Cite as: 528 U. S. ____ (1999)           1

                          Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
   JOHN B DEMPSEY v. RALPH MARTIN, DISTRICT
          ATTORNEY FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
  ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
             No. 99­5283.   Decided October 12, 1999

  PER CURIAM.
  Pro se petitioner Dempsey seeks leave to proceed  in
forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court.  We deny this
request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8.  Dempsey is
allowed until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the
docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his
petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1.  We
also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for
certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from
Dempsey in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the
docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his peti-
tions in compliance with Rule 33.1.
  Dempsey has abused this Court's certiorari and extraor-
dinary writ processes.  On October 5, 1992, we invoked
Rule 39.8 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with
respect to a petition for certiorari.  See Dempsey v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 506 U. S. 810.  At that time, Dempsey had
filed 11 petitions for certiorari and 1 petition for an ex-
traordinary writ, all of which were both frivolous and had
been denied without recorded dissent.  Since that time,
Dempsey has filed five petitions for certiorari, all of which
were also frivolous and denied without recorded dissent.
The instant petition for certiorari thus brings Dempsey's
total number of frivolous filings to 19.
  We enter the order barring prospective filings for the
reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)  (per curiam).  Dempsey's
abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary



2                      DEMPSEY v. MARTIN

                       STEVENS, J., dissenting

writs has been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our
sanction accordingly.  The order therefore will not prevent
Dempsey from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions
which might be imposed on him.  The order will, however,
allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the
claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

                                                  It is so ordered.

     JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
     For reasons previously stated, see  Martin v.  District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully
dissent.