Cite as: 528 U. S. ____ (1999)            1

                          Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KEITH RUSSELL JUDD v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT
         COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
                        TEXAS ET AL.
  ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
             No. 99­5260.   Decided October 12, 1999

  PER CURIAM.
  Pro se petitioner Judd seeks leave to proceed  in forma
pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court.  We deny this re-
quest as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8.  Judd is allowed
until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the docketing
fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in
compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1.  We also direct the
Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or
petitions for extraordinary writs from Judd in noncriminal
matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by
Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule
33.1.
  Judd has abused this Court's certiorari and extraordi-
nary writ processes.  On May 30, 1995, we invoked Rule
39.8 to deny Judd in forma pauperis status with respect to
a petition for an extraordinary writ.  See In re Judd, 515
U. S. 1101.  Prior to this Rule 39.8 denial, Judd had filed
six petitions for certiorari, all of which were both frivolous
and had been denied without recorded dissent.  Since the
Rule 39.8 denial, Judd has filed four petitions for certio-
rari, all of which were also frivolous and denied without
recorded dissent.  The instant petition for certiorari thus
brings Judd's total number of frivolous filings to 12.
  We enter the order barring prospective filings for the
reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).  Judd's abuse
of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has



2            JUDD v. UNITED STATES DIS. COURT FOR
                      WESTERN DIS. OF TEX.
                       STEVENS, J., dissenting

been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction
accordingly.  The order therefore will not prevent Judd
from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which
might be imposed on him.  The order will, however, allow
this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of
petitioners who have not abused our processes.

                                                  It is so ordered.

     JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
     For reasons previously stated, see  Martin v.  District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully
dissent.