Cite as: 528 U. S. ____ (1999)          1

                          Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    TEXAS ET AL.  v.  FRANÇOIS DANIEL LESAGE
                  AND UNITED STATES

   ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
    STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
            No. 98­1111.   Decided November 29, 1999

  PER CURIAM.
  Respondent François Daniel Lesage, an African immi-
grant of Caucasian descent, applied for admission to the
Ph. D. program in counseling psychology at the University
of Texas' Department of Education for the 1996­1997
academic year.  In the year Lesage applied, the school
received 223 applications for the program and offered
admission to roughly 20 candidates.  App. to Pet. for Cert.
A­22.  It is undisputed that the school considered the race
of its applicants at some stage during the review process.
The school rejected Lesage's application and offered ad-
mission to at least one minority candidate.  Lesage filed
suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief.  He
alleged that, by establishing and maintaining a race-
conscious admissions process, the school had violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Rev. Stat. §1977, 42 U. S. C. §1981, Rev. Stat. §1979,
as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1994 ed., Supp. III), and 78
Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d.
  Petitioners sought summary judgment, offering evidence
that, even if the school's admissions process had been
completely colorblind, Lesage would not have been admit-
ted.  At least 80 applicants had higher undergraduate
grade point averages (GPA's) than Lesage, 152 applicants
had higher Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores,
and 73 applicants had both higher GPA's and higher GRE
scores.  App. to Pet. for Cert. A­23.  In an affidavit, Pro-
fessor Ricardo Ainslie, one of two members of the school's



2                       TEXAS v. LESAGE

                           Per Curiam

admissions committee, stated that Lesage's personal
statement indicated that he had " `a rather superficial
interest in the field with a limited capacity to convey his
interests and ideas,' " and that his letters of recommenda-
tion were "weak."   Id., at A­24.  Ainslie stated that
Lesage's application was rejected early in the review
process, when the committee was winnowing the full
application pool to a list of 40.   Ibid.  The District Court
concluded that "any consideration of race had no effect on
this particular individual's rejection," and that there was
"uncontested evidence that the students ultimately admit-
ted to the program ha[d] credentials that the committee
considered superior to Respondent's."   Id., at A­26 to A­
27.  It therefore granted summary judgment for petitioners
with respect to all of Lesage's claims for relief.
     The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.  158
F. 3d 213 (1998).  The court did not review the District
Court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue as to
whether the school would have rejected Lesage under a
colorblind admissions process.  Instead, it held that such a
determination was "irrelevant to the pertinent issue on
summary judgment, namely, whether the State violated
Lesage's constitutional rights by rejecting his application
in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admis-
sions program."   Id., at 222.  An applicant who was re-
jected at a stage of the review process that was race con-
scious, the court reasoned, has "suffered an implied
injury"- the inability to compete on an equal footing.
Ibid.  Because there remained a factual dispute as to
whether the stage of review during which Lesage's appli-
cation was eliminated was in some way race conscious, the
court held that summary judgment was inappropriate and
remanded the case for trial.  Ibid.
     Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that summary
judgment was inappropriate on Lesage's §1983 action
seeking damages for the school's rejection of his applica-



                 Cite as: 528 U. S. ____ (1999)           3

                         Per Curiam

tion for the 1996­1997 academic year even if petitioners
conclusively established that Lesage would have been
rejected under a race-neutral policy, its decision is incon-
sistent with this Court's well-established framework for
analyzing such claims.  Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed.
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), even if the government has
considered an impermissible criterion in making a deci-
sion adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat
liability by demonstrating that it would have made the
same decision absent the forbidden consideration.  See id.,
at 287.  See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 593
(1998); Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518
U. S. 668, 675 (1996).  Our previous decisions on this point
have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected
First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimina-
tion, but that distinction is immaterial.  The underlying
principle is the same: The government can avoid liability
by proving that it would have made the same decision
without the impermissible motive.
  Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete
governmental decision as being based on an impermissible
criterion and it is undisputed that the government would
have made the same decision regardless, there is no cogni-
zable injury warranting relief under §1983.
  Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-
conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need
not affirmatively establish that he would receive the bene-
fit in question if race were not considered.  The relevant
injury in such cases is "the inability to compete on an
equal footing."  Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen.
Contractors of America v.  Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666
(1993).  See also  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.  Peña, 515
U. S. 200, 211 (1995).  But where there is no allegation of
an ongoing or imminent constitutional violation to support
a claim for forward-looking relief, the government's con-
clusive demonstration that it would have made the same



4                        TEXAS v. LESAGE

                           Per Curiam

decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any
finding of liability.
     Lesage's second amended complaint sought injunctive
relief and alleged that petitioners "have established  and
are maintaining, under color of the laws of the State of
Texas, an affirmative action admissions program at the
College of Education that classifies applicants on the basis
of race and ethnicity."  App. to Pet. for Cert. A­22 (empha-
sis added).  But in deciding that summary judgment was
improper, the Court of Appeals did not distinguish be-
tween Lesage's retrospective claim for damages and his
forward-looking claim for injunctive relief based on con-
tinuing discrimination.  Further, in their petition for
certiorari, petitioners assert that "[t]he case at bar differs
from  Adarand because there is no allegation that the
department of counseling psychology continues to use
race-based admissions subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's
Hopwood v. State of Texas[, 78 F. 3d 932, cert. denied, 518
U. S. 1033 (1996),] decision."  Pet. for Cert 13.  The brief in
opposition does not contest this statement.  It therefore
appears, although we do not decide, that Lesage has
abandoned any claim that the school is presently adminis-
tering a discriminatory admissions process.
     Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that petitioners
were not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's §1983
claim for damages relating to the rejection of his applica-
tion for the 1996­1997 academic year even if he would
have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy,
its decision contradicts our holding in  Mt. Healthy.  We
therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this respect.
     Lesage also asserted claims under 42 U. S. C. §§1981
and 2000d (Title VI).  Whether these claims remain, and
whether Lesage has abandoned his claim for injunctive
relief on the ground that petitioners are continuing to
operate a discriminatory admissions process, are matters



                 Cite as: 528 U. S. ____ (1999)                   5

                         Per Curiam

open on remand.  The case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                   It is so ordered.