. 94­214. Hunter v. Northrop University School of Law. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­215. Murphy v. International Business Machines Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 719. No. 94­216. Jakabovitz v. Cabrera et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 372. No. 94­217. Dyer v. United States et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­222. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 139. No. 94­224. Santana, aka Julio v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. No. 94­225. WVCH Communications, Inc., et al. v. Upper Providence Township et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 561. No. 94­227. S­1 and S­2, By and Through Their Parents and Guardians ad Litem, P­1 and P­2, et al. v. State Board of Education of North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 49. No. 94­228. Karel v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1054. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 877 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­229. Frederick v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 556. No. 94­230. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 94­233. Tapia-Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 738. No. 94­235. Layne v. Walter Industries, Inc., Group Benefit Plan for Salaried Employees. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­245. Gamboa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­246. Brown et al. v. Paige, State Tax Commis- sioner of West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 W. Va. 120, 443 S. E. 2d 462. No. 94­247. Scopo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 777. No. 94­248. Weingrad v. Departmental Disciplinary Committee, Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Divi- sion, First Judicial Department. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 App. Div. 2d 300, 609 N. Y. S. 2d 588. No. 94­250. In re Forman. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 634 So. 2d 330. No. 94­253. Heli-Mejia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 96. No. 94­254. Henderson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 917. No. 94­263. Miller v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 194. No. 94­266. Wolfson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 878 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­269. Rugiero v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1387. No. 94­272. Leede Exploration et al. v. NICOR Explora- tion Co. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­276. Nichols v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­278. Gittens v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 328. No. 94­284. Bieri et al. v. United States (two cases). C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 811 (first case) and 819 (second case). No. 94­285. Smith v. United States (two cases). C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1421 (first case); 19 F. 3d 485 (second case). No. 94­288. Gasko et ux. v. Celotex Corp. et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­296. Oczkowski v. Yudes. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­303. Meade v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 94­305. Moore v. Member Data Services, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 94­306. Hendrickson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 170. No. 94­307. Thiel v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 183 Wis. 2d 505, 515 N. W. 2d 847. No. 94­318. Saltaris et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 135. No. 94­320. Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 632. No. 94­345. Goetz v. Tordoff et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 432. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 879 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5001. Burress v. Presbyterian Church et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5002. Drummond et ux. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­5005. Stearman v. City of Greenville, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­5006. Brooks v. Fulton Department of Family and Children Services et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­5007. Cyprian v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1189. No. 94­5008. Brown v. Howard-Palmer et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5009. Rengifo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­5010. Rosa v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1531. No. 94­5011. Milligan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 177. No. 94­5012. Rose v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5013. Harris v. Hatfield, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 427. No. 94­5014. Iusan v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 App. Div. 2d 654, 606 N. Y. S. 2d 771. No. 94­5015. Halim v. Accu-Labs Research, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1436. No. 94­5017. Gardner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1200. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 880 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5020. Green v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 821. No. 94­5021. Peabody v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5022. McDonald v. Boydston et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 240. No. 94­5023. Colvin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5024. Rader v. Lewis, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5025. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1107. No. 94­5026. Alvarez Chavez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 133. No. 94­5027. Buckaloo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1443. No. 94­5028. Printup v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5029. Pizzo v. Risinger. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5030. Thompson v. Rone, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­5031. Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 440. No. 94­5033. Conrod v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 94­5034. Zuniga v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1254. No. 94­5035. Slade v. Wright. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 881 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5036. Cody v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­5037. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­5039. Smith v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 937. No. 94­5041. Childress v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 158 Ill. 2d 275, 633 N. E. 2d 635. No. 94­5043. Marquez v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1241. No. 94­5045. Coleman v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Ill. 2d 319, 633 N. E. 2d 654. No. 94­5046. Kontakis v. Morton, Administrator, New Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 110. No. 94­5047. Krawczuk v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 634 So. 2d 1070. No. 94­5049. Walker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 426. No. 94­5050. Sanders v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5051. Hallman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 821. No. 94­5052. Gorton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 58. No. 94­5053. Flores v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1169. No. 94­5054. Foust v. Oral Roberts University et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1121. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 882 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5056. Hulett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 779. No. 94­5057. Isby v. Wright, Superintendent, Maximum Control Complex. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­5058. Gutierrez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­5060. Sanders v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 431. No. 94­5061. Sanford v. Municipal Court Citrus Judicial District et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 29. No. 94­5063. Stansbury v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 591 A. 2d 188. No. 94­5064. Browner v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5065. Williams v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5066. Bedford v. Ohio; and Beuke v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio. St. 3d 1453, 626 N. E. 2d 957. No. 94­5067. Anderson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5069. Grube v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. No. 94­5071. Head v. North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 401. No. 94­5072. Head v. North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 563. No. 94­5073. Carrizales v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 303. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 883 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5074. Vinson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 431. No. 94­5075. Duncan v. Del Grosso et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 391. No. 94­5076. Palomino-Perez v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1464. No. 94­5077. Peters v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 540. No. 94­5078. Garcia Quintania v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. No. 94­5079. Lloyd v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1197. No. 94­5080. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­5081. Lutcher v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1216. No. 94­5082. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 396. No. 94­5084. Ricciardi v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 396. No. 94­5085. Macias v. Raul A. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 94. No. 94­5086. Lewis v. Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5087. Crosby v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 480. No. 94­5088. Bryan v. District of Columbia. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 A. 2d 1123. No. 94­5089. McIntyre v. Leavitt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 107. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:03 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 884 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5091. Gomez-Morales v. United States; and No. 94­5141. Grisales v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­5092. Gendreau v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 161 Vt. 645, 641 A. 2d 1349. No. 94­5093. Esparza v. Stice, Assistant Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Support Services Divi- sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. No. 94­5094. Hankerson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­5095. King v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­5096. Kamal v. Brown. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5098. Bush v. Crystal Homes, Inc., et al.; Bush v. Crystal Homes, Inc.; and Bush v. Long et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1436. No. 94­5100. Braggs v. Mobile County Health Depart- ment et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 57. No. 94­5101. DeLisle v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 517 N. W. 2d 216. No. 94­5102. Deerwester v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 660 N. E. 2d 569. No. 94­5103. Bates v. Burton, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­5104. Duffey v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 536 Pa. 436, 639 A. 2d 1174. No. 94­5105. Branson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 113. No. 94­5106. Waller v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 12. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 885 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5108. Thompson v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 450. No. 94­5109. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­5110. Adair v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 433. No. 94­5111. Dussault v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­5112. Boone v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 408. No. 94­5113. Holden v. Alaska. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­5114. Farmer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­5115. James v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­5116. Evans v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5117. Halim v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1433. No. 94­5118. Savage et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 404. No. 94­5119. Tamayo v. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 F. 3d 1000. No. 94­5120. Stroman v. West Coast Grocery. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 29. No. 94­5121. Jenoriki v. United States Postal Inspection Service of Houston, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 240. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 886 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5123. Melvin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­5124. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 202. No. 94­5126. Noel v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. No. 94­5127. Moses v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 396. No. 94­5128. Miller v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 926. No. 94­5129. McCully v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 712. No. 94­5130. Pink v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 426. No. 94­5131. Patino-Cardona v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­5132. Portillo-Valenzuela v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 393. No. 94­5133. Naddi v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5134. Breland v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. No. 94­5136. Botello v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 409. No. 94­5137. Cowart v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 642. No. 94­5138. Paxton v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 867 P. 2d 1309. No. 94­5140. Soo Hoo v. United States Parole Commis- sion. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 887 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5142. Flores-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 30. No. 94­5143. Guinn v. Cooper, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 33. No. 94­5145. Chaffer v. Long et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamil- ton County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5147. Gonzalez v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­5149. Fisher v. Duncan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5150. Henning v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 427 Pa. Super. 642, 625 A. 2d 90. No. 94­5151. Gonzales v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 982. No. 94­5152. Ellis v. Stainer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1112. No. 94­5153. Grant v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5154. Esparza v. Doe. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 239. No. 94­5155. Woods v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­5156. Williams v. Hill, Superintendent, Odom Correctional Center. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 414. No. 94­5157. Tejeda v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. No. 94­5158. Burress v. Christianity & Crisis, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 888 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5159. Moghal v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1538. No. 94­5160. Lawrence v. United States; No. 94­5161. Lawrence v. United States; and No. 94­5224. Lawrence v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 94­5162. Olson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 847. No. 94­5163. Moody v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5164. Montero et al. v. Meyer et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1444. No. 94­5165. Praimnath v. American Cablevision of Queens, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1426. No. 94­5166. Middleton v. Fordice et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 238. No. 94­5167. Santiago v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5169. Seaton v. Attorney Grievance Commission. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5170. Ayala v. Leonardo, Warden. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 83. No. 94­5172. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 404. No. 94­5173. Jameson v. Coughlin, Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 427. No. 94­5174. Fromal v. McCauley et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 400. No. 94­5175. Krishnamurthy et al. v. Nimmagadda et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 889 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5176. DiGianni v. Abraham & Straus, Inc.; and No. 94­5361. DiGianni v. Macy's Northeast, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 622. No. 94­5177. Bleicken v. Perkins et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 44. No. 94­5179. Galbraith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1054. No. 94­5181. McGill v. Faulkner et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 456. No. 94­5182. Rakes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5184. Ricco v. Gallo. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5185. McBride v. Jarvis, Warden (three cases). Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5186. Nonnette v. Borg, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1115. No. 94­5187. Russo v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 App. Div. 2d 940, 607 N. Y. S. 2d 520. No. 94­5188. McClung v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1429. No. 94­5189. Lee v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5190. Swann v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 Va. 222, 441 S. E. 2d 195. No. 94­5191. Salim v. United States; and No. 94­5476. Khan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­5192. Slezak et al. v. Evatt et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 590. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 890 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5193. Wesley v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 Md. App. 747. No. 94­5195. Christianson v. Relfe et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5197. Curiale et ux. v. Burton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5199. Kikuts v. Clinton County Social Services et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­5200. Vallera v. Endicott, Superintendent, Co- lumbia Correctional Institution. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5203. Cervantes Degortari v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 94­5204. Hines v. Rocha, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­5205. Bombela v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­5209. Ybarra v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­5210. Silva v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5211. Burden v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5212. DiGioia v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5213. Baldwin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 166. No. 94­5215. Davis v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 438. No. 94­5217. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 891 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5218. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1003. No. 94­5219. Dominguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­5221. Maberry v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­5223. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 94­5225. Moore v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 241. No. 94­5226. Marin-Cardona v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­5227. Novene v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1221. No. 94­5229. Laska v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 94­5230. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1030. No. 94­5231. Russell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 426. No. 94­5232. Stern v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. No. 94­5233. Washington v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 433. No. 94­5234. Vasquez-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 900. No. 94­5236. McGuire v. Farley, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Prison. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­5237. Lee v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 335 N. C. 244, 439 S. E. 2d 547. No. 94­5238. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 125. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 892 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5239. Washington v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 165. No. 94­5241. Torres v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5242. Wilson v. City of Berkeley et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 995 F. 2d 235. No. 94­5243. Slade v. Clarke et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5244. Williams v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 211 Ga. App. 393, 439 S. E. 2d 11. No. 94­5245. Casilla v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 600. No. 94­5246. Lucas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 596. No. 94­5247. Connor v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. No. 94­5248. Sloan v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­5249. Abengowe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­5250. Angheluta v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5251. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1500. No. 94­5253. Mobley v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5257. Bolton et ux. v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5259. Bergen v. Wood. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 Cal. App. 4th 854, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 893 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5260. D'Souza v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­5262. Hyde v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 112. No. 94­5263. Gowens v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 524. No. 94­5264. Evans v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 135. No. 94­5266. Saunders v. City of Beverly et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 123. No. 94­5267. Wilson v. Bowlen, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5268. Guzman-Salguero v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. No. 94­5269. Green v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5270. Holland v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­5272. Bell v. Garner, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1093. No. 94­5273. Bell v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5274. Gallant v. Magnusson, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5275. Hamilton v. Seal, Acting Director, AC- TION, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 432. No. 94­5276. Epps v. Iowa. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 432. No. 94­5280. Portillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 290. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 894 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5282. Russell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5283. McCullough v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5284. Preston v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5285. Ashford v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 16. No. 94­5286. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 250. No. 94­5287. Krikava v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 433. No. 94­5289. Davis v. Champion, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­5290. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­5292. Bronson v. Domovich, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5295. Carr v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­5296. Benincasa v. Benincasa. Ct. App. Ohio, Muskingum County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5297. Williams v. Jim Walters Resources, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­5298. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­5299. Mullins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 125. No. 94­5300. Pontillo v. United States; and No. 94­5524. Brady v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 282. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 895 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5301. Sowell v. Smith et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 424. No. 94­5302. Spencer v. Worthington, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5303. Stone v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­5304. Taylor v. Bernstein. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 637 A. 2d 829. No. 94­5305. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. No. 94­5306. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 408. No. 94­5307. Fletcher v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5308. Friend v. United Technologies/Hamilton Standard et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 246. No. 94­5309. Gainer v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­5310. Jerry v. Domovich, Superintendent, Penn- sylvania State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5311. Higgason v. Adank et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5312. McPeters v. Calderon, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5314. Stamey v. Winn et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1559. No. 94­5315. Steffen v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 1462, 627 N. E. 2d 1002. No. 94­5317. Fogleman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 896 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5320. Molina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5321. Grubbs v. Western Baptist Hospital. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­5323. Magee v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­5325. Patricia M. v. San Diego County Depart- ment of Social Services. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5327. Sjogren v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­5328. West v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 252. No. 94­5329. Easley v. Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 16. No. 94­5330. Easley v. Martin, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 15. No. 94­5331. Fertel-Rust v. City of Wauwatosa, Wiscon- sin, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5332. Taylor v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1488. No. 94­5333. Davis v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1393. No. 94­5335. Brumby v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 47. No. 94­5339. Cothran v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­5340. Cobb v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 875 S. W. 2d 533. No. 94­5343. Weinstein v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 340. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 897 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5344. Trice v. Ager et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5345. Ngenegbo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 404. No. 94­5346. Plourde v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 395. No. 94­5347. McCombs v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5348. Mladosich-Navejar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5349. Powe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 94­5350. Martin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­5351. Russel v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5353. Marlow v. Office of Court Administration of the State of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­5355. Taylor v. Peters et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 605. No. 94­5357. House v. Clarke County Commission. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662 So. 2d 927. No. 94­5358. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 949. No. 94­5359. Kennedy v. Zimmerman, Superintendent, Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Way- mart, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 122. No. 94­5362. DiGianni v. Stern's; and No. 94­5363. DiGianni v. Bloomingdale's, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 346. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 898 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5364. Warren v. Cole. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5365. Daniel v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­5366. Correia v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 Conn. App. 457, 636 A. 2d 860. No. 94­5367. Moore v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 335 N. C. 567, 440 S. E. 2d 797. No. 94­5368. Pesek v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Third District, et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5369. Mehio v. Graber et al. Ct. App. Utah. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5371. Haney v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1413. No. 94­5372. Hilliard v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5373. Frumentino v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 671 N. E. 2d 833. No. 94­5375. Hoffman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 808. No. 94­5376. Richmond v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 942, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580. No. 94­5377. Rollings v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5378. McDaniel v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5379. Lanier v. Haynes et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 819. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 899 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5383. Rogers v. Zant, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 384. No. 94­5385. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 108. No. 94­5386. Roark v. Jackson County. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 Ore. App. 505, 863 P. 2d 491. No. 94­5388. Quintero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 600. No. 94­5389. Lyons v. Southern California Rapid Tran- sit District. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5390. McQueen v. Brister, Judge, Texas District Court, 234th District. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5391. Roden v. Smith et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5392. Lawal v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele- graph Co. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 Ga. App. XXVIII. No. 94­5393. McDermott v. Lynch et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 566. No. 94­5394. Lowe v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5396. Dusenbery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 110. No. 94­5397. Trail et ux. v. Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­5399. Parker v. United States; and No. 94­5400. Mendez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 15. No. 94­5401. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 135. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 900 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5402. Walters v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­5405. Ford v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 374. No. 94­5407. Ziereis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­5408. Dumornay v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1056. No. 94­5409. Brown v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 423. No. 94­5411. Campbell v. Sheehan, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5414. Schultz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1212. No. 94­5415. Boyd v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5418. Harvey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 109. No. 94­5420. Arnstein v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­5422. Demolfetto et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 477. No. 94­5424. Smith v. Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 24 F. 3d 251. No. 94­5425. Walker v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5426. Shackelford v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 135. No. 94­5428. Vega v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 560. No. 94­5431. Tichio v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 670. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 901 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5432. Smith v. United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5433. Gordon v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 640. No. 94­5434. Harwood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5435. Jacques v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­5436. Hampton v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1059. No. 94­5437. Jones v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 477, 873 P. 2d 122. No. 94­5438. Higgins v. Neal, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5439. Fertel-Rust v. Security Bank SSB of Mil- waukee et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5443. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 77. No. 94­5444. Worthington v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 94­5445. Stotts v. Kernan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­5447. Delarco v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 629 So. 2d 140. No. 94­5448. Mora Carrillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 617. No. 94­5449. De Leon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1093. No. 94­5450. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 37 and 251. No. 94­5452. Bibbins v. New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 13. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 902 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5453. Follins v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1102. No. 94­5454. Herriman v. Nagle, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5456. Lilly v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­5458. McCrary v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1047. No. 94­5459. McCostlin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1125. No. 94­5460. Rosser v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1125. No. 94­5461. Reid v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 114. No. 94­5462. Padilla-Castillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5464. Amsden v. Professional Conduct Commit- tee, New Hampshire Supreme Court. Sup. Ct. N. H. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5465. Cooper v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5466. Deaton v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 635 So. 2d 4. No. 94­5468. Turner v. University Housing. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­5471. Cain v. Missouri State Board of Podiatry Medicine. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 S. W. 2d 508. No. 94­5472. Vineski v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 903 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5473. Fertel-Rust v. City of Milwaukee, Wiscon- sin (two cases). C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5474. Klang v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5477. Graham v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 391. No. 94­5479. Harmon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 425. No. 94­5481. Benson v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 104. No. 94­5482. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 94­5483. Bauer v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5485. Glass v. Boothby. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 673. No. 94­5487. Grey v. Rutt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­5488. Hays v. Klauser, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­5489. Garvey v. Szabo, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 218. No. 94­5490. Gorlov v. New York City Department of Social Services, Human Resources Administration (two cases). C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5491. Guichard v. Wisnieski et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 236. No. 94­5492. Floyd v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. No. 94­5493. Johnson v. Duncan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 131. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 904 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5494. Good v. New Castle Youth Development Center. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5495. Johnson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5496. Kelley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 936. No. 94­5497. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1387. No. 94­5498. Rae v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5500. Pagan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 102. No. 94­5501. Piervinanzi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 670. No. 94­5502. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­5504. Logan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 429. No. 94­5505. Rees v. Reyes. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5506. Pruitt v. Hannigan, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5507. Reid v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 537 Pa. 167, 642 A. 2d 453. No. 94­5508. Brant v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­5509. Cooper v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5510. Mackall v. Thompson, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5511. Armstrong v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 409. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 905 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5515. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­5517. Eldeeb v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 841. No. 94­5518. King v. White, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­5519. T. H. v. T. H. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 255 Ill. App. 3d 247, 626 N. E. 2d 403. No. 94­5520. Donovan v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 908. No. 94­5521. Temple v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1052. No. 94­5523. Krueger v. Saiki, Administrator, Small Business Administration. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1285. No. 94­5525. Cicero v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1156. No. 94­5526. Scalice v. Davies et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 249. No. 94­5528. Ramos Beauchamp v. Board of Bar Examin- ers. Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5529. Soto v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 252. No. 94­5531. Smith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1230. No. 94­5532. Clonts v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5533. Vashone v. Embry, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1123. No. 94­5534. Yovev v. Kern County Superior Court et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5535. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 79. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 906 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5536. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1318. No. 94­5537. Maness v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1006. No. 94­5538. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 315. No. 94­5539. Razor-Bey v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5540. Riley v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5541. Lindsay v. Mozingo et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 237. No. 94­5542. Medina v. Quamme. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5543. Leonard v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­5544. Martin v. Initial U. S. A. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. No. 94­5546. Adair v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5547. Adams v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5548. Bighom v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­5549. Baker v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1278. No. 94­5550. Becerra-Flores v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 250. No. 94­5552. Duncan v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5553. Hudson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 433. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 907 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5554. Hubbard v. Roesch. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 407. No. 94­5556. Hanna, aka Weech v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1438. No. 94­5558. Thody v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 978 F. 2d 625. No. 94­5559. Garcia Tovarez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­5561. Boyd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­5562. Braggs v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1047. No. 94­5563. Brown v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Wash. App. 1073. No. 94­5564. Clyburn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 613. No. 94­5565. Carrio v. Hemstree et al. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5566. Tapia-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 570. No. 94­5567. Javier Valenzuela v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 397. No. 94­5568. Wainwright v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1229. No. 94­5569. Coleman v. Peters, Superintendent, Water- town Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5570. Perry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 409. No. 94­5571. McKnight v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1139. No. 94­5572. Long v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 908 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5573. Mangino v. Department of the Army et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1437. No. 94­5575. Casal v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1437. No. 94­5576. Cross v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5582. Edwards v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 445 Mich. 879, 519 N. W. 2d 886. No. 94­5583. Kriegh v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­5584. Green et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 F. 3d 987. No. 94­5585. Garcia v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1487. No. 94­5586. Jacobson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2 F. 3d 1158. No. 94­5587. Jose M. v. San Diego County Department of Social Services. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 4th 295, 867 P. 2d 706. No. 94­5589. Chowdhury v. Southern California Coach et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5591. Bercovici v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 22 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­5592. Simmons et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 403. No. 94­5593. Bennatt v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5595. Fullard v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 Md. App. 738. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 909 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5598. Snead v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 560. No. 94­5604. Reynolds v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5605. Oyler v. Allenbrand et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 292. No. 94­5612. Hale v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 So. 2d 521. No. 94­5613. Lowry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 641. No. 94­5614. Shabazz v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 560. No. 94­5616. Sorenson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 252. No. 94­5620. Hill v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­5621. Grier et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­5622. Brittingham v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. No. 94­5624. Blanc v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1029. No. 94­5625. Baca v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 250. No. 94­5628. Gilbert v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5629. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 924. No. 94­5631. Dusenbery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­5632. Agofsky v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 866. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 910 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5635. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 96. No. 94­5638. Beneby v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 237. No. 94­5639. Schneider v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 572. No. 94­5640. Del Hierro-Vargas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 238. No. 94­5643. Livsey v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­5645. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 444. No. 94­5646. Mercier v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5648. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5649. Madrigal-Maceda v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­5653. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 84. No. 94­5654. Vela v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 924. No. 94­5658. Wilson v. Hames, Commissioner, Alaska De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 252. No. 94­5663. Avery v. Robertson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­5666. Garza et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 1 F. 3d 330. No. 94­5669. Bauer v. United States Department of Justice et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5670. Haynes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 911 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5674. Mack v. Stone, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5679. Morrow v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 255. No. 94­5680. Robledo-Grimaldo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 236. No. 94­5681. Flanagan et ux. v. Resolution Trust Cor- poration et al. (two cases). C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 248 (first case) and 245 (second case). No. 94­5682. Gleason v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 605. No. 94­5687. Bustos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 238. No. 94­5688. Burleson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 93. No. 94­5689. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­5690. Estevez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5695. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 238. No. 94­5698. Milwood v. Mann, Superintendent, Shawan- gunk Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5708. Schoenborn v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1438. No. 94­5710. Vegas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 773. No. 94­5711. Wittman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 239. No. 94­5715. Velasquez Contreras v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 912 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5717. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 354. No. 94­5725. Ingram v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 A. 2d 364. No. 94­5726. Buller v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 94­5727. Baro v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 563. No. 94­5728. Dykes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­5729. Berry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 94­5730. Azuogu v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­5731. Velez-Morales v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 738. No. 94­5739. Caine v. Milwaukee Mack Sales, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5740. Houston v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 250. No. 94­5741. Grossman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 94­5742. Evans v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­5746. Ortiz-Marquez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 636. No. 94­5748. Pineda-Morales v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. No. 94­5749. Okiyama v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­5750. Mims v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1492. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 913 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 94­5752. Love v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5753. Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 565. No. 94­5754. Matthews et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­5757. Moseley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 94­5758. Longoria v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1107. No. 94­5759. McCarty v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5762. Rinard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5763. Carmichael v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­5764. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 403. No. 94­5765. Kessler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­5768. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5772. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­5774. Campbell v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 38, 630 N. E. 2d 339. No. 94­5783. Cunningham v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5789. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 320. No. 94­5790. Niebla-Pacheco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 914 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5795. Toledo-Yin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5802. Hurtado-Olivero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 240. No. 94­5824. McIntyre v. Crouch et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 402. No. 93­1669. Arave, Warden v. Fetterly. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 997 F. 2d 1295. No. 93­1824. Pennsylvania v. Travis. Super. Ct. Pa. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 428 Pa. Super. 621, 626 A. 2d 650. No. 93­1844. California v. Pimentel. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1875. Rison et al. v. Demjanjuk et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent John Demjanjuk for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 338. No. 93­1898. Florida v. Smith. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 1086. No. 93­2021. Alabama v. Hansbrough. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 143. No. 94­43. Harper et al. v. Mujahid, aka Smith. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 28. No. 93­1782. Sweeney, Individually and as Trustee of the Maple Leaf Trust and of the Canadian Realty Trust, et al. v. Resolution Trust Corporation et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 915 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 No. 93­1891. Macario, Administrator of the Estate of Macario, Deceased v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1430. No. 93­1960. International Terminal Corp. v. M/T Loire et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1079. No. 93­2070. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Fidel- ity & Casualty Insurance Company of New York et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1230 and 1249. No. 93­2092. Manson et al. v. Stacescu et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1127. No. 93­2099. Edwards v. First American Title Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re- ported below: 19 F. 3d 1427. No. 93­9012. Georgacarakos v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 218. No. 93­9099. Scott v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the considera- tion or decision of this petition. No. 93­9137. Donovan v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. No. 93­9322. Gallagher v. Federal National Mortgage Association. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 401. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 916 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9714. Sabetti v. Dipaolo. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 16. No. 93­9780. Dupont v. Duboise, Warden, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 94­39. Stern et al. v. General Electric Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 746. No. 94­58. General Electric Capital Corp. et al. v. Na- tional Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 323. No. 94­94. Woodson Construction Co. v. Amoco Pipeline Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 935. No. 94­5122. Eno v. Department of Housing and Urban Development. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 401. No. 93­1810. Francis v. American Telephone & Tele- graph Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Con- nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 409. No. 93­1912. Ridgeway et al. v. Pfizer, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 600. No. 93­1987. Kelly, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al. v. Sprint Communications Co. et al.; and No. 94­95. Sprint Communications Co. et al. v. Kelly, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consid- 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 917 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 eration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 642 A. 2d 106. No. 93­2052. Albrecht et al. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 93­9512. Hanh Le v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Con- nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 302. No. 94­134. Sawtell v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re- ported below: 22 F. 3d 248. No. 94­239. Voakes v. AT&T Communications, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Con- nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 1673, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802. No. 93­1971. Fitch et al. v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona (First Interstate Bank of Arizona et al., Real Parties in Interest). C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Chuck Walker et al. for leave to intervene denied. Certiorari denied. No. 93­1993. Wells Fargo & Co. et al. v. Greenwald et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of American Bankers Association and American Electronics Association et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 922. No. 93­1995. ANR Pipeline Co. et al. v. Director of Prop- erty Valuation, Kansas Department of Revenue. Sup. Ct. Kan. Motions of Committee on State Taxation, Interstate Natu- ral Gas Association of America, and Western Resources, Inc., et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 254 Kan. 534, 866 P. 2d 1060. No. 93­2006. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro v. SMS Hasen- clever GmbH. Ct. App. Ga. Motion of U. S. Council on Inter- national Banking, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 918 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 1994 513 U. S. curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 211 Ga. App. 360, 439 S. E. 2d 502. No. 93­2014. FoxMeyer Drug Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand. C. A. 3d Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari and/or mandamus denied. No. 93­2067. White et al. v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of petitioners to strike portions of the brief in opposition denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Ill. 2d 432, 634 N. E. 2d 733. No. 93­2096. Bonser v. Town of Nottingham, New Hamp- shire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Motion of Terry L. Bonser and Mary L. Parks for substitution as petitioners in place of Robert A. Bonser, deceased, granted. Certiorari denied. No. 93­2097. Bonser v. Town of Nottingham, New Hamp- shire. Sup. Ct. N. H. Motion of Terry L. Bonser and Mary L. Parks for substitution as petitioners in place of Robert A. Bonser, deceased, granted. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9035. Quiban v. Department of Veterans Affairs. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Gilbert M. Mendoza for substitution in his capacity as personal representative of Felomina Quiban, deceased, granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 928 F. 2d 1154. No. 93­9153. Ana G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion of California Public Defenders Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9261. Lewis v. Sharp et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike brief in opposition denied. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 306. No. 93­9319. Chaklos v. Department of the Army. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 968 F. 2d 1226. No. 94­20. Pacific Northwest Venison Producers et al. v. Smitch, Director of Washington Department of Wild- life, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of North American Elk 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 919 513 U. S. October 3, 1994 Breeders Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1008. No. 94­68. Rhode Island et al. v. Narragansett Indian Tribe et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of Claiborne Pell et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 685. No. 94­87. Ethicon, Inc. v. Eisenmenger, an Incapaci- tated Person, by Eisenmenger, Her Guardian and Conser- vator. Sup. Ct. Mont. Motion of American Cyanamid Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari de- nied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or deci- sion of this motion and this petition. Reported below: 264 Mont. 393, 871 P. 2d 1313. No. 94­97. Taylor, Warden v. Evans-Smith. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 899. No. 94­123. Advance Security, Inc., et al. v. Mulhall. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 586. No. 94­281. W. R. Grace & Company-Conn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for award of damages denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 955. No. 94­5048. Vernon v. Benson, Warden, et al.; and No. 94­5146. Breland v. Benson, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Motions of Minnesota for leave to intervene denied. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5125. Milton v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 39. No. 94­5254. McGee v. Block. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5478. Hanna v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Mo- tion of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 920 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 3, 4, 7, 1994 513 U. S. leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 Wash. 2d 704, 871 P. 2d 135. No. 94­5527 (A­125). Toegemann v. Rhode Island. C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5580. Germany v. Wilson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondents for sanctions denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 563. Rehearing Denied No. 93­8257. Allen v. Illinois, 511 U. S. 1075; No. 93­8427. Jones v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 512 U. S. 1239; and No. 93­8516. Parris v. United States, 511 U. S. 1144. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 93­8426. Harper v. Interior Board of Land Appeals, 512 U. S. 1239; and No. 93­9298. Damatta-Olivera v. United States, 512 U. S. 1244. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. October 4, 1994 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 93­9777. Geary v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 110 Nev. 261, 871 P. 2d 927. October 7, 1994 Certiorari Granted No. 93­1408. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; No. 93­1414. Cuomo, Governor of New York, et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; and No. 93­1415. Hospital Association of New York State v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari in Nos. 93­1408 and 93­1414 granted. Certiorari in No. 93­1415 granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 921 513 U. S. October 7, 1994 Briefs of petitioners are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, November 16, 1994. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 13, 1994. Reply briefs, if any, are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 29, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 708. No. 93­1911. Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Cor- rectional Facility v. Conner et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, November 16, 1994. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, De- cember 13, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 29, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1463. No. 94­3. Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al. v. Hyde. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, November 16, 1994. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 13, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 29, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 240, 626 N. E. 2d 75. No. 94­18. Mastrobuono et al. v. Shearson Lehman Hut- ton, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, November 16, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 13, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 29, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 713. 513ord$$1a 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 922 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 7, 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­197. Anderson, Director, California Department of Social Services, et al. v. Green et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, November 16, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 13, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 29, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 95. No. 94­286. Freightliner Corp. et al. v. Myrick et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motions of American Trucking Associations, Inc., and Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, November 16, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 13, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 29, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1516. October 11, 1994 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­9597. Stennett v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Department of Reve- nue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767 (1994). No. 93­9673. Gibbs v. Franklin et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825 (1994). Reported below: 18 F. 3d 521. No. 94­5183. Mickens v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994). Reported below: 247 Va. 395, 442 S. E. 2d 678. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 923 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 Certiorari Dismissed No. 93­8709. Owen v. Nebraska (two cases). Ct. App. Neb. Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Reported below: 4 Neb. App. 382, 510 N. W. 2d 503 (first case); 2 Neb. App. 195, 508 N. W. 2d 299 (second case). Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 93­9220, ante, p. 1.) No. ­­­ ­ ­­­. Chapman v. Bryan et al.; and No. ­­­ ­ ­­­. Sigler v. Twyford et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. D­1417. In re Disbarment of Asbell. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1267.] No. D­1419. In re Disbarment of Lashley. Douglas L. Lashley, of Olney, Md., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on August 2, 1994 [512 U. S. 1267], is hereby discharged. No. D­1421. In re Disbarment of Slan. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1267.] No. D­1431. In re Disbarment of Schmieder. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1269.] No. D­1461. In re Disbarment of Weinfeld. It is ordered that David Michael Weinfeld, of Meadowbrook, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1462. In re Disbarment of O'Keefe. It is ordered that Michael Phillip O'Keefe, of Overland Park, Kan., be sus- pended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 108, Orig. Nebraska v. Wyoming et al. Third Interim Report of the Special Master on Motions to Amend Pleadings received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with sup- porting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 924 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. briefs, if any, may be filed by the parties within 30 days. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 511 U. S. 1066.] No. 120, Orig. New Jersey v. New York. It is ordered that Paul Verkuil, Esq., of Heathrow, Fla., be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceed- ings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The Special Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate. The compensation of the Special Master, the allowances to him, the compensation paid to his legal, technical, stenographic and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses, including travel expenses, shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 511 U. S. 1080.] No. 93­1121. Plaut et al. v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1141.] Mo- tion of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 93­1462. California Department of Corrections et al. v. Ramon Morales. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1287.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that James R. Asperger, Esq., of Los Angeles, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 93­1543. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1106.] Mo- tions of Equal Employment Advisory Council and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. No. 93­1677. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1204.] Motion of Greyhound Lines, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 93­9082. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:04 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 925 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 93­9444. In re Gaydos; No. 93­9577. Gaydos v. Chertoff, Former United States Attorney, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; No. 93­9618. In re Gaydos; No. 94­5018. In re Gaydos; and No. 94­5070. In re Gaydos. Motions of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until November 1, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­294. In re Dunkin et al. Petition for writ of man- damus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied No. 93­1341. West Penn Power Co. et al. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 535 Pa. 108, 634 A. 2d 207. No. 93­1535. West Penn Power Co. et al. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 150 Pa. Commw. 349, 615 A. 2d 951. No. 93­1687. Texas v. Bradford. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 873 S. W. 2d 15. No. 93­1758. Giddens v. Shell Oil Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 208. No. 93­1975. King v. Brown, Superintendent, Clallam Bay Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 F. 3d 1403. No. 93­2013. City of San Diego v. Paulson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 990 F. 2d 1518. No. 93­2030. Durden, Administratrix of the Estate of Freeman, Deceased v. DeKalb County, Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 34, 440 S. E. 2d 170. No. 93­2042. Michigan et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 348. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 926 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­2053. Enplanar, Inc., et al. v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al.; and Turner, Trustee of V. Keeler & Co., Inc. v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1284 (first case); 25 F. 3d 1043 (second case). No. 93­8780. Hyder v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 128. No. 93­8906. Murphy v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­8978. Burnett v. Reasoner. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 93­9116. Hrbek v. Hundley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 777. No. 93­9267. Nesby v. Department of Veterans Affairs et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 602. No. 93­9431. Bowser v. Boggs, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1060. No. 93­9441. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1070. No. 93­9464. Heiser v. Stepanik, Superintendent, Penn- sylvania State Correctional Institution at Dallas. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 299. No. 93­9483. Angel Flores v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 S. W. 2d 714. No. 93­9488. Hyder v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 715. No. 93­9528. Terrell v. Department of Transportation. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1444. No. 93­9548. Herrick v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1437. No. 93­9575. Henderson v. United States Parole Commis- sion et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1073. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 927 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 93­9630. Conner v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 1239. No. 93­9749. Cullum v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 5 F. 3d 1495. No. 93­9781. Libby v. Duval, Superintendent, Massachu- setts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 733. No. 94­7. West Penn Power Co. et al. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 157 Pa. Commw. 150, 629 A. 2d 221. No. 94­13. Kansas Department of Corrections v. Brink- man et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 370. No. 94­56. Mitchell et al. v. State Farm Fire & Cas- ualty Co.; and No. 94­290. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mitchell et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 959. No. 94­64. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Depart- ment of Agriculture. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 211. No. 94­84. Ramona Convent of The Holy Names v. City of Alhambra. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 10, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140. No. 94­86. Bell et al. v. City of Miami. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 634 So. 2d 163. No. 94­98. Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, Department of the Interior, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 20 F. 3d 1418. No. 94­102. Borden, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 502. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 928 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­105. Amato v. Securities and Exchange Commis- sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1281. No. 94­106. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. United States ex rel. Siller. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1339. No. 94­109. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 11. No. 94­113. Ivimey v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. No. 94­115. Hampshire v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1096. No. 94­136. Scott et al. v. Krissman et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­139. General Motors Corp. v. Jackson, Individu- ally and as Next Friend and Natural Guardian of Her Minor Daughter, Jackson, et al. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 310. No. 94­149. Resolution Trust Corporation, as Receiver for Mid Kansas Savings & Loan Assn. et al. v. Homeland Stores, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 17 F. 3d 1269. No. 94­182. Boostrom v. Bach. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 622 N. E. 2d 175. No. 94­202. Lynds v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 102, 630 N. E. 2d 679. No. 94­211. Musslewhite et al. v. Reading & Bates Petroleum Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­221. Downer v. Hanneman et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Nev. 167, 871 P. 2d 279. No. 94­223. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 558. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 929 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­234. Columbus, Georgia v. Knight et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 579. No. 94­237. Trumbly et ux. v. Lawler, Individually and as Independent Executor of the Estate of Lawler, De- ceased, et al. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­238. Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth v. City of Grand Prairie. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 868 S. W. 2d 835. No. 94­240. Weissbrodt v. White Mountain Apache Tribe of Arizona et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 31 F. 3d 1176. No. 94­241. Oliver et al. v. Lewis. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 178 Ariz. 330, 873 P. 2d 668. No. 94­242. Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, aka Baker Protective Services, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1444. No. 94­244. Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Safeco Insurance Company of America et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 94­260. Scheib et al. v. Grant et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 149. No. 94­261. Hill v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 984. No. 94­274. King et al. v. Jackson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1573. No. 94­277. Greenwood v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 783. No. 94­279. Huckaby v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­282. Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 184. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 930 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­283. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 787. No. 94­287. Gillilan v. Teccor Electronics, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. No. 94­289. Wright et al. v. AMF Corp. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­291. Freeland et al. v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 301. No. 94­292. Pittsburg State University v. Hurd. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 564. No. 94­293. Bailey v. Florida. Cir. Ct. Fla., Alachua County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­297. Puricelli v. Morrisville Borough, Pennsyl- vania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 123. No. 94­298. Porter v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­302. Wilson v. Belin et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 644. No. 94­304. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hud- son Corp. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 962. No. 94­308. Louisiana v. Corley. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 151. No. 94­309. Lamb et al. v. Village of Quincy. Ct. App. Ohio, Logan County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Ohio App. 3d 592, 636 N. E. 2d 412. No. 94­310. Lekvold v. Westinghouse Hanford Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 131. No. 94­313. Auto Club Insurance Assn. v. White & White, Inc. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 931 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­316. Bueno v. City of Huntington Park. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­319. Long Distance Services, Inc., aka Long Dis- tance Service of Washington, Inc., et al. v. Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 260. No. 94­321. Kozelka v. Weider et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 398. No. 94­323. Lepardo, dba AFL Disposal Co., Inc. v. Board of Health and Hospitals of Boston et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 Mass. App. 1114, 634 N. E. 2d 154. No. 94­324. Mount et al. v. El Dorado County Superior Court (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­338. Emerson v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 880 S. W. 2d 759. No. 94­340. Hurley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­344. Cope et al. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 S. W. 2d 87. No. 94­349. Burdick v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, Committee on Character and Fitness. Sup. Ct. N. H. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­350. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­353. Finizie v. City of Bridgeport. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­356. Kelly v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 235. No. 94­363. Grable v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 53. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 932 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­373. Weber v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 140. No. 94­375. City of Cabool et al. v. Casey. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 799. No. 94­383. Staton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­384. Berkson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­387. Hakel v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 P. 2d 1224. No. 94­397. Bradford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 94­403. Pattillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­406. Talley v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 214. No. 94­412. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­417. Morris v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 465. No. 94­425. Solomon v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 396. No. 94­435. Amuso v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1251. No. 94­472. Pion v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 18. No. 94­474. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­496. Wachs et al. v. Trevino, a Minor, By and Through Her Next Friend, Her Grandmother, Cruz. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1480. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 933 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­5038. Stearman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1170. No. 94­5044. Altamirano-Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1090. No. 94­5055. Kindler v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 536 Pa. 228, 639 A. 2d 1. No. 94­5090. Nunnemaker v. Ylst, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1115. No. 94­5099. Ardoin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 177. No. 94­5139. Hurley v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 876 S. W. 2d 57. No. 94­5206. Davis v. Greer, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1134. No. 94­5208. Scott v. United States; No. 94­5277. Rodriguez v. United States; No. 94­5326. Sellers v. United States; No. 94­5341. Denson v. United States; and No. 94­5360. Gaston v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­5216. Atkinson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­5220. Bonner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 14. No. 94­5281. Richmond v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5316. Slanco v. Eastwood Mall, Inc. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 626 N. E. 2d 59. No. 94­5337. Scott v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5338. Clemmons v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1047. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 934 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5370. Westmoreland et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 62. No. 94­5440. Wheelock v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­5512. Baker et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 1374. No. 94­5514. Gallegos v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P. 2d 1097. No. 94­5574. Carter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5577. Colina v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 634 So. 2d 1077. No. 94­5594. Hazime v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 136. No. 94­5596. Ealey v. Armontrout, Assistant Director/ Zone II, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5597. Fields v. City of West Palm Beach, Florida, et al. (three cases). Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 634 So. 2d 623 (first and third cases); 632 So. 2d 1026 (second case). No. 94­5606. Anderson v. Butler, Superintendent, Mas- sachusetts Correctional Institution. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 593. No. 94­5607. Woods v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 316. No. 94­5609. Werner v. Bergen County Jail et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 125. No. 94­5611. Tyson v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5617. East v. Coffel. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 245. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 935 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­5618. Floyd v. Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 651, 873 P. 2d 905. No. 94­5626. Johnson v. Dutton, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5627. Head v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 129. No. 94­5636. Braxton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1385. No. 94­5637. Abad v. Zavaras, Executive Director, Colo- rado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1055. No. 94­5641. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 238. No. 94­5644. McIntosh v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1454. No. 94­5655. Wells v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­5656. Banks v. California Department of Motor Vehicles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5660. James v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 20. No. 94­5661. Greenlaw v. Smith. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 123 Wash. 2d 593, 869 P. 2d 1024. No. 94­5662. Head v. Harris et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 129. No. 94­5664. Watson v. Stine. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5668. Davis v. Oda. Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5671. Forsyth v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 936 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5672. Frost v. Lutz et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 246. No. 94­5675. Moore v. EMC Mortgage Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 566. No. 94­5676. Ruff v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 402. No. 94­5677. Pugh v. Butterworth et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5683. Faunce v. McCarthy et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 130. No. 94­5684. Greer v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 424 Pa. Super. 645, 617 A. 2d 389. No. 94­5686. Cousino v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5691. Jackson v. Pflum et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5692. Gilmore v. Local 295, International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Help- ers of America, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 396. No. 94­5693. Ansari v. Plummer. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5694. Benavides v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5696. Rinehart v. Nix, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 127. No. 94­5697. Perri v. Beyer, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5699. Ogden v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 118 N. M. 234, 880 P. 2d 845. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 937 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­5700. Love v. Wheeler et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 237. No. 94­5701. Robinson et al. v. Bartley. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5702. Miller v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 466. No. 94­5703. Luna v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1490, 635 N. E. 2d 45. No. 94­5704. Rivas v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 468. No. 94­5705. Macnab v. Board of Parole. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5706. Mendez v. San Diego County Department of Social Services. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 4th 295, 867 P. 2d 706. No. 94­5712. Twiggs v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution (and Diagnostic and Classifica- tion Center), Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­5713. McGuire v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 139. No. 94­5716. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­5718. Butler v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5719. Tardy v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5721. Cordova v. Cooper, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1056. No. 94­5722. King v. Murphy. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 938 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5723. Young, aka Gilkey v. Mannion, Judge, Cir- cuit Court of Illinois, Cook County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5724. Alexander v. Cormier et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­5733. Cates v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 94­5736. Thorpe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­5761. Lopez-Yanez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­5767. Chandler v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farmington Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5770. Bessman v. WSOS Community Action Commis- sion, Inc. Ct. App. Ohio, Sandusky County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5775. Ali v. McDade, Superintendent, Harnett Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1208. No. 94­5776. Speight v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1464. No. 94­5778. Aziz v. Perkins et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 126. No. 94­5781. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5786. Yao Kuang Saeteurn v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 110. No. 94­5794. Dial v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 242. No. 94­5797. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5801. Foley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 408. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 939 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­5810. Head v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 556. No. 94­5813. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 563. No. 94­5816. Cardona-Usquiano v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1194. No. 94­5819. Watson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. No. 94­5820. Washington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­5821. Duranseau v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 804. No. 94­5825. Nickles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­5826. Flores Medina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 109. No. 94­5827. Owens v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 53. No. 94­5833. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 115. No. 94­5835. McAdams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 370. No. 94­5847. Brumfield v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 133. No. 94­5849. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 568. No. 94­5851. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 114. No. 94­5854. Grayer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­5857. Friends v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 417. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 940 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5863. Brown v. City of St. Petersburg et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 36. No. 94­5864. Cole v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 622 N. E. 2d 245. No. 94­5874. Covarrubias Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 397. No. 94­5877. Gaskins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­5879. Ashworth v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5883. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 327. No. 94­5884. Minicone v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 297. No. 94­5890. Moore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­5893. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 669. No. 94­5896. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­5900. Iovino v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1060. No. 94­5901. Harris v. United States. Ct. Mil. App. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 376. No. 94­5902. Graham v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5904. Acevedo v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 620. No. 94­5906. Crain v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­5908. Barrera Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 624. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 941 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­5909. Ramirez Guerra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­5911. King v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5918. Stockstill v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 492. No. 94­5920. Andrews v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1328. No. 94­5921. Barnett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 127. No. 94­5922. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­5924. Couch v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5926. Dale v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1060. No. 94­5927. Caradine v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1050. No. 94­5929. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1002. No. 94­5931. Wood v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 117. No. 94­5934. Londono v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. No. 94­5936. McAtee v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 134. No. 94­5937. Pedraza v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1515. No. 94­5938. Narvaez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­5939. Pickens v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1059. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 942 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5942. Townsend v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 215. No. 94­5953. Ashley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1008. No. 94­5958. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­5960. Hallett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­5971. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 619. No. 94­5972. Osborne v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 255. No. 94­5973. Curry v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 126. No. 94­5975. Caballero v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­5978. Riselay v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 409. No. 94­5979. Lopez-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­5988. Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­5991. DeFranco v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 664. No. 94­5993. Randolph v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­5994. Mathis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­5995. Zajac v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 636. No. 94­6017. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1212. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 943 513 U. S. October 11, 1994 No. 94­6027. Hickey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 48. No. 94­6031. Hadlock v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­144. Combined Management, Inc. v. Atchinson, Superintendent, Bureau of Insurance of Maine. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of International Association of Entrepreneurs of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1. No. 94­255. Collins et al. v. Greene County Memorial Hospital et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent Greene County Memorial Hospital for damages, costs, and attorney's fees denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 536 Pa. 475, 640 A. 2d 379. No. 94­258. Home Savings of America, FSB v. Maynard. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of Texas Savings et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. No. 94­264. Aimable et al. v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of United Farm Workers of America et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 434. No. 94­271. Florida v. Holland. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 1289. No. 94­314. Underwager et al. v. Salter et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of National Association of State VOCAL Orga- nizations and National Congress for Men and Children, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 730. No. 94­385. Exxon Corp. et al. v. Eyak Native Village et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 773. No. 94­422. Rutledge v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner to supplement petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1445. 513ord$$1b 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 944 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 11, 14, 17, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5633. Chatima v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner to consolidate this petition with No. 93­8962, Chukwura v. United States, denied. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. 93­6812. Powell v. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, 510 U. S. 1179. Petition for rehearing denied. October 14, 1994 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­295. United States v. Williams. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. October 17, 1994 Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Geoffrey Development Co. v. City of Alpharetta; and No. - ­ ­­­. Gadson v. Abdul-Wasi et al. Motions to di- rect the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. A­267 (94­6456). Russell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the peti- tion for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court. No. 94­66. Moore et al. v. Dupree et al.; and No. 94­82. Lamar County Board of Education and Trustees et al. v. Dupree et al. Appeals from D. C. S. D. Miss. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in these cases expressing the views of the United States addressing the following issue: "In light of the Mississippi Supreme Court's hold- ing in Greenville Public School Dist. v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 575 So. 2d 956 (1990), that Miss. Code Ann. § 37­7­103 (1990) supersedes Miss. Code Ann. § 37­7­611 (1972) and repeals it by implication, what remedy, if any, can a federal 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 945 513 U. S. October 17, 1994 court offer for failure to preclear § 47 of the Uniform School Law, 1986 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 492, which also purported to repeal § 37­7­611?" No. 94­5743. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; and No. 94­5860. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. (two cases). C. A. 3d Cir. Mo- tions of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until November 7, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­5766. Fertel-Rust v. Milwaukee Police Depart- ment et al. C. A. 7th Cir.; and No. 94­5950. Burke v. Kelly et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until November 7, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit peti- tions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. Certiorari Granted No. 94­325. Chandris, Inc., et al. v. Latsis. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 45. No. 94­251. United States v. Robertson. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 862. Certiorari Denied No. 93­1920. McDaniel et al. v. Tellis. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1314. No. 93­2018. Kansas et al. v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 436. No. 93­9130. Davis v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 212. No. 93­9345. Thigpen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 31. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 946 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 17, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9652. Flieger v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 878. No. 93­9720. Jacobs v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 93­9729. Tagala v. Prewitt, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 29. No. 94­81. General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, Helpers & Automotive Employees of Contra Costa County, Local No. 315 v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1017. No. 94­135. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. et al. v. Ga- worski et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1104. No. 94­141. Terry v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 575. No. 94­160. Reilly v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 629. No. 94­168. Sprague v. King, Director, Office of Person- nel Management. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 185. No. 94­183. Legg v. Smith, Trustee. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 650. No. 94­204. Chisum v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 26. No. 94­273. Mayes v. Sanford. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 A. 2d 855. No. 94­311. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Laborers' Interna- tional Union of North America, AFL­CIO; and No. 94­312. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. v. Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL­CIO. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 375. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 947 513 U. S. October 17, 1994 No. 94­322. Stuart, Guardian ad Litem for Stuart, and Administrator of the Estate of Stuart, Deceased v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1483. No. 94­328. California Department of Corrections v. Bland. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1469. No. 94­332. Vermilion Parish Bus Drivers & Operators Assn. et al. v. Vermilion Parish School Board et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­333. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Adkins et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 203, 442 S. E. 2d 737. No. 94­336. Smith v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1160. No. 94­337. Pudlo v. Sheahan, Sheriff, Cook County, Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­339. General Environmental Science Corp. v. Horsfall et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­341. Touche Ross & Co. v. Congregation of Pas- sion, Holy Cross Province. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 137, 636 N. E. 2d 503. No. 94­343. Thanh Vong Hoai v. Sun Refining & Market- ing Co., Inc. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 953. No. 94­347. Morissette et al. v. Yu et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1114. No. 94­348. Allen et al. v. Williams. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1526. No. 94­351. Todd, Special Administrator of the Estate of Todd, a Deceased Minor v. Societe Bic, S. A., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1402. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 948 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 17, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­352. S. W. S. Erectors, Inc., dba Southwest Signs v. Triangle Sign & Service, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­354. Kralman v. Illinois Department of Veter- ans' Affairs. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 150. No. 94­359. Carter v. Harry Lee Carter Estate Man- agement Trust et al. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­360. Hosoya Fireworks Co., Ltd. v. Barone et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 610. No. 94­361. Bybee v. Proctor Community Hospital. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1053. No. 94­369. Kayani v. Fields et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­389. Clostermann v. Johnson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­448. Invex Holdings, N. V. v. Equitable Life In- surance Company of Iowa. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 241. No. 94­452. Roscoe v. City of Albuquerque et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5040. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 34. No. 94­5148. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5171. Glover v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 133. No. 94­5271. Fletcher v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5279. Lee v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 413. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 949 513 U. S. October 17, 1994 No. 94­5288. Crain v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 468. No. 94­5293. Dellorfano v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­5313. Torres v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 600. No. 94­5322. Mucciante v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1228. No. 94­5356. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­5395. Connor v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1426. No. 94­5398. Mandilakis v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 278. No. 94­5421. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 20. No. 94­5442. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 637. No. 94­5457. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 862. No. 94­5470. Stankowski v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5486. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1432. No. 94­5555. Igbo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 993 F. 2d 885. No. 94­5560. Agofsky v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 866. No. 94­5600. Lampkins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 94­5602. Lucht et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 541. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 950 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 17, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5603. Pirollo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 560. No. 94­5615. Serna v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1037. No. 94­5619. Griffin v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 183 Wis. 2d 327, 515 N. W. 2d 535. No. 94­5623. Castro v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 333. No. 94­5652. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 57. No. 94­5665. Hooker, aka Banks v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 954. No. 94­5709. Cunningham v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 127. No. 94­5714. Schwab v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 3. No. 94­5720. Enigwe v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. No. 94­5732. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 240. No. 94­5738. Sanders v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5745. Kelly v. L. L. Cool J et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 398. No. 94­5751. McMennemy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 115. No. 94­5777. Webber v. Franklin County et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­5779. Rainey v. Thigpen, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 409. No. 94­5780. Nichols v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1216. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 951 513 U. S. October 17, 1994 No. 94­5782. McFadden v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5784. Burton v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 208. No. 94­5785. Saade v. Trippett, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­5787. Day v. Norman et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5791. Powers v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Ohio App. 3d 400, 635 N. E. 2d 1298. No. 94­5796. Fruchtman v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 418 Mass. 8, 633 N. E. 2d 369. No. 94­5799. Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­5800. Esquibel v. Rice, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­5804. Garrett v. Kason Industries, Inc., et al. Super. Ct. Coweta County, Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5805. Kelley et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­5806. Jernigan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 621. No. 94­5807. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 580. No. 94­5808. Brockman v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1055. No. 94­5809. Jarrett v. US Sprint Communications Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 256. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 952 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 17, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5818. Sierra v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. No. 94­5828. Tucker v. Essex County Jail et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1431. No. 94­5836. Marin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 560. No. 94­5838. Lekan v. American Energy Services, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 19. No. 94­5839. Lomprez v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 155 Ill. 2d 564, 633 N. E. 2d 5. No. 94­5840. Mancini v. Ohio Department of Rehabilita- tion and Corrections. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1438, 632 N. E. 2d 522. No. 94­5841. Mitchell v. Zent, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­5842. Rather v. Price et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­5844. Odiaga v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 384, 871 P. 2d 801. No. 94­5848. Bartlett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­5850. Joseph v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­5852. Griffith v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Ill. 2d 476, 634 N. E. 2d 1069. No. 94­5870. Aultman v. Larkins, Deputy Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1484. No. 94­5872. Allen v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 P. 2d 79. No. 94­5881. Hightower v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 182. No. 94­5882. Harris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1043. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 953 513 U. S. October 17, 1994 No. 94­5886. Duberry v. Government of the Virgin Is- lands. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 556. No. 94­5889. Davis v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 S. W. 2d 403. No. 94­5899. Dubyak v. San Bernardino County, Cali- fornia, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5935. Lowe v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1059. No. 94­5952. Atkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1401. No. 94­5954. Shorter v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 403. No. 94­5967. Harris v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 S. W. 2d 798. No. 94­5970. Lloyd v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 540. No. 94­5992. Booth v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 Ore. App. 282, 862 P. 2d 518. No. 94­6001. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­6005. Carnet v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 133. No. 94­6006. Arenas-Patino v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 620. No. 94­6008. Cranshaw v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­6018. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­6022. Banks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­6023. Cook v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 507. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 954 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 17, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6028. Jones v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 636. No. 94­6029. Gaumer v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 568. No. 94­6034. Reinke v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 183 Wis. 2d 435, 516 N. W. 2d 23. No. 94­6035. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­6041. Kubosh v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­6049. Moffitt v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6051. Heip Tran v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1060. No. 94­6053. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 569. No. 94­6057. Lizalde v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­6060. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­6061. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 571. No. 94­6062. Epps v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1186. No. 94­6072. Quiroz-Mendez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 251. No. 94­6075. Cannon v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6078. Bellazerius v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 698. No. 94­6080. Bell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 955 513 U. S. October 17, 1994 No. 94­6082. Springs v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 192. No. 94­6085. West v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 68, 517 N. W. 2d 482. No. 94­6086. Sierra v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­6092. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1378. No. 94­6095. Gable v. United States; and No. 94­6113. Funderburk v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 133. No. 94­6096. Collins v. Hesse, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 141. No. 94­6098. Stanwood v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­6106. Enand v. Atlis Systems, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 400. No. 94­6108. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 50. No. 94­6109. Green v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­6114. Walker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 417. No. 94­6125. Rivera Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 236. No. 93­2069. Idaho v. Odiaga. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 384, 871 P. 2d 801. No. 93­9061. Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 722. 513ord$$1c 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 956 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 17, 28, 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­416. Malia et al. v. General Electric Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 828. No. 94­5760. Bowie v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1296. No. 94­6097. Hernandez Coplin v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 312. No. 94­38. Moreland v. Resolution Trust Corporation. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of Fifth RMA Partners, Real Party in Interest, for leave to substitute Fifth RMA Partners as party respondent granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 102. No. 94­300. T. B. Butler Publishing Co., Inc. v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to lodge sealed record excerpts granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 469. October 28, 1994 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­5484. Holmes v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1240. October 31, 1994 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­9478. Simon v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127 (1994). Reported below: 633 So. 2d 407. No. 94­334. Williams et al. v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari granted, judg- 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 957 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 ment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994). Reported below: 7 Cal. 4th 860, 873 P. 2d 1224. No. 94­5463. Palmieri v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994). Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1265. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. - ­ ­­­, ante, p. 5.) No. - ­ ­­­. West v. County of Kern et al. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indi- gency executed by petitioner denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Myers v. Estelle, Warden, et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. D­1420. In re Disbarment of Bernstein. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1267.] No. D­1424. In re Disbarment of Holzmann. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1268.] No. D­1426. In re Disbarment of Nolan. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1268.] No. D­1428. In re Disbarment of Sternberg. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1268.] No. D­1430. In re Disbarment of Field. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1269.] No. D­1432. In re Disbarment of Thompson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1269.] No. D­1435. In re Disbarment of McGreevy. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1275.] No. D­1436. In re Disbarment of Sims. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1275.] No. D­1438. In re Disbarment of Kennedy. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1275.] 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 958 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. D­1439. In re Disbarment of Crist. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1275.] No. D­1440. In re Disbarment of Offstein. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1275.] No. D­1441. In re Disbarment of Hamer. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1276.] No. D­1463. In re Disbarment of Riley. It is ordered that Christopher H. Riley, Jr., of Millville, N. J., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1464. In re Disbarment of Smith. It is ordered that Davis Hall Smith, of Jackson, Miss., be suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 93­1636. Swint et al. v. Chambers County Commis- sion et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1204.] The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: "Whether the Eleventh Circuit, by virtue of its jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of the individual defendants' motions seeking summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, also had jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of the Chambers County Commission's mo- tion for summary judgment." Brief of petitioners is to be filed on or before Wednesday, November 30, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed on or before Thursday, December 15, 1994. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. This case is removed from the December 6, 1994, argument calendar. No. 93­7927. Kyles v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1051.] Motion of petitioner to en- large the record granted. No. 94­5843. Rodenbaugh v. Senape et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; No. 94­6132. In re Reidt; and No. 94­6133. In re Geurin. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioners are allowed until November 21, 1994, within which to 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 959 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit peti- tions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­6099. In re Mendive Gonzalez; and No. 94­6107. In re Flowers. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 94­5659. In re Jeffus; and No. 94­5983. In re Loomis. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 94­367. Heintz et al. v. Jenkins. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 536. No. 94­372. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Whitecotton et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 374. No. 94­395. United States v. Williams. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1143. No. 94­23. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 802. No. 94­172. Hubbard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to the following question: "Whether petitioner's convictions under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for knowingly making false statements in pleadings filed with the Bankruptcy Court are barred by the so-called `judicial function' exception to § 1001." Reported below: 16 F. 3d 694. No. 94­329. Rosenberger et al. v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of Intercollegiate Studies Institute and Christian Legal Society et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 269. Certiorari Denied No. 93­2073. Dashnaw v. Pena, Secretary of Transporta- tion. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1112. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 960 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­8580. Smith v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 868 S. W. 2d 561. No. 93­8843. Motley v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1223. No. 93­9257. O'Neal v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 239. No. 93­9344. Bannister v. Armontrout, Assistant Direc- tor/Zone II, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 F. 3d 1434. No. 93­9496. Benson v. United States; and Ambort v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9553. Russell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 468. No. 93­9564. Abdurrahman v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9602. Rourke v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 407. No. 93­9646. Snell v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1289. No. 93­9653. Singleton v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 316 Ark. 133, 870 S. W. 2d 742. No. 93­9722. Scott v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 418. No. 93­9751. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 732. No. 93­9765. Shea v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 305. No. 93­9769. Behler v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1264. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 961 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 93­9789. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 412. No. 94­42. Middlemist et al. v. Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 19 F. 3d 1318. No. 94­96. Golden Pacific Bancorp et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1066. No. 94­116. School City of Mishawaka v. Family & Chil- dren's Center, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 13 F. 3d 1052. No. 94­190. McGrath v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 158. No. 94­208. Zych, dba American Diving & Salvage Co. v. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1136. No. 94­252. Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp. v. Hospital Employees' Division of Local 79, Service Employees Inter- national Union, AFL­CIO. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1080. No. 94­256. Babin et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1032. No. 94­259. Brown v. National Medical Enterprises Inc. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­265. Wikberg v. Reich, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 188. No. 94­268. B & A Marine Co., Inc. v. American Foreign Shipping Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 709. No. 94­301. Craig v. California State Bar. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­346. Pritchett v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 624. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 962 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­376. Sulmeyer, Chapter 11 Trustee v. Pacific BMW. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 130. No. 94­377. Bresnan Communications Co. v. City of Huntsville et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 20 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­378. Marsilio v. Consolidated Rail Corporation. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 122. No. 94­380. Izen et al. v. Nichols et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 690. No. 94­382. Collins et al. v. Schweitzer, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­391. International Business Machines Corp. v. Sims, Chapter 11 Trustee, Bankruptcy Estate of Unicom Computer Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­394. Transphase Systems, Inc. v. Southern Cali- fornia Edison Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­398. Azor et al. v. Cardinal Industries et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­408. Redwood Village Partnership v. Graham et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 839. No. 94­409. Bailey v. Board of Education for the De- troit Public Schools. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­410. Reynolds v. International Amateur Ath- letic Federation. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 1110. No. 94­415. In re M. K. et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 431 Pa. Super. 198, 636 A. 2d 198. No. 94­419. Edwards v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 748. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 963 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­420. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. v. McElveen, Sheriff, Calcasieu Parish. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 631 So. 2d 563. No. 94­421. Dickerson et al. v. Williams et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 631. No. 94­423. Kovacs et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­424. Knipe et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 390. No. 94­426. Snap-Tite, Inc. v. National Coupling Co., Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 644. No. 94­429. Ashness v. First Bank & Trust Co. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 A. 2d 802. No. 94­432. Buschman v. Aiken & Mawicke, S. C., et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 Wis. 2d 402, 516 N. W. 2d 789. No. 94­433. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Pollack et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 808. No. 94­436. Chicago Board of Education v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 1261. No. 94­437. Breaux Brothers Farms, Inc., et al. v. Teche Sugar Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 83. No. 94­439. Moore v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 569, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­443. Modern Graphic Arts, Inc., et al. v. Beding- haus et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1027. No. 94­446. City of Corvallis v. Turpen et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 978. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 964 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­447. Jerrel v. Alaska et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­450. Des Moines Independent Community School District et al. v. Winegar. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 895. No. 94­453. Davis v. Johnson Controls, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 866. No. 94­457. Illinois State Board of Elections et al. v. Hastert et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1430. No. 94­460. Jackson v. Congress of the United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­465. Stevens et al. v. Stott et al. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Ore. App. 440, 873 P. 2d 380. No. 94­467. Humphreys v. Texas State Bar. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 S. W. 2d 402. No. 94­468. Lee et al. v. Life Insurance Company of North America et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 14. No. 94­473. Martin et al. v. Bank of Floyd. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­484. Fleck et al. v. Hoffinger Industries et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­487. Braswell v. Los Angeles Unified School District. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 988 F. 2d 118. No. 94­488. Dorman v. Emerson Electric Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1354. No. 94­489. Farmer v. Superior Court of California for the City and County of San Francisco (Cheit et al., Real Parties in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:05 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 965 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­492. Union School District et al. v. Smith, By and Through His Parents, Smith et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1519. No. 94­493. Rokke v. Check Services Northwest. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Wash. App. 1056. No. 94­497. Vaughan v. Benedict et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­507. Starnes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 568. No. 94­517. Laughlin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1523. No. 94­519. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 459. No. 94­522. Banda Gutierrez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 108. No. 94­524. Lee v. State Bar of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 247. No. 94­537. Godfrey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 263. No. 94­541. Anders v. West Mead Township Zoning Hear- ing Board et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 156 Pa. Commw. 683, 626 A. 2d 692. No. 94­572. Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 540. No. 94­579. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­583. Yurch v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 229 Conn. 516, 641 A. 2d 1387. No. 94­600. Kelly v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 S. W. 2d 865. No. 94­5003. Cruz v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 966 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5019. Ehi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 12. No. 94­5032. Whitehead v. Greer et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5042. Witherspoon v. United States; and No. 94­5412. Smalls v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 94­5180. Fontenot v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1364. No. 94­5201. Whalen v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5214. Williams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1356. No. 94­5222. Eaton v. Murray, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5235. Parsons v. Barnes, Warden. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 P. 2d 516. No. 94­5265. Earhart v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 877 S. W. 2d 759. No. 94­5294. Trevino v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­5319. Clark v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 959. No. 94­5334. Crane v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5342. Blanchard v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586. No. 94­5354. Overly v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 967 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­5374. Escobedo, aka Joquin, aka Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1441. No. 94­5387. Payne v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 94­5404. Hollingshead v. Hoxworth et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 N. J. 473, 641 A. 2d 235. No. 94­5406. Free v. Peters, Director, Illinois Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 700. No. 94­5413. Scudder v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1123. No. 94­5423. Wable v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1431. No. 94­5429. Snelenberger v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 799. No. 94­5430. White v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 404. No. 94­5503. Love et al. v. United States; Wilson v. United States; Bender v. United States; and Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 415 (first case); 9 F. 3d 115 (second case); 16 F. 3d 977 (third case); 26 F. 3d 127 (fourth case). No. 94­5578. Duncan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­5588. Krall v. Department of the Air Force et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5590. Williamson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 445. No. 94­5601. Portwood v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­5630. Skurdal v. Barr et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 127. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 968 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5642. White v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 237. No. 94­5651. Young v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­5657. Cohen v. Federal Savings & Loan Insur- ance Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1432. No. 94­5667. Ayrs v. Greenwald. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­5673. Martinez Ramirez v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 178 Ariz. 116, 871 P. 2d 237. No. 94­5678. Malik v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 45. No. 94­5737. Yeoman v. Dougan et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5744. Kelly v. Broadcast Music, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 407. No. 94­5756. Mata v. Ricketts et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 981 F. 2d 397. No. 94­5811. Johnson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 97, 636 N. E. 2d 485. No. 94­5812. DeVille et al. v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 654. No. 94­5814. Dokes v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 992 F. 2d 833. No. 94­5817. Rivera Demuniz v. Oregon Parole Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1112. No. 94­5822. Moon v. Zant, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 93, 440 S. E. 2d 657. No. 94­5823. McNary v. Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 16 F. 3d 1225. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 969 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­5829. Tyler v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farm- ington Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 127. No. 94­5830. Whitson v. Pet Inc. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 243. No. 94­5831. Storey v. Idaho Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­5832. Williams v. Duval, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5834. Shaw v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5856. Jacobs v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 S. W. 2d 506. No. 94­5858. Garcia et ux. v. Bernstein et al. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5859. Giles v. Snow et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 37. No. 94­5861. Gallant v. Delahanty, Chief Justice, Supe- rior Court of Maine, Androscoggin County, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5862. Flowers v. Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 27 F. 3d 569. No. 94­5868. Pew v. Cox. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5869. Pemberthy et al. v. Beyer et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 857. No. 94­5875. Powell v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 445 Mich. 927, 521 N. W. 2d 7. No. 94­5876. Judge v. Bolan. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 486. No. 94­5888. Roller v. LeMacks et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 970 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5891. Wilmer v. Johnson, Director, Pretrial Services Division, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 451. No. 94­5892. McFadden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Mich. 960, 514 N. W. 2d 767. No. 94­5897. Dyer v. Sheldon et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 432. No. 94­5898. Mortimer v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 135 N. J. 517, 641 A. 2d 257. No. 94­5903. Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Man- agement. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 421. No. 94­5905. Baxter v. California Commission on Judi- cial Appointments. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5914. Matlock v. Abramajtys, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5915. Cole v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 635 So. 2d 27. No. 94­5916. Woodall v. Rowland, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 136. No. 94­5919. Allen v. Dane County. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 183 Wis. 2d 431, 516 N. W. 2d 20. No. 94­5925. Awawdeh v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 72 Wash. App. 373, 864 P. 2d 965. No. 94­5928. Hyman v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 718, 643 A. 2d 704. No. 94­5930. Ross v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 P. 2d 940. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 971 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­5940. Melton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 927. No. 94­5941. Johnson v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5943. Coulombe v. Bowers et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5944. Conley v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 126. No. 94­5945. Curiale et ux. v. Andrus, Governor of Idaho, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5946. Ammar v. Shilling. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5947. Bailey v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5948. Breard v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 Va. 68, 445 S. E. 2d 670. No. 94­5949. Aizen v. New Jersey Department of Educa- tion et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1484. No. 94­5951. Brossette v. City of Baton Rouge et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. No. 94­5955. Dunham-Bey v. Michigan. Cir. Ct. Muskegon County, Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5956. Kerpan et ux. v. Davis. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5957. Gibb v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 73. No. 94­5959. Boyle v. Brigano, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1047. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 972 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5962. Gill v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­5963. Gomez v. Brun Apartments. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­5965. Doose v. Poppen et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5966. Boroja v. Nedeljkovich et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5968. Ogunsalu v. Kroger Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1433. No. 94­5974. Drake v. Walker et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­5976. Baker v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5981. Lindsey v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 1327. No. 94­5982. Penk v. City of Aurora et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5984. Parker v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1394. No. 94­5985. Pinster v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5986. Morris v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5987. Reed v. Henson. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 432. No. 94­5990. Damerville v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5996. Van Duesen v. Evatt et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1212. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 973 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­5997. Smith v. City of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 103. No. 94­5998. Rebar v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­5999. Moore v. Dillon, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6000. Owens v. Larsen et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1210. No. 94­6002. Sanchez v. McLendon et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 302. No. 94­6003. Shaw v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Depart- ment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6004. Scales v. McCaughtry, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6007. DiGianni v. Saks Fifth Avenue. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 553. No. 94­6010. March v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 240. No. 94­6012. Mata v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6014. Carroll v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 1316. No. 94­6019. Noorzin v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 App. Div. 2d 69, 605 N. Y. S. 2d 37. No. 94­6026. Montgomery v. Evatt, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1040. No. 94­6030. Isiah v. Tansy, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1057. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 974 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6033. Rebar v. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­6037. Mobin v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1114. No. 94­6040. Fairchild v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 317 Ark. 166, 876 S. W. 2d 588. No. 94­6044. Houston v. Rocha, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­6047. Harris v. Robinson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 11. No. 94­6065. Azar v. Health Alliance Plan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6066. Hoekel v. Plumbing Planning Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 839. No. 94­6067. Johns v. McFadden, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 247. No. 94­6068. Hernandez v. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6069. Johnson v. Dickinson. Ct. App. Tenn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6070. Howard v. Beason et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 662 So. 2d 927. No. 94­6071. Ford et al. v. Clement et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 94­6073. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­6074. Dunmore v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1477. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 975 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­6079. Clemon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 640. No. 94­6081. Velasquez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 135. No. 94­6084. Smith v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 509. No. 94­6090. Davis v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 1012. No. 94­6091. Brifis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­6102. Cleveland v. Schley et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6105. Beasley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­6134. Hanson v. Passer, Chief Executive Officer, Anoka County Adult Detention Facility. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6135. Guzman-Bruno v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 420. No. 94­6139. Zavala Maldonado v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 4. No. 94­6141. Mohammed v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 815. No. 94­6143. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6144. Williams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­6145. Schmidt et ux. v. Internal Revenue Serv- ice. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­6146. Alonso v. Municipal Court of California, County of Ventura (California, Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 976 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6147. Payton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 17. No. 94­6154. Ford v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1115. No. 94­6156. McCullough v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 251. No. 94­6159. Bashford v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 412. No. 94­6161. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1126. No. 94­6165. Carver v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Southern Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6167. Rimell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 281. No. 94­6171. Baugh v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­6177. Ridings v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­6182. Lavin v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 40. No. 94­6185. Waddell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­6186. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 829. No. 94­6190. Veteto v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 641. No. 94­6191. Martin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 142. No. 94­6192. Longenette v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6193. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 914. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 977 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­6194. Perez-Monragon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 110. No. 94­6196. Moore v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 637. No. 94­6197. Marts v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 109. No. 94­6198. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 271. No. 94­6199. Miller v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­6202. Redmon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­6203. Craig v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. No. 94­6208. Johnson v. Rosemeyer, Superintendent, Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Greens- burg, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 301. No. 94­6210. Urena v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1487. No. 94­6212. Hutchison v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 109. No. 94­6218. Elcock v. Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 276. No. 94­6219. Lan Ngoc Tran v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 785. No. 94­6220. Hoover v. United States Parole Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­6221. Hung Van Huynh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6223. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 243. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 978 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 October 31, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6224. Kleinbart v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 586. No. 94­6225. Locklear v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 641. No. 94­6233. Simmons v. McCaughtry, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6235. Cromlish v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6236. Colburn v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­6237. Torres Velasquez et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 694. No. 94­6243. Escobar-Urrego v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­6245. Fitzgerald et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6246. Gutierrez-Calle v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­6248. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6253. Harris et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1275. No. 94­6256. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1213. No. 94­6262. Compton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­6269. Houck v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 113. No. 94­6275. Dago v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 63. No. 94­6277. Mesa-Celis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 979 513 U. S. October 31, 1994 No. 94­6280. Lee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 115. No. 94­6281. Nathan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. No. 94­6283. Moore v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 969. No. 94­6298. Hobbs v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 562. No. 94­6300. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6301. Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 631. No. 93­1663. Means v. Wortham et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tions of National Association of Assistant United States Attor- neys et al., Federal Bar Association, and 403 Attorney-Employees of the U. S. Department of Justice for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 F. 3d 1313. No. 94­169. Swanner, dba Whitehall Properties v. An- chorage Equal Rights Commission et al. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 P. 2d 274. Justice Thomas, dissenting. Petitioner owns residential rental property in Anchorage, Alaska. He maintained a consistent policy of refusing to rent to any unmarried couple who intended to live together on his prop- erty, based on his sincere religious belief that such cohabitation is a sin and that he would be facilitating the sin by renting to cohabitants. At the instigation of several people to whom peti- tioner applied his policy, respondent ruled that petitioner had violated state and local ordinances that prohibit landlords from basing rental decisions on prospective tenants' "marital status." Petitioner appealed to the Alaska Superior Court, which upheld respondent's ruling. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, con- cluding that the application of the ordinances to petitioner's con- duct did not violate his right to the free exercise of religion under either the United States Constitution or the Alaska Constitution. 874 P. 2d 274, 279­284 (1994) (per curiam). 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 980 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Thomas, J., dissenting 513 U. S. The Alaska Supreme Court also ruled that petitioner had no defense to the state and local ordinances under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V), enacted during the pendency of the proceedings below. RFRA provides that a gov- ernmental entity "shall not substantially burden a person's exer- cise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless the entity "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest." §§ 2000bb­1(a), (b)(1).1 In a footnote, the opinion below dismissed petitioner's invocation of this Act of Congress: "Assuming that the Act is constitutional and applies to this case, it does not affect the outcome, because we hold in the next section that compelling state interests support the prohibi- tions on marital status discrimination." 874 P. 2d, at 280, n. 9. Petitioner seeks review of this latter ruling. I would grant cer- tiorari to resolve whether, under RFRA, an interest in preventing discrimination based on marital status is sufficiently "compelling" that respondent may substantially burden petitioner's exercise of religion. RFRA explicitly adopted "the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder." 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), we stated: "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, `only the grav- est abuses [by religious adherents], endangering paramount inter- ests, give occasion for permissible limitation [on the exercise of religion].' " Id., at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945)). And in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), we emphasized that the government's asserted interest must be truly paramount: "The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order . . . 1 RFRA was Congress' response to our decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), which supplanted the compelling interest test in Free Exercise Clause jurispru- dence with the inquiry into whether a governmental burden on religiously motivated action is both "neutral" and "generally applicable." Thus, as a substitute for constitutional protection, RFRA grants a statutory "claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb(b)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. V). 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 981 979 Thomas, J., dissenting can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id., at 215 (emphasis added). I am quite skeptical that Alaska's asserted interest in prevent- ing discrimination on the basis of marital status is "compelling" enough to satisfy these stringent standards. Our decision in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983), is instructive in the context of asserted governmental interests in preventing private "discrimination." In that case, we held that "the Govern- ment has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education." Id., at 604. We found such an in- terest fundamental and overriding-in a word, "compelling," see ibid.-only because we had found that "[o]ver the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public educa- tion." Id., at 593 (discussing, inter alia, Brown v. Board of Edu- cation, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958); and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V)). By contrast, there is surely no "firm national policy" against marital status discrimination in housing decisions. Chief Justice Moore, dissenting in the case below, correctly observed that "mar- ital status classifications have never been accorded any heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of either the federal or the Alaska Constitutions." 874 P. 2d, at 289. Accord, Smith v. Shalala, 5 F. 3d 235, 239 (CA7 1993) ("Because [a] classification based on marital status does not involve a suspect class . . . , we must examine it under the rational basis test"), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 930 (1994). Moreover, the federal Fair Housing Act does not prohibit people from making housing decisions based on mari- tal status. See 42 U. S. C. § 3604 (outlawing housing discrimina- tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin). Cf. § 3602(k) (defining "familial status" to mean the domicil of children with adults). Nor does Alaska law, apart from the statutes at issue in this case, attest to any firm state policy against marital status discrim- ination. Indeed, as the dissent below pointed out: "Alaska law explicitly sanctions such discrimination. See, e. g., AS 13.11.015 (intestate succession does not benefit un- married partner of decedent); AS 23.30.215(a) (workers' com- pensation death benefits only for surviving spouse, child, par- 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 982 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Thomas, J., dissenting 513 U. S. ent, grandchild, or sibling); Alaska R. Evid. 505 (no marital communication privilege between unmarried couples); Serra- dell v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 843 P. 2d 639, 641 (Alaska 1992) (no insurance coverage for unmarried partner under family accident insurance policy)." 874 P. 2d, at 289. The majority admitted that these were "areas in which the state itself discriminates based on marital status." Id., at 283. If, despite affirmative discrimination by Alaska on the basis of marital status and a complete absence of any national policy against such discrimination, the State's asserted interest in this case is allowed to qualify as a "compelling" interest-that is, a "paramount" interest, an interest "of the highest order"-then I am at a loss to know what asserted governmental interests are not compelling. The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court drains the word compelling of any meaning and seriously undermines the protection for exercise of religion that Congress so emphati- cally mandated in RFRA. Although RFRA itself is a relatively new statute, the state courts have already exhibited considerable confusion in applying the Sherbert-Yoder test to the specific issue presented by this case. Apart from this case, the highest courts of Massachusetts and Minnesota are each deeply split on the question whether preventing "marital status" discrimination is a "compelling" inter- est under our precedents, and the California Court of Appeal has twice applied the compelling interest test adopted by RFRA in reaching decisions that are directly contrary to the decision below. See Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 636 N. E. 2d 233 (1994); State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N. W. 2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. App.), review granted, 880 P. 2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P. 2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dism'd, cause remanded, 859 P. 2d 671 (Cal. 1993).2 2 There is no doubt that these decisions applied the Sherbert-Yoder test adopted by RFRA. See Desilets, 418 Mass., at 321­322, and n. 5, 636 N. E. 2d, at 236, and n. 5 (plurality opinion); id., at 334­335, 636 N. E. 2d, at 243 (Liacos, C. J., concurring); id., at 341, 636 N. E. 2d, at 246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); French, 460 N. W. 2d, at 13­14 (Popovich, C. J., dissenting); Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 403, 406, 409, 410; Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 41, 44. 513ord$$1d 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 983 513 U. S. October 31, November 7, 1994 By itself, this confusion on an important and recurring question of federal law provides sufficient reason to grant certiorari in this case. I respectfully dissent. No. 94­179. CenTra, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Rela- tions Board. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer con- sideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 2d 366. No. 94­5855. Jolly v. Gammon, Superintendent, Moberly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 51. No. 94­535. Zisk et al. v. Placer County Superior Court (Walker, Real Party in Interest). Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Motion of petitioners to supplement petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5977. Azubuko v. Commissioner of Parking, City of Boston, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating Justice White (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit during the period October 31 through November 3, 1994, and for such time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294(a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. November 7, 1994 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­1004. United States v. Foster. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of United States v. Shabani, ante, p. 10. Reported below: 978 F. 2d 716. No. 93­1353. United States v. Simpson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 984 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 1994 513 U. S. for further consideration in light of United States v. Shabani, ante, p. 10. Reported below: 10 F. 3d 645. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Wright v. Alexandria Division of Social Services. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with- out an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted. No. - ­ ­­­. Ervin v. Smith, Warden, et al.; and No. - ­ ­­­. Graham v. Texas et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. D­1425. In re Disbarment of Abrams. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1268.] No. D­1434. In re Disbarment of Perry. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1275.] No. D­1442. In re Disbarment of Feldman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1276.] No. D­1445. In re Disbarment of Sparrow. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1276.] No. D­1446. In re Disbarment of Kenderian. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1276.] No. D­1447. In re Disbarment of Cregan. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1276.] No. D­1448. In re Disbarment of Crowley. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1277.] No. D­1449. In re Disbarment of Levine. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1277.] No. D­1465. In re Disbarment of Goodman. It is ordered that Lennard S. Goodman, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1466. In re Disbarment of Walsh. It is ordered that Arthur Beauchesne Walsh, of Littleton, Colo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 985 513 U. S. November 7, 1994 returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 94­13. Kansas Department of Corrections v. Brink- man et al., ante, p. 927. Motion of respondents for attorney's fees and costs denied without prejudice to refiling in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. No. 94­251. United States v. Robertson. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 945.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Glenn Stewart Warren, Esq., of San Diego, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 94­464. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. North Car- olina Railroad Co. Ct. App. N. C. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 94­5059. Jones v. Schulze, Director, Missouri De- partment of Social Services, Division of Family Services, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 805] denied. No. 94­6316. In re Liggins; No. 94­6341. In re Seagrave; and No. 94­6408. In re Rae. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 94­6299. In re Grubbs. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 94­6118. In re Chamberlin. Petition for writ of manda- mus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Denied No. 93­1633. Swan et al. v. Peterson, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6 F. 3d 1373. No. 93­1906. Tuxedo Union Free School District et al. v. Cullen. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 96. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 986 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­2098. Grimes et al. v. Vitalink Communications Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1553. No. 93­6940. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 438. No. 93­9689. Jonsson, aka Akaberian v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 759. No. 93­9698. Miller v. United States; and No. 94­5068. Hamilton, aka Nordquist v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 350. No. 93­9773. Pasquarille v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 682. No. 94­70. City of Los Angeles et al. v. Bradford. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­72. Sandler Associates, L. P., et al. v. BellSouth Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 123. No. 94­108. Comparato, Individually and as Administra- tor of the Estate of Camparato, Deceased, et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 455. No. 94­173. Dixon v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 256 Ill. App. 3d 771, 628 N. E. 2d 399. No. 94­207. Grupo Protexa, S. A., et al. v. All American Marine Slip, a Division of Marine Office of American Corp., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1224. No. 94­212. Holmberg et ux. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1062. No. 94­257. Evans, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Daley, Deceased v. Resolution Trust Corporation, Receiver for University Savings Assn., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 236. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 987 513 U. S. November 7, 1994 No. 94­262. Hughes Aircraft Co., Inc. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 974. No. 94­267. Toti v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 806. No. 94­335. Duncan v. Blinebery, Zoning Inspector, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1472, 634 N. E. 2d 627. No. 94­371. Goff v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 918. No. 94­444. Nebraska ex rel. Nelson, Governor v. Cen- tral Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 77. No. 94­449. Santa Fe Pacific Corp. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 725. No. 94­459. Bishop v. Georgia State Bar. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 241, 442 S. E. 2d 734. No. 94­463. Schankman v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­471. Babinski v. Regucci et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 555. No. 94­476. Doughtie et al. v. Florida Department of State et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 4. No. 94­477. Leisure Time Productions, B. V. v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 17 F. 3d 38. No. 94­478. Tortuya v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 249. No. 94­480. Timberlane Regional School District v. Murphy, By and Through His Legal Guardians, Murphy 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 988 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 1994 513 U. S. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1186. No. 94­482. Enterprise Consolidated School District, By and Through Its Board of Trustees v. Lauderdale County, Mississippi, School District, By and Through Its Board of Education, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 671. No. 94­483. Succession of Ricord v. Energy Transporta- tion Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 236. No. 94­485. Benigni v. Cowles Media Co., dba Star Trib- une, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­486. Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. Cali- fornia State Water Resources Control Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 Cal. App. 4th 1459, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734. No. 94­491. Wildberger v. American Federation of Gov- ernment Employees, Council 228, et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­495. Quisenberry v. Berk, Trustee, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 989. No. 94­498. Lintz et al. v. Skipski et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 304. No. 94­499. Gardner et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1056. No. 94­501. Hinshaw v. Mahler et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­506. Tillman-Brown et al. v. City of Sacramento et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­516. Wilson v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 287, 444 S. E. 2d 306. No. 94­544. Zieser et al. v. Farmers Home Administra- tion et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 572. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 989 513 U. S. November 7, 1994 No. 94­582. Shong-Ching Tong v. General Dynamics et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­587. Chow et ux. v. Internal Revenue Service et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 245. No. 94­594. Nash v. Halliburton Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1043. No. 94­598. Roach v. Beaufort County Schools. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 114 N. C. App. 330, 443 S. E. 2d 339. No. 94­601. Mummau v. Mummau. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 432 Pa. Super. 700, 635 A. 2d 214. No. 94­604. Quintero v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­606. Koczak v. Smith, Secretary of State of Flor- ida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1096. No. 94­611. S&P Co. v. Yorkshire et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 942. No. 94­653. Jacobs Manufacturing Co. v. Sam Brown Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1259. No. 94­5207. De la Fe v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 35. No. 94­5228. Neal v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 425. No. 94­5384. Lambert v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5480. Carroll v. Phillips. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5599. Todd v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 140. No. 94­5771. Copple v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 535. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 990 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5980. Reaves v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 1. No. 94­6013. Collins v. Stanislaus County Department of Social Services. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6024. Williams et al. v. Arnold & Arnold. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 315 Ark. 632, 870 S. W. 2d 365. No. 94­6025. Bowie v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 625 So. 2d 393. No. 94­6032. Roussos v. Baxley et al. Ct. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 334 Md. 212, 638 A. 2d 753. No. 94­6036. McBride v. Sharpe, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 962. No. 94­6039. Sanchez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367. No. 94­6042. Fitzgerald v. Gamble, Administrator, Mon- tana Department of Corrections and Human Services, Corrections Division. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 28 F. 3d 105. No. 94­6043. Eldridge v. Kincheloe, Superintendent, Spring Creek Correctional Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 130. No. 94­6050. Reyes v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1058. No. 94­6059. Larson v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6063. Johnson v. Prewitt, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 131. No. 94­6087. Yakich v. Municipal Court of San Jose, California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 991 513 U. S. November 7, 1994 No. 94­6089. Williams v. Stainer, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6100. Allen v. Johnson, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 566. No. 94­6101. Snelling v. Chrysler Motors Corp. et al. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 S. W. 2d 527. No. 94­6104. Barnette v. Johnson, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1038. No. 94­6117. Brown v. Barton et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­6119. Jones v. Michigan Department of Social Services et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6120. Bolling v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1038. No. 94­6121. Brown v. Carlton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6124. Meade-Stephens v. School District of the City of Jersey City, Hudson County. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 137 N. J. 167, 644 A. 2d 614. No. 94­6126. McFadden v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6127. Reyes v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 945, 638 N. E. 2d 961. No. 94­6128. Meeks v. Dewitt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 538. No. 94­6129. London v. Haws, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 569. No. 94­6130. Richardson v. McBride, Superintendent, Westville Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 430. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 992 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6138. Branch v. Keohane, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6149. Molina v. Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 637, 873 P. 2d 891. No. 94­6170. Bartlett v. Ortiz, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 104. No. 94­6172. Burress v. Presbyterian Church et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6205. Knapp v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 451. No. 94­6258. Schomer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 94­6272. Becton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 242. No. 94­6302. Allen v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1180. No. 94­6306. Shackleford v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6309. Pinochet v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 49. No. 94­6313. Myers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­6314. Prieto v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 94. No. 94­6319. Hiratani v. Department of the Treasury et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 632. No. 94­6320. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. No. 94­6321. Kramm v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6324. Bruning v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 142. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 993 513 U. S. November 7, 1994 No. 94­6326. Branch v. United States et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Wis. 2d cxxiii, 524 N. W. 2d 144. No. 94­6327. Couch v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 711. No. 94­6336. Ankomah v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 118. No. 94­6339. Malbrough v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 624. No. 94­6346. Galban v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1494. No. 94­6349. Korando v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1114. No. 94­6354. Mays v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 641. No. 94­6365. Minh Do v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 785. No. 94­6368. English v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6375. Kinard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 636. No. 94­6383. Winzer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 637. No. 94­6385. Tate v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 131. No. 94­6388. Council v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6389. Cole v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 16. No. 94­6392. DiGianni v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6396. Nosair v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 553. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 994 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6398. Adams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­6401. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 61. No. 94­6403. Harris et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6456. Russell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­33. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Sea Savage, Inc., et al.; and No. 94­220. Sea Savage, Inc., et al. v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Re- ported below: 13 F. 3d 888 and 22 F. 3d 568. No. 94­479. Cool Light Co., Inc. v. GTE Products Corp. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 349. No. 94­6363. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the considera- tion or decision of this petition. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1296. No. 94­6372. Carmichael v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1296. No. 94­236. Baby "Richard," aka Baby Boy Janikova, a Minor, by His Guardian ad Litem, O'Connell v. Kirchner; andNo. 94­615. Doe et ux., Adoptive Parents of Baby Boy Janikova v. Kirchner, Biological Father of Baby Boy Jani- kova. Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of DeBoer Committee for Children's Rights et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 347, 638 N. E. 2d 181. No. 94­454. Kentucky v. Linehan. Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 S. W. 2d 8. 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 995 513 U. S. November 7, 1994 No. 94­470. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction v. Starr. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1280. No. 94­466. Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Nueces County Appraisal District et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Motions of American Petroleum Institute, Institute of Prop- erty Taxation, and General Motors Corp. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 S. W. 2d 298. No. 94­490. Arkansas Educational Television Commis- sion v. Forbes. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Association of Ameri- ca's Public Television Stations et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1423. No. 94­494. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Zenith Labora- tories, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Hoffman-La Roche Inc. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1418. Rehearing Denied No. 93­9152. Vey v. Colville et al., ante, p. 834; No. 93­9214. Bowen v. Kernan, Warden, et al., ante, p. 836; No. 93­9308. Gibbs v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Affirmative Action Unit, ante, p. 840; No. 93­9517. Veneri v. Domovich, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, ante, p. 851; No. 93­9660. Hensler v. United States, ante, p. 859; No. 94­5029. Pizzo v. Risinger, ante, p. 880; No. 94­5256. In re Montgomery, ante, p. 806; No. 94­5266. Saunders v. City of Beverly et al., ante, p. 893; No. 94­5364. Warren v. Cole, ante, p. 898; No. 94­5420. Arnstein v. United States, ante, p. 900; No. 94­5464. Amsden v. Professional Conduct Commit- tee, New Hampshire Supreme Court, ante, p. 902; 513ord$$1e 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 996 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 7, 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5546. Adair v. United States et al., ante, p. 906; andNo. 94­5591. Bercovici v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ante, p. 908. Petitions for rehearing denied. November 14, 1994 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­112. Harleston et al. v. Jeffries. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661 (1994). Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1238. No. 94­5798. Sterling v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849 (1994). Reported below: 26 F. 3d 29. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Vda de Mendoza et al. v. United States. Motion for reconsideration of order denying leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [ante, p. 802] denied. No. - ­ ­­­. McNamara v. United States. Motion to di- rect the Clerk to file an application and present it to Justice Scalia denied. No. D­1450. In re Disbarment of Karch. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1281.] No. D­1451. In re Disbarment of Linder. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1282.] No. D­1452. In re Disbarment of Mitwol. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1282.] No. D­1453. In re Disbarment of Zelman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1282.] No. D­1456. In re Disbarment of Freedman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1282.] 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 997 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 No. D­1467. In re Disbarment of Wilson. It is ordered that Grafton B. Wilson II, of Gainesville, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1468. In re Disbarment of Laudani. It is ordered that A. David Laudani, of Eastpointe, Mich., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is awarded a total of $972 for the period July 1 through September 30, 1994, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 803.] No. 108, Orig. Nebraska v. Wyoming et al. Motion of the Special Master for award of compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $180,833.83 for the period April 1 through September 30, 1994, to be paid as follows: 30% to be paid by each Nebraska and Wyo- ming, 15% to be paid by Colorado, and 25% to be paid by the United States. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 923.] No. 121, Orig. Louisiana v. Mississippi et al. Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed by the parties within 30 days. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 804.] No. 93­1318. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Trans- con Lines et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1029.] Motion of respondents for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted. No. 93­1783. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Newport News Ship- building & Dry Dock Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1287.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 93­9082. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 998 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9444. In re Gaydos; No. 93­9577. Gaydos v. Chertoff, Former United States Attorney, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; No. 93­9618. In re Gaydos; No. 94­5018. In re Gaydos; and No. 94­5070. In re Gaydos. Motions of petitioner for recon- sideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 924] denied. No. 93­9122. Rodenbaugh v. Ott (two cases). C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 805] denied. No. 94­5291. Baasch v. Reyer et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 805] denied. No. 94­5860. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. (two cases). C. A. 3d Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 945] denied. No. 94­203. Morse et al. v. Republican Party of Virginia et al. Appeal from D. C. W. D. Va. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 94­5198. In re Dancy; No. 94­6103. In re DiGianni; and No. 94­6228. In re Moorehead. Petitions for writs of man- damus denied. No. 94­5865. In re Collier; No. 94­5867. In re Magee; and No. 94­5894. In re Higgins. Petitions for writs of manda- mus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 94­167. Gutierrez de Martinez et al. v. Lamagno et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 402. No. 94­500. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1119. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 999 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 Certiorari Denied No. 93­8521. Fleenor v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 622 N. E. 2d 140. No. 93­9155. Kimball v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 54. No. 93­9358. Hall v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 157 Ill. 2d 324, 626 N. E. 2d 131. No. 93­9674. Heidemann v. Young. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 1026. No. 93­9699. In re Head (two cases). C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1429. No. 93­9748. Hall v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1184. No. 93­9790. Borowy v. Bass, PLC, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1184. No. 94­249. Rowe v. DeBruyn, Commissioner, Indiana De- partment of Correction, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1047. No. 94­315. Billing et al. v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P. A., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1242. No. 94­327. Beus v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­366. UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 766. No. 94­374. Weber v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 140. No. 94­396. Wizbowski et al. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­475. Earth Island Institute, Marine Mammal Fund, et al. v. Brown, Secretary of Commerce, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 76. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1000 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­504. Yeoman et al. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet et al.; and No. 94­525. Smith et al. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet et al. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 S. W. 2d 873. No. 94­508. Optimal Data Corp. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 138. No. 94­509. MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 116. No. 94­510. Zekaria Realty, Inc. v. Ocean County, New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 271 N. J. Super. 280, 638 A. 2d 859. No. 94­515. Mitchell et al. v. Amarillo Hospital Dis- trict et al. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 855 S. W. 2d 857. No. 94­521. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1385. No. 94­523. Davis, Personal Representative of the Es- tate of Davis, et al. v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 426. No. 94­528. Haydoo et al. v. General Electric Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 133. No. 94­530. Shaffer, Secretary of State of New York v. New York State Association of Realtors, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 834. No. 94­531. Augustus et al. v. Louisiana, Through Its Governor, Edwards, et al. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 1218. No. 94­532. Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd., fka Bank Line Ltd., et al. v. Bowers et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 800. No. 94­536. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Orjias et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 995. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1001 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 No. 94­543. DoPadre v. DoPadre. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­545. Worrell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­546. Subafilms, Ltd., et al. v. United Artists Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1088. No. 94­547. Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 998. No. 94­548. Knight v. Mingledorff, Alabama Commis- sioner of Revenue. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 645 So. 2d 372. No. 94­550. DeWeerth v. Baldinger et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1266. No. 94­551. Harris v. City of Akron et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1396. No. 94­553. Meche v. Meche. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 635 So. 2d 614. No. 94­556. Moore v. Local Union 569, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 107. No. 94­561. Lowry v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 344. No. 94­565. Athmann et al. v. North Slope Borough. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 108. No. 94­567. Duffy v. District Board of Trustees, Miami- Dade Community College. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­577. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­585. Jarvis v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 97. 513ORD Unit: $PT1 [01-06-00 06:49:36] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1002 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­586. Johnson v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 101. No. 94­589. LeBlanc et vir v. Meza et al. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 620 So. 2d 521. No. 94­602. Henderson v. Kessler et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1209. No. 94­620. Buchbinder et al. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­629. Dass v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­639. McKenna v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­641. Shields v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 137. No. 94­656. Traxler v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 476. No. 94­663. Casas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 788. No. 94­678. Daddona v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 163. No. 94­679. Scott v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 518 N. W. 2d 347. No. 94­696. Menzer v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1223. No. 94­700. Thomas et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­702. Kassouf et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­5196. Stephens v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 498. No. 94­5202. Cashin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1221. 513ORD Unit: $PT1 [01-06-00 06:50:39] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1003 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 No. 94­5252. Luis v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 625 N. E. 2d 506. No. 94­5258. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5530. Zeigler v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 486. No. 94­5551. Singleton v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 233. No. 94­5734. Carter v. Peters, Director, Illinois De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 697. No. 94­5769. Bailey v. Bailey. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 97 Md. App. 750. No. 94­5815. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5871. Brown v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 P. 2d 56. No. 94­5907. Jones v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 229, 443 S. E. 2d 48. No. 94­5913. Pollard v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 28 F. 3d 887. No. 94­5969. Pender v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1426. No. 94­6021. Riddle v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 314 S. C. 1, 443 S. E. 2d 557. No. 94­6088. Taylor v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 30. No. 94­6116. Tal-Mason v. Kern et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­6122. Califorrniaa v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:06 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1004 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6123. Anderson v. Makel, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6131. Seaton-El v. Attorney Grievance Commis- sion. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6137. C. B. v. Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 Vt. 229, 647 A. 2d 1001. No. 94­6140. Ray v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Depart- ment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6148. Sterling v. Hawley et al. (two cases). C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6150. Call v. Carlson et al. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6158. Dempsey v. Turner Broadcasting System et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6160. Crannell v. Crannell. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 162 Vt. 643, 648 A. 2d 664. No. 94­6168. Hendrix v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 916. No. 94­6176. Rusher v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1042. No. 94­6178. Phillips v. Maryland et al. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 335 Md. 229, 643 A. 2d 383. No. 94­6213. Irelan v. United States; and No. 94­6282. Pedraza v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1515. No. 94­6217. Dorri v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 888. No. 94­6222. Green v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­6229. Todd v. Wall, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1005 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 No. 94­6232. Pratt v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 594, 873 P. 2d 848. No. 94­6241. Green v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6271. Bracewell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6278. Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1407. No. 94­6279. Wallis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 572. No. 94­6284. Range v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1049. No. 94­6304. Gomez v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 126 Idaho 83, 878 P. 2d 782. No. 94­6325. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 131. No. 94­6329. Stephens v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 553. No. 94­6330. Wiley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 345. No. 94­6332. Perez v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1212. No. 94­6334. Brandt v. Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 126 Idaho 101, 878 P. 2d 800. No. 94­6338. Pasto v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­6344. Bermudez v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 645. No. 94­6352. Nichols v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1016. No. 94­6353. McKinnon v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 644 A. 2d 438. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1006 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6355. Rosebar v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­6360. Lazor v. Sperry Rand Corp., Univac Division (nka Unisys Corp.). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6362. Chukundah v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 131. No. 94­6366. Bills v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 62. No. 94­6367. Duffy v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 625. No. 94­6371. Koss v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­6374. Calderon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­6379. Werhan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 637. No. 94­6380. Carter v. Amtrak. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­6384. Sexton v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 321, 444 S. E. 2d 879. No. 94­6394. Peters v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 114. No. 94­6399. Buchanan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 639. No. 94­6407. Coy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 629. No. 94­6411. Orr v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­6412. Powell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 28. No. 94­6419. Sather v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 821. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1007 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 No. 94­6420. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6421. Forde v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 127. No. 94­6422. Hilton, aka Montana v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 115. No. 94­6423. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1259. No. 94­6428. Castano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­6430. Cheeks v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 118. No. 94­6431. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1239. No. 94­6432. Tillman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­6436. Lucas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 636. No. 94­6437. Madrid v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1269. No. 94­6444. Morales v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 44. No. 94­6445. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 641. No. 94­6446. Coyne v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 124. No. 94­6447. Branch v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1074. No. 94­6448. Maldonado Contreras v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6453. Duncan v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 1332. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1008 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6454. Hill v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 250. No. 94­6457. Burger v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6458. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­6459. Braslavsky v. Board of Trustees of Uni- versity of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­6461. Shinaberry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 55. No. 94­6462. Smith v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 128. No. 94­6464. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 572. No. 94­6466. Duran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­6467. Dunkins v. United States; and No. 94­6487. Fisher v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 574. No. 94­6468. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­6469. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­6470. Joyce v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1035. No. 94­6472. Parkins v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 114. No. 94­6474. Osorio-De Holguin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­6476. Mastrogiovanni v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1009 513 U. S. November 14, 1994 No. 94­6483. Einspahr v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 505. No. 94­6489. Goetsch v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 186 Wis. 2d 1, 519 N. W. 2d 634. No. 94­6496. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 540. No. 94­6497. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6499. Sonagere v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 51. No. 94­6504. Calvillo v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1492. No. 94­6505. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1009. No. 94­6508. Tangeman v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 950. No. 94­5610. Porter v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to file an amendment to petition for writ of certio- rari granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 554. No. 94­6331. Wadlington v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1296. Rehearing Denied No. D­1423. In re Disbarment of Okocha, 512 U. S. 1284; No. 93­2056. Reichstein v. Nalico International Corp. et al., ante, p. 824; No. 93­9035. Quiban v. Department of Veterans Affairs, ante, p. 918; No. 93­9416. Marcum v. United States, ante, p. 845; No. 93­9436. Voth v. Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, ante, p. 846; No. 93­9516. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police De- partment et al., ante, p. 851; 513ord$$1f 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1010 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 14, 15, 21, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9523. Gocken v. Washington, ante, p. 851; No. 93­9573. Jimenez v. General Motors Corp. et al., ante, p. 854; No. 93­9581. Lloyd v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ante, p. 854; No. 93­9762. Russell v. United States, ante, p. 864; No. 93­9764. Besinga v. United States et al., ante, p. 864; No. 93­9784. In re Crawford, ante, p. 806; No. 94­114. Davis v. New Jersey Bell, ante, p. 871; No. 94­143. Nelson et al. v. Massachusetts et al., ante, p. 872; No. 94­5143. Guinn v. Cooper, Warden, et al., ante, p. 887; No. 94­5177. Bleicken v. Perkins et al., ante, p. 889; No. 94­5242. Wilson v. City of Berkeley et al., ante, p. 892; No. 94­5336. In re Crumb, ante, p. 805; and No. 94­5491. Guichard v. Wisnieski et al., ante, p. 903. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 93­115. NYSA­ILA Welfare Fund et al. v. Dunston, New Jersey Commissioner of Health, et al., 510 U. S. 944. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. No. 93­738. Oberle, aka Jones v. United States, 510 U. S. 1025. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. November 15, 1994 Miscellaneous Order No. 94­167. Gutierrez de Martinez et al. v. Lamagno et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 998.] Mi- chael K. Kellogg, Esq., of Washington, D. C., a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to brief and argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. November 21, 1994 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­670. Caldwell et ux. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 573. 513ORD Unit: $PT1 [02-12-00 19:28:46] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1011 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­392. Ward v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767 (1994). Reported below: 870 S. W. 2d 659. No. 94­428. Ristow et ux. v. South Carolina Ports Au- thority et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, ante, p. 30. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 84. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Laughter v. Belk-Simpson; and No. - ­ ­­­. Mester v. Saiki et al. Motions for reconsider- ation of order denying leave to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time [ante, p. 802] denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Lee et al. v. Flightsafety Services et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Nicholson et al. v. Cooney, Secretary of State of Montana, et al.; No. - ­ ­­­. Mendlow v. University of Washington et al.; and No. - ­ ­­­. Kersh v. Deven Lithographers, Inc. Mo- tions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Moretti v. Red Roof Inn et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time and without a final judgment from the highest court of the State in which a judgment could be had denied. No. A­292. In re Application of Hirsch. Dist. Ct. Ore., Josephine County. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Scalia and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­313. Beddoe v. United States et al. D. C. E. D. Cal. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Thomas and re- ferred to the Court, denied. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1012 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. A­344 (94­892). C. W., by Her Guardian ad Litem, McKinley v. Wasiek. Super. Ct. Pa. Application for stay, ad- dressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1462. In re Disbarment of O'Keefe. A response to the rule to show cause having been filed, it is ordered that the rule to show cause is hereby discharged, and the order heretofore entered October 11, 1994 [ante, p. 923], suspending respondent from the practice of law in this Court is vacated. No. 93­1202. Brunwasser v. Steiner, 510 U. S. 1195. Mo- tion of petitioner to vacate order of May 2, 1994 [511 U. S. 1067], denied. No. 93­1841. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Secre- tary of Transportation, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of L. S. Lee, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae out of time granted. No. 93­1935. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 93­7927. Kyles v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1051.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted. No. 94­3. Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al. v. Hyde. Sup. Ct. Ohio. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 921.] Motion of Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 94­18. Mastrobuono et al. v. Shearson Lehman Hut- ton, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 921.] Motions of American Association of Limited Partners and Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. No. 94­6263. Deggendorf et al. v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich.; and No. 94­6293. Sampang v. Detrick. C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until December 19, 1994, within which to 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1013 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit peti- tions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­6267. Fertel-Rust v. Milwaukee Police Depart- ment et al. C. A. 7th Cir.; No. 94­6268. Fertel-Rust v. Ambassador Hotel et al. C. A. 7th Cir.; and No. 94­6340. In re Whitaker. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioners are allowed until December 19, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­6627. In re Wilson. C. A. 8th Cir. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied. No. 94­6621. In re Granada. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. No. 94­628. In re Taylor et al.; and No. 94­6494. In re Chaudhary. Petitions for writs of man- damus denied. No. 94­588. In re Biggins. C. A. 1st Cir. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 126. Certiorari Granted No. 94­270. United States v. Aguilar. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1475. No. 94­590. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton et ux., Guardians ad Litem for Acton. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1514. No. 94­562. Wilton et al. v. Seven Falls Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 934. No. 94­623. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of Maritime Law Association of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1014 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this peti- tion. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 727. No. 94­5707. Wilson v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 317 Ark. 548, 878 S. W. 2d 755. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 94­6627 and 94­588, supra.) No. 93­1958. Feldman v. Bahn et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 730. No. 93­7963. Scott v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1223. No. 93­8910. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1544. No. 93­9295. Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 511. No. 93­9484. Richardson v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 93­9645. Lawrence v. Riley, Secretary of Education, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1232. No. 93­9758. Ferran et al. v. Town of Nassau, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 21. No. 94­22. Washington v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­32. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Deus et al.; and No. 94­427. Deus v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 506. No. 94­44. Belknap v. Henderson et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1305. No. 94­161. Heuer v. United States Secretary of State. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 424. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1015 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­231. Anderson et al. v. United States; and No. 94­243. Tilley et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 295. No. 94­280. Gleave v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1313. No. 94­342. Gaev v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 473. No. 94­362. Acevedo-Villalobos et al. v. Hernandez et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 384. No. 94­364. A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 138. No. 94­365. Grant v. Lone Star Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 649. No. 94­368. Vernon Home Health Care Agency, Inc. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 693. No. 94­370. Funderburg v. United States Railroad Re- tirement Board. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 400. No. 94­390. American Water Development, Inc. v. City of Alamosa et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 874 P. 2d 352. No. 94­399. Hobley v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 272, 637 N. E. 2d 992. No. 94­400. Caterair International v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 22 F. 3d 1114. No. 94­404. Roth v. Securities and Exchange Commis- sion. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­405. Vastola v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 164. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1016 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­411. Piping of Ohio, Inc. v. Reich, Secretary of Labor, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1049. No. 94­440. Setola et al. v. Bob Schmidt Chevrolet, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­502. Afaneh v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­513. Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­563. Davis v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­566. Freeman v. Johnston. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 84 N. Y. 2d 52, 637 N. E. 2d 268. No. 94­569. Casa Veerkamp, S. A. de C. V., et al. v. Kreim- erman et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 634. No. 94­570. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Department of Treasury of Michigan et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 445 Mich. 470, 518 N. W. 2d 808. No. 94­571. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. v. Mangini. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 4th 1057, 875 P. 2d 73. No. 94­573. Mello et ux. v. Woodhouse et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Nev. 366, 872 P. 2d 337. No. 94­574. John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro, Commissioner, General Land Office, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 667. No. 94­576. Robertson, Chapter 7 Trustee of Interna- tional Nutronics, Inc. v. Isomedix, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 965. No. 94­578. District of Columbia et al. v. Lampkin et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 605. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1017 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­581. Foss Maritime Co. v. Ettinger. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­593. Hopping v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 N. E. 2d 1294. No. 94­595. ILQ Investments, Inc., et al. v. City of Roch- ester. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1413. No. 94­597. Myers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1122. No. 94­599. Rhinehart et al. v. Seattle Times et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Wash. App. 1067. No. 94­603. Black v. J. I. Case. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 568. No. 94­607. Eder v. ITT Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1039. No. 94­609. Pulasty v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 136 N. J. 356, 642 A. 2d 1392. No. 94­610. Branson v. Haber. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 244. No. 94­614. Yagman & Yagman, P. C. v. Gates et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 73. No. 94­616. Zapata Protein (USA), Inc., fka Zapata Hay- nie Corp. v. Butler. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 1274. No. 94­619. Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 129. No. 94­621. Spartanburg Steel Products, Inc. v. Con- stant. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 316 S. C. 86, 447 S. E. 2d 194. No. 94­622. Greene v. South Carolina Election Commis- sion et al. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 314 S. C. 449, 445 S. E. 2d 451. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1018 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­626. Baker v. Bennett et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 91. No. 94­632. Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Maxway Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 980. No. 94­633. Bell v. Supermarkets General Corp., t/a Pathmark. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 555. No. 94­635. Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Fund for California et al. v. Tri-Capital Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 849. No. 94­640. Scanlon v. State Bar of Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 251, 443 S. E. 2d 830. No. 94­643. McLaren v. Harlan. Ct. App. Wash. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 72 Wash. App. 1009. No. 94­646. Ritter, Bankruptcy Trustee, Substitute for Condrey v. Howard et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 624. No. 94­651. Exportadora de Sal, S. A. de C. V. v. Sugi- moto et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1309. No. 94­658. Hodge et al. v. Jones et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 157. No. 94­659. D. G. v. T. M. N. et al. Ct. App. Kan. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 19 Kan. App. 2d 574, 874 P. 2d 680. No. 94­667. McLenagan v. Karnes et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1002. No. 94­668. Mendenhall et al. v. Astec Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1573. No. 94­669. Badarayan v. Drake et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1038. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1019 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­676. Williams et al. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 930. No. 94­685. Murphy v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 486. No. 94­686. Zabkar v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 97. No. 94­687. Ross v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 103. No. 94­698. Shadian et ux. v. Carmenita Associates. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­707. Fuller v. Perry, Secretary of Defense, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 86. No. 94­710. Okon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1025. No. 94­711. United Mine Workers of America, District 28 v. Island Creek Coal Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 126. No. 94­722. Conklin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1105. No. 94­726. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 409. No. 94­727. Heyward v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 106. No. 94­736. Richard v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1458. No. 94­740. Wilson v. Central Freight Lines, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­758. Mobile Medex, Inc. v. Bramucci, Commis- sioner of Labor of New Jersey. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 558. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1020 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­760. LeDonne v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1418. No. 94­777. West v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 586. No. 94­5062. Yankelevicz v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 9. No. 94­5380. Lester v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 407. No. 94­5403. Webber v. Byers et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 433 Pa. Super. 625, 636 A. 2d 1224. No. 94­5416. Cordova v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5451. Brimmer v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 876 S. W. 2d 75. No. 94­5467. Sumrall v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 148, 442 S. E. 2d 246. No. 94­5647. Nolley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 80. No. 94­5792. Villalobos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­5803. Jovanovic et ux. v. Stained Glass Overlay, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 138. No. 94­5853. Kitchen v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 1, 636 N. E. 2d 433. No. 94­5866. Roman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 35. No. 94­5873. Cuartas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5878. Fair v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 51, 636 N. E. 2d 455. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1021 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­5895. Zimmerman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 S. W. 2d 360. No. 94­5932. Hatfield v. Daugherty, Garrad District Judge, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­6009. Lavold v. Chang et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6056. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 953. No. 94­6111. Johnston v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 184 Wis. 2d 794, 518 N. W. 2d 759. No. 94­6142. Platsky v. Studeman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 102. No. 94­6151. Holmes v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 622 So. 2d 877. No. 94­6152. Etemad v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6157. Miller v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6163. Reiss v. Clarkstown et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6164. Lyons v. Kiernan et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 131. No. 94­6166. Abidekun v. New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6174. Kirakossian v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6179. Andrews v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 682, 641 A. 2d 1218. No. 94­6180. Childs v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 S. W. 2d 781. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1022 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6181. Sports v. Vaughn, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­6184. Vining v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 921. No. 94­6188. Bedford v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6189. Bolender v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1547. No. 94­6200. Nenninger v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., South- ern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 S. W. 2d 589. No. 94­6201. Love v. Stalder, Secretary, Louisiana De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6204. Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 194. No. 94­6206. Keenan v. Michigan Department of Correc- tions. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6207. Irby v. Macht et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 184 Wis. 2d 831, 522 N. W. 2d 9. No. 94­6209. Freeman v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 P. 2d 283. No. 94­6215. Adamo v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 431 Pa. Super. 529, 637 A. 2d 302. No. 94­6231. Lewis v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 641. No. 94­6234. Lopez Rojas v. Ratelle, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6239. Sheldon v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 4th 1136, 875 P. 2d 83. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1023 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­6244. Hydrick v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6247. Edinbyrd v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6249. Hutchings v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6250. Harrison v. Oklahoma et al. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6252. Kirby v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 So. 2d 587. No. 94­6254. Hooper v. Carlton, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6255. Saintil v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 251. No. 94­6257. Williams v. Bunnell, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 136. No. 94­6259. Wallace v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6264. Wallace v. Stinson, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 94­6265. Traylor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 19 F. 3d 37. No. 94­6266. Fields v. City of West Palm Beach, Florida; and Fields v. Graham, Mayor of the City of West Palm Beach, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 1026 (first case); 630 So. 2d 1099 (second case). No. 94­6276. Valdez v. Joy Technologies et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 623. No. 94­6285. Lucas v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 Mich. App. 717, 507 N. W. 2d 5. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1024 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6286. Roldan v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6288. Story v. Kindt, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 402. No. 94­6290. Gutierrez Marquez v. Gunn, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 632. No. 94­6291. Larkins v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6292. Wunderlich v. Hunter. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6295. Skelly v. Heidemann et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6296. Stein v. Lewis et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 108. No. 94­6297. Hooper v. Morgan County, Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6303. Ammar v. Welsch. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 99 Md. App. 740. No. 94­6310. Ramos v. Coughlin, Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6311. Patten v. Ruttger et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6312. Oliver v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6315. McCombs v. Cooledge et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 563. No. 94­6318. Estrella v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1108. No. 94­6322. Esparza v. Johnson, Deputy Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Health Services Divi- 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1025 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1492. No. 94­6335. Carnell v. Reed et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1120. No. 94­6343. Werner v. Bergen County Jail et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 125. No. 94­6345. Herron-Cole v. Jeter et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 407. No. 94­6347. Goodwin v. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6348. Jamerson v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­6351. Johnson v. Epps. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 566. No. 94­6358. Diaz Lopez v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 619. No. 94­6359. Payne v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6364. Chambliss v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 48. No. 94­6370. Kirkpatrick v. Stotts, Secretary, Kansas Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 142. No. 94­6376. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 640. No. 94­6377. Words v. Kansas. Dist. Ct. Sedgwick County, Kan. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6381. Sinai v. New England Telephone & Tele- graph Co. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 471. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1026 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6393. Powell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1212. No. 94­6395. Moses v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­6404. Holloway v. Hundley, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 627. No. 94­6406. Cooper v. Cox et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6410. McBride v. Head et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6417. McAfee v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6426. Hoffman v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 536 Pa. 546, 640 A. 2d 414. No. 94­6435. Otto v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1395. No. 94­6440. Smathers v. Greiner. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­6442. Randall v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of Volusia County et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 639. No. 94­6450. Green v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6452. Garrett v. Perry, Secretary of Defense, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­6473. Perez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­6490. Ramsey v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­6493. Dubyak v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1027 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­6495. Clark v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 23. No. 94­6498. Falcone v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­6502. Early v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 140. No. 94­6509. Lucas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 397. No. 94­6511. Rosas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­6514. Moody v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­6515. Munoz-Solarte et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­6516. Pedrick v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 756. No. 94­6519. Burgess v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­6520. Day v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­6521. Craven v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1211. No. 94­6522. Nichols v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­6529. Castro Gaxiola v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6530. Pfeiffer v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6531. Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 439. No. 94­6533. Heaton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 629. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1028 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6534. James v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 569. No. 94­6535. Furutani v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­6536. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 276. No. 94­6539. Sauer v. Alaska et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6540. Vladimirov v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 49. No. 94­6542. Dahlheim v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6543. Allbright v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1494. No. 94­6544. Garza-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1494. No. 94­6546. Davila v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 640. No. 94­6548. Weeks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 605. No. 94­6549. Trevino v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 563. No. 94­6550. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 568. No. 94­6551. Santos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­6552. Denoyer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6554. Cardenas-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1494. No. 94­6555. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1073. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1029 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­6558. Hart v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­6561. Lindsey v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 68. No. 94­6562. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­6563. Parker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 542. No. 94­6564. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6565. Rubio-Vasques v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­6566. Rincon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 921. No. 94­6567. O'Bannon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1495. No. 94­6572. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­6573. Hardison v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 110 Nev. 1542, 893 P. 2d 404. No. 94­6576. Humphrey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­6577. Flores-Juarez, aka Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6583. Hiebert v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1005. No. 94­6587. Perez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1060. No. 94­6588. Henry v. Speckard, Superintendent, Grove- land Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1209. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1030 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6590. Bandy v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­6592. Welch v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 573. No. 94­6596. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­6598. Edelson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6600. Green v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­6603. Chong In Kim v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1426. No. 94­6604. Hughes, aka Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1496. No. 94­6606. Jeffers v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 569. No. 94­6609. Camargo-Vergara v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1075. No. 94­6611. Arce v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1494. No. 94­6616. Pablo Turruellas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­6625. Strickland v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 110. No. 94­6629. Baker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­6631. Tracy v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 199. No. 94­6632. Todd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­6635. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 563. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1031 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­6636. Granger v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 557. No. 94­6637. Linares v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­6638. McClain v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­6639. Maxwell et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1389. No. 94­6641. Olvera v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1195. No. 94­6642. Morris v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 537 Pa. 417, 644 A. 2d 721. No. 94­6648. Suleiman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 570. No. 94­6649. Foy v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 464. No. 94­6650. McDowell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 561. No. 94­6651. McAlpine v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 484. No. 94­6652. Chesney v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­6655. Slagel v. Shell Oil Refinery et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 410. No. 94­6659. Holst v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 109. No. 94­6666. Phillips v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 138 N. J. 265, 649 A. 2d 1285. No. 94­6668. Ford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 445. No. 94­6670. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1032 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6681. Johanson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­6684. Beshaw v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6687. Baze v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 569. No. 94­6693. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 131. No. 94­6696. Salemi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1084. No. 94­6697. Vegas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 445. No. 94­6713. Dudzinski v. City of Livonia, Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 446 Mich. 854, 520 N. W. 2d 152. No. 94­381. International Primate Protection League et al. v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­388. Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman v. Kline et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Business & Financial Lawyers et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 480. No. 94­591. Ohio v. Singfield. Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari denied. No. 94­592. Doherty, Director, Illinois Department of Employment Security v. Pennington. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1376. No. 94­618. Iowa et al. v. Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1033 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 383. No. 94­6409 (A­293). Owens et ux. v. EMC Mortgage Corp. Sup. Ct. Ga. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. D­1413. In re Disbarment of Kilpatrick, ante, p. 803; No. 93­1441. Walsh v. Delaware et al., ante, p. 806; No. 93­1547. In re Smith, ante, p. 807; No. 93­1679. Britenbach v. United States, ante, p. 808; No. 93­1827. Lokay v. American Real Estate Corp., ante, p. 810; No. 93­1840. Hudson v. Varney et al., ante, p. 811; No. 93­1967. Jackson v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority et al., ante, p. 818; No. 93­1972. Lopez v. Behles, Trustee; and Lopez v. Behles, Trustee, et al., ante, p. 818; No. 93­2020. Perkins v. Western Surety Co., ante, p. 821; No. 93­2025. Spaletta v. County of Mendocino Employ- ees Retirement Assn. et al., ante, p. 821; No. 93­2096. Bonser v. Town of Nottingham, New Hamp- shire, ante, p. 918; No. 93­2097. Bonser v. Town of Nottingham, New Hamp- shire, ante, p. 918; No. 93­8712. Lariscy et ux. v. United States, ante, p. 828; No. 93­8843. Motley v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 960; No. 93­9102. Castro Vasquez v. Myers, Warden, ante, p. 833; No. 93­9157. Fleming v. Rocha, Warden, ante, p. 834; No. 93­9160. Doerr v. County of San Bernardino, Cali- fornia, et al., ante, p. 834; No. 93­9195. Rice v. United States, ante, p. 836; No. 93­9203. Grant v. Ohio, ante, p. 836; No. 93­9269. Preuss v. District of Columbia, ante, p. 839; No. 93­9270. Baker v. Miller et al., ante, p. 839; No. 93­9275. Hamilton v. Morrison, Warden, et al., ante, p. 839; 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1034 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 1994 513 U. S. No. 93­9288. Leonard v. Rose's Department Store, ante, p. 839; No. 93­9289. Melendez v. Arizona Department of Eco- nomic Security et al., ante, p. 839; No. 93­9296. Baker v. Kelley et al., ante, p. 840; No. 93­9325. Long v. Texas, ante, p. 841; No. 93­9339. Vincent v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital et al., ante, p. 841; No. 93­9375. Kneller v. Kneller, ante, p. 843; No. 93­9421. Densmore v. Michigan, ante, p. 845; No. 93­9423. McLeod v. Loudoun County Department of Social Services et al., ante, p. 845; No. 93­9428. Williamson et al. v. King County, Washing- ton, ante, p. 846; No. 93­9440. Rodenbaugh v. Curto, ante, p. 846; No. 93­9459. Roundtree v. Miller et al., ante, p. 848; No. 93­9501. Yacks v. Johnson, Warden, ante, p. 850; No. 93­9544. Stewart v. United States, ante, p. 852; No. 93­9548. Herrick v. United States, ante, p. 926; No. 93­9567. McCoy v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al., ante, p. 854; No. 93­9580. Lee v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings Assn. et al., ante, p. 854; No. 93­9604. Lewis v. Thompson, Warden, ante, p. 856; No. 93­9612. In re Fromal, ante, p. 856; No. 93­9620. Rogers v. Reed-Fleming et al., ante, p. 856; No. 93­9623. Trantino v. Rothstein, ante, p. 857; No. 93­9624. Batten v. Ohio, ante, p. 857; No. 93­9640. Rodenbaugh v. Singer, ante, p. 858; No. 93­9641. Quintanilla v. Orange County Personnel Division of Sheriff Coroner Department et al., ante, p. 858; No. 93­9650. Agha v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al., ante, p. 858; No. 93­9655. Ferdik v. McFadden, Warden, et al., ante, p. 858; No. 93­9662. Aguilar v. New Mexico, ante, p. 859; No. 93­9677. Pettigrew v. United States, ante, p. 860; No. 93­9776. Aguilar v. New Mexico, ante, p. 865; 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1035 513 U. S. November 28, 1994 No. 94­118. D-Landco et al. v. Oklahoma Department of Transportation, ante, p. 871; No. 94­137. Seal v. Seal, ante, p. 872; No. 94­146. In re Johnson, ante, p. 806; No. 94­165. Srinivasan v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (Rio Hondo Community College Dis- trict, Real Party in Interest), ante, p. 873; No. 94­170. Rosenfeld v. River Place East Housing Corp., ante, p. 874; No. 94­198. Kile v. Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Placer (Trepantis, Real Party in Interest), ante, p. 875; No. 94­336. Smith v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority et al., ante, p. 947; No. 94­406. Talley v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ante, p. 932; No. 94­5001. Burress v. Presbyterian Church et al., ante, p. 879; No. 94­5008. Brown v. Howard-Palmer et al., ante, p. 879; No. 94­5014. Iusan v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development et al., ante, p. 879; No. 94­5030. Thompson v. Rone, Warden, ante, p. 880; No. 94­5046. Kontakis v. Morton, Administrator, New Jersey State Prison, et al., ante, p. 881; No. 94­5121. Jenoriki v. United States Postal Inspection Service of Houston, Texas, et al., ante, p. 885; No. 94­5158. Burress v. Christianity & Crisis, Inc., et al., ante, p. 887; No. 94­5165. Praimnath v. American Cablevision of Queens, Inc., ante, p. 888; No. 94­5174. Fromal v. McCauley et al., ante, p. 888; No. 94­5184. Ricco v. Gallo, ante, p. 889; No. 94­5195. Christianson v. Relfe et al., ante, p. 890; No. 94­5197. Curiale et ux. v. Burton et al., ante, p. 890; No. 94­5237. Lee v. North Carolina, ante, p. 891; No. 94­5248. Sloan v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 892; No. 94­5308. Friend v. United Technologies/Hamilton Standard et al., ante, p. 895; No. 94­5367. Moore v. North Carolina, ante, p. 898; 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1036 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 November 28, 29, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5383. Rogers v. Zant, Warden, ante, p. 899; No. 94­5396. Dusenbery v. United States, ante, p. 899; No. 94­5483. Bauer v. United States, ante, p. 903; No. 94­5486. Griffin v. United States, ante, p. 949; No. 94­5527. Toegemann v. Rhode Island, ante, p. 920; No. 94­5538. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas et al., ante, p. 906; No. 94­5544. Martin v. Initial U. S. A., ante, p. 906; No. 94­5547. Adams v. Connecticut, ante, p. 906; No. 94­5631. Dusenbery v. United States, ante, p. 909; No. 94­5633. Chatima v. United States, ante, p. 944; No. 94­5669. Bauer v. United States Department of Jus- tice et al., ante, p. 910; No. 94­5676. Ruff v. South Carolina et al., ante, p. 936; No. 94­5681. Flanagan et ux. v. Resolution Trust Cor- poration et al. (two cases), ante, p. 911; No. 94­5824. McIntyre v. Crouch et al., ante, p. 914; No. 94­5864. Cole v. Indiana, ante, p. 940; No. 94­5885. In re Tucker, ante, p. 806; and No. 94­5904. Acevedo v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue, ante, p. 940. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 93­9780. Dupont v. Duboise, Warden, et al., ante, p. 916; No. 94­385. Exxon Corp. et al. v. Eyak Native Village et al., ante, p. 943; and No. 94­5122. Eno v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, ante, p. 916. Petitions for rehearing denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. No. 94­5471. Cain v. Missouri State Board of Podiatry Medicine, ante, p. 902. Motion of petitioner to defer consider- ation of petition for rehearing denied. Petition for rehearing denied. November 29, 1994 Rehearing Denied No. 94­5319 (A­370). Clark v. Scott, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 966. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for rehearing denied. 513ord$$1g 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1037 513 U. S. December 2, 5, 1994 December 2, 1994 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­6653. Nyberg v. Riska et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. December 5, 1994 Dismissals Under Rule 46 No. 94­6132. In re Reidt. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. No. 94­6133. In re Geurin. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Hoggard v. Purkett, Superintendent, Farm- ington Correctional Center; No. - ­ ­­­. Levario v. State Bar of Texas; No. - ­ ­­­. Lord v. Duckworth; and No. - ­ ­­­. Vitale et ux. v. Perfection Management Co., Inc., et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. D­1444. In re Disbarment of Gasperi. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1276.] No. D­1454. In re Disbarment of Anthony. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1282.] No. D­1457. In re Disbarment of Gerlin. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1285.] No. D­1460. In re Disbarment of Friedman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 803.] No. D­1469. In re Disbarment of Boneta. It is ordered that Philip L. Boneta, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1470. In re Disbarment of Rocker. It is ordered that Andrew Joseph Rocker, of Cambridge, Ohio, be suspended 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1038 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1471. In re Disbarment of Niles. It is ordered that Peter L. Niles, of Daytona Beach, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1472. In re Disbarment of Cullen. It is ordered that Thomas P. Cullen, Jr., of Woodside, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1474. In re Disbarment of Murphy. It is ordered that James Patrick Murphy, of Houston, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1475. In re Disbarment of Kincaid. It is ordered that James G. Kincaid, of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1476. In re Disbarment of Gibbes. It is ordered that Brian Peter Gibbes, of Hilton Head, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1477. In re Disbarment of Dawkins. It is ordered that Reuben Samuel Dawkins, of Boston, Mass., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1478. In re Disbarment of Chastain. It is ordered that Randall Meads Chastain, of Columbia, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1039 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 No. D­1479. In re Disbarment of King. It is ordered that Harold T. King, of Bridgehampton, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1480. In re Disbarment of Mack. It is ordered that John Eugene Mack, of New London, Minn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1481. In re Disbarment of Lieber. It is ordered that Paul Gerald Lieber, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1482. In re Disbarment of Knight. It is ordered that Robert Clyde Knight, of Darien, Wis., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1483. In re Disbarment of Morin. It is ordered that Volney Frederick Morin, Jr., of Ashland, Ore., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 93­1408. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; No. 93­1414. Cuomo, Governor of New York, et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; and No. 93­1415. Hospital Association of New York State v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 920.] Motion of respondents New York State Health Maintenance Organization Conference et al. for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: 20 minutes for Travel- ers Insurance Co. et al. and 10 minutes for New York State Health Maintenance Organization Conference et al. No. 93­1577. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1287.] Motion of 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1040 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 93­1823. Missouri et al. v. Jenkins et al. (two cases). C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1287.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 93­1883. Anderson, Director, California Depart- ment of Social Services, et al. v. Edwards, Guardian ad Litem for Edwards, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 93­1935. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­18. Mastrobuono et al. v. Shearson Lehman Hut- ton, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 921.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­6132. In re Reidt. Motion of petitioner for reconsid- eration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 958] denied. No. 94­6647. Brown v. Brown et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until December 27, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­6342. In re Agrio; and No. 94­6427. In re Bell. Petitions for writs of mandamus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 94­560. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1503. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1041 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 Certiorari Denied No. 93­8697. Cochran v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 56. No. 93­8815. Colavito v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 69. No. 93­9244. Schmeltzer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 610. No. 93­9377. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 644. No. 94­162. Rosales v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1461. No. 94­386. VSA, Inc., dba VSA Carolinas v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 588. No. 94­418. Shaw v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 182. No. 94­430. Bird v. United States (Reported below: 40 M. J. 270); Bledsoe v. United States (40 M. J. 292); Jones v. United States (39 M. J. 315); Williams v. United States (40 M. J. 271); Collavini v. United States (40 M. J. 271); Lumsden v. United States (40 M. J. 275); Carter v. United States (40 M. J. 275); Clanin v. United States (40 M. J. 302); Duncan v. United States (40 M. J. 314); Johnson v. United States (40 M. J. 306); Greenhouse v. United States (40 M. J. 289); Fisher v. United States (40 M. J. 291); Hickman v. United States (40 M. J. 280); Thorpe v. United States (40 M. J. 305); Fritz v. United States (40 M. J. 290); Tatum v. United States (40 M. J. 320); Miller v. United States (41 M. J. 77); Biesterveld v. United States (40 M. J. 274); Small v. United States (40 M. J. 285); Norris v. United States (40 M. J. 311); Winston v. United States (41 M. J. 66); Hilts v. United States (40 M. J. 283); Key v. United States (40 M. J. 319); Davis v. United States (41 M. J. 75); Fiese v. United States (40 M. J. 280); Alfred v. United States (40 M. J. 281); Bench v. United States (40 M. J. 290); Horning v. United States (41 M. J. 93); Edwards v. United States (41 M. J. 87); Hicks v. United States (40 M. J. 312); Larocca v. United States (40 M. J. 315); Garcia v. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:07 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1042 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. United States (40 M. J. 298); Bryan v. United States (40 M. J. 301); Johnson v. United States (41 M. J. 66); Mercado v. United States (40 M. J. 289); Sanderson v. United States (40 M. J. 301); Domingo v. United States (41 M. J. 92); Nieves v. United States (41 M. J. 88); Vargas-Coronado v. United States (40 M. J. 293); Moreno v. United States (41 M. J. 110); Kramer v. United States (40 M. J. 282); Jovanovich v. United States (40 M. J. 284); Stohosky v. United States (41 M. J. 72); Bishop v. United States (40 M. J. 303); Howe v. United States (40 M. J. 308); Wixom v. United States (40 M. J. 308); Miller v. United States (41 M. J. 83); Brinkley v. United States (40 M. J. 273); Cormier v. United States (41 M. J. 76); Simon v. United States (40 M. J. 274); Blaylock v. United States (41 M. J. 81); Scholtz v. United States (40 M. J. 298); Hughes v. United States (40 M. J. 298); Adams v. United States (40 M. J. 294); Snapp v. United States (40 M. J. 301); Durr v. United States (40 M. J. 301); Milburn v. United States (40 M. J. 306); Martinez v. United States (40 M. J. 307); Robinson v. United States (40 M. J. 308); Famularo v. United States (40 M. J. 310); Oates v. United States (40 M. J. 313); Williams v. United States (40 M. J. 313); Jones v. United States (41 M. J. 66); Strong v. United States (41 M. J. 68); Bouquet v. United States (41 M. J. 68); Roberts v. United States (41 M. J. 71); Provencio v. United States (41 M. J. 75); Jackson v. United States (41 M. J. 76); Hatmaker v. United States (41 M. J. 92); Wilkins v. United States (41 M. J. 88); Trivino v. United States (40 M. J. 286); Sirnic v. United States (41 M. J. 69); Mathews v. United States (40 M. J. 289); Mendenhall v. United States (41 M. J. 90); Murphy v. United States (41 M. J. 95); Sanchez v. United States (40 M. J. 313); Jacobs v. United States (40 M. J. 282); Lott v. United States (41 M. J. 81); Key v. United States (41 M. J. 97); Ware v. United States (40 M. J. 319); Wright v. United States (41 M. J. 84); Rhodes v. United States (41 M. J. 94); Loudermilk v. United States (41 M. J. 84); Dice v. United States (41 M. J. 85); Cummings v. United States (41 M. J. 73); Mitchell v. United States (40 M. J. 270); Majors v. United States (40 M. J. 275); Deleon v. United States (40 M. J. 312); Ellis v. United States (40 M. J. 274); Poole v. United States (40 M. J. 285); Drown v. United States (40 M. J. 279); and Bundy v. United States (41 M. J. 77). C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1043 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 No. 94­441. Mackey v. Moss et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­456. Bunce et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 138. No. 94­462. City of Grapevine v. Department of Trans- portation et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 17 F. 3d 1502. No. 94­469. Holley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 902. No. 94­559. Ramirez v. United States; Harshaw v. United States; McSparran v. United States; Owen v. United States; Deberry v. United States; and Lubitz v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 315 (first case); 40 M. J. 320 (second case); 41 M. J. 72 (third case); 41 M. J. 89 (fourth case); 41 M. J. 122 (fifth case); 40 M. J. 165 (sixth case). No. 94­605. Andrews-Powley v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 76. No. 94­644. Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission Auditing Division. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 877 P. 2d 133. No. 94­647. Wright v. Clay. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 629 N. E. 2d 857. No. 94­649. George v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­652. Freedom Ranch, Inc. v. Tulsa Board of Ad- justment et al. Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 P. 2d 380. No. 94­657. Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 784. No. 94­660. DeGrooth et al. v. General Dynamics Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 103. No. 94­664. Johnson, dba F. C. Johnson Construction Co. v. Hyneman. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1044 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­665. Brobst v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­666. International Rectifier Corp. v. SGS-Thom- son Microelectronics, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1177. No. 94­672. Brown v. University of Medicine and Den- tistry of New Jersey. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 31 F. 3d 1170. No. 94­673. Guyer et al. v. Alachua County School Board et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 634 So. 2d 806. No. 94­674. Allen et al. v. City of Duarte et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­677. Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1437. No. 94­680. Lanphere & Urbaniak et al. v. Colorado et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1508. No. 94­681. Ries, Mayor of Parma, Ohio v. Picha. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­683. BB Asset Management, Inc., dba Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 630. No. 94­684. Airbus Industrie, G. I. E., et al. v. Linton, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Es- tates of Howell et ux., Deceased, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 592. No. 94­690. Grace Investment Co. et al. v. Red Mountain Machinery Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1408. No. 94­697. Barrett v. Mississippi Bar. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. No. 94­703. Cox v. Boeing Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1056. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1045 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 No. 94­709. Encinas v. Board of Registration for Pro- fessional Engineers and Land Surveyors et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­795. Brothers et al. v. Klevenhagen, Sheriff, Harris County, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 452. No. 94­5083. Rodriguez-Mejia v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1090. No. 94­5278. LaSalle v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1433. No. 94­5324. Palomino-Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5441. Thurmond v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­5499. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1355. No. 94­5516. Girolamo, aka Mascitti v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 320. No. 94­5735. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 307. No. 94­5923. Harris v. Evans et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­5933. Smith v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 398. No. 94­5961. Welsand v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 205. No. 94­6016. Williams v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 629. No. 94­6052. Brunk v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 236. No. 94­6169. Iglesias v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 118, 517 N. W. 2d 175. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1046 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6214. Hudson v. Hedge et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 274. No. 94­6242. Green v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 142, 443 S. E. 2d 14. No. 94­6337. Aldridge v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6357. Rhodes v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 920. No. 94­6373. Cully v. Grace Hospital et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 18. No. 94­6378. Spencer v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 519 N. W. 2d 357. No. 94­6390. Johnson v. Davis et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­6400. Jordan v. City of Aurora, Colorado, et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 P. 2d 38. No. 94­6402. Kashannejad v. Block, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6405. Farr v. Stinson et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 181 Wis. 2d 1003, 513 N. W. 2d 707. No. 94­6414. Owens v. Call et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 130. No. 94­6416. Long v. Taylor et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6418. Royster v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6425. Zagwoski v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1047 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 No. 94­6429. Ballard v. Gartz et al. Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6433. Ybarra v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6434. Sadler v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 108. No. 94­6438. Semien v. Comanche County et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 417. No. 94­6439. James v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1486. No. 94­6441. St. Hilaire v. Parin et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­6443. Mallory v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 991. No. 94­6451. Green v. Adams et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 1362. No. 94­6455. Watson et al. v. Farlow et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6463. Carnegie v. Dowling et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 App. Div. 2d 502, 606 N. Y. S. 2d 655. No. 94­6478. Marsh v. John et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 993 F. 2d 1547. No. 94­6479. Mikkilineni v. Amwest Surety Insurance Co. et al.; Mikkilineni v. Chester et al.; Mikkilineni v. Borough of Forest Hills; and Mikkilineni v. Glenn Engi- neering & Associates, Ltd., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­6480. Mikkilineni v. Borough of Forest Hills. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 537 Pa. 651, 644 A. 2d 737. No. 94­6484. Crittenden v. Federal Trade Commission et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 26. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1048 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6541. Echols v. Yukon Telephone Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 631. No. 94­6545. Cleckley v. Abate et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6547. Clark v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 Md. App. 727. No. 94­6568. Lawrie v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 643 A. 2d 1336. No. 94­6580. Freter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 783. No. 94­6581. Durham v. Henman, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 126. No. 94­6582. Bell v. Richardson, Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1484. No. 94­6585. Heath v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1499. No. 94­6607. Cook v. Evatt, Commissioner, South Caro- lina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 129. No. 94­6619. Wallace v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6626. Seiwell v. Lewis et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­6630. Broughton v. Smith et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 421. No. 94­6671. Singleterry v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 733. No. 94­6672. Sherrill v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 344. No. 94­6677. Gilliard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 131. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1049 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 No. 94­6678. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­6686. Sutherlin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­6690. Mateo-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1446. No. 94­6695. Blake v. Blake et al. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 S. W. 2d 209. No. 94­6704. Lawton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­6706. Parker v. Department of Justice et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6709. Marshal v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­6710. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­6714. McCutcheon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 271. No. 94­6715. Keenan v. Allen. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1213. No. 94­6718. O'Neal v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6723. Zenon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 624. No. 94­6725. Dickerson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1496. No. 94­6727. Philbin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 567. No. 94­6729. Muhammed v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1393. No. 94­6731. Ratcliffe v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1464. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1050 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6734. Thompson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 671. No. 94­6737. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 82. No. 94­6740. Bowling v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 326. No. 94­6741. Dix v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 55. No. 94­6743. Creech v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1382. No. 94­6746. Wright v. Alexandria Division of Social Services. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 Va. App. 821, 433 S. E. 2d 500. No. 94­6753. Furman v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1034. No. 94­6756. Griffith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 686. No. 94­6758. Polan v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­6761. Nieves v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6763. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 563. No. 94­6765. Wooten v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 639. No. 94­6766. Warren v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 602. No. 94­6767. Allen v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1488. No. 94­6769. Atwood v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 126. No. 94­6770. Baldeon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1499. 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1051 513 U. S. December 5, 1994 No. 94­6771. Abrego v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 572. No. 94­6772. Bushert v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 997 F. 2d 1343. No. 94­6781. Forsyth v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 628. No. 94­6782. Garner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­6794. Adail v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1046. No. 94­6797. Anjum v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 53. No. 94­6801. Rodriguez-Roncancio v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 573. No. 94­6802. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 93. No. 94­6803. Rivas-Sabogal v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­6804. Moses v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­6805. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6806. Owens v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 94­6818. Krueger v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1106. No. 93­9593. Gendron v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 955. No. 94­655. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania et al. v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1052 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 5, 6, 1994 513 U. S. part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 102. No. 94­407. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. v. In- ternational Rectifier Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motions of American Board of Trial Advocates and Houston Intellectual Property Law Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1177. No. 94­445. Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1527. No. 94­661. W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Maryland Cas- ualty Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondents to strike reply brief of petitioner denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 617. Rehearing Denied No. 93­8709. Owen v. Nebraska (two cases), ante, p. 923; No. 93­9435. Robinson v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, ante, p. 846; No. 93­9614. In re Wright, ante, p. 806; No. 93­9755. Hunt v. Grinker, Commissioner, New York City Department of Social Services, et al., ante, p. 864; No. 94­182. Boostrom v. Bach, ante, p. 928; No. 94­204. Chisum v. United States, ante, p. 946; No. 94­347. Morissette et al. v. Yu et al., ante, p. 947; No. 94­353. Finizie v. City of Bridgeport, ante, p. 931; No. 94­5768. Anderson v. United States, ante, p. 913; and No. 94­5808. Brockman v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, ante, p. 951. Petitions for rehearing denied. December 6, 1994 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­401. Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 277. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­394 (94­7100). Hawkins v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1053 513 U. S. December 6, 7, 9, 1994 sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the peti- tion for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court. No. A­411. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Bannister. Application to vacate the stay of execu- tion of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy would grant the application. December 7, 1994 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7127 (A­408). Resnover v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. December 9, 1994 Miscellaneous Orders No. 94­558. United States v. Hays et al.; and No. 94­627. Louisiana et al. v. Hays et al. Appeals from D. C. W. D. La. The Court defers noting probable jurisdiction in these cases so that the United States District Court for the West- ern District of Louisiana, by reentering its judgment, can cure a procedural defect arising from that court's having entered judg- ment prior to the issuance on July 27, 1994, of this Court's judg- ment in Louisiana v. Hays, No. 93­1539. This order shall be sent to the District Court forthwith. The District Court shall immediately reenter its judgment. This Court will then note probable jurisdiction and consolidate the cases for briefing and oral argument on the same schedule as if this Court had noted probable jurisdiction today. No. 94­753. St. Cyr et al. v. Hays et al. Appeal from D. C. W. D. La.; and No. 94­754. St. Cyr et al. v. Hays et al. C. A. 5th Cir. The Court defers further consideration in these cases so that the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisi- 513ord$$1h 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1054 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 9, 11, 12, 1994 513 U. S. ana, by reentering its judgment, can cure a procedural defect arising from that court's having entered judgment prior to the issuance on July 27, 1994, of this Court's judgment in Louisiana v. Hays, No. 93­1539. This order shall be sent to the District Court forthwith. December 11, 1994 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7193 (A­425). Kinnamon v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 731. December 12, 1994 Affirmed on Appeal No. 94­753. St. Cyr et al. v. Hays et al. Affirmed on ap- peal from D. C. W. D. La. Reported below: 862 F. Supp. 119. Certiorari Dismissed No. 94­6817. Hann v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. It appearing that petitioner died December 3, 1994, certiorari dis- missed. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 570. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 94­634, infra.) No. - ­ ­­­. Kirkpatrick v. California. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Wildberger v. United States. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari under seal denied. No. D­1458. In re Disbarment of Cole. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1285.] No. D­1459. In re Disbarment of Durusau. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 512 U. S. 1285.] No. D­1473. In re Disbarment of Bostic. It is ordered that Lee Harold Bostic, of Jamaica, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1055 513 U. S. December 12, 1994 within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1484. In re Disbarment of Altschul. It is ordered that Donald Scott Altschul, of San Francisco, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1485. In re Disbarment of Jacobs. It is ordered that Richard Mark Jacobs, of St. Louis, Mo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 93­1202. Brunwasser v. Steiner, 510 U. S. 1195. It is ordered that Allen Brunwasser, of Pittsburgh, Pa., shall within 21 days of this order pay respondent $500 as ordered by this Court on May 2, 1994 [511 U. S. 1067], or show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court or otherwise disciplined for failure to comply with an order of the Court. No. 93­1408. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; No. 93­1414. Cuomo, Governor of New York, et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; and No. 93­1415. Hospital Association of New York State v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 920.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­286. Freightliner Corp. et al. v. Myrick et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 922.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami- cus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­500. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 998.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1056 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 12, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­5843. Rodenbaugh v. Senape et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 958] denied. No. 94­6893. In re Suhy. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 94­6654. In re Russell. Petition for writ of manda- mus denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 94­558. United States v. Hays et al.; and No. 94­627. Louisiana et al. v. Hays et al. Appeals from D. C. W. D. La. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. The stay heretofore entered August 11, 1994 [512 U. S. 1273], is reentered as of the date the District Court reentered its judgment. Re- ported below: 862 F. Supp. 119. Certiorari Denied No. 93­1140. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 263 Ga. 609, 437 S. E. 2d 782. No. 93­1882. Swanson et al. v. North Carolina et al. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 335 N. C. 674, 441 S. E. 2d 537. No. 93­9392. Isby v. Spencer, Judge, Circuit Court of Indiana, Madison County. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­171. Toler v. United States; No. 94­5417. Blain v. United States; and No. 94­5557. Formann v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 745. No. 94­326. Soundgarden et al. v. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, et al. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 Wash. 2d 750, 871 P. 2d 1050. No. 94­330. Lewis v. Brigano, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 428. No. 94­331. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue et al. v. Norwest Bank Duluth, N. A., et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 514 N. W. 2d 565. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1057 513 U. S. December 12, 1994 No. 94­402. Pinson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1056. No. 94­414. Pacifico v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 F. 3d 1234. No. 94­503. Henegar v. Banta. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 223. No. 94­505. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A., et al. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (Tammen et al., Real Parties in Interest). C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­512. Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. Moore, In- dividually and by Next Friend, Moore. Sup. Ct. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 889 S. W. 2d 246. No. 94­518. Andrews v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 312. No. 94­533. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. General Drivers, Salesmen & Warehousemen's Local Union No. 984, an Af- filiate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, AFL­ CIO. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1039. No. 94­617. Lierenz v. Bowen et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Erie County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­699. Prymer v. Ogden et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1208. No. 94­704. City of Chicago v. Alex et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1235. No. 94­705. Hirai v. Ito, Personal Representative of the Heirs of Ito, Deceased; and No. 94­751. Macro Energy, Inc., et al. v. Ito, Personal Representative of the Heirs of Ito, Deceased. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­713. Ray v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1058 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 12, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­715. Hall v. Grayson. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 566. No. 94­716. Scheidler et al. v. Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc., et al.; and No. 94­718. Migliorino (Miller) v. Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1053. No. 94­719. Birkbeck, Personal Representative of the Estate of Birkbeck, Deceased, et al. v. Marvel Lighting Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 507. No. 94­725. Liability Investigative Fund Effort, Inc., et al. v. Massachusetts et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 418 Mass. 436, 636 N. E. 2d 1317. No. 94­731. Lake County, Indiana v. Myers et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 847. No. 94­733. Jones v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 139. No. 94­737. O'Leary v. County of Sacramento. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1440. No. 94­738. City of New Haven et al. v. Kuntz. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 622. No. 94­739. Rokke v. Rokke. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 94­744. Reel Pipe & Valve Co., Inc., et al. v. Consoli- dated City of Indianapolis-Marion County et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 N. E. 2d 274. No. 94­750. Quantum Chemical Corp. et al. v. Wulf et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1368. No. 94­755. Chanoff et al. v. United States Surgical Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 66. No. 94­767. Wexford Associates, Inc., et al. v. Atkisson et ux. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 Va. 142, 445 S. E. 2d 101. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1059 513 U. S. December 12, 1994 No. 94­774. Suan See Chong et al. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 573. No. 94­781. Figgie v. Moskovitz. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 638, 635 N. E. 2d 331. No. 94­793. Eick v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 559. No. 94­804. Velentzas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 381. No. 94­812. Mangano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 853. No. 94­813. Ferrel v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1444. No. 94­816. Klinginsmith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1507. No. 94­822. Heller v. Norcal Mutual Life Insurance Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 4th 30, 876 P. 2d 999. No. 94­827. Pierce v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 149. No. 94­838. Torres v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1463. No. 94­839. Hill v. Hill. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 Conn. App. 160, 644 A. 2d 951. No. 94­845. Green v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1378. No. 94­851. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Hoopa Valley Tribe. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 30 F. 3d 1138. No. 94­858. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 238. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1060 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 12, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­863. Wertheimer v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­868. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­875. O'Neil, aka Kerpsack v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­5168. Sullivan v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 198. No. 94­5410. Cartwright v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6 F. 3d 294. No. 94­5419. Fox v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 183, 631 N. E. 2d 124. No. 94­5773. Blackmon v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 560. No. 94­5793. Benson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 567. No. 94­5912. Griffin v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 Ill. App. 3d 1, 616 N. E. 2d 1242. No. 94­5964. Wilkerson v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 S. W. 2d 321. No. 94­6054. Melville v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 134. No. 94­6055. Lambey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 974 F. 2d 1389. No. 94­6058. Moose v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 424 Pa. Super. 579, 623 A. 2d 831. No. 94­6076. Armstrong v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 409. No. 94­6077. Ciardo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1061 513 U. S. December 12, 1994 No. 94­6083. White v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­6110. Goulding v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 656. No. 94­6115. Doe v. Gallegos et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 406. No. 94­6240. Fowler v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 873 P. 2d 1053. No. 94­6323. Jones, fka Park v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1289. No. 94­6424. Smith v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 P. 2d 375. No. 94­6449. Chan v. California Department of Motor Vehicles. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6465. Alderman v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1541. No. 94­6475. Lowe-Bey v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 816. No. 94­6477. Pierce v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 633. No. 94­6482. Washington v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6486. Kelly v. Withrow, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 363. No. 94­6488. Hunes v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6491. Jackson v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 648 A. 2d 424. No. 94­6501. Kersh v. Borden, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 972 F. 2d 347. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1062 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 12, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6503. Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 454. No. 94­6512. Roy v. University of Hawaii et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 139. No. 94­6517. Long v. General Motors Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6518. Posey v. Magnolia State Enterprises. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6523. Grizzle v. Wiesman, Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Missouri, St. Louis County, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1393. No. 94­6524. Gaval v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 Mich. App. 51, 507 N. W. 2d 786. No. 94­6525. Hyder v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 1370. No. 94­6526. Holly v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1495. No. 94­6528. Garcia v. Duncan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6537. Higareda v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 Cal. App. 4th 1399, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763. No. 94­6538. Garcia v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6556. Green v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6557. Greene v. Phelps et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­6569. Long v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 So. 2d 486. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1063 513 U. S. December 12, 1994 No. 94­6579. Calvento v. Metcalf et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6584. Henderson v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 879 P. 2d 383. No. 94­6601. Crawford v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6602. Bernard v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indiana State Reformatory, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 136. No. 94­6608. Costello v. Kernan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6617. Sawyer v. International Dairy Queen Inc. et al. (two cases). C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6624. Staten v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 419, 639 N. E. 2d 550. No. 94­6633. Shores v. Reddoch et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6644. Desmond v. Nynex Corp. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1484. No. 94­6645. Farr v. Davis et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6662. Bender v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6663. Harris v. Lillard et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6667. McGee v. County of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6669. Van Hook v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1448, 633 N. E. 2d 542. No. 94­6760. Nathan v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6774. Corrigan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 436. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1064 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 12, 1994 513 U. S. No. 94­6787. Blanchard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1495. No. 94­6793. DeVelasquez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 2. No. 94­6810. Robinson v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 32 F. 3d 571. No. 94­6815. Ecker v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 966. No. 94­6821. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 557. No. 94­6822. Orr v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 636. No. 94­6823. Mayo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1068. No. 94­6827. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 563. No. 94­6829. Lominac et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­6830. Juvenile (AG­S) v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 140. No. 94­6838. Smith et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 739. No. 94­6843. Mason v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­6844. Burton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 55. No. 94­6846. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­6854. Diaz-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 94. No. 94­6856. Abreo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 29. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1065 513 U. S. December 12, 1994 No. 94­6858. Morrell v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­6859. Osifo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­6860. Alley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1068. No. 94­6865. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­6867. Hart v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1124. No. 94­6868. Dowell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 53. No. 94­6869. Douglas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­6873. Ferreyros-Perriggo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1074. No. 94­6879. Greer v. Government of the Virgin Islands. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 556. No. 94­6880. Gonzalez v. Government of the Virgin Is- lands. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 556. No. 94­6881. Parke v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 44. No. 94­6882. Harris v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6883. Inico v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1236. No. 94­6892. Walker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1179. No. 94­317. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1066 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 December 12, 1994 513 U. S. Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 469. No. 94­634. In re Carter et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari, habeas corpus, and mandamus denied. No. 94­695. International Business Machines Corp. v. Allen-Myland, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Jus- tice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 194. No. 94­754. St. Cyr et al. v. Hays et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied. Rehearing Denied No. 93­9113. Baker v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al., ante, p. 833; No. 93­9145. Rodenbaugh v. Knisley et al., ante, p. 834; No. 93­9231. Whitney v. Cruz et al., ante, p. 837; No. 93­9379. Barton v. United States, ante, p. 843; No. 93­9578. Lang v. Department of Health and Human Services, ante, p. 854; No. 93­9658. Friday v. United States, ante, p. 859; No. 94­5013. Harris v. Hatfield, Warden, ante, p. 879; No. 94­5021. Peabody v. Arizona, ante, p. 880; No. 94­5100. Braggs v. Mobile County Health Depart- ment et al., ante, p. 884; No. 94­5498. Rae v. District of Columbia et al., ante, p. 904; No. 94­5588. Krall v. Department of the Air Force et al., ante, p. 967; No. 94­5612. Hale v. Florida, ante, p. 909; No. 94­5661. Greenlaw v. Smith, ante, p. 935; No. 94­5677. Pugh v. Butterworth et al., ante, p. 936; No. 94­5838. Lekan v. American Energy Services, Inc., ante, p. 952; No. 94­5945. Curiale et ux. v. Andrus, Governor of Idaho, et al., ante, p. 971; No. 94­6066. Hoekel v. Plumbing Planning Corp., ante, p. 974; No. 94­6090. Davis v. Louisiana, ante, p. 975; and No. 94­6316. In re Liggins, ante, p. 985. Petitions for re- hearing denied. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1067 513 U. S. December 12, 22, 1994, January 2, 1995 No. 94­5125. Milton v. United States, ante, p. 919. Peti- tion for rehearing denied. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. December 22, 1994 Miscellaneous Order No. 94­167. Gutierrez de Martinez et al. v. Lamagno et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 998.] Motion of respondent Dirk A. Lamagno to substitute counsel denied with- out prejudice to the filing of a motion for divided argument. January 2, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7010 (A­403). Jacobs v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1319. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting. In my opinion, it is fundamentally unfair for the State of Texas to go forward with the execution of Jesse Dewayne Jacobs. The principal evidence supporting his conviction was a confession that was expressly and unequivocally disavowed, at a subsequent trial, by the same prosecutor who presented the case against Jacobs. That same prosecutor's office now insists that the State may con- stitutionally go forward and execute Jacobs. The injustice, in my view, is self-evident. Jacobs was convicted of murdering a woman named Etta Ur- diales. After his arrest, he gave a videotaped confession stating that he abducted the victim and fatally shot her in a wooded area. He led investigators to her body. At his trial, the State introduced this confession and relied heavily on it. Jacobs, however, testified at trial that the confession was false. He claimed to have given the false confession because he believed it would lead to a death sentence, which he perceived to be prefer- able to the alternative of spending the rest of his life in jail. In 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1068 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 Stevens, J., dissenting 513 U. S. his trial testimony, Jacobs admitted kidnaping Urdiales, and tak- ing her to an abandoned house where his sister, Bobbie Hogan, was waiting. But he denied shooting the victim. According to Jacobs' testimony, he left Urdiales in the house with his sister and then went outside and sat on the porch. He did not know Hogan was armed, or that she planned to kill Urdiales. Rather, he believed Hogan, who was romantically involved with Urdiales' estranged husband, wanted to scare the victim into giving up custody of her children. Jacobs testified that while he was wait- ing outside, Hogan shot Urdiales. When Jacobs entered the house, Hogan said that she did not mean to kill Urdiales. Jacobs then told Hogan to go home, said he would take care of things, and buried the victim's body. The prosecution disputed Jacobs' trial testimony, arguing that " `[t]he simple fact of the matter is that Jesse Jacobs and Jesse Jacobs alone killed Etta Ann Urdiales.' " 31 F. 3d 1319, 1322, n. 6 (CA5 1994). The jury convicted Jacobs of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Several months later, Hogan was tried in connection with the Urdiales killing. At this trial, the State abandoned its theory that Jacobs had shot Urdiales. It called Jacobs as a witness, vouched for his veracity, and, according to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, "told the jury that the evidence revealed [through further] investigation cast doubt on Jacobs's conviction." Ibid. As described by the Court of Appeals: "[T]he prosecutor said that the state had been wrong in tak- ing the position in Jacobs's trial that Jacobs had done the actual killing. The prosecutor stated that, after further in- vestigation, he had determined that Hogan, not Jacobs, had killed the victim. The prosecution maintained that Jacobs did not know that Hogan had a gun. The state called Jacobs as a witness to testify that Hogan shot the victim." Id., at 1322­1323 (footnotes omitted). The prosecutor told the jury that he had " `changed my mind about what actually happened. . . . And I'm convinced that Jesse Jacobs is telling the truth when he says that Bobbie Hogan is the one that pulled the trigger.' " Id., at 1322, n. 6. He also "claimed that Jacobs was telling the truth when he testified that he did not in any way anticipate that the victim would be shot." Id., at 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1069 1067 Stevens, J., dissenting 1323, n. 7. Several police officers testified at the sister's trial that portions of Jacobs' confession were untrue. Id., at 1323, n. 6. Despite these post-trial developments, the State of Texas now insists that it may constitutionally carry out Jacobs' death sen- tence. I find this course of events deeply troubling. If the prosecutor's statements at the Hogan trial were correct, then Jacobs is innocent of capital murder. Cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 417 (1993) (discussing whether habeas relief is available to a death-row inmate who has advanced "a truly persuasive dem- onstration of `actual innocence' "). Moreover, for a sovereign State represented by the same lawyer to take flatly inconsistent positions in two different cases-and to insist on the imposition of the death penalty after repudiating the factual basis for that sentence-surely raises a serious question of prosecutorial mis- conduct. In my opinion, it would be fundamentally unfair to exe- cute a person on the basis of a factual determination that the State has formally disavowed. Almost 60 years ago, we recognized that a prosecutor's knowing presentation of false testimony is "inconsistent with the rudimen- tary demands of justice." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 (1935). We have refined this principle over the years, finding a due process violation when a prosecutor fails to correct testimony he knows to be false, Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U. S. 28 (1957), even when the falsehood in the testimony goes only to the witness' credibility, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972) (new trial required when Government witness testified falsely on matters relating to credi- bility and the prosecutor who served as trial counsel should have been aware of the falsehood). In Durley v. Mayo, 351 U. S. 277 (1956), we granted certiorari to consider whether due process was offended by a conviction which was later alleged to rest upon perjured testimony, despite the fact that the prosecutor did not know of the testimony's falsity at trial. Although the Court ultimately held that jurisdiction was lacking, and disposed of the case on that basis, four Justices would have reached the merits. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Douglas would have found a "clear" due process violation: "It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjured offends 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1070 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 2, 3, 1995 513 U. S. due process. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103; Pyle v. Kan- sas, 317 U. S. 213. While the petition did not allege that the prosecution knew that petitioner's codefendants were lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now knows that the testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false. No competent evidence remains to support the convic- tion. Deprivation of a hearing under these circumstances amounts in my opinion to a denial of due process of law." Id., at 290­291. See also Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F. 2d 218 (CA2 1988); cf. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411, 413 (1942) ("Mere recantation of testi- mony" does not justify voiding a conviction on due process grounds). Here, the facts are far stronger than in Durley, as the State itself has formally vouched for the credibility of Jacobs' recantation of his confession and police officers have testified, under oath, that parts of Jacobs' confession were false. I have long believed that serious questions are raised "when the sovereign itself takes inconsistent positions in two separate criminal proceedings against two of its citizens." United States v. Powers, 467 F. 2d 1089, 1097 (CA7 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); see also United States v. Ott, 489 F. 2d 872 (CA7 1973). The "heightened need for reliability" in capital cases, see Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 323 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted), only underscores the gravity of those questions in the circumstances of this case. At a minimum, Jacobs' execution should be stayed so that we may carefully consider his claims by way of our ordinary procedure respecting petitions for certiorari. I respectfully dissent from the order denying the application for a stay of execution. January 3, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7470 (A­469). Jacobs v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay of execution. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1071 513 U. S. January 5, 6, 1995 January 5, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­1024. Huddleston v. CIGNA Insurance Co., fka INA Underwriters Insurance Co., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1491. January 6, 1995 Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 94­631. Miller et al. v. Johnson et al.; No. 94­797. Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and No. 94­929. United States v. Johnson et al. Appeals from D. C. S. D. Ga. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 864 F. Supp. 1354. Certiorari Granted No. 94­431. Ryder v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 39 M. J. 454. No. 94­455. Johnson et al. v. Jones. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 727. No. 94­514. United States v. Gaudin. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 943. No. 94­555. Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Service v. Phillips. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 113. No. 94­688. National Private Truck Council, Inc., et al. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certio- rari granted. Reported below: 879 P. 2d 137. No. 94­749. Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Les- bian & Bisexual Group of Boston et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 418 Mass. 238, 636 N. E. 2d 1293. No. 94­771. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Na- tion. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 964. 513ord$$1i 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1072 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 6, 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­859. Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore- gon et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1463. No. 94­788. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Division, Na- tional Gypsum Co., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 581. No. 94­834. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas et al.; and No. 94­835. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. United Steel- workers of America, AFL­CIO­CLC. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 53. No. 94­6187. Witte v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 250. January 9, 1995 Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Brooks et al. v. Doe et al.; and No. - ­ ­­­. Chivers v. North Slope Borough et al. Mo- tions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. A­428. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­450. Zakiya, fka Ross v. United States. D. C. Md. Application for recall and stay of mandate, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1382. In re Disbarment of Harrod. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1027.] No. D­1463. In re Disbarment of Riley. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 958.] No. D­1464. In re Disbarment of Smith. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 958.] 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1073 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. D­1486. In re Disbarment of Collins. It is ordered that Robert Frederick Collins, of New Orleans, La., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1487. In re Disbarment of Oji. It is ordered that Walter Henry Obiorah Oji, of Houston, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1488. In re Disbarment of Jones. It is ordered that Ronald Lee Jones, of Tallahassee, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1489. In re Disbarment of Israel. It is ordered that William C. Israel, of Yonkers, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1490. In re Disbarment of McGee. It is ordered that Robert Butler McGee, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1491. In re Disbarment of Kukla. It is ordered that Michael F. Kukla, of Crystal Lake, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1492. In re Disbarment of Wohlfarth. It is or- dered that Robert Michael Wohlfarth, of Annapolis, Md., be sus- pended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1493. In re Disbarment of Scott. It is ordered that Winfield William Scott, of Dallas, Tex., be suspended from the 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1074 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1494. In re Disbarment of Otchere. It is ordered that Felix B. Otchere, of Arlington, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1495. In re Disbarment of Humphreys. It is or- dered that Lloyd Edwin Humphreys, of Dallas, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 93­390. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. McAngues et al., 510 U. S. 1040. Motion of respondent Timothy Cogan for attorney's fees denied. No. 93­1462. California Department of Corrections et al. v. Ramon Morales. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1287.] Motion of petitioners to strike the amici curiae brief of National Legal Aid and Defender Association et al. denied. No. 93­1783. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Newport News Ship- building & Dry Dock Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1287.] Motion of National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 93­1841. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Secre- tary of Transportation, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of Maryland Women Business Entrepreneurs et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of petitioner to strike Appendices B and C of respondents' brief denied. No. 93­1883. Anderson, Director, California Depart- ment of Social Services, et al. v. Edwards, Guardian ad Litem for Edwards, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of Alliance for Children's Rights et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1075 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 93­1935. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attor- neys for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 94­3. Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al. v. Hyde. Sup. Ct. Ohio. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 921.] Motion of Brown & Szaller Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 94­78. Michigan v. Asher. Ct. App. Mich. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certio- rari denied. No. 94­999. Downey et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite con- sideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 94­5707. Wilson v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. [Certio- rari granted, ante, p. 1014.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that John Wesley Hall, Esq., of Little Rock, Ark., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 94­5743. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 945] denied. No. 94­6620. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; and No. 94­6970. In re Miller. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioners are allowed until January 30, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit peti- tions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­6391. In re Smith; No. 94­6834. In re Higgins; and No. 94­6837. In re Sule. Petitions for writs of mandamus denied. No. 94­6597. In re Higgins. Petition for writ of prohibi- tion denied. Certiorari Denied No. 93­8640. Gordon v. Pham Tien et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 208. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1076 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 93­9474. Berryman v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 6 Cal. 4th 1048, 864 P. 2d 40. No. 93­9787. Caldwell v. Fellin. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­138. Milone v. Camp, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 693. No. 94­355. Robertson v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 211. No. 94­358. Duchesne County et al. v. Arnold. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 982. No. 94­393. Guetersloh v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1044. No. 94­458. Local 783, Bridge Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. BE&K Construction Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 1459. No. 94­461. Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidenti- fied Agents of the United States of America. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1448. No. 94­481. Oliveira et al. v. Mayer et al.; and No. 94­526. Mayer et al. v. Oliveira et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 642. No. 94­520. Sullins v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 25 F. 3d 601. No. 94­529. Lot 5, Fox Grove, Alachua County, Florida v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 23 F. 3d 359. No. 94­539. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1518. No. 94­540. County of Fulton et al. v. Whalen, Individ- ually and as Parent and Legal Guardian of Whalen, an Infant, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 828. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1077 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­542. Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., Garrett En- gine Division and Garrett Auxiliary Power Division v. United States et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 28 F. 3d 1188. No. 94­549. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1216. No. 94­552. Schneider et ux., Individually and as Guardians of Schneider v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1327. No. 94­554. Scales, Individually and as Trustee for the Bert F. Scales 1981 Trust, et al. v. Federal Deposit Insur- ance Corporation, as Receiver for MBank Abilene, N. A. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 654. No. 94­557. Florida et al. v. Platt et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 356. No. 94­575. Chaplin v. Baker. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 517 N. W. 2d 911. No. 94­580. Koehler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 867. No. 94­584. Bilby v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 M. J. 467. No. 94­613. Bolden v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 721. No. 94­624. Dawson et al. v. Halperin, Commissioner, New York State Division of Housing and Community Re- newal, et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 996, 640 N. E. 2d 143. No. 94­630. Bell v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 77. No. 94­638. Michigan Department of Mental Health v. Louisiana Homes, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 203 Mich. App. 213, 511 N. W. 2d 696. No. 94­645. Posner v. Securities and Exchange Commis- sion. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 520. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1078 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­654. Realbuto v. Howe, Individually and as Com- missioner of the New York State Office of Mental Retar- dation and Developmental Disability, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 620. No. 94­662. City of Henderson et al. v. Nevada Enter- tainment Industries, Inc., et al.; and No. 94­786. Nevada Entertainment Industries, Inc., et al. v. City of Henderson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 131. No. 94­675. Moore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 116. No. 94­682. Robinowitz v. Resolution Trust Corpora- tion, as Receiver for Gibraltar Savings, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 951. No. 94­706. White Swan, Ltd. v. Nature Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 638. No. 94­714. Raine, Trustee of the Television Trust Agreement v. Gleason, Formerly Personal Representa- tive of the Estate of Gleason, Deceased. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 631 So. 2d 321. No. 94­720. DeVries et al. v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 162 Vt. 617, 647 A. 2d 1013. No. 94­723. Lilburn v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 265 Mont. 258, 875 P. 2d 1036. No. 94­729. Krause v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1024. No. 94­730. Cicippio et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 164. No. 94­734. Lussier v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 App. Div. 2d 910, 613 N. Y. S. 2d 466. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:08 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1079 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­735. Rockwood v. O'Connell et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­741. Hildebrand et al. v. Commissioner of Inter- nal Revenue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1024. No. 94­743. Association for Retarded Citizens of Con- necticut, Inc., et al. v. Thorne et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 367. No. 94­747. Huber v. Danning, Trustee. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 572. No. 94­756. Long Island Railroad Co. v. Marchica. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1197. No. 94­757. Ricchio et al. v. Poesnecker et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Pa. Commw. 459, 631 A. 2d 1097. No. 94­759. Job v. Wells Fargo National Bank, N. A. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­762. Hininger v. Can-Am Industries, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 124. No. 94­763. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 763. No. 94­764. Goldgar v. Office of Administration, Execu- tive Office of the President. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 32. No. 94­765. Goodman Holdings et al. v. Rafidain Bank. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1143. No. 94­769. Bell v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 565. No. 94­772. Watson v. Thomas. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 646 So. 2d 84. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1080 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­773. Q­1 Motor Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 25 F. 3d 473. No. 94­778. Elford v. Elford. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 94­779. LeBlanc et al. v. Ward Lake Drilling, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­782. Constant et al. v. Ray et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­783. Pensacola Construction Co. v. Tyger Con- struction Co., Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 29 F. 3d 137. No. 94­784. Town of Longboat Key v. Reserve, Ltd. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1374. No. 94­787. Gibas v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 Wis. 2d 355, 516 N. W. 2d 785. No. 94­789. Tanner v. Illinois Court of Claims et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 156 Ill. 2d 567, 638 N. E. 2d 1126. No. 94­791. First Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 419 and 27 F. 3d 526. No. 94­792. Hallco Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al. v. Foster et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1079. No. 94­794. Garmon v. Alabama State Bar. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662 So. 2d 289. No. 94­800. Rimert v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 315 S. C. 527, 446 S. E. 2d 400. No. 94­803. Knighten v. Cave & McKay et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 566. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1081 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­808. Smith v. Kelly, aka Sirbello, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 55. No. 94­809. Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Cheesman et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 25 F. 3d 356. No. 94­817. Harris County Sheriff's Department Civil Service Commissioners et al. v. Steverson. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 666. No. 94­819. Tassio v. Soper et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 630. No. 94­821. Gibbons v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 S. W. 2d 164. No. 94­823. Nelson v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­824. Crosby v. Hawaii et al. Sup. Ct. Haw. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 76 Haw. 332, 876 P. 2d 1300. No. 94­825. Brandon v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1321. No. 94­826. Johnson & Higgins of California et al. v. Steiner Corp. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 935. No. 94­828. California Department of Corrections et al. v. Moyo. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 982. No. 94­832. Wierbicki v. Norfolk Southern Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­836. Alexander v. Patterson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1068. No. 94­837. Dennis v. Dennis. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 274. No. 94­840. Alarid et al. v. Secretary, New Mexico De- partment of Taxation and Revenue. Ct. App. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 118 N. M. 23, 878 P. 2d 341. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1082 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­846. Peterson et al. v. Fisher et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 628. No. 94­848. Showboat Operating Co., dba Showboat Hotel & Casino v. Steiner, Administrator of the Estate of Steiner, Deceased. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1459. No. 94­850. Brown v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 36. No. 94­853. Caputo v. Compuchem Laboratories, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1485. No. 94­854. Yoder et al. v. Elkhart County Auditor et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 632 N. E. 2d 369. No. 94­856. Guzman v. Department of Justice. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­857. Winther v. City of Portland. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­860. L. E. S. Properties, Hotel Venture v. Westin Hotel Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­861. Dow Corning Corp. v. Hopkins. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1116. No. 94­862. Brumley v. Department of Labor. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 746. No. 94­866. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 94­869. Persinger v. Carmazzi et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 563. No. 94­871. Meredith v. Scarborough et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662 So. 2d 290. No. 94­872. Bongiovanni et al. v. San Filippo. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 424. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1083 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­874. Payne v. Murray, Director, Virginia Depart- ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­876. Lennon et al. v. Alexander, Executor of the Estate of Quade, Deceased. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1355. No. 94­877. Smith v. Fruin et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 646. No. 94­882. Kleve v. Board of Green Township Trustees. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­883. Virginia State Corporation Commission v. National Home Insurance Co. (A Risk Retention Group). Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 Va. 161, 444 S. E. 2d 711. No. 94­884. Zahran et al. v. Frankenmuth Mutual In- surance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1436. No. 94­887. West v. County of Kern et al. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­893. Waycaster v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 558. No. 94­899. Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri v. Lynch et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 336. No. 94­900. Bayou des Familles Development Corp. et al. v. West Jefferson Levee District. Sup. Ct. La. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 640 So. 2d 1258. No. 94­901. Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. No. 94­912. Harris et al. v. Davidson. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 963. No. 94­918. Haass v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 902. No. 94­933. Williams v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 216. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1084 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­937. Merex A. G. v. Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 821. No. 94­940. Migdaleck v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 566. No. 94­945. Viti v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1061. No. 94­950. Gutierrez v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 336 Md. 1, 646 A. 2d 389. No. 94­954. Woodward v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­962. Johnsen v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1208. No. 94­964. Hamilton v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 22. No. 94­976. Norris v. Oklahoma City University et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1115. No. 94­1016. Montanino v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 364. No. 94­1021. White et al. v. Moulder, Chief of Police of Des Moines, Iowa, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 80. No. 94­1028. Sellers, By and Through Her Guardian, Natural Mother, and Next Friend, Sellers, et al. v. Baer et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 895. No. 94­5475. Karr v. Carper, Governor of Delaware, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 303. No. 94­5513. Herman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­5522. Barber v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 879 S. W. 2d 889. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1085 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­5579. Gardner v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­5650. Ortiz v. DuBois, Commissioner, Massachu- setts Department of Correction. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 708. No. 94­5747. Ledford v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 60, 439 S. E. 2d 917. No. 94­5788. Davis v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­5910. Mighty v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­5989. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 789. No. 94­6015. Sutherland v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 So. 2d 976. No. 94­6038. Wilkerson v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 498. No. 94­6045. Adams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­6048. Milton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 203. No. 94­6064. Fleming v. United States Postal Service Air Mail Facility at O'Hare et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 259. No. 94­6094. Hamilton v. Groose, Superintendent, Jef- ferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 859. No. 94­6112. Ford v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1271. No. 94­6162. Richardson v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 S. W. 2d 874. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1086 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6173. Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 487. No. 94­6183. Paton v. Federal Communications Commis- sion et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6195. Myers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 826. No. 94­6211. Fowlie v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1059 and 1070. No. 94­6216. Carr v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1194. No. 94­6227. Wheatfall v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 S. W. 2d 829. No. 94­6238. Fahy v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 537 Pa. 533, 645 A. 2d 199. No. 94­6251. Englert v. Small Business Administration. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 105. No. 94­6270. Cazes v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 875 S. W. 2d 253. No. 94­6287. Street v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 So. 2d 1297. No. 94­6305. Baiza Hernandez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6307. Lackey v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 486. No. 94­6317. Cervantes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1151. No. 94­6350. Kelly v. LaFace Records et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6356. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 744. No. 94­6397. Lance v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 117. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1087 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6532. Pedroza v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1125. No. 94­6553. Bejjani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 406. No. 94­6559. Hawkins v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6560. Oats v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 20. No. 94­6571. Gaudin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 943. No. 94­6578. Geitz v. Thieret et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1216. No. 94­6586. Galloway v. Thurman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6593. Tate v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 242. No. 94­6594. Walton v. Lindler, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6595. Blevins v. Lewis, Director, Arizona De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6599. Fisher v. Murray, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6605. Gardner v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 640. No. 94­6613. Woods v. Robertson et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 625. No. 94­6618. Wakefield v. Egles et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1173. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1088 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6622. Cancel v. Thurman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6623. Grant v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­6628. Broussard v. Edwards, Governor of Louisi- ana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 237. No. 94­6646. Farr v. Gray & End et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6656. Caraballo v. Beyer et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6657. Silas v. Roche et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­6658. Ayers v. Evans, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 141. No. 94­6660. Grant v. Wong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 570. No. 94­6661. Hutto v. North American Van Lines. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 37. No. 94­6664. Larson v. Moore et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 57. No. 94­6665. Mayberry v. Michigan Department of Cor- rections. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 447 Mich. 978, 523 N. W. 2d 627. No. 94­6674. Warner v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 433 Pa. Super. 638, 638 A. 2d 272. No. 94­6676. Greene v. McFadden, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­6679. Gibbs v. Stalder, Secretary, Louisiana De- partment of Public Safety and Corrections, Corrections Services, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1490. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1089 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6680. Greenwood v. Bechill. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1068. No. 94­6682. Huffman v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6685. Holloway v. Kaiser, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6688. Reams v. Rocha, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 139. No. 94­6689. Pote v. Shillinger, Attorney General of Wyoming. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 574. No. 94­6691. Mahaley v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 332 N. C. 583, 423 S. E. 2d 58. No. 94­6692. Doe v. Iowa et al. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6698. Dalis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 141. No. 94­6699. Brown v. California. Munic. Ct. of Shasta County, Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6700. Judd v. Gonzales, Secretary of State of New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6702. Saunders v. Thompson, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6705. Palomo et al. v. Territory of Guam. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 368. No. 94­6708. Robinson v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 78, 443 S. E. 2d 306. No. 94­6711. Puffer v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 132. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1090 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6712. Ogden v. San Juan County et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 452. No. 94­6717. Gilliam v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 Ohio St. 3d 17, 635 N. E. 2d 1242. No. 94­6719. Long v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 304. No. 94­6721. Simpson v. Groose, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­6722. Weakley et ux. v. Security State Bank & Trust et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 468. No. 94­6730. Okocha v. Cleveland Bar Assn. et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 398, 632 N. E. 2d 1284. No. 94­6733. Tucker v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 137 N. J. 259, 645 A. 2d 111. No. 94­6735. Howard v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 566. No. 94­6738. Tripati v. Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6742. Bryson v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 P. 2d 240. No. 94­6744. Hartford v. Arizona Department of Eco- nomic Security. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6747. Simonson v. Simonson. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6748. Aziz v. Wright et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 587. No. 94­6749. Aziz v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1070. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1091 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6750. Aziz v. Schriro, Director, Missouri Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­6751. Flayter v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 709, 520 N. W. 2d 110. No. 94­6752. Gagliardi v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 418 Mass. 562, 638 N. E. 2d 20. No. 94­6754. Knox v. Shillinger, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 964. No. 94­6755. Sesario Depineda v. Zavaras, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1076. No. 94­6757. Padilla v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 N. Y. 2d 850, 641 N. E. 2d 161. No. 94­6759. Mason v. Los Angeles Superior Court Ap- pellate Department. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6764. Wilson v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 433. No. 94­6768. Dearinger v. DuCharme, Superintendent, Washington State Reformatory. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6773. Adams v. Leapley, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 713. No. 94­6775. Crummie v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6777. Summers v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6779. Jardine v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1092 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6780. Jackson v. Ratelle, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­6783. Kiskila et ux. v. Business Exchange, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6784. Graves v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6786. Ford v. Williams et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6788. Denham v. Kernan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 245. No. 94­6791. Holloway v. Olivarez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 246. No. 94­6792. Brunn v. United Guaranty Residential In- surance Company of North Carolina. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 254 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 667 N. E. 2d 1110. No. 94­6795. Bradvica v. Jones, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6796. Betka v. Smith et ux. Cir. Ct. Ore., Clacka- mas County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6798. Chatters v. Thurman, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6799. Reyes v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6800. Long v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6807. Reese v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 166. No. 94­6808. McClellan v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 Ohio App. 3d 315, 638 N. E. 2d 593. No. 94­6809. Love v. Scott et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 629. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1093 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6811. Brown v. Nobles. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6812. Burley v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­6813. Gossage v. Barbour, Superintendent, Twin Rivers Corrections Center; and Thelan v. Barbour, Super- intendent, Twin Rivers Corrections Center. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6814. Wise v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 S. W. 2d 494. No. 94­6816. Hess et al. v. Harden et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­6819. Hill v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1383. No. 94­6820. Finkel v. New York City Housing Author- ity. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 94­6824. Miller v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6825. Williams v. Borg & Warner Automotive Electronics & Mechanical System Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1230. No. 94­6826. Holiday v. Gilmore, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 570. No. 94­6832. Cotton v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 206 App. Div. 2d 979, 616 N. Y. S. 2d 266. No. 94­6835. Grisso v. New Madrid County, Missouri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1394. No. 94­6836. Sizemore v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 568. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1094 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6840. Smith v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6841. Witcher v. Witcher. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 433 Pa. Super. 14, 639 A. 2d 1187. No. 94­6842. Pearson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1381. No. 94­6847. Russell v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 Mass. App. 152, 638 N. E. 2d 37. No. 94­6848. Nesmith v. McKellar et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 423. No. 94­6849. Luna v. Russell, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 Ohio St. 3d 561, 639 N. E. 2d 1168. No. 94­6850. Makemson v. McBride, Superintendent, Westville Correctional Center. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 570. No. 94­6851. Rodriguez Mendoza v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di- vision, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­6852. Quinto v. Office of Personnel Management. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 983 F. 2d 1088. No. 94­6855. Corona v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1381. No. 94­6857. Mims v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6861. Ivy v. Moore, Former Director, Missouri Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 634. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1095 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6862. Gocken v. City of Auburn, Washington, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­6863. Cassidy v. Industrial Indemnity Co. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6864. Atkins v. Tandy Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6870. Williams v. United States Postal Service et al.; and Williams v. National Association of Letter Carriers of the USA et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 575. No. 94­6871. De la Cerda v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6872. Gifford v. Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 565. No. 94­6874. Powers v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­6875. Onuorah v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 110. No. 94­6877. Dash v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 572. No. 94­6878. Celestine v. Rocha, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1424. No. 94­6884. Ghazali v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6885. Jones v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6886. Gray v. Alford, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1491. No. 94­6887. Hubbard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1410. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1096 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6888. Juels v. Deutsche Bank AG. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 391. No. 94­6889. Severe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 444. No. 94­6890. Coleman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 881 S. W. 2d 344. No. 94­6894. Torres v. United States; No. 94­6945. Torres v. United States; and No. 94­7041. Santoyo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 567. No. 94­6895. Banks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 557. No. 94­6900. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 94­6901. Robinson v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 630. No. 94­6902. Rishor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1118. No. 94­6903. Eason v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 730, 445 S. E. 2d 917. No. 94­6904. Revilla v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 P. 2d 1143. No. 94­6905. Rasheed v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6906. Marin-Perez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1382. No. 94­6907. Moore v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­6908. Willis v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1097 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6911. Green v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­6913. Fleming v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 557. No. 94­6915. Frieberger v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 916. No. 94­6917. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­6918. Crank v. Tolle, Judge, Criminal District Court of Texas, Dallas County. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6919. Garrett v. Arthur Andersen & Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 254. No. 94­6923. Renner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 642. No. 94­6926. Andres Paez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6927. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 53. No. 94­6928. Leaphart v. Commissioner of Internal Rev- enue. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­6930. Thakkar v. DeBevoise. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6932. Zuniga v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 572. No. 94­6934. Byse v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1165. No. 94­6936. Chandler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1383. No. 94­6938. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1098 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6942. Jorge Torres v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 130. No. 94­6943. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6944. Spaulding v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 559. No. 94­6950. Johnson et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1487. No. 94­6952. Hensler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1378. No. 94­6953. Speer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 605. No. 94­6954. Hickson, aka Pratt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 559. No. 94­6955. Young v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 920, 520 N. W. 2d 292. No. 94­6959. Fisher v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 684, 445 S. E. 2d 866. No. 94­6960. Hess v. Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 29 F. 3d 632. No. 94­6962. Mobley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­6964. Morehead v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1381. No. 94­6965. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 57. No. 94­6969. Outler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­6972. Davis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 613. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1099 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­6973. Chapman v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 49. No. 94­6975. Blackwell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1068. No. 94­6976. Daugaard v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 231 Conn. 195, 647 A. 2d 342. No. 94­6977. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1075. No. 94­6978. Valentine v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­6979. Ruiz-Cases v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 94­6985. Harbert v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 271. No. 94­6986. Hurtado-Rojas v. United States; and No. 94­6988. Rojas-Hurtado v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 94­6989. McGahee v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­6993. Mizkun v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6996. Lenis v. United States Marshal. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 49. No. 94­6998. Brown v. McGinnis, Director, Michigan De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7001. Cain v. United States; and No. 94­7051. Martin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 53. No. 94­7008. Siaw v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1075. No. 94­7009. Segars v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 655. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1100 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7012. Soriano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7014. Jones, aka Barnard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 94­7016. Miles v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­7019. Wishon v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1121. No. 94­7021. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 562. No. 94­7024. Townsend v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 262. No. 94­7026. Steele v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 788. No. 94­7027. Amis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1485. No. 94­7034. Hinton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 817. No. 94­7036. Hummer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­7040. Skinner v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1564. No. 94­7046. Anderson v. Department of the Air Force et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1380. No. 94­7049. Brazzell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 576. No. 94­7050. Mustilier v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7052. Pratt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 625. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1101 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­7053. Law v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1077. No. 94­7057. Lawrence v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 44. No. 94­7063. Pulido v. United States; No. 94­7072. Gomez v. United States; and No. 94­7105. Preval Planas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1407. No. 94­7064. Peery v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­7065. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1500. No. 94­7067. Matra v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1396. No. 94­7071. Barrientos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7073. Jessie v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7077. Carter v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 709, 520 N. W. 2d 110. No. 94­7080. Cox v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1074. No. 94­7081. Mendoza v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­7082. Barber v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­7084. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1378. No. 94­7093. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 557. No. 94­7097. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1094. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1102 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7103. Alonso Morales v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 576. No. 94­7106. Sorrentino Pimentel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 799. No. 94­7109. Ruiz Sifuentez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1047. No. 94­7120. Sarceno-Barrios v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 135. No. 94­7121. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 558. No. 94­7126. Conzett v. South Carolina. Ct. Common Pleas of Richland County, S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7179. Watts v. Chapleau, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­7198. Lohnes v. Class, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­438. Ellingsworth, Warden, et al. v. Reynolds. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 756. No. 94­799. Williams, Superintendent, Fulton Correc- tional Facility v. Vidal. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 67. No. 94­881. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction v. Hill. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 832. No. 94­650. Eyak Native Village et al. v. Exxon Corp. et al.; and No. 94­855. Exxon Corp. et al. v. Eyak Native Village et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Re- ported below: 25 F. 3d 773. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1103 513 U. S. January 9, 1995 No. 94­776. Gillette Co. v. Michigan Department of Treasury. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 198 Mich. App. 303, 497 N. W. 2d 595. No. 94­689. Duncan Energy Co. et al. v. Three Affili- ated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1294. No. 94­766. Duffy et al. v. Wetzler, Individually and as Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of New York, et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Motion of Na- tional Association of Retired Federal Employees et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 207 App. Div. 2d 375 and 378, 616 N. Y. S. 2d 48 and 213. No. 94­810. Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Independent Distributors Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­833. ASARCO Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of American Petroleum Institute et al. and Alaska Miners Association et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1565. No. 94­843. Ridgeway et al. v. Pfizer, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 94­865. Rutgerswerke AG v. Bettis et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of Federal Republic of Germany for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. 93­9007. Moss v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 831; No. 93­9344. Bannister v. Armontrout, Assistant Director/Zone II, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions, et al., ante, p. 960; 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1104 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 9, 1995 513 U. S. No. 93­9707. Cain v. Vickers et al., ante, p. 861; No. 94­508. Optimal Data Corp. v. United States, ante, p. 1000; No. 94­524. Lee v. State Bar of California, ante, p. 965; No. 94­535. Zisk et al. v. Placer County Superior Court (Walker, Real Party in Interest), ante, p. 983; No. 94­5032. Whitehead v. Greer et al., ante, p. 966; No. 94­5207. De la Fe v. United States, ante, p. 989; No. 94­5354. Overly v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ante, p. 966; No. 94­5610. Porter v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, ante, p. 1009; No. 94­5626. Johnson v. Dutton, Warden, et al., ante, p. 935; No. 94­5756. Mata v. Ricketts et al., ante, p. 968; No. 94­5814. Dokes v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction, ante, p. 968; No. 94­5822. Moon v. Zant, Warden, ante, p. 968; No. 94­5859. Giles v. Snow et al., ante, p. 969; No. 94­5892. McFadden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al., ante, p. 970; No. 94­5907. Jones v. North Carolina, ante, p. 1003; No. 94­5954. Shorter v. Smith, Warden, et al., ante, p. 953; No. 94­5956. Kerpan et ux. v. Davis, ante, p. 971; No. 94­5963. Gomez v. Brun Apartments, ante, p. 972; No. 94­6010. March v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al., ante, p. 973; No. 94­6033. Rebar v. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, et al., ante, p. 974; No. 94­6065. Azar v. Health Alliance Plan, ante, p. 974; No. 94­6167. Rimell v. United States, ante, p. 976; No. 94­6341. In re Seagrave, ante, p. 985; No. 94­6360. Lazor v. Sperry Rand Corp., Univac Division (nka Unisys Corp.), ante, p. 1006; No. 94­6417. McAfee v. Texas, ante, p. 1026; No. 94­6442. Randall v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of Volusia County et al., ante, p. 1026; 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1105 513 U. S. January 9, 11, 1995 No. 94­6459. Braslavsky v. Board of Trustees of Uni- versity of Illinois, ante, p. 1008; No. 94­6493. Dubyak v. Smith, Warden, ante, p. 1026; and No. 94­6530. Pfeiffer v. Arizona et al., ante, p. 1027. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 93­1782. Sweeney, Individually and as Trustee of the Maple Leaf Trust and of the Canadian Realty Trust, et al. v. Resolution Trust Corporation et al., ante, p. 914. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. No. 93­9353. Smith v. Dixon, Warden, ante, p. 841; and No. 94­5692. Gilmore v. Local 295, International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Help- ers of America, et al., ante, p. 936. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. No. 94­459. Bishop v. Georgia State Bar, ante, p. 987. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied. No. 94­6158. Dempsey v. Turner Broadcasting System et al., ante, p. 1004. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for rehearing denied. Petition for rehearing denied. No. 94­5895 (A­489). Zimmerman v. Texas, ante, p. 1021. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for rehearing denied. January 11, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­100. Faulkner v. United States, ante, p. 870. Peti- tion for rehearing dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Miscellaneous Order No. A­510 (94­7612). Pollard v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1106 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 11, 13, 16, 1995 513 U. S. disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. January 13, 1995 Certiorari Granted No. 94­780. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board et al. v. Pinette et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, February 23, 1995. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, March 23, 1995. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 675. No. 94­790. Reno, Attorney General, et al. v. Koray. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, February 23, 1995. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, March 23, 1995. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 558. No. 94­820. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be- fore 3 p.m., Thursday, February 23, 1995. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, March 23, 1995. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 86. January 16, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7660 (A­516). Marquez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1j 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1107 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­960. Synbiotics Corp. v. IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1080. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­1805. Mims v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Tome v. United States, ante, p. 150. Re- ported below: 12 F. 3d 217. No. 94­564. United States v. Ruddell. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., ante, p. 64. Reported below: 2 F. 3d 1159. No. 94­6261. Tomlin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Tome v. United States, ante, p. 150. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 110. Certiorari Dismissed No. 94­7612. Pollard v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed. The stay of execution of sentence of death is reinstated. This stay shall remain in effect pending the District Court's consider- ation of petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 106, Orig., ante, p. 177.) No. - ­ ­­­. Sigler v. Twyford et al. Motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration of order denying leave to file peti- tion for writ of certiorari out of time [ante, p. 923] denied. No. - ­ ­­­. Summerfield v. Holcomb et al.; and No. - ­ ­­­. R & R Mechanical, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1108 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. - ­ ­­­. Fadayini v. United States. Motion of Greg- ory Burr MacCaulay to withdraw as Court-appointed counsel for petitioner granted. No. D­1466. In re Disbarment of Walsh. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 984.] No. D­1467. In re Disbarment of Wilson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 997.] No. D­1493. In re Disbarment of Scott. Due to mistaken identity, the order entered January 9, 1995 [ante, p. 1073], sus- pending Winfield William Scott, of Dallas, Tex., from the Bar of this Court is vacated, and the rule to show cause is discharged. No. D­1496. In re Disbarment of Hotze. It is ordered that T. Wilson Hotze, of Richmond, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 93­1408. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; No. 93­1414. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.; and No. 93­1415. Hospital Association of New York State v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 920.] Motion of Federation of American Health Systems for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 93­1841. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Secre- tary of Transportation, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1288.] Motion of Maryland Women Business Entrepreneurs Association et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. No. 94­23. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 959.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: 15 minutes for the Solicitor General and 15 minutes for the private respondents. No. 94­167. Gutierrez de Martinez et al. v. Lamagno et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 998.] Motion 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1109 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. Motion of respondent Dirk A. Lamagno for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: 20 minutes for amicus curiae in support of judgment below and 10 minutes for respondent Lamagno. No. 94­226. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 512 U. S. 1289.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 94­367. Heintz et al. v. Jenkins. C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 959.] Motion of Commercial Law League of America for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. No. 94­7284. In re Roemer; No. 94­7355. In re Bond; and No. 94­7406. In re Carson et al. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 94­928. In re Anderson et al. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 94­413. Knox v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 733. No. 94­442. Boston Post Road Limited Partnership v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 477. No. 94­451. Holland v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1040. No. 94­511. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 1560. No. 94­527. Bella v. Chamberlain et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1251. No. 94­534. Olivas v. Boeh. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 761. No. 94­538. Boers et al. v. United States Department of Agriculture et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 244. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1110 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­568. McKinney v. Osceola County Board of County Commissioners. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1550. No. 94­648. Aispuro, Warden v. Melendez Longoria. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­692. Parker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 638. No. 94­694. Burke v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­701. Nelson et ux. v. United States Department of the Interior. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 349. No. 94­708. El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd., dba El Do- rado Mobilehome Park v. Rent Review Commission of the City of Palm Springs et al.; and No. 94­963. Residents of El Dorado Mobilehome Park v. Rent Review Commission of the City of Palm Springs et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­717. Napoli v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 31. No. 94­721. USX Corp. v. Cox et al.; No. 94­724. United Steelworkers of America v. Cox et al.; and No. 94­910. Cox et al. v. USX Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1386 and 30 F. 3d 1347. No. 94­748. Yong Hyon Kim v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 947. No. 94­752. American Bankers Assn. et al. v. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1100. No. 94­768. Cleveland et al. v. Beltman North Ameri- can Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 30 F. 3d 373. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1111 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 No. 94­814. Dougherty et al. v. Marks et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1487. No. 94­844. Cummings et al. v. DeKalb County et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1349. No. 94­864. Larson v. Nutt, Sheriff, Martin County. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 647. No. 94­867. Hyundai Motor Co. et al. v. Phillip, Per- sonal Representative of the Estate of Phillip, Deceased. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 1064. No. 94­880. Cross v. Cunningham, Warden. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 N. H. 591, 644 A. 2d 542. No. 94­894. Roberts v. Town of Canton et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 62. No. 94­895. American Union of Baptists, Inc., et al. v. Trustees of the Particular Primitive Baptist Church at Black Rock, Inc. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 335 Md. 564, 644 A. 2d 1063. No. 94­897. Wang, Chairman, Campaign Spending Commis- sion of Hawaii, et al. v. Lind. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1115. No. 94­902. Van Winkle v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­906. Richards, Conservator and Guardian of the Estate of Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1048. No. 94­911. Dolny v. Erickson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 381. No. 94­913. Berry, Personal Representative of the Estate of Berry, Deceased v. City of Detroit. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1342. No. 94­914. Adams et al. v. Barclays American Business Credit, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 389. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1112 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­915. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. v. Highlands Insurance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1027. No. 94­916. Remmey et al., Executors of the Estate of Remmey, Deceased v. PaineWebber, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 143. No. 94­927. Woods et al. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 520 N. W. 2d 305. No. 94­930. Balducci Publications et al. v. Anheuser- Busch, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 769. No. 94­931. Lewellen v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 345. No. 94­934. Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 823. No. 94­935. Taub v. City of Deer Park. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 S. W. 2d 824. No. 94­939. Enterprise VI et al. v. Ferguson et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 94­942. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlak- neft Oil Production Assn. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1232. No. 94­948. Kucinski v. Morning Call, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­955. DiCuccio v. Geisinger Clinic. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 414 Pa. Super. 85, 606 A. 2d 509. No. 94­957. American Disposal Co. et al. v. Hume et al. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 Wash. 2d 656, 880 P. 2d 988. No. 94­958. Brummett v. Campbell et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1113 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 No. 94­973. Thomas v. Monsanto Employees' Credit Union. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1060. No. 94­974. Ohio Savings Bank, fka Ohio Savings Assn. v. Hamilton et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 Ohio St. 3d 137, 637 N. E. 2d 887. No. 94­975. Benson et al. v. Empire State Bank. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 516 N. W. 2d 550. No. 94­985. Forgette v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 574. No. 94­991. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbus et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1402. No. 94­997. Beckman et ux. v. Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1007. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1493. No. 94­1008. Esposito v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 F. 3d 1540. No. 94­1017. Adams et al. v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services et al. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 Md. 105, 647 A. 2d 96. No. 94­1031. Felix v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 356. No. 94­1032. Reynolds v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 198. No. 94­1065. Martindale v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 348. No. 94­1067. Coleman v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 46. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1114 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1068. Greaves v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 432. No. 94­1069. Morgan v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 405. No. 94­1071. Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 637. No. 94­1078. Scolieri v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­1083. Koen v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 722. No. 94­1095. Enriquez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 55. No. 94­5144. Andrews v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 612. No. 94­5352. Moore v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 534 Pa. 527, 633 A. 2d 1119. No. 94­5634. Smith v. Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 25 F. 3d 1363. No. 94­5837. Pittman v. Ahitow, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 569. No. 94­5846. Burks v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 876 S. W. 2d 877. No. 94­6011. Norman v. Taylor. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1259. No. 94­6093. Lucas v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 877 S. W. 2d 315. No. 94­6136. Nichols v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 877 S. W. 2d 722. No. 94­6230. Moore v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 882 S. W. 2d 844. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1115 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 No. 94­6260. Bashara v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­6263. Deggendorf et al. v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6369. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1186. No. 94­6387. Fasola v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 627. No. 94­6413. LaPlante v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1. No. 94­6415. Queen v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 877 S. W. 2d 752. No. 94­6471. Menzies v. Utah. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 P. 2d 393. No. 94­6485. Huerta-Macias, aka Macias-Huerta v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­6506. Budd v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 442. No. 94­6507. Spaziano v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1028. No. 94­6513. Oliva et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1096. No. 94­6527. Jackson v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1492. No. 94­6570. Rich v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6574. Jefferies v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 316 S. C. 13, 446 S. E. 2d 427. No. 94­6589. Brantley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1116 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6591. Troncoso v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 612. No. 94­6614. Petty v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6778. Ford v. United States District Court for the Central District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6971. Price v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 645 So. 2d 454. No. 94­6980. Schmidt v. Minnesota Department of Cor- rections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1185. No. 94­6981. Torres v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 225. No. 94­6982. Schaffer v. Bevevino et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6984. Wills v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 567. No. 94­6987. Hall et al. v. Local Union 1183, United Au- tomobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 648 A. 2d 424. No. 94­6990. Mafnas v. Aldan-Pierce. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 756. No. 94­6991. Ramos v. Office of the Public Defender, Hudson Region. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6992. Pizzo v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6994. Reilly v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6995. Marvel v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 651 A. 2d 788. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1117 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 No. 94­6997. Ruthers v. Ortiz, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­6999. Dyer v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7000. Dusenbery v. Graves et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­7002. Cazeau, aka LaFleur v. Pennsylvania State Police et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1486. No. 94­7003. Bradford v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 639 So. 2d 1326. No. 94­7004. Bronfman v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, et al. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 879 S. W. 2d 587. No. 94­7006. Sierotowicz v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7011. Sowa v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 447. No. 94­7015. Mehrer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 253. No. 94­7017. Paradis v. Arave et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 950. No. 94­7023. Bencs v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 555. No. 94­7035. Gonzales v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7037. David v. Hudacs, New York Commissioner of Labor. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 N. Y. 2d 663, 632 N. E. 2d 461. No. 94­7043. Baez v. Douglas County Commission et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:09 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1118 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7045. Barrow v. Board of Regents of the Univer- sity of Texas at El Paso et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­7055. McKenzie v. Weer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1415. No. 94­7056. Ladson v. Metropolitan Dade County et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 1362. No. 94­7061. Turpin v. Kassulke, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1392. No. 94­7069. Rawlins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7075. Burns v. Department of the Air Force et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 406. No. 94­7076. Campos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7085. Harper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1143. No. 94­7091. Vautier v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 93. No. 94­7095. Gidiglo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 556. No. 94­7098. Coefield v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1496. No. 94­7100. Hawkins v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7113. Beasley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1106. No. 94­7116. Austin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 89. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:10 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1119 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 No. 94­7117. Kimble v. Montgomery County Government et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 Md. App. 751. No. 94­7118. Alvarado Barron v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 559. No. 94­7123. Kovalic v. DEC International. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 Wis. 2d 162, 519 N. W. 2d 351. No. 94­7129. Brannon v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1182. No. 94­7133. Hadrick v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­7138. Griggs v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­7140. Osuorji v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1186. No. 94­7141. Pierro v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 611. No. 94­7143. Mason v. United States; and No. 94­7144. Noyer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 134. No. 94­7145. Munoz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 632. No. 94­7151. Seligsohn v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­7155. Stancil v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 558. No. 94­7160. Walton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 57. No. 94­7166. Purk v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­7167. Clark v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 831. 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:10 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1120 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7169. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1213. No. 94­7171. Bustillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1506. No. 94­7177. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7182. Cupa-Guillen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 860. No. 94­7183. Castellanos et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 803. No. 94­7186. Bascue v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7190. White v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 94. No. 94­7192. Erwin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 565. No. 94­7194. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­7195. Pena v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7196. Quinn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 565. No. 94­7197. Oriakhi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­7199. Redman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 437. No. 94­7200. Nixon v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 751. No. 94­7288. Moseley v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 N. C. 710, 445 S. E. 2d 906. No. 94­761. Calderon, Warden, et al. v. Wade. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:10 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1121 513 U. S. January 17, 1995 pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1312. No. 94­801. Arizona v. Burkett. Ct. App. Ariz. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 179 Ariz. 109, 876 P. 2d 1144. No. 94­932. Michigan v. Caruso. Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 446 Mich. 643, 521 N. W. 2d 557. No. 94­909. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of Individual Professors of International Law and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1166. No. 94­946. Forest Grove, Inc., et al. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, as Receiver of Hill Financial, S. A. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent to substitute RTC Mortgage Trust 1994­S5 in place of Resolution Trust Corporation, as Re- ceiver for Hill Financial, S. A., granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 33 F. 3d 284. No. 94­951. Hall et al. v. O'Sullivan et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of California Justice Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. No. 94­966. Primate and Bishops' Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia v. Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy Resurrection, Inc., et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of James Andrews et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 418 Mass. 1001, 636 N. E. 2d 211. No. 94­986. Clapp v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Motion of peti- tioner to defer consideration of petition for certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 App. Div. 2d 386, 592 N. Y. S. 2d 580. Rehearing Denied No. 93­9758. Ferran et al. v. Town of Nassau, New York, et al., ante, p. 1014; 513ord$$1k 03-10-98 18:20:10 PGT*ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1122 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 17, 18, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­22. Washington v. United States, ante, p. 1014; No. 94­280. Gleave v. United States, ante, p. 1015; No. 94­343. Thanh Vong Hoai v. Sun Refining & Market- ing Co., Inc., ante, p. 947; No. 94­362. Acevedo-Villalobos et al. v. Hernandez et al., ante, p. 1015; No. 94­440. Setola et al. v. Bob Schmidt Chevrolet, Inc., et al., ante, p. 1016; No. 94­441. Mackey v. Moss et al., ante, p. 1043; No. 94­665. Brobst v. Pennsylvania et al., ante, p. 1044; No. 94­5062. Yankelevicz v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ante, p. 1020; No. 94­5310. Jerry v. Domovich, Superintendent, Penn- sylvania State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al., ante, p. 895; No. 94­5380. Lester v. Jabe, Warden, ante, p. 1020; No. 94­5986. Morris v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, ante, p. 972; No. 94­6009. Lavold v. Chang et al., ante, p. 1021; No. 94­6124. Meade-Stephens v. School District of the City of Jersey City, Hudson County, ante, p. 991; No. 94­6259. Wallace v. Smith, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1023; No. 94­6319. Hiratani v. Department of the Treasury et al., ante, p. 992; No. 94­6345. Herron-Cole v. Jeter et al., ante, p. 1025; No. 94­6351. Johnson v. Epps, ante, p. 1025; No. 94­6380. Carter v. Amtrak, ante, p. 1006; No. 94­6381. Sinai v. New England Telephone & Tele- graph Co. et al., ante, p. 1025; No. 94­6440. Smathers v. Greiner, ante, p. 1026; and No. 94­6541. Echols v. Yukon Telephone Co., Inc., et al., ante, p. 1048. Petitions for rehearing denied. January 18, 1995 Dismissals Under Rule 46 No. 94­7054. McCall v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 750. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1123 513 U. S. January 18, 20, 23, 1995 No. 94­815. Public School Retirement System of Mis- souri v. Lynch et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 336. January 20, 1995 Certiorari Granted No. 93­2068. Kimberlin v. Quinlan et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, March 1, 1995. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, March 29, 1995. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 6 F. 3d 789. No. 94­6790. Garlotte v. Fordice, Governor of Missis- sippi. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of peti- tioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, March 1, 1995. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, March 29, 1995. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 216. January 23, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­995. Home Buyers Warranty Corporation II et al. v. Lopez. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted, judgment va- cated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, ante, p. 265. Reported below: 628 So. 2d 361. No. 93­1000. Terminix International Company Limited Partnership et al. v. Jackson et ux. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, ante, p. 265. Reported below: 628 So. 2d 357. No. 93­1816. Southern Health Corporation of Hamilton, Inc., et al. v. Lorance. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1124 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, ante, p. 265. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 475. Certiorari Granted-Reversed. (See No. 94­941, ante, p. 364.) Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Lowry v. Rubin, Judge; and No. - ­ ­­­. Rogers v. Guerrero et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. D­1465. In re Disbarment of Goodman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 984.] No. D­1469. In re Disbarment of Boneta. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1037.] No. D­1497. In re Disbarment of Skinner. It is ordered that Truman A. Skinner, of Miami, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1498. In re Disbarment of White. It is ordered that David Garth White, of Cedar Key, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 105, Orig. Kansas v. Colorado. Exceptions to the Re- port of the Special Master set for oral argument in due course. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 803.] No. 108, Orig. Nebraska v. Wyoming et al. Motion of Basin Electric Power Cooperative for leave to file a reply to certain Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master granted. Motion of Platte River Trust for leave to file a response to Wyo- ming's Second Exception to the Report of the Special Master granted. Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master set for oral argument in due course. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 997.] No. 94­431. Ryder v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Motion of petitioner to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1125 513 U. S. January 23, 1995 No. 94­514. United States v. Gaudin. C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Motion of respondent for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. No. 94­623. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer et al. C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1013.] Motion of American Association of Exporters and Im- porters for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Jus- tice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 94­1024. Huddleston v. CIGNA Insurance Co., fka INA Underwriters Insurance Co. et al., ante, p. 1071. Mo- tion of respondents for double costs and damages granted in part, and respondents are awarded a total of $500 to be paid by counsel for petitioner on or before February 17, 1995. No. 94­6790. Garlotte v. Fordice, Governor of Missis- sippi. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1123.] Mo- tion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Brian D. Boyle, Esq., of Washington, D. C., be ap- pointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 94­7449. In re Vey. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 94­203. Morse et al. v. Republican Party of Virginia et al. Appeal from D. C. W. D. Va. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 853 F. Supp. 212. Certiorari Granted No. 94­12. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1016. No. 94­896. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 646 So. 2d 619. No. 94­947. National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 625. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1126 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6615. Thompson v. Keohane, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1073. Certiorari Denied No. 93­1857. Carpenters District Council of New Or- leans and Vicinity et al. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 15 F. 3d 1275. No. 93­7218. Suess v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 5 F. 3d 1056. No. 94­596. Hughes v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 1069. No. 94­612. Jackson v. Scheibel, Director, ACTION. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 126. No. 94­775. Estate of Marcos v. Hilao et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1467. No. 94­796. Dr. John Hagelin for President Committee of Kansas et al. v. Graves, Secretary of State of Kansas. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 956. No. 94­798. United States Lines Reorganization Trust, Successor to United States Lines (S. A.), Inc. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 385. No. 94­811. Wallshein v. Cablestrand Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 644. No. 94­925. Metropolitan Washington Airports Author- ity et al. v. Hechinger et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 97. No. 94­952. Pan American World Airways, Inc., et al. v. Pagnucco et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 804. No. 94­965. Weisberg v. Minnesota. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1271. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1127 513 U. S. January 23, 1995 No. 94­968. Pineville Real Estate Operation Corp. et al. v. Michael et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 32 F. 3d 88. No. 94­969. Odekirk v. Imperial Palace, Inc., V. E. B. A. Trust Employee Medical Benefit Plan, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1102. No. 94­970. Buster v. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employ- ees Trust et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1114. No. 94­971. Campbell et al. v. Leech Lake Band of Chip- pewa Indians et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 521 N. W. 2d 357. No. 94­978. Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Liberty Mu- tual Insurance Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 30 F. 3d 630. No. 94­979. Patterson v. Matanuska Maid, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 P. 2d 1038. No. 94­983. Holahan, Chair of the Minnesota Ethical Practices Board, et al. v. Day et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1356. No. 94­994. Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1439. No. 94­996. Schulz et al. v. New York et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 N. Y. 2d 231, 639 N. E. 2d 1140. No. 94­998. Bullwinkle v. Alaska. Super. Ct. Alaska, 4th Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1001. Stewart v. Keohane. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 882 P. 2d 1293. No. 94­1005. Harhai v. Caruso et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1169. No. 94­1006. King v. Young et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 430. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1128 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1009. Larsson et ux. v. City of Lake Oswego, Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Ore. App. 647, 874 P. 2d 99. No. 94­1011. Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1240. No. 94­1014. Ndefru v. Sherwood et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 142. No. 94­1018. Mass et al. v. City of Carlsbad et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1056. John W. Martin Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Norwest Bank Kalispell, N. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1113. No. 94­1091. Kelley et al. v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 265. No. 94­1101. Schmidgall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1533. No. 94­1108. Vivas v. United States; and No. 94­1115. Andonian et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 94­1108, 29 F. 3d 634 and 1432; No. 94­1115, 29 F. 3d 634. No. 94­6226. Long v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 54. No. 94­6500. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 876. No. 94­6575. Holdridge v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 134. No. 94­6634. Desantiago-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 394. No. 94­6673. Searles v. Relic et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 620. No. 94­6683. Mariani et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1275. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1129 513 U. S. January 23, 1995 No. 94­6736. Flower v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 530. No. 94­6831. Becker v. City of Kennewick. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6845. Peterka v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 640 So. 2d 59. No. 94­6891. Williams v. Hawley, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6897. Hawkins v. Hargett, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6898. Hayes v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6899. Guy v. Navarro, Sheriff, Broward County, Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6909. Scarpa v. DuBois, Commissioner, Massachu- setts Department of Correction. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1. No. 94­6910. Smart v. Board of Trustees of the Univer- sity of Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 34 F. 3d 432. No. 94­6912. Harris v. 7232 Pleasant View Drive. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6914. Fields v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 Kan. App. 2d xviii, 875 P. 2d 1016. No. 94­6916. Fanny v. Levy et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­6920. Tredway v. Farley, Superintendent, Indi- ana State Prison, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 288. No. 94­6921. Smith v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Cor- rectional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1130 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6922. Dehler v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6924. Lyles v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 N. E. 2d 1385. No. 94­6925. Moore v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 S. W. 2d 253. No. 94­6937. Ayers v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 335 Md. 602, 645 A. 2d 22. No. 94­6941. Hardnett v. Marshall, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 875. No. 94­6946. Kirk v. Simpson, Sheriff. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 566. No. 94­6948. Giles v. Idaho et al. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 125 Idaho 921, 877 P. 2d 365. No. 94­6949. Gilmore v. Gregg et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6951. Chamberlin v. Hayes et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6956. Kersh v. Liberty State Bank & Trust. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 1452. No. 94­6957. Kersh v. Huntington Banks of Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 212. No. 94­6961. Derrick v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 378. No. 94­6966. Redmond v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6967. Rawlins v. Olson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 248. No. 94­7005. Walls v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 381. No. 94­7007. Torrey v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio- rari denied. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1131 513 U. S. January 23, 1995 No. 94­7013. Nichols v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7018. Parker v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 369. No. 94­7022. Ballard v. Breeden. Cir. Ct. City of Norfolk, Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7032. Holston v. Griffin et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1209. No. 94­7033. Hollingsworth v. Burton, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 109. No. 94­7038. Bradford v. San Luis Obispo County, De- partment of Social Services. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7042. Shiver v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7044. Wardlaw v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7047. Gines v. Curran et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7048. Faile v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7058. Murray v. Penobscot County District At- torney et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 126. No. 94­7059. Rigney v. Beyer, Superintendent, New Jer- sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7060. Calia v. Parker et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1395. No. 94­7066. DeGrijze v. Schwartz et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7068. Maghe v. Carr, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1105. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1132 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7128. Armstrong v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 523 N. W. 2d 443. No. 94­7146. Quigley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 135. No. 94­7149. Marquard v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 54. No. 94­7162. Anderson v. Humana, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1076. No. 94­7206. Chischilly v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1144. No. 94­7210. White v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7213. Bonasia v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1306. No. 94­7215. Tuesta Toro v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 771. No. 94­7218. Wagoner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 90. No. 94­7219. Beil v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­7221. Treur v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 135. No. 94­7224. Rivera-Santiago v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 212. No. 94­7225. Williams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 850. No. 94­7227. Scott v. Hall et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 566. No. 94­7228. Ashby v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7229. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 663. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1133 513 U. S. January 23, 1995 No. 94­7232. Lyons v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­7233. Pledger v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 574. No. 94­7234. Osorio-Arce v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7235. Ovalle-Salcedo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 F. 3d 1432. No. 94­7240. Dorsey v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 285. No. 94­7241. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­7242. Harris v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 712. No. 94­7245. Hoyle v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 415. No. 94­7247. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1498. No. 94­7248. Treece v. Waters, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­7249. Berkery v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­7252. Beyah v. Senkowski. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7255. Hassan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­7256. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1051. No. 94­7257. Valencia-Vargas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7258. Francisco v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 116. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1134 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7260. Marquez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1459. No. 94­7261. Potter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 94. No. 94­7262. Mathis v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 474. No. 94­7276. Turner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 636. No. 94­7277. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 574. No. 94­7278. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 140. No. 94­7282. Rosario, aka Torres-Rosario v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­7290. Vick v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 558. No. 94­7298. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1104. No. 94­7299. Golden v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 94­7300. McClarin, aka Nealy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 642. No. 94­7303. Wilder v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 558. No. 94­7306. Freeman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1508. No. 94­7307. Woods v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1533. No. 94­7308. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 636. No. 94­7310. Skipper v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 337 N. C. 1, 446 S. E. 2d 252. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1135 513 U. S. January 23, 1995 No. 94­7314. Daniels v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 337 N. C. 243, 446 S. E. 2d 298. No. 94­7316. Davila-Escovedo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 840. No. 94­7317. Briscoe v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 271. No. 94­7319. Arnold v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 94. No. 94­7321. Turner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 636. No. 94­7322. Scott v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­7327. Killion v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 844. No. 94­7328. King v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 728. No. 94­7331. Hatchett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7334. Romano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 699. No. 94­7335. Mayberry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 631. No. 94­7336. Wai Chong Leung v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1402. No. 94­7337. Murphy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 143. No. 94­7340. Restrepo-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 636. No. 94­7344. Minniecheske v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7346. Burton v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 Md. App. 790. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1136 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 23, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7351. Vijendira v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7379. Merola v. Beyer et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­712. Fressie v. Trans World Airlines et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­961. Delaware v. Jackson. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 A. 2d 1360. No. 94­993. Illinois v. Turner. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 259 Ill. App. 3d 979, 631 N. E. 2d 1236. No. 94­7222. Whitney v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 420. No. 94­7750 (A­536). Smith v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. 94­389. Clostermann v. Johnson et al., ante, p. 948; No. 94­487. Braswell v. Los Angeles Unified School District, ante, p. 964; No. 94­664. Johnson, dba F. C. Johnson Construction Co. v. Hyneman, ante, p. 1043; No. 94­5876. Judge v. Bolan, ante, p. 969; No. 94­5878. Fair v. Illinois, ante, p. 1020; No. 94­6110. Goulding v. United States, ante, p. 1061; No. 94­6189. Bolender v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, ante, p. 1022; No. 94­6222. Green v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, ante, p. 1004; No. 94­6276. Valdez v. Joy Technologies et al., ante, p. 1023; 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1137 513 U. S. January 23, 24, 26, 30, 1995 No. 94­6486. Kelly v. Withrow, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1061; No. 94­6536. Jones v. United States, ante, p. 1028; No. 94­6627. In re Wilson, ante, p. 1013; No. 94­6630. Broughton v. Smith et al., ante, p. 1048; No. 94­6655. Slagel v. Shell Oil Refinery et al., ante, p. 1031; and No. 94­6663. Harris v. Lillard et al., ante, p. 1063. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 94­5977. Azubuko v. Commissioner of Parking, City of Boston, et al., ante, p. 983. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the con- sideration or decision of this motion. January 24, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7770 (A­547). Edmonds v. Jabe, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1123. January 26, 1995 Miscellaneous Order No. 94­6615. Thompson v. Keohane, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1126.] Motion for appoint- ment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Julie R. O'Sullivan, Esq., of Washington, D. C., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. January 30, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7851 (A­556). Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Jus- tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 159. No. 94­7857 (A­557). Russell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1138 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 January 30, February 2, 5, 13, 1995 513 U. S. sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. February 2, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­7401. Kennon v. Robertson et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 629. February 5, 1995 Certiorari Denied No. 94­7948 (A­574). Motley v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. February 13, 1995 Miscellaneous Order No. A­555. O'Connell, Guardian ad Litem for Baby Boy Richard v. Kirchner; and No. A­558. Doe et al. v. Kirchner. Applications for stay, addressed to Justice O'Connor and referred to the Court, denied. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. Wrenching factual circumstances such as these have arrived on our doorstep twice in as many years. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U. S. 1301 (1993). Baby Richard is nearly four years old. He has lived his entire life in the care of the Does, a couple who believed, at least initially, that he was legally their child. Otakar Kirchner, the boy's biological father, was told for the first 57 days of the boy's life that his son was dead. When Kirchner learned that Baby Richard had instead been put up for adoption by his biological mother, Kirchner immediately asserted his rights and sought the boy's return. Last year, after finding Kirchner a fit parent and determining that he had adequately pursued his inter- est in the child, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the adop- tion, see In re Petition of Doe, 159 Ill. 2d 347, 638 N. E. 2d 181 (1994). We denied the petition for certiorari seeking review of 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1139 1138 O'Connor, J., dissenting that judgment, see ante, p. 994. To date, Otakar Kirchner has never met his son. One week ago, four hours after concluding oral argument on Kirchner's habeas petition, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a one-line order directing the Does "to surrender forthwith custody of the child known as Baby Boy Richard" to Otakar Kirchner. In so doing, the court evidently did not apply a recent amendment to the state adoption laws, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 50/20b (1994), which provides, "In the event that an order for adoption is vacated, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of the proceeding pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The parties to the proceed- ing shall be the petitioners to the adoption proceeding, the minor child, the biological parents whose rights have been terminated, and other parties who have been granted leave to intervene in the proceeding. The provisions of this Sec- tion shall apply to all cases pending on and after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1994." The amendment employs mandatory language. Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 472 (1983). It also appears on its face to apply to the instant case. At this juncture, we can only speculate about the Illinois Su- preme Court's rationale for avoiding application of a state law that appears to mandate a "best interests" hearing. The court may have rested its decision on state law grounds, either finding the provision altogether inapplicable in this habeas proceeding or determining that it violated the State Constitution. On the other hand, the court may have rested its decision on a conclusion that 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 50/20b runs afoul of the Federal Constitu- tion. Cf. 159 Ill. 2d, at 363, 638 N. E. 2d, at 188 (Heiple, J., writing in support of denial of rehearing) (citing Stanley v. Illi- nois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), a case based on the Federal Constitu- tion, to support the proposition that the "best interests" standard should not be the determining factor in custody cases); id., at 190 (suggesting that the enactment of a provision designed to affect pending cases violates state principles of separation of powers). That we are left guessing about the basis for the Illinois Su- preme Court's decision, particularly when opinions are forthcom- 513ord$$2l 03-07-98 22:04:28 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1140 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 13, 14, 15, 16, 1995 513 U. S. ing, gives me considerable pause. A decision that the Federal Constitution invalidates the Illinois statute may raise a conflict with decisions of other courts. See, e. g., In re Baby Boy C., 630 A. 2d 670 (D. C. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. H. R. v. E. O., ante, p. 809. Because we are presently ill equipped to evaluate the issues in this difficult case, I would grant a stay extending until 10 days after issuance of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion or 45 days from today, whichever comes first. As in Sklaroff v. Skeadas, 76 S. Ct. 736, 738, 100 L. Ed. 1524, 1525 (1956) (Frank- furter, J., in chambers), I believe that in this case, "[d]isrupting the statu[s] quo forthwith . . . has consequences whose disad- vantages, from the point of view of the child's interests, out- weigh any loss to the [biological father] that may result from a short delay in acquiring custody of the child." I respectfully dissent. February 14, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­1119. 20th Century Insurance Co. et al. v. Quack- enbush, California Insurance Commissioner, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari dismissed as to 20th Century Insurance Co. and 21st Century Casualty Co. under this Court's Rule 46. Re- ported below: 8 Cal. 4th 216, 878 P. 2d 566. February 15, 1995 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 94­891. DLG Financial Corp. et al. v. Board of Gov- ernors of the Federal Reserve System et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 993. February 16, 1995 Rehearing Denied No. 94­7100 (A­602). Hawkins v. Texas, ante, p. 1118. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Peti- tion for rehearing denied. 513ORD$$2l 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1141 513 U. S. February 17, 20, 21, 1995 February 17, 1995 Miscellaneous Order No. A­597. Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves v. Pires et al. Sup. Ct. N. Y., County of New York. Application for injunction, presented to Justice Ginsburg, and by her referred to the Court, denied. February 20, 1995 Miscellaneous Order No. A­617. Hawkins v. Texas. Application for stay of exe- cution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. February 21, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 93­1728. O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of McKennon v. Nash- ville Banner Publishing Co., ante, p. 352. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 176. No. 94­1097. Harris v. Hirsh. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid- eration in light of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U. S. 246 (1994). Reported below: 83 N. Y. 2d 734, 636 N. E. 2d 1375. No. 94­6155. Whitmore v. Avery, Superintendent, Com- munity Corrections Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Schlup v. Delo, ante, p. 298. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1426. No. 94­7373. Nave v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Cor- rectional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Schlup v. Delo, ante, p. 298. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 802. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1142 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Cordero v. United States; and No. - ­ ­­­. Duque v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. A­502. Mance v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Appli- cation for stay of mandate, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­534 (94­1244). Behrens v. Pelletier. C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of District Court proceedings, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted, and it is ordered that proceedings in this case in the United States District Court for the Central District of California are stayed pending this Court's action on the petition for writ of certiorari. If the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, this order terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this order is to remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. No. D­1455. In re Disbarment of Wong. Allan Yon Kwong Wong, of Somerville, Mass., having requested to resign as a mem- ber of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on September 14, 1994 [512 U. S. 1282], is hereby discharged. No. D­1478. In re Disbarment of Chastain. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1480. In re Disbarment of Mack. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1039.] No. D­1481. In re Disbarment of Lieber. Paul Gerald Lieber, of New York, N. Y., having requested to resign as a mem- ber of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on December 5, 1994 [ante, p. 1039], is hereby discharged. No. D­1499. In re Disbarment of Benson. It is ordered that Seth Benson, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1143 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1500. In re Disbarment of Sacks. It is ordered that Bernard Sacks, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1501. In re Disbarment of Tinari. It is ordered that Nino V. Tinari, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1502. In re Disbarment of Steutermann. It is or- dered that Edward M. Steutermann, of Prospect, Ky., be sus- pended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1503. In re Disbarment of Sydnor. It is ordered that Richard W. W. Sydnor, Jr., of Huntington, W. Va., be sus- pended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1504. In re Disbarment of Hanson. It is ordered that Lyle Marion Hanson, of Kansas City, Mo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1506. In re Disbarment of Westler. It is ordered that Murray Westler, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1507. In re Disbarment of Bain. It is ordered that David Lee Bain, of San Diego, Cal., be suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1144 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. D­1508. In re Disbarment of Samarco. It is ordered that James Phillip Samarco, of Fresno, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1509. In re Disbarment of Mason. It is ordered that Cecil Vernon Mason, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 105, Orig. Kansas v. Colorado. Motion of Kansas for divided argument granted, and the time is allotted as follows: Kansas, 30 minutes; Colorado, 20 minutes; and the United States, 10 minutes. Motion of Colorado for divided argument denied. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument denied. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1124.] No. 108, Orig. Nebraska v. Wyoming et al. Motion of Wyoming for leave to file a reply brief granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1124.] No. 111, Orig. Texas et al. v. New York. Motion of plaintiff-intervenor States of Alabama et al. for leave to dismiss their respective amended complaints without prejudice denied. Bill of complaint dismissed. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 804.] No. 93­2068. Kimberlin v. Quinlan et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1123.] Motion of the parties to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 94­440. Setola et al. v. Bob Schmidt Chevrolet, Inc., et al., ante, p. 1016. Motion of respondents for award of dam- ages and costs denied. No. 94­455. Johnson et al. v. Jones. C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Motion of petitioners to dis- pense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 94­771. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Na- tion. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Mo- 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1145 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 tion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. No. 94­590. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton et ux., Guardians ad Litem for Acton. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1013.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­5707. Wilson v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. [Certio- rari granted, ante, p. 1014.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 94­749. Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Les- bian & Bisexual Group of Boston et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Respondents' suggestion of mootness rejected. No. 94­6620. Gaydos v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of peti- tioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 1075] denied. No. 94­7354. Fertel-Rust v. Dane County Social Serv- ices et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until March 14, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­7377. Longnecker v. Kelley. Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 14, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­7526. In re Walker; and No. 94­7568. In re Flakes. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 94­728. In re Smith; No. 94­1100. In re Rogers; No. 94­7125. In re Green; No. 94­7201. In re Nash; 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1146 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7581. In re Gay; and No. 94­7652. In re Tabas. Petitions for writs of mandamus denied. No. 94­1257. In re Constant. Petition for writ of manda- mus and/or prohibition denied. No. 94­7086. In re Gibson. Petition for writ of prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 94­1039. Romer, Governor of Colorado, et al. v. Evans et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Motions of Family Defense Coun- cil and Colorado for Family Values for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 882 P. 2d 1335. Certiorari Denied No. 93­9690. Fairchild v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 799. No. 94­2. Mitsubishi International Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 14 F. 3d 1507. No. 94­625. D & G Marine Maintenance et al. v. Kollias et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 67. No. 94­636. Alvarez et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­637. Cruz v. Perry, Secretary of Defense. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 570. No. 94­671. Lopez-Amaro v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 986. No. 94­691. Gregory v. United States et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 564. No. 94­785. Deeb v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 13 F. 3d 1532. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1147 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­807. Piroglu v. Coleman, Fire Chief, District of Columbia, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 25 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­829. Langguth v. McCuen, Secretary of the State of Arkansas. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 30 F. 3d 138. No. 94­841. Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Ameri- cas, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 376. No. 94­842. Magill v. Evans, George & Bronstein. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 52. No. 94­879. Legge v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 94­885. Brown et al. v. Resolution Trust Corpora- tion et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 128. No. 94­888. NationsBank of Texas, N. A. v. Executive Life Insurance Co. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 Cal. App. 4th 1156, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734. No. 94­903. Atkins v. Coltec Industries, Inc., fka Colt Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­904. Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 718. No. 94­905. Nakata et al. v. Hawaii et al. Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 Haw. 360, 878 P. 2d 699. No. 94­908. J. R. Simplot Co. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 58. No. 94­917. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., et al. v. City of Columbia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 52. No. 94­919. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. v. Health Insurance Association of 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1148 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. America et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 412. No. 94­926. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951, AFL­CIO & CLC v. Mulder et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 365. No. 94­938. Kreines v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1105. No. 94­943. Rodriguez et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 94­949. Greenblatt v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1102. No. 94­953. Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1418. No. 94­956. Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville, Alabama, et al. v. Alabama Power Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 384. No. 94­959. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Author- ity v. Environmental Protection Agency. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 600. No. 94­980. City of Los Angeles v. Chew. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1432. No. 94­984. Hopkins et al. v. Andaya et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 632. No. 94­992. Dou-Han, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 641 So. 2d 872. No. 94­995. Worcester County, Maryland, et al. v. Cane et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 921. No. 94­1000. Virginia Gasoline Marketers & Automotive Repair Assn., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 220. No. 94­1013. Ojavan Investors, Inc., et al. v. California Coastal Commission. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1149 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 denied. Reported below: 26 Cal. App. 4th 516, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103. No. 94­1015. Gellert v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1019. Hernandez Torres et al. v. Negron Gaztam- bide. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 25. No. 94­1020. McLaughlin v. State Farm Mutual Automo- bile Insurance Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 30 F. 3d 861. No. 94­1022. McDermott International, Inc. v. Beasley et al. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 640 So. 2d 1326. No. 94­1023. Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 230 Conn. 525, 646 A. 2d 92. No. 94­1025. Unanue-Casal, aka Unanue v. Goya Foods, Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 561. No. 94­1027. Anderson et al. v. Douglas & Lomason Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1277. No. 94­1034. Lucas v. Hahn et al. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 Vt. 456, 648 A. 2d 839. No. 94­1035. Paterson Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hackensack Water Co. et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1036. Jackson v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1486. No. 94­1037. Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1491. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1150 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1038. Fleming v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1040. City of Dearborn v. Loschiavo et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 548. No. 94­1042. Wright v. Tackett et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 155. No. 94­1043. Kahan v. Seror. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 79. No. 94­1044. Berry et al. v. County of Sonoma et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­1046. East v. West One Bank, Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1047. Morgenstern v. Wilson et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1291. No. 94­1049. Houdek et al. v. Mobil Oil Corp. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 P. 2d 417. No. 94­1050. Hickey v. Attorney General of Illinois, as Intervenor on Behalf of the Illinois Department of Pub- lic Aid. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 263 Ill. App. 3d 658, 635 N. E. 2d 853. No. 94­1051. Papetti's Hygrade Egg Products, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1177. No. 94­1052. Gerijo, Inc. v. City of Fairfield. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 Ohio St. 3d 223, 638 N. E. 2d 533. No. 94­1054. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Bolivi- ana. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 148. No. 94­1058. Carter v. Burch. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 257. No. 94­1061. Jensen v. Brokaw, Chief Financing Division Agent, Small Business Administration. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1100. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1151 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­1062. McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 127. No. 94­1063. Klump v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­1064. Ma v. TRW, Inc. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 Cal. App. 4th 1834, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460. No. 94­1066. Ferrellgas, Inc., et al. v. Clay et al. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 118 N. M. 266, 881 P. 2d 11. No. 94­1072. Klauser et al. v. Burkes. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 309, 517 N. W. 2d 503. No. 94­1073. Transco Products, Inc. v. Performance Con- tracting, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 38 F. 3d 551. No. 94­1080. Kirschner, Director, Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, et al. v. Salgado et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179 Ariz. 301, 878 P. 2d 659. No. 94­1081. Wilkes v. Young et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1362. No. 94­1082. Golden v. El Camino Resources. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 561. No. 94­1084. Toliver v. Sullivan Diagnostic Treatment Center. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­1085. Lesnick, Individually and as Personal Rep- resentative of the Estate of Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 939. No. 94­1086. Britt v. Smith et al. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1152 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1087. Ross, aka Zakiya v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1067. No. 94­1088. Forrester et al. v. City of San Diego et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 804. No. 94­1089. City of Hamilton, Ohio, et al. v. Amalga- mated Transit Union, Local No. 738. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 70 Ohio St. 3d 210, 638 N. E. 2d 522. No. 94­1092. Shong-Ching Tong et al. v. Stanton. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1094. Reich, Secretary of Labor v. Continental Casualty Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 33 F. 3d 754. No. 94­1098. Scholesser v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 453. No. 94­1103. Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 939. No. 94­1106. Kearns v. General Motors Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1178. No. 94­1107. Salem Blue Collar Workers Assn. et al. v. City of Salem et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 33 F. 3d 265. No. 94­1110. Quillian v. Evatt, Commissioner, South Car- olina Department of Corrections, et al. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 315 S. C. 489, 445 S. E. 2d 639. No. 94­1111. Manges et al. v. Seattle-First National Bank et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1034. No. 94­1113. Hodges v. Huntsman. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 562. No. 94­1116. U. S. A. Direct, Inc., et al. v. North Ameri- can Communications, Inc. Ct. Common Pleas of Pa., York County. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1153 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­1117. Lopez v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 354. No. 94­1118. Knox v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 28. No. 94­1119. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al. v. Quackenbush, California Insurance Commis- sioner, et al.; and No. 94­1120. Century-National Insurance Co. et al. v. Quackenbush, California Insurance Commissioner, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 4th 216, 878 P. 2d 566. No. 94­1123. Bell et al v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 537 Pa. 558, 645 A. 2d 211. No. 94­1125. McGee v. Holmes County, Mississippi. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 631. No. 94­1126. One Times Square Associates Limited Part- nership v. Banque Nationale de Paris. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1502. No. 94­1129. Brau v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 94­1130. Teague et al. v. Bakker et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 978. No. 94­1132. Ciaffoni v. Cowden. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­1133. Dupuis v. Don Snell Buick, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 632. No. 94­1135. Sochia et ux. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 F. 3d 941. No. 94­1136. Tonn v. Forsberg et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1356. No. 94­1138. Taylor v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 M. J. 168. No. 94­1141. BP Performance Polymers, Inc. v. Ethyl Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 23. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1154 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1142. Galanis v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 49. No. 94­1144. Foote v. Hathaway. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 63. No. 94­1145. Milton v. Hullar et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 633. No. 94­1149. Shelley v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1150. Keener v. Exxon Co., USA, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 127. No. 94­1152. Singh v. California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­1153. Lucille v. City of Chicago. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 546. No. 94­1155. Hiatt v. Indiana State Student Assistance Commission. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 21. No. 94­1156. Ward v. Citibank, N. A., et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 App. Div. 2d 405, 608 N. Y. S. 2d 800. No. 94­1157. Crawford et al. v. Pee Dee Federal Sav- ings Bank. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1158. Brooks et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 141. No. 94­1159. Curtis v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 301. No. 94­1160. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 948. No. 94­1162. Marshall v. County of San Bernardino et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 59. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1155 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­1163. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1533. No. 94­1165. Burzynski v. Trustees of the Northwest Laundry and Dry Cleaners Health & Welfare Trust. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 153. No. 94­1168. Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele- graph Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 983 F. 2d 1573. No. 94­1169. Lunde v. Helms et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 367. No. 94­1171. Reshard v. Pena, Secretary of Transporta- tion (two cases). C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1174. Griffith v. Collier County, Florida, et al.; and No. 94­1177. Bishop et al. v. Collier County, Florida, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 635 So. 2d 145. No. 94­1176. Porter County Plan Commission et al. v. Marshall. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1215. No. 94­1179. Bowles v. Askew, Director of Admissions, Office of Bar Admissions, et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 520, 448 S. E. 2d 191. No. 94­1186. Blue Streak, Inc., et al. v. Gulf Island IV, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 743. No. 94­1195. Hall et al. v. Creative Games Technology, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 572. No. 94­1196. Wright v. Boulder Valley School District RE­2. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 P. 2d 215. No. 94­1205. County of San Diego et al. v. Schneider. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 89. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1156 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1211. Skeens v. Missouri. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 Md. App. 807. No. 94­1215. Trung Van Tran v. Oregon Department of Revenue. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 320 Ore. 170, 880 P. 2d 924. No. 94­1218. Stombaugh v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 208. No. 94­1224. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1539. No. 94­1225. Fitzgerald, Statutory Trustee Liquidator of Phoenix Systems International, Inc. v. Bayham et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1231. Caterina v. Blakely Borough et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1486. No. 94­1241. El Hani v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1280. No. 94­1259. Liegakos v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­1260. Webb v. Environmental Protection Agency et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1096. No. 94­5455. Madden v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 F. 3d 304. No. 94­5880. Albanese v. Peters, Director, Illinois De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 21. No. 94­5917. Duhamel v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1109. No. 94­6020. Nobles v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­6273. Clark v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 881 S. W. 2d 682. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1157 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­6274. Garcia Briseno v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6294. Weeden v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1223. No. 94­6328. Childress v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 498. No. 94­6361. Prajedes Arellano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6382. Wellons v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 117. No. 94­6386. Solomon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 961. No. 94­6481. Butler v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 872 S. W. 2d 227. No. 94­6492. Harvey v. Myers, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 106. No. 94­6510. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 127. No. 94­6610. Bailey v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ill. 2d 498, 639 A. 2d 1278. No. 94­6643. Hathaway et al. v. Minnesota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 976. No. 94­6694. Crane v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6701. Ibarra v. New Mexico. Ct. App. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 116 N. M. 486, 864 P. 2d 302. No. 94­6716. Reed v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 523. No. 94­6724. Dean v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 571. No. 94­6726. Cesar A. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1158 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6728. Gelis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­6732. Belin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 557. No. 94­6739. Wissinger v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 726, 643 A. 2d 710. No. 94­6745. Udala v. Office of Administrative Hearing Officer. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6762. Deninno v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 572. No. 94­6776. Turner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 981. No. 94­6789. Hannon v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 638 So. 2d 39. No. 94­6828. Parker v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1068. No. 94­6833. Pace v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1382. No. 94­6839. Sweeton et al. v. McGinnis et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1162. No. 94­6853. Camps v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 102. No. 94­6866. Judd v. Hansen, Judge, United States Dis- trict Court for the District of New Mexico. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­6876. Piper v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 611. No. 94­6931. Sanchez v. United States; and No. 94­7028. Chaviano v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1330. No. 94­6939. Thurman v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 59. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1159 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­6947. Hunt v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 127. No. 94­6958. Howard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 996 F. 2d 1232. No. 94­6968. Roncale v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 639. No. 94­6983. Spriggs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­7029. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 670. No. 94­7030. Fennie v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 648 So. 2d 95. No. 94­7031. Green v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 391. No. 94­7039. Bacon v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 337 N. C. 66, 446 S. E. 2d 542. No. 94­7062. Kleinschmidt v. Wehby. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 746. No. 94­7070. Garcia Piadares v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7074. Wiley v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 252. No. 94­7078. Mains v. Lira. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7079. Brooks v. O'Leary, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 56. No. 94­7087. Bleicken v. Coos County Superior Court. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7088. Berniard v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 625 So. 2d 217. No. 94­7089. McNair v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 So. 2d 353. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1160 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7090. Cooper v. Schriro, Director, Missouri De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 674. No. 94­7094. Sassi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 56. No. 94­7096. Cardona v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 361. No. 94­7102. Gomez v. Ahitow, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 1128. No. 94­7104. Macklin v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 1307. No. 94­7107. Scaife v. Hannigan, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1510. No. 94­7108. Wilson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7110. Alston v. Redman, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1237. No. 94­7112. Burks v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1424. No. 94­7114. Bell v. Klincar. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 568. No. 94­7115. Brown v. City of Louisville et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 54. No. 94­7124. Euell v. Rosemeyer, Superintendent, Pennsylvania State Correctional Facility at Greens- burg, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7130. Gallagher v. McNutt et al. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7131. Gasper v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1161 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7132. Gooden v. Brereton et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1092. No. 94­7134. Griffin v. Robinson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7135. Klopp v. Avco Lycoming Textron et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7137. Hurt v. Roe, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7139. Hines v. Seton Hall University et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7148. Lawrence v. Armontrout, Assistant Direc- tor, Missouri Division of Adult Institutions. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 662. No. 94­7150. Paschal v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7152. Warren v. Mississippi. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7153. Conway v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 Cal. App. 4th 385, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533. No. 94­7154. Smith v. Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7156. Fuller v. Schaefer, Governor of Mary- land, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­7157. Devier v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 F. 3d 1445. No. 94­7159. Williams v. Godinez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 252. No. 94­7161. Wesley v. Virginia. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1162 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7163. Beck v. Wheeler et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 24 F. 3d 244. No. 94­7165. Carter v. Endell, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7168. Engle v. Devoe. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7170. Wharton-El v. Hundley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 372. No. 94­7172. Sanders v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 317 Ark. 328, 878 S. W. 2d 391. No. 94­7173. Peppers v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7174. Shaw v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 93. No. 94­7175. Clifton v. Duncan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 58. No. 94­7176. Alphonso v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7178. Harris v. White, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7180. Towne v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7181. Schreyer v. Tattersall, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7185. Smith v. Oklahoma Department of Correc- tions et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 142. No. 94­7187. Clisby v. Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1054. No. 94­7188. Kendall v. Kendall. Ct. App. Wash. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 73 Wash. App. 1013. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1163 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7189. Smith v. Dahm, Superintendent, Omaha Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 138. No. 94­7202. Langford v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 267 Mont. 95, 882 P. 2d 490. No. 94­7203. Long v. Administrative Director of New Jersey Courts et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7204. Lin v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7207. Godaire v. Ulrich et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 633. No. 94­7208. Saunders v. Magnusson, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7211. Yocas v. Cowin et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 619. No. 94­7212. Cupit v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 532. No. 94­7214. Wilson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7216. Peraza Salgado v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7217. Wright v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7220. Brown v. Siegel, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1030. No. 94­7223. Smith v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 1319. No. 94­7226. Stephen v. United States District Court for the Southern District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7230. Plantz v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 P. 2d 268. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1164 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7231. Rhodes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 867. No. 94­7236. Jones v. Marshall, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7237. Hymans v. Western Bank, Taos. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7238. Iwuala v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­7243. Schwarz v. Utah State Tax Commission. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7244. Fondren v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1097. No. 94­7246. Jones v. Baker, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 566. No. 94­7250. Cosner v. Haws, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7251. Simms v. Braxton, Administrator, Occoquan Facility. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7253. Bey v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 137 N. J. 334, 645 A. 2d 685. No. 94­7259. Cassidy v. Michigan Department of Correc- tions. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7263. Russell v. Norandal USA, Inc., Scottsboro Division, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1125. No. 94­7264. Royster v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7265. Moore v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 325. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1165 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7266. LaFlamme v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1400. No. 94­7267. Moore v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 N. E. 2d 816. No. 94­7268. Perea v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7269. Paitsel v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7270. Damascus v. California Board of Dental Examiners. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7271. Crooks v. Evatt, Commissioner, South Caro- lina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 555. No. 94­7272. Davis v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1379. No. 94­7273. Njoku v. Schmidt. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 621. No. 94­7274. Lake v. County of Cattaraugus District Attorney's Office et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7275. Mann v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 231 Conn. 912, 648 A. 2d 158. No. 94­7279. Olson v. Cole, Attorney General of Alaska. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7280. Harris v. Schaefer, Governor of Maryland, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 51. No. 94­7283. Ross v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 230 Conn. 183, 646 A. 2d 1318. No. 94­7285. Morton v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1166 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7286. Perryman v. Prado, Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7287. Stewart v. United States; and No. 94­7404. Davidson, aka Brown v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 50 and 34 F. 3d 44. No. 94­7289. Martin v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 71 Ohio St. 3d 1411, 641 N. E. 2d 1110. No. 94­7291. Chichester v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 248 Va. 311, 448 S. E. 2d 638. No. 94­7292. Chivars v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1071. No. 94­7293. Raphlah v. Texas Board of Higher Educa- tion et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 94­7294. Partee v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1011. No. 94­7295. Michener v. ARA Health Services, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 Kan. App. 2d xxvi, 875 P. 2d 305. No. 94­7296. Adams v. Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7297. Kish v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Lorain County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7301. Chen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 25 F. 3d 1061. No. 94­7302. Southerland v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 316 S. C. 377, 447 S. E. 2d 862. No. 94­7304. Willcutt v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1195. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1167 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7305. Frazier v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Fairfield County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7311. Aloma v. United States; and No. 94­7489. Espinosa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 324. No. 94­7312. Brown v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 569. No. 94­7318. Ingram v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1047. No. 94­7320. Combs v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 69 Ohio St. 3d 1480, 634 N. E. 2d 1027. No. 94­7323. Smith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1407. No. 94­7325. Griffin v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7326. Hill v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 11 F. 3d 166. No. 94­7332. House v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7333. Felton v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 867. No. 94­7338. Nobles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 630. No. 94­7339. Old Chief v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1103. No. 94­7341. McBride v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7345. Thomas v. Humfield et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 566. No. 94­7347. Boreland v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1168 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7348. Voss v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1269. No. 94­7349. Bradley v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7350. Bridges v. Pittsburgh et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1240. No. 94­7352. Bell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­7353. Ardila-Calderon v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7356. Doe v. Gainer et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 Ill. 2d 15, 642 N. E. 2d 114. No. 94­7358. Oriakhi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1501. No. 94­7360. Murray, aka Hines v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7361. Banks v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1112. No. 94­7362. Bishop v. State Bar of Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7363. Calia v. Parker et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7364. Pemberton v. E. G. Lowry Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 89. No. 94­7365. Robinson v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7366. Chau Hai Do v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1507. No. 94­7367. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 131. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1169 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7368. Contreras v. Lungren, Attorney General of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7370. Irving v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 A. 2d 365. No. 94­7371. Burch v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7372. Ball v. Scott et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1509. No. 94­7374. Stephen v. Caughey et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7375. Monga v. Sommer. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 Mass. App. 761, 626 N. E. 2d 16. No. 94­7376. Larson v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7378. Ornelas-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7380. Porter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1104. No. 94­7381. Lacio v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7382. Russell v. Gunn, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7383. Stoner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­7384. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 480. No. 94­7385. Welch v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1098. No. 94­7386. Zuckerman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1174. No. 94­7387. Hallums v. Hambrick, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 566. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1170 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7389. Hickman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 630. No. 94­7390. Searle v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 636. No. 94­7391. Soria v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 630. No. 94­7392. Tasby v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 629. No. 94­7393. Seligsohn v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­7395. Foster v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­7396. Brito v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1189. No. 94­7397. McVey-Mehta v. Department of Commerce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1117. No. 94­7398. Vance v. Banks. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 Ohio App. 3d 475, 640 N. E. 2d 1214. No. 94­7399. Walker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1179. No. 94­7400. Basheer v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1460. No. 94­7402. Gonzalez v. Ocean County Board of Social Services et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1486. No. 94­7405. Blanchfield v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 A. 2d 787. No. 94­7407. Fermin et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 674. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1171 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7409. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1501. No. 94­7410. Carey v. Nagle, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7411. Cantu v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7414. Unger v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7415. Crowder v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 691. No. 94­7416. White v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1106. No. 94­7417. Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504 et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1501. No. 94­7418. Pigott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 569. No. 94­7420. Harris v. Hargett, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7421. Cuevas v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1089. No. 94­7422. Lorang v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 560. No. 94­7423. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1403. No. 94­7424. Connelly v. Grossman et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7426. Sapp v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 574. No. 94­7428. Williams v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1424. No. 94­7429. Steinmark v. United States; and No. 94­7601. Trainor v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 565. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1172 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7430. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 632. No. 94­7431. Rodgers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7432. Peshomme v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7433. Peddle v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­7435. Winters et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 720. No. 94­7437. Scott v. Hyundai Manufacture of Fountain Valley et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 645 So. 2d 454. No. 94­7438. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 355. No. 94­7439. Tierney v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Wash. App. 346, 872 P. 2d 1145. No. 94­7440. Thomas v. Metropolitan Dade County et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 878. No. 94­7441. Carter v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 P. 2d 1234. No. 94­7442. Crago v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 Ohio App. 3d 621, 639 N. E. 2d 801. No. 94­7443. Corrales-Quinceno v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7444. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1383. No. 94­7446. Banh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1173 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7447. Chapa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7450. Martinez v. New Mexico et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1105. No. 94­7451. Stephens v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 451. No. 94­7452. Williams v. United States Supreme Court et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7453. Rouse v. United States; No. 94­7496. Bryant et al. v. United States; and No. 94­7521. Ward v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­7454. Fitch v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 127. No. 94­7456. Martin v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7457. McDaniel v. Cody, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1509. No. 94­7458. Gowen v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1466. No. 94­7459. Felion v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1501. No. 94­7461. Locke v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1507. No. 94­7462. Arce v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 561. No. 94­7463. Harris v. Richardson, Commissioner of In- ternal Revenue. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 26 F. 3d 1186. No. 94­7465. Kramer v. University of Pittsburgh et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1487. No. 94­7466. Clifton v. Suburban Cable Television Co., Inc., et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 434 Pa. Super. 139, 642 A. 2d 512. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1174 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7467. Brewer v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7468. Courtney v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­7469. Dilley v. Gunn et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7472. Yamamoto v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7473. Williams v. Kincheloe, Superintendent, Spring Creek Correctional Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1508. No. 94­7474. Theodoropoulos v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1173. No. 94­7475. Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1094. No. 94­7476. White v. Wilkinson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7477. Buckley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1106. No. 94­7478. Bussell v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 882 S. W. 2d 111. No. 94­7479. Sever v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7481. Gossage v. Oldenkamp et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1187. No. 94­7482. Ewing v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­7483. Hogan v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 P. 2d 1157. No. 94­7484. Rickman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 511. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1175 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7486. Morritz v. Government of Israel. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7487. Krupp v. Neubert, Administrator, Bayside State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7488. Johanson v. Whitley, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 89. No. 94­7490. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1352. No. 94­7491. Randall v. Golden, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7493. Meyers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 566. No. 94­7495. Lilly v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1222. No. 94­7497. Austin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1514. No. 94­7498. Arias-Santos v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­7499. Arterberry v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1193. No. 94­7500. Sharp v. Virginia State Bar. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7501. Hilarios-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 562. No. 94­7502. Cestnik v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 904. No. 94­7503. Calderon-Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 636. No. 94­7504. Cabral-Castillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 182. No. 94­7506. Arevalo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1176 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7508. Sloane v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 568. No. 94­7510. Real-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 632. No. 94­7515. Garcia v. United States; No. 94­7534. Fuentes v. United States; and No. 94­7661. Nieto v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 568. No. 94­7516. Jones v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 633. No. 94­7519. Bustamante Lomas v. United States; and Perez-Estrada v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1191 (first case); 46 F. 3d 1148 (second case). No. 94­7522. Dawson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1099. No. 94­7525. Williams v. Meese, Former Attorney Gen- eral, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 563. No. 94­7527. Egwuonwu v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 637. No. 94­7529. Clark-Rubin v. Ohio State University Hos- pitals, Inc. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7531. Ditter v. Clarke, Director, Nebraska De- partment of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1393. No. 94­7532. Borromeo v. Johnson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1175. No. 94­7533. Escobedo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 562. No. 94­7535. Dabney v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7538. Reynolds v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mo- berly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1177 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7539. Kovack v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1242. No. 94­7540. Kenney v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1245. No. 94­7541. Massey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7544. Fiel et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 997. No. 94­7546. Ayers v. Taylor et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1465. No. 94­7548. Allison v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 850. No. 94­7549. Banks v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 161 Ill. 2d 119, 641 N. E. 2d 331. No. 94­7550. Adams v. Melnick/Nickel et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1460. No. 94­7554. Oreto et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 739. No. 94­7555. Rutledge v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 998. No. 94­7559. Krause v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 324. No. 94­7560. King v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 610. No. 94­7561. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 569. No. 94­7562. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 635. No. 94­7563. Ables v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7564. Hicks v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 610. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1178 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7565. Hill v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1241. No. 94­7566. Harper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 60. No. 94­7569. Mitchell v. Maass, Superintendent, Ore- gon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 571. No. 94­7572. Jordan v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 712. No. 94­7575. Lanier v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 641 So. 2d 879. No. 94­7576. Schoolfield, aka KB­X v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 132. No. 94­7577. Valentine, aka Neton, aka Newton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1070. No. 94­7578. Wilhelm v. Scott, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7583. Prioleau v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1236. No. 94­7584. Simmons v. Iowa. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1478. No. 94­7587. Austin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1054. No. 94­7590. Richmond v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 418. No. 94­7591. Smith v. Lamar, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7599. Ortiz v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 610. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1179 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7600. Ray v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 610. No. 94­7602. Turner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1179. No. 94­7605. McMurray et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1405. No. 94­7606. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1229. No. 94­7607. Martinez-Estrada v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7609. Neal v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1035. No. 94­7611. Jackson v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7613. Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 644. No. 94­7618. Snow v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 P. 2d 291. No. 94­7624. Connors v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 37 F. 3d 1486. No. 94­7633. McHenry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­7634. McKenzie v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1496. No. 94­7637. Cahoon v. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7638. Thorpe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1095. No. 94­7639. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­7643. Callahan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1213. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1180 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7644. Nieves v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 46 F. 3d 1119. No. 94­7647. Salas-Muniz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 319. No. 94­7648. Spencer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1179. No. 94­7650. Alexandre v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 388. No. 94­7653. Viscaino-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1516. No. 94­7654. Long Crow v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1319. No. 94­7655. Shuler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7656. Anderson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7658. Fruth v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 649. No. 94­7659. Lubben v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1219. No. 94­7662. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1386. No. 94­7665. Chapa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 319. No. 94­7667. Claybrook v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7671. Paul v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1490. No. 94­7673. Serrano v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7674. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 1473. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1181 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7675. Lezine v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1189. No. 94­7676. Kalinowski v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1533. No. 94­7677. Santana-Lopez, Charged as Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1190. No. 94­7679. Armour v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­7680. Stein v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1407. No. 94­7685. Tai Tan Duong v. United States; and No. 94­7721. Chi Thien Duong v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 570. No. 94­7688. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1294. No. 94­7689. Pike v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1011. No. 94­7690. Powers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 572. No. 94­7695. Ashley v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 678. No. 94­7696. Eley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 319. No. 94­7697. Negrin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 324. No. 94­7701. Puentes v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1171. No. 94­7705. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 324. No. 94­7706. Thurston v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 324. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1182 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7707. Yannott v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 999. No. 94­7708. Umana v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7709. Wright v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 568. No. 94­7711. Johnson et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 265. No. 94­7712. Leal et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 577. No. 94­7713. Clary v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 709. No. 94­7714. Cimino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 635. No. 94­7716. Pugh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 573. No. 94­7717. Moore v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 320. No. 94­7718. Farr v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7719. Farmer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 133. No. 94­7726. Stackhouse v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­7727. Jenson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1502. No. 94­7728. Wayno v. Commissioner of Internal Reve- nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 12 F. 3d 1111. No. 94­7729. Woody v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 431. No. 94­7746. Falls v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1178. 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1183 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 No. 94­7749. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 320. No. 94­7756. Sheek v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1245. No. 94­892. C. W., by Her Guardian ad Litem, McKinley v. Wasiek. Super. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 433 Pa. Super. 167, 640 A. 2d 427. No. 94­920. Calderon, Warden, et al. v. Siripongs. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1308. No. 94­922. Michigan v. Anderson. Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 446 Mich. 392, 521 N. W. 2d 538. No. 94­1076. Ritz, Assistant Attorney General of Colo- rado v. Gagan. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 35 F. 3d 1473. No. 94­972. Tri-State Machine, Inc. v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of Hanley C. Clark and National Association of Insurance Commissioners for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 309. No. 94­987. WMX Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Canadian General Insurance Co. et al. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 138 N. J. 106, 649 A. 2d 379. No. 94­1079. United Technologies Corp. et al. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 96. No. 94­1033. Computer Curriculum Corp. v. Instruc- tional Systems, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of Na- 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1184 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 1995 513 U. S. tional Association of Manufacturers et al. and Computing Technol- ogy Industry Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 813. No. 94­1099. CPC International, Inc. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1176. No. 94­1121. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re- ported below: 35 F. 3d 1435. No. 94­1124. Hensler v. City of Glendale. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of National Association of Home Builders for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 4th 1, 876 P. 2d 1043. No. 94­1137. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Thorn Apple Valley, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of Michigan Association of Insurance Companies et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 371. No. 94­7254. Barber v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 889 S. W. 2d 185. Opinion of Justice Stevens, respecting the denial of the peti- tion for writ of certiorari. On occasion it is appropriate to restate the settled proposition that this Court's denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the merits. United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923). See also Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 940, 942­946 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari). In this case, for example, there are valid reasons for the Court's decision to deny review. But this does not mean petitioner's challenge to his death sentence, based in part upon the trial judge's definition of an aggravating circumstance, lacks merit. Under the trial court's instruction, a jury could find an aggravating circumstance sufficient to impose the death penalty merely by concluding that a murderer's state of mind was " `wicked or morally corrupt.' " Pet. for Cert. 3. Because such a state of mind is a characteristic of every murder, the instruction 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1185 513 U. S. February 21, 1995 is plainly impermissible under this Court's holdings in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428­429 (1980) (striking down instruction allowing jury to find aggravating circumstance if murder was " `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman' "), and Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 363­364 (1988) (" `especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel' "). No. 94­7589. Klinger et al. v. Nebraska Department of Corrections et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of National Women's Law Center et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 727. No. 94­7623 (A­512). Burdine v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre- sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Rehearing Denied No. 93­1140. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia et al., ante, p. 1056; No. 93­6735. Goines et al. v. James et al., 510 U. S. 1057; No. 93­8976. Kent v. Bechtel Group, Inc., ante, p. 830; No. 94­622. Greene v. South Carolina Election Commis- sion et al., ante, p. 1017; No. 94­639. McKenna v. United States, ante, p. 1002; No. 94­5005. Stearman v. City of Greenville, Texas, et al., ante, p. 879; No. 94­5038. Stearman v. United States, ante, p. 933; No. 94­5470. Stankowski v. New Jersey, ante, p. 949; No. 94­5684. Greer v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 936; No. 94­5868. Pew v. Cox, ante, p. 969; No. 94­6199. Miller v. United States, ante, p. 977; No. 94­6201. Love v. Stalder, Secretary, Louisiana De- partment of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 1022; No. 94­6251. Englert v. Small Business Administration, ante, p. 1086; No. 94­6348. Jamerson v. California, ante, p. 1025; No. 94­6358. Diaz Lopez v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc., et al., ante, p. 1025; No. 94­6391. In re Smith, ante, p. 1075; No. 94­6455. Watson et al. v. Farlow et al., ante, p. 1047; No. 94­6465. Alderman v. Thomas, Warden, ante, p. 1061; 513ORD$$2m 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1186 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 21, 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­6512. Roy v. University of Hawaii et al., ante, p. 1062; No. 94­6547. Clark v. Maryland, ante, p. 1048; No. 94­6569. Long v. Louisiana, ante, p. 1062; No. 94­6645. Farr v. Davis et al., ante, p. 1063; No. 94­6650. McDowell v. United States, ante, p. 1031; No. 94­6669. Van Hook v. Ohio, ante, p. 1063; No. 94­6700. Judd v. Gonzales, Secretary of State of New Mexico, ante, p. 1089; No. 94­6744. Hartford v. Arizona Department of Eco- nomic Security, ante, p. 1090; No. 94­6774. Corrigan v. United States, ante, p. 1063; No. 94­6796. Betka v. Smith et ux., ante, p. 1092; No. 94­6798. Chatters v. Thurman, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1092; No. 94­6811. Brown v. Nobles, ante, p. 1093; No. 94­6812. Burley v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., ante, p. 1093; No. 94­6930. Thakkar v. DeBevoise, ante, p. 1097; No. 94­6952. Hensler v. United States, ante, p. 1098; No. 94­6998. Brown v. McGinnis, Director, Michigan De- partment of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 1099; No. 94­7284. In re Roemer, ante, p. 1109; and No. 94­7355. In re Bond, ante, p. 1109. Petitions for rehear- ing denied. No. 94­793. Eick v. United States, ante, p. 1059; No. 94­5204. Hines v. Rocha, Warden, ante, p. 890; and No. 94­6557. Greene v. Phelps et al., ante, p. 1062. Mo- tions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. February 27, 1995 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 94­1170. Johnson et al. v. American Airlines, Inc., et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment va- cated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, ante, p. 219. Reported below: 261 Ill. App. 3d 622, 633 N. E. 2d 978. No. 94­6308. Robinson v. Arvonio, Superintendent, East Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of peti- 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1187 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of O'Neal v. McAninch, ante, p. 432. Re- ported below: 27 F. 3d 877. Miscellaneous Orders No. - ­ ­­­. Wheeler v. United States. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied. No. D­1461. In re Disbarment of Weinfeld. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 923.] No. D­1468. In re Disbarment of Laudani. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 997.] No. D­1470. In re Disbarment of Rocker. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1037.] No. D­1471. In re Disbarment of Niles. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1472. In re Disbarment of Cullen. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1473. In re Disbarment of Bostic. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1054.] No. D­1474. In re Disbarment of Murphy. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1475. In re Disbarment of Kincaid. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1476. In re Disbarment of Gibbes. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1477. In re Disbarment of Dawkins. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1038.] No. D­1479. In re Disbarment of King. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1039.] No. D­1482. In re Disbarment of Knight. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1039.] 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1188 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. D­1483. In re Disbarment of Morin. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1039.] No. D­1484. In re Disbarment of Altschul. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1055.] No. D­1505. In re Disbarment of Beitler. It is ordered that Roger Beitler, of Sun City, Cal., be suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1510. In re Disbarment of Watson. It is ordered that John E. Watson, of St. Petersburg, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1511. In re Disbarment of Zeltzer. It is ordered that J. Jerry Zeltzer, of Miami Beach, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1512. In re Disbarment of Pels. It is ordered that Kenneth Anthony Pels, of Washington, D. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1513. In re Disbarment of Polansky. It is ordered that Stanley Polansky, of Babylon, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1514. In re Disbarment of Mazer. It is ordered that Lawrence Mazer, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1515. In re Disbarment of Simone. It is ordered that Robert F. Simone, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1189 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1516. In re Disbarment of Kent. It is ordered that Michael Gayhart Kent, of Huntingtown, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1517. In re Disbarment of Provine. It is ordered that Leon Eggleston Provine, of Grenada, Miss., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1518. In re Disbarment of Gouiran. It is ordered that Emile E. Gouiran, of Paris, France, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 94­7636. In re Gaydos. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Petitioner is allowed until March 20, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. No. 94­7917. In re Branch. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 94­7574. In re Williams; and No. 94­7598. In re Adams. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 94­1139. Government Employees Insurance Co. et al. v. Duane. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1036. Certiorari Denied No. 93­9434. McGahee v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 632 So. 2d 981. 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1190 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­847. Wexler v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 117. No. 94­852. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bap- tiste. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 433. No. 94­989. Sam Brown Co. v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 F. 3d 1259. No. 94­1002. Zaia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 567. No. 94­1010. National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. CNA Insurance Cos. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 28 F. 3d 29. No. 94­1012. Manville Sales Corp. et al. v. Equal Em- ployment Opportunity Commission et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 27 F. 3d 1089. No. 94­1026. Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 65. No. 94­1048. National Football League et al. v. Sulli- van; and No. 94­1206. Sullivan v. National Football League et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1091. No. 94­1070. General Electric Co. et al. v. Ingram et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 717. No. 94­1147. Video Visions, Inc., et al. v. Konstam, Direc- tor of Law for City of Mansfield, Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Richland County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1148. Huppeler et al. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 245. No. 94­1166. Scarfia v. Travelers Indemnity Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1383. No. 94­1167. Kachina Plywood, Inc., et al. v. Hurt. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 130. 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1191 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 No. 94­1172. Skyline Lodge, Inc. v. Delaney et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 Ohio App. 3d 264, 642 N. E. 2d 395. No. 94­1178. Sultenfuss v. Snow et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 1494. No. 94­1180. Harbold v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 262 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 635 N. E. 2d 900. No. 94­1181. Starnes v. Capital Cities Media et al. (two cases). App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­1184. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc. v. Cray Communications, Inc., fka Dowty Communications, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 390. No. 94­1185. City of Chanute et al. v. Williams Natural Gas Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 31 F. 3d 1041. No. 94­1189. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 671 N. E. 2d 836. No. 94­1190. Fisher v. Fitt et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 1236. No. 94­1192. Jenkins v. Weis. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 868 P. 2d 1374. No. 94­1193. Thomure v. Phillips Furniture Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 1020. No. 94­1194. Sardy v. Hodge, Executrix of the Estate of Hodge, Deceased. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 264 Ga. 548, 448 S. E. 2d 355. No. 94­1197. Davis v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 260 Ill. App. 3d 176, 631 N. E. 2d 392. No. 94­1198. Dreksler v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 259 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 674 N. E. 2d 1280. 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1192 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­1199. Zisk v. High Street Associates. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 Conn. App. 922, 643 A. 2d 311. No. 94­1201. Blankenburg et al. v. Corbin, Trustee and Fiduciary of the Pattern & Model Makers' Association of Warren & Vicinity Pension Fund (Defined Benefit). C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 650. No. 94­1232. Ohio Savings Bank v. Estate of Popp. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 Ohio App. 3d 640, 641 N. E. 2d 739. No. 94­1265. Wolverine, Ltd., et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 39 F. 3d 1190. No. 94­1274. Martinson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 353. No. 94­1275. Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 37 F. 3d 216. No. 94­1279. McElroy v. United States; Duchinsky v. United States; Owens v. United States; Martz v. United States; and Hebert v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 M. J. 368 (first case); 41 M. J. 375 (second and third cases); 42 M. J. 9 (fourth case); 41 M. J. 376 (fifth case). No. 94­1282. Ward v. University of Tennessee et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1183. No. 94­6175. Emery v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 881 S. W. 2d 702. No. 94­6460. Ward v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 F. 3d 1355. No. 94­6612. James v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7020. Dandridge v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 773. 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1193 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 No. 94­7092. Vanterpool, aka Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. No. 94­7119. Weeks v. Jones, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 F. 3d 1030. No. 94­7122. Salcido v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 1244. No. 94­7136. Huffstetler v. French, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1209. No. 94­7142. Hernandez Perez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1403. No. 94­7147. Rutledge v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 671. No. 94­7419. Gutierrez v. Toombs, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7494. Musgrave v. Welborn, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7505. Sloan v. Wilkinson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1214. No. 94­7507. Parish v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 645 So. 2d 910. No. 94­7509. Pizzo v. Whitley, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7512. Satcher v. Netherland, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7514. Snyder v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7517. Nicholas v. Wright, Superintendent, Clal- lam Bay Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1103. No. 94­7520. Muhammad, aka Williams v. Hawley, War- den, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1194 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7523. Brookings v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor- ida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7528. Dixon v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7536. Carter v. Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, Second Judicial Department. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7537. Mayes v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 P. 2d 1288. No. 94­7542. Chambers v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 261 Ill. App. 3d 123, 633 N. E. 2d 123. No. 94­7543. Jackson v. Rochester Housing Authority et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7545. Bond v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 So. 2d 674. No. 94­7551. Cooper v. Riggs et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7556. Spencer v. Groose, Superintendent, Jeffer- son City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1101. No. 94­7558. Pledger v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7567. Brooks v. Ford Motor Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 565. No. 94­7571. Slavin v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 84 N. Y. 2d 863, 642 N. E. 2d 327. No. 94­7592. Ollie v. Rosemeyer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Greensburg. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7593. Watkins v. DiPaolo, Superintendent, Massa- chusetts Correctional Institution. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1484. 513ORD$$2n 09-12-99 14:59:09 PGT*ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1195 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 No. 94­7594. Blameuser v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 258 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 674 N. E. 2d 955. No. 94­7596. Johnston v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 640 So. 2d 1102. No. 94­7597. Ayers v. Smith et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 45 F. 3d 425. No. 94­7608. Luton v. Grandison, Superintendent, Chil- licothe Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 44 F. 3d 626. No. 94­7615. McGuire v. Schriro, Director, Missouri De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7616. Diaz v. McClellan, Superintendent, South- port Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7617. Gumpl v. Wilkinson et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Lorain County. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7640. Vey v. Colville et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 94­7700. Keys v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 F. 3d 668. No. 94­7722. Harris v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7740. Rishor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 51 F. 3d 284. No. 94­7741. Scott v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 28 F. 3d 1487. No. 94­7757. Quintero v. United States; No. 94­7787. Rodriguez v. United States; and No. 94­7848. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1317. No. 94­7758. Cunningham v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 28 F. 3d 117. 513ORD Unit: $PT2 [01-06-00 06:53:13] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1196 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7759. Jeffery v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 63. No. 94­7761. Jefferson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7762. McManus v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 474. No. 94­7763. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 94­7766. Morrell et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 F. 3d 1223. No. 94­7767. Lowery v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1172. No. 94­7769. Jeffries v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1182. No. 94­7771. McCray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 325. No. 94­7772. Longstreet v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7773. McQueen v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1182. No. 94­7775. McNair v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7780. Espinoza-Padilla v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 F. 3d 1403. No. 94­7781. Huff v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1496. No. 94­7783. Ogungbe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1189. No. 94­7784. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1190. No. 94­7792. Calverley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 160. 513ORD Unit: $PT2 [01-06-00 06:53:13] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1197 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 No. 94­7793. Clemons v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 1217. No. 94­7795. Curtis v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 94­7798. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 856. No. 94­7805. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 F. 3d 1509. No. 94­7806. Wilder v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1497. No. 94­7807. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1179. No. 94­7809. Thornton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1104. No. 94­7817. Lomask v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1189. No. 94­7828. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 320. No. 94­7829. Trotter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 F. 3d 389. No. 94­7835. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 442. No. 94­7837. Benitez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 F. 3d 1489. No. 94­7838. Jeanes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 1501. No. 94­7841. Roney v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1190. No. 94­7842. Staudt v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 185 Wis. 2d 916, 520 N. W. 2d 290. No. 94­7843. Fillmore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 F. 3d 638. 513ORD Unit: $PT2 [01-06-00 06:53:13] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1198 OCTOBER TERM, 1994 February 27, 1995 513 U. S. No. 94­7845. Rosales v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 1190. No. 94­7847. Harris v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 95. No. 94­7849. Harris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 30 F. 3d 132. No. 94­7865. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7866. Carballo-Menendez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 F. 3d 323. No. 94­7868. Kreutzer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 36 F. 3d 1103. No. 94­7876. Keel v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 337 N. C. 469, 447 S. E. 2d 748. No. 94­7879. Viola v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 33 F. 3d 50. No. 93­1098. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Woltering, Ad- ministrator of the Estate of Grace, Deceased. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Motion of National Marine Manufacturers' Associa- tion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 245 Ill. App. 3d 684, 615 N. E. 2d 86. No. 94­981. O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to clarify or amend petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 F. 3d 872. No. 94­1188. American President Lines, Ltd., et al. v. Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Assurance- foreningen Skuld et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 F. 3d 1244. No. 94­7552. Cooper v. National RX Services. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 35 F. 3d 577. 513ORD Unit: $PT2 [01-06-00 06:56:21] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1199 513 U. S. February 27, 1995 No. 94­7657. Linehan v. Harvard University. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 29 F. 3d 619. Rehearing Denied No. 93­8730. Giles v. Alabama, 512 U. S. 1213; No. 94­662. City of Henderson et al. v. Nevada Enter- tainment Industries, Inc., et al., ante, p. 1078; No. 94­803. Knighten v. Cave & McKay et al., ante, p. 1080; No. 94­5747. Ledford v. Georgia, ante, p. 1085; No. 94­6038. Wilkerson v. Whitley, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1085; No. 94­6112. Ford v. United States, ante, p. 1085; No. 94­6415. Queen v. Texas, ante, p. 1115; No. 94­6479. Mikkilineni v. Amwest Surety Insurance Co. et al.; Mikkilineni v. Chester et al.; Mikkilineni v. Borough of Forest Hills; and Mikkilineni v. Glenn Engi- neering & Associates, Ltd., et al., ante, p. 1047; No. 94­6480. Mikkilineni v. Borough of Forest Hills, ante, p. 1047; No. 94­6661. Hutto v. North American Van Lines, ante, p. 1088; No. 94­6692. Doe v. Iowa et al., ante, p. 1089; No. 94­6747. Simonson v. Simonson, ante, p. 1090; No. 94­6783. Kiskila et ux. v. Business Exchange, Inc., et al., ante, p. 1092; No. 94­6841. Witcher v. Witcher, ante, p. 1094; No. 94­6863. Cassidy v. Industrial Indemnity Co. et al., ante, p. 1095; No. 94­6870. Williams v. United States Postal Service et al.; and Williams v. National Association of Letter Carriers of the USA et al., ante, p. 1095; No. 94­6928. Leaphart v. Commissioner of Internal Rev- enue, ante, p. 1097; No. 94­7019. Wishon v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, ante, p. 1100; and No. 94­7046. Anderson v. Department of the Air Force et al., ante, p. 1100. Petitions for rehearing denied. 03-07-98 20:43:03 513BV$1301 Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 1301. The numbers between 1199 and 1301 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish in-chambers opinions with permanent page numbers, thus making the official citations available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 513us1IC1Z 03-10-98 17:43:15 PAGES IC1301PGT OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN CHAMBERS IN RE DOW JONES & CO., INC. on application for stay No. A­369. Decided December 5, 1994 The application of Dow Jones & Co., Inc., for a stay of the Court of Ap- peals' November 3, 1994, order filed "under seal," so that Dow Jones can publish and report on the order and its contents, is moot. A later order in which the Court of Appeals denied Dow Jones' motion for reconsider- ation and discussed the November 3 order and its contents was not filed "under seal." Chief Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice. On November 3, 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for Appointing Independent Counsels, issued an order denying Dow Jones & Company, Inc.'s (Dow Jones) "Motion for Disclosure of and Access to Report of Former Independent Counsel Robert B. Fiske." That order was filed "under seal," apparently to prohibit Dow Jones from publishing or reporting on the order or its contents. Dow Jones subsequently filed a mo- tion to unseal the November 3, 1994, order (which has not been ruled on) and a motion for reconsideration of the No- vember 3, 1994, order. On November 22, 1994, Dow Jones filed in this Court an emergency application for stay of the November 3, 1994, order, seeking permission only to publish and report on the Court of Appeals' order and its contents. The following day, the Court of Appeals denied Dow Jones' previously filed mo- tion for reconsideration by an order in which it discussed the November 3, 1994, order and its contents, and gave its rea- 1301 513us1IC1H 03-10-98 17:43:15 PAGES IC1301PGT 1302 IN RE DOW JONES & CO. Opinion in Chambers sons for refusing to release the report of Independent Coun- sel Fiske. This order was not filed "under seal," and there is no indication that Dow Jones is prohibited from reporting on or publishing this order. Because Dow Jones may report on and publish this second order, which refers to the Novem- ber 3, 1994, order and its contents, I believe that Dow Jones' emergency application for stay is moot. 513US2IC2Z 12-13-96 17:09:22 PAGES IC13PGT OCTOBER TERM, 1994 1303 Opinion in Chambers O'CONNELL, guardian ad litem for BABY BOY RICHARD v. KIRCHNER on application for stay No. A­555. Decided January 28, 1995* Applications by the guardian ad litem for Baby Boy Richard and by his adoptive parents are denied. In seeking to recall the Illinois Supreme Court's mandate and to stay that court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing that Richard's custody be transferred to his natural father, they argue that no writ of habeas corpus ordering a change in custody can be issued absent a full and fair hearing because Richard has a constitutional liberty interest in remaining with his adoptive parents and they have a liberty interest in maintaining their relationship with him. However, this argument cannot succeed. The underlying liberty interests have already been the subject of exhaustive proceedings in the Illinois courts, culminating in the decision that Richard's biological fa- ther is entitled to present custody. The habeas corpus proceeding from which the adoptive parents now seek relief adjudicated no new substan- tive rights, but merely enforced the mandate of the prior decision. Ac- cordingly, applicants have received all the process due them under fed- eral law. Justice Stevens, Circuit Justice. The guardian ad litem for Baby Boy Richard and his adop- tive parents have filed with me in my capacity as Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit applications to recall the man- date of the Illinois Supreme Court and to stay that court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing that custody of Baby Boy Richard be transferred to his natural father. The decision implements an earlier judgment entered by the Illi- nois Supreme Court, see In re Petition of Doe, 159 Ill. 2d 347, 638 N. E. 2d 181 (1994); two months ago, this Court denied a petition for certiorari seeking review of that judg- ment, ante, p. 994. *Together with No. A­558, Doe et al. v. Kirchner, also on application for stay. 513US2IC2Z 12-13-96 17:09:22 PAGES IC13PGT 1304 O'CONNELL v. KIRCHNER Opinion in Chambers The applications are based on a procedural due process theory that Baby Boy Richard has a constitutionally pro- tected liberty interest in remaining in the family of John and Jane Doe, his adoptive parents, and that the Does have a liberty interest in maintaining their relationship with Rich- ard. Under this theory, no writ of habeas corpus ordering a change in the child's custody could be issued absent a full and fair hearing. I accept the representation in footnote 5 of the Does' application that this claim was presented to the Illinois Supreme Court, at least as to the rights of the adop- tive parents. I must therefore assume that the state court passed upon this claim and that this Court has jurisdiction. I have concluded, however, that the claim cannot succeed. The underlying liberty interests the applicants claim have already been the subject of exhaustive proceedings in the Illinois courts, culminating in the Illinois Supreme Court's decision last year. The result of those proceedings was a determination that the biological father was entitled to pres- ent custody. The habeas corpus proceeding from which the adoptive parents now seek relief was an execution of the court's prior decision, ordering the adoptive parents to sur- render custody "forthwith." That order adjudicated no new substantive rights, but merely enforced the mandate of the prior decision. Accordingly, applicants have received all the process due them under federal law. The adoptive parents also claim that Illinois law requires an additional hearing in these circumstances. But the high- est court in the State apparently disagrees; for if applicants correctly described their state-law entitlement, the Supreme Court of the State would have ordered the hearing they seek. I have no authority to review that court's interpreta- tion of the law of Illinois. Finally, the regrettable facts that an Illinois court entered an erroneous adoption decree in 1992 and that the delay in correcting that error has had such unfortunate effects on innocent parties are, of course, not matters that I have any authority to consider in connection 513US2IC2Z 12-13-96 17:09:22 PAGES IC13PGT Cite as: 513 U. S. 1303 (1995) 1305 Opinion in Chambers with the dispositions of the pending applications for federal relief. Accordingly, both stay applications are denied. It is so ordered. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) I N D E X ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS. See Habeas Corpus, 3. ADMIRALTY. Jurisdiction-Tort liability for flood damage.-A Federal District Court had admiralty jurisdiction to determine, and limit extent of, re- spondent's tort liability for flood damage allegedly caused by its negligence in replacing piles in a riverbed above an underground freight tunnel. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., p. 527. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, 2; Federal Rules of Evidence. ADOPTION. See Stays, 1. ADVISORY JURY VERDICTS. See Constitutional Law, I. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967. Relief for discriminatory discharge-Later discovered legitimate dis- charge grounds.-An employee discharged in violation of ADEA is not barred from all relief when, after her discharge, employer discovers evi- dence of wrongdoing that, in any event, would have led to her discharge on lawful and legitimate grounds had employer known of it. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., p. 352. AGENCY. See National Bank Act. AGRICULTURE. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. AID FOR FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN. See Case or Controversy. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1970. Pre-emption of state regulation.-Act's pre-emption provision bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, but allows room for state-court enforcement of contract terms set by parties themselves. American Air- lines, Inc. v. Wolens, p. 219. ALABAMA. See Constitutional Law, I. AMTRAK. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. ANNUITIES. See National Bank Act. 1307 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1308 INDEX ARBITRATION. See Federal Arbitration Act. ATTORNEYS. See Supreme Court, 1. BANKS. See National Bank Act. BAN ON HONORARIA. See Constitutional Law, III, 1. CALIFORNIA. See Case or Controversy. CAPITAL MURDER. See Constitutional Law, I; Habeas Corpus, 3. CASE OR CONTROVERSY. See also Stays, 2. Ripeness-Change in Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro- gram.-This case, in which California AFDC recipients challenge a Cali- fornia law that would limit new residents, for first year they live in Cali- fornia, to AFDC benefits paid in State from which they came, is not ripe for review because Department of Health and Human Services approval is required for payment differential to take effect. Anderson v. Green, p. 557. CERTIORARI PETITIONS. See Federal Election Campaign Act. CHILD CUSTODY. See Stays, 1. CHILDREN'S EXPLOITATION. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. CIVIL JUDGMENTS. See Vacatur. COMMERCE. See Federal Arbitration Act; Interstate Commerce Act. COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Federal Arbitration Act. COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY. See National Bank Act. CONSISTENT OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS. See Federal Rules of Evidence. CONSPIRACY. See Criminal Law, 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Federal Arbitration Act; Habeas Corpus; Taxes. I. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Capital sentencing scheme-Weight accorded advisory jury verdict.- Alabama's capital sentencing statute, which vests sentencing authority in trial judge but requires him to "consider" an advisory jury verdict, is not rendered unconstitutional by its failure to specify weight judge must give to jury's recommendation. Harris v. Alabama, p. 504. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1309 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued. II. Due Process. Discriminatory taxes-Relief.-Georgia failed to provide a meaningful "clear and certain" remedy, consistent with due process and McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Busi- ness Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, for income taxes it collected from federal, but not state, retirees in violation of Federal Constitution. Reich v. Col- lins, p. 106. III. Freedom of Speech. 1. Ethics in Government Act of 1978-Honoraria ban.-Insofar as § 501(b) of Act prohibits Federal Executive Branch employees below grade GS­16 from accepting honoraria for making appearances or speeches or writing articles, it violates First Amendment. United States v. Treasury Employees, p. 454. 2. Government-created corporation as Government actor.-Where Federal Government creates a corporation by special law for furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of corporation's directors, corporation is part of Gov- ernment for First Amendment purposes. Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, p. 374. 3. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977- Scienter requirement.-Because term "knowingly" in 18 U. S. C. § 2252 modifies that section's later phrase "the use of a minor," Act is not facially invalid under First Amendment as lacking a scienter requirement. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., p. 64. IV. States' Immunity from Suit. Bistate entity.-Respondent, a bistate entity created by New York, New Jersey, and Congress pursuant to Federal Constitution's Interstate Com- pact Clause, is not entitled to its parent States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Hess v. Port Authority Trans- Hudson Corporation, p. 30. CREDIT REGULATIONS. See Interstate Commerce Act. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964. See Supreme Court, 1. CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, I; III, 3; Habeas Corpus; Supreme Court, 1. 1. Drug conspiracy-Proof of an overt act.-Federal drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. § 846, does not require Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy. United States v. Shabani, p. 10. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1310 INDEX CRIMINAL LAW-Continued. 2. Federal Rules of Evidence and of Criminal Procedure-Admission of statements made during plea discussions.-A criminal defendant's agreement to waive Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) and Fed- eral Rule of Evidence 410, which exclude from admissibility against him statements made during plea discussions, is valid and enforceable, absent some indication of fraud or coercion. United States v. Mezzanatto, p. 196. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law, I. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. See Stays, 1. DEATH SENTENCES. See Constitutional Law, I. DEBT SECURITIES. See Taxes. DISABILITY BENEFITS. See Veterans. DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. DISCRIMINATION IN TAXING. See Constitutional Law, II. DISCRIMINATION ON ACCOUNT OF AGE. See Age Discrimina- tion in Employment Act of 1967. DRUGS. See Criminal Law, 1. DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II; Habeas Corpus, 2. EIGHTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, I. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, IV. EMPLOYEE PENSION PLANS. See Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Age Discrimination in Employ- ment Act of 1967; Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978. See Constitutional Law, III, 1. EVIDENCE. See Federal Rules of Evidence. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES. See Habeas Corpus, 2. EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS. See Supreme Court, 2. FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE. See Federal Rules of Evidence. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1311 FARMERS. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT. Written contract-Enforceability of arbitration provision.-Section 2 of Act-which makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in "a con- tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce"-should be read broadly as extending Act's reach to limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, p. 265. FEDERAL COURTS. See Vacatur. FEDERAL DEBT SECURITIES. See Taxes. FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT. Federal Election Commission's authority to file certiorari petition.- FEC lacks independent statutory authority to file a certiorari petition in this Court, and Solicitor General's "after-the-fact" authorization in this case did not relate back to date of FEC's unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, p. 88. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, III, 1. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. See Criminal Law, 2. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. See also Criminal Law, 2. Recent fabrication or improper influence or motive-Rebuttal using consistent out-of-court statements.-Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits introduc- tion of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before charged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being. Tome v. United States, p. 150. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1970. FILED RATE DOCTRINE. See Interstate Commerce Act. FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III. FLOOD DAMAGE LIABILITY. See Admiralty. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II; Habeas Corpus, 2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, III. FRIVOLOUS PETITIONS. See Supreme Court, 2. GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1312 INDEX HABEAS CORPUS. See also Stays, 1. 1. Constitutional error-Harmless-error determination.-A federal habeas court that (1) reviews a state-court criminal judgment, (2) finds a constitutional error, and (3) is in grave doubt about whether error is harm- less, should treat error as substantially and injuriously affecting verdict and grant relief. O'Neal v. McAninch, p. 432. 2. Exhaustion of state remedies.-Respondent failed to exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal habeas review, when he did not ap- prise state court of his claim that evidentiary rule he was challenging violated not only state law, but also due process under Fourteenth Amend- ment. Duncan v. Henry, p. 364. 3. Procedural bar-Actual innocence claim.-When a habeas peti- tioner facing execution raises an actual innocence claim to avoid a proce- dural bar to his constitutional claims, proper inquiry is whether constitu- tional violation has "probably" resulted in conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, p. 298. HARMLESS ERROR. See Habeas Corpus, 1. HONORARIA BAN. See Constitutional Law, III, 1. ILLINOIS. See Stays, 1. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Constitutional Law, IV. IMPROPER INFLUENCE OR MOTIVE. See Federal Rules of Evidence. IN FORMA PAUPERIS. See Supreme Court, 2. INJUNCTIONS. See Interstate Commerce Act. INTEREST INCOME AS TAXABLE INCOME. See Taxes. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Federal Arbitration Act; Inter- state Commerce Act. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT. Filed rate doctrine-Enforcement of credit regulations.-Filed rate doctrine does not bar ICC from obtaining injunctive relief to enforce its credit regulations in a manner that would prevent collection of a rate filed in a published tariff. ICC v. Transcon Lines, p. 138. INTERSTATE COMPACT CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, IV. JUSTICIABILITY. See Case or Controversy. LAWYERS. See Supreme Court, 1. MARITIME JURISDICTION. See Admiralty. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1313 MOOTNESS. See Stays, 2. MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1980. Withdrawal from underfunded plan-Calculation of interest.-Under Act, interest on amortized charge a withdrawing employer must pay to cover its fair share of a plan's unfunded liabilities begins to accrue on first day of plan year following withdrawal. Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., p. 414. MURDER. See Habeas Corpus, 3. NATIONAL BANK ACT. Annuities sales-National banks as agents.-Comptroller of Curren- cy's determination that national banks may serve as agents in sale of annu- ities is a reasonable construction of 12 U. S. C. §§ 24 Seventh and 92, and therefore warrants judicial deference. NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., p. 251. NEBRASKA. See Taxes. NEW JERSEY. See Constitutional Law, IV. NEW YORK. See Constitutional Law, IV. OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS. See Federal Rules of Evidence. OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONSPIRACIES. See Crimi- nal Law, 1. PATENTS. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. PENSION PLANS. See Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT OF 1970. Sale of seed for reproductive purposes.-Under Act-which extends patent-like protection to novel varieties of plants grown from seed-a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for purpose of replanting his own acreage. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winter- boer, p. 179. PLEA BARGAINS. See Criminal Law, 2. PORNOGRAPHY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. PRE-EMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS. See Airline Deregula- tion Act of 1970. PRIVATE SALE CONTRACTS. See Securities Act of 1933. PROCEDURAL BARS TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS. See Habeas Corpus, 3. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1314 INDEX PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION ACT OF 1977. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. PUBLISHED TARIFFS. See Interstate Commerce Act. RATES FOR TARIFFS. See Interstate Commerce Act. REPETITIOUS FILINGS. See Supreme Court, 2. REPRODUCTION OF PLANTS. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS. See Taxes. RESCISSION RIGHTS. See Securities Act of 1933. RIPENESS. See Case or Controversy. SALES OF ANNUITIES. See National Bank Act. SCIENTER REQUIREMENTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. Private sale contract.-Section 12(2) of Act-which gives buyers an express right of rescission against sellers who make material misstate- ments or omissions "by means of a prospectus"-does not extend to a private sale contract, since a contract and its recitations that are not held out to public are not a "prospectus" under Act. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., p. 561. SEED SALES. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. SETTLEMENTS. See Vacatur. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, IV. STATES' IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Constitutional Law, IV. STATE TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II; Taxes. STAYS. 1. Child's custody.-Applications to recall mandate of Illinois Supreme Court and to stay that court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing that custody of Baby Boy Richard be transferred from his adoptive par- ents to his natural father are denied. O'Connell v. Kirchner (Stevens, J., in chambers), p. 1303. 2. Mootness.-Dow Jones' emergency application for stay, seeking per- mission to publish and report on a Court of Appeals' order filed "under seal," is moot, since Dow Jones can report and publish a second order of 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1315 STAYS-Continued. same court, which referred to first order and its contents and was not filed "under seal." In re Dow Jones & Co. (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers), p. 1301. SUPREMACY CLAUSE. See Taxes. SUPREME COURT. See also Federal Election Campaign Act. 1. Application to withdraw as counsel.-Application to withdraw as counsel is granted where attorney appointed under Criminal Justice Act of 1964 filed a brief in Fourth Circuit concluding that no meritorious ap- peals issues existed and then filed withdrawal application before certiorari filing deadline in this Court. Austin v. United States, p. 5. 2. In forma pauperis filings-Repetitious filings.-Under this Court's Rule 39.8, pro se petitioner, who has filed numerous frivolous petitions with Court, is prospectively denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on all petitions for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters. In re Whitaker, p. 1. TARIFFS. See Interstate Commerce Act. TAXES. See also Constitutional Law, II. State taxes-Interest income on repurchase agreements involving fed- eral debt securities.-Nebraska's tax on interest income derived from re- purchase agreements involving federal debt securities is not prohibited by 31 U. S. C. § 3124 as a tax on "obligations of the United States Govern- ment" or by Supremacy Clause. Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewen- stein, p. 123. VACATUR. Civil judgments of subordinate courts.-Federal appellate courts should not, absent exceptional circumstances, vacate subordinate courts' civil judgments in cases that are settled after appeal is filed or certiorari sought. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, p. 18. VETERANS. Disability benefits-Fault-or-accident requirement.-Title 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3), which requires certain veterans' benefits claimants to prove that disability resulted from negligent VA treatment or an accident during treatment, is not consistent with plain language of controlling statute, 38 U. S. C. § 1151. Brown v. Gardner, p. 115. VIRGINIA. See Constitutional Law, II. WAIVER OF FEDERAL RULES. See Criminal Law, 2. WELFARE BENEFITS. See Case or Controversy. 513ind$$bv 02-13-98 20:01:48 PGT*INDBV (Bound Volume) 1316 INDEX WITHDRAWAL FROM PENSION PLANS. See Multiemployer Pen- sion Plan Amendments Act of 1980. WORDS AND PHRASES. 1. "A contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." Fed- eral Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 2. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dob- son, p. 265. 2. "An injury, or an aggravation of an injury [that occurs] as the result of." 38 U. S. C. § 1151. Brown v. Gardner, p. 115. 3. "Knowingly"; "the use of a minor." Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U. S. C. § 2252. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., p. 64. 4. "Obligations of the United States Government." 31 U. S. C. § 3124. Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, p. 123. 5. "Prospectus." § 12(2), Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2). Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., p. 561.