Cite as: 528 U. S. ____ (1999)        1

                            Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
               IN RE FREDERICK W. BAUER
  ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
               No. 99­5440.   Decided October 18, 1999

  PER CURIAM.
  Pro se petitioner Bauer seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court.  We deny this re-
quest as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8.  Bauer is allowed
until November 8, 1999, within which to pay the docketing
fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in
compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1.  We also direct the
Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or
petitions for extraordinary writs from Bauer in noncrimi-
nal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required
by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with
Rule 33.1.
  Bauer has repeatedly abused this Court's certiorari and
extraordinary writ processes.  On October 4, 1993, we
invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Bauer in forma pauperis status
with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ.  See
In re Bauer, 510 U. S. 807.  Prior to the Rule 39.8 denial,
Bauer had filed three petitions for certiorari and five
petitions for extraordinary writs, all of which were both
frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent.
Since the Rule 39.8 denial, Bauer has filed two petitions
for certiorari, both of which were also frivolous and denied
without recorded dissent.  The instant petition for man-
damus thus brings Bauer's total number of frivolous fil-
ings to 12.
  We enter the order barring prospective filings for the
reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).  Bauer's abuse
of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has



2                          IN RE BAUER

                       STEVENS, J., dissenting

been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction
accordingly.  The order therefore will not prevent Bauer
from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which
might be imposed on him.  The order will, however, allow
this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of
petitioners who have not abused our processes.

                                                  It is so ordered.

     JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
     For reasons previously stated, see  Martin v.  District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully
dissent.